Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

All threads that are locked or marked for deletion will be moved to this forum. The topics will be cleared from this archive on the 1st and 16th of each month.
Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 21053
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Philip » 31 Jul 2013 19:12

Surya,posted similar reports in the AMCA page,including lesser number of FGFAs now intended (144) and delays too.There are details about the content of the tech transfer that will benefit us.As I've said in that post,even advanced nations are having difficulties with 5th-gen stealth fighters (JSF,Japan,SoKo,apartf rom the Russian bird),and that it is highly optimistic to expect us to produce an "indigenous" AMCA when even the LCA flies with a GE engine and firang radar.

However,here is a most interesting report (not sure if earlier posted) on the IAF's innovativeness,using transports as bombers ever since it used AN-12s in '71,which also underscores my analysis that the IAF needs a dedicated strategic bomber of medium size that can carry Nirbhay and (hypersonic) Brahmos in internal weapons bays.These two missiles are going to be our key stand-off weapons in the next decade.

IAF’s Innovative use of Transporters as Heavy Bombers.If we are using AN-32s now,then our IL-76s and even C-17s in the future could play similar roles.
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories ... ombers.htm

By Gulshan Luthra Published: April 2013

Pokhran Test Range, Western India. On February 22, two An-32 transport aircraft successfully bombed their assigned target at the IAF’s annual Iron Fist exercise at this firing range in the Thar desert of Rajasthan.

The bombing by the transport aircraft was a scheduled event, indicating that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been working at this concept steadily, ever since 1971 when it first deployed An-12s to bomb the hell out of Pakistani formations attempting to cut Kashmir from the rest of India. Although no confirmations of the damage caused by these bombing were officially available, a western news agency had reported several thousand Pakistani casualties and heavy losses of their armour.

The bombings were done at night, after IAF achieved air superiority in the western sector (and air supremacy in the eastern sector) in the Bangladesh Liberation War.

It is interesting to recall the development and successful execution of this concept, and the contribution in this regard of 44 Squadron, which is now equipped with IL-76 aircraft. It was on board an aircraft of this squadron that I flew along with media colleagues and defence attaches from various embassies to Jodhpur towards the Pokhran range.

Pakistan of course would not have given out any operational deployment details or those of its losses. But western press reports indicated that the then Pakistani martial law administrator General Yahya Khan had deployed around 30,000 troops in his offensive to cut Kashmir, and that the IAF raids had crippled those forces.

According to Air Marshal (Retd) Ashok Goel, an authority on transport aircraft and India Strategic’s Aviation Editor, IAF had toyed with the idea of using the An-12s for bombing when Wing Commander VC Mankotia, VM & Bar, took over the command of IAF’s 44 Squadron in 1967. The innovative idea was encouraged by the then CAS (Chief of the Air Staff), Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh.

However, while IAF is keeping up with the practice, Air Marshal Goel believes that it would not be possible to use transport aircraft in today’s hi-tech air defence environment.

Nonetheless, it is worth recalling the inspiring effort that IAF made in this direction, surprising the Soviet officers who observed that the AN-12 was normally not meant for bombing missions. They did indeed compliment the Indian pilots.

Wing Commander Mankotia got some cradles built locally to store and roll out the bombs and crews were trained for low-level night missions. His successor, Wing Commander AK Bhattacharjee continued enthusiastically with the training; unfortunately, he perished in one night training mission near Pune along with the crew.

On May 25, 1971, Wing Commander VB Vasisht became the Commanding Officer of No. 44 Squadron . He selected seven crews while his flight engineer, Warrant Officer Rangaswamy, mathematically worked out the sequence and timing of each bomb’s fuse. The aircraft’s rear 35mm turret gun was activated and a rear radar was installed.

The aircraft was configured to carry 28 to 36 500-pounders for carpet bombing, and the day the war broke out with a Pakistani attack on December 3, 1971, six aircraft of the 44 Squadron led by the Commander himself bombed Pakistan Army’s Changa Manga ammunition depot in the forests for two days.

In the next round, a Pakistani artillery concentration around the Haji Pir pass was attacked, and based on intelligence inputs, the GOC-in-C Lt General Sartaj Singh congratulated Wing Commander Vasisht and later told him that a Pakistani artillery brigade had been wiped out.

The aircraft, based in Bareilly, were then tasked to attack Pakistan Army’s 18 Division at Fort Abbas across Ganganagar, then Suleimanke head works, and then other installations around Bhawalnagar. In one operation, Wing Commander Vasisht flew at about 200 ft, provoking the Pakistanis to open their air defence guns and disclose their positions. Other aircraft in the formation were at about 6,500 ft and they were able to deliver fire with pinpoint accuracy.

Wing Cdr Vasisht, who was awarded an MVC (Maha Vir Chakra), India’s second highest gallantly award, also attacked Pakistani formations three more times. Interestingly again, in the last attack, he led from an An-12 while the other pilots were in Canberras.

Several other officers immensely contributed in these bombing missions, some of whom are Squadron Leader GS Ahluwalia, (Vr C – Vir Chakra), Squadron leader AKM Bhide and, Warrant Officer Godfrey (VM- Vayu Sena Medal) who requested to put off his retirement in November to take part in the war, Flight Lieutenants Balasubramaniam, Flight Lieutenant NN Arora, Flight Lieutenant Kalra (Vr C), and Squadron Leader Nagpal.

Flight lieutenant Kalra, a navigator, has an interesting tale to tell.

It may be remembered that in 1971, modern day navigational aids were non-existent and night navigation was, by and large, done by astral means or on ‘mental’ DR (Dead Reckoning).

Kalra’s aircraft was not able to designate the target due to darkness in his last mission, and there was no question of going wrong due to the proximity of Indian troops close by on the border. He asked the Captain for a decision when the aircraft was on its 4th round over the target.

The Captain literally responded with deadly humour by switching on all the aircraft’s lights. The Pakistanis opened ground fire, and the aircraft was able to shower hell from its massive load of bombs in retaliation.

Notably, 44 Squadron is the only transport squadron of the Indian Air Force to be conferred the Battle Honours, a feat otherwise reserved for active operational combat units and Wing Commander Vasisht was the first of the two transport pilots in the IAF to win the MVC.

Postscript: It will not be out of place to mention the powerful words Lt General Sartaj Singh told his officers and men on the eve of the War: Do NOT Lose and Do NOT Die.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5034
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Surya » 31 Jul 2013 22:05

philip - I will agree that dreaming of AMCA till LCA is delivered and proven is crazy


Meanwhile Shukla continues with another article on IAF clarifications

someone in MOD is driving this

debacle written all over

KrishnaK
BRFite
Posts: 948
Joined: 29 Mar 2005 23:00

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby KrishnaK » 31 Jul 2013 22:21

This L1/competitve bidding business is not going to work out in the long run. I can see the IAF's predicament. Badly need a trainer, can't have 1 or 2 competitors, so let's water down the specifications. Once we've have done that, HAVE to go for the lowest price.


Any suspicion of hankypanky in this deal and they'll re-probe the MRCA too.
Last edited by KrishnaK on 01 Aug 2013 06:25, edited 1 time in total.

member_27444
BRFite
Posts: 488
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby member_27444 » 31 Jul 2013 22:26

Then I suppose we must get rid of all PPT presentations and TDs....


PPTs are not products...
TDs are not final product but crucible technology
Map is not a country but a paper

Deliver LCA then lets talk Rambha 2 or Urvasi 1

Vivek K
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2484
Joined: 15 Mar 2002 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Vivek K » 31 Jul 2013 22:37

I have a question for Gurus here - what would the F-16s fate have been if it had been developed by HAL? Would the IAF have accepted it or would it still be in trials?

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 31 Jul 2013 22:44

For what it is worth:

July 31, 2013 :: Admissions, obfuscations in Indian Air Force explanation on Business Standard reports

The IAF has issued a verbose "clarification" that is full of evasions and outright falsehoods

Two news reports in Business Standard on Monday and Tuesday have elicited a “clarification” from the Indian Air Force (IAF).

The two articles (July 29, Indian Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer; and July 30, IAF diluted at least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft) reported on a letter from Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, to Defence Minister AK Antony, requesting that a contract for 106 trainer aircraft be awarded to Swiss company, Pilatus. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), which is currently developing the trainer, should be stripped of the contract, says Browne.

The news reports are based on documents available with Business Standard.

They report Browne’s unprecedented assault on HAL, which he has accused of misrepresenting the cost of their trainer --- called the Hindustan Turbo Trainer–40 (HTT-40) --- and of being incapable of delivering it on time to the IAF.

Browne has written to Antony that the HTT-40 would cost Rs 43.59 crore apiece at 2011 prices and, after factoring in forex escalation and inflation, would cost Rs 59.31 crore in 2018 and Rs 64.77 crore in 2020.

The IAF chief contrasts this with the cost of the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II, which he claims costs just Rs 30 crore apiece.

That figure of Rs 30 crore is incorrect. The cost of the PC-7 Mark II is derived from the IAF’s contract for 75 PC-7 Mark II trainers, signed on May 24, 2012 for Swiss Franc 557 million (Rs 3,606 crore). The contract specifies that each trainer would cost Swiss Francs 6.09 million. Since payment is linked to delivery, the cost of each PC-7 Mark II is touching Rs 40 crore today.

The news reports also reveal that at least 12 changes were made to performance benchmarks for the basic trainer the month after it was decided to buy 75 out of the IAF’s overall requirement of 181 trainers from the global market, while HAL developed the remaining 106.

Surprisingly, the performance benchmarks that were imposed on HAL (in a March 2009 document called the Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirements, or PSQR) were exceptionally stringent. These were subsequently diluted, the month after it was decided to buy abroad, and issued in Oct 2009 in a document called the Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR).

In a happy coincidence, the diluted ASQR allowed the PC-7 Mark II to qualify (it did not meet the PSQR requirement, which had been imposed on HAL). Without that dilution, Pilatus would have had to field the PC-21, a costlier trainer that would have been unlikely to be the lowest bidder. Making the PC-7 Mark II technically compliant by lowering the specifications brought a low-cost trainer into contention.

Meanwhile the other trainers that qualified --- the Korean Aerospace KT-1; and the American Hawker-Beechcraft T-6C Texan-II --- were qualitatively better (meeting the PSQR requirements), but also more expensive. The PC-7 Mark II won the contract as the cheapest trainer that met the (lowered) specifications.

Comments were sought from the IAF before each news report, but it chose to remain silent. Today, the IAF has responded with a lengthy “clarification”.

The IAF’s first response is that the stringent benchmarks in the PSQR that was imposed on HAL in Mar 2009 were only “Desirable” parameters for the trainer, not “Essential” parameters. In lengthy citations of the Defence Procurement Policy, the IAF tries to suggest that there was no dilution of QRs, only a legitimate paring of “Desirable” parameters.

This is not a valid argument. The PSQR, of which Business Standard has a copy, does not differentiate between “Essential” and “Desirable” parameters. All parameters are listed together, with no differentiation.

HAL officials, speaking anonymously, confirm that, until the parameters were diluted in the ASQR issued in Oct 2009, the HTT-40 was being built to meet all the parameters in the PSQR.

The IAF also suggests that no rules were broken, since the PSQR was revised downwards along with the ASQR, after benchmarks were lowered in Oct 2009. “The amended ‘PSQR’ after ratification by (the MoD) on 01 December 2009 were issued to HAL… Therefore, as on date, PSQR and ASQR are similar.

That neatly sidesteps the essential point of the news report --- which was that performance benchmarks were irregularly lowered when it came to a global buy. The PSQR was lowered, as was the ASQR. It matters little that they are similar today. In that respect, the IAF confirms a key point made by Business Standard.

The IAF seeks to validate the selection of the PC-7 Mark II by stating, “It needs to be noted that the (tender) for BTA received maximum responses generating the largest competition in aircraft procurement in recent history, wherein M/s Pilatus was one of the three vendors who met all ASQR and… emerged as the L1 (lowest bid) vendor on the basis of their commercial offer.”

This evades the point that lowered benchmarks appear to have allowed the PC-7 Mark II to meet the specifications, introducing a low-cost aircraft into the contest.

The deal was held up for almost a year after the Korean defence minister wrote personally to Antony requesting him to intercede. An internal MoD investigation eventually gave a go-ahead.

The IAF also suggests that the compromise made in crucial safety specifications, by removing the need for a “zero-zero” ejection seat (which allows the pilot to bail out even while the aircraft is stationary on the ground) was done because “retaining the ASQR of 0-0 ejection seat would have narrowed the competition to only two vendors.” Lowering the specifications “ensured that more than seven vendors remained in the competition.”

On the one hand, this argument accepts that specifications in even “Essential” parameters were lowered. However, the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) nowhere states that important safety compromises can be made to generate competition. And the fact is that the PC-7 Mark II does not have a “zero-zero” ejection seat.

The IAF also tries to justify its dilution of multiple criteria reported by Business Standard by responding that “both the ASQR and current PSQR” do not stipulate requirements for parameters like cockpit pressurization; external vision criteria; in-flight simulation (for simulating failures); take off within 1000 metres; and maximum speed of 450 kmph.

That the ASQR and current PSQR have identical benchmarks does not exonerate the improper dilution of benchmarks in the “current PSQR” after taking a decision to buy the basic trainer from the global market.

In other respects --- as evident from the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II webpage on the internet --- the IAF “clarification” contains outright falsehoods. It claims that “the maximum speed of the PC-7 Mk Il is 555 kmph and not 448 kmph as falsely stated in the news article.”

In fact, as is well known, the maximum speed of an aircraft is calculated in level flight at sea level and the Pilatus website (http://www.pilatus-aircraft.com/#46) states that this is 448 kmph.

The IAF “clarification” admits that the IAF chief gave out false figures in his letter to the RM, since the current exchange rate was not factored in. The IAF now says the PC-7 Mark II would cost Rs 38.3 crore. And it now says the HTT-40 would be 25 per cent more expensive than the PC-7 Mark II.

Browne’s letter to Antony had stated, “As per the contract, the unit price of PC-7 Mk II is INR 30 Cr for the mean delivery year of 2014. The aircraft would be supplied at the same cost up to 2017 under the “Option Clause”. Hence the HTT-40 will be more expensive to the IAF when compared with the PC-7 Mk II by over 89% from 2018 onwards.”

“It is unprecedented for a service chief to present incorrect figures to the Raksha Mantri,” says a senior MoD official anonymously. “And what makes this doubly damning is that the air chief is using incorrect figures to make a case for a foreign vendor.”

Katare
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2579
Joined: 02 Mar 2002 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Katare » 01 Aug 2013 01:47

Great Job Ajai Shukla! Finally someone in media (DDM) earned his/her journalist's tag for defense reporting. You just tore a fresh one for IAF chief and all the import-walahs.

Great job by HAL too in actually coming out in the open and let everyone see the rot. They kept a dignified silence for so long even after this step motherly treatment by IAF but they were relentlessly provoked by IAF chief on this issues for almost 2 years. Enough is enough!

member_22539
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2022
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby member_22539 » 01 Aug 2013 07:13

^+1

Singha
BRF Oldie
Posts: 66601
Joined: 13 Aug 2004 19:42
Location: the grasshopper lies heavy

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Singha » 01 Aug 2013 07:27

so the koreans had a point in protesting.
korea and japan are not yet wise to the ways of the wetern and russian arms suppliers in how problem are "worked around" and "managed". being new they are yet to "develop contacts" with those in power.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5034
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Surya » 01 Aug 2013 07:29

if you can believe a swiss made product is the cheapest :) anything is possible

maitya
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 492
Joined: 02 Feb 2001 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby maitya » 01 Aug 2013 10:30

Surya wrote:philip - I will agree that dreaming of AMCA till LCA is delivered and proven is crazy

Surya, sorry but, no it's not - reg the point about "dreaming AMCA till LCA is delivered and proven" etc, well, to me (and few other folks who wants to think thru a bit) the opposite is actually true.
All these Rah/Rah stmts from Philip and co are just that - stmts without any detailed thinking.


But first thing first - may I ask, what exactly is the current state of AMCA project holding up that is impacting LCA Mk-1 (or Mk-2) flight testing and production stages?
Earlier aguptaji (and even Philipji) made a very very valid point - productionising requires attention and design level thought-process. And, in fact, I'd go to an extent, that productioning aspects needs to be "built-in" in the design phase itself. These are fundamental facts that can't be argued against (and I'm not sure, if anybody is trying to do that either, as Philipji and few others are trying to make us believe).

But linking this argument to stop funding AMCA (or put the project in cold-storage - betw exactly what does this mean for a project in initial design phase) is plain wrong/biased (to put it mildly).
Has anybody taken the pain of going thru the current ADA org structure and try to flesh out which of it's depts would be required to be involved and to what extent in LCA Mk-1/Mk-2 phases - thus which of the depts that will be lightly/moderately engaged will have got capacity to progress with projects like AMCA (the phase of such projects are the key).

I'm sure nobody has (ADA will never come out and state these stuff openly, but we need to be able to deduce some of it).
Just to give an example how much capacity of say, ARD&P and IFCS folks, would be getting utilized towards LCA Mk-1/Mk-2 currently (just as a point of ref, each of these have approx 10 Dir Level folks with their own orgs).

Also if anybody had cared to find out ADA has already deputed senior folks from almost every depts towards helping in productionising LCA Mk-1 - I think they are acting as consultants to HAL, and wouldn't be surprised if some of teh internal subsystems and layout turns out to be different from what we see in PVs and LSPs.
And this is where aguptaji's comment is appropriate i.e we should have (but didn't) thought-thru and implemented productionising aspects into the detailed design level about 15yrs back - we were new in designing aero-platforms, so missed it (and are now having to spend time and effort to bring those aspects at a pre-production stage of a life-cycle - tough luck, but it's part of the institutional learning process that we are going thru).


I can go on and on ... but the fact remains, at the current-state of the AMCA project, it can be easily sustained - yes, it'll become an issue to progress to detailed design kind of phases and would require the design aspects of Mk-2 atleast out of the way.

And, all these lollipop press stmts are for us, aam junta's consumption. Something public demonstration of action was required, due to constant slippage of LCA deadlines - so pick out the most easy and non-controversial one and make good press. Hey it makes everybody happy (at least it lowered Philipji's anxiety towards some AMCA numbers impacting FGFA ordered numbers), and ADA folks and can surely chuckle and keep their heads down and continue as usual.


But you point wrt dreaming about AMCA etc ...
My take is, we need to dream and we need to be dreaming now, as our dreams have just too many distractions and are not yet well-formed, so it tends to take longer than the dreams of US/Russia et all. Some Sukhoi designers did dream about FGFA 10-15yrs back and we have in-flight platform - similarly, we also need to dream about AMCA now to have a flying platform in 2025 timeframe.

It's after all, some SDRE who dreamt about "Wings of Fire" 30yrs back and we all know the result - and similarly he had, in his time, many detractors asking him not to dream and be "practical" (aka import, preferably from Russia).
Of course, he had one unfair advantage - a very very restrictive multilateral export control regimes silenced these import-lobbyists, so his dream had that less number of distractions.

So dream we must, these assorted detractors and the Harruump Dark/Navy tribe (and their urderlings) be damned – and to ADA, happy dreaming about AMCA!!
Last edited by maitya on 01 Aug 2013 10:44, edited 2 times in total.

Victor
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2628
Joined: 24 Apr 2001 11:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Victor » 01 Aug 2013 10:39

Did we expect the IAF to put basic training on hold and wait for HAL to produce a trainer? They did what they had to do because they didn't have the luxury of experimentation after having to ground all defective HAL trainers. Unless the bulb goes off in our heads that HAL is the problem, this shameful tragi-comedy will contibue to entertain our enemies.

maitya
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 492
Joined: 02 Feb 2001 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby maitya » 01 Aug 2013 10:51

Victor-ji again, why should IAF compromise on operational aspects by waiting for HAL to deliver. If there's no platform available from HAL, they should import.

But that's not the point here.

The point is, IAF asking HAL to produce a basic Trainer with a set of requirements - and then diluting those requirements to suite foreign design/manufacturing houses (multiple, mind you, so pls don't jump into the corruption bandwagon, as yet).
This, of course, begs a question - was HAL being set-up for a failure with a set of very diffcult requirements to facilitate import at a later stage with a set of diluted requirements.

And since opertional aspects were being bought into the discussion, is ther no impact to the operational aspects by diluting those requirements. If no, why a more stringent requirements were set aside for HAL - to make it fail, is it?

Victor
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2628
Joined: 24 Apr 2001 11:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Victor » 01 Aug 2013 11:09

IIRC the Pilatus was a rushed buy after thr HPT32's sudden grounding. Upto that point IAF was OK with HAL developing a Tucano-type trainer in HAL standard time. After the grounding, the HAL trainer was dead. Why are they raking it up now after sleeping on it for decades? Did HAL not know that IAF would need a basic trainer after 'n' years?

Nope. This whole thing stinks of MOD-HAL babugiri of the worst kind.

merlin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2153
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: NullPointerException

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby merlin » 01 Aug 2013 12:59

Victor wrote:Nope. This whole thing stinks of MOD-HAL babugiri of the worst kind.


Not at all. The whole thing stinks of IAFs contempt for HAL and active sabotaging of any and every attempt by HAL to build basic trainers at home.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 01 Aug 2013 17:12

WRT the trainer (and other efforts too), there is plenty of blame to go around.

The point that got me was that the IAF Chief, in 2013, thought the best course of action was to write a half baked letter to the RM !!!!! This is the one man - I would think - who needs to support an Indian effort moving forward. Granted that the Indian effort has been flawed in many respects, even then HE has that responsibility to work around such humongous problems (in addition to the others he has) and not complain so loudly.

The MoD seems to be a huge part of this particular problem. When SK screamed blue murder, the MoD took some time to check out their claim and promptly closed the "file" (I find these "files" to be a joke in this modern secured internet era - a diff story). Seems like SK had a good reason to complain. IAF goofed it and the MoD covered the goof up.

Victor
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2628
Joined: 24 Apr 2001 11:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Victor » 01 Aug 2013 18:20

NRao the point should be that in 2013, IAF lives depend on a soviet-era dinosaur that has proved inefficient on every single yardstick but is still being kept alive by a coterie of anti-national crooks. IAF tried to open the field to non-government players but this is being cunningly torpedoed by the same crooks. This is not so difficult to understand. Look around us and see who has a government run aerospace industry that is successful in 2013. I would love to emulate China but only if we also emulate Chinese system of incentives. I am increasingly of the mind that we need that to survive, forget thrive.

Katare
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2579
Joined: 02 Mar 2002 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Katare » 01 Aug 2013 19:44

Victor,
You are right but you are talking about a different issue that nobody disagrees with. HAL's issues and need for import are clear and no problem with the decision to import.

Problem is that an unworkable set of specs were projected by IAF's as requirements and given to HAL to come up with a proposal but as soon as they had an opportunity to buy from abroad those specs were reduced and a low performance aircraft suddenly became OK. What if IAF had given decent specs early in 2005-07 era to HAL, they may have been able to deliver it by upgrading the old version.

Calling a BTA that served IAF for decades a failure due to higher accident rates while keep flying Mig 21s and not utter a word against Mother ever is hypocracy that is clearly visible to anyone willing to look at it.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5034
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Surya » 01 Aug 2013 19:46

maitya

IMO the way thngs are - keep the dream to a small sub section and keep quiet about it

First get the damn LCA operational

impossible to get anyone to buy on AMCA till LCA can be delivered and in service. that is just the way its going to be

again others have valid points but I would find it hard to sell AMCA till I prove myself with LCA

just like the the Dhruv has given them the chance to be confident about LCH etc

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 01 Aug 2013 19:49

The lives (of anyone for that matter) has to be a concern for everyone. So, that should not be an issue, but is one because all three entities did not play their roles over the last 60 years.

However, pertaining to recent events (the letter from the CAS to the RM), the CAS makes it a point to make the cost an issue !!!!!

Prior to that his own Force changed (trying to be nice and not use "diluted" here) the specs. So, is 0-0 ejection seat suddenly not an issue for saving lives? Only a pilot going at 60 kmph needs to be saved? (Just asking aloud - internet).

Also, something that has not come up - the IAF would like to use the same plane for the NEXT stage training - IF the IJT is not ready. Fair enough. BUT, this plane cannot go beyond a certain height (not pressurized) - a necessary requirement for the next stage training that was removed from the specifications. So, what gives? (Again, just asking.)

Seems to me that in the heat of this battle (over years) people (on ALL sides) have not adhered to basic tenets of the situation. That includes the IAF too - they too have indirectly influenced the situation and continue to do so (above two points as examples).

The IAF does have a valid point, but this letter was uncalled for.

As far as the HTT-40 - I suggest HAl make a very basic trainer, not one that can be a light this and light that. The bells and whistles can come in the next version.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 01 Aug 2013 20:10

And, just BTW, I am vehemently opposed to the Chinese model.

I am very satisfied with the Indian one, IF India could get rid of corruption, chalta-hai, yaha-thak-pahunchgaye, etc attitude.

The Chinese models works for the Chinese - right now. I am of the opinion that it will fail them in a few more decades (unless they steal on a consistent basis) (BTW, the Chinese have been progressively going down the food chain to steal: started with the US military in early 2000 (F-35, etc), then when they hardened, went to the next rung - US vendors, when they hardened, next rung - US suppliers. Today the Chinese are at suppliers from other nations, which is difficult to harden.)

Victor
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2628
Joined: 24 Apr 2001 11:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Victor » 01 Aug 2013 20:31

Katare wrote:Problem is that an unworkable set of specs were projected by IAF's as requirements and given to HAL

From what I can see, the original specs were to result in a Super Tucano-like trainer which RAF uses. What is "unworkable" about it? It was the most sensible and responsible set of specs, far better than the Pilatus we ended up with. I am pretty sure HAL can come up with a fair product to these specs given HAL Standard Time (a decade or two) and I would be a fan of it. AFAIK, the IAF was fully supporting HAL's efforts in this regard, the last reports on this being as late as 2009-10. But...

..as soon as they had an opportunity to buy from abroad those specs were reduced and a low performance aircraft suddenly became OK.

The "opportunity" arose when all the HPT-32 Deepaks suddenly had to be grounded due to an alarming number of back-to-back crashes and the IAF found itself without a way to train rookies. In a situation where their rookie pilots could be trained better in Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, the MoD mercifully allowed for emergency purchase of basic trainers. Unfortunately, our neta-babu coterie had created the world's most idiotic rules of purchase to mask their own corruption which made it impossible for the IAF to simply purchase what they thought was the best trainer out there. So they did what was in the best interests of the country and their own pilots--get several quotes ASAP and pick one ASAP based on the same idiotic rules compounded by the damned "L1" which effectively ruled out the Super Tucano or even the Pilatus PC-9. They picked the Pilatus PC-7 which is a watered-down version of the PC-9 trainer used by the USAF. It was probably the L1 that forced us to ignominiously accept the snooty Swiss de-arming our trainers due to their human rights bullsh!t. An OK but not ideal situation.

I don't see anything ominous or underhanded here other than an attempt by the same neta-babu coterie to damage the IAF by suggesting crookery in their ranks. If this isn't traitorous, I don't know what is.

member_27444
BRFite
Posts: 488
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby member_27444 » 01 Aug 2013 21:07

The Swiss cheap theory is full of holes like Swiss cheese!

Yeah kya naya Cheese hain ji?

Sagar G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2594
Joined: 22 Dec 2009 19:31
Location: Ghar

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Sagar G » 01 Aug 2013 21:33

From HTT-34 to HTT-35 to LCA and now HTT-40 the IAF's glorious record of sabotaging indigenous projects continues, of course under the stewardship of MoD.

What disciplinary action can be taken against an officer for fudging figures ???

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 01 Aug 2013 21:36

I wonder if the CAS got wind of an effort to "force" the HTT-40 on the service? Is that a possibility? (Just a wild, wild, wild guess.)

Sagar G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2594
Joined: 22 Dec 2009 19:31
Location: Ghar

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Sagar G » 01 Aug 2013 21:46

^^^ That makes no sense.

Lalmohan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 13262
Joined: 30 Dec 2005 18:28

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Lalmohan » 01 Aug 2013 21:46

Amyrao wrote:The Swiss cheap theory is full of holes like Swiss cheese!

Yeah kya naya Cheese hain ji?


not necessarily - the marginal cost of production for these aircraft will be much lower than for a new aircraft programme. the swiss have been building them for some time and will have come way down the cost curve, and will have amortised much of the development cost. despite high labour costs, i can see how they can produce units relatively cheaply (especially if they have high plant automation, etc., etc.)

many components in both aircraft will be internationally sourced and paid for in dollars, but putting it together will be easier for the guy with more specific experience and knowledge.

what we are witnessing is the gap that HAL has for production engineering - once again. the IAF knows this, and also knows that this gap means that production quality is also suspect. a lower risk option for them is to go for the established product.

Sagar G
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2594
Joined: 22 Dec 2009 19:31
Location: Ghar

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Sagar G » 01 Aug 2013 21:57

Lalmohan wrote:what we are witnessing is the gap that HAL has for production engineering - once again. the IAF knows this, and also knows that this gap means that production quality is also suspect. a lower risk option for them is to go for the established product.


Lets consider that your logic is correct, if so then why did IAF created a QR which asked for a domestic agency to create the best available BT in the international market ??? Did the IAF purposefully wanted HAL to fail ??? To get to the established product IAF diluted the PSQR, even diluting essential parameter why was that done ??? If IAF is happy with the present BTT it brought from the market then why did it ask for the moon from HAL ???

member_27444
BRFite
Posts: 488
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby member_27444 » 01 Aug 2013 22:04

That costing method is for cost accounting not for pricing, especially if what you say is true then one does not need to down grade specs to acomodate price.

First the IAF purchase of Swiss product is different from HAL offerings

Its different matter that if HAL has the capacity to make planes...


cost + margins is not valid for arms indusytry product pricing.... Admiril Groshkov can testify to that
and pricing isnever transparent till CAG audit comes after 10 yrs down the lane

tsarkar
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3263
Joined: 08 May 2006 13:44
Location: mumbai

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby tsarkar » 01 Aug 2013 23:06

Lets take a factual view of the entire trainer saga. Lets start with the HPT-32 Deepak. Here is a neutral CAG report (neither IAF nor HAL)

http://www.cag.gov.in/reports/defence/1 ... /chap3.htm

Since the spin characteristics were not found acceptable during further flight evaluation of the aircraft carried out in 1980, Air HQ proposed to procure only 10 aircraft initially. This was, however, not found a viable proposition by Department of Defence Production. An order for 40 aircraft was, therefore, placed on the PSU in October 1981 to be supplied by 1985-86 at an estimated cost of Rs 7.70 crores (unit cost Rs 19.25 lakhs).
Despite the shortcomings in performance of the aircraft, Air HQ proposed in May 1983 procurement of 150 additional aircrafts by 1991 for meeting their training requirements.


Since an aircraft has a lifetime of 30 years, aircraft last delivered 1995 should theoretically stay in service until 2025.

But it didn’t. Why? Answer

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 042_1.html

That was when the IAF’s notoriously unreliable basic trainer, the HPT-32 Deepak, was grounded after a horrific crash that killed two experienced pilots. In 17 Deepak crashes so far, 19 pilots have died.


Since the Deepak cannot glide without engine power for even a short distance, a serious crash in inevitable.


Independent confirmation that the plan cannot glide http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article431223.ece
Reliability of the HPT-32 has long been in question with technical issues caused by the integration between the American Lycoming piston engine and the indigenously designed airframe being the most hurting. For the IAF engine cuts (a situation where the aircraft's engine suddenly switches off in mid-air) on the HPT-32 have been disastrous: there have been over 90 engine cuts during the HPT-32 operational life and given the trainer's poor power of glide, fatalities have been frequent.


Now the requirement for the replacement would be for an aircraft in 2025, hence, higher requirements were drawn up. Since by 2025, those requirements would have become baseline.

Unfortunately, given the retirement in 2009, there was no luxury of waiting until 2025 for the replacement. A buy was inevitable. To avoid a single vendor situation, the requirement was lowered. This is very acceptable norm.

Now, practically, even if HAL starts developing a new trainer, even with reduced specs, earliest it can get into service is 10 years. (2013-2023). Can the IAF wait until then? No.

An airforce can ground fighters but definitely not trainers. Learning to fly & keeping a ready pool of flyers is paramount. More important than grounding fighers.

Lastly, HAL track record. HPT-32 had design flaws. Tejas is still limping. No LSP-6. IJT is overweight.

FGFA, instead of even being an MKI, will be a MiG-27 Bahadur just assembled from kits.

Those members stating HAL builds lovely planes, & not allowed to build, or given steep specifications, should maybe take a long hard look at HPT-32 Deepak.

What HAL needs to do is build credibility with its users, by getting IJT on track, instead of emulating Vehicle Factory Jabalpur.

VFJ manufactures Stallion trucks from kits supplied by Ashok Leyland. It’s a bigger scam than BEML Tatra. There was a plan for VFJ to manufacture BMP-2, instead of Stallions that could be better built by Ashok Leyland, but I don’t think that ever took off.

member_27444
BRFite
Posts: 488
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby member_27444 » 01 Aug 2013 23:37

That brings us back to the question of competency of DRDO/HAL/PSU.
It’s sad to know that Deepak instead of leading IAF to ujala, lead it to andhera!

Now we have great institutions like IISc, ADA, IIT Kharghpur/Madras with aeronautical specializations
Why could they not rectify the faults like simple gliding? How did it get airworthy certification?
Could it be that this being experience with trainers, IAF wants zero altitude ejection seats? Then thais requirement should have gone into Deepak as mandatory requirement?

vishvak
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 5836
Joined: 12 Aug 2011 21:19

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby vishvak » 02 Aug 2013 00:20

When trainer is ready and only if one logistics can be supported then it is perhaps better to have trainer ready in due course and then switch the trainers.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 02 Aug 2013 00:51

tsarkar,

Thanks.

Just proves that the entire system was goofed up. IF they ALL could live with what seems to be a flawed design - for decades, then the entire system has to do with the problem.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16831
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby NRao » 02 Aug 2013 00:56

As I had guessed, that letter was in anticipation of some event:

DAC to decide on IAF-HAL tussle on trainer aircraft

The Defence Acquisition Council is expected to take a final call on the ongoing tussle between the Air Force and the HAL on whether to procure an imported basic trainer aircraft or to develop it indigenously.

The IAF and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited are locked in a tussle over the issue as the air force is in favour of procuring imported Pilatus PC-7 basic trainer aircraft while the defence PSU wants to develop the aircraft indigenously.

The DAC headed by Defence Minister A K Antony is expected to take a final call on whether to order more Pilatus aircraft from Switzerland or to ask the HAL to go ahead with the indigenous development of its proposed HTT-40 aircraft, sources said.

The meeting is attended by Defence Secretary, the three Services chiefs and other stakeholders while deciding on procurements for the three services.

The IAF has already placed an order for 75 Pilatus trainer aircraft and is planning to procure 106 more after the completion of the delivery of first lot by the end of 2017. On the other hand, the HAL is in favour of developing the aircraft indigenously.

The Defence Ministry will have to take a call on the issue at a time when in view of the scams in defence hardware acquisitions, it has decided that imports would be the last priority and main focus would be on indigenous production.

The IAF and the HAL have been debating on the issue for over a year now but it came to fore recently when IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne wrote to Antony, asking the government to procure the Pilatus instead of the one proposed by the HAL.

The IAF Chief has also told the government that cost of the HTT-40 aircraft being developed by the HAL would be higher than that of the Pilatus aircraft.

IAF has also told government that the indigenous aircraft would be 25 per cent more expensive than the imported Pilatus.

The HAL has told the government that the aircraft proposed by it would be much more advanced than the Pilatus as it will have weapon firing capabilities also along with other advancements.

PTI

jamwal
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 5211
Joined: 19 Feb 2008 21:28
Location: Somewhere Else
Contact:

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby jamwal » 02 Aug 2013 01:59

The way things are going, bank accounts, phones and email of all the staff chiefs and senior officers including their 'trustworthy' relatives involved in procurement should be kept under surveillance, even after they retire. Some of the things these guys do can be attributed to ignorance, petty ego issues, technical shortcomings etc, but lately it is either plain corruption or active sabotage. They don't even try to hide it anymore.

PS: To think of it, technical ignorance shouldn't be an excuse. These guys are paid and trained to defend lives of their subordinates and civilians.

maitya
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 492
Joined: 02 Feb 2001 12:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby maitya » 02 Aug 2013 08:58

Sagar G wrote:
Lalmohan wrote:what we are witnessing is the gap that HAL has for production engineering - once again. the IAF knows this, and also knows that this gap means that production quality is also suspect. a lower risk option for them is to go for the established product.


Lets consider that your logic is correct, if so then why did IAF created a QR which asked for a domestic agency to create the best available BT in the international market ??? Did the IAF purposefully wanted HAL to fail ??? To get to the established product IAF diluted the PSQR, even diluting essential parameter why was that done ??? If IAF is happy with the present BTT it brought from the market then why did it ask for the moon from HAL ???


agupta wrote:Geez, what's so hard about this... because they were for different points in time.

Sorry not so fast pls ... it's hard for few of us actaully!!

PSQR = Future, on the assumption that the NOW= HPT 32 fixed (finally - after n+1 years of chalta hai)

That assumption is yours ... not ours. PSQR is list a specification for a BT to produced in certain time-frame actaully. It has nothing to do HPT-32 issue fixing.
Counter argumet could be, if IAF was serious about fixing HPT-32 issues, why generate a PSQR with all bells and whistles slapped on a BT and not generate a ASQR equiavlent of specification list?
Scared was it, the brown-sahibs of IAF, that if ASQR-equivalent specification list be given to HAL, they would actually be successful in meeting those and thus prevent these uber-brown-sahibs to tom-tom about the foreign-made stickers of these airplanes.

ASQR = NOW ! fully mature ; lower, different requirements

What exactly is this dilution of requirement? Not specifying for a zero-zero ejection seat? Did you even care to look up how many pilot lives of the accidental post-spin-stall accidents in HPT-32 etc could have been saved with inclusion of this particular requirement?

HAL came with this dilution is it?

If these uber-brown-sahibs are ready to live with these dilution, why shouldn't it be cosher to question their culpability in the lives of pilots that were lost becuase of HPT-32 accidents over the years?
Or is it, patriotism is reserved for a select few, who wear them as arm and shoulder lapels?

One can only call the latter "diluted" in the academic world where the time element is irrelevant. In the real world, time matters.

Yes, in so-called-real-world-of-yours along-with "Time" a bit of "Forward-Thinking" also matters - in that real-world what also matters something called prevention-of-narrow-mindedness. Is it too much to ask from these brown-sahibs?

Lalmohan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 13262
Joined: 30 Dec 2005 18:28

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Lalmohan » 02 Aug 2013 12:23

what is the lightest 0-0 ejection seat? can it fit an ab-initio trainer?

chiragAS
BRFite
Posts: 169
Joined: 16 Nov 2006 10:09
Location: INDIA
Contact:

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby chiragAS » 02 Aug 2013 12:31

agupta wrote:Exactly - they had that chance with the HPT-32 and they blew it. Then they killed a large number of pilots by not fixing it quicky and pissed off the IAF. Thank god a few Chiefs came by who had the political balls to meet this insidious threat head on... y'all get outraged at one Pilot Officer tortured by the Pakis... ever heard of ONE Chief Engineer or GM or MD held responsible at HAL for putting out a turd like this - and most importantly, NOT FIXING it? In the Soviet Union, the Chief Designer would either be shot or sent off to a "re-education camp" for doing something like this. Where's the outrage ?

HAL had every opportunity to do a HPT-32 Mk.2 if the fixes demanded it but that would be too unsexy and not enough people could make money off of it. 1000s of crores sanctioned, all new systems, all new workforce deployment...so the only thing they would do would be a super-duper HTT-40; we are too hi-funda for doing simple evolutionary planes onlee...


^+1

Austin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 23387
Joined: 23 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Austin » 02 Aug 2013 13:07

Lalmohan wrote:what is the lightest 0-0 ejection seat? can it fit an ab-initio trainer?


Martin Baker seats are the lightest in the category.

Sanku
BRF Oldie
Posts: 12526
Joined: 23 Aug 2007 15:57
Location: Naaahhhh

Re: Indian Military Aviation- Jan 10 2012

Postby Sanku » 02 Aug 2013 14:12

tsarkar wrote:Lets take a factual view of the entire trainer saga. Lets start with the HPT-32 Deepak. Here is a neutral CAG report (neither IAF nor HAL)


Pooh If only IAF had ordered 1500 Deepak's in 1945, they would have been delivered by 1960 and changed the face of 62 war.

Its all IAFs fault.


Return to “Trash Can Archive”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 12 guests