Pakistan arms sales, ops, doctrine, etc

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Mar 2014 19:44

^^^Last time, it was the acquisition of WLR by PA which prompted the purchase of APU equipped Bofors and T-80 induction led to purchase of T-90...The Turkish gun may serve similar purpose.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Mar 2014 00:51

X-Post...

Dilbu wrote:Pak won't become US junkyard, mainly interested in MRAP vehicles
ISLAMABAD: The US military may have another option for disposing of $7 billion worth of armored vehicles and other equipment it’s struggling to get rid of now that its war in Afghanistan is ending.

Some of it could be driven across the border and handed over to Pakistan, part of an effort by the Pentagon to unload excess military supplies to US allies at no cost.

The discussions between American and Pakistani officials have been going on for months and center on leftover military hardware that the United States does not want to pay to ship or fly home.

Although no final decisions have been made, Pakistan is particularly interested in the US Army’s mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, which Pentagon officials say will have limited strategic value as US forces withdraw from Afghanistan this year.

But with Pakistan’s military expected to be battling Taliban insurgents for years, the MRAPs could help Pakistani forces slow their high casualty rate of more than 20,000 dead or injured troops since 2001.

“We will not take it for the sake of just taking it, and we will not take it because it’s free,” said one senior Pakistani military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the negotiations. “We will take it because we need it.”

The backbone of the US military’s vehicle fleet in Afghanistan, MRAPs were designed to protect American troops from explosive devices. But each MRAP weighs as much as 40 tons, and Pentagon leaders have said it would potentially cost more than $100,000 per vehicle to ship them back to United States. They also have qualms about leaving them in Afghanistan, noting that the stock is far larger than what the Afghan army would be able to maintain.

The Washington Post reported in June that the US military was shredding hundreds of MRAPs for scrap metal, despite their initial cost of $400,000 to $700,000 each.

But Mark E. Wright, a Pentagon spokesman, said the military still has about 13,000 MRAPs scattered worldwide that remain in good working condition, including about 1,600 in Afghanistan.

The US government is offering them to allies for free on an “as-is, where-is” basis, Wright said. But the recipients, who would be vetted by the State Department, would be responsible for shipping them out of Afghanistan.

Twenty countries have expressed an interest, he added.

The Defense Department “is reviewing every request and is expediting the review process to support US retrograde timelines,” said Wright, noting that decisions must be made by the end of this year.

But Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Wednesday that many countries have ultimately decided that it’s neither cost-effective nor practical for them to pay to collect the MRAPs from Afghanistan.

“It’s very expensive for countries to take those vehicles from Afghanistan,” he said.

Pakistan, however, shares a 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan. Coalition forces also use Pakistani highways and ports to ship material into and out of landlocked Afghanistan.

In January, the New York Times reported that Uzbekistan, which borders Afghanistan, also has been inquiring about receiving surplus US military hardware.

At the time, the newspaper noted that the US-led coalition was increasingly relying on Uzbekistan to transport equipment and supplies out of Afghanistan because supply routes through Pakistan were partly blocked.

Dilbu, The TSPA is eyeing those MRAPs for a dash to Red Fort. recall during Parakram the IA had laid extensive minefields to channel the TSPA into zones where they can be decimated.

The US is again arming TSPA with offensive weapons and pretednig to get rid of scrap. At 40 tonne weight, those MRAPs are nothing but protected amroured personnel carriers (APC).

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 18 Mar 2014 10:09

Panter vs FH77B. Panter does appear to be heavier, awkard and takes longer time to deploy. However full marks to the Turks for achieving excellent results. This was their first attempt at crafting an indigenous Howitzer. WIth the longer barrel, it will be a real pain for the IA in next round of artillery duelling in kashmir that will start in 2015.

If it were the IA in their place, I do not need to delve further on the self flagellating summer trials that would have taken 10 years to complete.

FH 77B

Panter

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 18 Mar 2014 12:45

This is awkward, Singapore Kinetics FH-2000 is listed as a derivative of the Turkish Panter. When do we get our Bofors? Yawn...Nevermind

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 18 Mar 2014 18:55

^^^ Errr its the other way around. There is nothing indigenous about Turkish industry.

Turkey bought Singapore technology and the Panter is the derivative of the Singapore FH-2000. Similarly Turkish Basic Trainer is a copy of South Korean KT-1. Their T129 helicopter is copy of Augusta A129. Their UAVs are copies of Israeli ones with technology transferred before relationship broke down.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Mar 2014 08:35

Have those Jordanian F 16s arrived yet? Absolutely no news since the original flurry of items. I still think the story is a plant.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 19 Mar 2014 09:16

I think the F-16s and the Malaysian plane wound up in Somalia.

Did you check with Bhutan?

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 19 Mar 2014 09:45

^^^Nevertheless, the Turks are well on their way to becoming the military technology powerhouse of the Islamic world as they were in the Ottoman times.

Funny how history is repeating itself. Recall the persian Safavids copying the artillery from the Ottomans to wrest Kandahar from the Mughals. Now the Pakis want to do the same to India in Kashmir.

Who have they copied the Altay from?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 19 Mar 2014 10:33

>>>^^^Nevertheless, the Turks are well on their way to becoming the military technology powerhouse of the Islamic world as they were in the Ottoman times.

True. If Iran was not isolated by sanctions and its own loony leaders, it would actually be the frontrunner followed by Turkey.

PRC and Turkey are actually the two long term sources of supply to Pak, we can't stop.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 19 Mar 2014 10:43

Licensed Technology will only go so far.

Their T129 program is limping because Augusta Westland wants to keep squeezing & sucking them.

Their Anka UAV program is stuck at that point where relationship with Israel went sour.

But yes, unlike UAE or KSA, they try to build.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 19 Mar 2014 10:50

Pakistan learning from history?

I thought they only create history.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 19 Mar 2014 12:24

tsarkar wrote:^^^ Errr its the other way around. There is nothing indigenous about Turkish industry.

Turkey bought Singapore technology and the Panter is the derivative of the Singapore FH-2000. Similarly Turkish Basic Trainer is a copy of South Korean KT-1. Their T129 helicopter is copy of Augusta A129. Their UAVs are copies of Israeli ones with technology transferred before relationship broke down.

I think, you are right.

They do look strikingly similar and specs also are broadly the same. Though how they took a 13 ton 52 Cal Howitzer and ''upgraded'' it to 18 tons+ is beyond me. A larger APU seems to provide much better mobility than the original variants.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 19 Mar 2014 19:12

The reason PAF likes to upg f-solah in TAI is because of slimmer chance that it will be held up incase another round of sanctions are slapped by US.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 19 Mar 2014 19:31

With Turkey going more Islamist, I suspect some of their sources of supply may stop (Israel) or downgrade in quality (US).

rkhanna · Post by **rkhanna** » 19 Mar 2014 20:46

>>>he reason PAF likes to upg f-solah in TAI is because of slimmer chance that it will be held up incase another round of sanctions are slapped by US<<<

Do not think that is true. Turkey is a part of NATO and if Sanctions adopted by NATO then Turkey would have to toe the line. It would be extremely rare for US to issue sanctions and NATO countries not follow suit.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 20 Mar 2014 01:01

Nothing prevents Turkey from secretly assisting Pak

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 21 Mar 2014 10:20

Uncle always allowed Pakis F-16, P-3C Fleet Iran F-14, P-3F fleet to be operational inspite of sanctions.

Uncle cannot say why it supports TSP since it cannot be supported for Minority rights, energy resources, liberal eldarado or any logical reason other than to exterminate dirty pests

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 22 Mar 2014 09:59

Karan M wrote:Nothing prevents Turkey from secretly assisting Pak

Absolutely. The US and Turkey are partners in many crimes. All that we have to do is to recall how a dozen entities in Turkey exported nuclear-related components to Pakistan during the AQ Khan era. In order to hoodwink the rest of the world, the US continued to issue warnings to Turkey which that country happily discarded. The US did nothing and later obliquely accepted the Turkish excuse that its export laws were weak. Many years later, when it tightened its export laws, the exports of nuclear components to Pakistan did not stop. This time, the Turkish explanation was that its laws were OK but enforcement was feeble. The US still accepted that as well.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 22 Mar 2014 10:06

the next PM if non-congi should give clear instructions that artillery duels across fwd positions are a no-no inconclusive game.

instead MLRS fire should pulverize the nearest big TSPA camp or depot...upto 50km deep.

the silhouette of panter reminds of a the old german flak88 on the steppe

true shoot n scoot types like the archer will be hard to catch with this cumbersome thing
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpobrfOhohI

i.e. if we ever get the true soot n scoot types

if expense is not an issue, truly the most terrifying demo is this ... around 18 Pzh2000 line up and unleash hell...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CR_9pcNT_Qs

brown pants comes free with that deal.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 22 Mar 2014 10:26

Singha wrote:the next PM if non-congi should give clear instructions that artillery duels across fwd positions are a no-no inconclusive game.

instead MLRS fire should pulverize the nearest big TSPA camp or depot...upto 50km deep.

the silhouette of panter reminds of a the old german flak88 on the steppe

true shoot n scoot types like the archer will be hard to catch with this cumbersome thing
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpobrfOhohI

i.e. if we ever get the true soot n scoot types

if expense is not an issue, truly the most terrifying demo is this ... around 18 Pzh2000 line up and unleash hell...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CR_9pcNT_Qs

brown pants comes free with that deal.

Singha PM politician should not make military decisions but ask military about appropriate response.

negi · Post by **negi** » 22 Mar 2014 11:27

^ I think he meant the same however even non Congi PMs in the past have been a disappointment , remember PMO's diktat about no use of fighter AC during initial phases Kargil ? Only after the Mi-17 was hit by a stinger did numb nuts in MOD allow the IAF to field the M2Ks and Migs even there they were handicapped by being instructed to not cross the LOC.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 22 Mar 2014 11:53

Negi-. that simply not true, both Mi-17 and Fighters were used on the same time. Mi-17 was lost the next day after Mig-27 flame out and Mig 21 SAR being shot down.

negi · Post by **negi** » 22 Mar 2014 11:56

^ No they were NOT; I might have got the Mi-17 incident wrong but initially fighters were not deployed.

negi · Post by **negi** » 22 Mar 2014 12:05

Intially idiots in MOD and PMO did not even want IAF to get involved only IA was allowed that too in initial stages without ARTY support , anyways this is rehash of Kargil thread so I will let it pass.

Mihir · Post by **Mihir** » 22 Mar 2014 20:52

This is the Ultimate MiG-21

A very good overview of the JF-17 by David Axe, with some interesting tidbits.

Further enhanced with a new wing, a cutting-edge intake design and a new, more powerful engine, the JF-17 is Pakistan’s most important front-line fighter—and a remarkable extension of a basic plane design dating back to the 1950s...

... Over a decade of work, the side-intake MiG-21 variant evolved into something much more sophisticated: the JF-17. Chinese, Pakistani and Russian engineers added a better wing—similar to the U.S. F-16’s wing—plus so-called “divertless” intakes that work equally well while the plane is flying fast or slow...

...And that same year, the new jets flew bombing missions targeting suspected terrorists in South Waziristan, part of Pakistan’s restive tribal area...

Mihir · Post by **Mihir** » 22 Mar 2014 21:01

negi wrote:^ No they were NOT; I might have got the Mi-17 incident wrong but initially fighters were not deployed.

The go-ahead to use fighters came the day after the IAF was authorized to mount offensive operations.

Before launching a tirade against the "numb nuts" in the GoI, MoD, IAF, Ministry of Agriculture, Pune Municipal Corporation, etc. etc., do take into account stuff like the fog of war and the uncertain international geo-political situation. In the initial stages of the war, everyone, including the army, was taken by complete surprise. Neither the scope of the infiltration, nor the level of direct Pakistani involvement were clear. Everyone was scrambling to regain their bearings and deal with the situation as best as they could in the midst of all the confusion.

While we make the Musharuffian the butt of all jokes for his actions and pronouncements during and after the war, we tend to forget that Operation Badr truly *was* a tactically brilliant op.

We can rah-rah all we want about unleashing the artillery and offensive air power today, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. But we weren't there to see how the uncertainty, lack of information, and conflicting reports had confounded the CCS at that time.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 23 Mar 2014 00:29

^^ There were signs. Increased build up at logistical bases at Skardu, more C-130 & Mi-171 flights, radio chatter, all of which were noted but not tied together to build the big picture. Thereafter IA consequently MoD & GoI took the stand of a localized intrusion, and we'll get them by the "scuff of the neck". Thereafter IA asked for Mi25/35 that could not fly at those altitudes.

To its credit, IAF & CoAS Tipnis, recognized the situation better than IA leadership, and mobilized & deployed much earlier & effectively.

It also showed how Air Doctrine in India was outdated. Traditionally one of the primary roles of IAF was to assist IA by doing CAS. Hence huge numbers of MiG-21M, MiG-23BN & MiG-27M were acquired. However, in the modern battlefield, CAS has its own challenges.

Thereafter IAF came its own by focussing on interdiction and choking supply lines that were less defended and achieved successes.

Kargil was strategically IAF's victory. Its strong deterrent posture kept PAF out. PA knew it could not sustain without PAA air maintenence that stopped after IAF provided local air dominance, and after supply lines were cut. Its generals psychologically accepted defeat, and left its men to rot to their fate.

There is a path breaking book "Dereliction of Duty", where the author, H R MacMaster, a distinguished soldier, states that it is one of the fundamental duties of Generals to clearly appraise the military situation & thereafter advise course of action to Political Leadership. IA leadership failed to do so in 1962 & a section of Generals in 1999 misguided leadership to cover their dereliction of duty. Its genesis lies in the fact that Generals are chosen based on political expediency rather than their skills & performance.

"We were surprised by the enemy" is a lame excuse in battle. Vigilance & Intelligence are fundamental duties. No one serves Intelligence on a silver platter.

negi · Post by **negi** » 23 Mar 2014 00:32

Mihir wrote: The go-ahead to use fighters came the day after the IAF was authorized to mount offensive operations.

This is a typical bureaucratic answer it is obvious that anything which services do comes after authorization it is a given; however that is not the point here Kargil war apart from showing the clear ball dropping by the RAW as well as other intel agencies (remember the comment from Secretary of NSCS "Inki bhi to laaj rakhni hai" ?) also showed how services showed a complete lack of coordination (again clearly evident in the manner in which IA and IAF top brass played the blame game (I can point to atleast 4-6 articles written by IA and IAF top brass having a go at each other and blaming the other for delay and lack of coordination in air attacks) one such can be quoted from AM Narayan Menon's IDR piece

“A case in point is the counter attack by Pak Army on Tiger Hill on 6 July, 1999 in which our troops suffered casualties. This target – junction of the spurs from Tiger Hill and Trig Height 4875 – was recommended to be attacked on the night of July 5/6 at 0330 hrs by the Air Force representative. Aircraft were loaded and readied, but at 2130 hrs on July 5 the Corps HQ called off the attack without assigning any reason. After the counter attack by the enemy on July 6 the Corps HQ requested an air strike on the same target which was carried out on July 7 by Mirage-2000 aircraft armed with PGMs.
Had the air strikes been carried out as planned earlier, the enemy’s capability to counter attack would have been diminished. During planning if the full picture had been revealed to the IAF, then other options could have been explored to the benefit of our troops. This inexplicable reluctance to share information/intelligence was something that I continued to perceive in my later appointment as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations).”

Kindly read this and just look at the sheer beauty of bureaucracy at work here.

On May 11 the Army asked for armed Mi-17 helicopters to attack the occupied points. The extent of intrusions or the numbers involved from across the LoC continued to be a mystery. Employment of armed aircraft/helicopters within 10 km on either side of the IB/LoC is prohibited as per an air agreement signed between India and Pakistan in 1991 (how does this even matter , we were infiltrated right ? ). I transmitted Army's request upwards as it was outside my jurisdiction to say 'Yes' or 'No'. (I wonder then why did the wired message come to AM Narayan should it not directly go to who has the jurisdiction to say Yes/No; people will say I am splitting hairs here but I know how forces work they are too government like in these matters for a single approval the request goes through 10 people and only the 10th chap has the jurisdiction to say Yes/No rest all is for pomp and show)

See the actual date of commencement of ops

On May 25 we received the codeword to commence offensive operations from the nextday. But there was a caveat. Under no circumstance could our aircraft cross the LoC.

Given that the known intruded area was about 140km along the LoC with depths varying between 1 to 8 km, the constraint of not crossing the LoC posed considerable problems, the most severe being the restrictions on attack profiles of fighter aircraft. A fighter aircraft must sight the target, get into a dive to achieve weapon release parameters, release the weapons and pull out of the dive while maintaining visual contact with other mission members. Restricting attack direction, as this caveat of not crossing the LoC imposed would lead to sub optimal weapon delivery and our difficulties would be compounded by the irregular alignment of the LoC.

So even after 14 days we only got an approval from MOD(obviously after consultation with PMO) but on condition that we not cross the LOC. Nice while we are infiltrated we cannot cross the LOC how can someone outside of the IA/IAF/IN or those who are fighting dictate the tactical rules of engagement ? This kind of $hite only happens in India and sorry this is no 20/20 hindsight I said this in my first post when I joined this forum, the articles on how shoddy our coordination came out only after a while.

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 23 Mar 2014 01:04

If I am not mistaken, pakis were gloating for months and suddenly hauled their mushriff to USA while jihadi army was downhill skiing. Then US prez, nawaz miya and Vajpayee had a meeting about the truce.

When navaz miya declared that it was indeed Paki Army jihadis who infiltrated ~~like little rats~~ at dead of night and fired on Indian soldiers, India should have cut short the meeting only to declare that Indians were hit on the back by islamic infiltrators from across the border and bombed ~~shitistan~~Pakistan to pieces.

Indians were busy "participating" in meeting even when pakis agreed to barbaric infiltration.

Mihir · Post by **Mihir** » 23 Mar 2014 01:13

Negi, the first rule of digging a hole, is that when you have reached the bottom you should stop digging. Right now, you are doing the exact opposite. "I may have been wrong about everything I said, but I will still curse the powers that be as I wish regardless of the data", seems to be your approach to the whole issue.

This is a typical bureaucratic answer it is obvious that anything which services do comes after authorization it is a given

Gee, it didn't seem that obvious when you went off on a rant about how it took a helicopter to be shot down before the "numb nuts" gave the green light for fighter operations

(I can point to atleast 4-6 articles written by IA and IAF top brass having a go at each other and blaming the other for delay and lack of coordination in air attacks) one such can be quoted from AM Narayan Menon's IDR piece

You clearly don't understand. It is no one's case that mistakes weren't made. The point is, every military that goes to war after a prolonged period of peace makes mistakes. Real military operations always expose flaws in doctrine, strategy, operations, communications, and the assumptions that that underlie these. You can either go on a tirade against all and sundry with all the benefit of fifteen years of hindsight, or you can put the lessons learned from these mistakes to good use. Most articles written after the war try to analyse what happened, what mistakes were made, and how they can be avoided in the future.

We know *now* that Corps HQ calling of the strike on July 6th was a mistake. But has anyone actually done an analysis of how that decision was made in the context of the information available to Corps HQ and the uncertainty at that time? No?

Employment of armed aircraft/helicopters within 10 km on either side of the IB/LoC is prohibited as per an air agreement signed between India and Pakistan in 1991 (how does this even matter , we were infiltrated right ?)

If only life were so simple that we could respond with full military force once enemy infiltrators in mufti entered our territory. It's easy for a keyboard jingo to make such prescriptions. The government and bureaucracy you curse so much had to take into account the international situation and the disposition of Pakistani defences before they committed to a major escalation of the conflict. We were pretty much a pariah after the nuclear tests, and *any* slip-up on our part would have been by the West and China used as a stick to beat us up with and provide weaponry to the Pakistanis, or so the thinking went at that time. These aspects cannot be simply brushed aside. Face it, even our government was surprised that Clinton came out in India's support at the time and China gave Pakistan the cold shoulder.

Nice while we are infiltrated we cannot cross the LOC how can someone outside of the IA/IAF/IN or those who are fighting dictate the tactical rules of engagement

Uhh, the decision to cross a heavily militarised de-facto border goes well beyond the scope of "tactical ROE".

This kind of $hite only happens in India and sorry this is no 20/20 hindsight I said this in my first post when I joined this forum

With all due respect, even a broken clock is right twice a day. Unless it is your case that you were the only all-seeing seer who knew of the flaws in India's political and military set-up while the entire leadership was blind to them, I would request you to avoid this particular line of argument.

Mihir · Post by **Mihir** » 23 Mar 2014 01:22

Tsarkar, I agree with much of what you wrote. The Kargil war did indeed expose several flaws in our security set-up, and it exposed the IAF to the realities of fighting a war in the mountains.

What I take issue with is the contention that everything that was wrong with that set-up could be seen by internet warriors who were far removed from the action, and the optimal path of action available to India after the infiltration was discovered was clearly laid out. And the insightful commentary such as "Only after the Mi-17 was hit by a stinger did numb nuts in MOD allow the IAF to field the M2Ks and Migs" that flows from these assumptions.

Anyway, my last post on the topic. I don't wish to derail this thread any further.

negi · Post by **negi** » 23 Mar 2014 02:22

^ I do not know why are you getting so worked up at.

I made a very simple point i.e decision making in India is far too federated across the various tiers and no one questions that problem is a bad setup does not look bad unless people die or something of this sort happens . Just look at the dates there i.e between IA asking for air support and actual air offensive taking on ground and even there with handicap to not cross the LOC. You have now caught hold of my Mi-17 being shot down part and are trying to brush aside everything behind it which by the way I clarified even before you made your first post on this topic.

And why this lecture to me about being an internet warrior , who here is not an internet warrior and what is wrong with it ? You can say that if you actually fought in Kargil war and have data to refute what I posted.

If you would have taken some effort and gone to Kargil threads the topic of approval for offensive air ops and even part about not being allowed to not cross the LOC was brought up back then and again there I am not sure why are you bringing up 20/20 hind sight part , IA had asked for air support that in itself should have been replied in affirmative however it took more than 14 days for just the GO code, can you tell us what happened in those 14 days as far as just giving an approval is concerned ? Leave the LOC part for now.

negi · Post by **negi** » 23 Mar 2014 02:39

Mihir wrote: You clearly don't understand. It is no one's case that mistakes weren't made. The point is, every military that goes to war after a prolonged period of peace makes mistakes. Real military operations always expose flaws in doctrine, strategy, operations, communications, and the assumptions that that underlie these. You can either go on a tirade against all and sundry with all the benefit of fifteen years of hindsight, or you can put the lessons learned from these mistakes to good use. Most articles written after the war try to analyse what happened, what mistakes were made, and how they can be avoided in the future.

I for one did not even bring in the military aspect at first ; the debate started with how decisions making is handicapped by existing protocols . Also what you are brushing aside as mere flaw in doctrine is actually a more serious issue i.e. there is a lack of coordination among our 3 service arms and it is well known , be it Kargil committee report or 10s of others which have talked about a CDS and other stuff none of them have taken flight.

If only life were so simple that we could respond with full military force once enemy infiltrators in mufti entered our territory. It's easy for a keyboard jingo to make such prescriptions. The government and bureaucracy you curse so much had to take into account the international situation and the disposition of Pakistani defences before they committed to a major escalation of the conflict. We were pretty much a pariah after the nuclear tests, and *any* slip-up on our part would have been by the West and China used as a stick to beat us up with and provide weaponry to the Pakistanis, or so the thinking went at that time. These aspects cannot be simply brushed aside. Face it, even our government was surprised that Clinton came out in India's support at the time and China gave Pakistan the cold shoulder.

Wait did I talk about waging a war against TSP ? Also bringing in China, USA and other players here imho become a usual red herring of sorts if Pakistan itself had denied any involvement with intrusion in the first place then on what grounds could clean up of our own territory amount to act of war ?

Besides I think a lot of stuff at strat level is usually peddled for sake of argument (no I am not talking about you or even this particular discussion of ours for this has been brought up by others elsewhere ) I mean after a point TSP had started openly shelling Indian positions in order to give it's troops on top some ARTy cover and we too had pushed ARTY and MLRS into action so if China and US were actually looking for an excuse to intervene they could/should have intervened they need not have waited for an Indian Mig to actually cross the LOC . Btw the need to cross LOC was not to actually carry some deep strike inside TSP territory but to allow fighters a far more open flight envelope and not make their approach predictable to chaps with stingers.

Finally it is also well know fact that PM ABV then wanted a cabinet meeting before making a decision on IA-IAF's request for airstrikes for he was worried about his Lahore declaration, Jaswant Singh was out of India and it took some convincing before the nod was given and this has not happened for the first time. In 1962 similar mistakes were made right from political oversight to lack of coordination between the IA and IAF.

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 23 Mar 2014 04:13

Mihir - your point is well taken that everyone is wiser in the hindsight.

However, the point is also how well people act upon insight that is available. Or worse, let peripheral considerations drive decision making.

You did indicate in your earlier post that lessons have been learnt & desseminated, but some of us believe to the contrary that we ignore those lessons & avoid systemic reforms required for sound decision making.

Contrast Sam Manekshaw telling Indira Gandhi that war was better waged in December than April to Thapar & Kaul's saying what their masters wanted to hear.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 23 Mar 2014 11:40

The use of IAF in the Kargil needs to be seen in larger context.

The IA was asking for IAF support as if it was an extension of artillery and when it was in desperation to make something work. They were themselves not sure of the extent of intrusion and challenge ahead. It would be interesting to map the time period when IA itself took a pause in fighting and started to build-up artillery in the theater by inducting Bofors from other sectors versus when it asked for air-strike.

Long story short - IAF was very clear from the beginning that (a) use of air force represented a quantum jump in the involvement and IAF had to be ready for a larger war. It required permission and clearance from the political class for they had to be ready to factor in increase in hostilities and involvement of PAF and counter thereto. (b) IAF could not have been used only as an extension of artillery in mud-moving role. There had to be more transparency from IA's side on the ground situation for full appreciation of situation. IAF would then pitch in the best possible way to help the ground forces.

In fact, use of IAF was simply not gamed by the Pakistanis. This is quite evident from the DGMO level talks which were happening during the conflict. PA DGMO was clearly rattled (as compared to his earlier demeanor and smart ass comments to Indian DGMO) and accused India of increasing the conflict.

That the PAF was nude in the period was finally borne out by account of the PAF wing commander on his blog.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 23 Mar 2014 14:33

Singha wrote: true shoot n scoot types like the archer will be hard to catch with this cumbersome thing
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpobrfOhohI

i.e. if we ever get the true soot n scoot types

Is shoot and scoot really as important as made out to be as in the brochures and prom-videos? Enemy Weapon Locating Radars should be destroyed pretty early in the war by any force with decent Anti-Radiation systems right?

Mihir · Post by **Mihir** » 23 Mar 2014 21:42

TSarkar, fully agree. My intention behind mentioning the lessons disseminated was only to point out that a majority of the articles published after the war sought to expose flaws in the existent set-up and suggest means to correct those. I don't know whether the relevant lessons were learnt, or to what extent required changes in the decision making structure were made; I haven't really followed that particular side of military affairs very keenly.

Anyway, my sole point is that attributing India's supposedly blundering reaction to the events and the refusal to rush headlong into an air war was not because of "numb nuts" who couldn't find their a$$es with two hands. There are several complexities and nuances there that Rohit has explained very well.

Indrajit · Post by **Indrajit** » 24 Mar 2014 22:26

Mihir wrote:This is the Ultimate MiG-21

A very good overview of the JF-17 by David Axe, with some interesting tidbits.

Further enhanced with a new wing, a cutting-edge intake design and a new, more powerful engine, the JF-17 is Pakistan’s most important front-line fighter—and a remarkable extension of a basic plane design dating back to the 1950s...

... Over a decade of work, the side-intake MiG-21 variant evolved into something much more sophisticated: the JF-17. Chinese, Pakistani and Russian engineers added a better wing—similar to the U.S. F-16’s wing—plus so-called “divertless” intakes that work equally well while the plane is flying fast or slow...

...And that same year, the new jets flew bombing missions targeting suspected terrorists in South Waziristan, part of Pakistan’s restive tribal area...

As per this article the Cruise/AShM AKG CM-400 or YJ-12 Has a range of 150 miles and a speed of Mach 4,Wiki says so,can anyone verify this.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 25 Mar 2014 18:59

The PA had equipped its troops with MANPADS, so certainly they had prepared for it. Infact they were pretty successful:

1. Mi-17 ops (the most effective of the CAS platforms) were stopped after hit
2. Canberra ops were also stopped

IMHO, the IAF was a big factor in our victory, but it was the artillery deployment that won that war. That the Army recognized Arty as a battle arm after Kargil, seems to be an acknowledgement of their role.

rohitvats wrote:...In fact, use of IAF was simply not gamed by the Pakistanis. This is quite evident from the DGMO level talks which were happening during the conflict. PA DGMO was clearly rattled (as compared to his earlier demeanor and smart ass comments to Indian DGMO) and accused India of increasing the conflict.

That the PAF was nude in the period was finally borne out by account of the PAF wing commander on his blog.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 25 Mar 2014 19:04

Manpads meantt the Pakis gamed IAf role, but thought like the soviets in Aafganistan, IAF cannot make accurate strikes in the Mountains, plus they thought thier Ghauri would scare India, ony during the conflict they found out it does not work.