India Border Watch: Security and Operations

[Karthik S]

DNA: Analysis of footage of confrontation between Indian and Chinese soldiers on border

[shaun]

Haphruda.. i feel like taking an axe and napalm to that forest...i think we have lost far too many men there...

This is what is done in some parts of NE . Militants / terrorists always take forest cover for ambush , its very difficult to detect intruders using UAVs and other sensors like radars and even for foot patrols. Forests at the route of infiltration should be completely decimated.

[Sid]

I just hope we share/express same level of outrage that we felt when our men died in north east.

Four casualties is a huge number, to say even one is not less.

[Surya]

Haphruda.. i feel like taking an axe and napalm to that forest...i think we have lost far too many men there.

I know and especially for the SF

I want to defoliate the whole @#@#@$# place

every time I see an SF casulty high certainty its in that miserable forest

I hate it

[member_27581]

This is what is done in some parts of NE . Militants / terrorists always take forest cover for ambush , its very difficult to detect intruders using UAVs and other sensors like radars and even for foot patrols. Forests at the route of infiltration should be completely decimated.

Wasn't there a doctrine of hitting at or destroying posts abetting infiltration? There needs to be some strong retribution

I wish all the news channel barked at the same pitch that they were at the "Beef Murder" in Noida.

[shaun]

Forest , vegetation and the hilly terrain is ideal for ambushing petrol parties , the same happens when IA ambushes those pigs crossing border. But we have lost a good many people in these ambushes on patrol parties . what need to be done is creating a buffer zone from the fences which is completely devoid of vegetation ,this will help in sensors , aerial assets to have a clean vision on the intruders.

In NE's insurgency infested areas , what is done is , trees and bushes , 20 to 30 mtrs on both side of the roads passing through sensitive areas are completely burnt . This deters the insurgents . But shits still happens because of the terrain . For convoy passing in such terrains , an UAV keeping watch over head is the need of the hour.

[vasu raya]

4 jawans of Army’s elite unit killed in Kupwara gunfight

"The dense forests and thick undergrowth in the forest have made it a favoured hideout for militants over the years. Militants here are at advantage and there is always a possibility that you may be targeted from any direction. That’s the reason for lot of Army casualties in the area," said a defence official.

Sources said the latest encounter broke in the forest area yesterday evening. "The first contact with the militants was established for brief time on Sunday evening and militants managed to escape in the fading light. It is believed that the militant group later scattered in vast Hafruda forests. As the troops were combing the forest area, hiding militants, who were strategically placed, opened heavy fire on a column of troops. Four Army men were injured out of whom three succumbed to injuries before being evacuated,” a source said.

After the firefight, the Army has expanded its operation across the Hafruda range that connects Handwara to Kupwara. Additional troops have cordoned off a vast area of the forest and elite para-commandoes have also been engaged to track the militants. The Army has also pressed helicopters into service to trace the militants.

[Aditya G]

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/arm ... klQOJ.html

A scrawl by a young army officer on the remnant of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired by Pakistani soldiers on an Indian position captures the mood along the Line of Control (LoC).
“En RPG fired at BT. Why? Inki itni himmat!” it says, with En standing for the word ‘enemy’ and BT for a post called ‘Big Tree’.

Pakistani provocations appear to have compelled India to shed its restraint and pursue a more aggressive approach, evident from the Army lifting a self-imposed restriction on bringing in artillery and commanders on the ground being told to be on the lookout for rogue border action teams (BAT).

Toughening its stance along the troubled border, the Army used 120mm mortars -- held by light artillery regiments -- for the first time in Poonch sector in early September after violations by the Pakistani army peaked in intensity and numbers. HT spotted an artillery battery equipped with these heavy mortars at a post called Forward Defended Locality 490, which was moved closer to the LoC on September 18 as hostilities grew.

“We fired 120mm mortars on two different occasions to good effect,” revealed Brigadier Navdeep Brar, commander of Poonch-based 93 infantry brigade. Battalion/ brigade commanders cannot order 120mm mortar fire and the go-ahead has to come from the Northern Army commander in Udhampur. Pakistan, however, uses the destructive weapon freely.

India’s response to border violations has been forceful and has seemingly compelled Pakistan to tone down its belligerence. Guns have been silent along the LoC since Indian and Pakistani commanders met at Chakan Da Bagh -- a border trading point on Poonch-Rawalakot road -- on September 21 to reduce rising hostilities that had left the ceasefire in tatters.

But there’s always a possibility of BAT raids. Terrorists suspected to be backed by Pakistani special forces form such teams, responsible for Indian soldier Hemraj’s gruesome beheading and the cold-blooded murder of five other soldiers in separate cross-border assaults two years ago.

“I have asked battalion commanders to stay ready for BAT raids. It gives us the opportunity to kill them, ” said Lieutenant General RR Nimbhorkar, commander of the Nagrota-based 16 Corps.

HT visited several forward posts and found the LoC to be tense, but quiet. It may appear to be a good starting point for the upcoming dialogue between the two director generals of military operations for which dates are being worked out. But just for how long the fragile will peace hold is a question commanders find difficult to answer.

“No one knows when the guns start booming again. It can happen tonight, it may happen tomorrow. But they will be in for a shock if they go back to their old ways,” said Brigadier HS Sahi, commander, I20 infantry brigade located at Bhimber Gali.

His men defend a 45-km meandering stretch of the LoC and also man positions along the fence behind it, the second tier of the Army’s counter-infiltration grid.

http://ofbindia.gov.in/products/data/weapons/wme/3.htm

[Thakur_B]

Wasn't there a move by the army for modern 120mm mortar system in late 2000s ?

[Austin]

Yes, we can-ine: How strays are foiling infiltration bids along LoC

[ashthor]

Yes, we can-ine: How strays are foiling infiltration bids along LoC

One of my friends father who had served on the western front(along the LOC) during one of the wars(forgetting the year) did mention dogs being poisoned a few days before the attack.

[deejay]

There is a fantastic story by Manto - "Titwal ka kutta". May not seem nice today with the "= =" in the story, but it is nice all the same.

[Vipul]

Govt set to clear Jammu and Kashmir’s plan for concrete bunkers along LoC, IB for civilians.

Concerned over the killing of civilians in ceasefire violations by Pakistan, the home ministry is set to clear a proposal of the Jammu and Kashmir government to build some 20,000 concrete bunkers along the line of control (LoC) and the international border (IB) in Jammu.

As many as 14 civilians have been killed, the highest in recent years, in cross-border shelling till 30 September in Jammu against 14 killed in three years from 2012 to 2014.

Some of the sectors such as Poonch, RS Pura and Kupwara in Jammu have heavy density of civilian population living close to the border, making them a “soft target”, a home ministry official said.

“Discussions have been going on since March with the state government and various security agencies, including BSF (Border Security Force) and the Army as to how the civilian population in this area can be protected,” he said on condition of anonymity. “After the ministry gave the in-principle approval to the plan in end-September, it was decided to construct concrete community bunkers where civilian population can take shelter from heavy shelling by Pakistani Rangers. The state government had sent a formal proposal to this effect in June for constructing 20,125 such bunkers at a cost of Rs.1,000 crore and things have now been cleared.”

The ministry has sanctioned Rs.3 crore asking the state government to start a pilot to construct some bunkers.

“After the ministry gave the in-principle approval...it was decided to carry out a pilot project first so as to ascertain whether the bunkers can withstand explosives and heavy mortar shelling by Pakistani Rangers or some changes need to be made in their structure before construction can start on the 20,000-odd bunkers,” the official said. “The state government has been asked to ensure that the location of these bunkers is close to the village so that any major dislocation can be avoided for the residents.”

In addition to loss of human life, nearly 193 houses were damaged due to border firing or shelling on the Jammu border in the past four years. The sharp increase in killing of civilians this year in cross-border shelling reveals a deliberate plan by Pakistan to target villages and houses in border areas. New Delhi had raised this issue with Pakistan during the three-day talks from 9 September between Border Security Force and Pakistani Rangers.

Pakistan would continue to hit civilian areas on the Indian side as they are not only “soft target but maximum damage can be inflicted on them”, according to Prakash Singh, former director general of BSF.

Singh stressed on the need for the Indian security agencies to take preventive measures at the earliest.

“If one analyses the recent trend in ceasefire violations by Pakistan, it clearly reveals that the attack on civilian areas has increased. This seems to be a deliberate strategy on part of Pakistan to provoke India into taking some drastic step,” Singh said. “But it is good that the centre and state are taking preventive measures to prevent loss of life.”

[Vipul]

India plans big project along Bangladesh border.

The Cabinet Committee on Security cleared a massive infrastructure project for the Bangladesh border last week, a senior official told The Hindu. Projects worth Rs. 4,400 crore were cleared by the CCS headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week, but no announcement was made by the government.

Cross-border migration has been high on the agenda of the NDA government and it was one of the major poll issues before it came to power. Till August this year, the Border Security Force intercepted 1,731 Bangladeshi nationals trying to cross over to India.

The CCS has cleared around 200 km of fencing along the border. Sanction has also been given to construct a 400-km road in the border areas.

The Cabinet Committee on Security has given an extension to the border fencing project till 2019 as the March 2014 target could not be met due to various issues like land acquisition, forest clearance, rough terrain and public protest, according to a senior official.

Under Phase I of the border infrastructure project, completed in 2000 during NDA I tenure, over 850 km fencing was done. Under Phase II, 1,973.572 km fencing work was completed.

A high-level empowered committee will reschedule the balance work that has not been allotted yet and will expedite land acquisition in consultation with the State governments. The border with Bangladesh runs along West Bengal (2,216.7 km), Assam (263 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Tripura (856 km) and Mizoram (318 km).

In May this year, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh wrote to the respective Chief Ministers asking them to expedite land acquisition so that fencing could be completed in these States.

[Aditya G]

All peaceful and friendly at the LoC .... high time AFSPA removed and J&K demilitarized as per the wishes of the Pakistani people.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/min ... zx3CN.html

Mind games along LoC: Two key Indian Army posts on Pakistan radar

Rahul Singh, Hindustan Times, LoC, Saujiyan Sector | Updated: Oct 20, 2015 09:02 IST

Rifleman Bhupender Basnet is sharpening his khukri in a heavily-fortified bunker barely a few hundred metres from the troubled Line of Control between India and Pakistan. Latest intelligence inputs on this section of the LoC in Poonch suggest the Pakistani army plans to target two extremely vulnerable posts—Haq and Kopra 2—where bunkers destroyed in previous strikes are still being rebuilt.

But Basnet, known as a booby trap expert in the battalion that guards one of the most vulnerable sections of the de facto Indo-Pak border, isn’t worried. “Their efforts to destablise the LoC don’t bother us. The enemy is well aware of what they’re up against,” says Basnet. The 26-year-old could well be speaking on behalf of the 5/4 Gorkha Rifles that holds over 25 posts in this sector. “We are more than capable of taking on a fresh wave of cross-border attacks,” says Basnet as his sharpening stone sings along the curved edge of the khukri .

The aggressive posture struck by the Pakistani soldiers perched on heights overlooking the posts has led the Gorkhas deployed here to be prepared for a counter-assault as they shore up defences against the threat from Pakistani posts - Kopra OP, Kopra LP and Brown Patch. “There are reports the enemy is talking about overrunning the two posts. Holding advantageous positions gives them that confidence. But I have told my boys it will be a jackpot for us as we won’t have to go looking for them, ” says Colonel JV Singh, the 40-year-old commanding officer of the battalion.

The Poonch sector is guarded by one of the army’s largest brigades with nine battalions, and it was in this area that the army used artillery for the first time to strike back. A localised conflict triggered by the Pakistani army here can spread rapidly along the LoC as the army would then concentrate its firepower on the weakest Pakistani posts in other sectors such as Krishna Ghati and Bhimber Gali.

“When they talk about attacking specific posts, they are playing mindgames. “The intensity of our retaliatory strikes is not lost on them,” says Lieutenant General RR Nimbhorkar, commander of the Nagrota-based 16 Corps.

The Pakistani army has been indulging in speculative firing in the Poonch sector to provoke a reaction from Indian soldiers. Commanders say the so-called plan to strike at Haq and Kopra-2 may be an attempt to test the waters or spread propaganda to divert the army’s attention. Whatever be the motive, the army is alive to the threat.

“We carry out a detailed analysis of such inputs. The focus is on identifying our weaknesses and taking steps to fix them,” says Brigadier Navdeep Brar, the commander of the Poonch Brigade. “And then we look for the opportunity to move in for the kill.”

Intelligence inputs suggest that the neighbouring army has plans to foment trouble by launching a fresh wave of attacks on the two posts – Haq and Kopra-2 where bunkers destroyed in previous strikes are still being rebuilt. (Gurinder Osan/HT Photo)



Colonel JV Singh moves to a forward post near the LoC in Poonch sector. (Gurinder Osan/HT Photo)

[Aditya G]

Part quoting a piece by Gen Hasnain ...

http://www.ibnlive.com/blogs/india/lt-g ... 53882.html

...

Let me describe three scenarios from my own operational experience. The first is from Op Pawan, the IPKF's long drawn deployment in India’s first out of area operation (OOAP). The second is from the LoC where I take the case of a unit deployed in a mode to ensure the sanctity of the LoC (which essentially means, no change to its current status, which in turn means that not an inch of the territory in our control should change ownership) and prevent any infiltration of terrorists from POK. And, the third is of an RR unit deployed in depth but close to a forested area with population centres nearby in Kashmir. These are classic examples of the way Infantry and some other Arms function in operational areas.

After the blood and gore of the intense phase of operations in the Jaffna Peninsula in Oct-Jan 1987 the IPKF settled to more routine counter insurgency (CI) operations. There was really nothing routine about them because the LTTE's well-trained cadres fought almost like regulars and less like militants. Units were deployed in company groups at operating bases (COBs) with an area of responsibility. The LTTE could muster as many as 100-200 men at a given point and if ambushed could actually conduct counter ambush drills to break the ambush, quite unlike militants. Their own ambushes were well sited, in large numbers and almost always accompanied by IEDs. Patrols which went out could not let down their guard even within hundred meters from the gate of their posts. Units which remained inside posts without dominating their periphery suffered because the approaches were mined by daring young tigers that crept up as close as ten meters from posts. Trees were booby trapped as were bushes. On the coastline near the town of Mullaitivu an attempt to occupy posts with 20 men or so met with response from 50 or more militants, leading to the Army suffering heavy casualties. Leave parties left and arrived once in three weeks when the road was opened and there was no certainty about reaching destinations without an engagement. As a company commander, if I went on an operation with two platoons I always remained worried about the state of security at my COB where only 20 men were left. Equally when I was at the COB I was always ready to rush for reinforcement of any other company or my own men out on operations. So what can be expected in such an environment except a severe state of tension especially since failure meant loss of quite a few lives. The Indian Army takes casualties with much concern and a high loss of lives without commensurate infliction of higher losses on the adversary is hugely frowned upon, leading to even accusations of inaction and cowardice on part of officers. An entry such as this in your CR means the end of career.
neww_imgt

The LoC deployment is in posts and picquets and in some places can be as low as eight men. In the Uri sector is a high altitude area of height 14000 feet and more where snow levels top 35 feet and the area of approximately a company plus (functionally 120 men) is cut off for six months. Extremely difficult evacuation of sick soldiers or casualties by helicopter is possible only with severe risk. The evacuation of small posts to reach the mother post before heavy snow sets in is always fraught with danger and is a unit commander’s nightmare. That leaves routes open which terrorists could sneak through with risk only terrorists can take. Every year a few frozen bodies of dead terrorists are found. In summer, isolated posts can be attacked by Pakistan regulars mixed with terrorists (BAT teams). So can our logistics parties which carry out advance winter stocking for almost six months and move on predictable routes every day, be ambushed en route by shallow raiding Pakistan elements. By day it is essential to carry out snow clearance in winter. In summer there is the challenge of carrying water from sources which keep receding to a far distance (there is no system of bottled water in the Army). Then comes night and four to six man ambushes have to be deployed along the LoC fence from last light to well after first light. To ensure the right density a major part of the sub unit remains deployed along the LoC Fence and the remaining personnel ensure the security of the post.

A brief description of the functioning of RR units on the CT grid is outlined. Every RR unit has its peculiar area of operations. The threat is of standoff fire by terrorists or sneak attacks on posts and not large scale attacks of the LTTE kind. In today’s environment the RR unit’s source of tension is more from bandhs and stone throwing mobs which target their vehicles or patrols. Quick thinking independent decisions are required from junior leaders keeping propriety in mind and degree of response. Small vehicle convoys have been targeted by mobs leaving soldiers in quandary over the need to fire or not to save themselves and Government property. The pressure for results in urban areas and nearby forests is ever present and unit commanders drive their troops to ensure domination and control, gain intelligence and execute innovative operations while seeking contact. I would classify tension here as high but lower than the LoC where threat to life and possibility of adverse contact is far higher.

The tour of duty for Indian soldiers is usually two to three years; that of troops of western armies is six months. Despite terrain constraints the western armies depend far more on helicopter support for logistics and even for bail outs in adverse tactical situations; not so in the Indian Army except for casualty evacuation. The Indian soldier as much as the western one does not fear for his life, but prevailing uncertainty and lack of rest are two major factors for stress. Climatic conditions in high altitude areas can be a major source of tension and if soldiers fear anything it is the effects of climate. Avalanches top the list. In Sri Lanka where operational conditions were far more life threatening I used to look into the eyes of my soldiers and draw solace from that; hardly ever did I find fear writ on their faces. If there was it was due to the possibility of being isolated or detached from the subunit. The necessity of buddy contact was essential. One does not fear for life but of being detached from the subunit or being taken prisoner. What is remarkable is the complete lack of emotions to losses of even close buddies in operations. Our soldiers take the disorder of battle extremely well as well as deprivation of comforts. I always emphasized on the need for ‘sleep/rest management’ of the soldiers because that is an area which is usually neglected by the leadership. Soldiers cannot be expected to function 24x7 but the demands of their responsibility expect exactly that. On the LoC night and day is the same in terms of alert.
There are cases of suicides but hardly ever is this work related. The availability of the mobile phone acts as the biggest threat. In the tense environment of the LoC or RR related operations bad news from home can act as a trigger. In many such instances it is young soldiers unable to bear the additional tension of problems at home; problems as seemingly irrelevant as a newlywed wife unable to get along with the mother in law. Sitting far away on a remote post the immediate world around the soldier may be perceived by him to be within his control but not the world around his home where the problems affect him much more. In his post or on patrol he can still share his immediate concern about safety with his buddy or his superior but sharing home based problems is a greater challenge. Marital problems are one dimension, property problems in rural areas and absence at crucial moments when something legal is involved can be extremely stressful. While leave policy of units is always liberal and the government has sanctioned two free trips home with other trips at concessional rates it is a question of timing. Everyone cannot be away from duty at harvest time or during festivals and that is a problem which the units minimize through whatever they can do to compensate.

The experience of western armies has been the inability of returning soldiers to merge in society; that is a form of PTSD or an effect. Loss of partners while they were away, inability to concentrate on jobs, fits of anger and regret due to unpalatable actions in dealing with aliens and innocents in way off lands, etc; all add to the terrible isolation that individual citizens feel in developed societies. That is the saving grace of Indian society where despite prickly problems of farmer suicides or rural poverty there is family and societal support for those who are away serving the nation. It may all disappear in due course and the mishandling of OROP may very well contribute to the soldier’s dwindling confidence in the support system which Indian society and family system continues to provide.

More than anything else the psychological well-being of soldiers is contingent upon the efficient functioning of the Regimental system of the Indian Army. To a visiting DG of a CAPF I strongly recommended a day be spent with an RR unit. This was in response to his query as to what makes an RR unit tick and achieve so much. He was kind to take my advice, spent a day at Baramula and then rang me up to say that he had got the answer. Bonding of the cap badge and the lanyard has been taken by the Indian Army to such a high level that camaraderie is natural; a soldier’s problems, from womb to tomb (notwithstanding stray cases of neglect of widows reported once in a while) are the unit’s problems. There has been much talk of diluting the Regimental system; the British could not help it and had to compromise with theirs due to downsizing. They taught us what Regimentation means; today the Indian Army can teach them a few lessons in psychological strengthening of soldiers through the Regimental system

....

[Aditya G]

http://projects.hindustantimes.com/frontier-diaries

Frontier Diaries

In September, HT's defence correspondent RAHUL SINGH and photo editor GURINDER OSAN travelled to the tough terrains of the Line of Control, the de facto border between India and Pakistan. In Frontier Diaries, we bring you their dispatches from what is one of the most volatile borders in the country

A panaromic view of the LED lit LoC fence at night. (Gurinder Osan/HT)

[Aditya G]

x-post

Compare and contrast to UPA.

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/151026/n ... end-firing

Pakistan Rangers DG calls BSF chief, urges end to firing
PTI | October 26, 2015, 21.36 pm IST

New Delhi: The top commander of Pakistan's border guarding force on Monday called up the BSF chief to urge Indian troops to stop their retaliatory firing over escalated ceasefire violations by the neighbouring country following which both sides agreed to halt the exchanges.

Amidst a spurt in ceasefire violations along the Indo- Pakistan International Border (IB) in Jammu and Kashmir, the chief of Pakistan Rangers called up BSF DG DK Pathak urging the Indian side to stop its retaliatory firing.

Sources said that Rangers Director General Maj. Gen. Umar Farooq Burki told the BSF chief that they have suffered "very heavy" damage because of the BSF response and urged the border guarding force to stop its firing.

The Border Security Force (BSF) DG told his counterpart that there would be no retaliation if Pakistan does not initiate the firing, they added.

The Rangers DG, sources said, rang his BSF counterpart Monday afternoon on the newly-operationalised hotline between the two sides and urged Pathak to ensure tranquillity and stop firing on the border.

There have been repeated ceasefire violations by Pakistani troops since October 23.

"Both sides agreed to stop the firing, but BSF made it clear that they will retaliate if provoked," they said.

The Indo-Pakistan IB in Jammu and Kashmir was peaceful since the Rangers and BSF held a DG-level conference last month in the national capital recently in September, but fresh violations by the other side began last week.

The two sides had decided to create a new mechanism and the two Directors General (DsG) had agreed to activate a hotline to get in direct touch in case of any problems on the border they guard.

Pakistan today targeted 30 border outposts and several hamlets with mortar bombs and heavy machine gun firing in the Samba and Kathua districts of J-K, leaving a civilian injured as ceasefire violations by the neighbouring country it continued for the fourth day.

The recent instances of ceasefire violations have left a civilian dead and seven others injured till now on the Indian side.

Meanwhile bluster and bluff co.

http://arynews.tv/en/indian-firing-alon ... akistanis/

RAWALPINDI: Four Pakistani civilians were injured when Indian forces opened indiscriminate fire at the Working Boundary on Sunday, ARY News reports.

At least seven people have been injured by Indian fire at the border area in the past three days.

According to details, Indian Border Security Forces opened heavy fire and shelling at Narowal, Zafarwal and Shakargarh sectors due to which four people were wounded.

Punjab Rangers gave a befitting response to the Indian fire, silencing their guns. (and said, sirjee, please please stop)

A sense of terror has been taking hold of masses due to continuing fire in the vicinity.

The violation of ceasefire along the Working Boundary and the Line of Control (LoC) has resulted in the martyrdom of a number of Pakistani troops and citizens, wounded and damages apart.

In short, Pakistan is busy trying to put a lid on its casualties but the news is trickling out.
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/ar ... ?id=306644

Indian firing kills two Pakistani nationals: official
Oct 26,2015

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 26 (Xinhua) -- Pakistani officials said early Monday that Indian firing had killed at least two Pakistani people and wounded nearly a dozen others.

BSF!

[Kashi]

The violation of ceasefire along the Working Boundary and the Line of Control (LoC) has resulted in the martyrdom of a number of Pakistani troops and citizens, wounded and damages apart.[/b]

Now that's as candid as one can get.

I wonder how this was allowed to slipped past ISPR.

[member_22906]

Wasn't sure where to post this, but thought this thread would be the most logical one to put in

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 569132.cms

Japanese war bunkers, constructed during Japanese occupation of the Andaman and Nicobar islands during the 2nd World War, would be revived to bolster security.

The Andaman and Nicobar Command has taken a decision to operationalise the high-security bunkers located in strategic areas of the islands cluster.

The Commander-in-Chief of the tri-services command, Vice-Admiral P K Chatterjee told a press conference recently, "The bunkers can significantly boost the security apparatus, if brought into operation."

Chatterjee said that the Command was struggling to augment the defence infrastructure owing to demanding clearance procedures of the government. But the norms for smaller land acquisitions like that of Japanese bunkers in civilian areas, if relaxed by the government, would strengthen the security mechanism.

The Japanese forces during their occupation of the islands had constructed a chain of war bunkers at strategic locations. Intended for surveillance, the structures are reportedly secure from air strikes.

A majority of the bunkers in the civilian areas are currently in ruins because of the administration's apathy and failure to maintain them. Many of them have been reduced to garbage dump yards, some are home to anti-social elements and the others have been demolished unlawfully like the one near a prominent resort at South Point.

"Heaps of garbage, liquor bottles etc can be seen openly dumped inside some bunkers located near the Water Sports Complex and Dugnabad," residents of Aberdeen Bazar said.

[vishvak]

Punjab Rangers gave a befitting response to the Indian fire, silencing their guns. (and said, sirjee, please please stop)

Actually, this is a victory for Pakis. We have a clear policy of not firing first, even then we try going through motions when Pakis come with white flags - without promising to never fire again. There is probably a tendency still not to give muh tod jawab if you see such hollow actions. I think the BSF need to consider following as well while completing muh tod jawab every time:
* Pakis are squatting on our territory since 1947
* Pakis threw 'irregulars' across the border too in 1947, and are at it ever since
* Pakis are not willing to promise never to fire again, from our own territory which is occupied
* Pakis still train terrorists and openly let them roam in the occupied territory
* Pakis, the army the politicians and rest of them as a whole, is willing to sell out parts of land
* Even after selling parcels of land, Pakis stand up and throw claims at occupied parts of the state

I think someday we may have to enforce no fly zone from our side, and take out any bunch of jihadis firing at our troops the way Russians are bombing ISIL in Syria.

[Prem]

[Prem]

On Top Of The Planet's Roof: IA at Siachen.

[Kakkaji]

Border youth may get martial arts training

The idea is to have first line of defence at times of aggression

The new Border Area Development Plan drawn up by the Union government lays emphasis on providing “martial arts” training to the young population living close to the Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and China borders, say new Union Home Ministry guidelines.

The Border Security Force, posted along the Bangladesh and Pakistan borders; the Sashastra Seema Bal, along the Nepal and Bhutan borders; and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force, along the China border, will be asked to encourage “martial arts” among the youth and train them in shooting, archery and boxing.

The paramilitary forces have been asked to provide training platforms and coaches, the guidelines say.

[Aditya G]

X-post for records:

Some recent op details to warm the cockles of our hearts

1. GR unit posted on LOC - A JCO was shot in the head by a sniper. CO calls up BDE Cmdr and tells him 'I'm going in sir'. BDE Cmdr - 'I am travelling, I did not get your message. Best of luck'. Unit launches an attack. 37 Paki casualties. Happened a few months ago. As expected , complete peace and quiet in the Area of Responoability of said unit now.

2. Bachelor Cmdr Arty of a Div posted on LOC gets the following order from his new GOC ' M (common Mallu name), at so and so day and time I want you to open up with every thing you have but for exactly 3 minutes' ie every single gun in the Div would fire in intense fire mode for 3 mins. Every battery will already have targets (SOP). M is ecstatic ! Calls up his 3/4 COs and conveys the order. When all is set GOC gives order and every gun fires. Exactly 3 mins later GOC orders Cease Fire. For the rest of the GOC's tenure, complete peace resigned.

Lots of stories like this some of which have been narrated here.

I call this 'good communication'. We are merely speaking in the language they understand. When we do so the message is always understood. Simples

Crossed referenced it with reports from recent days (Akshay - not doubting your sources, only painting a more complete picture):

Updated: August 25, 2015 16:15 IST
JCO killed in Pakistan firing on LoC

PTI

A Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) was on Tuesday killed in a cross-LoC firing in Kupwara district of Kashmir.

The JCO was hit near the LoC in Nowgam sector and later succumbed to injuries, an Army spokesman said.

He said Pakistan troops resorted to firing on forward positions in the sector around 1300 hours, violating the ceasefire.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/jammu- ... 24318.html

Tribune News Service
Srinagar, August 25
In the first ceasefire violation after the cancellation of the Indias-Pak National Security Adviser-level talks, a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) was killed in north Kashmir’s Nowgam sector.
This is the third ceasefire violation along the Line of Control (LoC) in Nowgam, 120 km northwest of Srinagar in the past 50 days. Two violations last month had left two BSF jawans dead.
The Army said the JCO, Naib Subedar Krishna Singh of 3 Kumaon regiment, was killed when Pakistani troops fired few sniper shots near the LoC in the Nowgam sector of the frontier Kupwara district.
“The JCO was critically wounded by the Pakistani sniper fire at 1 pm and he succumbed to his injuries later,” an Army spokesman said in Srinagar.
Sources said there was a brief exchange of fire between the two sides after the JCO was hit.
In the Nowgam sector, which is also a major route for militants to sneak into the Valley from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), there have been two ceasefire violations in July this year.
On July 9, BSF constable Krishan Kumar Dubey of 119 Battalion was killed in sniper fire in the same sector. Four day earlier, another BSF jawan was also killed in ceasefire violation in Nowgam. While there have been frequent ceasefire violations in the Jammu region along the LoC and the international border, the LoC in the Kashmir region has been relatively stable.

[Aditya G]

April 2015 analysis by SATP on the reason for skirmishes on the IB vs LOC:

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Arch ... ssessment2

...

Meanwhile, as reported on March 29, 2015, the Border Security Force (BSF) has submitted a report to UMHA stating that terrorist launch pads have been activated within three kilometers from the Jammu border. Bada Bhai Masroor, Abhial Dogra, Sukhmal and Charkbhura in the Narowal District and Chaprar in the Sialkot District of the Punjab Province in Pakistan, close to the Jammu border, have been identified as the launch pads that are being controlled by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Terrorists who have undergone training in camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) have been brought to these forward areas and are on standby to strike at short notice.

Moreover, according to an April 1, 2015, report, the Intelligence Bureau has warned that at least six terrorist outfits, including Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), LeT, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Tahreek-e-Jehad (Movement for Holy War), Al Badar and another unnamed terror outfit, backed by Pakistan, are on standby mode, waiting to launch attacks, primarily in Jammu Division. According to the report, the militants are planning attacks on security installations inside Rajouri and Poonch Districts.

A design to widen the arc of terror appears to be crystallizing. Indeed, as a result of the active domination of the Line of Control (LoC) by the Indian Army, routes along the IB are now being activated for infiltration by the Pakistan Army and its spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). According to SATP data available since March 1, 2000, though there were no infiltration related incidents along the IB till May 9, 2008, at least 40 such incidents have been recorded thereafter (data till April 2, 2015).

Moreover, intelligence reports indicate that the heavy shelling by the Pakistani side along the IB in recent past was being carried out to support terrorist infiltration bids. According to a March 29, 2015, report, an unnamed BSF officer observed, "Low-scale firing across the border has been going on almost every day for the past few months. There has been a pattern. When there is heavy shelling in an area, apparently to divert our attention, it is noticed that infiltration is being planned from an adjoining area." Arnia, Paharpur, Samba, Kathua and Akhnoor in Jammu have been the vulnerable spots in the terror groups' plans to infiltrate into the Indian side.

Talking about ceasefire violations, Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag noted, on January 13, 2015, that the action has slowly moved to the IB from the LoC: “That is probably, likely to be because our counter infiltration grid is stronger on LoC.” Partial data compiled by SATP confirms the trend: out of 42 incidents of ceasefire violation reported in 2015, 41 were recorded along the IB. In fact, incidents of Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) violations at the IB have been on constant increase since 2009, except for year 2011. According to SATP’s partial data, the number of CFA violations along the IB stood at 7 in 2009, 26 in 2010, 11 in 2011, 23 in 2012, 24 in 2013 and 38 in 2014.

These trends also coincide with a recent escalation in terrorist violence in the State. It is significant that terrorist violence in J&K dropped consistently and dramatically from a peak in 2001, when 4,507 fatalities were recorded, to just 117 fatalities in 2012. 2013 and 2014, however, have registered a spike, with 181 and 193 fatalities, respectively.

Recognizing the rising threat of terrorism and Pakistan-backed infiltration, the Centre has reportedly released INR 100 million as the first installment for land acquisition and construction of a protective shield all along the 198 kilometer-long IB in the Jammu region to save civilians from firing by the Pakistani Rangers and to curb infiltration by terrorists from across the border. UMHA has assured the State Government that the funds would be no problem as the proposed defences would not only check infiltration of militants but also serve as protective shield for the civilians from small arms’ fire, though not from mortars and rocket launchers.

The most recent attack in the Kathua-Samba sector demands a review of existing security procedures and Force responsibility. The IB and the LoC have very different security topographies and related intelligence grids. While a determined group of terrorists from across the border could breach the IB in a matter of a few hours, a similar action across the more heavily defended LoC could take as many days. Improving the cordon along the IB must, consequently, rank high in any holistic security review that Delhi and Srinagar may undertake.

On March 22, 2015, the Parliamentary Standing Committee of the Home Ministry advised that, while various aspects of terrorism in J&K have been well documented, all these facts should still be brought out in the form of a White Paper as part of a single document for public information – and hopefully, an objective debate in the legislature. India’s J&K policy has long been hobbled by incoherence and drift, and a focused effort to bring it in line with a consistent and clearly articulated strategy is now an imperative. The relative decline in violence since the peak of 2001 and the political mandate that high participation rates in the Assembly elections of November-December 2014 provide a window of opportunity to secure the necessary clarity of strategy and response, and it would be an unforgivable failure on the part of the Government if this is not capitalized on.

[Aditya G]

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... ing-force/

13 SSB personnel released after brief detention by Nepalese border guarding force
The patrol party was detained near Kishanganj district at around 7 am this morning.

A patrol party comprising 13 SSB personnel was on Sunday detained by the Nepalese border guarding force after it “inadvertently” crossed over to the other side chasing suspected smugglers along the Indo-Nepal border in Bihar’s Kishanganj district.

“All the 13 SSB personnel, detained by Nepalese border guards, released and are back in Indian territory,” SSB DG BD Sharma said.

The incident occurred at about 7.30 am when a 13-member patrol party of Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) saw suspicious activity along the Ambari-Kesna border post and began a ‘hot pursuit’ of the suspected smugglers.

Officials said the party followed the lead team of two jawans, identified as Constables Roshan and Ramprasad of the 12th SSB battalion deployed in the area, and “inadvertently” crossed over to the other side by about 50 metres into Khuntanmani village after which villagers surrounded it.

The squad was handed over to Nepal border guarding troops of Armed Police Force (APF) which brought them to their border post in Jhapa district of Nepal, they said.

“Thirteen of our men have been detained by APF at a border post along Indo-Nepal border. I had an interaction with the APF Chief and IG Mr Kesh Raj Onta and he has assured that these men who crossed over inadvertently will be sent back safely. A border meet is on between the field commanders of the two sides,” SSB Director General B D Sharma told PTI in New Delhi.

The DG said he is continuously monitoring the situation.

Officials said while 6 SSB troops are armed, the rest are without their service weapons.
The DG said there has been no ‘bodily harm’ to the personnel and that they have been extended due courtesies by APF and the issue will be resolved soon.

Officials said the SSB patrol team led by a Sub-inspector was on vigil in the area since early morning as the force had seized about 1,500 litres of diesel being allegedly smuggled to the other side Saturday evening.

“Last night, our teams seized about 1,500 litres of diesel which was being smuggled from the same area on the border and hence the patrol party was on alert,” SSB Inspector General (Operations) Deepak Kumar, speaking at the force headquarters, said.

After having witnessed suspicious activity, the officials said, two SSB jawans followed the alleged smugglers after which the rest of the party went in.

The paramilitary force guards the 1,751 km-long open frontier with Nepal.
The officials said reports from the ground state that local villagers have surrounded the Kesna border post of APF protesting against the SSB troop

[Aditya G]

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/ind ... XDGbM.html

A year after Indian and Chinese soldiers were caught in a tense border standoff in Ladakh’s Chumar sector, it has emerged that the Indian Army was prepared to use its special forces and had moved its toughest fighting men close to the incursion site, signalling a hardened posture along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The Army had mobilised commandos from the elite 9 Para (Special Forces) last September, asking them to be on standby in case there was a further flare-up in hostilities as more than 2,000 soldiers of both armies were locked in the standoff, said a senior officer familiar with the deployment.

The para commandos, whose home base is in Udhampur, were positioned barely five km from the disputed LAC to mount a swift response and provide backup to the Indian troops. “The Army had seriously considered the possibility of launching special forces had the situation worsened. It wasn’t a faceoff involving 15 or 20 soldiers…the troop buildup was of a worrying proportion,” he said.

Dominating the area in which the three-week faceoff took place – Pt 4991 - allows control over 480 sq km of territory. “When special forces are brought into the picture, it indicates the Army wants to hit back swiftly and effectively,” said Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, a paratrooper and former director general of military operations.

An Indian Air Force pilot who helped troops hold their ground by flying basic supplies in 32 sorties was awarded a gallantry medal, rarely given during such border squabbles.

The LAC has remained largely quiet during the last one year except a squabble in Burtse area in September, but a flare-up was avoided as both armies stuck to protocols for maintaining border peace. Tensions along the border eased after two flag meetings at Daulet Beg Oldie and Chushul on September 15.

“Border personnel meetings are taking place quite frequently since the Chumar incident – on an average once in 10 days. It has helped prevent things from spinning out of control,” said another officer. The Chumar standoff began on September 10, 2014 when Indian forces found that Chinese troops had deployed heavy machinery to construct a temporary road inside Indian territory.
...

[rohitvats]

Lot of this Chinese 'incursion' is happening because the infrastructure development has picked up and is being expedited with fresh and dedicated resources.

[Aditya G]

Gaurav Savant in his video tweet attests to the response by IA to Pakis on LOC this year. I bet this guy has a lot more info which he cannot reveal (thanks to background and long innings of defence reporting .... so his overall assessment has to be seen in that context.

https://twitter.com/IndiaToday/status/6 ... 8821871616

http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/ ... 200747.ece

NEW DELHI: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s peace moves vis-a-vis Islamabad appear to have started showing results. In the past 50 days, not a single incident of ceasefire violation by the Pakistan army has been reported along the Line of Control. Leaders of India and Pakistan have met on four occasions in the past one month. In fact, Modi has met his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif twice in less than a month, and this seems to have contributed to ensuring peace along the LoC.

Military sources say such a long pause on the border is “surprising” and “unusual”. A military assessment suggests that this peace could be due to resumption of talks between leaders of the two nations. Though the overall number of ceasefire violations is high this year, the year-end lull is significant.

The LoC has witnessed 152 ceasefire violations till October-end this year compared to 146, same period last year. The last violation occurred on November 2 in Poonch, in which two jawans were killed in firing by Pakistani troops at Indian posts.

July and August witnessed a maximum of 70 violations, almost half the total violations this year. Aggression from across the border was met with equal use of firepower. Union Home Minister Rajnath singh at the time warned, “India will stop counting the bullets it fires in response if Pakistan provokes.”

...

Data point:

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/6 ... 996180.ece

As many as 677 cases of cross-border firing by Pakistan have been reported from May 2014 to October 2015, Rajya Sabha was informed on Wednesday.

“During the period May 2014 to October 2015, 677 cases of cross-border firing incidents by Pakistan Rangers have been reported along the Indo-Pakistan border,” Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju said in reply to a written question.

He said due to cross-border firing, the number of casualties of civilians during the period May 2014 to October 2015 in Jammu and Kashmir was 27.

“During this period three BSF jawans died and 19 were injured due to cross-border firing,” he said

[Paul]

Went to Nathu La Pass and N Sikkim last week. Some Observations:

IA and PLA photograph every single adult visitor to the Observation deck. IA maintains boots on the ground strategy. In the 1 hr I was there at the deck there were 100+ Indian visitors and 3 Chinese visitors to the deck. Both the sides watch each other very closely. The whole area is ringed by 30-50 OPs/Bunkers on either side. In addition to a hand held camera, PLA also monitors the situation with long range cameras. IA soldiers thruout Sikkim dress smartly and almost all wore creased trousers with boots shining like mirror. Cho La is behing Nathu La but is not open to civilians.


A stupid Bong was arguing with IA guards on not being allowed to another part of the deck and this was watched by PLA carefully. The post commander came for a inspection and the flurry of activity by IA jawans was again monitored carefully by PLA. I dunno why our guys display name/unit on the uniform. I am sure this info along with their mugshot is passed on to intelligence and probably cross checked with Pakis.

Modiji is supposed visit Nathu La in Jan. Helo land pad was being prepped. Funny thing is PLA soldiers seem to be working harder to spruce up their side than the IA.

Roads:
Except for the approach to Nathu La which is in E Sikkim and undergoing upgrades due to Kailash Mansarover pilgrimage route, the entire road network in Sikkim is in Shambles. North Sikkim roads are in worse shape. Under current conditions, forget Brahmos carriers even 105 LFG Tow will be carried on these roads with great difficulty. My driver told me a few more things about IA preparation which I cannot relate here. The local taxi drivers had very nasty things to say about BRO corruption and pilferage of fuel/kerosene. Unfortunately from what I saw of the condition of the roads, BRO seems no better than MES in work ethics and efficiency

The locals have permission to go 8km into Tibet past Nathu La to a trade post where Indian traders congregate and they spoke highly of the excellent condition of roads there. Most have been to Bhutan and spoke highly of the road network there too.

The local road from Namchi (CM's constituncy) to Gangtok is so bad I could not believe even the CM has to travel this route. Right now, the highway to Gangtok cannot take even a Volvo bus let alone heavy vehicles.

LOTS and LOTS of work has to be done to upgrade the road network in Sikkim.

As an encore, saw Sukhois lined up at Bagdogra airport.

[Aditya G]

For records. These papers by Colonel Vivek Chaddha (Retd.) are among the most clear ones on LOC fighting.

Read in full

http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/Assessing ... dha_160113

Assessing Pakistan’s Transgression on the Line of Control

Vivek Chadha
January 16, 2013

On 8 January 2013, Pakistani soldiers came across the Line of Control (LoC) into Indian territory and ambushed a patrol, killing two soldiers. Unlike past instances of violations of the 2003 ceasefire agreement, which involved firing from across the LoC by Pakistan, this incident was more on the lines of a well planned operation by a Border Action Team (BAT). BATs are small groups of specialised troops, supported at times by terrorists, which target bodies of troops and isolated posts across the LoC. The aim of such actions is to create the fear of unknown, uncertainty and a defensive mindset, thereby gaining moral ascendancy. BAT operations are specialised in nature and need detailed planning, preparation and support since these are conducted in the close vicinity of enemy posts across the LoC. Pakistan’s 8 January action, besides being a ceasefire violation, also involved physical transgression of the LoC and the gruesome killing of two Indian Army soldiers, including the mutilation of bodies and carrying away of the head of one as a trophy. The incident came two days after an exchange of fire between India and Pakistan in Uri sector. That was described as “Indian forces raided Pakistan’s ‘Sawan Patra’ security check-post”, resulting in the death of one soldier.1 However, given that planning and preparation are required for any BAT action, even as the Pakistani operation inside Indian territory was aimed at regaining moral ascendancy in the sector, a number of other factors indicate the linkage of the incident with the larger aim of using Kashmir as a domestic and diplomatic tool.

Expectedly, the Pakistani establishment termed the accusation of killing Indian soldiers across the LoC as “baseless and unfounded”.2 This follows past Pakistani attempts of describing regular army intrusions and operations on Indian soil either as the handiwork of “irregulars”, “Kashmiri freedom fighters” or “mujahideen”.3 The series of lies perpetuated after the Kargil conflict, including disowning soldiers belonging to the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions and mutilation of the body of Captain Saurabh Kalia, exposes the credibility of Pakistani statements.4

In order to understand the series of incidents on the LoC in the last few weeks, it is important to assess the circumstances in which the incident occurred.

Assessment of Incident

First, the description of the incident as a terrorist-led or- planned operation can only appeal to those who are unfamiliar with both the capabilities and modus operandi of the so called “mujahideen”. The information available through the media indicates that this was not a chance encounter. It was a planned operation, clearly with the aim of disturbing the status quo and raising temperatures on the LoC.

Second, there is a substantial difference in the nature of deployment on the LoC on the two respective sides. Pakistan’s threat perception is not based on an offensive Indian intent to grab territory. Nor is it influenced by a sub-conventional terrorist threat from India. Conversely, history dictates that India is vulnerable to both these threats. The Pakistan Army has in the past undertaken sneak attacks into Indian territory, with the most blatant being Kargil.5 Pakistan’s proxy terrorist warriors are not only trained in camps across the LoC but their stay at launch pads in the vicinity of the LoC is also facilitated.6 It is during their stay at these launch pads that terrorists undertake detailed reconnaissance of routes, vulnerable areas across the LoC and routine movement of Indian soldiers to plan ambushes. Pakistan does not face the threat of infiltration from India. This allows it to man posts with greater strength, even at the cost of allowing larger gaps between posts. However, India faces constant ceasefire violations as a result of cross LoC firing, BAT actions and infiltration by terrorists. This leads to manning of the LoC with minimal gaps, resulting in smaller troop deployments, which in turn makes them easier targets for BAT action.

Third, some news reports have indicated 29 Baluch7, the Pakistani battalion stationed opposite 13 Rajputana Rifles, as the probable perpetrator of the gruesome attack across the LoC.8 However, the manner of conduct of the operation provides indicators to the involvement of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG). For one, the 8 January Pakistani action across the LoC did not take place in the same divisional sector as that of the 6 January exchange of fire between the two sides, which latter occurred in the Uri sector. This implies that the Pakistani decision to launch the cross-LoC attack in the Poonch sector was taken at a level beyond the two Pakistani divisions involved. A Corps, which is the next higher level, has on its orbat a SSB battalion that is trained and equipped to carry out such a task. The second indicator of SSG involvement lies in the fact that regular battalions on the LoC are heavily committed to their defensive role of holding posts. In contrast, the nature of the Pakistani cross-LoC attack needs joint planning, rehearsals and a regular working relationship with irregulars, which develops over a period of time. Given the mandate of the SSG, the operation best fits in its area of expertise. This also reinforces the argument that the operation was not a localised tit-for-tat action and was carried out after deliberate planning. The final indicator of SSG involvement comes from local reports that troops of the Baluch battalion loudly announced their non-involvement in the incident to the Indian battalion stationed opposite them with the intent of avoiding being targeted as the aggressor.

Fourth, the geography and conditions of the region facilitate laying an ambush or launching a raid. The area is characterised by thick forests and undergrowth in pockets, limiting visibility to the bare minimum. The mountainous terrain creates a number of recesses between the ridges and cliffs, which can easily allow a small body of men to move undetected. The LoC does not run in a straight line and creates geographical avenues jutting into opposing territory. Crossing undetected is easier in areas where the posts are located at a distance from the LoC and shielded by vegetation and broken terrain. While the fence along the LoC was meant to neutralise this constraint, however because of Pakistan’s resistance to erection of the fence along the principal ridge line, the fence was constructed in a number of areas in its shadow, thus precluding surveillance of the LoC. This has placed the fence behind the LoC posts in most cases, making detection of infiltrators that much more difficult. These constraints are made worse during the winter, when fog reduces visibility. These circumstances can lead to established patterns of movement and vulnerable periods during hours of duty. In this case, these patterns were studied by Pakistani Special Forces and exploited by laying an ambush. Therefore, the fence is a limited obstacle and should be seen as such and laying an ambush or raiding a small body of troops by an adversary is possible under favourable conditions.

Fifth, Pakistan undoubtedly realised the repercussions of the incident. If the expected reaction was factored into the strategic calculus of military planners and they were still willing to go ahead with the operation indicates a desire to raise tensions with India.

Sixth, this is not the first incident of this type in the specific area. The very same area witnessed a similar incident in 1999. This reinforces the tactical advantages that a special operations team draws, given the geographical peculiarities and element of surprise. These conditions can be exploited by Special Forces of both countries. On the LoC, where troops are deployed in eye ball to eye ball contact, gaining and retaining moral ascendancy is of critical importance. Aggressiveness of intent and action therefore gets established within a short period of stay of a battalion. Commanders resort to military action to retain this psychological edge. It is also for this reason that retaliatory actions are undertaken. However, the unusually limited time taken to decide on retaliation and undertake a response in the form of an ambush, which needs time to plan and lay, indicates a pre-planned and pre-meditated decision, rather than a local knee jerk reaction.

All this leads to the conclusion that the barbaric incident was a planned operation carried out by Pakistani Special Forces at a place of tactical advantage as part of a well thought out strategy. While his may have been done to achieve moral and psychological advantage militarily, however, it would be useful to understand regional events that could be a pointer towards a larger design.

Evolving Regional Dynamics and its Impact on LoC

The next two years are likely to witness a shift in the strategic landscape of the region. The US and Western military withdrawal from Afghanistan could progressively release pressure on the Taliban-led forces, which until then would remain engaged militarily. With a favourable alignment of forces in Afghanistan and reduction of pressure from the United States, the Pakistan Army will be able to disengage some of its forces deployed in the region and reinforce areas bordering India. Having designated domestic terrorists as the principle threat, it would be in Pakistan’s interest to either engage them head on or redirect them with state support externally. It is likely that Pakistan would choose the latter course of action. In order to create circumstances for such redirection of both military forces and terrorists, the Pakistan Army will create military tension on the LoC, social upheaval in Jammu & Kashmir and religious hysteria within Pakistan as a prelude to adopting a more proactive role in Kashmir. Since these conditions are likely to be created over a period of time, the possibility of preliminary action became evident in 2012 itself. National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon, while referring to the level of infiltrations and ceasefire violations across the LoC, said that in the year 2012 there has been “an overall increase over 2011 and that is a fact.”9 The progressive increase in infiltration seems difficult to explain otherwise especially given the fact that there have been successive improvements in troop deployment models, equipment held by the army on the LoC and the quality of fencing. An increase in infiltration and ceasefire violations can only be the result of a shift in Pakistan’s strategy. The appearance of Hafiz Saeed on the LoC on 8 January 2013 and a statement by a top Tehrik-e-Taliban leader, Wali ur Rehman, in a rare video appearance, indicates exploitation of religious fundamentalism. Rehman said: “The practical struggle for a Sharia system that we are carrying out in Pakistan, the same way we will continue it in Kashmir, and the same way we will implement the Sharia system in India too. And this is the only solution for people's problems.”10 The impact of fundamentalist propaganda and an increasingly belligerent stand by Pakistan is likely to witness its fallout on the LoC.

The recent bilateral dynamics between India and Pakistan have achieved little on the diplomatic front. Pakistan has shied away from granting Most Favoured Nation status to India, and there has been little progress on the Sir Creek and Siachen issues.11

Pakistan is in the midst of a flux. General elections are scheduled for mid-2013. There are indications that Army Chief General Kiyani is unlikely to get an extension when his tenure ends in 2013. While this could lead political parties to raise the issue of Kashmir for political advantage, Kiyani could create conditions of uncertainty to highlight his indispensability, as was done in 2010.12

The US presence in Afghanistan had placed it directly in charge of events in the region. However, post 2014, it will either have to create a security architecture that continues to provide it the same influence or rely on partners to carry it forward. Historical evidence and the emerging scenario point towards Pakistan as the country that is likely to carry forward this mandate. Pakistan is likely to raise the cost of helping the United States to a level that the ensuing quid pro quo will cater for increased financial and military aid as well as a more flexible US position on Kashmir. This will not only give Pakistan an opportunity to placate the hard-line domestic audience, but also further its agenda of seizing the initiative in Kashmir.

Measures to Enhance Indian Preparedness

The LoC is likely to become the focus of Pakistani military misadventures involving heightened terrorist activity and bids to infiltrate into Jammu & Kashmir to bolster the reducing numbers of terrorists there. It will also include an increase in ceasefire violations in the form of sniping firing incidents to enhance first round effectiveness, unprovoked firing and limited BAT actions, with the blame being shifted to “Kashmiri freedom fighters”. This reality necessitates the adoption of the following measures to ensure that Indian security interests are guarded in the evolving circumstances:

The Indian troop deployment is disadvantaged on the LoC, since it needs to hold its tactical positions in strength and simultaneously guard against infiltration. This is a contradictory requirement, as the first task demands strong deployment at important ground features while the latter leads to deployment of forces in penny packets. It is the latter requirement that makes small groups of men vulnerable to ambushes and BAT actions. Under existing circumstances, the possibility of holding posts on the LoC in strength and the second tier on the LoC fence as a counter infiltration deployment could be considered.13 A similar condition of uncertainty can also be created for Pakistan by infiltration and clinical actions across the LoC.

The Kargil conflict is a grim reminder of the disconnect between peace parlays and military preparedness. Irrespective of reduced violence levels within Jammu & Kashmir and peace talks between leaders of the two countries, India must not lower its guard on the LoC. The only focus of a battalion deployed in such an area is the operational challenge it faces and nothing must detract it from this critical task.

Some of the most vulnerable phases of daily routine are administrative movements on the LoC and LoC fence: for rations, operational logistics requirements, ferrying of water and route activities. While operational measures necessitate movement and are usually accompanied by necessary security measures, administrative movements can be minimised by making posts self-contained through the provision of modern state-of-the-art amenities.

Pakistan has for long resorted to a sub-conventional approach involving the employment of terrorists as proxy elements, which has enabled it to retain the operational initiative. This can be neutralised through a calibrated response mechanism designed to raise the cost of military misadventures. This could involve a declaratory policy of punitive strikes in response to unprovoked incidents from Pakistan. The desire for peace should not be seen as the absence of resolve.

The introduction of modern military hardware has improved the capability of the forces deployed manifold. This initiative must be carried further to ensure a substantial technological edge for the Indian army, thereby improving the detection, tracking and neutralisation capabilities of forces deployed on the LoC.

Conclusion

The LoC, despite the ceasefire of 2003, has witnessed intermittent violations and infiltration from Pakistan into India. However, the increase in the number of both ceasefire violations and infiltration in 2012 clearly indicates a shift in Pakistan’s approach towards India in general and Kashmir in particular. This shift is likely to manifest itself on the LoC, which could become the test bed for further attempts at destabilising India and testing the country’s resolve. It is therefore important to understand the realities of the area and undertake suitable measures to ensure that a high state of preparedness is retained on the LoC.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Ambusho ... dha_120813

Ambush on the LoC: Rethinking the Response

Vivek Chadha
August 12, 2013

During the early hours of August 6, 2013, the relative quiet of the last few months was shattered, when a group of approximately 20 heavily armed personnel, ambushed an Indian patrol about 400 metres across the LoC on the Indian side. Five soldiers were killed and the sixth was injured. Earlier, on January 8, 2013, the Pakistani Army in conjunction with terrorists had carried out an ambush against the Indian Army and beheaded a soldier. In addition to the resultant international outrage, the incident had practically derailed peace talks between the two countries. The ambush, which began as a tactical operation by Pakistan, had a far-reaching strategic impact on relations between the two countries.

While the ambush of January 8 came in the period preceding general elections in Pakistan, this misadventure comes in the immediate aftermath of the Nawaz Sharif Government taking over power and indicating its intent to restart peace talks with India.

There have reportedly been 57 ceasefire violations of the Line of Control (LoC) this year, which, according to the Defence Minister, are 80 per cent more than the same period last year, and the number of infiltration attempts have doubled. However, incidents similar to the cross border ambush of January 8 were not repeated, until 06 August. The incident raises a number of issues of concern, which need to be analysed in the perspective of recent events.

First, the Kargil conflict took place under the watch of Nawaz Sharif and in the wake of possibly the most significant peace initiative led by then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Since then, while the Pakistani Army continues to remain the most critical determinant of peace initiatives with India, terrorists within Pakistan have gained ground and have the capability to undertake violent actions at will. The jail break at Dera Ismail Khan is the most recent example of a series of such incidents. This places a question mark on the capacity of the civilian establishment in Pakistan to move forward on any form of peace initiative with India since it is unable to exercise control internally.

Second, this weakness and helplessness of the civilian establishment in Pakistan is often quoted as an alibi for greater responsibility and restraint from the Indian side. This is considered a pre-requisite for strengthening the hands of moderates within Pakistan and defeating the design of terrorists and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to derail peace initiatives. The imperative of pursuing peace is unquestioned and India has often ignored provocations from the other side in pursuit of peace. However, repeated attacks on Indian soldiers across the LoC cannot be tolerated in one-sided pursuit of peace with Pakistan, as peace is never won from a position of weakness. Such attacks, without suitable counter action in the immediate aftermath, have a demoralising effect on the soldiers for whom pride and a sense of moral ascendency is imperative to succeed while operating under extremely difficult circumstances. It is also gives a message of helplessness to the countrymen who look up to the armed forces as the protectors of India’s territorial integrity. If an ineffective Pakistani civilian establishment and international community feel that such incidents are beyond the control of the Pakistan government and should not become an impediment in peace parleys, then they should also be prepared to accept resultant counter action by the Indian side with the same degree of accommodation. Proponents of an uninterrupted and uninterruptible peace process between the two countries argue that terrorist acts should not be able to derail peace talks. By the same logic, all measures to defeat the designs of terrorists should also not derail the peace process. These measures must include an immediate and proportional response from the Indian side.

Third, the identity of the people executing the August 6 attack remains unclear at this juncture. These could be: regular soldiers of the Pakistani Army; a combined border action team (BAT) comprising of a mix of terrorists and regular soldiers; and, a group comprising only the terrorists. However, an ambush by approximately 20 heavily armed men in Army uniform, 400 metres inside Indian territory could not have possibly taken place without the knowledge of the Pakistan Army, deployed in close vicinity. Therefore, even if the attack was executed by the terrorists without participation by the Pakistani troops, the complicity of the Army and ISI is a foregone conclusion. All those who have served on the LoC would understand that the preparation of an operation of this nature cannot go unnoticed by the troops deployed along the LoC. The bottom line is that the Pakistani Army is doing nothing to stop the occurrence of such incidents and, therefore, cannot be absolved of its responsibility. It is quite obviously not interested in peace with India.

Fourth, difficulty of the terrain notwithstanding, the second incident of this nature inside Indian territory this year in the same divisional sector, and the ability of the adversary to achieve surprise and get away with it, raises questions about the defenders’ deployment pattern and field craft. Whereas the units of the holding formation are entrusted with maintaining the sanctity of the LoC, those on the fence are tasked to neutralise infiltration attempts. Any attempt to deploy forces in numbers smaller than tactically desirable on the LoC can make them vulnerable to such ambushes. It needs to be ensured that this fundamental guideline remains the basis of deployment, unless the benefits clearly out weigh the risks involved.

Fifth, the need to control escalation of such incidents into larger military flare-ups is undeniable. However, this does not preclude a calibrated and appropriate military response. The most suitable response to such incidents is executed at the tactical level of a battalion or brigade. This can best be done if contingencies are worked out in advance and execution of the plan is done with least delay. The tendency to raise the level and look over one’s shoulder for orders is likely to result in no action being taken.

Sixth, the history of the peace process with Pakistan and the existence of power centres like the Army within the establishment, and terrorists outside of it, clearly indicates the need to remain vigilant even while pursuing simultaneous diplomatic initiatives. Complacency of any kind can have serious consequences and result in avoidable loss of life besides complicating diplomatic initiatives.

In conclusion, it needs to be reinforced that peace must be pursued with Pakistan. It is also important that any escalation on the LoC is avoided. However, in order to achieve long-term, effective peace, existing weaknesses in the deployment must be overcome and, simultaneously, contingencies must be ready to undertake immediate response at the local level.

[Vipul]

India to buy radar to detect Pakistani mortar fire.

India has decided to buy modern counter mortar radars to repel heavy shelling on the international border by Pakistan as happened with increased frequency last year. These radars can track incoming mortar fire, give precious seconds as an alert to the Border Security Force and enable precise counter-fire to engage the enemy.

A committee of technical experts on January 13 completed the task of drawing up specifications required of such equipment, after the home ministry commissioned the exercise in August last year.

This came after the Pakistan Army and Rangers had resorted to heavy mortar shelling on the International Border in Jammu on various occasions in 2014 and 2015, causing civilian and BSF casualties.Subsequently, in September last year, the director general of Pakistan Rangers came to India to meet the BSF chief and both sides agreed not to resort to mortar shelling.

In 2014, the United States had supplied such radars to the Ukrainian armed forces.

As per the specifications drawn up by the committee, the radar should be able to detect and track incoming mortar shells, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and rockets from any direction from a distance of up to 10 km.

The radar is also desired to track at least five targets simultaneously fired at any angle and should have accuracy of point of origin and point of impact accuracy up to 5 metres. An estimate of the place from where the fire is coming will enable BSF to accurately launch return fire. The radar should be capable of being remotely operated to protect operators from any targeted attack on the radar. The government wants the system to be lightweight and portable.

A government official said such equipment will help in two ways. First, an alert of precious seconds if a BSF post is target of the incoming mortar fire, so that it can take evasive measures. Second, the firing position from Pakistan can be accurately known based on the trajectory and the counter-engagement be launched immediately to minimise capacity of the enemy fire, especially if the impact zone in India is a civilian area.

The US calls this an effective counter-measure to "asymmetrical fire" by the enemy. The radar uses GIS maps and algorithms to calculate the origin point of the fire and is able to work effectively even if wind speed is up to 40 miles per hour.

[shiv]

Terror attacks and curious surrenders

Over the last three years, a new kind of terrorism has been unfurling across the Jammu-Punjab stretch, according to many who have closely studied the over half a dozen attacks that have taken place in the region.

The attack on the Pathankot airbase in the first week of this month is the latest among them.

Terrorists involved in these attacks only have a few days of ‘professional’ life; their training is nowhere as intensive as the ones who stormed Mumbai or operate in the Kashmir Valley; and they exploit not just drug smuggling routes but also other aspects of the fog of war that exists along the border, according to those in the establishment who forward the argument about the new kind of terrorism.

A close examination of six major attacks in this belt since March 2013 also throws up curious coincidences: at least in two instances when attacks were happening, two militants surrendered to security forces not very far from the attack spots. Sources point out that such surrenders are no more encouraged in J&K.

In four of those attacks, terrorists sneaked in through the same forest nursery in Samba, and in two of them they changed their wet clothes in spots a hundred metres or so away in the nursery before launching the attacks. Also, attacks in the Punjab-Jammu belt have happened not very far from National Highway 1A that runs parallel to the International Border.

“Attacks across this part are primarily meant to cause a few casualties and grab a lot of media attention. To infiltrate into the Valley a terrorist needs to be very well trained to trek across the high mountains, whereas here it is mostly a walk across, or at best wading through some water,” one official says.

According to authoritative sources, around the time attacks started in two of the instances, a militant each surrendered around 40-50 km away from the attack spot. “It isn’t just a coincidence,” one of them argued.

On the morning of July 27, 2015 in Dinanagar even as the attack began, a militant walked to a security installation around 50 km away in the Jammu region. Sources said the surrendered militant, who claimed to be from Naushera in Rajauri district, was carrying an AK rifle, a pistol, one AK magazine, 30 AK rounds, two magazines of pistol and Rs. 8,100 in currency. He claimed to have been in a Pakistani prison, after being arrested there for allegedly spying for the Indian Army since 2012. “The story was improbable, and strangely coincided with yet another terror attack. This was the second instance that I noticed of a militant surrender about an hour’s drive from the attack spot in this belt,” one official said.

Officials suspect that it is not just the drug smuggling network that is involved in facilitating the attacks in the region, but other players such as cross-border sources too seem to have a role in these attacks.

In the new trend of attacks, Haria Chak Forest Nursery in Kathua is a preferred infiltration route for the terrorists. They have used the same route for launching several attacks, even though the BSF claimed to have plugged the Chhap Nullah, through which they cross into the nursery along the IB with the Riverine Integrated Surveillance and Communication System. During investigations into attacks on the Hiranagar police station on September 26, 2013 and March 20, 2015 attack in Kathua, wet clothes that the terrorists had thrown off before launching the attacks in army fatigues were recovered just a few hundred metres away.

Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain, former GOC of 15 Corps and a leading commentator on terrorism, says, “In the hierarchy of terrorist targets the highest are the metros for which you need highly trained terrorists. Number two is the fidayeen attacks in the Valley where a very organised grid of the Army exists. Third are the cannon fodder that are now coming to north Punjab and Jammu areas.” In the Valley, fidayeen will take a minimum of 20 days before he reaches a safe house, and can take another month or two to launch an attack, says Gen. Hasnain. “But here they are dead in a few days’ time,” he adds.

[ramana]

I wish high officials and journalists stop using the word fidayeen and call them plain suicide terrorists.

[member_27581]

Rajat Pandit reporting
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 730664.cms

Meanwhile Vishnu som of NDTV reporting

Residents of a Rajasthan village have alleged that "material" dropped by a fighter jet caused cracks in some houses

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/what-if- ... eststories

Different people different perspectives

[Aditya G]

^ balloon or whatever its nice to see su-30 shooting it out of the sky! Grrrr

[Aditya G]

“Between 1030 and 1100 hours today, an unidentified balloon shaped object was picked up by IAF radar. An IAF fighter was launched which intercepted the object and brought it down. Further investigation is underway,” an IAF spokesperson said.

[member_27581]

^ balloon or whatever its nice to see su-30 shooting it out of the sky! Grrrr

IF it's a "shoot down".
Then there should be visual contact established no..? I would think shoot down would have followed after visual contact and radio contact(if any)/warnings.

[saip]

Today morning I read somewhere "IAF Blooper. 5 bombs accidentally dropped by IAF fighter in Rajastan". I can not find that item now. This is different from the shoot down of the balloon.

Added later. I found it. Here is the link.

IAF blooper: Fighter jet accidently drops 5 bombs in Rajasthan, loud explosion heard

What is this about? Is this DDMitis?