India Border Watch: Security and Operations

[khan]

Is there some authoritative writeup on this China standoff somewhere?

[VinodTK]

Interesting detailed explanation

[Larry Walker]

We are taking Chinese much more seriously then we should, their intent is no war, they want to create a situation on border and then use their pet leftist communist media to create a ruckus and show Modi in bad light. This Ladakh issue is equivalent to WWE fights, all fury but no fire. Chinese are pragmatic and will not venture into any project where they think it will cost them lives and especially HnD. On the other the Pakis are actually genocidal and suicidal. All the Pak-pasand media is hyping up minor Chinese intrusion just to provide some saving grace to Pakis from their daily humiliation at hands of IA.

[khan]

So, the whole thing is just Drama it seems. They need to get back to building the roads & keeping the Chinese uncomfortable.

[nam]

I am now thinking the Chinese will not settle the LAC until we publicly agree NOT to build access roads.

I was right. This from Shivsankar menon's book




The Chinese did not believe we will be able to build our infra. Now they are seeing a problem for the future. And they want a Veto.

[darshan]

It would be nice to see something being announced with every clash. Like weapon testing, weapon ordering, banning Chinese apps, nailing Chinese cell phones doing something, etc.

[khan]

The Chinese did not believe we will be able to build our infra. Now they are seeing a problem for the future. And they want a Veto.

They are going to have to do a whole lot more than pitch some tents and start some shoving matches.

[Philip]

Don't underestimate your enemy.China is under international pressure over CV culpability. A diversion with India where it feels it has the local advantage ,grab some territory,giving India another " lesson" ,and showing the world who is top dog in Asia is an attractive option for it. The Ladakh spat may be a diversion too as Ar.Pradesh it claims,plus dealing a blow to the Dalai Lama's influence in the region is a primary objective. Remember that the Chins are liars,deceivers,and backstabbers supreme.

The best countermove that we have is in the maritime domain,where we can intercept,capture or destroy Chin tankers and merchantmen in the IOR,esp. thos transiting the Gulf.
Unfortunately,in a huge error by the IN,it is still trying to shove down the MOD the 65K t " turd" carrier,with EMALS and all the bells and whistles ! This project with components of a CBG, will cost upwards of $15B, will beggar the budget and has openly been criticised by the CDS ,with further statements that the IA and borders are top priority.It may be so at the moment with Chin mischief on our borders,but It is this asinine approach that cost India its independence centuries ago.The Europeans conquered us from the sea,not from land! Our landlubbers in the MOD,etc. have myopic memories,as China which has alread put its navy as top priority,is further accelerating its growth and development.China has 4 to 5 times the number of subs.It can send 20% of its sub fleet into the IOR in any crisis ,and is building for Pak a sub fleet of at least 8 to 16 new AIP boats . It is steadily building up its string of pearls in the IOR littoral,from Djibouti, East African coast, Gwadar,Hambantota to Burma. In time,it will permanently base its earships and subs in its IOR bases. It is also outstripping naval ship and sub building in compariaon with us by a factor of 4.

The IN should concentrate on buying ( saves time) and building at least 16 new AIP boats.We need a sub fleet of at least 24 conv. boats plus around 12 to 16 N-boats. 6 will be SSBNs for strategic purposes. Leasing more upgraded Akula SSGNs is one measure in which to maintain the qualitative edge over the Chin sub fleet.

At this juncture with the " argy- bargy" in the Himalayas, the IN openly buzzing Chin tankers and shadowing their warships in the IOR/ Arabian Sea,would send a strong message to the Chins to back off as we could devastate their global shipping and energy supplies inour part of the world.It would lead to a huge loss of face for China and its slit-eyed intestinal parasite XI Gins.
The CDS should accelerate the naval modernisation as off yesterday.We are v.deficient in mine warfare, no minesweepers at all,while lusting after carrier ambitions! Our admirals have supped too long in yanqui naval wardrooms methinks! They want to simply sell us EMALS and vintage SHs ,costing us billions in the bargains.

Remember,borders are not just those on land. The seas are borders too.

[fanne]

This link is an old one, but shows accurately, where Chinese units in the Western theatre are deployed.
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot- ... r-command/

Currently China has the 76th and 77th group armies in the Western Theatre (Tibet). One in North west Tibet/ Xiajiang (North of Hotan) and one army in Eastern tibet (mostly east of Arunachal). They are at the edge of the Tibet plateau because of the much higher altitudes of Tibet (5000 meters).
Each group army has 6 combined arms brigades, with supporting artillery, helicopters, engineers etc. They are roughly the equivalent of an IA corps with 3 divisions. In addition to the 76th and 77th armies, the PLA has 3 brigades on the Tibet Plateau.

There is no infrastructure close to the LAC that can support even a single PLA division on the LAC.

Against this we have the following:
XIV corps - Leh (1 division each in Leh and Dras and an armored brigade)
IX Corps - Yol - can deploy a division for Himachal
1 reserve division (Bareilly) for Uttaranchal

XXXIII corps - Siliguri - 3 divisions for Sikkim and West Bhutan
IV corps - Tezpur - 3 divisions for West Arunachal
III corps - Dimapur (3 divisions for counter insurgency and for Walong - East Arunachal
We also have a Ranchi based division in reserve.

This excludes the MSC which is XVII corps in Pangarh (in my opinion not required - would be better to strengthen the firepower of existing formations)

Clearly therefore, the 76th and 77th armies cannot take on the IA on the LAC. However, since the PLA has 13 group armies, the 76th and 77th
can potentially be reinforced by the 81st, 82nd and 83rd armies from their Central theatre which is intended to be used as a reserve in any conflict.
There are also light infantry/ motorised divisions used for internal security in Xinjiang. My sense is that in a conflict, some of these will be used to provide additional infantry for the PLA, since their combined arms brigades have shed infantry in favor of mechanised forces (of limited use in the mountaIns). This would give the PLA rough parity with IA in terms of forces that can be deployed along the LAC - in theory.

I have said, `in theory' because rail capacity (and road capacity from the rail head) is insufficient to deploy the equivalent of 6 group armies - all their food and drinking water for e.g. has to be transported from hundreds of km away.

The PLAAF has 288 modern fighter aircraft in the Western Theatre command. However, the total no of bases in Tibet, within range of the LAC can realistically accommodate only half this number. Aircraft have huge payload penalties operating from airfields in Tibet. That makes the Chinese helicopter superiority largely irrelevant.

More questions - Just to nail chinese capability vs Indian capability for good. (All info from Wikipedia)
I will use a rough number (and it is going to be very inaccurate, as with IA only, these vary greatly). IA maneuver at CORP level, but our Corp has sometimes 2 or 3 divisions and the strength varies (plus independent brigades get assigned to them). Best is to count numbers at Division level/Brigade level. This number of course discount quality of equipment and men, but it would be fool hardy to discount other side on men, and material though important has its limit in the Himalayan region. That means it is the raw number that reflects the real power. Leadership, placement, logistics, training and material then makes difference from there.
A division has 25,000 men; a Brigade 4000 men (just a rough number). Chinese apparently have RMA and can maneuver at Brigade level. Most likely we will maneuver at the Division level (25,000 men vs x number of brigades from the other side) .
if I hear Shiv's youtube channel, apparently their are 8 places of conflict through all of LAC. But an enterprising general can find more, and strike where none is expected and make gains (hello MSC).

X1V corps - 2 divisions and 1 armored brigade = 25,000 +25,000 + 4000 = 54,000 Men
IX Corps - I think it will be tasked for TSP. As you rightly pointed out, 1 Div could find a place in Himachal = 25,000 men
1 reserve division (Bareilly) for Uttaranchal - You don't have to tell which one, lets add another 25,000 men (are they ready made mountain climate acclimated?)
XXXIII corps - 3 divisions and 1 art brigade = 25,000 * 3 + 4000 = 79,000 men
IV corps - 3 Div =75,000 Men
III corps - 3 Div =75,000 Men
XVII corps - 1.5 Division = 40,000 Men
Total army men tasked with China = 290,000 Men ; roughly 3 Lakh professional soldiers. 13.5 Divisions
Just to round it off - It has perhaps 2-3 independent armored and artillery regiment each (numbers included above). This number is on optimistic side. Not all Divisions will perhaps have 3-4 Brigades.


On China side
76th Army = 6 brigades or one corp with three divisions = 75,000 men; though reading wiki means they have substantial armor, artillery, Anti aircraft support element but less infantry (i.e. more equipment heavy than IA). How much that can be used in mountain is a question and will be heavily dependent on logistics. They also have significant Special ops element
77th group army - 75,000 men same comments
3 Brigades - I will give them higher numbers, they should be more integrated with support and independent (else they are fools to mess with IA) = 6000*3 =18,000 men.
Total 170,000 Men

As noted, perhaps in conflict they can deploy 3 more group armies (another 220,000 people) and perhaps we cannot increase our in worse case as we would be fighting two front war. But where they will deploy these men? If they replace killed or wounded PLA soldiers then we would have already won the war by then, perhaps they will come to plug holes that MSC suddenly creates. But they will have a very very long logistic lines (not 100 but 1000s of kilometers), and most of the elements of these divisions (armor, artillery) may not be able to deploy.
If I think like Chinese, they will make a fight at Arunachal, Bhutan and Sikkim. West of that, they have a huge logistic line, we can perhaps simply walk, kill and occupy. No wonder, out of 13.5 divisions, only 3-4 of ours are west of Sikkim. We know that, they know that. A strike division there would fetch us good chunk of land and we should be able to fight the Chinese to a draw or victory in the rest.

Aircrafts are interesting, they now have fairly modern planes. Hopefully our MKI are better than theirs SU35s (I doubt), and Rafale better than there LO platforms. But we have numbers and hopefully lots or practical and long experience post operation Safed Sagar. PLAAF though would have a easier mission profile, stop IAF bombers only from bombing their infra and war machines.

We do not look so bad on paper, I guess from now on it is a matter of mentality, who blinks first and God forbid some hot war (this time it could be WW3, where Covid 19 is already the first round).

My personal guess, Chicoms are trying to gain leverage on WHO, their internal politics and perhaps a signaling to the larger world. Either way, the blood and death will be real, hope it does not come to that, but if it does, let it be more on their side.

[ManuJ]

Ex. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's assessment of infrastructure on the two sides:

As I have pointed out, there has been significant improvement in our border infrastructure over the past decade or so but the asymmetry with Chinese capabilities remains serious. For example, the Chinese post at Demchok is connected with a metal road to the Tibet-Xinjiang highway. It has 24X7 power supply, being connected to the power grid. There is an observation tower on the nearby Zorawar Hill that enables monitoring of any troop movement on our side. Our post at Demchok still depends upon diesel generators and a considerable part of supplies use helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. From DBG when you fly in a helicopter to the Karakoram Pass the flight is monitored by an array of Chinese surveillance cameras placed on the hills on either side of the valley.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 926909.cms

[Philip]

Good point about the western theatre,Ar.Pr.,etc.It's is where its claims of " S.Tibet", etc. and desire to wipe off the face of the map the Dalai Lama's influence in the region.It's put huge pressure upon Bhutan,threatens Sikkim and has turned Nepal into a catspaw. Interdicting its logistic lines is paramount.A great pity we have no long-range bombers which could've been tasked with destroying the rail link to Tibet.

[chola]

On China side
76th Army = 6 brigades or one corp with three divisions = 75,000 men; though reading wiki means they have substantial armor, artillery, Anti aircraft support element but less infantry (i.e. more equipment heavy than IA). How much that can be used in mountain is a question and will be heavily dependent on logistics. They also have significant Special ops element
77th group army - 75,000 men same comments
3 Brigades - I will give them higher numbers, they should be more integrated with support and independent (else they are fools to mess with IA) = 6000*3 =18,000 men.
Total 170,000 Men

Only three chini brigades are actually on the Tibetan Plateau. The other units of their Western Theater are thousands of miles and literally another world away because they can't instantly breath on the plateau even if they could get there quickly.

https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot- ... r-command/

The chini Western Command is a massive theater. Most of its troops are in places where they can breath and those are outside Tibet.

You can check how many front line units are in Tibet next to India. There are only three brigades shown here -- 2) 52nd, 53rd Mountain, 3) 54th Mechanized:

[shyamd]

* The Chinese have pitched close to a hundred tents at four points on the Galwan River between Patrolling Point 14 (PP 14) and Gogra
* There is a serious stand off in the finger 4 area on the north shore of Pangur Tso
This is going to be a long summer. They are not going to budge, and the Indian Army will not back down either.

Options available:
- Wait the PRC out. Talk using mil-to-mil mechanism. Then escalate to Special rep level. If nothing happens just let status quo continue till winter.
- GOI repeats PLA move in another sector. This competition plays out until winter on different parts of the border.

[chola]

^^^ Third option:

- Overrun their 3 brigades of 15-20K in Tibet with the quarter of a million jawans we have on the chini border.

[srin]

We have quarter million high altitude acclimatised jawans ?

[Y I Patel]

Manjgu thanks for the Nathan Ruser tweet. Very revealing of Chinese intentions:



Notice how the Chinese tents are deployed in a line along a very narrow river gorge (Galwan Lungpa). What this imagery seems to convey is that their intent is make sure that the troops of the first intruding party in Indian territory is supported by logistics and is not cut off. In other words, they are going to be there for a while.

[manjgu]

YIP ...can u mark the points mentioned in ur post on google maps... ??

[Deans]

More questions - Just to nail chinese capability vs Indian capability for good. (All info from Wikipedia)
I will use a rough number (and it is going to be very inaccurate, as with IA only, these vary greatly). IA maneuver at CORP level, but our Corp has sometimes 2 or 3 divisions and the strength varies (plus independent brigades get assigned to them). Best is to count numbers at Division level/Brigade level. This number of course discount quality of equipment and men, but it would be fool hardy to discount other side on men, and material though important has its limit in the Himalayan region. That means it is the raw number that reflects the real power. Leadership, placement, logistics, training and material then makes difference from there.
A division has 25,000 men; a Brigade 4000 men (just a rough number). Chinese apparently have RMA and can maneuver at Brigade level. Most likely we will maneuver at the Division level (25,000 men vs x number of brigades from the other side) .
if I hear Shiv's youtube channel, apparently their are 8 places of conflict through all of LAC. But an enterprising general can find more, and strike where none is expected and make gains (hello MSC).

X1V corps - 2 divisions and 1 armored brigade = 25,000 +25,000 + 4000 = 54,000 Men
IX Corps - I think it will be tasked for TSP. As you rightly pointed out, 1 Div could find a place in Himachal = 25,000 men
1 reserve division (Bareilly) for Uttaranchal - You don't have to tell which one, lets add another 25,000 men (are they ready made mountain climate acclimated?)
XXXIII corps - 3 divisions and 1 art brigade = 25,000 * 3 + 4000 = 79,000 men
IV corps - 3 Div =75,000 Men
III corps - 3 Div =75,000 Men
XVII corps - 1.5 Division = 40,000 Men
Total army men tasked with China = 290,000 Men ; roughly 3 Lakh professional soldiers. 13.5 Divisions
Just to round it off - It has perhaps 2-3 independent armored and artillery regiment each (numbers included above). This number is on optimistic side. Not all Divisions will perhaps have 3-4 Brigades.


On China side
76th Army = 6 brigades or one corp with three divisions = 75,000 men; though reading wiki means they have substantial armor, artillery, Anti aircraft support element but less infantry (i.e. more equipment heavy than IA). How much that can be used in mountain is a question and will be heavily dependent on logistics. They also have significant Special ops element
77th group army - 75,000 men same comments
3 Brigades - I will give them higher numbers, they should be more integrated with support and independent (else they are fools to mess with IA) = 6000*3 =18,000 men.
Total 170,000 Men

As noted, perhaps in conflict they can deploy 3 more group armies (another 220,000 people) and perhaps we cannot increase our in worse case as we would be fighting two front war. But where they will deploy these men? If they replace killed or wounded PLA soldiers then we would have already won the war by then, perhaps they will come to plug holes that MSC suddenly creates. But they will have a very very long logistic lines (not 100 but 1000s of kilometers), and most of the elements of these divisions (armor, artillery) may not be able to deploy.
If I think like Chinese, they will make a fight at Arunachal, Bhutan and Sikkim. West of that, they have a huge logistic line, we can perhaps simply walk, kill and occupy. No wonder, out of 13.5 divisions, only 3-4 of ours are west of Sikkim. We know that, they know that. A strike division there would fetch us good chunk of land and we should be able to fight the Chinese to a draw or victory in the rest.

Aircrafts are interesting, they now have fairly modern planes. Hopefully our MKI are better than theirs SU35s (I doubt), and Rafale better than there LO platforms. But we have numbers and hopefully lots or practical and long experience post operation Safed Sagar. PLAAF though would have a easier mission profile, stop IAF bombers only from bombing their infra and war machines.

We do not look so bad on paper, I guess from now on it is a matter of mentality, who blinks first and God forbid some hot war (this time it could be WW3, where Covid 19 is already the first round).

Fanne ji, Some of these points analysed in my book (its free on Kindle unlimited and Kindle unlimited itself has a free 30 day trial. I'm mentioning
it as royalties go to our army battle casualties and I get those even for free copies on Kindle unlimited.
https://www.amazon.in/2022-Indias-two-f ... B07Q29P3M1

You raise some interesting points. My view is:

I've seen Shiv's analysis (the best on the subject). There are indeed limited points on the LAC, were a large sized force can clash. Its not a question of finding additional points to cross the border - no doubt small patrols can do that. Its about weather vehicles can access these crossing points, how a force will be supplied etc. The potential points where a large Chinese force can mass are:
1. The Depsang Plain - opposite and south of Daulat Beg Oldi
2. East of Chushul, southern bank of Pangong Tso
3. Demchok - South of Chushul.
4. Barahoti - Uttaranchal
5. Chumbi Valley Sikkim (finger pointing towards Siliguri).
6. Northern Sikkim
7. Bum La towards Tawang (West Arunachal)
8. River valley towards Tuting (East Arunachal)
9. River Valley towards Kibhitoo/ Walong (East Arunachal)

Apart from these there are a couple of passes in Himachal and Central Arunachal, which are potential crossing points, but if we occupy them
they are difficult to get past. There is now also Lipulekh pass near the Nepal/Kumaon/Tibet tri-junction.

For a Chinese force:
Only entry points 1, 3 and (to a limited extent) 6, can be used for armoured warfare, that too on a limited scale. We can bring up tanks
faster than the Chinese.
The terrain is unsuitable for heavy vehicles of any kind in 2, 4, 8 & 9. In these places it would be an infantry battle, where it would be very
difficult to dislodge whoever is occupying ground. My money would be on a professional IA soldier from the hills defending his homeland vs.
a Chinese conscript.
1,2,3 & 6 are located at extremely high altitude. IA is the only army with any experience of sustaining men at those heights. Its not just having
men occupy posts in the mountains. How much time would it take for conscripted Chinese labour (because local Tibetans will be unreliable) to
unload a train and then have an oxygen deprived driver drive that material hundreds of km to staging areas. In India, every civilian in the area would willingly be a porter. We already have the infrastructure to support our various formations on the LAC. The Chinese don't, which is why they rely on their road network to bring up supplies and switch formations. However, their transport network is vulnerable - basically a single ring highway parallel to the LAC.

The land immediately behind the LAC on the Chinese side is flat and at a much higher altitude, but with few ingress points across the LAC. It means a large Chinese force cannot be massed there for long. Once that force advances towards the LAC, it gets squeezed into bottlenecks, though the immediate area is flat. it means that IA artillery targeting Chinese formations has a far higher probability of hitting something, compared to Chinese artillery trying to target our dug in positions sheltered by the mountains.

Any Chinese aircraft taking off from Tibet has a serious payload penalty compared to an IAF aircraft taking off from a much lower altitude
(same is true with helicopters). There is insufficient air to air refuelling capacity from the PLAAF to operate from more distant lower altitude
bases. Therefore the PLAAF's role will largely be air to air combat and not close air support, or targeting our ground formations. Inducting the S-400 will pretty much ensure an air battle will be fought over Tibet and not India.

There is at best a 3 year window, after which our transport infrastructure will improve to a point where we would no longer feel threatened even by a big Chinese build up opposite the LAC, or even by a prolonged battle. Some significant completed projects are:
1. The Bogibeel bridge across the Brahmaputra, to quickly reinforce Eastern Arunachal.
2. The Rohtang tunnel, which enables us to move forces from Himachal to Ladakh throughout the year.
3. Daporijo bridge - Middle sector of Arunachal, to reinforce Mechuka.
4. 2 Alternate routes to Doka-la (Doklam)
5. Leh-Karakoram road becoming all weather, including the recently completed Shyok bridge.
6. Passighat to Brahmakund road, parallel to the LAC, connecting Central with Eastern Arunachal.
7. 55 of the 61 crucial border roads projects along the LAC completed / awaiting black topping.

[Aditya_V]

Manjgu thanks for the Nathan Ruser tweet. Very revealing of Chinese intentions:

https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1264 ... 72/photo/1

Notice how the Chinese tents are deployed in a line along a very narrow river gorge (Galwan Lungpa). What this imagery seems to convey is that their intent is make sure that the troops of the first intruding party in Indian territory is supported by logistics and is not cut off. In other words, they are going to be there for a while.

[Mollick.R]

India looks ready for long stand-off with China, may not stop border infra work
TNN | May 24, 2020, 11.26 PM IST

NEW DELHI: As Indian and Chinese troops remain locked in stand-off positions in several points in Ladakh, at the senior levels of government there is a determination that India will not stop its border development activities. While reinforcements in men and material are being rushed to the forward positions where soldiers from both sides have pitched tents and dug in, it appears that India is also prepared for a long stand-off.

Diplomatic contacts and ground level military contacts continue, but there is no resolution till date. The Indian government made its only statement putting the responsibility for the stand-off squarely at the door of the Chinese system, but kept it to the foreign ministry spokesperson, which is the level the Chinese are responding at.

On Sunday, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi did not mention India even once during his long annual press conference in Beijing. In New Delhi, no comments have been forthcoming from the political leadership. With the Chinese National Peoples’ Congress having started off in Beijing from Friday, there is unlikely to the any meaningful dialogue between the two sides until this ends.

On the ground, the stand-off at Galwan is connected to Indian construction activities, which includes building a road from Dharchuk via Shyok to Daulat Beg Oldie which is now a revamped advance landing ground (ALG), literally the highest airstrip in the world, where India can land C-130 J aircraft, giving a huge boost to its strategic airlift capability. It is this road which gives India access to the Karakoram Highway, is what the Chinese are objecting to. The road was completed in 2019.


Indian security sources say India should be prepared for more turbulence with China on the border. This is because, as a “second mover” India is playing catch-up to China’s own impressive border development works. In the past four years, India has stepped on the gas on border roads and landing strips, all along the LAC. That is bringing Indian troops straight up to the LAC faster and easier than before, enabling India to more frequently challenge Chinese aggressive border patrolling. Mirroring their deployment and behaviour, there has, on occasion, been Indian aggressiveness in response. This is inevitably leading to more face-offs.

The current crisis, which burst in the first week of May, initially looked like the normal early summer jostling on the LAC where both sides try to patrol on their respective perceptions of the LAC, which has well documented points of dispute. For India, the Galwan intrusion was new, but they are equally concerned at the Chinese intrusions on the north bank of the Pangong Tso. China was unpleasantly surprised at the fisticuffs between officers at a point in Sikkim on May 9.

The crisis is both like and unlike Doklam. This is happening on familiar territory, which periodically sees skirmishes, unlike Doklam which was in Bhutanese territory. However, like Doklam, here too, the verbal aggression is coming from Beijing, both through their foreign ministry as well as through their official media like Global Times. New Delhi, like in 2017, has remained quiet. This, according to sources, will continue.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 953937.cms

[pushkar.bhat]

Let's not forget the Vikas regiments. They give our chining bhai's both a headache and a heartburn. If this group has been mobilised and has infiltrated Tibet Plateau than we can wreak havoc at a time and place of our choosing.

[nam]

Any Chinese aircraft taking off from Tibet has a serious payload penalty compared to an IAF aircraft taking off from a much lower altitude
(same is true with helicopters). There is insufficient air to air refuelling capacity from the PLAAF to operate from more distant lower altitude
bases. Therefore the PLAAF's role will largely be air to air combat and not close air support, or targeting our ground formations. Inducting the S-400 will pretty much ensure an air battle will be fought over Tibet and not India.

Which side manages to keep the Air power, will determine the victor. The Chinese will try everything in the book to keep IAF away from LAC or busy.

1. Their primary weapon of defense against IAF will be SAM's. Long range ones like S400 and HQ9 types, providing a 300-400 km buble. I expect them to be deployed far more numbers than we can. Won't be surprised if it is 3-4 times than what we can deploy.

2. They have JH7s in Tibet, along with Su30 knock off. The CAS will be provided by JH17 with probably SDB or air launched ATGMs. Hence crucial for them to keep IAF at bay.

3. Primary A2A job would be to keep IAF busy. They will try to throw in numbers and BVRs to keep any IAF jets, constantly trying to dodge BVRs

4. All fighters would take off light and tank up. With their Y20 coming in large numbers tanker should not be a problem. I wonder if there are regions in Xingjang where they can fly at lower altitude. But there will be large number of tankers in Tibet, with sub-optimal usage.

5. PLAAF bomber force: They will probably be employed with ALCM. I can see them firing off through Burmese airspace. There is nothing Burma can do, even if their airspace is violated. This has been my prime concern for years now.

Out primary air objective should to knock off the tankers & AWACS. We need very long range A2A or SAM. Hope someone has thought about a very long range version of NGARM or a Ramjet powered version.

The primary objective on the ground should be to knock off those SAM. We need to figure out a way to overcome their superiority in SAM.

[shaun]

It's more about the offensive weapon and we don't have sufficient cruise missiles in range and numbers . More over our indigenous UAV and UCAV will take years to materialize . Both cruise missiles and UAV in sufficient numbers is the need of the hour . In the opening shot they will try to knock all of our forward located air bases with cruise missiles . Offence is the best defence .

[nam]

It's more about the offensive weapon and we don't have sufficient cruise missiles in range and numbers . More over our indigenous UAV and UCAV will take years to materialize . Both cruise missiles and UAV in sufficient numbers is the need of the hour . In the opening shot they will try to knock all of our forward located air bases with cruise missiles . Offence is the best defence .

They cannot. CM in large numbers is waste of resources. It is a glorified 250KG flying bomb, which a Su30 can drop 24 of them at one go.

PLA is the primary arm. PLAAF is the secondary. Destroying PLA at LAC should the core objective. For that we need IAF at LAC. This requries PLAAF SAM. tankers, AWACS to be neutralized.

We will never have enough fighters to carry out Battle of Britain style air combat with PLAAF.

[srin]

Send a few destroyers to the Malacca straits and some Mig-29Ks to buzz oil tankers headed to China.

[chola]

If the balloon goes up then the IN has to sally forth to interdict chini flagged ships and disrupt their shipppng lanes in the IOR.

As our forces take over all the immediate and defensible areas of the LAC (our overwhelming advantages in men and aircraft will GUARANTEE it) then the best way to pursue the chinis to accept the situation on the borders -- like we did in 1962 -- and not make it a prolonged war is to hold their sea lanes under our grip. We can magnaminously allow their ships to go through if they accept and deal with more pertinent threats to their security to their east with Unkil and Japan.

If they are stupid and try to push a fleet into the IOR then we'll perform a repeat of the Tsushima Strait on them at Malacca:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tsushima

fought on 27–28 May 1905 (14–15 May in the Julian calendar then in use in Russia) in the Tsushima Strait located between Korea and southern Japan. In this battle the Japanese fleet under Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō destroyed two-thirds of the Russian fleet, under Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, which had traveled over 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to reach the Far East. In London in 1906, Sir George Sydenham Clarke wrote, "The battle of Tsu-shima is by far the greatest and the most important naval event since Trafalgar"; decades later, historian Edmund Morris agreed with this judgment.

...

The battle had a profound cultural and political impact upon Japan. It was the first defeat of a European power by an Asian nation in the modern era.

[yensoy]

The more the roads, bridges, bunkers and fortifications we make, the less it makes the LAC ambiguous. In many places along the LAC our last outpost is now face to face with last Chinese outpost. In other words, whether the Chinese exchange maps with us or not it is clear on the ground where their claims end. Their deep Chinese game of keeping their rights to claim the world is eroded away. As dubious and fraudulent as this Chinese game is, it is a useful thing to poke their enemies with from time to time. I think this may be one reason they are pissed that we are building permanent structures - they don't like a line drawn in the sand.

[pushkar.bhat]

Any Chinese aircraft taking off from Tibet has a serious payload penalty compared to an IAF aircraft taking off from a much lower altitude
(same is true with helicopters). There is insufficient air to air refuelling capacity from the PLAAF to operate from more distant lower altitude
bases. Therefore the PLAAF's role will largely be air to air combat and not close air support, or targeting our ground formations. Inducting the S-400 will pretty much ensure an air battle will be fought over Tibet and not India.

Which side manages to keep the Air power, will determine the victor. The Chinese will try everything in the book to keep IAF away from LAC or busy.

1. Their primary weapon of defense against IAF will be SAM's. Long range ones like S400 and HQ9 types, providing a 300-400 km buble. I expect them to be deployed far more numbers than we can. Won't be surprised if it is 3-4 times than what we can deploy.

2. They have JH7s in Tibet, along with Su30 knock off. The CAS will be provided by JH17 with probably SDB or air launched ATGMs. Hence crucial for them to keep IAF at bay.

3. Primary A2A job would be to keep IAF busy. They will try to throw in numbers and BVRs to keep any IAF jets, constantly trying to dodge BVRs

4. All fighters would take off light and tank up. With their Y20 coming in large numbers tanker should not be a problem. I wonder if there are regions in Xingjang where they can fly at lower altitude. But there will be large number of tankers in Tibet, with sub-optimal usage.

5. PLAAF bomber force: They will probably be employed with ALCM. I can see them firing off through Burmese airspace. There is nothing Burma can do, even if their airspace is violated. This has been my prime concern for years now.

Out primary air objective should to knock off the tankers & AWACS. We need very long range A2A or SAM. Hope someone has thought about a very long range version of NGARM or a Ramjet powered version.

The primary objective on the ground should be to knock off those SAM. We need to figure out a way to overcome their superiority in SAM.

I think its time that BR reins in its wild thoughts specially with respect to the scenarios being painted out in the quoted post.

Let me say one thing here. If this conflict goes anything beyond the Galwan Valley you may see a leadership change in CCP. The non-card bearing Chinese middle class is already not very happy with this Xi chap specially his handling of the entire CV episode. The fact that the entire world is pissed off at CCP and by extension the Chinese diaspora does not help the average Chinese. Hong Kong plus Taiwan is spiralling out of control and undoing the calibrated policies put in place over multiple decades. If body bags start reaching the villages of the Yangtze & Yellow river delta things will come to a boil & the Party will have to purge the leadership to save their own bacon. Xi knows that well and so does his state councillor. This will play out over the long summer and if HK becomes too hot, Xi may quietly pull out of Galwan to buy a favour from his friend.

Things are geopolitically more complex for China than for us in Galwan Valley.

[nam]

I think its time that BR reins in its wild thoughts specially with respect to the scenarios being painted out in the quoted post.

Let me say one thing here. If this conflict goes anything beyond the Galwan Valley you may see a leadership change in CCP. The non-card bearing Chinese middle class is already not very happy with this Xi chap specially his handling of the entire CV episode. The fact that the entire world is pissed off at CCP and by extension the Chinese diaspora does not help the average Chinese. Hong Kong plus Taiwan is spiralling out of control and undoing the calibrated policies put in place over multiple decades. If body bags start reaching the villages of the Yangtze & Yellow river delta things will come to a boil & the Party will have to purge the leadership to save their own bacon. Xi knows that well and so does his state councillor. This will play out over the long summer and if HK becomes too hot, Xi may quietly pull out of Galwan to buy a favour from his friend.

Things are geopolitically more complex for China than for us in Galwan Valley.

What happens to or in China politically is irrelevant for us from a military point of view on LAC. It is not about what China will do, rather what it can do.
Any notion that Xi will back off, because his latest mistress details became public will not help us on LAC. If Xi is made go home, some other Xi Xi will do a standoff.

If anyone can accurately predict what the Chinese will do, I will ask him to try it out on the stock market, so that i can make some money.

Germany started the WW2 when it was economically weak. The Chinese did 62, when it in the Great Famine!

[nam]

Word seems to be spreading on SM, specially among the goras, that "Chinese have invaded India, there could be war".

Mashallah.. we should make more noise and play out being the victim.

Before someone jumps on me, the PLAAF has hardly any blast shelters for it's fighters in tibet. So, no the Chinese are not attacking.

But that is beside the point.. we have to play victim.

[Philip]

According to media reports,70 of our troops were injured,some.v.seriously requiring medevac . This is not a friendly WWE "rumble and tumble",but a vicious criminal show of aggression by the Chinks, to overcome resistance to their relentless strategy of pushing back the borders in their favour.
As said for years,we must punish China on every front, diplomatically,economically,and in the last event militarily.
The megalomaniac XI Gins has a dream of world domination.He is a 1000 times more dangerous than Adolf Hitler.Hitler only wanted " lebensraum" ,living space,for Germany in Europe, the repudiation of humiliating protocols of the Treaty of Versailles, and expulsion from Germany of the " untermenschen", races and peoples he considered sub- human polluting " Aryan" Germany.

XI and his CCP are the fascist Nazis of the 21st. century. In fact as said before the greatest threat to global peace as the Chin " fuhrer" wants the entire world at his feet,kowtowing to China. Caught out with his diabolic plot thatunleashed CV worldwide, revolt in Hong Kong, the Chinese are openly displaying the use of force to settle the debate. It is most unfortunate that at this time of crisis over CV, we have the menace of China at our doorstep.I said a few years ago that China was waiting for its moment to teach India another Himalayan "lesson". PM Modiji's international outreach and pitch for India to be an alternative to Cina for MNCs is rattling the CCP. It has dlready taken eco measures against Australia over imports,something it cannot do with India with its huge trade surplus,thus the itch in XIs loincloth to execute another '62.
However,India's military are not the weak entity of '62 and Modi is not another Nehru,but XI ishell-bent upon achieving what he thinks is China's destiny.

[manjgu]

Manjgu thanks for the Nathan Ruser tweet. Very revealing of Chinese intentions:

https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1264 ... 72/photo/1
mg]

boss.. cant locate on g maps..can u give approx coordinates of the area of interest....

[manjgu]

According to media reports,70 of our troops were injured,some.v.seriously requiring medevac . This is not a friendly WWE "rumble and tumble",but a vicious criminal show of aggression by the Chinks, to overcome resistance to their relentless strategy of pushing back the borders in their favour.
.

the point is not if 70 of our boys got injured but how many did we injure... for me breaking of PLA majors nose was cool.. they must have gone back as badly battered / bruised... the story is still unfolding with more heresay than anything concrete....

[Ashokk]

boss.. cant locate on g maps..can u give approx coordinates of the area of interest....

34.768229, 78.2074013

[manjgu]

thnx...could zero in on the area... but can u guys see any tents etc??

[ldev]

It's more about the offensive weapon and we don't have sufficient cruise missiles in range and numbers . More over our indigenous UAV and UCAV will take years to materialize . Both cruise missiles and UAV in sufficient numbers is the need of the hour . In the opening shot they will try to knock all of our forward located air bases with cruise missiles . Offence is the best defence .

India should not make the mistake of trying to re-fight the 1962 war with the objective of winning this time. The "order of battle" in the border regions, listed in many posts above, ignores the overwhelming reliance the PLA places on it's missile forces. The PLA is now a combined arms force. The PLA has between 800 and 1000 short range DF-15 and DF-16 missiles with a range of between 800-900 kms. They are road mobile and if the balloon really goes up they will be transported such that they bring within their range all IAF airfields in the North and East. Targeting IAF airfields will be one of the first actions the PLA will do at the start of broader hostilities. In addition the PLA has 300-500 GLCMs. India can and will respond with the ground launched Brahmos to target PLAAF bases in Tibet, but in the event of a broader war India has to up the ante so that it shakes the political foundations of the CCP or at the very least of Xi. Having a 1000 or so Nirbhay cruise missiles with a range of 1500 km in India's inventory would have been very welcome right now.

[darshan]

Ha. There would have been many Indian "not meeting" requirements products that all Indian services would be happy to have in big numbers. Hopefully they will learn from this and put the orders in midnight today.

[Y I Patel]

Thanks for posting the lat lon and providing linked images from Nathan Ruser's tweet. Here are some other location lat lons that are of interest, in that area:

Samzungling - PLA base: 34.7142425N 78.7475967E this is close to the headwaters of Galwan Lungpa. Note how upper lungpa is easier to negotiate than the mouth in Indian territory. Close to the mouth it is a steep gorge

Shamal Lungpa: 34.4834955N 78.9166832E another gorge in that network of gorges. This one opens into Indian Chang Chenmo valley and provides much easier access from the Indian side

Gogra/Police Memorial/ vicinity of Hot Springs: 34.3101215N 79.0171051E (approximate location) main Indian base; police memorial is holy place for Indian police officers because of the sacrifices of the poliemen that made Indian control of this area possible.

Wikimapia is an excellent resource to locate these places, much better than google maps. But copying the coordinates in google will give better 3-d imagery

[Ashokk]

thnx...could zero in on the area... but can u guys see any tents etc??

I don't think the google map images are updated.

[RKumar]

Ha. There would have been many Indian "not meeting" requirements products that all Indian services would be happy to have in big numbers. Hopefully they will learn from this and put the orders in midnight today.

My shopping list, all from local produce :
NAG and Namica
Helina
LCH
Tejas - MK1A
Baba kalyani- ULH
Dhanush
ATGA
Astra
Bhramos
Aakash - compact version
Heavy n light torpedos
hand grandes
All types of ammunition