J&K News and Discussion-2011

[RoyG]

Probably created a ruckus. These separatists are something else. They hate India but have no problem staying in its fancy hotels and enjoying its other comforts.

[Prasad]

Isn't it surreal how these issues are never discussed with vigour until a Namo comes up and puts out an in-your-face speech calling the bullshit of the seculars
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-bu ... -justadded

[ramana]

If a GOM can divide AP without the people's consent, a future GOM can integrate J&K to make it more wholistically developed.

Right now Kashmir MLAs are able to terrorise the Center and other regions.

Current US economic situation and embroilment in Asia means they dont have the gravity to support indepnedent kashmir.
TSP is an basketcase in many fronts.
So Kashmir terrorists of all types can think it over.
Do they want development or they want fiefdom?

[prahaar]

If a GOM can divide AP without the people's consent, a future GOM can integrate J&K to make it more wholistically developed.

Right now Kashmir MLAs are able to terrorise the Center and other regions.

Current US economic situation and embroilment in Asia means they dont have the gravity to support indepnedent kashmir.
TSP is an basketcase in many fronts.
So Kashmir terrorists of all types can think it over.
Do they want development or they want fiefdom?

Does 370 prohibit EC from conducting fresh delimitations in the state? If delimitation is not prohibited by 370, then at least the Assembly segments should be redrawn to reflect the current population distribution, that would be a first small but significant step. The leadership in J&K should realize that if one dispensation in GOI could abolish Privy purses, another one can abolish 370 as well.

[ramana]

Art 370 has benefitted National Conference party, Abdullah family accolytes, some Kashmiri Muslim elites only.
The average common J&K person has not benefitted.

It has harmed Kashmiri women who marry outside the state by denying their property rights.

So in addition to harming economic equity it also harms gender quity.

[kish]

Typical Propaganda by paki pasand sunni jihadis to stop the artillery exercises.

Old munitions wrecking Kashmiri lives

A vast and picturesque meadow called Tosamaidan, about 112 kilometers west of Jammu and Kashmir's capital Srinagar, has become the rallying point for hundreds of villagers who want an end to artillery exercises being carried out there by the Indian Army. Unintended detonation of the unexploded shells of Tosamaidan have been tearing apart the villagers' lives.

Reshma, a villager, lost her 19-year-old son Bilal Ahmad in 1997 to a shell explosion while he was playing around the meadow. "As a mother, I don't want to see children getting killed in like this," Reshma told IPS.

In 1964, the meadow spread over 152 hectares (375 acres) had been taken on lease by the Indian Army from the state government for 50 years. The lease period comes to an end next April, and the residents of more than 30 villages around Tosamaidan have started to campaign against its renewal.

They say the shells have resulted in heavy casualties and maimed hundreds of people, besides killing livestock and hitting the picturesque area's tourism potential

[member_20385]

Must read Shekhar Gupta on Kashmir and response of Syed Ata Hasnain

Shekar Gupta : National Interest: Disarming Kashmir
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/natio ... /1204466/0

Syed Ata Hasnain : ‘Victory’ in the Valley
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-vict ... /1206096/0

[nachiket]

^^Gen. Hasnain's writing skills are impressive. He has given Shekhar Gupta a slap on the face in the most polite manner possible.

[member_20385]

Audacity of Shekhar Gupta to comment on death of soldiers traveling in uniform after return from leave is amazing. Such comments show only thing - the total detachment from reality. Such people have never done any thing in life except writing. Any body involved in any complex man management operation realizes that issuing activity wise instructions to such large no. of people taking into account all possible circumstances is impossible. In any case Gupta has never seen Army jawans traveling. Their entitlement is second class or sleeper and they much be returning from their far flung villages. To travel with dignity, I have seen soldiers traveling in uniforms and this must be the most likely case.

[Sanku]

^^^ Neeraj ji; I am afraid you are wrong. Shekar Gupta got his creds covering operation Pawan. Some of his writings on that are very pro army and poignant. So his current nonsense has nothing to do with his grasp on reality. He has a very good understanding of reality, sure enough.

Including figuring out which side of the bread is buttered.

[Rahul M]

+1

[ramana]

SG claims to be strategic affairs analyst and student of military history all in one article and yet gets it all worng. Looks like he went ot JNU!!!

[vishvak]

Pakis wanted to reach Siachen first and Indian army could make it quicker is reason we have Siachen in first place. What does it say about paki adventures? That we are talking about Siachen with pakis is the biggest problem perhaps at cost of our own land!

There are such profound gaps in literature from most experienced editors only.

[ramana]

http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/ ... alley.html

and

**** ‘Victory’ in the Valley


Wed Dec 11 2013,
Syed Ata Hasnain
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-vict ... /1206096/0

Define what it means before you decide what the army should do.

For the first time in years, a newspaper's leadership has thrown up a serious strategic issue for debate. Kashmir is far too complex for inexperienced minds to fully comprehend and there are so many stakeholders it confounds even those who have a semblance of an idea. In a recent article in this paper ('Disarming Kashmir', IE, December 7, goo.gl/SWPD7G), Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta talks about victory in the 24-year standoff and the necessity of an early withdrawal of the army from Kashmir's hinterland. We must first highlight what Gupta is seeking through this thought-provoking article. He says the army has become weary and therefore less professional, having lost soldiers in tactical operations this year. He wants the army to strengthen the LoC and de-escalate in the Valley, because Kashmiris, he says, must get a part of the "peace" dividend. He takes a dig, saying that some respected general with five tenures in the Valley had told him that, having defeated the Lashkar, the army has only been building golf courses and guest houses for the last five years. He adds that if any of these bad boys show their faces in Kashmir again, the army can come back to sort them out. He claims that the military objective in Kashmir (if any was spelt out) has been achieved and, that the UPA government has veritably introduced a new concept of governance — veto power (on strategic decisions) for the army. One of the most important points Gupta makes is, "you cannot find a Kashmir settlement with Pakistan before embracing your own Kashmiris and restoring trust with them first".

On the face of it, this article evokes negatives all the way but re-reads throw up issues which need serious pondering. Unfortunately, not many are aware of the degree of intellectual analysis that the army itself has done of its role in Kashmir. It recently organised a full deliberation on the concept of victory at the Army War College, Mhow.

The first question is: have we ever enunciated an aim in Kashmir? In all these years, there never has been a clearly stated political aim given to the security forces. The informally stated military aim was stabilisation by controlling infiltration and eliminating terrorists. No one realises that in such situations, political and military aims cannot be separated. In 2011, we enunciated our own joint politico-military aim for our commanders — "integrate Jammu and Kashmir with mainstream India, politically, economically, socially and psychologically". We were clear that eliminating terrorists was the easiest part of this war, that eliminating "terrorism" was the real challenge. I wish Gupta had faulted the army for not demanding the articulation of a politico-military aim as fighting without an aim is actually unfair. The lack of such an aim results in exactly what Gupta has done — declaring victory prematurely. Victory has to be measured against an aim, or else all kinds of versions are thrown around. We also have to measure victory against a realistic assessment of the future. Afghanistan 2014 with all its imponderables looms before us; any idea of victorious peace and subsequent actions has to be connected to it. Incidentally, I am speaking of victory as not against the people of Kashmir but for them, and against the intent of Pakistan, the separatists and terror groups.

It is essential to explain a few things to those with limited military orientation. First, Kashmir is a case of rim-land insurgency. It is not the LoC alone that needs to be strong. In the event of conventional war with Pakistan, the hinterland of Kashmir is as important as the LoC. It is here that the strategic assets exist, along with strategic arteries, which can be choked in war. Remember, in each Indo-Pak war, Pakistan has depended on the Kashmiri people to rise against us. Second, the larger number of incidents, and the loss of brave soldiers, this year should make us re-evaluate the actual military situation in the Valley. Ironically, this is least important in assessing victory. In counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism campaigns, the answer finally lies in what the people think. Third, in all these years, no serious attempt was made to project to the Kashmiri people how and why their future lay only with India. The only agency that did this was the army. No government agency has ever put together a psychological campaign to win the confidence of the people. The army did it because it is a part of its professional responsibility and all international military counter-insurgency experience talks of winning hearts and minds (WHAM). The "hearts doctrine" articulated by the army in 2011-12 was the first strategically oriented WHAM programme in Kashmir. Separatism and radicalism run hand in hand in the Valley and it will take years of committed campaigning before these are diluted — the on and off presence of terror groups doesn't help. Who has the capability to strategise, plan and stay committed to such a campaign but the army? To presume that the army has done its job and should hand over the responsibility to civilian agencies is absolutely correct, provided there are agencies who can take it forward to "peace". If there is none, why rue the army's insistence that its work must not be undone? Twenty-four years of institutional wisdom need not be sacrificed in the urgency for declaring a premature victory.

A few other observations by Gupta are designed to provoke non-intellectual minds, but they deserve a brief comment. The number of soldiers lost in negative incidents in a year is never reflective of the capability of an army fighting terrorism. Moreover, the deployment of the regular army in the hinterland is at its minimum today. The army's Rashtriya Rifles (RR) operates in the hinterland and its soldiers never get exhausted because it has a well-thought-out relief programme. Tactical minds within the RR also rue their presence among the populace, to neutralise just a handful of terrorists each year. This really is the problem — a misunderstanding that the RR's task is to kill terrorists alone, and not recognising that the task of a counter-insurgency force is to cement the separatist population with the mainstream. There is something else that our countrymen need to know about the RR: the highly professional and experienced military force is our add-on resource for conventional operations, especially now that 110 wings of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (the country's virtual RR) have received operational experience and modern weaponry to make them force multipliers. That is a major reason why the RR cannot be disbanded or re-deployed for counter-insurgency tasks in Naxal-affected areas.

To claim victory over terror groups is premature also because the number of surrendered terrorists in the Valley (all with different shades of antipathy to the establishment) is much higher than the number of terrorists in holding camps and launch pads in PoK. None of the promises (by the state government or the police) to these surrendered terrorists has been fulfilled, creating a potential resource for home terror.

Gupta's most potent statement is, "Because its (the government's) politics is frozen, it has introduced an unprecedented new factor in Indian policymaking: a veto for the army". Seeking and giving professional military advice is a part of governance and on Siachen, Kashmir or Manipur, the army has offered just that. If you go by this accusation, every proposal by the army should have been accepted. In the case of Siachen, it is the trust deficit that prevents the vacation of the Saltoro Ridge; on the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, the government almost relented but the only organisation that offered a rationale for its retention was the army. Its arguments went well beyond the ordinary, explaining just how it was balancing hard and soft power in the emerging situation and just how the AFSPA was only an umbrella to be used in an emergency. The army likes a cemented victory and celebration for the people, not a half-baked one which gives adversaries reason for glee.

The general with five tenures in Kashmir who says the army is out of a job needs to revisit Kashmir. Not a single new golf course has come up and yes, guest rooms are indeed necessary to ensure that more armchair strategists visit Kashmir to be briefed at Keran, Machel, Gurez, Uri, Sopore, Tral and Shopian, before passing judgement on their professional army. Don't just visit Srinagar, Gulmarg and Pahalgam to make up your mind because the advice you will then proffer will never meet the professional needs of our army or that of our nation. Learn to trust your army — it is your army.



The writer, a recently-retired Lt. General, is a former general officer commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps

Thanks for the jhaapad to self proclaimed start expert and student of military history and not just any history!!!

Looks like honorable Editor was riding a wild 'coup' charger* egged upon by think tank chatteratti!

The biggest flaw or hamartia in Gupta's thnking is he thinks of Kashmiris as not Indians and the Army as an occupation force. This is what muddles his thinking.


* (using the saying "If wishes were horses....)

he should stick to political articles and not tilt at windmills.

[Paul]

There is something else that our countrymen need to know about the RR: the highly professional and experienced military force is our add-on resource for conventional operations, especially now that 110 wings of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (the country's virtual RR) have received operational experience and modern weaponry to make them force multipliers. That is a major reason why the RR cannot be disbanded or re-deployed for counter-insurgency tasks in Naxal-affected areas.

The following intrigued me. The FC looks like our version of the BSF, aparamiltary force.

Further more, it could be on the frontline of action against the TTP in Waziristan but Question would be what is the relationship between FC getting weaponry and the RR disbandment?

There may be a hidden nugget here.

[CRamS]

Must read Shekhar Gupta on Kashmir and response of Syed Ata Hasnain

Shekar Gupta : National Interest: Disarming Kashmir
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/natio ... /1204466/0

Syed Ata Hasnain : ‘Victory’ in the Valley
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-vict ... /1206096/0

My take. Shekar Gupta's subterfuge is nothing but the current latent, US and its Cong lackey inspired narrative, i.e., allow soft secession of Kashmir to TSP. And they do this very cleverly so as to mask the truth about the rabid Islmaist nature of the entire secessionist movement, the need to give TSP a new lease of life from US's PoV, and above all by saying India "won", "great power" BS, to assuage its H&D.

The good Colonel HasnainJi on the other hand gets down to the reality. India has not "won" the TSP-waged war. What we are seeing in the valley is a tactical pause in terror by TSP, and they can up the ante in a heart beat. TSP is waging a massive military, diplomatic, and psychological war to wrest the valley from India. If Indian army leaves the hinter lands as KMs demand, and supported by US and its lackeys, in a matter of days, HafeezPig will be in giving speeches in downtown Srinagar. Just witness the ease with which TSP crosses the LoC and takes out our guys. The point being that TSP has arrayed a massive force including pigLets ready to infiltrate the valley in a heartbeat. Furthermore, with secessionist scum in full vigor, it is very important that Indian army continue their presence so things don't get out of hand.

Bottom line: What we have in the valley is a tenuous stalemate between India on the one side and TSP and KMs on the other.

The national policy that Shekar Gupta says is missing is not about giving KMs more space so they can collude with TSP in their nefarious desire to secede, but rather how to make Kashmir a national symbol so that every Indian knows how important Kashmir is to Indian nationhood so we will never have any sell out discussions like MMSJi's 4-point formula with TSP. Kashmir will be won only when TSP is defeated or disintegrates.

[ramana]

Paul what LT Gen Hasnain is saying is TSP's FC by virtue of its operational experience and modern weaponry is a potent force and Gupta and his ilk asking for RR disbandment is a double blow for that would reduce the Army reserves. And note he calls the FC, a virtual RR rather than a BSF.

CRS, SG and his ilk are fifth column in the fourth estate.

[Paul]

Meanwhile Shukla Sahib weighs in on the debate.....

Winning and losing in Kashmir


Who gives Indian generals a veto on Kashmir policy? What would facilitate a thinning out of troops?

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 16th Dec 13

Two recent newspaper articles join issue over whether the army is opportunistically expanding its role in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) because of New Delhi’s failure to initiate political dialogue with the state. On Saturday, Shekhar Gupta argued in the Indian Express (‘Disarming’ Kashmir, December 7) that political stasis in New Delhi had effectively given the army a veto on Kashmir policy. This permitted the generals to scuttle essential political gestures like the revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), even though militancy was practically dead in the valley. Gupta suggests the army is empire building, provocatively recounting: “in the past five years, the army has built more new golf courses and guest houses in Kashmir than the number of encounters it's had to fight.” He says the army must give the Kashmiri people a peace dividend by curtailing operations in populated areas, and focus instead on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, where complacency has set in.

Four days later, the same newspaper published a counterview (‘Victory’ in the Valley, Dec 11) by Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain, until last year the army’s top general in Kashmir. Rebutting Gupta, Hasnain says the army is guided by a clear politico-military aim that it formulated in the absence of a political directive from New Delhi. He terms Gupta’s declaration of victory “premature”, since Kashmir remains vulnerable to a jihadi influx from Afghanistan after NATO’s drawdown next year. While active militancy has abated, many surrendered terrorists live in the valley, writes Hasnain. With government promises to them still unfulfilled, violence could recur. He says the army cannot hand over responsibility to the civilians because nobody in J&K can yet take on that role. Dismissing critics of the army as “armchair strategists”, Hasnain urges: “Learn to trust your army --- it is your army.”

There is common ground in these two viewpoints. Both agree that New Delhi has failed to articulate a political vision for J&K; and to issue a strategic directive that specifies security objectives for the army. Hasnain reveals that, “(T)here has never been a clearly stated political aim given to the security forces (in Kashmir).” He says not even a military aim has been spelt out in Kashmir.

Gupta and Hasnain primarily disagree on whether improved security in J&K allows the army to withdraw from a central role and restore power to the state administration. Gupta says the army should step back since terrorists “have been roundly defeated”. Hasnain straddles both sides of the argument, admitting that there is peace today but arguing that success must be gauged not by today’s calm but by tomorrow’s potential chaos. Demanding “a realistic assessment of the future”, Hasnain evokes the “imponderables” of post-2014 Afghanistan. Peace, he seems to argue, requires not just the elimination of every last militant today, but also certainty that no more would arrive tomorrow.

Not every general favours such caution. Lt Gen Rustom Nanavatty, the hugely respected former commander of the northern army, believes the army must know when its mission has been accomplished in counter-insurgency operations. In his recent book, Internal Armed Conflict in India, Nanavatty points out: “(N)o government can, simultaneously, claim a ‘vastly improved security situation on the ground’, and persist with an unaltered military presence and unchanged methods in the conduct of military operations. Continuing with military operations on the same size, scale, pattern and intensity as before makes a mockery of such claims.”

Why then does the army remain embroiled in counter-insurgency, denying itself a peace dividend even after expending blood and treasure in imposing calm? There is little evidence to support allegations that the army has a vested interest in keeping the pot boiling in J&K --- such as awards, promotions and loosely monitored intelligence budgets. The more likely reason, as Hasnain suggests, is that the army fears that civilian incompetence might fritter away its hard-won gains, reviving terrorism and requiring the army to do the job all over again.

Hasnain is on stronger ground in arguing that confining the army to the LoC carries operational risks because roads leading to the border areas run through the big towns, making them vulnerable to interdiction. The army has, in fact, already handed over law and order duties in population centres to the state and central police. But it insists on retaining AFSPA for dealing with any disruption of these lifelines.

“To win army support for relaxing AFSPA, or for partial demilitarisation, the state and central government must convince the army of their ability to control the state and maintain security,” says Nanavatty.

The key question then is: When can the state administration provide acceptable security in J&K? For two decades Kashmir’s politicians, bureaucrats and security agencies have ceded centre stage to the army, creating a highly militarised security environment. The generals will always oppose any dilution of security powers since the army focuses on hard risks, not ephemeral political benefits. New Delhi, which has always dealt with J&K more as a security problem than a political one, has no wish to assume the risks inherent in reducing the army’s profile. The potential downside --- a resurgence of militancy --- is daunting, while the upside --- six Lok Sabha seats --- is small change. So the UPA fires the gun from the army’s shoulder by allowing the generals to “veto” AFSPA. Remember, little heed is paid to the army in crucial matters like equipment modernisation, operational preparedness and the need for tri-service command.

Hasnain would raise eyebrows with his suggestion that the army was assuming political policy. He writes, “In 2011, we enunciated our own joint politico-military aim for our commanders --- ‘integrate Jammu and Kashmir with mainstream India, politically, economically, socially and psychologically.’”

The army lacks the mandate and resources to execute this broad aim, which clearly encroaches into the realm of politics and governance. Even so, this is not political meddling but the response of a goal-oriented military to a policy vacuum --- it simply steps in and assumes the role. A plethora of civil-military scholars like Samuel Finer and Amos Perlmutter have documented this phenomenon extensively. In the scrupulously apolitical Indian Army, this is not cause for alarm. Yet, a farsighted political leadership would look to create the political, administrative and security environment needed for reducing the army’s role in Kashmir.

Hasnain makes his most questionable argument almost in passing. He says the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) --- some 40-50,000 soldiers, organised into counter-insurgency units --- must never be disbanded, though the RR was sanctioned in the 1990s as a temporary force for counter-insurgency. Hasnain wants RR battalions to be treated as regular army units, since Pakistan’s Frontier Corps militia, which operates in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border, are capable of fighting alongside the Pakistan Army. Adding more and more battalions may have benefited a 19th century army, but would be a grave disservice to the modern-day Indian Army. With an unsustainable chunk of the army’s budget already going on manpower, and with 100,000 additional soldiers being added for defending the China border, numbers must be pared to leave funds for equipment modernisation.

Comments are telling.

[RoyG]

Please provide us the link Paul. Thanks.

[ramana]

AS has his head in place with an extra s.


As long as there is an external threat and the J&K govt is unable to counter it there is need for the Indian Army to have a counter-insurgency presnece.

Its like asking why is the US army in the Frontier West! Because the very real threat of native American raids on the settlers was there. Once the threat was neutralized, the US Army got sent ot barracks and donwsized till WWI.

[member_22872]

Please provide us the link Paul. Thanks.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2013/12/ ... 7190245157

[Anindya]

So much for the true face of kashmiriyat....

Sikhs Threatened to Embrace Islam or Leave Kashmir Valley

[Prem]

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-d ... y/1208937/
The drift in the valley
H S Panag

There has been a volatile reaction within the strategic community both for and against Shekhar Gupta's views in his article 'Disarming Kashmir' (National Interest, IE, December 7). The article focuses on the need for change in political and military strategy to break the current impasse in Jammu and Kashmir; politically through proactive engagement, emotional healing and empowerment of the people, and militarily by the removal of the AFSPA and reduction of military presence in the hinterland. Interestingly, Gupta makes change in the political strategy and commencement of the political process contingent upon a change in military strategy. But the armed forces cannot be blamed for the failure of the political process and poor governance. It is to their credit that they have performed despite the government never having defined strategic political aims and contingent strategic military objectives, and in so doing may, by default, have partly assumed the role of the government, leading to fears of status quo ante in the event of a "pullout" or major redeployment.

In this context, Clausewitz's quote on the relationship between political aims and military means is pertinent: "War is simply the continuation of political intercourse with addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase, 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace." Thus it is the government that must formulate the political strategy on which military strategy is contingent, and commit and de-commit its armed forces to war or counter-insurgency (CI).The absence of this process is the bane of strategic decision-making in India. The government never clearly defines its political objectives or approves contingent military objectives, leading to a situation of continuous strategic drift.
The primary focus of the reviewed military strategy should be counter-infiltration. Fifty per cent of RR Battalions must be redeployed to strengthen the counter-infiltration grid. The remaining 50 per cent must be readjusted to be responsible for the forest zones, and also constitute the CI reserve in the hinterland to be called upon as and when required. Active CI operations, particularly in the cities and villages, must be taken over by the CRPF and the JKP. Both should be reoriented and trained at Indian army battle schools. This strategy will also adequately cater to the anticipated surge post the US pullout from Afghanistan.

The AFSPA was selectively and progressively applied in J&K with effect from 1990. With the changed strategic situation, it must be selectively and progressively removed. A 10-15 km belt along the LoC, which has the tiered counter-infiltration grid, must be covered by the AFSPA. Its application must be progressively removed, except from the forest zones, as the JKP and CRPF are covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The AFSPA must automatically be applied to a selected area when the RR Reserve is called upon to operate. Innovative modified application can also continue along convoy routes. Let there be no doubt that the military's CI campaign in J&K has been a model campaign. But a change in political and military strategy is now imperative as there are no more military objectives to be achieved. The focus of the future CI campaign should be on counter-infiltration with adequate reserve and flexibility to deal with the unforeseen. There are no victories to be won against our own people, and the military is a political instrument of last resort which must be used in harmony with political objectives.

[hulaku]

So much for the true face of kashmiriyat....

Sikhs Threatened to Embrace Islam or Leave Kashmir Valley

I would take this report with a pinch of salt.

You know somewhere deep in the Kashmiri Muslim phsyce there is a deep fear of Sikhs. I wonder where that came from

There is an interesting case from a few years back from the neighbourhood I grew up in

An elderly Sikh couple has alleged harassment at the hands of land grabbers. They say they are being threatened to vacate their house in Srinagar.

Gajinder Singh Mann (76) and his wife Harbajan Kaur (73) said they bought the house two decades ago from its original owner in September 1989.

Talking to HT over phone, Mann said, “On Saturday evening some women entered our house followed by a few men and Amin Dar. He claims to be the owner of the house.”

“I am feeling threatened with the way things are happening here.”

The former president of the Srinagar Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and also president of Shiromani Akali Dal in Srinagar, Mann said, “We felt helpless, as we didn’t know how to tackle the crisis.”

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-new ... 21489.aspx

They still stay there well and secure.

[BijuShet]

X-post from Indo-US thread
From Rediff: US court releases Kashmiri separatist Ghulam Nabi Fai

December 26, 2013 18:27 IST

Kashmiri separatist leader Ghulam Nabi Fai was released early from a minimum-security penitentiary, thanks to a surprising motion moved by the prosecution.

He served only 16 months of a two-year sentence for conspiracy and violations of various tax laws pertaining to a nonprofit. Srinagar-born Fai, 64, was released from the Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, after Assistant United States Attorney Gordon Kromberg moved a motion November 15 calling for his prison sentence to be reduced.

Kromberg said Fai had provided information leading to the indictment of three individuals who had been funneling money from Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence into the US to propagate Pakistan’s causes through the Kashmiri American Council, the non-profit that Fai headed.
...

[Karan M]

So much for the true face of kashmiriyat....

Sikhs Threatened to Embrace Islam or Leave Kashmir Valley

I would take this report with a pinch of salt.

You know somewhere deep in the Kashmiri Muslim phsyce there is a deep fear of Sikhs. I wonder where that came from

There is an interesting case from a few years back from the neighbourhood I grew up in

An elderly Sikh couple has alleged harassment at the hands of land grabbers. They say they are being threatened to vacate their house in Srinagar.

Gajinder Singh Mann (76) and his wife Harbajan Kaur (73) said they bought the house two decades ago from its original owner in September 1989.

Talking to HT over phone, Mann said, “On Saturday evening some women entered our house followed by a few men and Amin Dar. He claims to be the owner of the house.”

“I am feeling threatened with the way things are happening here.”

The former president of the Srinagar Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and also president of Shiromani Akali Dal in Srinagar, Mann said, “We felt helpless, as we didn’t know how to tackle the crisis.”

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-new ... 21489.aspx

They still stay there well and secure.

Chattisinghpora shows that sikhs nay all minorities in the valley are at risk from jihadis if secforce presence winds down.

[anupmisra]

Mirwaiz-led Hurriyat expels prominent leaders.

Shabir Ahmad Shah [Democratic Freedom Party], Nayeem Ahmad Khan [National Front] and Mohammad Azam Inquilabi [Mahaz-e-Azadi] for their indiscipline, anti-Hurriyat activities and continued absence from meetings for the last over 18 months

The Mirwaiz confirmed having mailed a letter to the APHC’s PoK convener Yousuf Naseem on December 27, following the APHC executive council’s decision, with the direction that the representatives of some constituents may no longer be invited to the group’s meeting in Muzaffarabad.

Are they allowed to convene meetings across the border? Why?

[Gerard]

Kashmir deal was almost done

Dr. Singh, in a significant revelation, for the first time, publicly acknowledged that secret envoys from the two countries had almost arrived at an agreed resolution to end the conflict in Kashmir. “At one time it appeared an important breakthrough was in sight. However, in Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf had to make way for a different set of [leaders]. I think that led to the process not moving properly. However, I still believe that good relations between India and Pakistan are possible.”

[Sachin]

Any idea on what the "deal" was? Was it gifting entire J&K or only the K-Valley? MM Singh looks like a typical real estate broker.

[abhishek_sharma]

^^ here is some information

The most recent version of the nonpaper, drafted in early 2007, laid out several principles for a settlement, according to people who have seen the draft or have participated in the discussions about it. Kashmiris would be given special rights to move and trade freely on both sides of the Line of Control. Each of the former princely state’s distinct regions would receive a measure of autonomy-- details would be negotiated later. Providing that violence declined, each side would gradually withdraw its troops from the region. At some point, the Line of Control might be acknowledged by both governments as an international border. It is not clear how firm a commitment on a final border the negotiators were prepared to make, or how long it would all take; one person involved suggested a time line of about ten to fifteen years.

One of the most difficult issues involved a plan to establish a joint body, made up of local Kashmiri leaders, Indians, and Pakistanis, to oversee issues that affected populations on both sides of the Line of Control, such as water rights. Pakistan sought something close to shared governance, with the Kashmiris taking a leading role; India, fearing a loss of sovereignty, wanted much less power-sharing. The envoys wrestled intensively over what language to use to describe the scope of this new body; the last draft termed it a “joint mechanism.”

[NRao]

BJP wants PM to take nation into confidence on ‘almost done’ Kashmir deal

[Jarita]

More from Bhushan

Prashant Bhushan for referendum on Army's J&K deployment

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 451882.cms

[CRamS]

BJP wants PM to take nation into confidence on ‘almost done’ Kashmir deal

Why is DDM silent on this and not asking tough questions of MMS and Sonia?

[Shankk]

BJP wants PM to take nation into confidence on ‘almost done’ Kashmir deal

Why is DDM silent on this and not asking tough questions of MMS and Sonia?

I cannot say anything about ms. maino but you should give MMS some time. Remember the same was said about Narsimha Rao as well but now we know better.

[CRamS]

Its not a question about giving time to MMS, but on such a pivotal issue as J&K, media should ask some tough questions as to what this "almost done" deal with TSP was? Where is Bakara with her "we the people" commentary? Where is the devil's advocate? Is that not healthy thing to do in a democracy? The same DDM will pounce all over Modi or BJP for any alleged perceived blot on India's democracy. Where are all the pseudo secular Tearu Tejpals (I know he is rotting on jail, hopefully) and Shomeless and other so called "guardians of democracy"?

[chetak]

Its not a question about giving time to MMS, but on such a pivotal issue as J&K, media should ask some tough questions as to what this "almost done" deal with TSP was? Where is Bakara with her "we the people" commentary? Where is the devil's advocate? Is that not healthy thing to do in a democracy? The same DDM will pounce all over Modi or BJP for any alleged perceived blot on India's democracy. Where are all the pseudo secular Tearu Tejpals (I know he is rotting on jail, hopefully) and Shomeless and other so called "guardians of democracy"?

CRamS ji,

You are barking up the wrong tree.

All turds mentioned are part of the same malsi incestuous cesspool.

They are waiting to see which way the wind blows before showing their hand onlee.

Wary of MaMo coming to power.

[Prem Kumar]

Kashmir deal was almost done

Dr. Singh, in a significant revelation, for the first time, publicly acknowledged that secret envoys from the two countries had almost arrived at an agreed resolution to end the conflict in Kashmir. “At one time it appeared an important breakthrough was in sight. However, in Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf had to make way for a different set of [leaders]. I think that led to the process not moving properly. However, I still believe that good relations between India and Pakistan are possible.”

That's the "I almost got the Nobel Prize" moment for him. There's many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip - thankfully for India

[sunnyP]

Any idea on what the "deal" was? Was it gifting entire J&K or only the K-Valley? MM Singh looks like a typical real estate broker.

Joint sovereignty, demilitarisation, free movement of people and goods across the LOC and self governance. This was always what Mushy wanted. Then in a few year's they'd find a way to take J&K into their possession.

[arun]

The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) bears careful watching as comments made by one of their key member, Prashant Bhushan, makes them sound a trifle reluctant about securing Jammu & Kashmir and bit like the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s “B” team on J&K:

Prashant Bhushan wants referendum on Army presence in Kashmir, sees AAP govt at Centre

Meanwhile Arun Jaitley of the BJP weighs in :

Should National Security Issues be decided by a Local Referendum? 06 Jan, 2014

[CRamS]

Joint sovereignty, demilitarisation, free movement of people and goods across the LOC and self governance. This was always what Mushy wanted. Then in a few year's they'd find a way to take J&K into their possession.

Absolutely, the trick by TSP, its 3.5, and their friends like MMS, PB etc in India is to get TSP a legal foothold in the valley such that TSP's anal itch is alleviated for its services rendered in AfPak, India has to basically surrender the valley but with some H&D intact, and the rest of the valley grab by TSP takes place in slow motion behind the scenes. I recall that this "almost done deal" was hailed by Economist rag, WP etc.