FMS deal has one component that is just the cost of the missile and the rest that is dependent upon the customer and what the customer desires. You cannot take 2 different FMS deals and compare the overall cost. A harpoon user requests just new missiles with zero integration or support for integration, while a new user has to get a lot lot more as a part of the FMS. Just read the various FMS deals and compare new users to existing users. The FMS deal once given a green light sends the desired hardware demand to the US agency tasked with procuring the same item for the US forces. The Agency then adds the weapon to the demand it sends to the OEM's at the cost it has negotiated for the same. The US government pays the OEM the exact same amount regardless of the intended customer for the missile, the other aspect is variable dependent upon what the FMS deal actually involves. Similarly training costs, size, scope and the amount of logistical supply may be different for different deals and that portion of the deal is subjective and not included in the generic press release and congressional notification (only what is provided is mentioned, not the scope of it). US OEM's that wish to undercut on a program for competitive reasons look to enter into Commercial deals and avoid the FMS route for in it the price negotiations are left to the US government based on its own procurement. The classic example here is Boeing. They were building the F-15K's for South korea and offered South Korea the F-15SE which was a standard F-15K upgraded in a spiral approach. They wished to win at all costs to keep the F-15 program afloat for the future. They chose to keep their bid out of the public (US Government) scruitiny by offering the airframes and the fighters as COMMERCIAL deals and keeping the weapon package as FMS. This was pretty stander practice many decades ago where vendors would undercharge upfront for the weapons system hoping to make huge profits by jacking up the support costs post winning the contract.
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%208-1/Comparison.pdf
The Government of India has requested a possible sale of 12 UGM-84L Harpoon Block II Encapsulated Missiles, 10 UTM-84L Harpoon Encapsulated Training missiles, 2 Encapsulated Harpoon certification training vehicles, containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $200 million.
The Government of Brazil has requested a possible sale of 16 AGM-84L Harpoon Block II Missiles, 4 CATM-84L Harpoon Block II Captive Air Training Missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor representatives’ technical assistance, engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $169 million.
The Government of Korea has requested a possible sale of 18 UGM-84L HARPOON Block II All-Up-Round Missiles, 1 UGM-84L HARPOON telemetry exercise section, containers, Guidance Control Units (GCU) spares, recertification and reconfiguration support, spare and repair parts, tools and tool sets, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $84 million
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