Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 03 Jul 2012 20:35

Accurate intelligence is very very difficult in these areas. By the time the intel reaches the planners, it's old. The band has moved on. The 'situation' is fluid, the terrain very tough and the rebels blend into the non-combatants. It is IMPOSSIBLE to deploy gunships in Maoist ops. Even in the Kishanji encounter, where the CRPF had very accurate info (how is a different story), it took almost three days to track him down. The rebels never stay in one area and even in a gunfight, they are always trying to escape, so even if you have guship support you wouldn't know where to point the guns. Then there is the question of political will. The Bengal joint forces had once surrounded Kishanji and were only 200 metres from him during a hostage exchange. They could have got him but were asked to stand down by the government because he threatened to kill the hostage cop. Our governments do not have the stomach for ruthless action. It's nice to talk of the need to be ruthless, but we need to wake up smell the coffee

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 03 Jul 2012 22:38

Adarsh case: Maha govt files affidavit in HC challenging CBI jurisdiction

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 04 Jul 2012 04:13

I suggested providing armed helicoptors to police forces fighting maoshitsI am not in favor of sending armed forces with their attack helicoptors.

sum · Post by **sum** » 04 Jul 2012 09:07

Livefist:

In what is being seen as a crucial victory for the Indian Army after a long-standing spat with the Indian Air Force, the government today accorded clearance to the Army to operate its own attack helicopter units.

India currently has two attack helicopter units, both under the command and control of the Army, but flown and maintained by IAF pilots and personnel. Seems pretty clear that the government's approval today means (a) that the two Mi-25/35 flights under two helicopter units will soon be flown by Army Aviation pilots (the choppers are in IAF livery) and the IAF will raise new units to house the 22 new attack helicopters (prospectively, the Boeing AH-64D Apache Block III) and, later, the Light Combat Helicopter. (b) The Mi-25/35s will be transferred to IAF command and control, while the Army raises new units and floats fresh requirements (it already stands to receive the Dhruv-WSI), or (c) a status quo on command and control of the current units, until new platforms enter service.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Jul 2012 09:25

^^^That is one of the most important developments as far as army modernization is concerned. Good going - about time we see ALH+WSI Dhruv as organic to the army corps.

rohankumaon · Post by **rohankumaon** » 04 Jul 2012 13:25

rohitvats wrote:That is one of the most important developments

Rohit - I am bit puzzled why you think it is very important development. As I understand that the units are operated by IAF but they were in control of IA. Then the question arises is how much of the integration is present or rather required? What I fail to understand if the units are under command of IA, then is not it the challenge of integration at divisional level? Or you would prefer Chopper units be the tip of IA strike corps?

Thanks in advance and let me know if this is already discussed.

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 04 Jul 2012 13:56

Cash for job scam: Defence Ministry transfers NDA commandant

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 04 Jul 2012 14:11

Chavan charge-sheeted in Adarsh scam

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Jul 2012 15:54

rohankumaon wrote:
rohitvats wrote:That is one of the most important developments
Rohit - I am bit puzzled why you think it is very important development. As I understand that the units are operated by IAF but they were in control of IA. Then the question arises is how much of the integration is present or rather required? What I fail to understand if the units are under command of IA, then is not it the challenge of integration at divisional level? Or you would prefer Chopper units be the tip of IA strike corps?

Thanks in advance and let me know if this is already discussed.

Rohan, it is not only about command and control. There are other larger issues here.

For example - who decides on the threat scenario and consequent size of attack helicopter fleet required? Where does the funding come from - IA or IAF? What about the incidental increase in the manpower and associated infrastructure and cost?

And I do feel that attack helicopters+ability for vertical envelopment represent a quantitative advantage over the enemy. For me, an ideal scenario for a strike corps is to -
Attack Helicopter Brigade - 2 x LCH Squadrons + 1 x WSI Dhruv
Composite Helicopter Brigade - 2 x ALH + 1 x WSI Dhruv

For others, it can be -
Attack Helicopter Brigade - 1 x LCH Squadrons + 2 x WSI Dhruv
Composite Helicopter Brigade - 2 x ALH + 1 x WSI Dhruv

The numbers and concentration can be worked out based on threat perception - for example, 9 and 16 Corps can have assets on line of Strike Corps - should serve as strong deterrent to ARN.

rohankumaon · Post by **rohankumaon** » 04 Jul 2012 16:19

rohitvats wrote:For example - who decides on the threat scenario and consequent size of attack helicopter fleet required? Where does the funding come from - IA or IAF? What about the incidental increase in the manpower and associated infrastructure and cost?

Thanks for your reply.

For the first example you gave - about who deciding the threat scenarios - Since the control of squadron is with the army, it is for the army to use it. Unless, you think that threat scenario perceived by the front line of IA, divisional hq and commander sitting in Delhi would have different perception, then what do you think is the best solution or there is no best solution as situation is very fluid?

If above is not the case, then why do army need to raise its own attack helicopter fleet because, to me, the control of use lies with them.

Second question/ example is very true that from where does the funding come from and that is something not easily achieved but also not something very difficult as well to draw a well chartered clauses.

Thirdly - about the incidental increase is cost. Will not this cost be much too less as compared to cost of maintaining a complete new squadron? Or army has already enough infrastructure that inducting another local made chopper (LCH Dhruv-WSI are similar to Dhruv) will not be difficult. I would imagine the second case for this point. Then the incremental point you made would become very true.

Thanks again for your reply and replies that you give (in anticipation)!

vasu raya · Post by **vasu raya** » 04 Jul 2012 21:10

Katare wrote:I suggested providing armed helicoptors to police forces fighting maoshitsI am not in favor of sending armed forces with their attack helicoptors.

second that, from the recent Dhruv video and its use in J&K, its very clear how mobility contributes to successful operations. To avoid being fired upon, a cheetah with IR sensor is being used to spot lurkers.

Most of the police causalties in maoist infested areas are due to land mines, and if police forces are denied air mobility, they can start demanding for the same given the arguments on why Army wants control of choppers vs. IAF. On the down side the small sized BSF air wing was a disaster due to lack of proper maintenance of the choppers. But then there are a lot of heli tour operators who are successful, so a solution maybe to outsource chopper maintenance to competent companies or Army aviation.

The police with air wing approach might have limitations due to the need for attack choppers, say in providing cover fire or in surviving flak

In summary, calibrate the response based on threat perception operationally and not limit to institutional capabilities. In that sense there is no difference between J&K terrorists and Maoists, we don't use excessive fire power even in J&K, so Maoists can be dealt similarly.

member_19648 · Post by **member_19648** » 04 Jul 2012 21:28

I don't think the Govt has asked for any armed action on part of IAF in counter-Maoist operations, they have asked for widened transport/medvac role, which the IAF hasn't refused but stated their concerns on HANGAR facilities etc. Usual DDM quoting IAF doesn't want widen red role. Air support is an absolute must in counter-insurgency operations, for transporting supplies to soldiers deep inside jungles where operations might go on for days, casualty evacuation, transportation of troops, surveillance etc. The BSF helos are very poorly maintained leading to many accidents, iirc, the Pawan Hans personnel used to maintain them and were quite shoddy about it. Without support from IAF, the operations would be really tough.

vasu raya · Post by **vasu raya** » 04 Jul 2012 21:38

On surveillance, DRDO has developed a people detecting radar, seeing a radar in the nose of dhruv, why can't they adapt the former type on it? they are also developing vegetation penetrating radar and then there is LOROS, all these should be sufficient to sanitize an area

nelson · Post by **nelson** » 04 Jul 2012 21:45

Regarding the armed/ attack helicopters(AH) in Indian Army, the transfer or creation of such assets will impose little change in operations and operational training. The reasons being that, firstly the assets have always been under command of army formations for such purpose, as brought out above. Secondly, Indian Air Force will remain the sole custodian of the airspace regardless of who operates what and the procedures which hitherto brought air force in the loop of close air support using AH will continue to remain, may be at a higher vigil.

However the proposed changes will make significant contribution in improving administration and logistics of the AH assets, or so it is expected. JMT.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 04 Jul 2012 22:10

Vasu. how will the best of radars differentiate between a half-pant clad Maoist and a half-pant clad simple villager going to the forest to collect sal leaves?? Btw, the Maoists don't move around with weapons all the time and mostly pitch camp near villages so that they can mingle with the population or use them as human shields. Radars are no help there, brother. Our police/paramilitary forces are fighting a daily nightmare out there and the majority of them are not even trained or equipped adequately for this kind of combat, the most gruesome and morale sapping of all

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 04 Jul 2012 22:30

rohankumaon wrote:
Thanks for your reply.

For the first example you gave - about who deciding the threat scenarios - Since the control of squadron is with the army, it is for the army to use it. Unless, you think that threat scenario perceived by the front line of IA, divisional hq and commander sitting in Delhi would have different perception, then what do you think is the best solution or there is no best solution as situation is very fluid?

If above is not the case, then why do army need to raise its own attack helicopter fleet because, to me, the control of use lies with them.

Rohan, actually, I had a different reason to quote the threat scenario point. AFAIK, the deployment of Mi-35 Squadrons is as per IA's deployment philosophy. What I wanted to say was that appreciation of threat scenarios lead to physical deployment plan as well as number of systems required. In addition, you may have a scenario where IA intends to increase its offensive potential by adding attack helicopter assets to its Corps. What happens then?

Coming to cost - just imagine if IA decides to add 5-6 squadrons of LCH to the Orbat. So, IA simply foots the bill and IAF raises the manpower and associated infrastructure? I don't think this structure is tenable in the long run as IA's demands increase and it can afford to add more to helicopter segment. Then there is the angle of more promotion prospects within Army Aviation Corps stream and prospects of commanding larger formations like Attack Helicopter Brigades or such things.

Everything said and then, the level of integration and cohesion that can be achieved between AAC and other IA arms will be more than IA and IAF.

Thirdly - about the incidental increase is cost. Will not this cost be much too less as compared to cost of maintaining a complete new squadron? Or army has already enough infrastructure that inducting another local made chopper (LCH Dhruv-WSI are similar to Dhruv) will not be difficult. I would imagine the second case for this point. Then the incremental point you made would become very true.

The induction of ALH has given IA the experience and infrastructure is already in place to some extent. However, the physical deployment of LCH Squadrons might not follow the deployment pattern of ALH and IA will need to add some infrastructure.

Rohan, you're welcome.

vasu raya · Post by **vasu raya** » 04 Jul 2012 22:58

pmund wrote:Vasu. how will the best of radars differentiate between a half-pant clad Maoist and a half-pant clad simple villager going to the forest to collect sal leaves?? Btw, the Maoists don't move around with weapons all the time and mostly pitch camp near villages so that they can mingle with the population or use them as human shields. Radars are no help there, brother. Our police/paramilitary forces are fighting a daily nightmare out there and the majority of them are not even trained or equipped adequately for this kind of combat, the most gruesome and morale sapping of all

the same tactic was used in J&K and we hear news about army cordoning off an entire area and letting people pass through checkpoints along with an ID, the downside being alienation of people

mobile fingerprinting/biometric stations such as those used for UID (Aadhar) collection at these checkpoints will help ID the local population. Once a ID pool is created, tracing people outside the system or identifying them based on intelligence intercepts should get better and in addition Aadhar is all about govt. schemes reaching the local people

the ratio of casualties between J&K terrorists and army troops in favor of the latter helped boost army's morale, it would help if police casualties are low vs. Maoists. In one famous incident after a landmine explosion, the Maoists fired on surviving but injured policemen, were Jammers ineffective or they were none? the heli borne radars escorting troop convoys can pick up operatives in close range trying to trigger the landmines remotely or can act as jammers

unlike J&K with small but highly trained terrorists, Maoists tend to come in large groups similar to the Chinese tactics?

armchair opinions only
JMT

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 04 Jul 2012 23:17

pmund wrote:Vasu. how will the best of radars differentiate between a half-pant clad Maoist and a half-pant clad simple villager going to the forest to collect sal leaves?? Btw, the Maoists don't move around with weapons all the time and mostly pitch camp near villages so that they can mingle with the population or use them as human shields. Radars are no help there, brother. Our police/paramilitary forces are fighting a daily nightmare out there and the majority of them are not even trained or equipped adequately for this kind of combat, the most gruesome and morale sapping of all

Collateral causalities remain a problem with ground operatiosn/forces too but it is taken care of by "rule of engagement" in peace time for all forces ground and air bound. Forces don't fire unless fired upon, non compliance of orders or imminent threat to their safety. In both cases it’s the caliber and size of weapon that creates problem not specifically the location (air or ground fired) of weapon.
You are thinking about Paki operations with F16 delivering 500 pounders on their population or their foot solders shelling their own villages with heavy artillery guns. A heli with a machine gun up in the air is roughly same as an armored truck with machine gun on ground. In many cases heli would have better view and can direct ground fire accordingly to minimize collateral damage.

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 04 Jul 2012 23:20

rohit/rohan,

I think a big change might come from actual army pilots operating these helicopters who would think more like a foot solder rather than airmen.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 04 Jul 2012 23:34

The rules of engagement are vastly different in J&K and Maoist-affected areas. You are talking of UID-ing and fingerpinting villagers in these areas? Hell, you can't get them to apply for ration cards and BPL cards, how will you get them to line up for a retina scan? Besides, the Maoist footsoldiers are all locals. They will simply take your biometric cards and go cut someone's throat in front of his wife and kids. Katare, you mean to say you have squinted down the sights of an LMG and felt sure, felt 110% sure, that you will hit the target and nothing but the target when there is a village 50 yards away? The anti-Maoist forces do not have the protection of something like the AFSPA. And I am NOT repeat NOT thinking of Paki F-16s dropping bombs on their populace.

member_23626 · Post by **member_23626** » 05 Jul 2012 00:00

Katare wrote:
pmund wrote:Vasu. how will the best of radars differentiate between a half-pant clad Maoist and a half-pant clad simple villager going to the forest to collect sal leaves?? Btw, the Maoists don't move around with weapons all the time and mostly pitch camp near villages so that they can mingle with the population or use them as human shields. Radars are no help there, brother. Our police/paramilitary forces are fighting a daily nightmare out there and the majority of them are not even trained or equipped adequately for this kind of combat, the most gruesome and morale sapping of all
Collateral causalities remain a problem with ground operatiosn/forces too but it is taken care of by "rule of engagement" in peace time for all forces ground and air bound. Forces don't fire unless fired upon, non compliance of orders or imminent threat to their safety. In both cases it’s the caliber and size of weapon that creates problem not specifically the location (air or ground fired) of weapon.
You are thinking about Paki operations with F16 delivering 500 pounders on their population or their foot solders shelling their own villages with heavy artillery guns. A heli with a machine gun up in the air is roughly same as an armored truck with machine gun on ground. In many cases heli would have better view and can direct ground fire accordingly to minimize collateral damage.

Leave it Katare sir, the spineless leaders of our country would rather have a separate state for NE than using such methods. I am not saying we should not care about innocent villagers, but I don't think there is anything wrong about learning new methods, go on Katare, please explain how that will happen and if there are any videos/reports that you can provide. Even I think it is a possibility in dealing with insurgents

member_19648 · Post by **member_19648** » 05 Jul 2012 00:07

Katare wrote:A heli with a machine gun up in the air is roughly same as an armored truck with machine gun on ground. In many cases heli would have better view and can direct ground fire accordingly to minimize collateral damage.

How will a helo have better view inside dense jungles where the maoists hide, also the helos are fired at from inside the jungles, and iirc, one airman was killed in such fire!!! There are chances, the helos can be shot down and with limited attack helos (bringing back UN ones), its always a huge risk.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 05 Jul 2012 00:24

An IAF sergeant was killed in Nov 2008 in Chattisgarh when Maoists fired at it with AK47 rifles. So yes, the threat is very real. As i said earlier, can u imagine the publicity coup for the Maoists if an IAF chopper crashes in rebel territory for whatever reason, or worse, the Maoists shoot it down and take the pilots hostage!!

rohankumaon · Post by **rohankumaon** » 05 Jul 2012 03:37

rohitvats wrote:What I wanted to say was that appreciation of threat scenarios lead to physical deployment plan as well as number of systems required.

Very valid point, makes a lot of sense! So obviously, more the choppers are integrated with army at all levels, the much better will be deployment plans. Thanks Rohit!

Katare wrote:I think a big change might come from actual army pilots operating these helicopters who would think more like a foot solder rather than airmen.

katareji - Can you throw more light on your statement above? What difference it will be specifically in operating a weaponised chopper?
Thanks in advance

hnair · Post by **hnair** » 05 Jul 2012 07:09

The minute an ordinance fired/dropped from the air kills a civilian, it stops being normal law enforcement

khan has hollywood to apply make-up over such ugly acnes in their social conscience. Their fanbois of all nationalities take the cue from there and start fanning out into the youtube world with footage of screeching gatlings and flying corpses of "bad guy" tossed up in the air.

The minute you are using overwhelming advantage (in this case, air) against ANY civilians, let alone your own civilians (however lowlife) is when ALL the civilians of your country gets the message that the govt will do **anything** to get over its sense of inadequacy in dealing with the situation. And that is bad, fricking bad. That sort of shyte is what attracts urban crowds for protests, in much more numbers than what some gibberish spouting undersexed harpie like ARoy etc can ever dream of.

Right now in India, against maoists, the fight is seen as evenly matched with near identical weapons. The key thing that is to the advantage to the law enforcement side is the support from a majority who wants peace and prosperity. In India, after a particularly sticky encounter, the collateral civilian causalities include the dead law-enforcement personnel's families. That is a powerful, powerful message to the world that these women and men fought humans at great costs, rather then cheaply killed vermin.

The maoists knew they lost a bit opportunity, when Home Ministery had to drop their creepy public musings on such usage.

It is a matter of time before prosperity reaches the maoists places too. Painstakingly building up local law enforcement and political systems is the only way against maoists. Military ground forces just provides a certain protection for the local enforcement, to remind these brave folks that they are not alone and that India's civic systems can work without the disruptions.

We never did it and should not even think of doing it. Not inside India. Not anywhere else.

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 05 Jul 2012 08:31

It's just funny that people will argue against what they want to argue against rather than what is being said/posted. Another habit is to bring US in discussions to make points.
A mounted gun on heli is same as a mounted gun on a LCV/Truck. Helicopters save lives by causality evac, rapid re-enforcement, recce and providing better direction to ground fire.
I am talking about policing grade helicopters with only mounted low caliber guns, not attack helis with rockets, bombs and missiles. Our police forces immediately need these capabilities in numbers to effectively meet threats posed by many militant groups.

wilson_th · Post by **wilson_th** » 05 Jul 2012 10:47

It is a matter of time before prosperity reaches the maoists places too. Painstakingly building up local law enforcement and political systems is the only way against maoists. Military ground forces just provides a certain protection for the local enforcement, to remind these brave folks that they are not alone and that India's civic systems can work without the disruptions.

We never did it and should not even think of doing it. Not inside India. Not anywhere else.

hnair sir , great thought rightly said.

D Roy · Post by **D Roy** » 05 Jul 2012 11:17

Where does the funding come from - IA or IAF

Funnily enough, these birds were always funded by the IA.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 05 Jul 2012 17:24

Nair Ji! Well said. We have never done it and we should never do it. An overwhelming use of power against our own people is out of the question. The Maoist insurgency cannot be tackled with the use of force alone but a mix of force and infrastructure development in the affected areas. Take out the top leadership in precision strikes and flood the villages with schools, hospitals, roads, electricity, jobs... The Maoist insurgency is proving tough to keep down because it is a complicated mix of a social problem, political games and a military nightmare. Gunships aren't the answer. A CoBRA commando is a better weapon than a chopper but yes, choppers would be invaluable in casualty evac and gathering intel.

Altair · Post by **Altair** » 05 Jul 2012 20:17

People here are too emotional and are acutely unaware of the facts.
Maoists get their strategy and funds form PLA. It has not been in public but ask any greyhounds (APs answer to naxal problem), They will tell you naxals use Chinese equipment (GPS, Freq hopping spread spectrum radios, jammers, anti personal mines, rockets etc).
They located and tracked the CRPF in Dantewada district while combing and attacked and killed 74 men in the Mukrana forest, about 540 km southeast of the State capital Raipur. The investigation later found that the Maoists were able to track the two way secure comms and triangulate them. I am guessing we can buy such tracking devices in flipkart or ebay?
It has no been made public because we have a traitor media who will suck up to anyone with gora skin and the country be damned.
So the Chinese will then escalate with SAMs and shoot down our choppers and we will have a war in our own country, well, we already are in war brothers. wake up!

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 05 Jul 2012 20:45

People here are too emotional and are acutely unaware of the facts.

I'd take offence to that but then I realised u dont know what u are saying

krisna · Post by **krisna** » 05 Jul 2012 20:53

Agree with hnair and pmund.

wrt helos to be used against red menace, it is a absolute no -no.
the maoists are our own people.
The collateral damage will be immense. it will also give lot of eyeballs to local populace in the region to take up arms. maoists and their sympathisers will exploit to the hilt with foreign funding. the funding will include more arms which will also help maoists take on aerial weapons etc. It will only escalate the war which should not be the main aim.

As an example-- israel and other countries are prone to use heavy handed methods to subdue the population sometimes their own. this creates a simmering tension which will not go away for years. there will violence in other ways if the affected population cannot take on the govt of the day. there will be increased violence due to pent up frustartions.

In J&K India has not used helos or aerial weapons of any sort to kill terrorists. Always used ground forces despite overwhelming evidence of tsp support(along with 3.5 friends).

There should be improvements in ground forces ability to tackle the maosists.--
1) work on improving socio economic conditions- health, roads sanitation employment etc
2) weeding out the supporters one by one everywhere, shame those involved in it arresting some for treason etc. Here not all are anti national- some do it for money or ideology etc but when informed of dangers to the nation, many abandon this sort of work. (IMHO)
3) choking the flow of funding, clamp down hard on human rights jholawallahs. check their sources of income- check for tax evasions, IB surveillance etc

Maoists violence have been going on for years and will not come down with increased state violence on our own people.

Altair · Post by **Altair** » 05 Jul 2012 20:57

pmund wrote:
People here are too emotional and are acutely unaware of the facts.
I'd take offence to that but then I realised u dont know what u are saying

Please take offence. I wouldnt care less.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 05 Jul 2012 21:09

Altair, u are funny

SBajwa · Post by **SBajwa** » 05 Jul 2012 23:56

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120705/main3.htm

Job scam: Antony orders transfer of NDA Commandant
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, July 4
Defence Minister AK Antony today ordered the immediate removal of Pune’s National Defence Academy Commandant Lt Gen Jatinder Singh days after the CBI unearthed a jobs-for-cash scam there.

“This (the Commandant’s removal) is with the view to ensure a free and fair investigation in the alleged bribery racket in the recruitment of Group ‘C’ posts in the
NDA,” a Defence Ministry spokesperson said.

The CBI today arrested Colonel AK Singh, a Physical Training Officer, at the NDA. He is the Presiding Officer of the Board appointed by the Academy to select subordinate staff. Colonel Singh was produced before the Special Judge in Pune, the CBI said.

The decision to transfer Lt Gen Singh from the NDA and the arrest of Colonel AK Singh comes 10 days after the CBI busted a recruitment scam at the NDA.

On June 24, the CBI had arrested six persons, including a serving Colonel, for allegedly receiving bribe for allegedly taking bribes of Rs 3-4 lakh per candidate for subordinate staff jobs, including those of cooks and gardeners. The CBI had claimed to have recovered Rs 1.76 crore from different locations in connection with the case. Among those arrested ten days ago was Colonel Kulbir Singh, staff officer to NDA Commandant Lt Gen Jatinder Singh.

The CBI had said, “The Staff Officer, in conspiracy with the other accused, obtained illegal gratification of Rs 3-4 lakh from each candidate to appoint them as cooks, gardeners, lab attendants, library attendants and cadet orderly."

The accused had allegedly taken signature of candidates on blank answersheets and subsequently filled in correct answers by fraudulent means. Thus, the actual deserving candidates were cheated.

Ever since New Army Chief Bikram Singh took over on June 1, he has kept his promise “nothing will be brushed under the carpet”. Besides this case, action has been taken against a Brigadier who was taking loans from his juniors.

The case

June 24: CBI arrests six persons, including a serving Colonel, for allegedly receiving bribe of Rs 3-4 lakh per candidate for subordinate staff jobs, including those of cooks and gardeners
The CBI claimed to have recovered Rs 1.76 crore from different locations in connection with the case
Among those arrested was Colonel Kulbir Singh, staff officer to NDA Commandant Lt Gen Jatinder Singh

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 06 Jul 2012 22:56

Indian Soldier killed in Congo

Anybody have details on who was KIA? As usual ToIlet wants to write about everything under the sun in its article except about the Indian soldier who died - Nehruvian education at its best

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Jul 2012 04:12

Why blame Nehru for morons?

member_23626 · Post by **member_23626** » 07 Jul 2012 04:14

ramana wrote:Why blame Nehru for morons?

He was their leader wasn't he?? Vallabh bhai patel should have been the prime minister of Bharat. Atleast we could have gotten rid of 30-40% of the social and govt ills we have today

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 07 Jul 2012 20:13

Antony dusts VK blueprint

SUJAN DUTTA
New Delhi, July 2: Defence minister A.K. Antony today asked the army to restructure its organisation to raise more forces particularly for the China border and procure hardware within a two-year deadline.

Antony was practically dusting off a mothballed “transformation” proposal by the former army chief at the first meeting with the new army chief, General Bikram Singh, on a two-year modernisation programme for the army.

“The defence minister asked the army to prioritise and focus on critical areas and suggested systemic and organisational changes to achieve the desired result in a short time-span,” a defence ministry official said after the meeting.

Gen. Bikram Singh and his team including the vice-chief, Lt Gen. S.K. Singh, gave a presentation to the defence ministry on the modernisation programme. Although this was Gen. Bikram Singh’s first such meeting, it is the third in a series after the leak of former army chief, Gen. V.K. Singh’s letter to the Prime Minister on critical shortages in the arsenal.

In his “transformation proposals”, sent after a two-year study to the ministry, the former army chief had suggested streamlining of the Corps of Electronics and Mechanical Engineers (EME), the Army Service Corps (ASC) and the Army Ordnance Corps (AOC) under a single “logistics branch”.

He had also proposed raising two mountain strike corps (of about 30,000 troops each) specifically for the Northeast and the border with China. The finance ministry had pointed to a cash crunch to shoot down the proposal for two corps. But the army has begun raising two divisions for a corps in the Northeast.

Antony told the new army chief and his team that “force accretion” should continue apace. The “force accretion” would involve deployment of more troop and cargo-carrying aircraft (airlifters), acquisition and deployment of “combat air assets”, chiefly ground-attack helicopters, modern ammunition dumps and acquisition and deployment of pilotless aircraft in the eastern command’s area of responsibility.

Last fortnight, the new army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh had asked the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to accelerate the building and widening of strategic routes to and from the frontier with China. He was reviewing the work on 20 strategic roads in the Northeast including 10 in Arunachal and 12 in Ladakh.

Defence ministry sources said that Monday’s review meeting flagged six priority areas for the army:

• Enhancement of airlift capability

• Improvement in storage of ammunition stocks

• Acquisition and deployment of ground-attack helicopters. (in addition to the possible acquisition of 22 Boeing-made Apache helicopters the army is set to order more than a 100 Light Combat Helicopters)

• Speeding up artillery acquisition — the slowest procurement of hardware because the army has not got a heavy gun since the Bofors 26 years back. The army is now set to buy the US-made M777 ultra light howitzers that can be underslung from helicopters and deployed in the mountains.

• Improved night vision devices, and

• Acquisition of pilotless aircraft and new surveillance equipment.

Gen. Bikram Singh was accompanied to the meeting by, among others, the director-general of military operations (DGMO) and the master general ordnance.

member_19648 · Post by **member_19648** » 07 Jul 2012 20:30

shyamd wrote: He had also proposed raising two mountain strike corps (of about 30,000 troops each) specifically for the Northeast and the border with China. The finance ministry had pointed to a cash crunch to shoot down the proposal for two corps. But the army has begun raising two divisions for a corps in the Northeast.

How is the raising of a new corps progressing without finances being approved and allocated by the finance ministry? Could someone please explain. Also, I remember reading the number to be 90000 additional troops and not 60000 as the report points out. So has it been reduced to 60000 now, ie 2 mountain strike corps?