LCA News and Discussions, 22-Oct-2013

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 13 Jan 2014 07:19

first steps:
cancel calling firang collaborations and then increase funding into
http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/boards/ardb/gatet.htm

within the org.. get the initiative started from components
- blades design to achieve the thrusts [quicker cooling vents, nano drilling holes, etc]
- TET and high temp materials
- fine tune on the bypass ratio, to increase efficiency and compression
- invest in future tech ( like plasma injection etc).

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 13 Jan 2014 07:21

The point is that the TOI is perhaps the most widely read newspaper in the country.It generates public perception.It would've been better if he had shown the % of indigenisation a decade before and now to make his point.Relevant because the UPA/Cong has been in power for a decade.A list of successes and failures too would've been more illuminating. We have spectacular successes with ballistic missiles and civilian rocketry,sats,etc.,but fail with BTs,IJTs,etc. It has been almost a year now since the DRDO "clusters" were set up with more empowered chiefs.There was another report yesterday about a new Defence body that would be established to oversee everything from plans,acquisitions,domestic production,etc. to speed up matters.Here's a Jan 1st report on def. deals hanging in the air.How accurate this one is in the light of other similar reports is open to Q,esp. now that MMS is on life support and has deliverd his "funeral oration".

http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/2014/1/ ... _plans.htm

XCpts:

The impact of Manmohan's statement of " cutting the coat according to the cloth" will be felt in the months to come.

The IAF's mother of all deals for the purchase of 126 Medium Multi- role combat jets from French aircraft maker Dassault still hangs in the balance.
It is unlikely to be finalised within this financial year and in all possibility the decision will be taken only by the new government.

Sources said key aspects of the contract pertaining to the transfer of technology for making Rafale combat jets in the country and offset proposals submitted by the French company have been finalised but other issues relating to ownership of the aircraft manufactured in India still has to be sorted out.

Apart from the combat jet deal, the IAF is also awaiting movement on the purchase of air- to- air refuellers ( A- 330), attack helicopters ( Apache) and heavy lift helicopters ( Chinook). The IAF hopes these contracts will be finalised in the first half of 2014.

For the Navy, it is a race against time to get the government's approval for a new line of submarines. The proposal has been pending for several years and the Navy hopes that it will see the light of day in 2014.
The Navy is also critically short of helicopters. It hopes the government will clear the purchase of the entire range of helicopters that need to be urgently replaced.

The Army's quest for new artillery guns also remains to be addressed.
Proposal to buy ultra light howitzers M777 from the US is in the final stages and it hopes to be finalised in the first half of 2014.

The Prime Minister, during his address to the three service chiefs, had urged caution in defence spending

srin · Post by **srin** » 13 Jan 2014 08:33

The article is a really silly article. It tells me more about the journo than the state of defence.

a) This percentage of content - is it by number of components or by price ? And is the price in rupees or in other currencies ?

b) 100% local manufacture of Sukhois by HAL will of course be more expensive. There are two big factors that influence the price: man-power and supply chain. Since you don't compare it with West (where everything done by people is horrendously expensive), the remaining reason is: supply chain. Existing component suppliers in Russia have long-term contract and can bring prices down, and also supply parts to other airframes as well. For HAL to setup the entire supply chain (and for those local manufacturers to come upto speed with proper QA-verified components) will be expensive.

And this is typical of the problem with DDM and with auditors. Of course, it will be more expensive, but you are creating an industry that will reduce the prices of LCA Mk2, the AMCA etc further.

c) There is a circular logic also here: DRDO isn't worthy of additional funding because its projects are delayed. Of course, you jackass, if the DRDO can't invest in research, what is it supposed to do ? Either import content or delay the project till it can develop on its own. And you have problems with both and are citing that as a reason for not funding DRDO.

d) I think that in the overall scheme of things, it is always good to import atleast some amount of stuff that is cutting edge. Two reasons: one, the military will be able to fight with the best that is there and the pressure is off the R&D organizations (even without much participation in FGFA, the important thing is that it reduces pressure on AMCA); and two, it will give the local organizations a much-needed competition (the most heartening thing is what HAL is doing with HTT-40 as competitor for PC7 - the attitude is unprecedented and it must be encouraged).

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 13 Jan 2014 09:29

Philip sir,

I ask you of only one favour. Please don't post and discuss Rajat Pandit's articles here. He does make my blood boil. I can refute each one of his points, but his points are so unsubstantiated cheap shots, that I don't want to stoop to that level.

At least let us not help him by increasing clicks to the verbal diarrhea which he calls reports.

isubodh · Post by **isubodh** » 13 Jan 2014 09:29

Whenever is critical of us we just throw bricks at him, no one analyzes that there is definitely some truth in that and introspection is required.

Kartik · Post by **Kartik** » 13 Jan 2014 10:02

Cosmo_R wrote:This is only tangential to the LCA program but I am frankly tired of these Rajat Pandit el stupido misleading articles:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 720189.cms

"Desi defence showpieces powered by videshi parts"

Colossal ignorance/laziness. Every program he mentions is pre serial production. It does not make sense for the products to be 100% indigenous until they are adopted so you can build the backward linkages.

The Su 30 program indigenasation keeps falling behind because they keep adding emergency orders to compensate for the delay in the MMRCA.

JMT

bloody turd this Rajat Pandit..third grade journo and this piece of dung article is on the first page of ToI..if this isn't lifafa journalism, I don't know what is..

vic · Post by **vic** » 13 Jan 2014 10:06

I have been pointing out for a super long time on BRF that Mirage 2000 upgrade charges are extremely suspicious. My guess of reasonable charges are around USD 5 Million per plane, rest is for piggy bank in Switzerland. Note that honest MoD has no problem with 280 crores per Plane for Mirage 2000 upgrade but are still bargaining LCA costs. MoD has still not placed formal orders for second batch of LCA mark-1.

merlin · Post by **merlin** » 13 Jan 2014 11:05

maitya, are you sure about the LPT disk from the US? My understanding is that hot section parts for the Kaveri come from Snecma.

member_28041 · Post by **member_28041** » 13 Jan 2014 11:15

vic wrote:I have been pointing out for a super long time on BRF that Mirage 2000 upgrade charges are extremely suspicious. My guess of reasonable charges are around USD 5 Million per plane, rest is for piggy bank in Switzerland. Note that honest MoD has no problem with 280 crores per Plane for Mirage 2000 upgrade but are still bargaining LCA costs. MoD has still not placed formal orders for second batch of LCA mark-1.

Moreover this 280 crore figure is for an aircraft which is almost 30 years old

.
This is absolutely ridiculous.It may server a maximum 10 years more.

With the price of one upgrade we could have bought almost 2 LCA which would have been brand new and have a life of 30+ years.Wonder who has done the cost benefit analysis of this upgrade.

On the LCA front, its heartening to see the enthusiasm of the navy on the NLCA.
Considering its much lower price(compared to MIG29k) as well as the lower operating cost(compared to MIG29K due to its gas guzzling twin engines), no wonder the navy itself is putting significant amount of their own money into its development and the assembly plant.
I believe their plan might be to replace the MIG29K by LCA Mk2 in the future.

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 13 Jan 2014 11:31

Marten wrote:
indranilroy wrote:Philip sir,

I ask you of only one favour. Please don't post and discuss Rajat Pandit's articles here. He does make my blood boil. I can refute each one of his points, but his points are so unsubstantiated cheap shots, that I don't want to stoop to that level.

At least let us not help him by increasing clicks to the verbal diarrhea which he calls reports.
Perhaps this is the time to do that - why don't knowledgeable folks like you, Kartik, Karan M, maitya put together a proper refutation of the usual points? And let's request one of the online media units to review and publish (for instance, Atriji's article on Maratha politics was published by CRI). It will be a start - instead of us getting simply frustrated and berating him on a forum where he** or the larger unsuspecting audiences do not venture!).
PS: ** since if he did read the forum, his tone would be at least a little educated. Right now, it seems driven by an agenda.

Folks, please do consider taking the time out - this year is truly the make or break year for purchases. If there is a larger number of folks who are aware of these manipulative practices that we call lifafa, things will change.

You have piqued my resolve. I have been thinking about it for some days now. There are at least 3 reporters who post here in the forum. AK and Ajai Shukla are also there. I am open to writing rebuttals (alone or collaboratively) on biased reports on indigenous aircrafts. I don't want any credits. I just can't take this misinformation any more. It is great injustice to India and the hardwork of lot of Indian scientists and engineers.

I don't know if people noticed the emotional cries of scientists in the 16Ton para-drop video from ARDE. That is the cry of a nameless man who has worked for years to solve something. It is okay, if one can't feel it. At least don't berate it with a cobbled up report which takes a day to write.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 13 Jan 2014 11:35

Project BRF: Strategies for countering DDM (example, you could be specific than being abstract)should be a thread for suggestions. After that, it is only a matter of consolidations then... unless if you or anyone individually wants to take credits. rohitvats has already strated few projects.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 13 Jan 2014 11:43

Cosmo_R wrote:This is only tangential to the LCA program but I am frankly tired of these Rajat Pandit el stupido misleading articles:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 720189.cms

"Desi defence showpieces powered by videshi parts"

Colossal ignorance/laziness. Every program he mentions is pre serial production. It does not make sense for the products to be 100% indigenous until they are adopted so you can build the backward linkages.

The Su 30 program indigenasation keeps falling behind because they keep adding emergency orders to compensate for the delay in the MMRCA.

JMT

The retard RP doesnt even understand that most defence programs would give their eyeteeth to get to the 60% local sourcing level. Or even the context of the data, e.g. in the AEWACS, the aircraft is from Brazil, so obviously the import % will be high.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 13 Jan 2014 11:44

Marten wrote:
indranilroy wrote:Philip sir,

I ask you of only one favour. Please don't post and discuss Rajat Pandit's articles here. He does make my blood boil. I can refute each one of his points, but his points are so unsubstantiated cheap shots, that I don't want to stoop to that level.

At least let us not help him by increasing clicks to the verbal diarrhea which he calls reports.
Perhaps this is the time to do that - why don't knowledgeable folks like you, Kartik, Karan M, maitya put together a proper refutation of the usual points? And let's request one of the online media units to review and publish (for instance, Atriji's article on Maratha politics was published by CRI). It will be a start - instead of us getting simply frustrated and berating him on a forum where he** or the larger unsuspecting audiences do not venture!).
PS: ** since if he did read the forum, his tone would be at least a little educated. Right now, it seems driven by an agenda.

Folks, please do consider taking the time out - this year is truly the make or break year for purchases. If there is a larger number of folks who are aware of these manipulative practices that we call lifafa, things will change.

Will contribute saar.

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 13 Jan 2014 11:52

nitinraj wrote: On the LCA front, its heartening to see the enthusiasm of the navy on the NLCA.
Considering its much lower price(compared to MIG29k) as well as the lower operating cost(compared to MIG29K due to its gas guzzling twin engines), no wonder the navy itself is putting significant amount of their own money into its development and the assembly plant.
I believe their plan might be to replace the MIG29K by LCA Mk2 in the future.

Nope LCA Mk2 is not the ideal fighter for aircraft carriers. IN has itself said so (IIRC they named the ideal plane as Rafale). The twin engine fighters have sufficient TWR when loaded with meaningful payloads to take off and land on an AC with adequate safety margins. IN actually wants AMCA. But it knows that the path to a naval AMCA goes through a naval Tejas Mk2. And they should be admired for that 25-year foresight.

Also Mig29K is a beautiful aircraft. The RD-33MK is quite a good engine. And for the price that India got it, it was quite a steal. I don't think anybody will get that price anymore.

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 13 Jan 2014 12:14

Cosmo_R wrote:This is only tangential to the LCA program but I am frankly tired of these Rajat Pandit el stupido misleading articles:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 720189.cms

"Desi defence showpieces powered by videshi parts"

Colossal ignorance/laziness. Every program he mentions is pre serial production. It does not make sense for the products to be 100% indigenous until they are adopted so you can build the backward linkages.

The Su 30 program indigenasation keeps falling behind because they keep adding emergency orders to compensate for the delay in the MMRCA.

JMT

its in the front page of their news paper as well and puts LCA phoriegn content at 55%

Ramu · Post by **Ramu** » 13 Jan 2014 14:25

How indigenous is his paycheck?

vic · Post by **vic** » 13 Jan 2014 16:45

Re Maitya, Can you share , provide some info about other turbofan, turboprop and turboshaft engines being proposed , developed by HAL?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 13 Jan 2014 17:01

titash wrote:
Karan M wrote:
quote=" Nick_S"Today we are getting a radar range of 45-50 km and we need to improve the same to 80-plus km with the new material,” the official said.

----
Thats shockingly terrible...

With a radar larger than mig-29's one, it should really be getting 110km range.
.....

Its helps to look into the details before getting all upset and posting off the cuff.

Indian standard RCS for calibration is 2 sq mtrs. The MiG-29 radar range is detailed for a standard RCS of 5 Sq Mtr.
With the quartz radome (which means less loss in radome itself) the 80+ km for 2 sq mtrs translates to 100+ km for the LCA against a target of 5 Sq Mtrs, which is a fairly decent range for such a small fighter with a low RCS itself and in line with what the radar is designed for.

+1 to Karan M's post. The devil is in the details.

The more relevant question for critiques is "what's the MiG-21 Bison's radar range against 2 sq. m. radar targets"? and "does the LCA exceed that MiG-21 Bison's performance"?

Missed this post earlier. The quoted range figures for Bison are 57 km against 5 sq mtr target. So 45 km against 2 sq mtrs, which is LCA performance without the new radome, and ~55% of that with the new radome.

member_20292 · Post by **member_20292** » 13 Jan 2014 23:25

indranilroy wrote: 1. 1 Rafale cannot be equal to 4-6 Tejas in combat, except in cases where the targets are outside Tejas's range. Unless the Rafale gets in tech mitigating the cost of developing the same in house, justifying its cost vis-a-vis Tejas is going to be very difficult.

2. The cost of upgrading those Mirage-2000 are starting to look really ridiculous now. There is only one justification, they had to be done to maintain squadron strength.

3. Tejas is always compared to Gripen. Question now is: Is 1 Gripen equal to 2-3 Tejas? Answer: Are you kidding?

The 126 mil / Rafale is only justified if it brings some capability to the IAF that the Tejas does not.

A little birdie and wiki tells me that the Rafale is and will be tasked to deliver nukes in the IAF. The Mirage 2ooo also has the same capability. it is to maintain and expand this segment of the nuclear triad that India is willing to shell out major moolah.

Other cababilities of Rafale that Tejas does not have
1. Sectra
2. MICA

and some more that I miss.

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 14 Jan 2014 00:10

Put as many Spectras and Micas as you want. It can't carry the same payload as 4-6 LCAs. Also ANY adversary will choose to fight 1 Rafale than 4-6 LCAs. Heck nobody wants to fight 4-6 JF-17s.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 14 Jan 2014 03:01

Why nobody wants to fight JF-17s?

srai · Post by **srai** » 14 Jan 2014 03:15

^^^

1 against 4-6 of those

MiG-21 Bisons were able to shoot down F-15s using swarm attacks during Cope India 2004/2005.

USAF VS. INDIAN AIR FORCE -- COPE INDIA 2005

...
If it turns out the US Air Force did, in fact, get their clocks cleaned, it will have been the second time. In Cope India 2004, an air combat exercise that took place near the Indian city of Gwalior, US F-15s were eliminated in multiple exercises against Indian late-model MiG-21 Fishbeds as fighter escorts and MiG-27 Floggers. In the 2005 exercises in Kalaikundi air base near Calcutta, Americans were most impressed by the MiG-21 Bisons and the Su-30 mkis.
...

For example, in Cope India 2004 the F-15 were using Sparrow semi-active radar guided missiles, which require the F-15s to illuminate a target rather than turn away immediately after launch and avoid visual range combat entirely. Using Sparrow, the F-15s have to close to visual range in order to guide the Sparrow all the way to target. More importantly they can only illuminate one target at a time while multiple fire and forget Slammers can be fired at several different targets.

The result of being limited to the Sparrow allowed a numerically superior Indian force in Cope India 2004 to tie up the F-15s in dogfighting Mig-21s after the initial Sparrow volley while the strike group of Mig-27's got to the target the F-15s were defending.
...

A Sharma · Post by **A Sharma** » 14 Jan 2014 06:32

Link

Interesting picture of Tejas loading into C-17. Any idea why?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 14 Jan 2014 06:39

A Sharma wrote:Link

Interesting picture of Tejas loading into C-17. Any idea why?

SidSom · Post by **SidSom** » 14 Jan 2014 07:03

Model for 26 Jan Ramp Walk?

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 14 Jan 2014 07:14

SidSom wrote:Model for 26 Jan Ramp Walk?

Its not a mock-up.

They could be flying it overseas for a defence expo or air show.

arun · Post by **arun** » 14 Jan 2014 08:28

X Posted from the “Indian Military Aviation” thread.

Picture taken by a different photographer vis a vis those posted above.

IAF C-17 Globemaster III unloads disassembled Light Combat Aircraft Tejas : Clicky

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 14 Jan 2014 08:59

arun wrote:IAF C-17 Globemaster III unloads disassembled Light Combat Aircraft Tejas : Clicky

How can you tell its unloading it?

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 14 Jan 2014 09:27

Brahma Chellaney with hits above and below the belt.Driving the harsh reality of the sales into focus.Replacing dependency upon Russia with dependency upon the US with no strategic benefit.Chellaney prescribes a moratorium on foreign purchases for a few years to get Indian industry having no alternative but to deliver.The LCA (not mentioned) is looking every day as becoming more crucial to the IAF and country as the country's pockets get emptied with social freebies and imports of "defensive weapons from the US".

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 575503.ece
Arming India into depedency

Brahma Chellaney
The government-to-government weapon contracts between the U.S. and India, with no competitive bidding or transparency, are deepening India’s import dependency without arming it with a decisive edge.
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 575503.ece

The blossoming of ties with the United States has become an important diplomatic asset for India in recent years. Yet, the heady glow of the much-ballyhooed strategic partnership helped obscure prickly issues that arose much before the Devyani Khobragade episode. In truth, the Obama administration’s reluctance to accommodate Indian interests on major issues, coupled with the fundamental challenge of managing an asymmetrical relationship, has created fault lines that are testing the resilience of the partnership.

One aspect of the relationship, however, has thrived spectacularly — U.S. arms sales to India. In just a few years, the U.S. has quietly emerged as India’s largest arms supplier, leaving Russia and Israel far behind. This development is linked to the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. Although it remains a dud deal on energy, with little prospect of delivering a single operational nuclear power plant for years to come, it has proved a roaring success in opening the door to major U.S. arms sales. The 2005 nuclear agreement-in-principle incorporated a specific commitment to ramp up defence transactions.

The booming arms sales — rising in barely one decade from a measly $100 million to billions of dollars yearly — have seemingly acquired an independent momentum. Nothing better illustrates this than the fact that, at the height of the Khobragade affair, India, far from seeking to impose any costs on America, awarded it yet another mega-contract — a $1.01-billion deal for supply of six additional C-130J military transport aircraft. When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House last September, among the gifts he took for President Barack Obama was a commitment to purchase $5 billion worth of new arms.

Today, India’s largely one-sided defence relationship with the U.S. is beginning to look akin to its lopsided ties with Russia, with weapon sales serving as the driving force. However, unlike the torpid Indo-Russian non-military commerce, the two-way Indo-U.S. trade has quadrupled in just seven years from $25 billion in 2006 to about $100 billion in 2013.

Still, few Indians are raising the key questions: How are India’s security interests being advanced by substituting the corrosive import dependency on Russia with a new dependency on the U.S., without progress to build a domestic arms-production base? What makes the strategic partnership “special,” given that Washington also has special relationships with India’s regional adversaries — a security alliance since 2004 and strategic partnership since 2006 with Pakistan, and a “constructive strategic partnership” with China since 1997 that predates the strategic partnership with India? Is a relationship locking India as a leading U.S. arms client sustainable in the long run?

Let’s be clear: India can never emerge as a major international power in a true sense, or acquire a military edge regionally, if it remains dependent on imports to meet even its basic defence needs. The capacity to defend oneself with one’s own resources is the first test a nation must pass on the way to becoming a great power.

Leading arms importer

Ominously, a still-poor India has emerged as the world’s biggest arms importer since 2006, accounting for 10 per cent of all weapons sold globally. Such large-scale imports might suggest that India is pursuing a well-planned military build-up. In truth, such imports lack strategic direction, given the absence of long-term political thinking or joint tri-service planning and command. They are being made in a haphazard manner, although any imported weapon makes India hostage to the supplier-nation for spares and service for the full life of that system.

The rising arms imports, far from making India secure, are only exposing new gaps in its capabilities to decisively win a war. The inveterate dependency burdens Indian taxpayers, forcing them to subsidise foreign military-industrial complexes. Worse still, defence transactions remain the single largest source of kickbacks for India’s corrupt and compromised political elites. This factor alone explains why India has failed to replicate in the conventional-arms sector its impressive indigenous achievements in the fields where imports are not possible — the space, missile and nuclear-weapons realms.

For the U.S., displacing Russia as India’s largest arms supplier has been a diplomatic coup. Rarely before has America acquired a major arms client of such size so rapidly. The U.S.’s India success indeed parallels what happened in the early 1970s when Egypt switched sides during the Cold War, transforming itself from a Soviet arms client to becoming reliant on American arms supplies. The difference is that unlike the perpetually aid-dependent Egypt, India buys weapons with its own money.

With U.S. military spending slowing and other export markets remaining tight, American firms are eager to further expand arms sales to India. The fact that the U.S. now conducts more military exercises with India than with any other country creates a favourable political milieu for its defence firms to aggressively push their wares for sale. Even so, the troubling lack of competitive bidding or transparency in the arms deals — all clinched on a government-to-government basis — has become conspicuous. In the one case where India invited bids — to buy 126 fighter-jets — American firms failed to make it beyond the competition’s first round.

Diplomacy without leverage

The annual value of India’s arms contracts to the U.S. already surpasses American military aid to any country other than Israel. Diplomacy, to be effective, must be backed by leverage and cross-linkages to minimise the weaker side’s disadvantages. Yet, New Delhi has not tried to leverage its contracts either to persuade the U.S. to stop arming Pakistan against India or to secure better access to the American market for its highly competitive information-technology and pharmaceutical companies, which are facing new U.S. non-tariff barriers. India’s new frontier of dependency has emerged even as the U.S. bolsters Pakistan with generous military aid.

To be sure, the U.S. signed a four-point declaration of intent with India last September to move beyond the sale of complete weapon systems to co-production through technology transfer. Translating that intent into practice won’t be easy, though. According to the joint declaration, efforts to identify specific opportunities for collaborative weapon-related projects will be pursued in accordance with “national policies and procedures.” But if U.S. policies and procedures do not evolve in the direction of facilitating such collaboration, the declared intent will remain little more than pious hope.

The declaration clearly sought to pander to India’s desire for a less inequitable defence relationship. By dangling the carrot of India being upgraded to the same level as America’s “closest partners,” the declaration also peddled a catchy slogan excitedly lapped up by the Indian media. The U.S. is now willing to co-produce some smaller defensive systems with India, such as the Javelin anti-tank missiles. Such restricted technology transfers, the U.S. believes, will pave the way for securing additional multibillion-dollar contracts to sell large readymade weapons to India.

Significantly, U.S. arms to India fall mainly in the category of defensive weapons. Russia, by contrast, has transferred offensive weapon systems to India, including strategic bombers, an aircraft carrier, and a nuclear-powered submarine. Will the U.S. be willing to sell high-precision conventional arms, anti-submarine warfare systems, long range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and other conventional counterforce systems that could tilt the regional military balance in India’s favour?

The China factor

Another issue relates to the strategic benefits from a closer defence relationship. True, such a relationship will have a countervailing value vis-à-vis China. Yet, it is also true that America has a deeper engagement with China than with India. Indeed, China is now central to U.S. economic and strategic interests. This fact helps to explain why the Obama administration has chartered a course of neutrality on territorial disputes between China and its neighbours, shying away from holding joint military exercises in Arunachal Pradesh.

A wake-up call for Asian states that rely on the U.S. as their security guarantor was Obama’s inaction on the 2012 Chinese capture of the Scarborough Shoal, located within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. America’s indifference to its commitment to the Philippines under their Mutual Defence Treaty emboldened China to effectively seize a second Philippine-claimed shoal. This is proof that despite its “pivot” toward Asia, the U.S. won’t act in ways detrimental to its close engagement with China. Obama’s foreign policy bears a distinct transactional imprint.

A wise India would consider declaring a moratorium on arms purchases from all sources to give itself time to strategise its priorities and clean up its procurement system. A moratorium of just three years will save the country a whopping $20 billion without compromising national security. With non-traditional threats — ranging from asymmetric warfare in the form of cross-border terrorism to territorial creep through furtive encroachments — now dominating India’s security calculus, procurement of more mega-weapons to meet traditional security challenges must wait until the nation has added strategic direction to its defence policy.

(The writer is a geostrategist and author.)

koti · Post by **koti** » 14 Jan 2014 09:28

indranilroy wrote:Put as many Spectras and Micas as you want. It can't carry the same payload as 4-6 LCAs. Also ANY adversary will choose to fight 1 Rafale than 4-6 LCAs. Heck nobody wants to fight 4-6 JF-17s.

I think I have a case against your argument Indranil saab.
Typical strike missions involve quick penetration in sizes of about 4-6 aircraft, take care of about 2-4 enemy CAP on the way, perform the objective, deal with 2-4 scrambled aircraft and return.
The Tejas, here will be at a disadvantage in terms of both payload and survivability when compared to Rafale.
Tejas, IMO will be able to match anything PAF can throw in the foreseeable future and most of the PLAAF birds bar the flankers. But this will decrease the achievable success rate for the said roles and IMO compromise the mission and present a clear advantage for Rafale which can outmatch the adversary aircraft in the said 2-4 numbers.
But more importantly, putting less pilots in the air to achieve the same objective is a big advantage for IAF that can justify a higher price.

member_20317 · Post by **member_20317** » 14 Jan 2014 09:53

SaiK wrote:Why nobody wants to fight JF-17s?

Because pig is a dirty animal.

..............

But seriously speaking, if the radome problem is taken care of and the radar gets to be used full force then more LCAs do make sense from a layman's perspective. Attacks from multiple quarters seems difficult to defend against, which is what more LCAs allow. LCAs in any case lack the legs to go deep penetration missions and can be expected to be defending within Indian airspace most times. If this presumption holds then such a multi quadrant engagement seems promising. Imagine throwing in other radars and the defence would be good to go.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 14 Jan 2014 10:06

please don't discount mk-2 range that also comes with deep penetration specific refuelers.

i am pretty positive about a squadron of LCA either with couple of sukhois and refuler or an AWACS system with refueler can pretty much clean up a deep strike op.
again think mk-2 specs, and considerable improvements on the radar and weapons store as well.

why MKI /Awacs - net-centricity.. cue from MKI, while LCA radars can go quite or stealth mode.. then at 300kms it can cue the 100km targets that can be fired from LCAs, with absolutely no signature leak out.

i'm damn positive that thundaars can't detect LCAs from 100km range or even 50km range.

member_20292 · Post by **member_20292** » 14 Jan 2014 12:12

thats all well and good.

but who will drop the nukes?

rafale has the stealth modes + nuke delivery capability - today.

vic · Post by **vic** » 14 Jan 2014 12:35

4-6 LCA can so similar deep penetration as one Rafale as they can carry lighter payloads and do buddy refueling. Read about 1100km Iraq Nuclear Reactor raid by Israel using early F-16s. LCA has better fuel fraction compared to those F-16s and should be able to do 1500km deep strike with fuel tanks and buddy refueling. In future with CFT, Supersonic fuel tanks, buddy buddy refueling and even MRTA refueling tanker, the range will cease to an issue and we can extend their strike range easily to 3000km. The issue is whether we want to waste USD 20 Billion on Rafale or use it for LCA.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 14 Jan 2014 13:09

Sagar G wrote:I like the idea of putting a EJ2000 inside Tejas and testing it out, GE414 was chosen because being L1 and not because of the rest of the marketing crap they doled out claiming least structural changes ityadi ityadi. IIRC ADA had done study on both the engines and the necessary changes required in Tejas and was ready for anyone winning the bid. I was sincerely hoping that America won't get it but at the end of the day GoI had to show where it's loyalty lies.

How come a new/late model engine like ej200 have less thrust than old model engine like ge414 or ge414epe?

Or does ej200 still performs better than 414 inspite of less thrust?

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 14 Jan 2014 13:19

Re Rajat Pandit's article

I think the most important thing is what is the criticality of the non indigenous components. Can supply be choked off? Take Tejas, its design, FBW, composite airframe, good part of the radar, cockpit are ours. Codes are ours. We can modify it, program it and use as we deem fit. We can swap one supplier to another as we deem fit. As long as there are multiple sources of of supply for non indigenous components its fine. In fact its efficient not to make everything yourself. Ge engine for MK2 was a mistake in my view but there is a solution there too. Buy 150 instead of 100 and learn how to change them ourselves. 60% indeginsation is not bad at all. I do agree with him on TOT though. Never really worked for us. We can develop our technology like we have done with Tejas, Pinaka. I'm not that enamoured of cutting edge tech. I think training, morale , robustness, tactics and strategy can trump tech if the gap is not massive.

Re Brahma Chellany's article

Agree except that we should have a 3 year moratarium. I think we should make a list of absolutely critical purchases for major systems and buy them and then have a moratorium. I'd say arty, subs, some fighters, naval helicopters and light helicopters are critical. I don't really see the urgent need of apaches, chinooks and Super Hercules.

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 14 Jan 2014 13:38

Karan M wrote:Maitya, you need to collect all your posts into a Kaveri- BRF Project analysis sort of thing. They are too valuable to be lost in the noise.

KaranM Thanks ...

"valuable" etc not too sure and is for others to judge - but I agree, related posts needs consolidation in one place for future reference and look-up etc.
But, time is a serious constraint - though minimum that I should do is to cross-post some of these posts to the Kaveri thread and have most (if not all) related posts in a single thread.

... before of course, they are lost permanently via next BRF server upgrades (plus post counts getting reset to 0).

Sorry, couldn't resist ...

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 14 Jan 2014 13:46

merlin wrote:maitya, are you sure about the LPT disk from the US? My understanding is that hot section parts for the Kaveri come from Snecma.

merlinji, IIRC the Kaveri/Kabini LPT discs were made from a cast-wrought nickel base superalloy UDIMET-720Li forging billets and bars imported from Special Metals Corp, USA (and before anybody gets "concerned" about sanctions and imports etc, note they have a subsidiary in B'Lore - including subsidiaries in Fr, Gr, UK, HKG, China, S'Pore etc etc.).

Related Factoid 1: Actually the earlier versions of the Kaveri engine used the indigenous INCO-718 based LPT disks ... but was found during testing that a thermal gradient of approx 300deg C resulted in doubling the thermal stress and 40-45% reduction in LCF life.
GTRE/DMRL could partially resolve the LCF cycle reduction, IIRC limiting to around 30% reduction or thereabouts but the increased thermal stress issue remained. So they chose to import the UDIMET-720Li based billet and bars and forged the LPT discs in MIDHANI using powder metallurgy based Hot Isothermal Processing.

Related Factoid 2: Alloy 720Li (Li -> ‘low interstitial’) was evolved from that of alloy 720, originally developed for blade application in land-based gas turbines. However, to achieve the strength (because of the high speed of rotation and associated centrifugal stresses experienced by discs, disc alloys should possess good elevated temperature tensile strength) and LCF resistance desired for disc application, the processing and heat treatment of alloy 720Li is different from that adopted for alloy 720 for creep-resistant blade application.
You can get a glimpse of differences in physical/strength requirements betw the blades and disks in this poser-post of mine, posted quite-a-few months back.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 14 Jan 2014 13:56

nitinraj wrote:
vic wrote:I have been pointing out for a super long time on BRF that Mirage 2000 upgrade charges are extremely suspicious. My guess of reasonable charges are around USD 5 Million per plane, rest is for piggy bank in Switzerland. Note that honest MoD has no problem with 280 crores per Plane for Mirage 2000 upgrade but are still bargaining LCA costs. MoD has still not placed formal orders for second batch of LCA mark-1.
Moreover this 280 crore figure is for an aircraft which is almost 30 years old .
This is absolutely ridiculous.It may server a maximum 10 years more.

With the price of one upgrade we could have bought almost 2 LCA which would have been brand new and have a life of 30+ years.Wonder who has done the cost benefit analysis of this upgrade.

That too this upgrade will be over 9 years of time. Long enough to have replaced them with Tejas.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 14 Jan 2014 14:52

indranilroy wrote:
abhik wrote: So 1 Rafale = 4 to 6 LCAs? Someone needs to do a cost to benefit study.
1. 1 Rafale cannot be equal to 4-6 Tejas in combat, except in cases where the targets are outside Tejas's range. Unless the Rafale gets in tech mitigating the cost of developing the same in house, justifying its cost vis-a-vis Tejas is going to be very difficult.

I didn't mean to say that 1 Rafale is equivalent to 4 to 6 LCAs, its obviously not. Just pointing out the scale of the rip off. If the deal does infact go through then a few years down the line we will be whining why there is no money for amphibious ships for the navy, armaments for the the Mountain Strike Corps etc.