Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

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amit
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by amit »

nelson wrote:I have issues with the following.

Arjun fits the requirment of terrain that IA would operate in.
Arjun is superior.
Arjun is indigeneous.

I have followed this thread and others on BRF for nearly a decade now. I am unconvinced even after going through the 'threadbare' discussions on Arjun. I have some datapoints and views to share. Fellow posters can ignore them. If the posts look meaningless or amounts to trolling, moderator action is welcome. Namecalling and attributing motives may please be avoided.
Nelson,

Arjun is superior: Unless you have a problem with Shukla like Sanku, this is what he wrote: Arjun tank outruns, outguns Russian T-90.

Note the MK2 order came after this trial.

Some excerpts:
The Arjun tanks, the observers all agreed, performed superbly. Whether driving cross-country over rugged sand-dunes; detecting, observing and quickly engaging targets; or accurately hitting targets, both stationery and moving, with pinpoint gunnery; the Arjun demonstrated a clear superiority over the vaunted T-90.

“The Arjun could have performed even better, had it been operated by experienced crewmen”, says an officer who has worked on the Arjun. “As the army’s tank regiments gather experience on the Arjun, they will learn to exploit its capabilities.”
“The senior officers who attended the trials were taken aback by the Arjun’s strong performance”, an army officer who was present through the trials frankly stated. “But they were also pleased that the Arjun had finally come of age.”

The army’s Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which has bitterly opposed buying more Arjuns, will now find it difficult to sustain that opposition. In keeping out the Arjun, the DGMF has opted to retain the already obsolescent T-72 tank in service for another two decades, spending thousands of crores in upgrading its vintage systems.
Tank experts point out that conducting trials only in Mahajan does not square with the army’s assertion that they are evaluating a role for the Arjun. Says Major General HM Singh, who oversaw the Arjun’s development for decades, “If they were evaluating where the Arjun should be deployed, they should have conducted the trials in different types of terrain: desert, semi-desert, plains and riverine. It seems as if the army has already decided to employ the Arjun in the desert.
And this:
But Business Standard has learned that senior officers are hesitant to induct the Arjun into strike corps. Sources say that the Arjun will be kept out of strike formations on the grounds that it is incompatible with other strike corps equipment, e.g. assault bridges that cannot bear the 60-tonne weight of the Arjun.
There that's the bridges excuse again.

Arjun fits the requirment of terrain that IA would operate in: Answered partly above, with Army presupposing what terrain that the tank would operate in.

However, I have more fundamental question.

If we can agree that the US Abrams tank is one of the, if not the, pre-eminent tank in the world today, I would like to ask you and other posters here a simple noobi type of questions.

Were the US designers concerned at what kind of "terrain" the tank would operate in? Considering the fact that US deployment plans are worldwide, as opposed to ours which is restricted to plains of Punjab, deserts of Rajasthan and hilly regions of the North East, were they ever worried that the bridges the tank may have to cross around the world might not be able to bear its weight? Or that roads may be too narrow for it to pass? Or perhaps young children would be scared to see such a huge beast of a tank? (Yes the Russians make much more petite looking, pretty tanks which can go round and round and make kids laugh).

Why is that only the Indian Army worries about things like terrain, bridges and other stuff and not about which is a better machine which ensures crew survivability and greater strike power?

In your decade of analysis have you found answers to these questions? I ask you because I'm still looking for a rational explanation.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

Sanku wrote:
rohitvats wrote:However, there is a small catch in the above numbers as well - the cost of Active Protection System was budgeted separately. If you add the above, the per unit cost of the system will rise further.
IIRC the Shotra/Trophy is still not fitted in right? Same for both Arjun and T 90 (although expression of interests had gone out)

Correct me if I am wrong.
Yes.

But INR 2,500 Crores was budgeted for it separately; and this was in 2009-2011 time-frame. God knows what the cost is now.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by nelson »

I don't have any problems with Col retd Shukla generally, and i understand that he has to earn his bread.

If i may, can i pose a counter question. 95% of the Indian Army's tank force weighs less than 50 tonne. Any futre development in terms of FMBT or otherwise is going to less than 50 tonne. Here we have Dr Saraswat on record saying so.

http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/l ... f/1055203/
MK-II variant of Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun has entered into the user trial phase and DRDO is looking at the Futuristic Main Battle Tank (FMBT) project aimed at reducing the weight of the battle tanks, said DRDO chief V K Saraswat, who was in the city to attend the valedictory function of Post Induction Training School (POINTS) - 17 at the Defence Institute of Advanced Technology (DIAT) at Girinagar in Khadakwasla.

Talking to the reporters Saraswat said, “The trials of MK-II variant MBT Arjun are expected to be complete within a year after which we will be in a position to produce 300 to 400 units for the Army.” On being asked about FMBT he said, “The idea is to reduce the weight of the tank. Developed nations such as the United States of America and Israel have been working on reducing the weights of battle tanks. Heavy weights of tanks affect their maneuverability. We are therefore looking to reduce the weight of FMBT to 50 tonnes each.”
So what is so sacrosanct about this 50 tonne, other than terrain considerations?
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

nelson wrote:<SNIP>
Some time, parallel to development of Arjun in the late 1990s, a concerted effort to develop bridges of 70 tonne MLC was made by DRDO. Sarvatra Bridge system is part of it. However, AFAIK, the requirements remain unfulfilled. We have gone through this discussion before.
Now, is that the case?

Funny that the Assault Engineer Regiment of the 31 Armored Division was carrying the Sarvatra Bridges in 2013 RD Parade. Here is the link:

http://defenceforumindia.com/jh4cz/asse ... 13-030.jpg

If there were delays, then they were in the past. The system is in service with those most required to operate them.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by nelson »

It will not suffice to parade a system. 'Requirement' has to be fulfilled in quantity also, as would be required during war. As i said, we have discussed this before. Let me leave it at that.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by amit »

nelson wrote:So what is so sacrosanct about this 50 tonne, other than terrain considerations?
Oh really?

Then can you explain why the Arjun's weight is what it is today? Wasn't because the Army GSQR (I should say changing GSQRs)? And can you explain why, as part of the "improvements" demanded on the MK1 was a significant weight gain?

Sorry cynic that I am, I think this 50 tonne weight is sacrosanct because somebody needed a post facto justification for their love for T90s.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by arnab »

nelson wrote:It will not suffice to parade a system. 'Requirement' has to be fulfilled in quantity also, as would be required during war. As i said, we have discussed this before. Let me leave it at that.
This is getting beyond ridiculous :) Given that T-90's TI or missiles did not work during parakram, should by your logic entail a cancellation of the T-90 program. Instead we ordered 1600 more!

Second this 'future' MBT just like Future-INSAS entails ongoing research. Of course everyone wants super vehicles - that are lighter, carry more, have more endurance and work in all terrains equally effectively. But things don't often work that way - especially given the evolving requirements of armed forces. There will usually be a trade-off between 'protection' and 'weight'. One cannot want more active protection against better projectiles and also want lighter tanks at existing technology levels. That is what 'future' research is supposed to address. Today the 'best' tank is one which offers the best chance of survival for the soldiers operating them and the best accuracy in hitting the target under all conditions. The Arjun outscores the T-90 in both these aspects.

The assertion that 'light' is 'better' has to be seen in the context of the technology that underpins the product and the time-line. The P51 mustang (a great aircraft in WW2) weighed 7,500 lbs. It was lighter than the 19,000 lbs F-16. So should the future have entailed a movement towards lighter aircrafts and the US get it wrong?
Last edited by arnab on 09 Apr 2013 10:45, edited 4 times in total.
amit
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by amit »

Nelson,

Since you don't have a problem with Shukla (I don't not because of who is but because a publication like Business Standard is willing to publish his writings) then perhaps you have seen what he wrote in November last year?

Army proposes to scrap Future Main Battle Tank
Now, by consensus between the DRDO and the DGMF, the future of indigenous tank building is to flow from the Arjun. Two Arjun regiments, consisting of 128 tanks, are already in frontline service. And a Mark II version of the Arjun is undergoing trials in Rajasthan. The army has committed to buying 118 Arjun Mark II tanks after trials are successfully concluded.

These orders for just 246 Arjuns are insignificant, complains a senior DRDO official, given that the army fields about 4000 tanks. To evolve the Arjun through successive models, the army would have to operate the tank in larger numbers and cooperate closely with the DRDO. This, says the DRDO official, would require a mindshift amongst senior army generals who tend to favour imports.
This DGMF decision not to develop an FMBT stems from the difficulty it faced in drawing up specifications for the new tank. A key hurdle was in reconciling the need for a four-man tank crew (like the Arjun, and unlike Russian tanks that have a three-man crew) with the simultaneous wish for a lighter tank that weighed not more than 50-tonnes. The 60-tonne-plus Arjun has been criticised as too heavy.
Says a key general: “All contemporary three-man-crew tanks weigh 50-tonnes, like those being built by South Korea, Turkey and Japan. Adding a fourth crew member also adds roughly 10-tonnes of weight, due to increase in the tank size and weight of armour. But we were asking for a 50-tonne FMBT that would have a four-man crew. It just didn’t add up.”
So much for the 50 tonne requirement that you think is set in stone.

And frankly I think the following quote should be the first post in any thread that discusses tanks here:
In a 2008 seminar, organized by the DGMF, Israeli Major General Yossi Ben-Hanan --- an acclaimed tank designer who fathered Israel’s successful Merkava tank --- told an attentive audience that tank design is evolutionary, each design building upon the previous one. The Israelis began designing their Merkava Mark-1 MBT in 1970; today they have the world class Merkava Mark-4.
One just hopes Shukla got it right and indeed the DGMF has been detoxified from its import obsession.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by member_20317 »

Rohitvats ji,

my write up was made in the light of a general impression that the debate here is giving. That of fungibility of T-90 and Arjun from a deployment perspective. The order-cost angle I brought in because that is the only way a Make or Buy can be dealt with in the present scenario, but backlinked to the planning and strategy. Something that you would like to add on too, going by your promise in your post, towards the end. You may not remember but I did ask you in the December 2011 Delhi BR meet if Cold start was meant only for the Pakis or did it have a China component to it. I addtionally planned to query you on the details. But then the discussion veered off to some other matter.

In fact, in my view, your post says the same thing from a micro perspective. Two different kinds of philosophies in product development will end up with two different types of deployment. Mine was the reverse case, starting from the Macro perspective.

Also my point about logistics was light on the service spares issue. The nearest analogy to the point that I was trying to convey would be the following:

If LCA and Rambha were to be fungible, then allowing for citrus paribus would I be ordering & stocking the same quantity of R-77.

Further I give in to your point that the only valid cost-comparison can be between two competing but stable production lines in the same country. However my hunch is the differential cost would still be around 5-6 Cr a piece. Which if combined with the additional impression being given will be an outlay of 5k to 10k Crores.

Then there is the issue of manpower. You have seen how in the other matter of manpower increase signals are sought to be sent on the budgetary squeeze despite impressive plans. Though I agree this is a matter of view and not of an established fact. I believe that in a fungibility case 12000 additional men cannot be easily achieved.

....................................


Amit ji, US deployed its tanks in tankable terrain only. In non tank country US has deployed tanks in trace quantities only and only as late as 2010/2011. The USSR did try it on high Afghan grounds and here is a link with a write up by a BRF member which explains well the trouble with deploying tanks in mountains.

http://www.adl.gatech.edu/research/brms ... 010802.pdf

Mountain Warfare Lessons : The Soviet Afghanistan Campaign
Rahul M (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com)
4) Armour : Most of the terrains where the Soviets fought, were not ideal tankable
country, and even in places like valleys and ravines, where tracked vehicles could be
deployed, they were easily ambushed from mountain sides and at choke points. There
was the added disadvantage of tank guns not being able to elevate to a high enough angle
in order to be able to return fire. The rough terrain also extracted a heavy toll on the tanks
and their continued deployment became linked to extensive maintenance efforts.
NOTE : What deserves attention in this context are the innovations applied by the Soviets
to get around some of the problems faced by armour. Broadly speaking, there were two
main innovations and numerous minor ones, viz.
i) In a departure from their normal practice, Soviet Motorized Rifle Units
(Mechanized Infantry) started dismounted operations on a regular basis. This
enabled the dismounted infantrymen to conduct operations in terrains inaccessible
to the vehicles and also to provide overwatch for their mounts by covering the
flanks. It may be mentioned that Soviet forces lacked regular light infantry and
this innovation can be seen as a compensating move.
ii) The Soviets put their APCs and ICVs (both tracked and wheeled) sans infantry to
good use by deploying them as an independent reserve providing direct fire
support. Called bronegruppa or armoured group, a typical such formation
consisted of about half a dozen vehicles of any combination of tanks and both
tracked and wheeled armoured personnel carriers.
iii) Some minor innovations included using the armoured groups as battle taxis for
speedy insertion and exfiltration of soldiers, carriage of excess amounts of fuel
and rations by the armoured groups since they were likely to operate outside the
range of a friendly logistical trail for extended periods of time and employing
whole armoured groups (bronegruppa) as leapfrog flank security for larger
convoys of forces. The need for stronger forces for flank security was felt because
these were expected to engage enemy on first contact on their own without
waiting for reinforcements, in accordance with the Soviet policy of ‘attack from
direct contact’.

[/Another relevant point from the same article would be the following:]

10) Engineering and Logistics Support : The increased stress on both these
requirements in a high altitude environment are obvious and smooth running of a
campaign in the mountains depend on effective functioning of both. The harsh
environment has a degrading effect on all mechanical systems and an inflated
maintenance effort is necessary to keep a force in working order. For uninterrupted
logistics operations, meticulous planning is necessary to cover all eventualities.
Also do consider that in Himalayas we have no lateral connectivity between different sectors.

Somebody else raised the issue as to why T-72s are being sent up for mountain duty. Well what if the IA is planning in intensive usage with no possibility of getting caught up in a salvage-abandon decision making.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by amit »

ravi_g wrote:Amit ji, US deployed its tanks in tankable terrain only. In non tank country US has deployed tanks in trace quantities only and only as late as 2010/2011. The USSR did try it on high Afghan grounds and here is a link with a write up by a BRF member which explains well the trouble with deploying tanks in mountains.

http://www.adl.gatech.edu/research/brms ... 010802.pdf

Mountain Warfare Lessons : The Soviet Afghanistan Campaign
Rahul M (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com)
4) Armour : Most of the terrains where the Soviets fought, were not ideal tankable
country, and even in places like valleys and ravines, where tracked vehicles could be
deployed, they were easily ambushed from mountain sides and at choke points. There
was the added disadvantage of tank guns not being able to elevate to a high enough angle
in order to be able to return fire. The rough terrain also extracted a heavy toll on the tanks
and their continued deployment became linked to extensive maintenance efforts.
NOTE : What deserves attention in this context are the innovations applied by the Soviets
to get around some of the problems faced by armour. Broadly speaking, there were two
main innovations and numerous minor ones, viz.
i) In a departure from their normal practice, Soviet Motorized Rifle Units
(Mechanized Infantry) started dismounted operations on a regular basis. This
enabled the dismounted infantrymen to conduct operations in terrains inaccessible
to the vehicles and also to provide overwatch for their mounts by covering the
flanks. It may be mentioned that Soviet forces lacked regular light infantry and
this innovation can be seen as a compensating move.
ii) The Soviets put their APCs and ICVs (both tracked and wheeled) sans infantry to
good use by deploying them as an independent reserve providing direct fire
support. Called bronegruppa or armoured group, a typical such formation
consisted of about half a dozen vehicles of any combination of tanks and both
tracked and wheeled armoured personnel carriers.
iii) Some minor innovations included using the armoured groups as battle taxis for
speedy insertion and exfiltration of soldiers, carriage of excess amounts of fuel
and rations by the armoured groups since they were likely to operate outside the
range of a friendly logistical trail for extended periods of time and employing
whole armoured groups (bronegruppa) as leapfrog flank security for larger
convoys of forces. The need for stronger forces for flank security was felt because
these were expected to engage enemy on first contact on their own without
waiting for reinforcements, in accordance with the Soviet policy of ‘attack from
direct contact’.

[/Another relevant point from the same article would be the following:]

10) Engineering and Logistics Support : The increased stress on both these
requirements in a high altitude environment are obvious and smooth running of a
campaign in the mountains depend on effective functioning of both. The harsh
environment has a degrading effect on all mechanical systems and an inflated
maintenance effort is necessary to keep a force in working order. For uninterrupted
logistics operations, meticulous planning is necessary to cover all eventualities.
Also do consider that in Himalayas we have no lateral connectivity between different sectors.

Somebody else raised the issue as to why T-72s are being sent up for mountain duty. Well what if the IA is planning in intensive usage with no possibility of getting caught up in a salvage-abandon decision making.
Ravi ji,

Obviously neither the Abrams or the Arjun would be a good fit in places like Sikkim. However my point is, do you think a tank which is considered to be fit for the deserts of Rajasthan is unfit to operate in the plains of Punjab?

That's what the Army has been telling us till now and I just can't wrap my head around it.

To give another example, the Abram has seen operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (to name just two countries). Now just suppose that the US Army were to attack Pakistan. Do you think the Abrams would be bogged down in the plains of Sind or Pakistan Punjab after slicing through Baluchistan and NWFP? Keep in mind the terrain differences.

I don't think that would even cause the Abrams to slow down.

Which is why I can't buy the logic that a tank which has lower ground pressure is considered unfit for the strike crops which would work their way out of Punjab.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

nelson wrote:@NRao
I was referring to "70 tonne load capacity" of the AM-50 bridges that you said, and pointed out it was incorrect. The bridge in the IA Engineers video is same AM-50 and is the mainstay, as of now.
It seems the desperation of defending the indefensible is really getting to you.

I can see you morph into another Sanku on this thread. But then, that is the nature of beast. Slowly but surely, all the facades in favor of T-90 are coming off and I can understand if it is a bit difficult to digest the reality.

Now, coming to your bridge argument and especially AM-50 bridges:

- How many such systems are there in the entire Indian Army?
- And what is the unit price of AM-50 Bridge Layer set?

You can very well say that the above numbers are not available in public domain. But hey!, we can do some ballpark calculations, right?

Let us take a top-down approach to find out the numbers required of this weakest link in the chain:

- So, IA has grand total of 3 x Armored Division, 6 x RAPID and 2 x (I) Mech Bdes and IIRC, 7 x (I) Armored Bdes. Add to this, the (I) Engineer Bdes with Strike Corps. Further, let us suppose that Engineer Regiments with Pivot Corps in western sector ( 12, 10,11 and 9) also require such bridging units for their armored components.

- How many Engineer Regiments does that add up to?

Lets see - @1 Engineer Regiment per Armored Division and RAPID gives 9 x Engineer Regiments. (I) Armored and (I) Mech Bdes have companies and IMO will require support from Corps Engineer Regiment or Bdes for any serious requirement.

To the above, add another 4 Regiment (@1 per Pivot Corps) and 10 Regiments with (I) Engineer Bdes.

You have grand total of 23 Engineer Regiments which require bridging equipment with express purpose of transporting tanks across obstacles. If you ask me, this is gross over estimation but we'll stick with this for present.

Now, what is per unit holding of AM-50? If one averages out equipment across various units (some would hold more, other less), can we assume 15 units per regiment? And this would give a total of 345 units. Let us be further charitable and jack this up to 400 units.

Let us see the cost part - The entire Sarvatra set is supposed to cost INR 200 Million i.e. INR 20 Crore per set (which comprises the 5 vehicles and associated paraphernalia). From what I know, 8 AM-50 units can be joined together to form a single bridge. Let us assume this forms ONE Set of AM-50 and costs the same as Sarvatra Set.

What is cost of 400/8 = 50 such units? @ INR 20 Crore per set, this amounts to INR 1,000 Crore or USD 200 Million (xchange rate of 1:50)

Meanwhile, Indian Army has decided to spend in excess of INR 20,000 crores in inducting 2,000 odd T-90 tanks. And this is cost as of today which will further rise.

Classic case of "Cutting off the nose to spite the face" ...!!!
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by alexis »

There is no logic! Only Natashas!

I also have tried my best to understand why IA cant induct Arjun Mk1s now while letting the line idle. But line constraint is another red herring as nothing stops Avadi from putting a new line for Mk2 and use existing line for Mk1s and upgrading them later.

Nothing logical has been found in any media or presented by BRF gurus. I have come to the conclusion that IA/MOD (however it was MOD which pushed IA even for a token induction) needs Natashas more than tanks.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

nelson wrote:It will not suffice to parade a system. 'Requirement' has to be fulfilled in quantity also, as would be required during war. As i said, we have discussed this before. Let me leave it at that.
Requirement is being fulfilled in quantity as well if the system has been inducted at Division Engineer Regiment level.

But why do you whine about Sarvatra - after all 1 Armored Division is equipped with T-90 and AM-50 can carry the T-90. Pretty simple. So, why the whine-fest about Sarvatra?

And if it was induction of Sarvatra that was holding up the induction of Arjun why didn't the IA go for import? After all, the rational for importing T-90 was imminent threat from across the border and delay in Arjun development. I didn't seen any such alacrity with respect to Arjun induction and requirement for bridging equipment to support the same.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

Arjun, cant see service cause the DRDO MLC 70 Bridge is a 15 meter span bridge. But it has not developed the 14 ,13,12,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1 Meter span MLC 70 bridge.

So buy the T 90.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by srin »

amit wrote:
Ravi ji,

Obviously neither the Abrams or the Arjun would be a good fit in places like Sikkim. However my point is, do you think a tank which is considered to be fit for the deserts of Rajasthan is unfit to operate in the plains of Punjab?

That's what the Army has been telling us till now and I just can't wrap my head around it.
Arjun doesn't have pressurized cabin - so non-acclimatized soldiers can't crew it. That's the real reason why Arjun can't be used. :twisted:

T-90's meet all requirements that were expected of them, so they can be used in NE
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

Can some one tell the power's that be that the suitability of a tank use WRT, terrain comes from ground pressure exerted by it and not its weight.

That being the case the Tin cans is unsuitable for most Indian terrain.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

Marten wrote:^Rohit, what stops the same units from inducting Arjun-based layers? Logistically, wouldn't that be an easier thing to do?

If the IA orders it, then yes. But no orders == no Arjun based layer.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

Marten wrote:^Rohit, what stops the same units from inducting Arjun-based layers? Logistically, wouldn't that be an easier thing to do?
Marten - The AM-50 type of bridges are bit different in the sense that multiple units can be combined to form a larger bridge. In case of AM-50, 8 units can be combined while in case of Sarvatra, 5 such units can be combined.

But the basic point is - if IA really wanted to induct Arjun and if development of MLC-70 Sarvatra bridge was holding the same up, IA could have asked for imported system as an interim measure.

BTW - the requirement for Arjun based BLT of MLC-70 stands on its own merit.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Sanku »

rohitvats wrote: But the basic point is - if IA really wanted to induct Arjun and if development of MLC-70 Sarvatra bridge was holding the same up, .
No the bridge is a secondary issue right now. The primary issue in holding up development of Arjun is its simple unavailability at the right time.

If enough Arjun's were available, looking at bridges actively made sense. Right now its cart before the horse.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

Can any one teach me the concept of Opportunity cost and how it applies in terms of production capacity.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by arnab »

Sanku wrote:The primary issue in holding up development of Arjun is its simple unavailability at the right time.

If enough Arjun's were available, looking at bridges actively made sense. Right now its cart before the horse.
Marten wrote:^
Step 1: Don't place an order.
Step 2: Claim the system is not in service.
Step 3: Turn around and buy a "comparable" system from Mader Roos.
Step 4: Deny Step 2 was because of Step 1.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by member_20317 »

amit wrote:Ravi ji,

However my point is, do you think a tank which is considered to be fit for the deserts of Rajasthan is unfit to operate in the plains of Punjab?

That's what the Army has been telling us till now and I just can't wrap my head around it.

Arjun makes perfect sense against Pakis. The additional orders of T90 were for mountains. Mountains is a question mark that nobody has yet answered.

Germans tried to move through mountains in WW-2 but they did that with horses and Pzkw-1 and 2. Before that horse cavalary tried fast encircling moves. After that only Umrikhans tried fast encircling moves with cavalry. But then Umrikhans are filthy rich. They can afford it. The Soviets decided on a variant, where their tanks would start from East Urop and basically get fully worn out by the time the reached south of france. In all these cases the attacker had a big MIC, much bigger then ours and a national perspective on conquest that we do not have.

In the mountains the Chinese I believe even abandoned their own heavy equipment and also ours that they captured from our forces.

Also a tank in Himalaya is not a ballerina that it is in the plains, so you have to think at least about the abandonment of intensively used equipment.

Coincidently a senior retd. IA officer listed the inability to truck back the supplies from FARPs near Siachen as one of the reasons for IA resistance to Siachen deal. Intensive use and abandonment looks to me like a reality and not a theory. You either shoot what you carry in the mountains else it would be wiser to haul some edibles instead.

Arjun is our product I am proud of it. But it came after the sunk cost of T90, which has an impact cost of its own.

My real worry is how the hell would even the so called lighter T-90 move in the mountains. Before you reach the Pamir you have got to clear the Himalayas.

Despite all this what I am suspecting is that the bits and pieces ordering will be experienced in Arjun's case too. Some or the other Raksha Mantri will do something for the public sector guys also. True that is not the smooth fast lane but that is looking like a distinct possibility in a case where the political leadership is confused.
Last edited by member_20317 on 09 Apr 2013 11:28, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

arnab wrote:
Sanku wrote:The primary issue in holding up development of Arjun is its simple unavailability at the right time.

If enough Arjun's were available, looking at bridges actively made sense. Right now its cart before the horse.
Marten wrote:^
Step 1: Don't place an order.
Step 2: Claim the system is not in service.
Step 3: Turn around and buy a "comparable" system from Mader Roos.
Step 4: Deny Step 2 was because of Step 1.
:rotfl: :twisted:
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

1) Are mountains suitable for tank warfare. Or will Tanks be picked off, by dismounted well camouflaged infantry equipped with ATGMS.
2) Or tanks are suitable for the platues, if yes, then in that case doesn't it make sense that the best is brought in to play. The challenge of moving a tank into mountain, is the same whether it is a 50 ton vehicle or a 60 ton vehicle. That is the road network. It that doesn't exist, then the tank wont get there.
Last edited by Pratyush on 09 Apr 2013 11:38, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by alexis »

Sanku wrote:
rohitvats wrote: But the basic point is - if IA really wanted to induct Arjun and if development of MLC-70 Sarvatra bridge was holding the same up, .
No the bridge is a secondary issue right now. The primary issue in holding up development of Arjun is its simple unavailability at the right time.

If enough Arjun's were available, looking at bridges actively made sense. Right now its cart before the horse.
Any quote from an IA officer on this specific point?
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by amit »

ravi_g wrote:Despite all this what I am suspecting is that the bits and pieces ordering will be experienced in Arjun's case too. Some or the other Raksha Mantri will do something for the public sector guys also. True that is not the smooth fast lane but that is looking like a distinct possibility in a case where the political leadership is confused.
Ravi ji,

I think bits and pieces orders is exactly what the Arjun line does not need. Such an approach will ensure that the production line never settles down and indigenisation will get hit. The net result is that economies of scale, which would bring down per unit cost, will never happen.

Take the current scenario. After 128 MK1s (which have been proved to be superior to T90s in comparative trials) the line has been shut down. Now once the MK2 meets the Army's expectations the MK2 line will start up and produce 116 pieces. After that what? MK3 with the MK2 line being shut down till such time that the Army is satisfied with MK3?

Look at the Merkava example I posted above. Is it so difficult to do the production in tranches and keep on improving and backwards upgrading?

The new T90s for the mountains is a very good example. Why does the Army need to import the 300 odd new tanks? Why can't T90s already in stock or those that have been contracted to be bought/produced be upgraded to this new export model standard - the so-called MS - that the Russians are tom tomming about?

And that number can be replaced by a mix of Arjun MK1s and MK2. Does that sound to be a impractical thing?

One other point. The worst possible scenario can be if some Raksha Mantri keeps dribbles of order going for Arjun to save public sector jobs and not because this is a worldclass desi product which is better than its foreign analogue which the Army seems addicted to.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by arnab »

alexis wrote:
Sanku wrote:
No the bridge is a secondary issue right now. The primary issue in holding up development of Arjun is its simple unavailability at the right time.

If enough Arjun's were available, looking at bridges actively made sense. Right now its cart before the horse.
Any quote from an IA officer on this specific point?
I believe it was mentioned by whatshername the lady defence minister of state in parliament sometime in 2006-07 :)
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Austin »

This T-90 versus Arjun debate is truly endless as I have seen this happening since 2001 , people have changed some are still with BRF and some are not , new people come and the old story continues ... I have myself took part in some debates and have studied the subject with great curiosity but finally I realised every tank has pro and cons and in the end IA is the best people to judge.

Personally speaking I was satisfied with i saw VKS speak on this matter , I am not sure if we can invite him on BRF meet in Delhi and have a word with him on what he thinks about it in more detailed matter ......perhaps he is too big a person to attend meets like that , the reason i said VKS is because most people word trust him and his word ..... so i would just post what he said in an interview on the subject.
What is the status on armour? Is T-90s the MBT now? What is being done about the large numbers of T-72 tanks which lack a night fighting capability? How many Arjun regiment will the army have, and are there plans to upgrade Arjun tanks?

VKS: By terming the T-90 tank as the main battle tank (MBT), the Indian Army implies that this tank is the future mainstay of the Indian Army, and is indicative of the volumes of this tank comprising the backbone of the mechanised forces. T-90 is a state of the art and highly capable weapon system, capable of survival in the most challenging environments.

The Indian Army has already addressed the issue of night blindness of T-72 tanks. A large number of tanks are now night-enabled. Measures are already in place to ensure speedy night enablement of the balance numbers. With this, we have ensured that the erstwhile issue of night blindness is addressed holistically, with our entire tank fleet capable of operations at night.

As far as Arjun tank is concerned, the Indian Army is looking at inducting a few additional numbers of MBT Arjun regiments in the future. The tank finally produced by DRDO is quite competitive and has come a long way. Upgradations and improvements to the MBT Arjun as a Mark- II version are underway. On successful completion of these improvements, the tank will meet the requirements of the Indian Army.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by arnab »

^
Considering the IA is being held culpable in the non-induction of Arjun, I find it difficult to accede to the logic that if the IA says that the T-90 is good, it should be the last word on the topic.(it may well be 'good' compared to what is around in the neighbourhood, but the Arjun is a better tank. Besides, it is more relevant to developing our own MIC - which is obviously of a limited concern to IA),
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by manum »

If MK-2 fails army will order more T-90, its as simple as that...They have easy options...

and MK-2 fails respective to what? obviously its not shedding its weight...
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Austin »

I guess the only option then if we dont take IA word is to hire an International Expert who can verify the claims of IA on tanks and put it to test , I agree IA can say what it likes and there is no reason why we should take their word for what it is , even DRDO hired Israel expert who concluded Arjun was a good tank and called it Dessert Ferrari.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

The simplest test will be have a comparative trial, with a Mk 1 Arjun and see, who wins. That ought to settle the matter. T90 won the last trial by the virtue of the Arjun being DQd for Killing a target while on the move. When the ROE stated the said target had to be engaged while standing still.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by arnab »

Austin wrote:I guess the only option then if we dont take IA word is to hire an International Expert who can verify the claims of IA on tanks and put it to test , I agree IA can say what it likes and there is no reason why we should take their word for what it is , even DRDO hired Israel expert who concluded Arjun was a good tank and called it Dessert Ferrari.
Exactly. Arjun has been evaluated by intenational experts (Israel) and has bested the T-90 in comparitive trials. OTOH The Russian Chief of Ground Forces have called the T-90s inferior (and expensive) to NATO products and has suggested that a better option is to go for Leopards.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by manum »

I know its like questioning your own dad...that all those things you did were wrong...
Dad did what was best in interest of the family, questioning him would call a ignorant brat son and obviously less experienced about how the outside world is...

So Questioning the fatherly institution for its word is wrong, or felt wrong because you have a different mindset, and obviously the father earns, protects the family...

So my questioning the IA...Our consistent questioning of IA...If it infuses a new kind of thinking, Its worth it...
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Austin »

arnab wrote: Exactly. Arjun has been evaluated by intenational experts (Israel) and has bested the T-90 in comparitive trials.
Agree so we need similar international experts lets call independent inspectors to monitor comparative trials since IA word on T-90 and Arjun cannot be taken at face value , as many in BRF have felt over many years that IA has been anti-Arjun and pro T-90 and few have even mentioned that IA has got addicted to bbb and have little concern over MIC development in India.
OTOH The Russian Chief of Ground Forces have called the T-90s inferior (and expensive) to NATO products and has suggested that a better option is to go for Leopards.
In that case Russian are better off joining NATO which is also a pre-condition to get and use NATO equipment .....they will get the tank almost free of cost as a incentive to join nato , it is better to use superior Leo and that should solve Russian Chief of Ground forces concerns on this issue.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

ravi_g wrote:
<SNIP>

Also a tank in Himalaya is not a ballerina that it is in the plains, so you have to think at least about the abandonment of intensively used equipment.

<SNIP>

Intensive use and abandonment looks to me like a reality and not a theory. You either shoot what you carry in the mountains else it would be wiser to haul some edibles instead.

Arjun is our product I am proud of it. But it came after the sunk cost of T90, which has an impact cost of its own.

My real worry is how the hell would even the so called lighter T-90 move in the mountains. Before you reach the Pamir you have got to clear the Himalayas.

<SNIP>

For someone who writes detailed and well researched posts, your arguments come across like shooting from the hip like our very own 'Quick Gun Murugan'...

Now, the mountain issue - First things first: All the examples of USSR and Americans and Germans as far as mountain warfare and their armored assets are concerned are irrelevant.

After we've cleared that from the way, let us see where exactly does this 'mountainous' theater exist in case of India and tanks. Theater 1 is eastern Ladakh and Theater 2 extreme north-east Sikkim where the Indian territory is extension of mountainous plateau.

BTW - Did you bother to look up the terrain in these mountainous areas? And what could be likely area of deployment along with its impact on the equipment? I think not or you'd not have made the above post at all.

They say a picture is worth a thousand words and I'll allow the pictures to do the talking. Here we go (all pictures are of eastern Ladakh):

Image

Image

Image

Does it appear in any of above pictures that terrain is going to be a limiting factor when it comes to deployment of tanks in these areas? Especially, Ladakh? And that only T-90 can operate in Ladakh and not Arjun? And does it look like these BMP-2s and tanks are on a one way trip of intense utilization and then abandonment?

In case of North Sikkim, the main challenge will be in terms of transporting the tank to the theater of operation. And here, the T-72/T-90 combine may well have an advantage.

Coming back again to Ladakh, let me point to couple more things:

http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=33.55 ... 4&z=12&m=h

The cursor in the above map is centered on a location called Spanggur Gap. The strategically important Chushul is to North-West of it and can be seen on the map. In 1962, PLA was expected to launch ARMORED Assault from this gap towards Chushul. IAF airlifted a troop of AMX-13 tanks and while no PLA Armored Assault came, these tanks helped in the battle of Chushul.

In 20XX, PLA is more capable and has better tanks. And next time, an assault from this gap cutting off the Chushul Bde from the forces further south (in Dhmechok area).

Now, let us undertake one more exercise. The same map (with cursor centered on Spanggur Gap) is linked below but in Google Terrain mode.

http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=33.55 ... 4&z=10&m=t

Scroll south on the map towards the point where Indus enters into India from Tibet. Zoom in and check the GRADIENT of the land here. And width of the Indus river valley.

When you do this, you'll see that while the valley floor is at considerable height, the lay of the land is flat and gradient is shallow. The valley is wide and mind you, this is the place which can permit PLA to develop a Division level attack into the country. And similarly, gives us an opportunity to break out into the Tibet.

You can look up pictures of PLA latest MBT exercising in Tibet. And these tip the scale in excess of 50 tonnes.

Conclusion - Fact of the matter is that tanks are deployable in the Ladakh and that is why IA was working with BRO to widen the NH-1A to take T-90 laden tank-trawlers. IA knows that PLA will come at it with house, kitchen and sink and that is why IA has asked for an (I) Armored Bde for the sector.

PS: IA got the IAF to land BMPs in THOISE in January 1987 during height of winter. These were meant to go west along the Shyok river into POK.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by member_20317 »

Pratyush wrote:1) Are mountains suitable for tank warfare. Or will Tanks be picked off, by dismounted well camouflaged infantry equipped with ATGMS.
2) Or tanks are suitable for the platues, if yes, then in that case doesn't it make sense that the best is brought in to play. The challenge of moving a tank into mountain, is the same whether it is a 50 ton vehicle or a 60 ton vehicle. That is the road network. It that doesn't exist, then the tank wont get there.

Pratyush ji, there is not a whole lot of precedence for mountains. I would say in the modern context some real gaming is required. With armour more then the quality of the shooting platform it is the deployment and ability to take the beating that matters.

The German armour besides being of poorer quality was also about a third smaller then the French armour in the opening moves. French had the best and also the heaviest armour available but were short on deployment. Germans came in from places that the French had not foreseen.

The later example of Soviet and German engagements were not in mountain country but they again proved that bigger tank and better equiped tank does not translate to better results on the ground.

The same happened with Indo Pak exchanges in 65. Both sides evenly matched produced mixed results for both.

Israeli and Syrian exchanges were also on plain ground and even their more then the shooting it was the digging that mattered.

So my view for the time being (I am open to education) is that Arjun on the Pamir would be a good idea provided I can get there the way Germans got over the Ardenne. IOW before the Chinese get a whiff of whats coming. Unfortunately for us, by the accounts coming in, it seems Chinese are ahead of us in this department.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by rohitvats »

Posting in full a 2011 article (http://indiatransportportal.com/2011/05 ... h-highway/)
India widens strategic Srinagar-Leh highway
– MAY 11, 2011

Srinagar: As part of their strategy to upgrade the infrastructure along the China border, government of India has widened the National Highway-1D connecting Srinagar and Leh primarily to facilitate the transport of T-72 tanks.

General Officer Commanding of Srinagar-based China Corps Lieutenant General S A Hassnain while opening the road after being closed for more than five months of winter blockage said that government is putting every effort to improve the infrastructure and resources for strengthening the capability of army.

"In 2010 we made an effort to see whether more tanks can be brought into this area. Like any other military force it was to see how we can improve the infrastructure, which improves army’s capabilities," said Hasnain.

The widening has been done keeping in view the needs of army stationed at frontier Ladakh region. Last year there were several reports of incursions from Chinese side into Indian side, which prompted government to invest on upgrading the infrastructure along the border. The road passes through Zojilla pass at an altitude of 11,500 feet above sea level and it is vital for Army that is stationed along China border and Siachen glacier facing Pakistan administered Kashmir.

Hasnain said that for the last many years army had sensed the need of using T-72 tanks in Ladakh as the region has flat terrain. “You can utilise mechanised elements here (in Ladakh) but bringing in mechanised elements by air has been a major problem in the earlier years,” said Hasnain.

Indian army operates a vast fleet of Russian-made T-72 tanks and it comprises of its main battle tank. The tank has also been upgraded with the addition of thermal imaging capabilities to its night-vision system.

The widening work on 434 km Srinagar-Leh highway was carried out by the 32 Border Roads Task Force (BRTF) and 122 RCC. The road is usually closed for five months in winter following its blockage by heavy snowfall.

When asked, Brig TPS Rawat, Chief Engineer of the Project Beacon confirmed that the road has been widened at many places to facilitate the transport, without elaborating on the exact width of the strategic highway

The border roads organization had to put in much-efforts to clear the snow this year. “This winter snowfall was highest in the last 15 years and at places it was upto 50 feet,” said Rawat.

Government has been trying hard to make the road an all weather round, which requires a long tunnel to be constructed at Zojilla pass. “A feasibility study for constructing a tunnel on this road is going on which will be completed in 2012,” said Hasnain hoping that the all weather road will be a boon for local population as well as army.

As the road gets blocked during winter, the local population of Ladakh stocks the essential supplies during summer time. More than 400 vehicles carrying essential supplies plied on the road on the first day of road opening.

Ladakh is a major tourist place and this year as an added incentive government has done away with toll tax on this road.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by member_20317 »

Hi there, didn't see your post. Looks like a lot of moolah. Thanks for that.

But just to get it out of the way. I am not baised against Arjun. Not baised in favour of T-90. I recognise that there is considerable flat country where somethings can be attempted.

I will try to come back with my apprehensions better articulated.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

Post by Pratyush »

Hmmm....

Nice that the Srinigar Leg highaway is being improved. I had missed it completely. This is in addition to the Manali Leh Highway improvements. A great news.

Now the question to the civil engineer types. What does it take to build a MLC 70 class road, where a MLC 50 Class road already exists.
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