Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

[vic]

IAF track record:-

Killed follow on of Marut for Jaguar DPSA
Killed HTT-35 and imported BTA
Killed Ajeet trainer off shoot and imported AJT-Hawk
Killed follow on of Ajeet for fighter (?)
Dragging its feet on LCA
Refusing to clear HTT-40
Refusing to clear CAT-AJT
Trying to kill Light Helo project
Dragging its feet on MLH and importing MLH
Delaying LCH due to over stringent specifications

[RKumar]

I don't agree with you Rohit!! IAF is against domestic products, there is no doubt about that. They have tried to kill each product systemtically, be it trainers or fighters. IAF is a spolied kid, who like to play with only imported maal.

RKumar, why is a lovely HPT-32 product crashing? Why are trainees & instructors dying? Did your father flew the lovely HPT-32 product? Or did you send your son/daughter to fly in that lovely HPT-32 product?

Keeping family outside of this debate which is non of your business.

How about lovely Mig-21s, Mig-23, Mig-27 or even mightly Su-30 or Mirages .... if a plane flies it will crash some time. Can you list a plane, which is extensively used but never crashed?

I would like to ask why there was no continues follow up of different programs? HPT-32 or Marut, we cry we don't have experience but why it was not developed step by step. Why a requirement for better product was not issued? after 5-10 years of service of HPT-32. If it was issued then why it was not followed up? Why there are always last minutes reactions then continues correction actions?

[pragnya]

philip,

Prag,details show that the Gnats.Ajeets were being completely phased out and that the two trainers were sent to the last operational sqd.The whole line was shut down.

they all were was phased out in 1991. 2nd Ajeet flew in 1983. the La Fontaine committe formed in late 70s studied the problem and gave its recommendation in 1985.

an interesting but old report/2003. do read it. it is revealing.

The IAF did their job with the AM La Fontaine Committee,made their recommendation which should've been taken up asap! After the IAF gave its choice in '85 for the Hawk,it was sanctioned a year later.When something has been "sanctioned",it is in the MOD's domain not the IAF's. The ball was then in the MOD/GOI's court.How could the IAF then ask for an inferior Gnat trainer not in production, after plumping for the Hawk approved by the MOD?!

but pray tell me if the GOI had no money, how were they going to pay for it?? remember india had to pledge gold in the early 90s(!).

in the light of the timeline of the La Fontaine study (1977-82) and the Ajeet prototype flying in 83 and then everything going quiet after that, i am more inclined to beleive Vina when he says -

The decision to shut down the line was a consequence of choosing the Hawk.

at the least Ajeet could have been a back up/stop gap till Hawks arrived. unfortunately IAF preferred waiting for the Hawk!!

[vina]

In fact, there is an extremely sensible write up on this entire sordid saga of trainers by Prasun K. Sengupta, who is rather "unpopular" here at BRF to put it mildly. But a must read I think, RIP HTT-35, HTT-40, HJT-36 and LUH and this was written in Dec 2012.

So really now the mangled decision making and "logic" of the IAF and MoD falls into place. Fundamentally, the IAF killed HTT-35 in the mid 90s and goofed up in asking HAL to make the IJT instead of an AJT (well , they killed a perfectly fine AJT earlier, so now asking them to revive one would have been bad form). Now they have an imported AJT , and an IJT which is due for service entry anytime (plus the soldiering on Kiran MKII) and are stuck with a 3 stage training regime (while the others have gone to a 2 stage one) .

In a perfect world, they would have an AJT and a PC-21 /TexanII/Super Tucano class trainer that does the 3rd stage and 1st and 2nd stages. But now with the "inconveninent" ITJ coming in, what they did, was dilute the BTT specs to fit in the IJT into it's training system.

Prasun is right. The MoD files on this from 1990 to 2005 needs to be declassified / got via RTI , if you need to get to the bottom of this . Ajai Shukla listening ?

[nachiket]

^^The IJT project is lost in the wilderness. Its engine is unreliable and the last couple of crashes apparently had nothing to do with the engine which means there are problems with the airframe as well. So I don't know how you have concluded that it is due for service entry at any time.

[vina]

^^The IJT project is lost in the wilderness. Its engine is unreliable and the last couple of crashes apparently had nothing to do with the engine which means there are problems with the airframe as well. So I don't know how you have concluded that it is due for service entry at any time.

Zimble onree. No news is GOOD News. We haven't heard anything at all about it, which means that it is fine. If it wasn't so, you would be seeing crowds of Natashas planting stories in the DDM and wiggling their hips.

Also, I see almost daily , a trainer flying early every morning (around 6 to 7 am , the LCA flights start just a little later) for the past few months in Bangalore. I cant make out if it is IJT , but I think it is. Seems like a pretty good tempo being worked up towards certification that is due. So all in all, the problems would have been licked (the engine just needs to mature and be certified in full, which will happen).

[pragnya]

mods, excuse me for putting this old report (2001) in full but i think it is relevant.

philip, please go thro' the report below. among other things it addresses the money factor!!

Pilot training and accidents in the Indian Air Force

THE LONG running debate over the IAF's proposed purchase of advanced jet trainers (AJTs) poses more than a few interesting questions that are rarely asked, leave alone answered, at least in public, so here goes...

First, a brief history. In the early 1980s, the IAF decided that it was facing unacceptably high levels of losses of both aircraft and fighter pilots and set up a committee under Air Marshal La Fontaine to study the problem. The committee submitted its report in 1984 saying that the accidents were a result of young pilots having to "convert onto'' high performance MiG-21 fighters straight from basic jet training on the HAL Kiran or the PZL Iskra. The committee went on to recommend that the solution lay with introducing an advanced jet trainer to bridge the gap between the two stages.

The AJT saga has since become almost mystical with imminent acquisition, regardless of price, stories alternating with accusations of corruption and "offers'' of alternates to the front-running British aircraft, the Hawk, ranging from the Franco-German Alphajet to the Russian MiG-AT. By all accounts, the Hawk is an excellent aircraft, but no aircraft is a magic bullet that can single-handedly transform pilot training and the AJT's acquisition could divert attention from perhaps more important criteria such as pilot selection, training standards, maintenance and so on.

Acquisition of the 66 Hawks reportedly required by the IAF will cost over Rs. 9,100 crores assuming that all of them are bought on the same terms that the NATO flying training school in Canada acquired them in 1999. This is the initial acquisition cost alone, with total maintenance costs over the lifetime of the aircraft being at least twice as great. Incidentally, the aircraft purchase is likely to be spread out over a few years, but in a peak year the outflow on this count may exceed 5 per cent of the total annual defence budget!!

Before getting into advanced fighter training, it is worth reviewing the IAF's current pilot training structure, concentrating on fighter pilots. Officer cadet training in the IAF is concentrated at the Air Force Academy, Dundigal (near Hyderabad), except for engineers, who train at Jalahalli, near Bangalore, and doctors, who attend the Armed Forces Medical College in Pune. Those expected to be inducted in to the IAF after three years at the National Defence Academy spend a year at Dundigal, whereas "Direct Entry'' officer cadets (who already have a university degree) train for a longer period.

Ground training at Dundigal in subjects ranging from aerodynamics, propulsion and navigation to meteorology is followed by, and concurrent to, primary flying training on the Deepak piston engined trainer made by HAL, Kanpur. Those successfully passing through this screening stage transit to the Kiran or the Polish Iskra jet trainers with the "Kiran stream'' moving onto armament training on the Kiran II. Some of this training is also conducted at the nearby Bidar and Hakimpet air bases. Successful completion of this basic training stage does not automatically lead to further fighter pilot training as the IAF also needs good transport and helicopter pilots and navigators, but the largest group heads for Tezpur, in Assam, and MOFTU, the MiG Operational Flying Training Unit, where they train on two-seat MiG-21s. Passing out of MOFTU means that the young officer finally becomes a fighter pilot who stays with the 21s or moves onto other fighters. The typical IAF fighter pilot goes on to "type qualify'' on more than one aircraft.

The statistics


Accident, or loss, rates of combat aircraft are usually measured in terms of incidents per ten thousand operational hours or "sorties.'' These are often not publicly disclosed and the IAF is no exception in this regard. However, the IAF with 26 aircraft lost in 2000 and 30 the year before is easily at the top of the accident league of large air forces and one can safely assume that measurements in terms of operational hours or sorties will not significantly affect its "record.''

Eighteen of the 26 aircraft lost in the year 2000 were fighters with the others ranging from helicopters to trainers like the Kiran and Iskra. Not all the 26 aircraft losses were fatal to the pilots concerned, but some were and the loss of civilian life and property on the ground was not insignificant.

Of the 18 fighters lost, ten were MiG-21s, prima facie a high level. Closer examination, however, reveals that only two were in Assam (or elsewhere in the North East). If one assumes that student pilots of MOFTU caused both, two out of 18, leave alone two out of 26, is a very low proportion hardly justifying hysteria on this count. Even this low figure might well be an over statement because a significant amount of MiG-21 operational flying takes place in north eastern India and the lost aircraft could well have been on those sorties.

The real reasons


Other reasons for losing the aircraft could range from bad weather to ageing aircraft and parts shortages leading to engine and structural failures. The morale of the IAF's engineering officers, and therefore of maintenance, reached a nadir during the Sareen era of the 1990s and one hopes that the small reduction in aircraft losses seen recently is a reflection of improvements effected following the extreme foolishness of that period.

If one goes back further in time, however, one discovers that the IAF used to have an excellent safety record - comparable to the best in the world. What has changed? Why have fighter pilot standards fallen so precipitously?

One can "buy'' the absence of an advanced trainer argument only if all the crashes were solely a result of errors at MOFTU by inexperienced pilot officers, but that falls flat on its face if the accidents involved pilots who had qualified from Tezpur and even more so if it involves flying officers, flight lieutenants and squadron leaders, and a large proportion do.

The obvious question that needs to be asked is if pilot selection and training has been compromised so far that those who ought never have been allowed to have been selected for further training, leave alone qualified as fighter pilots, have been let loose to cause mayhem in the sky and on the ground. Introduction of an advanced trainer should not be used to compensate for gross inadequacies in selection or training - it never can.

Mr. Fernandes should not allow himself to be led up the garden path with regard to the AJT. It is not only a matter of the tens of thousands of crores that the Hawks will cost over their lifetimes - only the best pilots contribute to national defence, while the others may end up costing it dearly for years to come.

C. Manmohan Reddy

http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/biz/2001/ ... 250100.htm

[member_20292]

......The much smaller Navy moved on to that path ....

And THAT , my dear Sir, in organizational behavioural term, is the "Nabz" of the problem.

All the services are HIGHLY top down, heirarchial systems, with a strong chain of command.
This is the exact opposite of what you actually want, if you want a highly innovative ecosystem. In an innovative ecosystem , which ideates, creates, adopts quickly, many small ideas are tried out all of the time. Each member of the ecosystem has similar amounts of power. He is free to try and retry small experiments; be those experiments, in technology, or partnership, or program, or ideas; and keep the ones that succeed.

All variations of this central theme of "democratized innovation" are present in the successful , somewhat innovative ecosystems that we see today around us; Silicon Valley, the US educational system, the IT giants in India.

This AGILE innovation takes place best in smaller organizations. Thats the point.

To remedy this. If the Army creates a "CENTRAL INNOVATION COMMAND" , it would be not correct.

However, if it were to institutionalize a culture of bottom up ideas coming up. I.e listening to the gunner about the bofors, and having the ideas permeate up the chain; allowing the gunner to make a trip to HAL/OFB/IITM to speak to a Professor of Mechanical engineering about what to do about the creep resistance and the fatigue resistance of his gun, how to oil the gun to prevent corrosion, then THAT would be a bottom up culture of innovation.

[sum]

In fact, there is an extremely sensible write up on this entire sordid saga of trainers by Prasun K. Sengupta, who is rather "unpopular" here at BRF to put it mildly. But a must read I think, RIP HTT-35, HTT-40, HJT-36 and LUH and this was written in Dec 2012.

From the same *haraam* link, interesting comment by PS:

Here are some of the unpardonable mistakes made by India’s apex decision-makers since the early 1990s:
1) Failure to undertake indigenous production of 1,000 FH-77B 155mm/39-cal towed howitzers since the early 1990s despite the OFB coming in possession of complete technical data packages required for series-production on an industrial-scale of such howitzers.
2) Failure to undertake indigenous production of up to eight additional Class 209/Type 1500 SSKs between the mid-1990s & 2005 to add to the four procured, despite MDL procuring the complete technical data packages and intellectual property rights required for series-production on an industrial-scale of the Type 1500 variant of the Class 209 SSKs.
3) Failure to mentor & financially support HAL between 1991 & 1998 to complete R & D work on the HTT-35 BTT, due to which the IAF & IN will in future be forced to procure & operate Pilatus PC-7 Mk2 BTTs.
4) Failure to mentor & financially support HAL to develop the HJT-36 as an AJT & not IJT between 1999 & 2007, due to which the IAF & IN will in future be forced to procure & operate BAE Systems-developed Hawk Mk132 AJTs.
5) The MoD’s & IAF’s combined failure to authorise ADA to develop the Tejas Mk1’s tandem-seat operational conversion trainer as a lead-in fighter-trainer (LIFT), more than 80 of which are required for both the IAF & IN.
6) Decision to opt for 1,000 T-90S MBTs at a time when the DRDO’s Arjun MBT project & TANK EX project both needed financial support & long-term industrial commitments in order to ensure guaranteed amortisation of financial investments that were sought from several Indian private-sector military-industrial companies. Had both the MoD & Army HQ thrown their combined weight behind both these projects, then by now the IA would have had the most potent inventory of MBTs in South Asia, & the obsolescence of the existing fleet of T-72M1 MBTs would have arrested & reversed almost a decade ago.
7) Failure to develop a naval PESA-based volume-search radar variant for installation on board principal surface combatants.
The IN’s failure to acquire a dedicated ocean-going vessel that could be used as a trials vessel used for testing out & validating the fitment & systems integration of various on-board mission sensors, mission management systems & propulsion systems PRIOR to their installation on board operational principal surface combatants.

Most of the points listed seem true and relevant

[Sanku]

Should have been given.. come on who gave the IN anything? The IN took it, )

IN took it? IN or any other services cant "take" anything.

GoI GAVE IN responsibilities -- Namely DGND Directorate General of Naval Design.

It also GAVE IN enough clout to send officers to head PSU docks. No IAF officer is being made head of HAL is it?

Despite massive IN control over its vendors, the situation is only better, but not good enough because the many issues still

http://thestrategicdialogues.com/tag/na ... gn-bureau/

Higher defence management in India suffers from two critical flaws that impact unfavorably on the ability to adopt a strategic approach to maritime force planning and naval ship construction. The first of these is the lack of sincere integration of Naval Headquarters (actually Service Headquarters) with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) such that it would be a part of the Government apex decision making structure. This condition exists despite recommendations of the Group of Ministers report for reforming the National Security Apparatus submitted in February 2001. The disjoint has led to establishments such as the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO, a part of the MoD) failing in their primary task of attaining self reliance in weapon systems without being answerable or indeed accountable to Service Headquarters and, downstream, to the shipbuilding programmes. The Navy on its part has no say in the matter other than to propose continued reliance on imported systems, the adjudication of which is presided over by the most unlikely and ill suited of agents—the bureaucracy in the MoD headed by the Defence Secretary. Consequently, delays, inefficiencies and sub-par decisions then become normal to the process.

The second debilitating flaw is another set of bizarre impediments that come to play when a comprehensively considered case from Naval Headquarters is meaninglessly put through multiple layers in the three departments under the MoD as well as its finance wing and then to the Finance Ministry before reappearing on the Minister’s table. These Kafkaesque processes not only mock maritime force modernization but also compromise attaining a strategic posture.

[Sanku]

On the other hand, here is the from Ship yards that they are pathetic because they are tied to Navy's apron strings

http://defencesecurityindia.com/indian- ... ted-gains/

In case of major warships, the Navy prefers telescopic method of construction in which the design parameters are kept open for a long time. This often impinges upon the schedule and cost of warship construction. Moreover, many a times the Navy brings in major changes in the design parameters midway through the construction process which necessitate modification and cause further delays and cost overrun. Similarly, since the Navy nominates the key equipments and their sources of procurement, the shipyards find it difficult to adhere to those decisions, for the reasons of higher cost, lack of competition and timely delivery. As a result, the normal construction schedule gets affected with due impact on the cost.

Yeah if only Navy gave them the free reign, the ship yards would fly, just like HAL one supposes

Historically Indian shipyards are dependent on foreign sources for ship design, because of a lack of investments on R&D and shortage of qualified naval architects and engineers. This has been a major factor why the majority of the Indian shipyards, especially the private yards, are constrained to participate in major naval shipbuilding projects, which involves more complex design compared to commercial shipbuilding. Among the defence PSU shipyards, except for the MDL, no other yards have full design capability to undertake construction of bigger and complex warships. Even MDL’s design capability is not comprehensive. Like other shipyards it is also dependent on the Navy which is the overall nodal agency for design activities pertaining to warship building.
However, this arrangement has not helped the Indian shipyards, including the MDL to become independent for the entire spectrum of shipbuilding, besides creating some other peculiar problems. As one general manager of MDL noted, “Dependence on the Navy’s design has over the years proven to be detrimental to the shipyards …which do not get direct exposure to any new design concept and have stopped thinking about generating their own designs.”

Poor poor DPSUs -- need to depend on Navy design, otherwise they would design the titanic, onlee that it would never sink, because it would never sail.

[Sanku]

This by DPSUs has gone on TOO long. They need to be told that it is THEY who need to do THEIR job, or have their control handed over to IAF/IA if all they can do is pass the buck to IA/IAF.

Let IA/IAF officers take over the control of significant parts of MoD and INTEGRATE, the functions of user, procurement and internal development, at a top level.

THAT is the solution.

[vina]

Let IA/IAF officers take over the control of significant parts of MoD and INTEGRATE, the functions of user, procurement and internal development, at a top level.

Out dog pound of the Armor and Artillery thread and trying to put smoothbore guns on the Arjun, and running loose, I see.

Ah, Maharaj Ji. Fighting men will also do Babugiri and Netagiri. Why of course it is the old saying, that a Prussian officer with his rules book can accomplish anything in the world.

Of course, he can also sing like this I suppose.

[Philip]

What about the miserable quality issue of aircraft supplied to the IAF? Read the AM's statements about "burn marks on brand new engines supplied,no space between engine and fuselage",etc. Going by the anti-IAF posts,we have had for decades the world's best aircraft manufacturer ,HAL,and but for a set of spoilt pilots ,who can't train anyone for nuts,not a single aircraft would've crashed!

Guys,everyone knows how difficult it is to maintain an automobile that is around 4-5 years old.After 3 years a Japanese baby needs to be sold.Imagine how difficult it has been for the IAF to nurse the MIG-21 for 50+ years! An indifferent MOD/GOI takes decades for an AJT to be acquired-no fault of the IAF here,because the sanction was made just one year after the bird was chosen.The IAF had been pleading for decades for the AJT without success.As a poster has said,we need an RTI to examine the files on the subject to establish who was responsible for the fiasco of the Hawk/AJT acquisition decades late.

Here's a '99 report on who is to blame.So please stop blaming the IAF who have been the victims of indecision and indifference from the MOD.

"Ask the babus why IAF doesn't have an AJT even after 13 years of perpetual demand?" the officer said. A recent report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence had pointed out the immediate need for an AJT, while pulling up the government for delaying the purchase.

Just look at this piece of backtracking by the DM/MOD Uncle George!

Jet trainer remains a Mirage for Air Force
TNN Nov 22, 2002, 04.03am IST

NEW DELHI: The estimated multi-billion pound British Hawk deal appears to have run against a wall with indiscernible pressures stalling the induction of the advanced jet trainer into the IAF.

After having asserted in a Channel 4 interview in July that the Hawk AJT deal was close to being finalised, defence minister George Fernandes' admission on Tuesday that "half a dozen aircraft could now be said to be in contention for the AJT deal'', has raised fresh doubts about the finality of Hawk making it to the IAF stable.

http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/22j ... [quote]IAF has one of the highest accident rates in the world

Josy Joseph in New Delhi

The staggeringly high number of crashes involving Indian Air Force planes, especially the MiG variant fighters, is due to the lack of advance jet trainers, inadequate maintenance and inefficient technical upgradation of the fighters, say senior air force officials. The air force has lost at least 20 fighters in the last nine months, most of them being MiG-2s flown by young officers just out of the Air Force Academy.

The latest crash of an IAF plane was on Sunday, when a Jaguar fighter on a routine sortie crashed at Gorakhpur.

Air force sources admitted that IAF has one of the highest accident rates in the world and that most of the ill-fated pilots - it has lost over 85 pilots in the last one decade - were very young officers. "Major reasons could be the lack of Advance Jet Trainers, and some technical troubles, especially with the MiG-21s," a senior air force officer said.

The IAF has been wanting to purchase an Advance Jet Trainer, highly sophisticated jets on which pilots can be trained in stage III, but various factors including bureaucratic delays have put the crucial project in the cold storage for over a decade now. "Ask the babus why IAF doesn't have an AJT even after 13 years of perpetual demand?" the officer said. A recent report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence had pointed out the immediate need for an AJT, while pulling up the government for delaying the purchase.

According to available information, in the last eight years the IAF has lost over 190 aircraft - majority being MiG 21 variants. Sources point out that the upgradation of the IAF's MiG-21 fleet -- of the 32 MiG squadrons, 16 are MiG 21 variants -- has not yet borne any fruit. The IAF and Russian authorities had tied up for a major technical facelift and upgradation of MiG-21s, but till date only two fighters have been upgraded.

In a statement made in March this year, Defence Minister George Fernandes said of the 37 IAF plane crashes since January 1997, 15 were due to technical defects while 12 were caused by human error. In three cases both of them were responsible. In two of these accidents, it was during training that the accident took place involving the training aircraft Kiran Mk 1A. But in nine cases it was pure human error on the part of the trained pilot that caused the accident.

On the equally high degree of technical problems, a senior official admitted that the upkeep of IAF aircraft, which is with the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, could be a reason. "HAL is an external agency, and all major maintenance are done by them," the officer said. He pointed out that there is almost no research and development in this sector, "which is crucial."

Another major reason is bird hits, because of which in 1996 the IAF withdrew its fighter squadron from Hindon, near Delhi. The IAF had identified 10 of its airfields as very prone to bird hits, but the Urban Affairs ministry and other agencies concerned have done very little to date. "We have been telling all concerned about the seriousness of the matter, but very little has been done," sources said.

In 1989 a Mirage 2000 had crashed, but otherwise the two Mirage squadrons have been relatively free of accidents. Till now four Mirages have crashed, while 19 Jaguars and four MiG 29s have been destroyed in accidents. Almost the rest of the fighters that have crashed were of the MiG 21 variety.

In March this year, an AN-32 transport aircraft had crashed very close to Delhi airport killing all 18 IAF personnel inside. The transport squadrons, though made up mainly of vintage planes, have been recording a much lower accident rate.

The last independent audit of the IAF's flight safety was done in 1997, by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India where it examined the nature of 187 accidents and 2729 incidents involving IAF aircraft between April 1991 and March 1997. It had pointed out that though the "overall accidents per 10,000 flying hours have registered a decline over the period 1991-97, the accident rate of fighter stream, particularly MiG-21 variants continue to be high." The IAF lost 147 aircraft and 63 pilots during 1991-97.

The report said, "The synthetic training equipment viz flight simulators, computer based training equipment and hot shot training aid are either not operational or have not been acquired depriving the training pilots of Indian Air Force of modern training equipment. The execution measures for minimising the bird menace in and around the airfields is languishing." [/quote]

And the IJT saga.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2013/02/h ... e-jet.html

Hindustan Aeronautics' Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) that has been in development since 1999

by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 5th Feb 13

The Indian Air Force (IAF) continues to grapple with difficulties in training its pilots. While quality basic training will become possible as the Pilatus Aircraft Company delivers the 75 PC-7 Mark II basic trainers that India bought last year for Rs 2,900 crore, the next stage of training remains an issue. IAF officials say the failure of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to develop an Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) is now a serious hurdle to training.


HAL has been developing an IJT, called the Sitara, since 1999. The IAF has forked out R&D costs of Rs 600 crore (up from an initial estimate of Rs 180 crore), and assured HAL of an order of 12 prototypes and 73 operational trainers. But, with the IJT delayed by almost a decade and still at least three years from delivery, rookie pilots will continue to train on outdated and inadequate aircraft.

The IAF trains its fighter pilots in three phases. Stage-1 training will now be carried out on the propeller-driven Pilatus PC-7 Mark II. From there, pilots graduate to Stage-2 training on jet aircraft, which is currently carried out on the vintage Kiran Mark I since the IJT Sitara, which was supposed to replace the Kiran long ago, has not been delivered. Finally, pilots carry out Stage-3 training on the vaunted Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT), which was acquired in the mid-2000s.

“The IJT has been a very poorly planned programme by HAL and a decade-long delay is unacceptable in a trainer aircraft. Given how much time and money the IAF has already committed, we have to stick with the IJT programme and induct it into service as a Stage-2 trainer,” a top IAF official bitterly complained.

But patience is running out in Vayu Bhawan, the IAF headquarters. A senior air marshal told Business Standard that, if the IJT was not delivered within three years, the IAF would consider using the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II as a Stage-2 trainer, in addition to its primary job as a Stage-1 trainer.

“The Pilatus could also be used for Stage-2 training until the IJT is ready. This could be done using the same aircraft, by putting the trainee pilots through more complex flying exercises,” explains the IAF official.

The IAF brass believes that HAL made a major blunder in deciding to change the IJT’s engine, replacing the French Larzac engine around which the Sitara was designed, with a more powerful AL-55I engine built by Russian engine-maker, NPO-Saturn. In 2005, HAL signed a $350 million contract with Russian defence export agency, Rosoboronexport, to build 250 AL-55I engines under license in Bangalore, with an option for 1000 more. After developing the engine, Moscow insisted on payment of another $64 million.

“HAL should never have gone in for a new engine mid-way, because an aircraft is always designed around its engine. Instead, they should have upgraded the Larzac,” points out a top IAF planner.

Contacted for comments, HAL has not responded. According to engineers involved in the IJT’s development, the testing regime that governs the new Russian engine has delayed the flight-testing of the IJT. This was predictable, since any new engine requires extensive and progressive testing. In this, the Russian certification agency allows the engine to fly only a fixed number of hours, after which the agency examines the engine and then clears it to fly a small number of additional hours. This progressive certification often holds up flight-testing.

Business Standard has followed the IJT Sitara’s development since the early 2000s, on regular visits to HAL. Design began in 1999, and the aircraft flew in 2003, a remarkably quick development process. But then, the engine was changed and problems began. Last year, an IJT prototype crashed, fortunately without loss of life.

HAL has said that it intends to build the IJT in its Kanpur facility, at a cost of about Rs 50 crore per aircraft.

.

[ramana]

The real issue is the polticians see defence purchases as a off the books and out of sight source of bribes. The long delays are to neogotiate with entities on how to structure the bribes or commissions. Meantime crisis hits India and its back to square one.
Having said that the services should have nurtured the local mfg base as time and again India has been subject to sanctions.
Off the three services IN has the best record of supporting the local base however there are still things that can be imporved in the shipyard throughput.

As to IAF I really dont know what steps were taken to locally procure all the ammo and ordnance that they need for a short and furious war.
Its poor record that they havent managed to get a cluster bomb locally produced in all these years.

[Philip]

Tx AG for that insightful chronological explanation of the issue.Going by the "Gnat would've sufficed" yardstick (keep on making Ambys) when the IAF was acquiring 3-4gen fighters,we should've just kept on building Kirans instead of developing an LCA supersonic trainer,which should have great potential for exports!

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 084_1.html

After the Hawk, a supersonic trainer LCA

It took immense public pressure and the death of tens of Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots for the government to okay the purchase of 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) for training rookie pilots on fast jets before sending them off to the MiG Operational Flying Training School (MOFTU) in Tezpur. There they are put into the cockpit of one of the world’s fastest and most unforgiving fighters — the MiG-21. It is no coincidence that accidents are dramatically down since training began on the Hawk.

Now the IAF is purchasing another trainer that could equip its pilots even better for flying the high performance fighters — the upgraded Jaguars, MiG-21s, 27s and 29s, the Mirage 2000s, the brutally powerful Su-30MKI and the MMRCA, when that is inducted — which will comprise the new IAF.

Top MoD sources have told Business Standard that the IAF will soon order from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) twelve of the newly developed two-seater trainer version of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). DRDO chief M Natarajan confirms that the Tejas trainer is set to make its first flight within two months.

This will give IAF pilots an additional stage of training. Currently, Stage I is carried out on a basic trainer, the HPT-32; Stage II on slightly faster and more complex aircraft like the Kiran; and Stage III on the jet-engined, but sub-sonic Hawk AJT. The induction of an LCA trainer will allow IAF pilots to fly a supersonic, light fighter before graduating to the combat squadrons.

Most advanced western air forces do not conduct four stages of training; instead, they rely extensively on aircraft simulators. But the IAF, like some other air forces, has tended to prefer live flying. To benefit from such a demand, South Korea has built and is marketing a supersonic trainer called the T-50 Golden Eagle. Natarjan declared at Aero India 2009 that the Tejas trainer would compete effectively with the Golden Eagle.

Ashok Nayak, Managing Director of HAL’s Bangalore Complex and the company’s next chief, explains that the Tejas assembly line will be busy until 2014, producing the IAF’s first order of 20 Tejas aircraft, which will include 16 single-seater fighters and 4 twin-seater trainers. Then, while the Tejas is reengineered and flight-tested with a new, more powerful engine, the assembly line will produce 12 more trainers.

For HAL, the new order is a relief, as it will keep the Tejas assembly line rolling. Nayak points out: “It is not in the interest of the Air Force, or of HAL, to have a break in production.”

Business Standard travelled to HAL for an exclusive look at the new Tejas trainer. From the outside, there is little to distinguish it from the single-seater fighter that performed aerobatics at the just-concluded Aero India 2009 show. A closer look, however, reveals an expanded cockpit, in which two pilots — an instructor and a trainee — sit one behind the other, both equipped with all the controls needed to fly the aircraft.

The design team for the twin-seater Tejas trainer was led by two women engineers — Poongothai, and Mamatha K — of HAL’s Aircraft Research and Development Centre. They pointed out that the additional pilot’s seat and controls have all been squeezed into the existing airframe, obviating the need for time-consuming redesign of the single-seater Tejas’ airframe.

PS:This is a 4 yr. old report!

[Victor]

The argument that IAF should have chosen Ajeet trainer for their IJT/AJT is just more bilge water to mask/exonerate HAL's stellar record. If the Ajeet was even barely suitable as a trainer, they would have used it, even if only as a stop-gap. The fact that they did not tells us that the aircraft was totally unsuitable as a trainer. The IAF had a far better regard for HAL back then and it is very likely that they just kept quiet about it. If it had happened today the story would be quite different. In any case, they had asked for and been promised the Hawk. It was the babus who kept putting it off for decades. HAL for its part did not come up with a trainer of any kind and is still struggling to get the HJT-36 to pass muster. Perhaps the Sitara will be ready when we are flying 7th Gen fighters.

[Ramu]

Tx AG for that insightful chronological explanation of the issue.Going by the "Gnat would've sufficed" yardstick (keep on making Ambys) when the IAF was acquiring 3-4gen fighters,we should've just kept on building Kirans instead of developing an LCA supersonic trainer,which should have great potential for exports!

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 084_1.html

PS:This is a 4 yr. old report!

Good Point! If I read it a week ago, I would have wondered why these so called 4 trainers still not manufactured. (PV5 flew at the end of 2009)

Is it MoD not releasing funds to HAL to setup shopfloor?
Is it HAL not giving enough attention while busy with assembling SU30s, Jaguars, AJTs etc?
Is it ADA not competent enough to get the operational clearance on time?

Recent Shukla's revelations about BTT tells me one thing clearly. If IAF has desired enough, those four 2-seater LCA would have been parked in Sulur during these 4 years. If IAF makes remarks about Fighter X/Trainer Y delays, may be thats what IAF desires - years and years of delay.

IAF has been able to acquire what it has desired consistently throughout its history. We just have to hope that whatever we are making is what IAF desires.

Rest of the discussion about specs, IOC I, II, III, ejection seats, AoA, etc are moot points to me.

[vic]

So that is why IAF Chief lied about the cost of Pilatus for the benefit of Nation?

[Philip]

Ramu,I don't think that it is the IAF that is responsible for the lack of LCA trainers.The IAF had expected the LCA's first sqd. to have been based at Sulur in 2011.One report says that Sukhois are to be based there in the interim.The IAF is fully aboard (after the programme got serious) the LCA bandwagon,and has been for some time now.It has placed its trust in HAL by ordering 40 Mk-1s.From the 2009 report 12 LCA trainers are supposed to be in the pipeline,but from reports of the last year,HAL has yet to get its production line perfected,as LSPs are being "custom built"each supposedly differing in some way from the other like prototypes.The IN too has had its "leap of faith" and the NLCA was rolled out with much fanfare,but landing gear problems,weight,etc., has slowed down its IOC schedule.No major problem here with the delays,as our new carrier,the Gorky/Vik will only start arriving later this year and the MIG-29Ks are in fine fettle at Goa waiting to land on her.

However,the Achilles heel of the LCA project is still the engine,as MK-2 hasn't arrived yet with the 414.This bird being the definitive version of the LCA,which will determine its true future,must enter production seamlessly after the first 40 Mk-1s are manufactured,which should be at double the rate of the official initial rate of just 8 per year.At that speed,we would've built barely 40+ a doz. trainers by 2020,when Rafale production (before 2020) and FGFA production would've started .How enthusiastic the IAF will be by that time when our threat scenario would've markedly changed ,7 years from now,is a moot point.It is why I've stated that to keep the LCA programme relevant,an incremental development of a MK-3 with some degree of stealth tech is a logical way to keep our boffins busy,order books happy,until the definitive concept for the AMCA has been finalised and the enormous amount of 5th-gen tech required for all aspects and components of the aircraft are available indigenously to as great a degree as possible.

Here is the CAS's speech made at Sulur in Dec. 2012.It carries some interesting points,but his later statements made at Aero-India 2013 and others this year would give a fuller picture.

Addressing mediapersons after the presentation of the President’s Standard to 25 Squadron and 33 Squadron at the Air Force Station, Sulur, the CAS said a fair amount of expansion for both was on the anvil.

“Six C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, designed to carry out special operations during combat, have already been inducted, and a contract for six more will be inked soon. Also, ten C-17 aircraft from the U.S. are expected to arrive in India and will become part of the IAF in June 2013. Such strategic airlift capabilities will be multiplied manifold. Ten more C-17 aircraft will join the IAF as part of phase II,” the Air Chief Marshal said.

The IAF was also looking at replacing IL-76 in the next 10 or 15 years with upgraded versions of AN-32s and C-17s.

On the upgrading of helicopters, of the 80 medium-lift Mi-17 V5 helicopters, for which a pact has been inked, 42 had already been inducted. A fresh contract to procure 59 more helicopters was expected to be signed soon, he said. When these got inducted into the Air Force, they were expected to become the backbone medium-lift capability in the Northern and Eastern sectors, he added. “Negotiations are on to induct 22 Apache attack helicopters, and heavy-lift Chinook helicopters in Chandigarh and Jorhat,” the CAS said.

On shortage of 700 pilots, he said “It was being made good” and by the end of the XII Plan period there was a proposal to enhance training capabilities to enable induction of more than 220 pilots every six months, the stipulated intake now.

Regarding induction of new helicopters into the Army and the Navy, he said the medium-lift, heavy-lift and attack helicopter units would continue to remain with the IAF because “duplication is going to cost the Government a lot of money”.

For such future acquisitions, the Army would have to make a fresh case with the Government, he added.

Commenting on the delay of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) into the IAF and early retirement of some aircraft, the Air Chief said the present combat squadron strength of 34 would not reduce in the XII and XIII Plan period.

“LCA will be inducted in 2015 and more squadrons of Sukhoi-30MKI will be formed in the near future. Numbers may go down but capabilities will be multiplied 10 times,” the Air Chief Marshal said. The tests for fitting the air variant of BrahMos in the Sukhoi aircraft were under progress and would be ready by 2013.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/t ... 214859.ece

[Ramu]

So that is why IAF Chief lied about the cost of Pilatus for the benefit of Nation?

This is the half a billion dollar question IAF needs to answer wrt Pilatus procurement.

Ramu,I don't think that it is the IAF that is responsible for the lack of LCA trainers.The IAF had expected the LCA's first sqd. to have been based at Sulur in 2011.One report says that Sukhois are to be based there in the interim.The IAF is fully aboard (after the programme got serious) the LCA bandwagon,and has been for some time now.It has placed its trust in HAL by ordering 40 Mk-1s.

Philip sir, Specifically wrt LCA, I am not trying to blame the delay entirely on IAF. There were few technical issues as it would in any such projects. I also agree with you that IAF got serious lately (I guess after 2009-2010 when PV5 & LSP3 started flying). But it also means some bunch of guys worked on something for 20 years which IAF wasn't fully onboard. They must have done commendable job if they actually brought IAF fully onboard.

Its the same story with HTT40. HAL developed something which IAF wasn't interested. I am not saying LCA, HTT40 are world beating innovative products that are best in their class worldwide. But it is about how best they are to our national interest.

Recycling 2000 crores within our country - for a trainer - during peace time - while spending rest of its capex 20000 crores on foreign procurements - when rupee value is so low is definitely in my national interest.

Spending $500 million to a foreign country during our current financial situation cannot be justified as a cost effective option.

I don't have an issue with any procurement that has been already signed or paid for. But I wish IAF changed its mindset wrt its future projects/procurements. It is in our national interest.

[arijitkm]

RUAG offers Dornier 228NG to India

The Swiss-German RUAG Aviation is offering India the modernised version of Dornier 228, which will help reduce HAL’s production costs by about $ 2million per aircraft.

The Dornier 228 NG (Next Generation), under production now by RUAG in Germany since 2009, is a more efficient aircraft than the model with India, and once an agreement is through between RUAG and HAL, then not only would there be savings in cash but RUAG will also give a commitment to buy at least six aircraft per year from HAL.

India’s HAL has been producing the existing model for several years after an agreement in mid-1980s for use by the Indian Air Force (IAF), Navy and Coast Guard, and the aircraft is only manufactured by it with global marketing rights. In fact, HAL supplies the aircraft’s entire airframe to RUAG in Germany where it is customised for onward sales to RUAG’s own customers, mainly for specified intelligence and surveillance roles.

A RUAG delegation was in India recently, and according to Thomas K Schilliger, Vice President Commercial Programmes, RUAG Aviation, if everything goes well, the production of this twin engine turboprop in India along with HAL could begin next year itself with delivery from 2015 onwards.

The NG version has newer Honeywell engines, TPE331-10 turboprops, which are more efficient than the Honeywell Garrett TPE-331-5-252D in the current Indian model, as also a modern glass cockpit which is used in all modern aircraft.

HAL, which has produced nearly 120 aircraft so far, describes the Dornier 228 it manufactures as a highly fuel-efficient, rugged, reliable, twin turbo-prop aircraft with advanced technologies in design and production and has been developed specifically to meet the manifold requirements of a variety of roles for various military, para-military and civil operators. Functional versatility with low operating costs makes HAL DO-228 adaptable for a wide variety of roles including Commuter, Air Taxi, Utility, Corporate, Aircrew Training, Maritime Surveillance, Search & Rescue and for Observation & Communication duties.

There is now a new requirement for 54 new Dornier aircraft and for the sake of commonality and costing, Dornier is looking for a tie-up for the Next Generation model with HAL. “It is to mutual advantage both in terms of technology and costs,” Schilliger told India Strategic recently.

RUAG wants to shift its Dornier 228NG production facility in Germany to India to cater to both the Indian as well as western customers by offering the aircraft manufactured by both the companies jointly in India.

RUAG however will customise the interiors by itself, depending upon whether an aircraft is needed for passenger or Intelligence role, he said.

Dornier 228 NG is described by RUAG as a versatile, reliable and cost efficient aircraft qualified for various special mission and regional air traffic.

The new Dornier has features like state-of-the-art avionics and communication systems, Universal UNS-1 digital glass cockpit with four 5x7in (13x18cm) Multifunction Displays (MFDs) featuring electronic instrument displays, better engines, longer range, better payload, new landing gear design and five-bladed propellers to name a few. EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) has certified it to fly for up to eight hours. The propellers are made of composite material in order to decrease the weight and noise of the aircraft.

RUAG sees a potential for some 300 Dornier 228 NGs internationally over the next 20 years.

[Austin]

22 fighter aircraft, including 10 MiG-21s, crashed since 2011

In the last three years, 22 fighter aircraft, including 10 MiG-21 planes, and 18 helicopters of the armed forces have crashed in which 49 people including 44 defence personnel were killed, Lok Sabha was informed today.

“From 2011-12 to 2012-13 and current year, 22 fighter aircraft including 10 MiG-21s and 18 helicopters of armed forces have crashed,” Defence Minister AK Antony said in a written reply in Lok Sabha.

In these accidents, apart from the loss of aircraft, 44 defence personnel and five civilians lost their lives, he said.

Replying to another query, the Defence Minister said the government has plans of operating the MiG-21 Bison aircraft till 2025.

“The upgraded version of MiG 21-Bis known as the Bison, is planned to be operational beyond 2019 up to 2025. MiG Bis is planned to be decommissioned in 2018 as originally scheduled,” Antony said.

On the investigation into the VIP chopper deal, he said the CBI had earlier frozen the accounts of former IAF chief SP Tyagi and his relatives.

“However, subsequently all the bank accounts have been de-frozen as per a court order, imposing certain conditions on the bank account holders,” he said.

[member_27444]

Somebody here said Gnat needs brute power from the pilot to control?
And without hydraulics?

It is hard to imagine a Jet fighter with out power steering!
Are we being told that surfaces are controlled by wire pulley rack and pinion
Like the Dakota's and other propeller air craft used to have twine or wire!

Kinda hard to believe

Also somebody said we publish papers
But still import engines like lycomingi
I am puzzled

[Victor]

somebody said we publish papers
But still import engines like lycomingi
I am puzzled

I'm puzzled too...by this statement of your's.

See some of us here are angry at the absurdity of this very thing and are dissing the DPSUs. That happens in a free country. You on the other hand are dissing India and Indians in blanket fashion. What's up with that?

Anyway, what you wrote should still help some of us make a point. You see, DRDO has designed and made a whole series of piston and rotary engines and display them along with impressive specifications at defense exhibitions. There is no need to display them but they do. There is a need to design weapons around them but they don't and we are still buying UAVs from Israel. We call this the "science project" problem of the DPSUs. [edit: we *may* be using a drdo engine on the Nishant UAV that was recently tested]. The defense space is closed to the private sector for all practical purposes, no matter what the sly politicians and bureaucrats say. It is a govt controlled racket where efficiency and productivity are not the top priority and it is apparent for all to see. We can't hide it.

Compare this to the Indian auto industry which was thrown open to full competition. Everyone was afraid that the industrialized countries will eat up our auto market but look what happened. India exports more cars than China. It has become a R&D destination for all the majors. Tata and Mahindra design and use their own engines and their SUVs are more popular than the foreign ones in India. Bharat Forge is the auto parts supplier of choice in the USA and elsewhere because they make forgings better, cheaper and faster than anybody else.

India can easily make world class guns, tanks and planes if the market is thrown open to competition. Unlike autos, the defense market is controlled and financed by the govt just like it is in every other country and it will have to obviously support qualified companies in a regulated market. How to do it is not a mystery--we just need to look at how it is done in countries that have a successful defense industry.

The next bus we will likely miss because of this criminal PSU policy is the coming explosion in civil air transport. Airports throughout India are going to be upgraded and within a decade or two there will be a need for hundreds of passenger jets. However, our neta-babu combine are already planning to corner this market too and it is very likely that we will end up buying these planes from Boeing, Airbus and Embraer.

[Pranay]

http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/ ... world&_r=0

Blog on NYTimes re: MIG 21's - BR gets a mention...

The MIG-21, which marked 50 years of service with the Indian Air Force in April this year, has been the backbone of the air force’s fleet. The aircraft has participated in every major conflict involving India since 1963, and still forms the bedrock for most of the air force’s operations.

Even as the MIG-21 stands tall in its performance for the Indian armed forces, its safety record, specifically in the past decade, has come under harsh criticism. A few months back, India’s defense minister, A.K. Antony, said that out of 29 crashes over the past three years in the Indian Air Force, 12 have been MIG-21 airframes. Two more MIG-21s have crashed since Mr. Antony put out those numbers.

Because of the MIG’s poor safety record, the aircraft has been given grim tags in the public sphere like the “Flying Coffin” and the “Widow Maker.” More than 170 Indian Air Force pilots have been killed in MIG-21 accidents since 1970. These accidents have also resulted in the deaths of 40 civilians.

The Indian Air Force has inducted more than 1,200 MIG variants in its fleet since 1963, when it was first used by the military. Currently, at least 252 MIG-21s are known to be operational in the air force, according to the Indian military enthusiast site Bharat Rakshak, including the latest upgraded version, the Bison.

[vic]

IAF track record:-

Killed follow on of Marut for Jaguar DPSA
Killed HTT-35 and imported BTA
Killed Ajeet trainer off shoot and imported AJT-Hawk
Killed follow on of Ajeet for fighter (?)
Dragging its feet on LCA
Refusing to clear HTT-40
Refusing to clear CAT-AJT
Trying to kill Light Helo project
Dragging its feet on MLH and importing them
Delaying LCH due to over stringent specifications

[pragnya]

Austin,

how many upgraded AN 32 apart from '25' (as of feb 5, 2013) are delivered?? and how many Mig 29K/Kubs (apart from the first 16) delivered so far??

thanks.

[eklavya]

IAF track record:-

Killed follow on of Marut for Jaguar DPSA
Killed HTT-35 and imported BTA
Killed Ajeet trainer off shoot and imported AJT-Hawk
Killed follow on of Ajeet for fighter (?)
Dragging its feet on LCA
Refusing to clear HTT-40
Refusing to clear CAT-AJT
Trying to kill Light Helo project
Dragging its feet on MLH and importing them
Delaying LCH due to over stringent specifications

HAL track record:-

Failed with under powered Marut project
Failed with deadly HPT-32 project and killed many IAF pilots through inability to fix fuel line problems (basic engineering)
Killed many IAF test pilots while failing to produce a safe Ajeet trainer
Failed to produce LCA on time and killed many IAF pilots flying aged MiG-21s and forcing huge cost on country for imported fighter aircraft
Failed to solve HPT-32 fuel line problems and has no credibility on HTT-40 project, which will be minimum 10 years late, 2x promised price and 50% of promised capability going by previous track-record
Failed to produce IJT on time and has no credibility to produce AJT
Failing to meet user specifications on LCH that it must have willingly accepted when awarded the project?
Failing to set up a production line for LCA

[Kakkaji]

I think HAL should focus on delivering the IJT and the LCA right now, and not fight for the BTT. It can keep developing BTT in the background with its own funds but don't stop Pilatus at this time.

After it has delivered the IJT and it has served in the IAF for a few years, the IAF will be more willing to consider the BTT produced by HAL, which would hopefully be ready by then.

[Austin]

Austin,

how many upgraded AN 32 apart from '25' (as of feb 5, 2013) are delivered?? and how many Mig 29K/Kubs (apart from the first 16) delivered so far??

thanks.

AFAIK , On Mig-29 , 16 from 1st batch is delivered , 4 from second batch of 29 has been delivered and another 7 by 2013..so we can expect 27 Mig-29K by EOY.

On An-32 the latest update is http://www.defencenews.in/defence-news- ... ld&id=1712

“Of the 40 aircraft that are to be upgraded in Ukraine, 25 have already been modernized and passed to the customer, and five more are at the stage of technical acceptance and will be sent to India soon. A seventh batch of An-32s is to be transferred to the Indian side by the end of the year.An eighth batch arrived in Kyiv for modernization in mid-July, and its transfer to the customer is scheduled for early 2014,”

[Philip]

Reg.RUUAG and the Dornier offer.We should pick it up.years ago we missed the boat when Fokker was up for sale.Look at how the Chinese are picking up important elements required for their self-reliance.AWST reports that they have picked up a German turbo-prop engine manufacturer,Thielert,whose diesel aero-engines are also good prospects for the wider African adnd Asian market where diesel is available.AVIC has also entered the US with sizeable investments in two US cos. prop aircraft and light jet manufacturers.Its fighter building arm has also been negotiating with Cessna .

[rohitvats]

Link to written reply given by IAF to the allegations made by Ajai Shukla in his article on HTT-40.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/156957781/Pro ... or-the-Iaf

Couple of points:

1. Blows the accusations made by AS to smithereens; no wonder AS called the reply 'verbose'. It counters all the points made by AS.

2. Shows how badly AS was played by powers-that-be - someone took him for a royal ride and fvcked him (and his reputation). It is obvious that facts and data points were presented to him in a manner so as to make IAF look like favoring a particular vendor.

3. Fact is, this is one of the incidences where IAF did not go about with 'BBC' mentality. The whole process started with 'Make' category but grounding of HPT-32 led to a situation of MOD allowing purchase of 75 'Buy' category products.

Question which remains - If HAL was to originally built the 106 of the balance trainers, why is the IAF not wanting them to develop the same now? My guess is that once the Pilatus came on board at a particular price point, HAL's offer became redundant. And very EXPENSIVE.

[chetak]

Reg.RUUAG and the Dornier offer.We should pick it up.years ago we missed the boat when Fokker was up for sale.Look at how the Chinese are picking up important elements required for their self-reliance.AWST reports that they have picked up a German turbo-prop engine manufacturer,Thielert,whose diesel aero-engines are also good prospects for the wider African adnd Asian market where diesel is available.AVIC has also entered the US with sizeable investments in two US cos. prop aircraft and light jet manufacturers.Its fighter building arm has also been negotiating with Cessna .

We missed the boat on the Dornier 328 also. The designs, plant and fixtures were available at a very very economical price at it was a fire sale situation for Dornier.

[eklavya]

Link to written reply given by IAF to the allegations made by Ajai Shukla in his article on HTT-40.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/156957781/Pro ... or-the-Iaf

Many thanks. Makes for very informative reading. Ajai Shukla is a joke, and the IAF has truly exposed him for what he is.

[pragnya]

Austin,

how many upgraded AN 32 apart from '25' (as of feb 5, 2013) are delivered?? and how many Mig 29K/Kubs (apart from the first 16) delivered so far??

thanks.

AFAIK , On Mig-29 , 16 from 1st batch is delivered , 4 from second batch of 29 has been delivered and another 7 by 2013..so we can expect 27 Mig-29K by EOY.

On An-32 the latest update is http://www.defencenews.in/defence-news- ... ld&id=1712

“Of the 40 aircraft that are to be upgraded in Ukraine, 25 have already been modernized and passed to the customer, and five more are at the stage of technical acceptance and will be sent to India soon. A seventh batch of An-32s is to be transferred to the Indian side by the end of the year.An eighth batch arrived in Kyiv for modernization in mid-July, and its transfer to the customer is scheduled for early 2014,”

thanks.

any idea what happened to the RFI issued by IAF (bypassing Russia) a couple of years back wrt IL 76 servicability and maintainence

[Austin]

pragnya , No idea on where we stand on it today , if you come across any thing share with us too.

[svinayak]

http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/ ... world&_r=0

Blog on NYTimes re: MIG 21's - BR gets a mention...

The MIG-21, which marked 50 years of service with the Indian Air Force in April this year, has been the backbone of the air force’s fleet. The aircraft has participated in every major conflict involving India since 1963, and still forms the bedrock for most of the air force’s operations.

Even as the MIG-21 stands tall in its performance for the Indian armed forces, its safety record, specifically in the past decade, has come under harsh criticism. A few months back, India’s defense minister, A.K. Antony, said that out of 29 crashes over the past three years in the Indian Air Force, 12 have been MIG-21 airframes. Two more MIG-21s have crashed since Mr. Antony put out those numbers.

Because of the MIG’s poor safety record, the aircraft has been given grim tags in the public sphere like the “Flying Coffin” and the “Widow Maker.” More than 170 Indian Air Force pilots have been killed in MIG-21 accidents since 1970. These accidents have also resulted in the deaths of 40 civilians.

The Indian Air Force has inducted more than 1,200 MIG variants in its fleet since 1963, when it was first used by the military. Currently, at least 252 MIG-21s are known to be operational in the air force, according to the Indian military enthusiast site Bharat Rakshak, including the latest upgraded version, the Bison.

NYtimes is a trash and this news is not really for a mainstream media. THis is a specialized info in other media.

[aharam]

Blog on NYTimes re: MIG 21's - BR gets a mention...

The MIG-21, which marked 50 years of service with the Indian Air Force in April this year, has been the backbone of the air force’s fleet. The aircraft has participated in every major conflict involving India since 1963, and still forms the bedrock for most of the air force’s operations.

Even as the MIG-21 stands tall in its performance for the Indian armed forces, its safety record, specifically in the past decade, has come under harsh criticism. A few months back, India’s defense minister, A.K. Antony, said that out of 29 crashes over the past three years in the Indian Air Force, 12 have been MIG-21 airframes. Two more MIG-21s have crashed since Mr. Antony put out those numbers.

Because of the MIG’s poor safety record, the aircraft has been given grim tags in the public sphere like the “Flying Coffin” and the “Widow Maker.” More than 170 Indian Air Force pilots have been killed in MIG-21 accidents since 1970. These accidents have also resulted in the deaths of 40 civilians.

The Indian Air Force has inducted more than 1,200 MIG variants in its fleet since 1963, when it was first used by the military. Currently, at least 252 MIG-21s are known to be operational in the air force, according to the Indian military enthusiast site Bharat Rakshak, including the latest upgraded version, the Bison.

The 21 is not a forgiving aircraft - it was built in a different era for a different war with very different loss dynamics where a classification such as interceptor still existed. Components age, airframes age, engines age and most importantly expectations change. A fighter ought to be as easy to fly as car is to drive - the question is a car of which era? By today's standards a p-51 Mustang is a death trap - again different era, different priorities.

The Mig 21s failure rate in the IAF is to one you can't answer simply with statistics. A plane that has served successfully for half a century is a bit more complicated.

Cheerios
Aharam

[manjgu]

@aharam.. rightly said... humans also age..i go to hospital more often now..sometimes its the knee, sometimes the eye. Doctor says take it easy pal..u r not the same as u were 40 years ago time to bid adieu ...