Indian Missiles and Munitions Discussion

[anmol]

Here is Manoj Joshi's blog :-

http://mjoshi.blogspot.in/

[ramana]

“We have carried out six successful launches and demonstrated the capability for 2,000 km targets... We have demonstrated it in two layers that is endo-atmospheric (inside the Earth’s atmosphere) and exo-atmospheric (outside the Earth’s atmosphere),” Mr. Saraswat said.

For all the tests, the target missile in these cases simulated a 2000 km missile. Rather than the range, it is indeed the speed of RV that is the criteria here. And the systems are built based on the detection capabilities of Radar which detects upto so and so RV speed. 2000 km notional figure is used to specify that the system is Pak centric and exact figure could be classified.

In all these cases, a modified Prithvi missile is used. This missile climbed to 120 km and re-entered with speed and angle simulating ~2000 km missile. Def. ordinary Prithvi can't do this unless it is modified. It is not a far fetched idea to entertain that this modified Prithvi is a two stage missile like Interceptor PAD. 120 km altitude is chosen to mark reentry as that of realistic long range ballistic missile.

Dr Saraswat said that the new seeker in the Interceptor enabled the missile to match the maneuvers of a hostile missile – like the zig zag movement of the Russian Topol missile.

Live screen shots of the radar images at the point of interception as seen on the command and control display station at Wheeler island, Orissa, on Monday. The Target missile is broken into multiple pieces.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/article535042.ece

This link already posted by Kanson has the AVM Barbora quote.

[ramana]

Ramana, that is not correct.

The IAF operates 38 SAM squadrons and has responsibility for strategic air defence. While the army operates SAMs, all of them are for protection of their formations. The AD network for the country is in the hands of the IAF with the army contributing L70/40s and some Zu-23-2 for VA/VP point defence.

Thanks for clarifying.

[Sanjay]

Kanson, don't ask at all. Got absorbed into a major OPV contractual disaster in Trinidad. Security deteriorating here beyond belief. E-mail me and I will spill the details. Thanks for everything.

[Prem Kumar]

Nag missile article shows that there is actually not much change in the real attitude of the army. The main difference is that they are now polite. Against a requirement of around 100,000 ATGMs, they give a small order of 400 to Nag along with condescending words.

Vic: I have been a critic of IA's attitude towards the Nag (got into an argument with Rohitvats over this a few pages back) but the latest report by Ajai Shukla is a breath of fresh air. I feel the IA has acted quite maturely by ordering 443 Nags, even though the seeker range is less than stipulated (a piece of information that no one here knew about till Ajai broke it). As he quite rightly says, the IA is more forthcoming in inducting a less-than-perfect system & the DRDO is more forthcoming in admitting limitations. A good change of attitude overall.

[vic]

Prem, the point that I am making is that Army brass has changed its style but the attitude is same. Take ARJUN, earlier to kill it they used to criticise it. Now they say, it is Great but lets make it greater and tag on huge amount of additional requirements which will make it 2-3 times more costly then T-90s. Arjun is supposed to have APU, AC, "three" thermal imagers, Active Protection system - all of which is not imposed on T-90s. India is the only nation in the world which imposes higher specifications on domestic equipment while importing junk. Similarly, there is no breath of fresh air, Army is playing the same game regarding Nag also. There is Javelin & Spike lobby against Nag. So the requirement of Nag keeps on getting raised while miniscule orders are placed. The same thing was done for AD gun when GSQRs were changed 11 times in 10 years to kill domestic project. I wonder it is coincidence that pimps for some AD offering foreign companies are facing charges.

[Austin]

OT but this is a nice video of how Anti-Ship BM works , Irans seems to be the second country after China that claims to have developed ASBM , some specs and video

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nc7eUO1aw9M

Iran Persian Gulf (Khalije Fars) Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile.
Range: 300 km
Warhead: 650 kg
Speed: supersonic Mach 3
Guidance: First Phase: Inertial Terminal Phase: Infrared, TV & Radar Probably
Feature: Diving toward the Target to increase the angle & the impact.

[Karan M]

Nag missile article shows that there is actually not much change in the real attitude of the army. The main difference is that they are now polite. Against a requirement of around 100,000 ATGMs, they give a small order of 400 to Nag along with condescending words.

Vic: I have been a critic of IA's attitude towards the Nag (got into an argument with Rohitvats over this a few pages back) but the latest report by Ajai Shukla is a breath of fresh air. I feel the IA has acted quite maturely by ordering 443 Nags, even though the seeker range is less than stipulated (a piece of information that no one here knew about till Ajai broke it). As he quite rightly says, the IA is more forthcoming in inducting a less-than-perfect system & the DRDO is more forthcoming in admitting limitations. A good change of attitude overall.

The original ATGM program proposed by DRDO was with semiactive laser guidance that they proposed could be developed in time and meet requirements since tech had matured. Instead, Army asked for IIR seeker. Its revealing about the IA mindset to ask for the "best and brightest", that even in 2012, it will require the best FPA sensor from Sofradir (Europe's leader in FPA tech and supplier to both Thales and Safran) to meet IA requirements of 4km range first set in the late '80s. Similar case with Arjun and tech. specs that are by far ahead of the T-90.

IA has to get into the process of stepping back and looking at its requirements, especially when they become too futuristic or cobbled together from journals. Some of the things they ask for, are simply unattainable at time of asking or even in a short-medium term timeframe thereafter.

[Singha]

and if by some means the brochure claims are all met, they will complain about the cost.
the Nag will likely get this from sofradirs vast portfolio
http://www.sofradir.com/pure-infrared/f ... ons_7.html
good thing is unlike the javelin whose sensor is kept cool for max 20 secs flight time, this thing lists "flight autonomy gas off" as >1 min after the initial burst of cooling. so even longer range missiles like Helina can use it.

[Prem Kumar]

Karan: To give the IA ts due, the 4KM range is not a new requirement. DRDO also knew about this & they thought their indigenous IIR seeker would do the job. During trials, it was discovered that under extreme heat conditions, the range is limited. So, the IA is inducting the system in limited quantities, while giving DRDO time to produce/procure a better seeker. I dont see anything wrong with this approach.

History is history - we cannot blame IA's above decision (which is pragmatic) because they didnt opt for a laser seeker based ATGM. Given the situation today, its the right decision IMO.

Note that since Nag is deployed with Namica, it presents a bigger target than a man-portable ATGM. At 2.5 KM, the Namica would be within range of the enemy MBT main gun.

As IA indicates, the initial order would be in Punjab where you have better cover and the visibility is not beyond 2.5 KM. In Rajasthan, you most likely need the 4 KM range for shoot and scoot.

[Prem Kumar]

Vic: my comments were specifically around the Nag episode. The step-motherly treatment towards Arjun is well known but is OT for this thread. When we see the attitudes changing, it has to be welcomed.

[Cybaru]

I don't get this.

1. If during the hottest period NAG cannot go more than 2.5KMs, will the enemy also not face the same handicap or has our enemy solved this problem ?

2. This works to 4 KMS at the other 20 odd hours in the day right ?

So why not order more namica's and get the ball rolling and when the improved nag-2 arrives, order the missiles then. What's this constant throwing a scrap here and there. IA is throwing a good working relationship under the bus by being hard nosed.

[Indranil]

Karan, we can't just blame the Army here. DRDO knew what was state-of-art in 1980 and what is state-of-art in 2012. why shouldn't DRDO have flagged it then?! Why promise something which looks difficult to provide anywhere in the near future?!!

[Karan M]

Karan: To give the IA ts due, the 4KM range is not a new requirement. DRDO also knew about this & they thought their indigenous IIR seeker would do the job. During trials, it was discovered that under extreme heat conditions, the range is limited. So, the IA is inducting the system in limited quantities, while giving DRDO time to produce/procure a better seeker. I dont see anything wrong with this approach.

The indigenous IIR seeker depends on an imported FPA sensor, because the DRDO does not have the budget to set up anywhere near the scale of the national programs the west did when developing similar sensors. Sofradir for instance is a French Govt. funded facility. And the current state of the art FPA seeker does not allow for 4 km engagement. What does that tell us of the kind of brochure bashing the Army engages in? So far, the DRDO has managed to develop the overall IIR seeker (which also has gimballed optics, signal processing hardware, plus the software). This is in production at BDL. (http://news.webindia123.com/news/articl ... 63740.html) But it remains dependent on a tech., which a worldclass facility has apparently developed now in the west, so what talk of having it in the 1980's or 1990's.

My point is fairly straightforward, that unlike the Navy, both the IAF and IA lack a product development & R&D organization, internal to each, which works on coming up with realistic product specifications and requirements and then hands it off to the broader civilian R&D set up to develop, while maintaining an oversight or PM function.

Hence, Army tends to ask for unobtainium which can delay programs for years, because current and even future tech struggles to match their requirements. In the meantime, Army imports "interim" systems, which then become the mass produced standard.

The Army often sets requirements on BBC (Best of Brochure Claims) or on mixed up specifications - see Part1 of the Arjun interview for what MajGen Mehta admits or see this critique (http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... ds/285028/) - and then the civilian technocrats rush to agree to whatever is asked, for fear of losing the contract to an import. Glossies and trade journals are often full of such future programs, which can often drop by the wayside, but it can be dangerous if we try to emulate them. Take a look at Crusader or Comanche.

This is a flawed system from the get go. In contrast, France for example has the exact sort of setup which I mentioned which allows for proper product development (this, despite having companies like MBDA, or Safran) and Israel of course, thanks to conscription has an unusually large number of military personnel wearing dual hats of weapons developers in national industry. Its not something we can replicate easily. But the first set up, of having a system which comes up with more realistic requirements - well we certainly can emulate that.

Otherwise, we will continue to ask for the moon, when even worldwide industrial base would struggle to achieve those standards (and which is often unavailable to us anyhow), and import away when indigenous programs get delayed.

History is history - we cannot blame IA's above decision (which is pragmatic) because they didnt opt for a laser seeker based ATGM. Given the situation today, its the right decision IMO.

Au contraire, I can blame the Army's decision to set such high standards for Nag, because it is not pragmatic, and if we had kept a simpler baseline, India would not have purchased 30,000 Milan2/2-T's or similar number of Konkurs/Konkur-Ms. Note that these missiles are not merely distributed to infantry formations. They are fielded on vehicles.

Now, Nag is a larger missile because it in part, carries its intelligence along with itself. http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-h_N2U5e9D2o/T ... er%2B2.jpg
While this is HELINA, the basic layout remains the same. Note the sensor package, the image processor, the higher density power supply, plus the larger motor component (to loft the missile).
A direct attack missile would have traded some size for a larger warhead, but would have saved weight elsewhere. Check the TOW for instance. http://media.defenseindustrydaily.com/i ... way_lg.jpg
The launcher assembly plus missile could be made compact as well. Check the Kornet. http://warfare.ru/0702ey70/update/feb2001/Kornet1.jpg

Note that since Nag is deployed with Namica, it presents a bigger target than a man-portable ATGM. At 2.5 KM, the Namica would be within range of the enemy MBT main gun.

Irrelevant claim, since what I am referring to is a 4km, laser guided missile, fielded on a vehicle. Something quite possible and doable.
The Kornet, developed by Russia many years thence, and imported by India on an emergency basis during Kargil as our wire guided Milans were having their wires snag on rocks, uses laser guidance.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kornet

A laser guided Nag would have had only one disadvantage in that it would not be top attack, and would have had to perhaps field a larger warhead. Even so, while more expensive than wire guided missiles, it would be far cheaper than the IIR guided Nag of today (which is a fairly expensive missile) and could have been mass produced. Needless to say, it would have been available earlier as well.

The only disadvantage for the Namica would be that it would no longer be F&F. But by putting the missiles on an exposed mast and with guidance contained, separating the entire setup from the crew, a degree of safety could have been obtained (as with the current NAMICA). See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... fig4-1.gif (TOW Missile launcher) or the German launcher for the HOT (http://www.nowtheendbegins.com/images/m ... issile.jpg).

As IA indicates, the initial order would be in Punjab where you have better cover and the visibility is not beyond 2.5 KM. In Rajasthan, you most likely need the 4 KM range for shoot and scoot.

Again irrelevant, since a laser guided ATGM at 4 km could have been mass produced as a standard ATGM for armour across most terrains.

In fact it would be better than the wire guided SACLOS rounds in service today, because unlike these rounds it could even be used over water bodies (where wires dip and rounds miss) and even in Urban terrain (where guidance wires get entangled).

The point is not whether the current Nag would be better than a simpler laser guided Nag. It most obviously is.

But a laser guided Nag would be available earlier, would be fairly cheaper, and would have supplanted the need for importing huge number of Milans and Konkurs and subsidizing the arms industries of other countries to begin with. Its worth noting even today, we continue to be reliant on Russia and France respectively for either missile's upgraded versions and then seek to license manufacture them. The Milan-2T actually does not meet the Army's minimum range requirement of 2.5km and comes in at 1.85 km or thereabouts.

Both missiles contain technology which is far simpler than that is on the Nag, yet we have been busy testing and developing a more complex system, while simpler systems were inducted for mass requirement needs and have established themselves. And even today, world leading systems off the shelf cannot meet what the Army expected of the Nag circa 80's when it came up with a requirement.

While yes, its good news that the Army is waiting for an improved Nag, the entire setup is what is wrong.
It is the same as that of the Arjun versus T-90 in some ways, wherein the Army asked for a tank in the 1980's which is hard to make in the 2000's, but in the meanwhile citing a delay in the former, went and imported T-72s and T-90s, both of which are simpler, and far less capable.

Again, it is willing to accept defective pieces in the latter, while asking for the moon in the former. A better balance would have helped.

My take is that if the Army had gone with a simpler missile, it would have been in mass service, and we could have worked on developing Nag class missiles later. And it would have been a big boost for industry.

[Prem Kumar]

Cybaru: the limitation is only for the IIR seeker that Nag uses. The enemy (take Pakistani TOWs for instance) might use a laser beam riding missile, which is not affected by the heat. We want to look first, shoot first and then scoot.

We can argue if 443 is an adequate number, but its a good start for the IA mechanized units to get familiar with the system, devise their doctrines and provide further feedback to DRDO. If the production run starts right away, by the time the 443 units and their Namicas are delivered, chances are that Nag with the new seeker will be ready before the production run finishes.

[Karan M]

Karan, we can't just blame the Army here. DRDO knew what was state-of-art in 1980 and what is state-of-art in 2012. why shouldn't DRDO have flagged it then?! Why promise something which looks difficult to provide anywhere in the near future?!!

Its not about blame but about seeking improvements to a system that can and should be improved...

In India, the system was very lopsided against indigenous manufacture and so pro-license production (which ironically used to be disastrous from time to time and further skew perception of local capability - see the Arjun video). Other cases in point are the constant refusal of Marut follow-ons to HAL, till its design staff was whittled to near nothing, by which time, when a LCA was required, HAL promptly raised its hands and the job went to ADA. This was both due to the lack of vision at MOD, and disinterest of service HQ who were used to getting hand me downs from UK, and later eqpt at friendship prices from Russia. Indian industry was anyways too weak to make such items, and the thought of sponsoring long term projects to make such systems and raise capability was never given serious thought, not till the 1980s anyhow.

So in such a milieu, this is what happens. People used to literally scrounge for important projects, and when these were granted, the estimations made were influenced by all sorts of political considerations and inability to say "no" to the all-important-customer, the services who could then pull the plug before the project was launched. The IGMDP was also subject to such pressures.

When Kalam went to the CCPA (Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs) sort of the forerunner to today's CCS/PM setup - he went with a proposal for 3 programs to be launched. He was then informed by the powers that be that he should launch all five, simultaneously. So that was that, and all the original estimations went for toss and delay was baked into the program from day one.

Similarly, when the Nag project was launched, DRDO pushed for a simpler laser guided missile because that was what they were confident of delivering. Army pushed back & asked for an IIR guided missile (!) and that was that. To say that either the DRDO or the Army could have predicted what technology would be capable of, is heights of folly. At the time, only a handful of countries had credible work on FPA sensors and what was published was what could be accepted as truth. India never had the funds to pursue a national program to indigenize each and every system either. The MTCR era sanctions also affected us by killing the materials source for many of our missiles, so we had to prioritize.

Now, take the Trishul - the choice of radar was again driven by Army! They purchased the Flycatcher and so one way or the other, the choice was made for Trishul. But the bands the radar operated in posed a huge challenge for DRDO because they had to match the missile guidance to the radar, and they faced significant challenges. Again, a "simple decision" ended up in a huge problem.

I find it singularly tragic, for instance, that the Army asked for 80-90%+ Pk fire on the move (and was not satisfied with even 70% later on in the late 90's - early 2000's) from the Arjun in the 1980's, based on BBC of the Abrams et al. When, the aforesaid Abrams came to Pakistan, it had a lousy firepower trial (pretty much missed every target it fired at), Challenger 1 tanks were unable to even fire accurately on the move in GW1, and in the meanwhile having set huge requirements for the Arjun, the Army was happy with its T-72s all the way till yesterday (they still lack complete FCS and have only drop in TISAS), which could not even fire anywhere near accurately on the move, and relied on a "short stop", to use their main guns. Meanwhile, their vision was matched by the GOI, which was offered advanced FCS by the only experienced producer at the time (Raytheon as I recall) for its Vijayanta's for even license production. This would have given DRDO/BEL huge experience and they pushed for it, but they were overruled, and were left to fend for themselves, with limited funds, finally getting a Dutch partner to help them out....who promptly went to the US to get tech.

Net, we have to evolve a system, where requirements are realistic from day one. Better timelines will come about as a result. We can always develop more complex systems as follow ons.

Ultimately we need agencies to understand and forecast tech at both the user and R&D level, and political support needs to be there (plus overarching vision) that one way or the other, indigenization will be pursued and hence transparency at all levels is a plus. No need to agree to unrealistic requirements and at the same, time accountability when a project is undertaken from all stakeholders to see it taken to the logical end. Funding also has to be realistic from day 1. To get programs sanctioned, the developers have always been advised (by well meaning insiders) to get whatever they could, and ask for more later..this sort of stuff leads to both bad press and user skepticism (justifiably). Our system can be improved, and should improve. To begin with, the Army & AF need to see the Navy, and evolve their own product culture.

[Prem Kumar]

Karan: I dont have an issue with the overall point you are making. We have seen best-of-brochuritis from the IA when it comes to indigenous products. This needs to change, no doubt.

Yes - the IA could have been more pragmatic and gone ahead with a mass-produced, cheaper option rather than importing Milans & Konkurs in the thousands. But this is a lesson for the future and doesn't solve the Nag seeker range problem we have today.

The IA is displaying pragmatism in its latest Nag order - this cannot be disputed. One hopes that this is positive trend that will continue. I am optimistic.

Irrelevant claim, since what I am referring to is a 4km, laser guided missile, fielded on a vehicle. Something quite possible and doable.
The Kornet, developed by Russia many years thence, and imported by India on an emergency basis during Kargil as our wire guided Milans were having their wires snag on rocks, uses laser guidance.

I was referring to the difference between a target presented by Namica versus a MANPATGM crew (which is why the 4 KM range is important). Was not talking about IIR versus Laser guided missiles.

Again irrelevant, since a laser guided ATGM at 4 km could have been mass produced as a standard ATGM for armour across most terrains.

I am not arguing in favor of a 2.5 KM Nag. I was pointing out that the IA was pragmatic to find uses for a 2.5 KM Nag even though it wasn't "perfect". A good interim solution and a demonstration that the IA might be finally "getting" the tranche concept.

[Karan M]

Prem Kumar, then we are in agreement.

Incidentally, on the point I was making previously..

This lack of clarity about what it needs and when, has been BTW, a long standing problem and continues today - again, note: http://www.business-standard.com/india/ ... ds/285028/

The CAG report, in unusually blunt terms, points out that GSQRs have been wrongly formulated, reflecting neither the army's own requirements, nor the reality of the market. In the GSQRs for 11 purchases that were scrutinised, the CAG found that four spelt out requirements that were unavailable anywhere in the world.

In four cases, the requirements "were unrealistic with respect to the actual requirements on the ground," which means that they did not meet the army's operational needs. And in seven cases, there was no way of testing whether the equipment met the parameters specified in the GSQRs.

The CAB observed that unrealistic GSQRs meant that, "in 66 per cent of the cases, only a single vendor was pre-qualified." In "single-vendor" cases, the vendor's monopoly means that he can virtually dictate his own price. Even more serious was the CAG's observation that GSQRs were formulated "sometimes merely on the basis of manufacturer's brochure."

Global vendors, admittedly with vested interests, have long alleged that Indian GSQRs are formulated to favour particular vendors. The CAG comes close to confirming that.

The CAG's report also illustrates that GSQRs did not differentiate between essential and inessential requirements in a piece of equipment.

Note - that my gripe is not with the Army doing the right thing with the Nag today - they surely deserve credit for that, my issue is with the systemic lack of product development and requirements gathering culture in the Army, which leads it to spin a lot of wheels..

[SaiK]

I think this is enough said about learning from IN. I feel it is not still late to have a joint force decision making authority for looking into defence projects and programs, where still all the forces have their say, but well scoped to quality requirements rather the hows, nuts and bolts of the decision making. We have enough data and statistics about a need for such and the recent IA issues in terms of purchases etc. This would also energize the joint authority to look it holistic aspects of various sub systems, and reuse of technology across the forces,, etc.

[Indranil]

Karan, I am not absolving the army of any wrong doing. But absolving DRDO of all wrong doing would be equally wrong.

Why did DRDO let itself be in such a gullible position of pandering to whatever is demanded is not understood by me. A position in which the Air Chief Marshal says, "you scientist should tell me what I should want, and not the other way round"? DEfinitely, there is historical perspective and may be alot of blame lies external to the DRDO. But, that DRDO has no fault of its own. That won't be true.

[srai]

Karan, I am not absolving the army of any wrong doing. But absolving DRDO of all wrong doing would be equally wrong.

Why did DRDO let itself be in such a gullible position of pandering to whatever is demanded is not understood by me. A position in which the Air Chief Marshal says, "you scientist should tell me what I should want, and not the other way round"? DEfinitely, there is historical perspective and may be alot of blame lies external to the DRDO. But, that DRDO has no fault of its own. That won't be true.

It's simple really. If one doesn't have experience, one thinks anything is possible as they don't know any better. You think you know but when you start doing it you realize you don't know much. By then, you have locked yourself into a commiment and things still feel doable by tomorrow (only that it was due yesterday). It's a universal human tendency to underestimate how much time it takes to acquire new knowledge and master it. You must have heard of the 10,000 hour (or ten years) rule, which basically means it take at the minimum of 10 years of dedicated effort to become an expert in a domain area.

Now that these DRDO scientists/establishments have couple of decades of experience (technical - manpower and knowledge-/project management/etc) under their belt, they can better tell the users (IAF/IA/IN) what is possible in the given timeframes. Again, if the customer is difficult and keeps moving the goalposts and funding is limited, then expect delays. There are many variables that can cause unexpected delays.

[Karan M]

Karan, I am not absolving the army of any wrong doing. But absolving DRDO of all wrong doing would be equally wrong.

Why did DRDO let itself be in such a gullible position of pandering to whatever is demanded is not understood by me. A position in which the Air Chief Marshal says, "you scientist should tell me what I should want, and not the other way round"? DEfinitely, there is historical perspective and may be alot of blame lies external to the DRDO. But, that DRDO has no fault of its own. That won't be true.

I have given you the answer line and verse, but you have not read it, or perhaps I was not clear enough. Srai has pointed out a huge reason - inexperience. The second reason is desparation.

Indian system for procurement and perspective design was so messed up, with a dysfunctional ad hoc MOD/MOF not looking towards long term planning, similar state of affairs at service HQ, that DRDO/PSU were desparate to get projects, so they agreed to all sorts of demands. Initial haggling went nowhere, so to keep the project, they'd sign on the dotted line. The problem (buck) would be passed onto others who came in later and were left with a mess of unreasonable requirements, constant mission and scope creep, plus low funding. In most cases in India, DRDO is the one stuck with these high risk positions because PSUs are safe since one way or the other, they get business. Because even if you license manufacture, it has to be produced in a PSU. That is what has led them to be so complacent. Its not an anomaly that PSUs like ECIL, Keltron which have been actively seeking and delivering on business, were sick units. They have learnt the hard way that just lazing won't do. But they are the exception, not the rule.

All this business of unrealistic requirements, improper project planning could have been avoided if the MOD had laid out a long term perspective plan with assured funding of technologies and weapon systems. And Service HQ had committed funding and membership from day 1. Instead, in India, we tend to lump all things together.

Take the lack of long term perspective from MOD end
For LCA, both critical technologies AND the platform itself had to be developed in parallel, the highest risk and most difficult approach altogether. Why? Because MOD did not clear any TD program before the LCA, such as FBW development at HAL, which could segue into the LCA.

Assured funding
LCA program has been funded in drips and trickles. It was properly funded only from 1993 onwards. But even so, the program has not been funded for success. Stuff like actuators and materials development requires long term funding and vision. Instead DRDO has clearly used program funding to drive development, and results have been corresponding and not drastic. We continue with shipsets from Moog for instance, same like most other players WW (Rafale, EF) but not like Russia which makes its own. Incidentally when sanctions came, only a handful of sets were available and these were rotated between planes to keep the test program going. A tribute to Indian cussedness and determination, no doubt, but also reflective of how limited procurement was. Similarly, number of prototypes planned initially was way too low.

Lack of service interest
Enough has been written already on this. But it took the IAF a decade after the program started development to even set up and depute a Project Management Team to the LCA program. Otherwise it was something they were clearly not too bothered about. Let it fail, MOD will buy us a new plane..

Fix the above three, and you can have programs run with transparency and clear requirements. A national aero commission ensuring funding, long term planning and transparency, plus PM/R&D set up (limited) at service HQ to give clear requirements and then commit to long term user involvement will assure the above. At developer end, in turn, with insecurity down, they have to commit to clear upfront expenses and go for a reasonable balance of mature vs risky tech.

Otherwise, we will end up with delays and mission creep.

The point is not to blame the Army per se, or blame the MOD or blame the developers.

The point is to fix the system one way or the other. We have far too much taxpayer money going abroad to subsidize their industrial development.

Now, thanks to dual sourcing and offsets, plus the revised DPP (with private participation), things are improving.

But we can and should improve on the above aspects as well.

[SaiK]

srai, classic Sys. Engg and maturity problems.. it is not simple even for experienced to know about newer technology, or even when a new technology is adapted for 90% of the product upgrade or changes. Sometimes, impact analysis can take a long time.

the problem is the scope of the projects.. and there is a natural pace at which it needs to be done from user's perspective. tell me which user wants to pay for old technology, when evil surroundings goes around stealing latest and greatest from amrika. so, there is a time and schedule issue there, that applies to the scope.

drdo's failure is agreed that they have inexperience etc.. but what have they done about it? imho, inexperienced should not consider massive projects like AMCA and with super duper objectives.. planning requires detailed understanding of user requirements that includes user environment, needs, wants, constraints, operational aspects, logistics, etc. there are risks in these where DRDO does not focus. they can't be pure product r&d to production guys.... classic case studies will reveal.

budgeting and planning can assume these super objectives for laying out projects for DRDO, but at the same time they have to look at user needs first and ensure it fits in the planning as early as possible. having the user team part of the project lifecycle is mandatory for success, that is measure time bound, and reviewed on a periodic basis.

continuous engineering cycle is preferred, where projects can be scheduled "as late as possible" to avoid knowledge gaps. [critical chain concept]

[member_22539]

I have given you the answer line and verse, but you have not read it, or perhaps I was not clear enough. Srai has pointed out a huge reason - inexperience. The second reason is desparation. But we can and should improve on the above aspects as well.

+1 billion. Man are you a breath of fresh air. I have never seen anyone articulate what you have said as well as you have. It is a long overdue break from the usual whining, moaning and breast beating. The rule must be carved in that if the development agencies provide the product reasonably up to specs that they will be ordered in significant amounts and at once. All I see is grudging approval after seeing ones fav tincan having its behind kicked, along with no orders in big numbers. How come the tincan was not asked to produce upgrades before more numbers were ordered?

[member_23360]

PDV was supposed to replace PAD in BMD, but didn't heard about its test, are we going to induct phase 1 without PDV ?

[Kanson]

I am not absolving the army of any wrong doing. But absolving DRDO of all wrong doing would be equally wrong.

Why did DRDO let itself be in such a gullible position of pandering to whatever is demanded is not understood by me. A position in which the Air Chief Marshal says, "you scientist should tell me what I should want, and not the other way round"? DEfinitely, there is historical perspective and may be alot of blame lies external to the DRDO. But, that DRDO has no fault of its own. That won't be true.

I see and take that this kind of statement itself is the successful misunderstanding perpetuated by all vested parties, that includes Govt. arm.

When it comes to Security of nation, we acknowledge that it is a team work. But why it is hard to even believe that developing tools to provide that security is not a team work.

Development of Weapons is a team work right from Intelligence (including Military Intelligence), MoD, MoF, MEA(I Kid you to not)....various Govt arms to DRDO and Govt Production agency. In this game of Relay, it is designed that the last man that have to reach the finishing line here is DRDO, & of course Production agency. If DRDO needs to reach the finishing line successfully it can't do so without the help of others doing their parts. In reality there are various pulls and pressures, every dept/inst/org have their own drive and synchronizing their work is most often just in papers. It is for this reason that Kalam was brought in - to Synch. kalam written about how hard it is to make them work as single unit and passed his lessons to all those who graduated under him.

When there is a failure, as it is often a policy in Delhi Durbar, the buck is passed on to others. Irony is, in cases, MoD rather than acting as true manager and streamlining the process, perpetuates the blame game. Often the scape goat is DRDO as he is the last man standing in the game.

The point I'm trying to put across is when there is a failure it is the team that is at fault, whichever way you want to look at it. But that is hardly what you hear through the media.
(For ex, If Kalam can turn things around, is it not MoD's fault not to appoint correct person for every failed project? You get it?)

And there are lobbies, dealers, for them DRDO robbed them of their commission.

So where to start to fix things or to start the blame game, seriously?

a. Long term planning with adequate support. (Karan M put this in his own wordings)

Currently, We are talking about importing IRFPA for Nag seeker from Sofradir to meed the army requirements. While West were into this tech few decades back, we felt the requirement only in 80s. Mind you, we only felt that in 80s. And now we want product comparable to the latest top line of products available in the market. While the West had an head start of few decades, we have to do that all by ourselves in a very less time, to compete with the best product thrown by the west. Is it a fair game?

Long term planning addresses many of the fault lines currently one can see in arms development. And a proper support throughout give enough time to mature the tech and hassle free engineering the tech into product. Which again have the effect on project timeline and cost overrun.

b. Motivation

We often hear that motivation is the biggest x factor for the soldiers to win battles. Every Army have their own set of methods to motivate their soldiers. For conquering a territory or defeating the obstacle a soldier needs motivation. But is it not that the battalions of scientists and engineers working in org like DRDO doing the same thing - conquering and winning battles in unknown territory - needs motivation? They are not only against Nature which conceals all that miracles from us to mold into an engineering product but also many man made obstacles. One of the man made obstacle is the tech denial regime.

We try to obtain the same IRFPA tech that we are currently trying to get from Sofradir for Nag seeker. But it was denied to us, we ought to develop this tech from scratch, literally from scratch. While this tech we are currently perfecting indigenously - at the same time trying to get that from Sofradir as stop gap measurement- can be considered as College grade, we started working on tech which is a Primary School grade. All becoz of tech denial. It is just one man made obstacle. They are many. How much obstacles they need to cross? Don't these people need motivation?

Instead, what we have given them? Blame game. And entire media were brought into this. Even compensation wise, only recently, few years back, it was made adequate and proportionate.

But the biggest motivation is the acceptance from the User and the Recognition.

[SaiK]

The correction process is always the join-strategy force. DRDO-Forces-MoD combined to form joint body to program and project management. All in one umbrella of monitoring and controls network, while indvidiual projects have an establish clean guidelines, with no confusion on the ambiguous requirements and not-really required features.

best examples: delays in many projects
- Kaveri failure [not technological, but PM wise]
- Arjun delays [look at the list of changes]
- Nag [over ambitious seeker ]
- MMR [pathetic project controls and work distribution]
...etc.

If one looks at all these, there can be only one joint unit that can account for all these aspects.
Unless we are serious about our defence industry future, this is a mandatory need.

Blaming about 80kN to 100kN change is a no-win argument. But, currently canceling the snecma deal for kaveri's K10 90kN version is a better idea which is planned to replace GE414 100kN engine., which when done will dissatisfy the user- for sure. very visible, but no body raises the voice early enough., and keep silent, and only discuss when the failure happens.

Preventive management and proactive strategies are looked as negative and bad names to org and people working there, is wrong.

[vic]

The range of Nag is not 2.5km. Only on few days, in middle of afternoon, in few locations it's "seeker" range is reduced to 2.5 km.

BEL has been asking for seed money of around Rs. 1000 crore (now) for setting up IIR sensor manufacturing line, which is being denied for one decade, because of our belief in "foreign maal is better".

There is no ATGM with Indian army which can hit even 2.5km in those extreme Rajasthan conditions. Can Pakistan do so?

I wonder, why Indian army does not come forward to mount Nag on light trucks for mountainous regions, where it can be a deadly bunker buster and direct fire munition.

Why not give initial orders for Helina??


PS- question to Army supporters, what is the miss distance of kornet & Invar missile at 4km?

[SaiK]

my point is this should be based on orders, but based on actually functioning of the system to requirements. if done, there should be an automatic process establish to produce the variant till such time a new variant comes up for production, such a way the production is not kept idle.

if every local development is based on orders, then we will never ever develop. funds should be driven established process. process correction should happen at the core.

[Karan M]

I just realized that Tarmak had reported all this (about Nag) way back in December 2011!

Bangalore/Hyderabad: This is the gripping love story of anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) Nag and its system sweetheart NAMICA (Nag Missile Carrier), that went awry. The climax of probably the longest story of India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), will finally unfold during coming Summer. Who will wed Nag? Will it be the NAMICA being re-groomedd by Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) or the one being nurtured by Larsen and Tubro (L&T)? Adding twist to the tale is the possibility of the best of both systems being taken and rolled into a single macho carrier.

The wait has put Hyderabad-based Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) into an emotional spin, considering that the Indian Army had earlier placed its Acceptance of Necessity (AON) for 443 Nag missiles 13 NAMICAs in 2005. The Army had made it clear then that a firm commitment will only be given once all trials are successful and the system is fit for induction. The Army also projected in their perspective plan the need for 7000 Nag missiles and around 200 NAMICAs.

“As a complete weapon system (Nag + NAMICA) a final commitment will be given only after the Pokhran trials in coming summer. After the user trials in 2010, we had accepted Nag as an ATGM, but wanted integration with launcher improved,” Army sources told Express. The electro-mechanical systems of the two NAMCIAs used during trials (both made by BEL) were found to be below Army's expectations in tough dessert terrain conditions, including reliability concerns propping-up.

Work on Nag weapon system began in 1987 and the day version of the missile proved its mettle in 2000. Then the Army and DRDO top brass wanted the missile to have day and night capabilities, which is said to have developed in 2002. Later, the need for dual sensors was felt, including IR sensor for day/night and CCD (charged coupled device) for day. Finally, in 2007, the development of missile was completed along with NAMICA and user trials in phases were held during 2008-2010, until the NAMICA became DRDL's Nag-ging niece. “We have hence decided to go for two companies (BEL, L&T) and the best NAMICA will be selected after comparative studies and re-validation trials. The competitive evaluation of reconfigured NAMICA is possibly the last hurdle before the Army places the order,” sources said.

The upgraded NAMICA boasts of an advanced fire control system (FCS), advanced sighting system for both gunner and commander and compact auxiliary power unit (APU) which operates inside the hull compartment. “The carrier will offer a better launcher drive mechanism, reduced weight, smooth mobility and amphibious capabilities. Earlier the Army wanted eight missiles on the launcher and four in the stowage. Now, this has been reduced to six ready-to-fire missiles on the launcher only,” sources said.

DRDL claims that the missile can hit target up to 4 km in favourable conditions and up to 3 km in adverse conditions. “It is a very potent warhead which can pierce in excess of 850 mm of armour. A new seeker being developed in-house will take the range to 4.5 km, and guaranteed 4 km under all conditions. So far the project has cost over Rs 300 crore and a total of 80 missiles were developed in the pre-production phase by Bharat Dynamics Ltd. Around 50 missiles were used during trials,” sources said.

So will it be BEL, L&T or best of both going to be the winner? In love and war, seldom you get a second chance. Stay tuned!

[vasu raya]

if ISRO can setup Antrix, whats stopping DRDO to have similar export specific agencies, at least that will give them maneuvering room with regards to order volume, the hurdles they will be facing wouldn't be different from what they are facing now

[Karan M]

DRDO is not a manufacturing agency so they need the manufacturer to also step up. Plus being in defence company, their primary customer does not like these systems open for everyone else to examine. Making export versions costs more money and time as well.

[vasu raya]

now a days the supply chains extend into the private sector, they shouldn't have a problem stepping up, even Americans don't like anybody peeping into their secrets, still they are managing exports and so is China

yes, please do safegaurd technologies, and I believe you will still be left with enough product portfolio good for exports, the financial gains can help fund developing your core technologies

while the armed forces have the flexibility of importing and fund foreign MIC, DRDO can have the same for exports to fund itself

[member_19648]

All these are fine, but exporting is not DRDO's choice to make, it is MOD's, DRDO can only propose I believe. Like the example for Dhruv, Brahmos etc, the exports are frozen till the demand from the armed forces are met. Similarly, it can be for Nag, till the time demand is met from the armed forces including the enhanced version, DRDO has to cater to it.

[nakul]

All these are fine, but exporting is not DRDO's choice to make, it is MOD's, DRDO can only propose I believe. Like the example for Dhruv, Brahmos etc, the exports are frozen till the demand from the armed forces are met. Similarly, it can be for Nag, till the time demand is met from the armed forces including the enhanced version, DRDO has to cater to it.

The Nag respresents an excellent scenario that can be taken advantage of. After delivering 443 Nag missiles to IA, DRDO can export this variant till the better variant is developed for IA. Larger orders will mean lower costs for the buyer (foreign as well as Indian).

[vasu raya]

I remember DRDO and armed forces settling an issue where DRDO can have veto on mil imports only when they can provide an viable alternative

just saying DRDO has enough clout but never read a report that they would be interested in exports except as part of GoI made strategic decisons

[pragnya]

if ISRO can setup Antrix, whats stopping DRDO to have similar export specific agencies, at least that will give them maneuvering room with regards to order volume, the hurdles they will be facing wouldn't be different from what they are facing now

they were planning one by the end of 2010. not sure if it has been put into place or exports are being 'seriously' thought -

DRDO to float commercial arm

Another from DNA

[vasu raya]

^^^

Thanks Pragyna, want to see beyond exporting Dhruv and find their motivation in that as well

[rohitvats]

@Karam M –

You have made multiple points on the NAG development aspect and I disagree with them; here are my views on the same.

First things first – No ATGM of the NAG class is employed by the Infantry. This is one product where the development cycle has not impacted the operational deployment of the army. And hence, till date, there has been no third party induction of such a system. The standard ATGM of the Army is Milan-2 /2T – because it is both cheap and man portable. Development of a beam riding Nag could not have served as an alternative to Milan-2/2T for two simple reasons – (a) Weight (b) Price.

The compact launcher that you linked for Kornet still weighs 29 Kg with missile itself weighing 27 kg. The Milan-2/2T assembly on the other hand weighs <12kg and Javelin unit weighs 18.2 Kg. Javelin is heavier as it carries a real heavy warhead for its class.

Same is case with TOW or HOT – these two missiles are categorized as heavy ATGM; all the countries which deploy these missiles have separate man portable ATGM in their arsenal. While the Europeans have their Milan-2/2T+HOT, Americans have their Dragon ATGM+TOW as the combination of light and heavy ATGMs. Javelin is now replacing Dragon ATGM in US Army – the TOW remains in use with modified (but SACLOS) variants.

Even the Kornet you talk about is not a missile for missile replacement of other man portable ATGMs in the Russian Army because of the price aspect. Their man-portable ATGM of choice is the 9K115-2 Metis-M or AT-13 Saxhorn-2. Kornet is entering service with dedicated tank-killer platforms where it is competing against other systems.

Pakistan Army which deploys TOW missiles does so with dedicated ATGM units - called as Heavy and Light AT Battalions depending upon platform of deployment (APC versus 4x4 vehicles). The fact that the system can be dismounted does not make them man portable or alternative to such missiles. PA also uses the Bakhtar-Shikan + TOW combo in its ATGM arsenal.

Also, in case of India, if there was ever a case of deployment of Kornet by Infantry, it could have been only by the dedicated ATGM Units of the Guards Regiment during Kargil. Emergency and limited use in a specific environment is hardly an argument for developing a system of a particular type. Especially, when Kornet is hardly a missile you can lug around in the mountains. Even then, the number of missiles imported as given on Wikipedia is paltry 250 – not even a dip in the ocean of ATGM requirement of IA. Had it been such a fantastic system meeting the requirements of the man portable ATGMs in the IA – I’m sure army would have gone for these rather than Javelin – after all, don’t we see a Russian lobby behind everything?

And which man portable laser guidance are we referring to as an example? AFAIK, there is none.

So, as far as man-portable laser guidance ATGM is considered, there is no case, or even template, for Nag being able to serve as replacement of Milan-2/2T.

Coming to second part of the argument - ATGM for the deployment on the BMP-2– again, we’re mixing facts here. BMP-2 and BRDM came with AT-5/Konkurs and then we started manufacturing Konkurs-M variant, which was a natural extension of Konkurs in our service.

So, unless we were planning to develop Nag as direct and future replacement for Konkurs-M in our inventory, I see no reason for developing laser guidance missile in the first place. And good we (or IA) did not link the development of Nag as replacement for an existing system – or we would have gone the Arjun way with pressure to import from outside in case of any delays.

And AFAIK, while Russia has displayed an upgraded BMP-2 with Kornet Missiles, the one proposed domestically comes with 2 x thermobaric missiles and 2 x Konkurs-M. While we may well see Kornets on BMP-2s (I would love to, it is a more potent system), the cost of deploying Kornet ATGMs on BMP-2 with their associated guidance system may well be a hindrance for fleet wide deployment of Kornets. Not to mention the increment in weight as Kornet weighs 2-times the Konkurs plus the weight of associated guidance unit.

You also referred to deployment of laser guided missile on vehicles - except for Russia with its Khrizantema system with AT-15 missile, which other systems of the type are (or were) operational? And how about the facts that not only are such missiles not Fire & Forget but also have limitations in terms of number of missiles which can be launched? AFAIK, each system can guide only one missile at a time.

As far as the development of a missile of type like Nag is concerned, we need to go with the deployment philosophy of IA and not what is simply doable. IA has never shown any inclination for stand-alone and dedicated ATGM systems or units – had this been the case, I’m sure systems like BMP-T or Khrizantema would have already entered the army.

IA is trying to fill a niche role here with a dedicated missile.

Where is the case of BBC here? The development from day one called for a F&F missile - If I understand correctly, the development of ATGM called for three versions – wire-guided, IIR and MMW. The wire-guided version was not developed for some reason while we know MMW represent its own challenges which are likely to be resolved in future. The world over, the transition from SACLOS (of wire guided type) has happened to F&F Missiles of 3rd generation. Only Russia has laser guided SACLOS missiles in its inventory – and IA has not shown any inclination for such missiles.

On development of technology – what I fail to understand is why justifications for delays in LCA program attributable to lack of industrial base not applicable here? Why is development of LCA good for aerospace complex of India while in case of Nag we have accusations of BBC thrown at IA? Because the former was conceived by the technocrats + scientist while in this case it is IA which asked for a particular thing?

As I said the world over, the transition is under way to 3rd generation F&F system – what good a SACLOS system have been with advancement in protection technology of tanks? What would have been shelf life of such a system and technology and how soon would have IA started to ask for F&F capability? And what would have we been doing about HELINA? Importing some western missile for it? What would have been arguments against the army then? What is rationale behind developing something for the sake of it?

From my perspective, the development of Nag and associated 3rd generation technology will help this country in the long run. IMO, Javelin is an interim purchase as far as the man portable ATGM is concerned – maturity of guidance technology on Nag will assist in developing home grown solutions for this requirement.

Without Nag, we would have been staring at importing such things lock stock and barrel. Whether we like it or not, we would have had to either develop or import the 3rd gen FPA technology. It is good that it is happening without the pressure of immediate induction of alternatives or stuff like that.

[Katare]

Rohit,

It seems tanks (both T90s and Arjun) can fire missiles up to 5-6KM range with rather large warheads and almost assured destruction of target. How does these missiles differ from Nag type dedicated carriers in destruction capabilities? What additional advantage a Nag type missile brings that justifies a whole new logistics chain integrated to armor thrusts/defenses?

I can think of Top attack capability, even larger warhead than tank fired missiles, better guidance with F&F and faster speed. Are these advantages of Nag type missiles needed to defeat a worthy Paki/Cheeni tanks/targets or the MBT fired missiles are sufficient to tackle these threats?

Nag seems to be real heavy killer but how much of this kill capability is actually needed and critical for IA? Is it more of a "nice to have" weapon that if available can be used effectively? Would it ever be deployed without MBTs around and if yes would it survive against enemy tanks?