Indian Army: News & Discussion

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krisna
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Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby krisna » 18 Aug 2011 21:04

Link to Previous thread--- viewtopic.php?f=3&t=5059&start=3960

Army gets 2 ex-CJIs to underline: Chief was born in 1951, not 1950
In an unprecedented move, the Army has sought the opinion of two former Chief Justices of India on the controversy over its Chief, Gen. V K Singh’s date of birth.
Both the former CJIs, Justice J S Verma and Justice G B Patnaik, have said that the government should factor in May 10, 1951, as his “correct” date of birth.


In his letter, Justice Verma has said that he has gone through all the records and has found the opinion given by the law ministry in February this year, that held Singh’s year of birth as 1951, as “very sound”.

Verma has also referred to Gen. Singh’s “not sparing even the highest in the armed forces for their involvement in the housing and land scams”. And has argued that if he has to step down before the “end of his legitimate tenure”, that would give “the public impression of silencing the voice of an inconvenient truth”.

Justice Verma disagrees. The impression that May 10, 1950 is the correct date of birth is “erroneous”, he has said. “In the prevailing environment of a crusade against corruption, supported by the union government with the Prime Minister repeatedly promising ‘zero tolerance’ to corruption, any injustice done to a high public functionary whose public image according to media reports is of combating corruption, is bound to erode the sincerity of this promise”.
Verma has also questioned the need of approaching the AG for another opinion after the law minstry had held that the correct year of birth is 1951. “I wonder what was the occasion for any further opinion on the subject unless someone concerned found it inconvenient to accept it,” the former CJI has written.


what is the problem with the current govt. sure would upset some other potential chiefs . viewtopic.php?p=1148999#p1148999
also the succession would change to Lt Gen KT Parnaik, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (northern command)

ASPuar
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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby ASPuar » 18 Aug 2011 23:26

Um.. thats a news article from June 1. Its old news.

ramana
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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby ramana » 19 Aug 2011 02:06

X-post....

SSridhar wrote:Game Theoretic Understanding of India-Pakistan Relations - IDSA Comment by Arvind Gupta



Look at the comments on Op Parakram in the above article. It was "no-war" War.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 19 Aug 2011 12:36

ramana wrote:X-post....

SSridhar wrote:Game Theoretic Understanding of India-Pakistan Relations - IDSA Comment by Arvind Gupta



Look at the comments on Op Parakram in the above article. It was "no-war" War.


ramana,

10 years from now when someone writes about Op. Parakram and what all transpired (militarily and politicaly), Op. Parakram will marked as watershed in terms of Indian Military Doctrine. IMO, if Sundarji transformed the IA to Offensive-Defense, Op. Parakram marked the shift to Offensive-Offense. Services, especially IA, learned very valuable lessons and has over the time, practised and perfected/in the process of perfecting and fine tuned, the SOP to implement this strategy. The concept of CSD has far higher ramifications then simply add teeth to Pivot Corps. It fuses Pivot Corps and Strike Corps in one fine mesh.

A lot is yet to be written about Op Parakram.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Surya » 19 Aug 2011 17:26

The AF also got 5 years of practice in that one period purely due to the coincidence of having formations together in one place.

Maybe someday some aviator will write about those hectic days.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby VinodTK » 20 Aug 2011 22:09

Deadly clash in Kashmir
Indian army officer and a dozen suspected fighters killed in battle along the de facto border that splits the territory.

An Indian army lieutenant and a dozen suspected fighters have been killed in a clash along the de facto border that splits Kashmir between India and Pakistan, the Indian army said.

The fighting erupted on Saturday in the northern Gurez district when a group of "heavily-armed militants tried to infiltrate" Indian administerd Kashmir from the Pakistani side of the divided territory, the army said.

"There were 12 terrorists who tried to cross over in a boat ... and the Kishen Ganaga River is a defacto line of control in some areas and during the gun battle six fell in the river and six others were killed on the shore," Lt. General JS Brar, the Indian army spokesman, told Al Jazeera.

He said that the six who fell into the river during the gun fight, would not have survived "the fast torrent and the depth of this river" and would have inevitably drowned.

Brar said that the operation was significant because it was the biggest attempt to infiltrate this year.

"More (fighters) will try over the next few months ... but we are monitoring the area closely and we will kill them"

"They are desperate to infiltrate because they have not been able to infiltrate over the past few months. Their identities have not been confirmed but they are likely to foreigners, in other words, Pakistani. And though there are a couple of groups operating in the valley and we do not want to pre-empt and speculate which group they might have been involved with".

India says it regularly intercepts fighters sneaking into Indian Kashmir to fight New Delhi's rule in the Himalayan region.
:

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby abhishek_sharma » 21 Aug 2011 07:00


Shishir
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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Shishir » 21 Aug 2011 18:50


VinodTK
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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby VinodTK » 22 Aug 2011 06:12

Delhi ready to counter Beijing's border might
:
Government sources said the Pannagarh-based corps (around 15,000 combat troops) will include a Ranchi-based formation, which is currently part of the Mathura-based 1 Corps. This means that the army will raise two more divisions in the coming years to replenish the Mathura Corps and another to add to the Pannagarh formation. For this purpose, the army has earmarked 6,000 acres of land in Pannagarh, which has a functioning air force strip and is located 150 km from Kolkata.

Already a battalion and a tank regiment, which will be part of the armoured brigade, have been moved to Sikkim.
:

andy B
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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby andy B » 22 Aug 2011 07:13

^^^ Rohit ul armoured land lubberi appreciate some inputs on the above...

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby abhishek_sharma » 22 Aug 2011 07:28

Image


rohitvats
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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 22 Aug 2011 12:33

VinodTK wrote: <SNIP> Government sources said the Pannagarh-based corps (around 15,000 combat troops) will include a Ranchi-based formation, which is currently part of the Mathura-based 1 Corps. This means that the army will raise two more divisions in the coming years to replenish the Mathura Corps and another to add to the Pannagarh formation. For this purpose, the army has earmarked 6,000 acres of land in Pannagarh, which has a functioning air force strip and is located 150 km from Kolkata.

Already a battalion and a tank regiment, which will be part of the armoured brigade, have been moved to Sikkim.
:


This is the lungi dance moment.....dhig chika,dhing chika,dhig chika,dhing chika,de de de!!!

OK. Here is a short analysis:

- This new Corps HQ is likely to be the Eastern Command reserve. But the choice of location is interesting; I had thought that new Reserve Corps would be east of Siliguri Corridor for beefing up the NE proper along with IV and III Corps.

- May be, one may see another Corps raised for NE proper; IMO, we need additional Corps there at a minimum.

- The first impression one gets, given the location of this Corps, is that it will be used to back up 33 Corps in Sikkim and if situation so warrants, for Western and Central Bhutan. It can form a continuum between 33 Corps in Sikkim to west and IV Corps in Tejpur to east.

- Armored brigade for Sikkim - if one Armored and one Mechanized Regiment are already in place, we need another two Armored Regiments + one medium arty regiment+ support elemetns for the brigade to reach (I) Armored Bde level standard.

- (I) Infantry Brigade for Barahoti (Barahoti is in eastern Uttarakhand along LAC towards Nepal border) - Sometimes back, there was a news report which stated that two new independent infatry brigades had been authorized for Uttarakhand and Ladakh, respectively. This news item may well refer to the same. Here, it is important to understand that Uttarakhand already has one (I) Independent Infantry Bde. and 6 Mountain Division in Bareilly will also come in, in case of shooting match with PLA.

- In case, this is in addition to earlier announcement, well, Uttarakhand will have three (I) Infantry Bdes - which seems unlikely though. Because, why not raise another Div HQ rather than have three (I) Infantry Bdes?

- The Ranchi based formation to form part of this new Corps is 23 Infantry Division. As the article says, with 23 ID gone to new Corps, I Corps needs another Division.

- Armored Bde for Ladakh - this is the real lungi dance stuff. This is something which has been proposed for a long time. This will give good offensive/defensive capability to the XIV Corps. An (I) Infantry Bde has already been authorised earlier; what we need now is another Division - the AOR of 3 Infantry Div is just too vast.

-We have positioned tanks in the region in the past and in case, people remember, there was a news item which spoke about BRO widening the Srinagar-Leh road to accomodate T-90 trailers. The two news items may be linked.

- 3 ID in Leh has a single Mechanized Regiment, the new armored brigade will augment this capability. In addition, 3 ID may see another Mechanized Regiment added to it.

Added later:

This new Corps HQ with two new divisions will lead pretty interesting options of IA on western border. :twisted:

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby chandanus » 22 Aug 2011 13:57

With what new stuff will these new divisions will be equipped ???

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby chetak » 22 Aug 2011 16:24

Received by email.


Indian Army and Independence

Lt Gen SK Sinha

In this season of revoked interest in the events leading and following India’s independence, I am sure this anecdotal and first hand narrative would be of interest to you.

“The Army’s contribution to India’s Independence and its role during the Partition of the Sub-Continent, have not received much attention. As one who served in the Army before and after Independence, as also witnessed the Partition holocaust, I would like to place on record my recollections of that period. My views on these two aspects of our Nation’s history are based on my personal experience and not on any erudite research.

I joined the British Indian Army during the Second World War and continued serving in the Army of Independent India. Having served in Burma (now Myanmar) and Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia), I returned home to India and landed in Calcutta (now Kolkata). I was in an army transit camp on 16 August 1946 when Jinnah launched his Direct Action Day. The Muslim League Premier of Bengal, Suhrawardy faithfully carried out the genocide in which thousands got killed in Kolkata, followed by killings and abductions in Noakhali. The calling out of the Army in Kolkata was deliberately delayed by Suhrawardy to allow the hoodlums to carry out their mayhem. I witnessed the streets of Kolkata strewn with mutilated dead bodies. Violence in the city abated after the Army was deployed to restore order.

A couple of weeks later, I was posted to the Military Operations Directorate of General Headquarters (now Army Headquarters) at Delhi. This Directorate had hitherto been an exclusive British preserve. All the officers and clerks were British.
I joined the Directorate in September 1946 along with two other Indian officers, Lt Col (later Field Marshal) Manekshaw and Major Yahya Khan, later President of Pakistan. We were allocated to three different sections of the Directorate, Manekshaw to Planning, Yahya to Frontier Defence and I to Internal Security. At that time as part of internal security duties, the Army was fully preoccupied in combating unprecedented communal violence. Never had the Army been used so extensively in this role. From my perch at Delhi I got a grandstand view of the cycle of communal violence taking place in the country. Kolkata- Noakhali killings were followed by mass killings of Muslims in Bihar and Garhmukteshwar.

The Unionist Ministry then in power in Punjab and the Congress Ministry in NWFP had managed to keep their provinces free of large scale communal violence. In March 1947 a Muslim League Ministry came to power in Punjab and a little later also in NWFP.

The floodgates of communal violence of the worst type now raged all over North India from Delhi and beyond. Muslims and non-Muslims (Sikhs and Hindus) were matched evenly in Punjab.

Both sides perpetrated the worst type of savagery. The entire population of the region appeared to have gone beserk. Towards the end of July, it was decided to have a Punjab Boundary Force of 50,000 soldiers comprising equal number of units earmarked for India and Pakistan. Major General Pat Rees took over as the commander of this Force. Two Indian Brigadiers, one Hindu remaining in India and the other Muslim going to Pakistan, were appointed his deputies. This experiment did not succeed. Within a month, the Punjab Boundary Force had to be disbanded. The two Dominions took over responsibility for maintaining order in their respective territories.

On our side, a new skeleton Command Headquarters, called Delhi and East Punjab Command, was set up with Lt Gen Sir Dudley Russell as the Army Commander. There were some twelve officers on his staff, all of them British except me.

I was then a Major dealing with operations. There were three subordinate formations under the Command – Delhi Area under Major General Rajendra Sinhji who later became Army Chief, East Punjab Area under Major General K S Thimayya who also later became Army Chief and Military Evacuation Organisation at Lahore under Major General Chimni. No passenger or goods train was running anywhere in Punjab. All the railway rolling stock had been mobilized for carrying refugees. Lakhs of Muslims from all over the country had concentrated in Delhi at three major locations, Purana Qila, Nizamuddin and the open space around the Red Fort. They were being evacuated in refugee trains, escorted by the Army, to Pakistan. Hindu and Sikh refugees coming from Pakistan were initially accommodated in a tented refugee camp at Kurukshetra, before being dispersed to other locations. At one time this camp held 5 lakh refugees. There were also long refugee foot columns, several miles long, moving from either side. It was impossible to provide adequate protection to these columns, extending several miles. Air drops of food packages were organized for these columns.

The civil administration had collapsed in Punjab and our Command was assigned the duty of restoring order and evacuation of refugees. Mountbatten had made the luxurious Viceroy’s train available to our Command. Russell established his mobile headquarters in that train. We were completely self-contained in the corridor train with accommodation for officers, clerical staff, security personnel, and our offices. Our messes and kitchen functioned in the train. We had line and wireless communications on the train as also our motor transport. I operated from this train for nearly two months travelling between Delhi and Lahore. I have in all humility recorded all these details so that some credence may be given to my views on the events of that time based on my personal experience.

As for the Army’s contribution towards the Independence of India, one has to go back to the Great Uprising of 1857. The British call it the Sepoy Mutiny or the Great Mutiny and Indian nationalists refer to it as the First War of Indian Independence. Call it what one may, it was primarily an uprising of the Indian soldier against foreign rule. It lit the spark of nationalism in the country and was a source of great inspiration for succeeding generations during our freedom struggle.

The gallantry of the Indian soldier in battles, during the First World War won world wide acclaim. This was a source of national pride for the Indian people giving them increased self confidence. The emergence of the Indian National Army under Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose during the Second World War, added a new dimension to our freedom struggle. The INA comprised soldiers of the Indian Army taken prisoners by the Japanese in Malaya. The INA trials generated a patriotic surge all over the country and were a big shot in the arm for our freedom struggle. This was followed by the Naval Mutiny in Mumbai and Karachi, Army mutiny in Jabalpur and Air Force mutiny in Karachi. This violently shook the foundations of the British Empire in India.

It was at this stage and soon after the Great Kolkata killings that I had joined the Military Operations Directorate in Delhi. There were three things that I found both interesting and revealing. First, a plan for the evacuation of all British civilians in India to the UK called Plan Gondola. Second, the operational map that I was required to maintain in the Operations Room. Third, a paper on the reliability of the Indian Army prepared by the Director of Military Intelligence.

The British feared an uprising on the lines of what had happened in 1857. Many British civilians were scattered in different parts of the country. Plan Gondola catered for their initial evacuation to temporary camps in the provinces, at provincial capitals and some selected convenient locations. These were called Keeps. Armed protection with necessary logistic support was to be provided at the Keeps.

In the subsequent phase, they were to be evacuated to Safes near the port towns of Kolkata, Vishakapatnam, Chennai, Cochin, Mumbai and Karachi, awaiting repatriation to the UK. The troops guarding the Safes and Keeps were to be a mix of British and Indian soldiers. In the event, as communal violence escalated there was no need to implement Plan Gondola. There was now much bitterness and violence between Hindus and Muslims and none against the British. It was a great irony that at the height of the communal carnage in Punjab, British officers could move around unarmed in Delhi and Punjab while Indian officers, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, had to carry arms and in remote areas move with an escort.

I had to maintain a large map of India with pins of different colours showing locations of all combat units in the country. Red was for British units, Green for Gorkha units and Brown for Indian units. A distinction was made between Indian and Gorkha units. At that time the Gorkhas were officered exclusively by the British with no Indian officers in those units. The Indian units had a mix of British and Indian officers with Commanding Officers and senior officers mostly British. The “mutiny syndrome” prevailed among the British. It was ensured that no location had only brown pins without some red and green pins in situ. Field Marshal Auchinleck, the then Commander-in- Chief frequently visited the Operations Room and would study the map maintained by me.

The paper written by the Director Military Intelligence had a novel security classification – Top Secret, Not For Indian Eyes. My predecessor a British officer in a hurry to go back home to the UK on demobilization, had handed over the key of the almirah containing classified documents to me without checking the documents. This paper was written in the wake of the INA trials.

It stated that the Indian officers of the Army could be divided into three categories – those commissioned before 1933 from Sandhurst, the pre-war officers commissioned between 1933 and 1939, and the wartime emergency commissioned officers. The Sandhurst officers were considered more reliable. They were now middle aged with family commitments and did not nurture much grievance as they had been treated well. They were very few, their total number being about thirty. The pre-war, 1933 to 1939 officers had a grievance because their emoluments were not at par with their British counterparts. This disparity was removed during the war but its memory and of some other discriminations still rankled with them. The wartime officers numbering about 12,000 against a total of 500 of the two previous categories, were considered most unreliable. While in their schools and colleges, they had been exposed to subversive political influence culminating in the Quit India movement.

They faced an uncertain future because they were all emergency commissioned officers and only very few were likely to be accommodated in the permanent post-war cadre of the Army. They were working at the company and platoon level interacting directly with the soldiers.

As for the soldiers, the position regarding them had also changed radically. Prior to the war, the strength of the Army was 1.37 lakhs and recruitment was confined to the martial classes. A large number of soldiers came from traditional military families. During the war, floodgates had been opened for recruitment. The Army had been expanded from 1.37 lakhs to 2.2 millions. The INA had had a psychological impact on the officers and men of the Army.

Further, the bulk of the Army overseas had served in South East Asia, where they had seen how the prestige of the colonial powers had suffered at the hands of the Japanese in the early years of the war. Towards the end of the war, national movements for freedom had erupted in Asian countries ruled by colonial powers like the British, the French, the Dutch and the Portugese. The paper also took into account that an economically exhausted Britain after a long drawn out war, was not in a position to maintain a strong British military presence in India. In the circumstance, the paper recommended early British withdrawal from India. I was much impressed by this very analytical study.

The fact that the Indian Army had an impact on our movement for Independence and hastened the dawn of freedom is indisputable. Earl Atlee the British Prime Minister, who had presided over the liquidation of the British Empire in 1947, confirmed this during his visit to India in 1956. He told Mr Chakravarty, the then Governor of Bengal, that the decision to quit quickly in 1947 had been taken because the British could no longer rely on the loyalty of the Indian Army.

The role of the Army during Partition has not so far been factored into discussions about Partition. The fact that the Army also effected the decision on Partition needs to be taken into account. After their experience with Cromwell’s military dictatorship, the British ardently nurtured the concept of an apolitical army.

It suited them to transplant that concept in the Indian Army that they raised. While this concept continues to hold good in India, it got thrown overboard in Pakistan for reasons which we may not discuss here. After 1857, the British decided not to have one class regiment except for Gorkhas and Garhwalis. All other combat units of the Indian Army had the composition of 50% Muslims and 50% non-Muslims (Hindus and Sikhs). This was in line with their policy of Divide and Rule. Different communities living together in war and peace and encouraged to remain apolitical, developed a regimental ethos which held them together.
I was commissioned in the Jat Regiment which had two companies of Jat Hindus and two companies of Muslims. I served with a Punjabi Muslim company. I found that the regimental spirit among the men was strong and there was no communal divide. This continued in the Army as a whole till the end of 1946 but started cracking in 1947, reaching a breaking point by August 1947. Yet I saw that when the Muslim companies of the Jat Regiment were going to Pakistan, tears were shed on both sides. This happened in other regiments as well.

In keeping with the Army’s apolitical traditions, Indian officers during the British days, hardly ever discussed political matters among themselves. I recall that in Rangoon soon after the end of the war, one junior British officer referred to the INA as traitors and also used vulgar epithets for it.

There was no senior officer present in the Mess. This led to a heated discussion between the British and Indian officers, both Hindus and Muslims. Although politics in India had got much communalized in the Forties, Netaji seems to have promoted complete communal harmony in the Azad Hind Government and the Indian National Army. Vande Matram as an anthem had been a source of discord between the two communities in India. Netaji had coined the slogan Jai Hind which could not raise any communal hackles.

The Indian Army got involved in a strange war in Indonesia. It had been sent to that country primarily to take the surrender of the Japanese. The Dutch had been driven out from those islands. They accompanied the Indian Army to re-establish their colonial rule. The Indonesians had declared their Independence and had raised an army of their own. The Indian Army got involved in fighting the Indonesians. It was a strange situation for us. The Indonesians would tell us that we were ourselves not free and yet we were fighting against their becoming independent.
During my service in Indonesia, I used to feel very embarrassed on this account. However, what surprised me was that when the Indonesians raised the banner of Islam in their appeal to Indian soldiers, a number of Muslim soldiers of the Indian Army deserted and joined them. I was told that about a thousand or more of our Muslim soldiers had deserted. They got left behind when we came out from Indonesia. I am mentioning this because this was for the first time that I saw the communal virus affecting the Army.

Notwithstanding the early signs in Indonesia, it is remarkable that during the outbreak of unprecedented communal violence in August 1946 and till well after 1947 had set in, the Indian soldier, both Hindu and Muslim, showed remarkable impartiality when called upon to deal with communal violence. This was so in Kolkata in August 1946, in Bihar in October 1946 and in Garhmukteshwar (U.P.) in November 1946. Two or three battalions of the Bihar Regiment which had Hindus and Muslims in equal number, had operated in Bihar during the communal riots and had remained completely impartial. The Bihar riots were horrendous.

For the first time communal riots had spread so extensively to rural areas. Hitherto communal riots had remained an urban phenomenon. Several thousand Muslims got massacred in Bihar as a revenge for thousands of Hindus killed in Kolkata and Noakhali. At the time of Bihar riots, I was in Delhi getting daily reports of what was happening in my home province.

Colonel Naser Ali Khan, who later went to Pakistan Army, and I were serving at General Headquarters and were living in the officers mess on Wellesley Road (now Zakir Hussain Road). He was many years senior to me and was always very kind to me. One morning at breakfast after having read of a news report about Bihar riots in the newspaper, he told me excitedly that his blood boiled when he remembered that I was a Bihari. I told him that I condemned what was happening in Bihar more than him. He was not the only Muslim officer I interacted with in Delhi who felt so worked up over the most unfortunate happenings in Bihar.

I am mentioning these incidents to bring out how circumstances were forcing communal virus to spread in the Army. Till March 1947 things appeared to be well under control. Local communal riots were taking place in different places and the Army deployed to maintain order remained very disciplined and impartial. Wavell during his farewell address on 21 March 1947 said, “I believe that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be the deciding factor in the future of India.” Pakistan had not emerged as a sovereign State till then and hardly anyone could imagine that it will become a reality in the next four months.

With Muslim League Ministries coming to power both in Punjab and NWFP, communal passions were sought to be aroused in a planned manner. Pictures of atrocities on Muslims in Bihar and Garhmukteshwar started being shown in mosques along with fiery speeches by Muslim clerics on Fridays. Widespread communal riots erupted in Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Soon the whole of North India was on fire. The strain on the soldiers started showing. Most of the soldiers, both Muslims and non-Muslims, were from the North. Their homeland was getting ravaged and in several cases their families had been victims of communal frenzy.

It was becoming increasingly difficult for the soldiers to retain their impartiality. The downslide in this regard became more perceptible after Partition was announced. The day after that announcement I met two officers in their uniforms in Delhi wearing strange shoulder tittles – RPE and RPASC. In those days officers from Engineers and Army Service Corps wore shoulder titles, RIE for Royal Indian Engineers and RIASC for Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Some officers had begun to wear Pakistan shoulder titles within hours of the Partition announcement and much before Pakistan came into being.
There were reports of senior Muslim officers going to meet Jinnah who then lived in his house, 10 Aurangzeb Road. This showed how officers going to Pakistan were getting politicized. It also showed the fervour for Pakistan among some Muslim officers. On the morrow of Independence in August 1947, the Gilgit Scouts staged a coup arresting Brigadier Ghansara Singh of the Kashmir Army who had been sent there as Governor by the Maharaja. This was the first military coup in Pakistan Army. More were to follow later.

As mentioned earlier, the Punjab Boundary Force comprising in equal measure, units earmarked for Indian and Pakistan Army, was set up under a British commander in late July 1947. It was hoped that it will help in maintaining order on both sides of the border, at a time when communal violence and migration was reaching a crescendo. The experiment failed because the impartiality of the soldier had got eroded and there were several instances of soldiers taking sides.

Large scale violence again erupted in Kolkata and Mahatma Gandhi had gone there to restore sanity among the people. He undertook a fast which had a dramatic effect. It was then that Mountbatten made his famous remark that a one man boundary force had succeeded in Kolkata while the 50,000 strong Punjab Boundary Force had failed in the North. The Punjab Boundary Force was disbanded within a month of its raising and the two Dominions assumed responsibility for maintaining order on their side of the border. As a tailpiece, I may add that after a couple of months, Indian and Pakistan Armies were locked in fighting a war against each other in Kashmir.

No doubt the Partition holocaust was the greatest tragedy in the history of the Subcontinent in which millions got killed and millions got uprooted. Soon after Hindus and Muslims had fought unison in the First War of Independence in 1857, the seeds of separatism were sown by Sir Syed Ahmed. He conceived a separate nationhood for the Muslims of India. Lord Morley by accepting separate electorate in 1906 provided the oxygen for it. It fully matured by 1947 and was exploited to the hilt by Jinnah.
Looking back in hindsight, one can say that Partition could have been averted had the Congress been more accommodative and the Muslim League less obdurate. However, after the planned genocide started by Jinnah on i6 August 1946 as part of his Direct Action programme, there could be no going back from the path of disaster. The Qaid-e- Azam had become Qatl-e- Azam.

The puerile attempt by some people to underscore Jinnah’s secular image on the basis of a lone speech by him while inaugurating the Pakistan Constituent Assembly does not carry conviction. One swallow does not make a summer. It now transpires that Jinnah made that conciliatory address not out of any goodwill but under compulsion. The inside story has been revealed in a book Select Documents on Partition of India by a distinguished historian, Dr Kripal Singh. Lord Ismay the Chief of Staff of Lord Mountbatten told him in an interview on August 17, 1964, the background to that much hailed address.

Mountbatten had asked Ismay to convey to Jinnah the need for his taking that line, now that he had achieved his Pakistan. The sole aim was to check the spiraling violence in Pakistan and the counter violence in East Punjab.

That Jinnah ‘s animosity towards India had not changed is made amply clear by Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir launched on 22 October 1947. His earlier slogan was India Divided or India Destroyed. That had now changed to India Divided and India Destroyed. It is a different matter that on 7 November 1947 the Indian Army turned back that invasion from the outskirts of Srinagar. This was perhaps in line with what Charles Martel had achieved at Tours in 732 against the Saracens thereby saving France or Jan Sobleski had done in 1683, throwing back the Turks from the gates of Vienna and saved Europe.
Lately attempts have been made by some people to exonerate Jinnah for his role in Partition.( COMMENT: Jaswant Singh !! ) They have even gone further, by trying to blame Patel and Nehru for accepting Partition. It is even insinuated that they were tired and old, and were in a hurry to grab power. Having opposed the two nation theory and partition all their lives, they caved in and opted for Partition. Ralph Emerson rightly wrote, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” In the Army the saying is that consistency is the hallmark of a mule.

Sardar Patel had the uncanny gift of foresight and the ability to take hard decisions. He rightly assessed the situation prevailing in mid 1947. Based on his experience in the Interim Government when the Muslim League had brought government functioning to a grinding halt, the crescendo of communal violence and the Army getting contaminated, combating communal violence for nearly a year, he realized that there was now no alternative to Partition. His decision to salvage the wreck in 1947 was an act of great statesmanship. If that had not been done, things would have become much worse.

We would have had a civil war on our hands with the Army broken up and participating from both sides. One does not know what the outcome of such a conflict may have been. India may have broken up into several independent States like erstwhile Yugoslavia or could have become a much larger version of present Lebanon. In his own words, the Sardar chose to save 80% of the country. Had a patchwork solution of unity with a weak centre been accepted in 1947, the results could have been disastrous. With a weak Centre the integration of the 500 odd Princely States may not have been possible.

The minority population of India was about 12% in 1947. Today, the combined minority population in an undivided India would have been over 40%. Petrol funded Islamist forces that have now emerged in the world would have swamped India. India as we know it today would not have existed. Patel’s acceptance of a moth eaten Pakistan and getting the Congress to accept it, was a great achievement. This was almost at par with his universally hailed achievement of integrating the Princely States with the Indian Union.

The first vivisection of India had taken place in the beginning of the second millennium. Although the Arabs had conquered Sindh in 712 A D, they had remained confined to the deserts of Sindh for three centuries and subsequently Sindh had not broken away from India. The Hindu Shahi dynasty ruled over Afghanistan with their capital at Kabul. They guarded the country’s North West Frontier. Starting from 999 A D, they succumbed to the invasions of the great conqueror and plunderer, Mahmud Gazni. India was exposed for the first time to the ferocity of religious fundamentalism. Soon, Afghanistan ceased to be a part of India. That was our country’s first vivisection.

The second took place in 1947 again on account of religious fundamentalism. Sardar Patel ensured that the 80% residual India was fully integrated and became a strong nation. Despite that part of the country which broke away becoming a theocracy and carrying out instant ethnic cleansing in the West and gradual in the East, Nehru and Patel ensured that India retained her secular values.

In August 1947 the residual Muslim League in India adopted a resolution reviving itself. Surprisingly, undeterred with all that had happened leading to Partition, its representatives in the Constituent Assembly, demanded reservation for Muslims and also separate electorate. Muslim members of the Assembly other than the few of the Muslim League, did not support this demand. It got rejected by an overwhelming majority. Speaking on this issue the Sardar stated, “I know they have a mandate from the Muslim League to move this amendment. I feel sorry for them. This is not a place for acting on madness. This is a place today to act on your conscience and to act for the good of the country. For a community to think that its interests are different from that of the country in which it lives, is a great mistake”.

Unfortunately the successors of Sardar Patel in his party have shown lack of vision. For the sake of garnering Muslim votes, they have been following the policy of appeasement and are prepared in that process to sacrifice national interest.

B K Nehru, an eminent member of the dynasty, in his autobiography, Nice Guys Finish Second, wrote that the old guard in the Congress considered national interests supreme but the new generation feels otherwise, giving priority to party interests.

The Congress practicing secularism selectively has been giving an impetus to communalism. It treats Muslim League as a secular party and welcomes it as an alliance partner in the Government, both at the Centre and in Kerala. It treats the BJP as untouchable and wants to have nothing to do with it, even when BJP has Muslim members but Muslim League does not have a single non-Muslim member.

It has been facilitating the illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims to build its vote bank. A Congress Prime Minister declares that Muslims must have the first call on the Nation’s resources. It has been decided to set up four new Muslim Universities like the Aligarh Muslim University, which had been the nursery for Pakistan. Several other such instances can be quoted. If we continue like this, the day is not far when we will have to put up with a third vivisection of the country.

The second partition was the product of separate electorate, the third may be the product of the policy of appeasement. Justice in full measurfe must be provided to the minority but appeasement can be disastrous both for them and the country.
The Indian Army made a significant contribution towards ushering the independence of India. Its role during the Partition holocaust was also of great significance.

I conclude quoting from Stephen Cohen’s book on the Indian Army. “India has virtually ignored the military as a factor in nation building. This is surprising, for the military had a profound impact on the course of nationalist politics and also upon policies after 1947.”

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Bob V » 22 Aug 2011 20:55

good read....brings back memories of the evenings spent with grandpa, who served in Burma.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Sanju » 22 Aug 2011 22:10

rohitvats wrote:.....<snip> But the choice of location is interesting;...<snip>


Rohitvats, 30 years ago my Father was posted in Panagarh (I don't recall the nn in the spelling). We all moved there. The place had nothing but the Armed forces and a hell of a lot of snakes (every house had a 12-18" foot cement barrier in front of the doors leading out).
He was part of the Brigade that had Mahar, MLI - the 3rd Unit I can't recall.

Within couple of months of coming to the station the whole Bde was made part of the Mtn Div. and moved out to forward areas in the Burma border area (mainly Nagaland, Manipur) to carry out COIN ops. The families stayed back as we couldn't go to forward areas.

Panagarh had lots of open areas. We lived in sight of the GT road. It was close to Calcutta. It was like a Cantt. town without the designation. It had WWII structures. I think that based on the availability of the area (since quarters for families of Officers, JCO's and OR), schools (there was a Central School there) and other such amenities that can be ramped up. Also it was used as a Base area for families.

I think we will see more Panagarhs around India due to the accommodation and other such issues.

PS: The Brigade was moved after just after a year to Punjab with Mahar going to Jalandhar Cantt., the 3rd Bttln was replaced by Madras and MLI went to DBN. (they took part in the famous Op)

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Sanju » 22 Aug 2011 22:26

Chetak, Thanks for posting that.
The whole divide and rule during the partition was engineered by the Brits to avoid a repeat of 1857 where the Indians (both Hindus and Muslims) rightly targeted the Brits. By dividing us they escaped paying for 200 years of bigotry and loot. Guess OT for this thread.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Nihat » 22 Aug 2011 23:16

Army planning to set up mountain strike corps

New Delhi: Army is planning to set up a mountain strike corps and is talking to various states including in the northeast against the backdrop of a Chinese build up of military infrastructure on its side of boundary.

"We are in talks with the governments of states including Assam, West Bengal and Bihar for setting up the Mountain Corps headquarters, which would require at least 4,000 to 5,000 acres of land," senior army sources said in New Delhi.

Around 10-12 locations in these states have been identified by the army to set up the formation, they said.

The Mountain Strike Corps is being planned by the army after it established two new Mountain Infantry Divisions for the northeastern region.

The two new divisions, with 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, have their headquarters in Zakama in Nagaland and Missamari in Assam.

The army is also looking to deploy ultra-light howitzers and light tanks along the Line of Actual Control in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

The IAF, on its part, has already based Sukhoi-30MKI fighters at airbases like Tezpur and Chabua. Eastern sector advanced landing grounds (ALGs) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar as well as several helipads in Arunachal Pradesh are also now being upgraded, much like western sector ALGs like Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche and Nyama in eastern Ladakh.

All these developments come against the backdrop of a major build-up of military infrastructure by China all along the border, which includes five fully-operational airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000-km of roads in Tibet Autonomous Region.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby shyamd » 23 Aug 2011 01:55

^^ Another PRC related move. Weren't they disbanded in the 90s to appease PRC?

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 23 Aug 2011 08:52

shyamd wrote:^^ Another PRC related move. Weren't they disbanded in the 90s to appease PRC?


What was disbanded in 90s?

As for the MSC news, well, we need to see if this is the same Corps which HT had reported yesterday and will be based in Panagarh.

Another thing I missed yesterday - with 23 ID going to new Corps, the replacement division will be most likely raised somewhere close to western border. More fun and games in terms of lower mobilization and et all... :mrgreen:

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Ashutosh Malik » 23 Aug 2011 10:16

Ravi Rikhye in www.orbat.com

"India to raise new strike corps against China? Hindustan Times says so, and identifies the corps HQ as Panagarh, West Bengal. It further says 23 Division (Ranchi) will go under the corps.

Our South Asia correspondent Mandeep Singh Bajwa says that while there are many plans, including a strike corps for Eastern command, its too early to take this as a done deal. And the Indian press is notorious for getting things wrong on defense.

Meanwhile, Mandeep says plans for a number of new China front independent brigades are proceeding. These include an armored brigade for Ladakh, a infantry brigade for Ladakh, a mountain brigade for the middle sector, a light armored brigade for Sikkim, and possibly a fifth brigade.

We've made this point before: China is a sovereign nation and if it wants to throw its weight around against India, that's right. But what exactly has China gained by its super-aggressive posture. we're already looking at two new divisions raised for Eastern Command, two under raising for Northern Command, two more planned for a strike corps for Eastern, plus 4-5 independent brigades. and this is just the start, by the way.

With Indian forces facing China already increasing by 75% compared to the low point in the 1990s and 2000s, when India thought it had a deal to start demilitarizing the Tibet border, what precisely does Beijing think it has gained? We'd love to know.

And the interesting point is that while India is responding to Chinese aggressiveness, this buildup is NOT defensive. Its intended, for the first time in half-a-century, to give India a solid offensive posture against China. This is because India has concluded the only thing China understands is the big stick.

So for no reason at all except false ago, China has created a problem for itself along its Southwest border where between 1970-2000 tensions were reducing. The Chinese government may think it is being cunningly clever with regard to India. Its being astonishingly foolish.

Also, BTW, India's GDP devoted to defense remains at 2% despite massive increases in the last five years. India has lots of room to spend much more on defense."

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 23 Aug 2011 10:50

Of all the information given above in Orbat.Com article, only the one about 2 new Mountain Divisions for Northern Command have not appeared in press but something that has been hinted at. Watch this space - the offensive capability of Northern Command will receive major fillip...as I said some time ago - watch out for 2012-2017 Defence Plan.

Another data point (shared by someone) - China lays claim to Barahoti Pass and is considered to be the oldest claim (1956). As I pointed out earlier, India maintains a (I) Mountain Brigade out of Joshimath. Positioning of addition infantry brigade will add to offensive capability in the sector.

Check this old article (2002) from Pioneer:

Alarm bells have rung in the Intelligence network in Uttaranchal, following reports that the Chinese have crossed the Line of Actual Control and are constructing a road just 2.5 km near the Tunjungla ridge.The Intelligence network was tipped off by shepherds who spotted the construction recently.According to Intelligence sources, around 60 labourers are working round the clock to build the road. There are around seven tents pitched in the area. A report was sent to IG, Intelligence, from Joshimath on Friday.The latest road construction follows similar construction by the Chinese across the LAC near the Niti pass, where they apparently constructed a road that is around 4 km from the LAC, a couple of years ago. Sources said that the Chinese riders in BDR outfits have had a history of crossing over the LAC into the Barahoti plateau. Armed with the advantage of height, they are given to riding into the plateau for a few hours and littering the area with Chinese-made cigarettes and coke tins to prove their claim in the area. Their favourite point of entry is the Tunjungla pass, from where they fan out to Niti, Mahrila and Sarsarla pass.

A notable point is that Barahoti constitutes the oldest claim by the Chinese (1956), that ultimately led to the difference of perception of the Sino-Indian border, between India and China. A disturbing fact is the distance disadvantage that Indians have, as the road head on the Indian side is 28 km away from the border. While the Chinese have equine transport, Indians have to move on foot on a terrain that is uphill all the way up to Barahoti.

The Chinese have also built three ton roads right up to the Tunjunla Mahrila passes.An several occasions, the Chinese have uprooted tents of Indian sheperds and shooed them away, while our paramilitary has stood and watched because of a Central Government directive which prevents them from taking any action without clearance.A complete absence of technical Intelligence in the Middle Sector from Lepu Lekh to Gayanker (spanning Uttaranchal and Himachal Pradesh) has made the area vulnerable. A report states that the intelligence matrix in the middle sector remains inadequate, largely because no aerial survey is possible here, as it would entail flying over Nepalese and Bhutanese territory and both the countries have refused permission.

In the absence of information on troop movement, roads, deployment North of Barahoti and Nelong Jedhang in Uttarkashi district, there is a complete hiatus on information of Chinese activities in the area. The report is even more disturbing because the middle sector is under discussion between India and China and maps have already been exchanged. Every road that is built will only serve to bolster the Chinese claim.


Added Later: When I said oldest claim, what I meant was that this was the first part of Indian territory to which claim was laid by the Chinese. And the date is 17 July 1954. The entry in the article above seems to be incorrect.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby ks_sachin » 23 Aug 2011 11:21


Rohitvats, 30 years ago my Father was posted in Panagarh (I don't recall the nn in the spelling). We all moved there. The place had nothing but the Armed forces and a hell of a lot of snakes (every house had a 12-18" foot cement barrier in front of the doors leading out).
He was part of the Brigade that had Mahar, MLI - the 3rd Unit I can't recall.

Within couple of months of coming to the station the whole Bde was made part of the Mtn Div. and moved out to forward areas in the Burma border area (mainly Nagaland, Manipur) to carry out COIN ops. The families stayed back as we couldn't go to forward areas.

Panagarh had lots of open areas. We lived in sight of the GT road. It was close to Calcutta. It was like a Cantt. town without the designation. It had WWII structures. I think that based on the availability of the area (since quarters for families of Officers, JCO's and OR), schools (there was a Central School there) and other such amenities that can be ramped up. Also it was used as a Base area for families.

I think we will see more Panagarhs around India due to the accommodation and other such issues.

PS: The Brigade was moved after just after a year to Punjab with Mahar going to Jalandhar Cantt., the 3rd Bttln was replaced by Madras and MLI went to DBN. (they took part in the famous Op)



Hi Sanju,

Was that part of 86 BDE in DBN. Our tigers replaced a MLI which participated in Bluestar....If it is the same MLI then they were not based at DBN but elsewhere....

Interestingly enough I met the CO of the Armd Regt that participated there as well...Interesting stories to say the least...

cheers

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Nikhil T » 23 Aug 2011 13:03



Dramatic. Good decision IMO, there have been incidents when militants under the rubble have emerged and killed jawans.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Sanju » 23 Aug 2011 20:52

ks_sachin wrote:

Hi Sanju,

Was that part of 86 BDE in DBN. Our tigers replaced a MLI which participated in Bluestar....If it is the same MLI then they were not based at DBN but elsewhere....

Interestingly enough I met the CO of the Armd Regt that participated there as well...Interesting stories to say the least...

cheers


Hi KS_Sachin,

Quite frankly I can't remember which Brigade in DBN. We were close to the CO of the MLI BN. His daughter was my classmate. I was n't happy when we moved to Jalandhar and they moved elsewhere.

IIRC right the first order was that they go to DBN, it may have been changed. I know the Bn number. We can take it offline or cont. in Nukkad.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Ashutosh Malik » 23 Aug 2011 21:19

Paging Rohit Vats.

Need to talk regarding The War that Never Was and other books by Ravi Rikhye. My number is +91 8800375554. Please call asap.

Best.
Ashu

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 23 Aug 2011 21:21

Sanju wrote: <SNIP> Within couple of months of coming to the station the whole Bde was made part of the Mtn Div. and moved out to forward areas in the Burma border area (mainly Nagaland, Manipur) to carry out COIN ops. The families stayed back as we couldn't go to forward areas.<SNIP>


Are you refering to late 70s period?

The reason I ask is because as per an article by Ravi Rikhye of Orbat.Com, 9th Infantry Division, which was based in Rachi, shifted to Punjab and UP in this preiod. 23rd ID took its place in Ranchi. My guess is that your Dad's Bde in Panagarh was part of 9th ID, then based in Ranchi.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Sanju » 23 Aug 2011 22:12

rohitvats wrote:
Sanju wrote: <SNIP> Within couple of months of coming to the station the whole Bde was made part of the Mtn Div. and moved out to forward areas in the Burma border area (mainly Nagaland, Manipur) to carry out COIN ops. The families stayed back as we couldn't go to forward areas.<SNIP>


Are you refering to late 70s period?

The reason I ask is because as per an article by Ravi Rikhye of Orbat.Com, 9th Infantry Division, which was based in Rachi, shifted to Punjab and UP in this preiod. 23rd ID took its place in Ranchi. My guess is that your Dad's Bde in Panagarh was part of 9th ID, then based in Ranchi.


It was late 1980 when we moved to Panagarh. Early 1982 or late 1981 when the Adv. party (which was led by Pa) went to Jalandhar to take over from the Sikh LI (IIRC). All this I am recalling from memory and don't have access to records. I will look for them the next time I am in Desh (hopefully these have not been burned to clean the house! :D

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 23 Aug 2011 22:29

^^^Yup, the same period.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Rahul M » 23 Aug 2011 23:23

I recall seeing tanks, probably T-55 regularly around panagarh station on the rail wagons. this was early 90's. any idea which unit ? part of an inf div's organic tank regiment ?

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 23 Aug 2011 23:32

Rahul M wrote:I recall seeing tanks, probably T-55 regularly around panagarh station on the rail wagons. this was early 90's. any idea which unit ? part of an inf div's organic tank regiment ?


There is a vehicle depot in Panagarh...maybe, these tanks were being transported to units from the depot.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Rahul M » 23 Aug 2011 23:37

this was not a one off sighting though. I journeyed through that route 8-10 times a year for 3 years and saw those at least 50% of the time.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 23 Aug 2011 23:51

^^^Should have been more elaborate. The vehicle depots hold the vehicles/tanks/other such stuff before the same are released to actual units. You can see T-90/T-72 tanks moving in and out of Delhi cantonment...there is a Central Vehicle Depot in heart of Delhi Cantonment.

PS: This is a guess. The tanks may well be in the area for exercise or other such stuff.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 24 Aug 2011 00:01

X-post -

While searching for some stuff, I came across this 1963 CIA document titled THE SECURITY OF INDIA'S HIMALAYAN FRONTIER..

This is a de-classified document; please read it here:
http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/82/0000254391/THE-SECURITY-OF-INDIA'S-HIMALAYAN-FRONTIER.html

Link to the original document can also be seen at the bottom of the page.

Just check the level of analysis. I'm yet to see a single book which covers the topics given in the document in such detail.

Please read it to understand the geography in the region where India and China may well face each other. While a lot has changed since 1963, the geography has remained the same and all the efforts are to over come this single most important aspect. Read all the news about infra development in Tibet and India in the context given in the document linked above.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby vasu_ray » 24 Aug 2011 02:14

Quote from the above article "Its military strength are hamperedaucity of production capacity for heavy military equipment, by the difficulty of shifting the complex Five Year Plan organizational machinery into war-oriented patterns"

India's 2nd set of reforms should be aimed at changing the five year plans to two year plans, its not about time compression but about managing goals

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Sanju » 24 Aug 2011 04:31

I found reading the CIA document that the original is a cleaner read as the HTML document is scanned and there are OCR irregularities. But as mentioned by Rohitvats their analysis is superb and to the point and it reads well not a dry read.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 24 Aug 2011 09:01

^^^And it was done in 1963 - when there was no wikipedia or uncle google. Lot of information given in the article can today be collated over the internet.

But the information given about dispositon of Indian Army Divisions, the geography of various sectors and other related stuff could have come as feedback from field agents and other such HUMINT sources or access to papers written by IA etc. This clarity of thought and objective is something I find not to be there even today in many such strategic thinkers.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby rohitvats » 24 Aug 2011 10:02

From Broadsword:http:http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/

Pasting in full:

In 2009, New Delhi acted decisively in sanctioning two new army divisions, about 35,000 troops, to strengthen Indian defences in Arunachal, which China claims as a part of Tibet. It can now be revealed that New Delhi has also sanctioned a new mountain strike corps, consisting of an additional 40,000 soldiers, which will be permanently located in bases in northeast India. The new corps will retaliate against any major Chinese ingress into India by launching an offensive into Tibet.


For decades after India’s humiliation at the hands of China in 1962, New Delhi shrank from a robust defence posture on the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC), fearing that it might provoke China. In the aftermath of 1962, through the 1960s and 1970s, the Indian Army stayed away from the border, remaining behind a self-imposed “Limit of Patrolling (LoP)”. In the 1980s, the army returned to the LAC, but remained entirely defensive in outlook. The sanctioning of a strike corps, therefore, signals a dramatic new assertiveness in New Delhi.


Business Standard has been aware of this development since 2009, but has refrained from reporting on it after requests from top-level MoD officials. Now, with the outlines of this development emerging in the media, Business Standard no longer feels bound by confidentiality.


The new mountain strike corps will control two divisions that are specially trained and equipped for an attack into Tibet. If China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) captures any Indian territory, by quickly concentrating an attacking force over Tibet’s impressive road network, the Indian Army would not be forced into bloody, Kargil-style counterattacks to recapture that territory. Instead, the new strike corps would launch its own riposte, advancing into Tibet and capturing a vulnerable chunk of Chinese territory, e.g. the Chumbi Valley that projects into Sikkim and Bhutan. Several such objectives would be identified in advance and detailed preparations made for the offensives.


The new strike corps will have its own mountain artillery, combat engineers, anti-aircraft guns and radio equipment. It would also be supported by Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters, operating from newly renovated bases in northeastern India. On 26th July, the then IAF chief confirmed that Sukhoi-30 fighters have already been deployed to air bases at Tezpur and Chhabua. On 25th June, he told NDTV that Jorhat, Guwahati, Mohanbari, Bagdogra and Hashimara were also being developed as air bases. The IAF is also modernising eight ALGs (Advanced Landing Grounds), which would be essential for quickly building up and resupplying a strike corps. These air bases would also be crucial for airborne operations, especially heli-lifting forces to key objectives behind the enemy frontlines.


The proposal to raise two additional divisions for the defence of Arunachal Pradesh as well as a strike corps dates back to 2007. It began as a decision of the China Study Group, a secretive government body that considers all strategic issues relating to China. Thereafter, the army’s Directorate General of Military Operations (DGMO) prepared a cabinet note. The decision to raise the additional divisions was taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on 14th May 2009. This was the last major decision taken by the UPA government before the elections of 2009. It was rushed through because top UPA leaders felt that, if the UPA were not re-elected, the new government would begin the decision-making process afresh, losing another two years.


To manage the expenses, it was decided that the two defensive mountain divisions would first be raised during the 11th army plan (2007-2012). Next, the strike corps, including its two mountain divisions, would be raised during the 12th Defence Plan (2012-2017). The cost of raising a new Indian Army mountain division is estimated to be Rs 700 crore.


The 4057-kilometre LAC consists of three sectors. In the western sector in Ladakh, which India’s 14 Corps defends, the PLA already controls most of the area that China claims. The central sector, at the UP-Tibet border, which India’s 6 Mountain Division defends, is relatively insignificant. The most contentious sector is the eastern sector, which includes Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, where China claims 90,000 square kilometres of territory that India occupies. It is here, driven by fear of Chinese aggression, that India is strengthening its capabilities by raising new formations.


A mountain strike corps will provide India with strategic capabilities that were badly missed when Mao Tse-tung marched the PLA into Tibet in 1950. While considering its responses, the Indian government asked the army chief of that time, General (later Field Marshal) KM Cariappa, what resources he had to intervene on behalf of Tibet. Cariappa could spare just one battalion (800 soldiers). And so New Delhi watched as Tibet was subjugated and the China border advanced all the way to the Himalayas.

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Re: Indian Army: News & Discussion

Postby Singha » 24 Aug 2011 10:12

that last para is telling. had we the infra and some forces could have sealed up vulnerable areas like aksai chin and chumbi valley before the PLA jackboots marched there.

one lesson seems to be nobody ever leaves free land as uncontested. either we occupy it or someone else will.


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