Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

[Austin]

So the actual Def Budget is lower than last year because Rupee Depreciated quite a bit.

FM is just giving a rosy look to it by comparing it to last year and stating its higher 10 % but in reality its lower than last year.

[Nikhil T]

So the actual Def Budget is lower than last year because Rupee Depreciated quite a bit.

FM is just giving a rosy look to it by comparing it to last year and stating its higher 10 % but in reality its lower than last year.

10% is a real hike, not a fictitious one.

1) We pay for our fiscal deficit in Rs, not dollars and that's the concern while allocating the budget.
2) A vast majority of budget (nearly 1.35/2.25 lakh crore) is Revenue Expenditure which is spent in Rupees. Nearly 30% of the remaining, the Capital Expenditure, is domestic purchases which is rupees again.
3) If you look at the 2014 Budget document on expenditure the spend on Capital Expenses will go up from Rs 78,872 crore (RE 2013-14) to Rs 89,587 crore (BE 14-15). This is a hike of 13.5%.
4) Finally, we can't ignore the possibility that the $ rate might go down during the next year. If NDA is elected, this is a very real possibility.

[Austin]

IF one looks at Rupee value then 10 % hike is a decent one .....when it comes to CAPEX as we import significant % of our military equipment that would take a hit as we would be paying in USD and Rupee hitting low means less $ to spend.

Yes Rupee can get stronger over FY 14 or it may even reach 65 to USD as some banks have predicted ....remains to be seen.

The most positive take away is one rank one pension getting accepted .....its been a long fought war for the veterans and as a nation its a fitting tribute for them.

[ramana]

X-Post for information....

^^^There seems to be selective reading and drawing inferences when making a case of non-automated artillery.

Before making big assertions the basic thing which needs to be done is to understand the war-fighting philosophy of the nations whose examples is being quoted. For example, Europeans are no longer facing the threat of staring down the tank barrels of massive Soviet Tank Armies; as it is, when it comes to conventional warfare with respect to NATO, the heavy lifting is done by USA. So, you've the French and other armies going for mounted gun systems which are transportable by C-130 and A400 for deployment in out of area contingencies. And limited conventional 155 Artillery - towed and SP - for conventional war-fighting. Their is no incentive for them to develop newer systems.

Similarly, in the Brigade Combat Team structure of US Army:

- Infantry BCT has the 1 x arty regiment with 2 x 105mm batteries and 1 x M777 battery
- Stryker BCT has 1 x arty regiment with 3 x M777 batteries - This whole Stryker BCT is supposed to be air-transportable by C-130 in 96 hours from the call.
- Armored BCT has 1 x arty regiment with 3 x M109 SP Artillery batteries

Americans have restructured their army to meet their expeditionary requirement, global commitments and nature of warfare. The Brigade Combat Team is a product of this changed war-fighting philosophy. However, outside of their brigades, they still retain formidable firepower in Corps Artillery Brigades. And for Americans, artillery gun is just one component of the massive firepower they can bring to bear on a target/objective.

We on the other hand are going to face a massive conventional war on either fronts where Artillery is going to play a decisive role. The formation of Artillery Divisions is product of a thinking which looks at them as 'Maneuver Element' rather than as support system. Their employment follows the concept of 'Maneuver by Fire' which looks to dominate/destroy/degrade an enemy's war-fighting potential through massive fire-assaults. That is where a 155/52 caliber counts; as for the requirement of automated gun, well, enough water has flown under the bridge to even consider this question. It was settled in 1987 when IA went for Bofors.

If anyone is going to face conventional war, it is us - and our requirement needs to be judged by our operational conditions. If you really want to understand the trend in artillery caliber and fire-power, please look up what the PLA and Pakistan Army have and are inducting.

It is erroneous to quote what Americans are doing or Europeans are doing w/o getting into context of these developments. Our operational requirement necessitates a powerful artillery arm.

Rohitvats, How do the Indpendent Brigades in the Indian Army compare?

[Prem Kumar]

DRDO lab produces 'smarter' ponies for Indian Army

Army to induct ponies in 2015 after summer & winter trials. An initial order of 5 ponies has been placed. DRDO complained that they need an order of at least 100 ponies to recoup the investment in cross-breeding & germplasm. Meanwhile, a fresh global RFP has been sent out by the Army. In the 2013 RFP, an Austrian pony that emerged as the lowest bidder, was rejected by the MOD because it ended up being a single vendor situation. The other vendor (a German horse) was blacklisted by the MOD after an Irish ass wrote an anonymous letter to A.K. Anthony, alleging "kick"backs paid to middlemen

[sum]

Some posts really need a tea spill alert!!

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>Rohitvats, How do the Independent Brigades in the Indian Army compare?

ramana - From my understanding, American BCT concept was developed to make their Army more modular in line with the nature of perceived threat by the USA. They wanted a Brigade to be a self-sustaining formation which can be deployed on its and various such Brigade Combat Teams can be grouped together under higher HQ as per the requirement of task at hand. This is line putting together Lego blocks to create a bigger block.

In our case, while the Independent Brigades have organic support elements, their role is different. In Pivot Corps, they hold the armor of the Corps and will be used to undertake the main thrust of the Corps. Or, they could serve as counter-penetration reserves to handle breakouts by the enemy formations. The (I) Armored Bde in Strike Corps could be expected to open secondary attack axis in support of the main formation. However, it is my reading that post 2001-2002 mobilization, the (I) Armored Bde are likely to partner with RAPID in each Strike Corps to form a powerful IBG.

(I) Infantry bdes are Corps reserves - again for offensive or counter-penetration purpose.

[Rahul M]

to put it in another way, before the latest re-structuring the smallest self contained (as in having all the dimensions required) unit the US army could deploy was the division (usually formed of 3 brigades + arty brigade + air and other units in support).

for most purposes this was a much larger force than was required. IOW the cost of deployment of div's for the smaller conflicts that US faces was too much, both in terms of costs and manpower.

the self contained brigades give them a more flexible option that doesn't break the bank. the restructured brigades are larger than the brigades of old but still smaller the div's. it makes perfect sense for a military that has manpower constraints it seeks to address by adding more supporting firepower and mobility.

interestingly enough, PLA has in last few years sought to emulate this model, which IMHO is a case of aping without understanding the reasons.
it makes little sense for a force that has no dearth of manpower to form a whole lot of self contained brigades in stead of div's. not to mention they have had serious problems finding officers competent enough to lead a combined arms unit. last I read about it they were using senior officers to head these units because the actual officers were not able to.

[kancha]

How does the recently announced defence budget stand as a percentage of GDP?

[wig]

How does the recently announced defence budget stand as a percentage of GDP?

kancha ji

the figures for defence extracted from the budget presented in Parliament:

Year 2013-14 , Estimates 2014-15
(Rupees in Crores)
total Non Plan expenditure 1114902 , 1207892
Defence 203672 , 224000
as a percentage 18.26%, 18.54%
however, the %age has gone down if you consider defence to plan + non plan expenditure

total expenditure 1590434 , 1763214
Defence as a percentage 12.80% 12.70%

the GDP figure for 2012-13 are Rs 9481013 crores. the %age of defence spending should be around 2%

sir, the link for the source is hereunder
http://planningcommission.gov.in/data/d ... le_158.pdf
http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/ub2014-15/eb/be.pdf

[merlin]

That's % of budget, not % of GDP right? % of GDP would be around 2%.

[kancha]

Many thanks, Wig and Merlin

[Austin]

That's % of budget, not % of GDP right? % of GDP would be around 2%.

You will get your answers here http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2014/02/b ... owest.html

its 1.74 % .. GDP figures though are notional as you cant spend your GDP.. its what you spend from Budget Revenue/Expenditure is what really matters.

Though Ajai is not right in saying US and Russia spend 4 %
http://rt.com/business/russia-increases ... dings-702/

The most militarized country in 2013 was Saudi Arabia with a 6 percent defence spending to GDP ratio. Japan had the smallest ratio at 1.1 percent. Russia was again the 3rd with 3.3 percent, slightly lagging behind the US where the figure is 3.5 percent.

Saudi spends around 6 % of GDP but thats not a issue for them as they have Surplus Money from Oil Export and have a Balanced Budget infact Surplus if I am not wrong ...... we spend 1.7 % but we have budget deficit at 4.5 % , CAD ....... In the end we cant afford to spend more than ~ 13 % of Budget Spending.

[Nikhil T]

The Defence Budget is understated. India does not include Defence Civil estimates which is the spending on MoD, Coast Guard and Pensions. This number is Rs 55,202 crore as per Budget 2014-15. Further, the expenditure on Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF or Paramilitary) like Rashtriya Rifles, BSF, Assam Rifles etc, all critical defence forces, is not included in defence budget. If you consider these expenses, the Defence Budget as a percentage of GDP will be closer to 2.5%, which is ballpark comparable to China's.

[Nikhil T]

Indian Express has rekindled the "coup" story. They're interviewing the then DGMO Lt Gen Choudhary, who retired last month. Here are two links from today

ex-DGMO speaks: Def Secy summoned me late night, said highest seat of power was worried, troops must go back quickly

Troop movement should have been avoided if they knew VK Singh's court date

[Austin]

Indian Express is a pseudo mouth piece of Con-gress party ...leak false news through its favorite media and then deny it ever did or existed .....in the bargain showing the Government in good light and defaming and damaging institutions and individuals.

[Lalmohan]

most countries do not put policing costs in the defense budget, more the home ministry budget
not sure what china does, but i believe they also have very large paramilitary and police forces

[Rahul M]

most countries do not put policing costs in the defense budget, more the home ministry budget
not sure what china does, but i believe they also have very large paramilitary and police forces

PAP budget is not shown under def. budget. they don't even show pensions etc under def. budget.

[Sachin]

most countries do not put policing costs in the defense budget, more the home ministry budget

My understanding is that RR units or IA are also budgeted under the Home ministry budget. Is this right?

[Rahul M]

yes for RR. not for IA.

[nelson]

Rashtriya Rifles were supposed to be funded from MHA budget at the outset, but it never turned out that way.

http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/i ... 50303.html

http://cgda.nic.in/accounts/code_heads/38_146.pdf

[AjitK]

Indian Express has rekindled the "coup" story. They're interviewing the then DGMO Lt Gen Choudhary, who retired last month. Here are two links from today

ex-DGMO speaks: Def Secy summoned me late night, said highest seat of power was worried, troops must go back quickly

Troop movement should have been avoided if they knew VK Singh's court date

They have come out with more on the story today.
Morning after DGMO meet, Govt chopper flew to check if troops were on way back

So rattled was the UPA government with the movement of troops on the night of January 16 that hours after the defence secretary had ordered Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Lt Gen A K Choudhary to send them back, a helicopter took off from Palam’s technical area to check whether the troops had moved back.

Sources have confirmed to The Indian Express that on the morning of January 17, on board the chopper was an official of the Intelligence Bureau, one from the Research and Analysis Wing and a third intelligence official.

Their mission: to ascertain the status of the armoured fighting vehicles which had moved from Hisar and were being carried on tank transporters.
..
....

By the time officials in the Defence Ministry received a copy of V K Singh’s petition, news had trickled in, first, via intelligence inputs, of unusual movement of a mechanised infantry unit from Hisar.

Subsequently, reports came in that a Para Brigade had left the cantonment in Agra. The Defence Secretary, who had, by then, landed in New Delhi, was asked to rush to 7, Race Course Road to attend another urgent meeting.

The Prime Minister, according to accounts, sat grimly throughout this meeting, which began at around 7.30 pm. Among those attending this security conclave were National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon; Home Minister P Chidambaram and Intelligence Bureau Chief Nehchal Sandhu, who was constantly receiving inputs from his formations and had images of the deployment on his Ipad.

This is surreal.

[Sid]

The thing that such assumptions are now being talked about a professional force Indian Army is beyond imagination. Its Indian Army, not Pakistan Army we are talking about.

Few handful of armored vehicle from I Corps and some soldiers to topple Gov because Army Chief wanted to be in command for one more year? They are so fearful of their own army that they wet their dhoties at the first sight of an APC?

The last thing any country would want to do is to undermine their own armed forces. When you ridicule/undermine the highest authority of a force, what kind of message will it send down the command chain?

[chetak]

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Two gentlemen, one the NSA for sure and the other from the PMO were solely responsible for this fiasco. They were the ones who spooked the dhothiwallas.

[svinayak]

The thing that such assumptions are now being talked about a professional force Indian Army is beyond imagination. Its Indian Army, not Pakistan Army we are talking about.

Few handful of armored vehicle from I Corps and some soldiers to topple Gov because Army Chief wanted to be in command for one more year? They are so fearful of their own army that they wet their dhoties at the first sight of an APC?

The last thing any country would want to do is to undermine their own armed forces. When you ridicule/undermine the highest authority of a force, what kind of message will it send down the command chain?

These are fake news report.
Few troop movement is nothing for a large country like India.

[nelson]

I don't think it was a fiasco, or something of that sort. IMO, it was an orchestrated campaign, by the PMO and for the PMO, to slander Gen V K Singh and bring him to submission or dismiss him in Jan 2012. Somehow he survived it then.
Even now, it is being raked up to prevent him from aligning with parties opposite to the present Govt. Gen retd V K Singh has to play his cards close to his chest.

[Austin]

Alarming shortage of personnel

[Austin]

Unhappy soldiers

Veterans’ woes

Positive accommodation: Defence Ministry

Right to vote: discriminatory rules

[chetak]

A Name Upon A Grave

India needs a proper account of the army's war dead

By ANIT MUKHERJEE | February 1, 2014

.

ON THE NIGHT OF 4 FEBRUARY 2000, an army post I was commanding in Kashmir
was fired upon. The incident was unremarkable at the time--just a few months
after the Kargil war--and no one was hurt. The next morning, a patrol went
to investigate the site from where the shots were fired. (I was away from
my post on another operation.) One of the members of the patrol was
Manokaran, a barber by trade, who was in many ways the live wire of the
company. He should have been on leave but, a week before, faced with a
shortage of personnel, I had ordered him to postpone his departure by two
weeks. Manokaran accepted this cheerfully.



At the site, the patrol discovered a backpack containing some clothes and a
steel tiffin box. The patrol commander, an experienced Gurkha, ordered that
the box not be disturbed, but Manokaran, with characteristic daredevilry,
exclaimed, "Maut se kyun dartey ho?" (Why are you afraid of death?) and
opened it. This triggered an improvised explosive device that blew out his
eyes. Within an hour, I was at the scene shouting into a radio to call for
casualty evacuation, and ordering a medic to do more to save Manokaran's
life. I could not get myself to do what I should have done: hold his hand
to comfort him. Just before he was put on a helicopter, I finally took his
hand, and lied to him that he was going to be OK. He was crying for his
mother. Manokaran died before the helicopter landed at Badamibagh
cantonment in Srinagar.



Many years later, I gave up my uniform and started a new career as an
academic. One afternoon I came upon a section of the Indian Army's official
website titled "Pay Homage to Your Martyrs". It includes a database listing
the name, rank, service number, home state, unit, and regiment of
apparently every soldier who has died in all of India's post-independence
wars, as well as the name of the operations in which they died and their
dates of death. In a way that other soldiers would understand, I searched
out Manokaran's name, and was happy to find that his death was listed and
thereby honoured. But then, as academics do, I started to collate and
analyse the army's information.



The overall picture that emerged was disturbing. The total number of
"martyrs" listed in the army's publicly accessible database is nearly 30
percent greater than the number of fatalities that have been reported by
the government in parliament. In each of the country's major military
operations, except the 1962 Sino-Indian war, more soldiers have apparently
died than has been officially acknowledged by the government. It's not
clear what the inclusion criteria are for the casualties listed on
the website, and it's possible that the discrepancies are unintentional.
But the size of the difference suggests, at the very least, a serious
accounting failure. Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that we may not
have all the data we need to properly look after the next of kin of those
who have sacrificed their lives for the country; only if we know who the
dead are can we fulfil our moral and financial responsibilities to their families.



Honouring soldiers who fall in battle is an ancient activity and has been
observed across societies. But it was only after the American Civil War,
notes the historian Drew Gilpin Faust in her seminal book, This Republic of
Suffering, that the idea took root that governments are obligated to honour
their war dead by naming and counting them. "A name upon a list was like
a name upon a grave," Faust writes, "a repository of memory, a gesture of
immortality for those who had made the supreme sacrifice."



In October of last year, I enlisted the help of my father, retired Wing
Commander Pulak Mukherjee (a fighter pilot turned software engineer), to
collate and analyse the data on the "Pay Homage to Your Martyrs" web page.
It is unclear who created and maintains this dataset, but it accurately
reflects the details of fallen colleagues and friends I knew, as well as
those of many soldiers often included in the pantheon of national heroes,
such as Lieutenant Colonel Tarapore (1965 war), Lance Naik Albert Ekka
(1971 war), and Captain Manoj Kumar Pandey (Kargil war), to name a few. The
dataset listed casualties in all known Indian operations, as well as one
operation that I had never heard of. In total, the database lists at least
31,700 casualties.



We collated information for those operations for which the government has
presented figures in parliament: the 1947-48 Kashmir war, the 1962
Sino-Indian war, the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, the 1987-90 Sri
Lanka operations, the 1999 Kargil war, and the 2001-02 mobilisation along
the India-Pakistan border known as Operation Parakram. Sorting through
the records, it became clear that the database was poorly maintained. Some
of the data was coded incorrectly; for instance, 432 casualties that
occurred during the 1965 war were listed under the 1962 war. We corrected
for this in our analysis. There were also errors such as duplicate or
missing service numbers, and fatalities dated years or even decades after
the operation under which they were listed. We excluded these records from
our final analysis. However, because of their large number, we included
2,354 records with missing casualty dates.



Despite these problems, the database revealed a great deal. According to
figures presented in parliament, the total fatalities suffered in all these
operations was 13,946. But according to the army website, we lost 17,874
soldiers--a difference of 28 percent. The website showed that, during the
Kargil war, we lost 970 soldiers; as recently as November 2012, Minister of
State for Defence Jitendra Singh reported in parliament that the losses
amounted to only 530--a difference of 83 percent. During Operation Parakram,
which was launched after the attack on the parliament building in 2001, we
lost 2,165 soldiers according to the website--more than in the Kargil war,
or in the Indian Peace Keeping Force operations in Sri Lanka between 1987
and 1990. This is 271 percent higher than the figure--798--that the then
defence minister, George Fernandes, stated in parliament in July 2003.
(Interestingly, 52 percent of the soldiers who died in all of these
operations are from Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttaranchal and
Himachal Pradesh, according to the database--states that altogether account
for only 7 percent of India's population.)



In addition to these discrepancies, there were 554 fatalities listed under
Operation Dummy, not a single one with a date of casualty. It's possible
that this was a label created by programmers to test the database, or that
it represents non-operational casualties. Lieutenant General (retired) Amit
Mukherjee (no relation), a thoughtful officer who has served in many key
army positions told me via email, "In my long career of 40 years and 7
months in the Army, I have never heard of Op Dummy." Any explanation for
the existence of this operation is bound to be problematic in some way--as
is the fact that we simply don't know what it is.



In November last year, I approached army headquarters in Delhi for clarity
on this data. Through the media office I was put in touch with the
Veterans' Cell, which is ostensibly charged to look after war widows. This
office was created only in 2010, and wasn't a part of central army
operations until last year. The brigadier in charge of it was unaware of
the "Pay Homage to Your Martyrs" section of the army's website. When I
asked him if he had a list of all war widows, he said, "No, that
information is not shared with us and is handled by another division. Do us
a favour, file an RTI and when you get the information, please tell us!"



I returned to the media cell and requested to be put in touch with the
division dealing with wartime casualties--the office of Manpower Planning-5
(MP-5). An MP-5 officer in mufti told me that the official number of war
dead is still classified. After hitting this wall, I met with the army's
deputy director general of public information, Brigadier Sandeep Thapar.
When I told him about the discrepancy in figures between the website and
what has been presented in parliament, his reply was
immediate: "Information presented to the parliament is supreme. They cannot
be questioned." He promised to look into the matter and give me an answer.
A few days later, a junior officer from the media cell informed me by
telephone that they were pulling down the "Pay Homage to Your Martyrs"
section as they were "unable to get the requisite information about both
how the parliamentary figures were arrived at and actual wartime casualties." When this piece went to press, the web page was still available at the following URL:
http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/martyrs/Home.aspx.



The mystery of these discrepancies aside, it is evident that India does a
poor job of honouring sacrifices made in the service of the nation. If we
are unable to reconcile the numbers of war dead, then naming and properly
honouring every single one, and looking after their next of kin, is not
possible.



In fact, it is not clear whether all war widows or next of kin have been
identified, and there is no single office or organisation in the army that
focuses exclusively on their welfare. The army's Veteran Cell does not have
all the requisite information as the office maintaining the list of wartime
casualties--MP-5--claims that the information is classified. Perhaps more
egregiously, it does not appear as if looking after war widows or next of
kin is an issue of particular concern to the Ministry of Defence (MOD).



The MOD is involved in handling pension cases, but it has left other
responsibilities relating to next of kin to state and
district administrations, and it does not monitor the effectiveness of
welfare schemes. The most recent version of the MOD's "Induction Material",
a 157-page document that lists the various functions and charters of
responsibility of all the ministry's offices, does not mention war widows
or next of kin. Instead, in practice, it is left to army units and
formations to organise welfare activities for veer naris, the widows of
their fallen soldiers. But the military lacks the capacity and resources to
be an effective welfare organisation. As a result, ad-hoc tokenism is
favoured--like distributing sewing machines or food processors.



The issue of counting and naming our war dead also dovetails with a current
debate about a proposed national war museum and memorial. Generations of
military officers have lobbied for the creation of a memorial that would
honour soldiers who died in the line of duty in India's post-independence
wars. In August 2012, after years of delay, a Group of Ministers led by
Defence Minister AK Antony finally recommended that such a memorial be
constructed in the capital, in an area close to India Gate, which was
constructed by the British to honour Indian soldiers who died during the
First World War. But Sheila Dixit, then chief minister of Delhi, opposed
this, arguing that it would spoil the area's "ambience".



When I began investigating the army's "Pay Homage to Your Martyrs"
database, I was interested partially because of my guilt--there is always
the guilt--over the role I played in Manokaran's death. Each name that
belongs in the database represents a lost son, father, brother, relative or
friend--and it is callous to neglect them. This is not just an issue of
misleading parliament--it's about the debt that a democracy owes to soldiers
who make the supreme sacrifice for causes determined by
elected representatives. Perhaps more importantly, it's about taking care
of those that they leave behind. It would not be difficult to track the
economic condition of the next of kin of our more than 31,700 fallen

[saje]

I recently went to watch the movie 'The Lone Survivor'. It was a good movie, but what disappointed me was that everyone was by turn applauding and sympathising with the US soldiers in that movie and I wonder if anyone was realising that our soldiers have time & again gone through worse situations. But sadly not many of our soldiers' stories make it to the big screen. 'Border' and 'LOC' were good efforts but that's all? There are still so many stories to be told. Those stories will inspire the next generation. I play 'Call of Duty' and 'Medal of Honour' on my PC, such games can really inspire the next generation and we need to have such games on modelled on the Indian Army and it's operations. I have imported Airsoft guns from the U.S. at huge cost and trouble -- in the US such guns and accessories are available cheaply and you have to see on You tube the way guys (grown ups and kids alike) there play with these guns...they actually stage life like army-style operations. Such an experience can really inspire the next generation. Sadly, I don't see things getting better and the intake shortage might actually become worse & we might have to go for conscription.

[Austin]

India Postpones Purchase of 145 Ultra Light Howitzers

India’s Ministry of Defense has deferred a decision on the purchase of 145 ultra light howitzers from the US subsidiary of BAE Systems because of issues relating to offset obligations, said an MoD source, although the program has not been canceled.

The Defense Acquisition Council, the MoD’s top decision-making body, at a Feb. 24 meeting deferred a decision on the howitzer buy because BAE systems wanted six years, instead of four, to meet its offset obligations. According to Indian law, overseas defense companies have to discharge offsets up to 30 percent of the value of the contract.

The program had been approved in 2010 but formal agreement is still awaited.

Meanwhile, the estimated cost of the 145 guns has risen from about $493 million in 2010 to $885 million because of inflation.

MoD originally selected Singapore Technologies, but that deal was canceled after charges of alleged corruption. ■

[Aditya_V]

Bollywood is so sold out that 'Border' and 'Laksya' are considered communal and movies like 'Shaurya' , 'War-Chod na Yaar' are considered the epitome of filmmaking.

See jhow much our Bollywood people have criticised patriotic movies.

Besides Movies are form of mass communicattion and influences peoples thinking without them naming.

Thats why Pentagon controls how miltary is projected in Hollywood, For example John Travolta had to always wear Black upper clothing in Broken arrow to make him look as an exception.

War Movies require our leadership, and no suprise politicans have the deepest pockets to fund favourable scripts.

If they want something else it will reflect something else.

[Lalmohan]

i watched border in a movie theatre in pune and the crowd were cheering and clapping...

[Aditya_V]

I am not talking aabout crowds, there is huge appitite for patriotic movies. It about producers and funders.

[Lalmohan]

ah them... well for years they were funded by D-Company and its many compulsions, and also many of them didn't want to hurt their markets in other parts of asia for purely financial reasons

[ramana]

UPA govt core component Congress is wary of the military as it is in mind Brown EIC. They don't feel they belong to India and hence act like an occupying elite unsure of their place.

[Roperia]

Former COAS VK Singh and 4 other former officers (ranking Lt. Gen. and above) have joined the BJP.

[vaibhav.n]

Some Morale Booster.....

This is the story of the brave men of 4/5 Gurkha Rifles during the 1971 Indo-Pak war, in the words of its the then commanding officer Late Brig. Arun Bhimrao Harolikar, MVC. The Battalion received ‘Sylhet’ as the Battle Honour and ‘East Pakistan-1971’ as a Theatre Honour. In Addition, two Maha Vir Chakras (out of three in the entire 8 Mountain Division), three Vir Chakras and three Sena Medals. Our total casualties were 11 officers, 5 JCOs, and 139 other ranks (Total 155).

I am mentally and emotionally transported to the battlefields of Atgram, Gazipur and Sylhet in Bangladesh; there to suffer the pain and agony once again, that I suffered in losing some of my beloved officers, JCOs and men in those three intense battles we fought.This is a narration of my personal experiences of the three battles the 4/5 GR, fought together.

CO's Diary 1971 Campaign:4/5 Gurkha Rifles assault on Atgram

CO's Diary 1971 Campaign:4/5 Gurkha Rifles assault on Ghazipur

CO's Diary 1971 Campaign:4/5 Gurkha Rifles Heliborne assault

[Paul]

deleted

[Karan M]

Ashok Mehta pontificating about acceptable behavior and not, LOL only.