West Asia News and Discussions (YEMEN, gulf)

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habal
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby habal » 11 Sep 2014 09:22

long ago I had said this "one God" is most likely the fallen/discredited angel.

Abrahamic meme needs to be read differently.

member_20317
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby member_20317 » 11 Sep 2014 11:23

Jhujar wrote:http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/09/10/i-am-a-14-year-old-yazidi-girl-given-as-a-gift-to-an-isis-commander-heres-how-i-escaped/
I am a 14-year-old Yazidi girl given as a gift to an ISIS commander. Here’s how I escaped.

One day, our guards separated the married from unmarried women. My good childhood friend Shayma and I were given as a gift to two Islamic State members from the south, near Baghdad. They wanted to make us their wives or concubines. Shayma was awarded to Abu Hussein, who was a cleric. I was given to an overweight, dark-bearded man about 50 years old who seemed to have some high rank. He went by the nickname Abu Ahmed. They drove us down to their home in Fallujah. On the road, we saw many Islamic State fighters and remnants of their battles.



Seems like there is a sliver of hope. There just may be a small number of sensible people among these 'sensibilities only' peoples.


कुछ भरसक प्रयत्न की ज़रूरत है| इन हल्के कदमों से कुछ प्राप्त नहीं होगा|

Austin
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Austin » 11 Sep 2014 19:22

Iran Doubts Emerging Coalition Members Ready to Fight IS Militants

MOSCOW, September 11 (RIA Novosti) - Tehran expressed doubts that the members of an emerging international coalition truly intend to fight radical Islamists in Syria and Iraq, Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported Thursday, citing Iranian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham.

“There are serious ambiguities in the real intention of an emerging so-called international coalition against the terrorist group of Daesh (also known as ISIS),” Afkham was quoted as saying by the agency.

She added that certain coalition members provided financial and technical support to the terrorists in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, other members proved unable to carry the responsibility put on them by the international community when it came to Iraq and Syria.

The comments by Afkham come as US Secretary of State John Kerry is visiting the Middle Eastern in an attempt to encourage the creation and maintenance of an international coalition to fight terrorism, particularly, the Islamic State. On Wednesday, Kerry visited Baghdad where he met with the new Iraqi authorities and spoke of the reforms needed for the Iraqi Army's success in fighting IS militants.

Unveiling his strategy to defeat Islamic State militants late on Wednesday, US President Barack Obama announced that the United States would lead a coalition aiming to roll back the terrorist threat and destroy the jihadist group altogether.

The IS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is a radical Sunni group, which has been fighting the Syrian government since 2012. In June, it started launching attacks in the northern and western regions of Iraq, announcing the establishment of a caliphate on all the territories under its control.

Philip
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Philip » 12 Sep 2014 07:40

Amazing US duplicity under O'Bomber! The US now can bomb the sh*t out of Syria,ISIS,Assad,whoever,but the Russians cannot send in humanitarian convoys into the UKR where their own ethnic people are being massacred by pro-US/Euro fascists of the illegal Kiev junta!

Without coordinating strike with the Syrian govt.a legitimate govt.,recognised by the international community,the strikes would be an act of war against the Syrian people.But trigger-happy Marshal O'Bomber and his Yanqui deputies care little for the international rule of law.Even pet poodle,the Brits have shied off on bombing Syria!

Is this really a conspiracy as some suggest that ISIS was "engineered" by the US and its oily allies to actually take over Iraq and conduct regime change in Syria surreptitiously? The statements from the anti-Syrian faction about regime change indicate that it may indeed be so.


http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/s ... trike-plan
Assad, Moscow and Tehran condemn Obama's plan for air strikes against Isis
Claims that strikes would violate sovereignty, as Syrian rebels welcome move and other Arab states offer 'appropriate' support

Ian Black, Middle East editor, and Dan Roberts in Washington
theguardian.com, Thursday 11 September 2014

John Kerry attnded a meeting of Arab states to seek support for Obama's plan for air strikes against Isis. Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

The Syrian government and its close allies in Moscow and Tehran warned Barack Obama that an offensive against Islamic State (Isis) within Syria would violate international law yesterday, hours after the US president announced that he was authorising an open-ended campaign of air strikes against militants on both sides of the border with Iraq.


Syrian opposition groups welcomed Obama's announcement and called for heavy weapons to fight the "terror" of Isis and Bashar al-Assad. Saudi Arabia and nine other Arab states pledged to back the US plan "as appropriate".

Hadi al-Bahra, head of the western-backed Syrian National Coalition, said the group "stands ready and willing to partner with the international community not only to defeat Isis but also rid the Syrian people of the tyranny of the Assad regime". In Reyhanli, on the Turkish-Syrian border, a spokesman for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) said that moderate anti-Assad forces urgently needed anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

But long-standing international divisions over Syria were starkly highlighed in the hours after the speech. Iran's foreign ministry said that "the so-called international coalition to fight the Isil [Islamic State] group ... is shrouded in serious ambiguities and there are severe misgivings about its determination to sincerely fight the root causes of terrorism."

Russia said it would not support any military action without a UN resolution authorising it. "The US president has spoken directly about the possibility of strikes by the US armed forces against Isil positions in Syria without the consent of the legitimate government," said a spokesman. "This step, in the absence of a UN security council decision, would be an act of aggression, a gross violation of international law." China said that the world should fight terror but that national sovereignty must be respected.

In Damascus, the Assad government warned against US raids. "Any action of any kind without the consent of the Syrian government would be an attack on Syria," said the national reconciliation minister, Ali Haidar. Analysts believe, however, that Assad would be likely to ignore strikes on Isis targets – and even seek to quietly cooperate with western efforts.

In a meeting with Staffan de Mistura, the new UN envoy for Syria, Assad stressed his commitment to fight "terrorism" but he made no mention of the US president's speech on Wednesday night.

"As long as air strikes only hit Isis they will be condemned as a violation of international law but won't be dealt with as aggression that requires retaliation," Jihad Makdissi, a former Syrian diplomat, told the Guardian.

Obama used a long-heralded address on the eve of the 13th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks to lay out his response to the appearance of an aggressive jihadi insurgency in the heart of the Arab world. US polls show growing support for military action since Isis fighters captured large areas of northern Iraq and eastern Syria and beheaded two American citizens in the past month.

He compared the campaign to those waged against al-Qaida in Yemen and Somalia, where US drones, cruise missiles and special operations raids have battered local affiliates without, however, notably improving the stability of either country or dealing decisive blows.

Obama's new strategy won swift if vague support from America's Arab allies, with Saudi Arabia agreeing to train Syrian rebel fighters. (!) John Kerry, the US secretary state, held talks in the port city of Jeddah with ministers from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and six Gulf states. After the meeting, participants said they had agreed "as appropriate" to "many aspects" of the military campaign against Isis, to stop the flow of funds and fighters and help rebuild communities "brutalised" by the group. Support was also expressed for the new, more inclusive Baghdad government – seen as vital to persuade Iraq's disaffected Sunnis not to support Isis. MPs in Jordan, warned, however, that they would not tolerate any participation in US action.

"We welcome this new strategy," said Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurdish politician and one of Iraq's newly appointed deputy prime ministers. "There is an urgent need for action. People cannot sit on the fence. This is a mortal threat to everybody."

There was confusion over Britain's role after Philip Hammond, the foreign secretary, said the UK would not take part in air strikes. But Downing Street quickly announced that UK participation had not been ruled out. Germany said it would not participate. Both countries have sent weapons and ammuniction to the Iraqi Kurds – part of the overall anti-Isis strategy.

The Pentagon is currently working on identifying suitable targets in Syria, according to White House officials. The US will also deploy a further 475 troops to Iraq, where they are expected to help identify targets.

US officials said that Kerry would be seeking to pressure Kuwait and Qatar to stop their citizens financing al-Qaida and Isis. The Saudis, stung by accusations of support for the jihadis, have already worked to crack down on funding and announced the arrest of scores of alleged terrorist sympathisers in recent weeks.

Obama said the air strikes were a necessary counter-terrorism measure to prevent the group from becoming a future threat to the US and therefore did not require fresh congressional approval. But he is expected to receive overwhelming congressional support for separate authorisation to provide military support to rival Syrian rebels like the FSA, a vote that some Republicans fear could help boost Democratic chances in this November's midterm elections by providing political support for his tough new foreign policy.

anmol
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby anmol » 12 Sep 2014 09:14


anmol
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby anmol » 12 Sep 2014 10:51

Former CIA intelligence analyst: lets build another syrian opposition army to fix the mess created by last one.

An Army to Defeat Assad

By Kenneth M. Pollack, foreignaffairs.com
FROM OUR SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2014 ISSUE


Syria is a hard one. The arguments against the United States’ taking a more active role in ending the vicious three-year-old conflict there are almost perfectly balanced by those in favor of intervening, especially in the aftermath of the painful experiences of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The cons begin with the simple fact that the United States has no interests in Syria itself. Syria is not an oil producer, a major U.S. trade partner, or even a democracy.

Worse still, intercommunal civil wars such as Syria’s tend to end in one of two ways: with a victory by one side, followed by a horrific slaughter of its adversaries, or with a massive intervention by a third party to halt the fighting and forge a power-sharing deal. Rarely do such wars reach a resolution on their own through a peaceful, negotiated settlement, and even when they do, it is typically only after many years of bloodshed. All of this suggests that the kind of quick, clean diplomatic solution many Americans favor will be next to impossible to achieve in Syria.

Nevertheless, the rationale for more decisive U.S. intervention is gaining ground. As of this writing, the crisis in Syria had claimed more than 170,000 lives and spilled over into every neighboring state. The havoc is embodied most dramatically in the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, a Sunni jihadist organization born of the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq. After regrouping in Syria, ISIS (which declared itself the Islamic State in late June) recently overran much of northern Iraq and helped rekindle that country’s civil war. ISIS is now using the areas it controls in Iraq and Syria to breed still more Islamist extremists, some of whom have set their sights on Western targets. Meanwhile, Syria’s conflict is also threatening to drag down its other neighbors -- particularly Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, where the influx of nearly three million refugees is already straining government budgets and stoking social unrest.

After resisting doing so for three years, the White House is now scrambling to expand its role in the turmoil. In June, U.S. President Barack Obama requested $500 million from Congress to ramp up U.S. assistance to moderate members of the Syrian opposition (such assistance has until recently been limited to a covert training program in Jordan). Yet at every stage of the debate on Syria, the administration has maintained that the only way to decisively ensure the demise of the Assad regime is to deploy large numbers of ground troops.

But there is, in fact, a way that the United States could get what it wants in Syria -- and, ultimately, in Iraq as well -- without sending in U.S. forces: by building a new Syrian opposition army capable of defeating both President Bashar al-Assad and the more militant Islamists.
The United States has pulled off similar operations before and could probably do so again, and at far lower cost than what it has spent in Afghanistan and Iraq. Considering the extent to which the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars have become entwined, such a strategy would help secure U.S. interests throughout the Middle East. Indeed, despite its drawbacks, it has become the best option for the United States and the people of Syria and the region.

PICK YOUR BATTLES

Given the powerful arguments against a greater U.S. role in Syria, any proposal to step up U.S. involvement has to meet four criteria. First, the strategy cannot require sending U.S. troops into combat. Funds, advisers, and even air power are all fair game -- but only insofar as they do not lead to American boots on the ground. Second, any proposal must provide for the defeat of both the Assad regime and the most radical Islamist militants, since both threaten U.S. interests.

Third, the policy should offer reasonable hope of a stable end state. Because spillover from Syria’s civil war represents the foremost security concern, defeating the regime while allowing the civil war to continue -- or even crushing both the regime and the extremists while allowing other groups to fight on -- would amount to a strategic failure. There are no certainties in warfare, but any plan for greater U.S. involvement must at least increase the odds of stabilizing Syria.

Finally, the plan should have a reasonable chance of accomplishing what it sets out to do. Washington must avoid far-fetched schemes with uncertain chances of success, no matter how well they might fit its objectives in other ways. It should also properly fund the strategy it does select. Announcing a new, more ambitious Syria policy but failing to give it an adequate budget would be self-defeating, convincing friend and foe alike that the United States lacks the will to defend its interests.

Every proposal so far for greater U.S. involvement in Syria has failed to satisfy at least one of these criteria. The Obama administration’s new bid to expand training and equipment aid for the moderate opposition is no exception. Over time, supplying advanced antiaircraft and antitank weapons to the rebels, as Washington intends, would make victories costlier for the Assad government. But even large quantities of such arms are unlikely to break the stalemate. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, for example, mujahideen fighters armed with U.S.-supplied Stinger antiaircraft and Milan antitank missiles inflicted heavy losses on Soviet tanks and helicopters but failed to score tactical battlefield gains. Moreover, unlike the Soviet Union, which was fighting a war of choice in Afghanistan (and could simply walk away), the Assad regime is waging a war for survival. Heavier equipment losses are unlikely to force it to capitulate, especially if it continues to win individual battles.

More problematic, the current strategy does not ensure a stable end state. Providing weapons and limited training to the rebels will simply improve their ability to kill. It will not unite them, create a viable power-sharing arrangement among fractious ethnic and sectarian communities, or build strong government institutions. These same shortfalls led to Afghanistan’s unraveling once Soviet forces withdrew; the victorious mujahideen soon started fighting one another, which eventually allowed them all to be crushed by the Taliban.

ARMY STRONG

Studying past cases of American military support suggests an alternative course: the United States could create a new Syrian military with a conventional structure and doctrine, one capable of defeating both the regime and the extremists. A decisive victory by this U.S.-backed army would force all parties to the negotiating table and give the United States the leverage to broker a power-sharing arrangement among the competing factions. This outcome would create the most favorable conditions for the emergence of a new Syrian state: one that is peaceful, pluralistic, inclusive, and capable of governing the entire country.

To get there, the United States would have to commit itself to building a new Syrian army that could end the war and help establish stability when the fighting was over. The effort should carry the resources and credibility of the United States behind it and must not have the tentative and halfhearted support that has defined every prior U.S. initiative in Syria since 2011. If the rest of the world believes that Washington is determined to see its strategy through, more countries will support its efforts and fewer will oppose them. Success would therefore require more funding -- to train and equip the new army’s soldiers -- and greater manpower, since much larger teams of U.S. advisers would be needed to prepare the new force and guide it in combat operations.

Recruiting Syrian army personnel would be the first task. These men and women could come from any part of the country or its diaspora, as long as they were Syrian and willing to fight in the new army. They would need to integrate themselves into a conventional military structure and adopt its doctrine and rules of conduct. They would also have to be willing to leave their existing militias and become reassigned to new units without regard for religion, ethnicity, or geographic origin. Loyalty to the new army and to the vision of a democratic postwar Syria for which it would stand must supersede all other competing identities.

The strategy’s most critical aspect would be its emphasis on long-term conventional training. The program would represent a major departure from the assistance Washington is currently providing the opposition, which involves a few weeks of coaching in weapons handling and small-unit tactics. The new regimen, by contrast, should last at least a year, beginning with such basic training and then progressing to logistics, medical support, and specialized military skills. Along the way, U.S. advisers would organize the soldiers into a standard army hierarchy. Individuals chosen for command positions would receive additional instruction in leadership, advanced tactics, combined-arms operations, and communications.

Because the existing Syrian opposition is hobbled by extremism and a lack of professionalism, vetting all new personnel would be crucial. History shows that the only effective way to do this is for the U.S. advisers to work with the recruits on a daily basis. That would allow the advisers to gradually weed out the inevitable bad seeds -- radicals, regime agents, thugs, and felons -- and promote the good ones.

Since training the first cadre of fighters (a task that the CIA would likely handle) would require security and freedom from distraction, it would be best to start it outside Syria. Possible training sites could include Jordan, where the United States is already providing some aid to the rebels, and Turkey. Both countries have strongly lobbied Washington to widen its support for the Syrian opposition. Yet both would probably demand compensation for hosting big new base camps. Jordan already receives about $660 million in U.S. aid per year, and in February 2014, the White House pledged an additional $1 billion in loan guarantees to help the country with its refugee burden. Washington could offer to continue such aid in return for cooperation with its new strategy.

In addition to being trained and organized like a conventional military, the new force must be equipped like one. Washington would need to provide the new army with heavy weapons, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and surface-to-air missiles -- vital tools for eliminating the regime’s current advantage in firepower. The new army would also need logistical support, communications equipment, transport, and medical gear to mount sustained offensive and defensive operations against the regime.

THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS

This new Syrian army would eventually move into Syria, but only once it was strong enough to conquer and hold territory. For that, it would need to reach a critical threshold of both quantity and quality. It would be unwise to send the new army into the maelstrom of Syria until it could field at least two or three brigades, each composed of 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers. Yet more important, these formations should go into battle only once they have developed the unit cohesion, tactical skills, leadership, and logistical capabilities necessary to beat the regime’s forces and any rival militias. And when it does cross into Syria, the army should do so accompanied by a heavy complement of U.S. advisers.

Even after the force made its first significant territorial gains, it would have to keep growing. Its ultimate task -- securing control of the entire country by crushing all actors that challenge it -- would require several hundred thousand soldiers to complete. But the launch of military operations would not have to wait until the army could field that many fighters. Quite the contrary: it could still recruit and train most of its soldiers after its first brigades made their initial advance.

Once the soldiers began to secure Syrian territory, their leaders would need to quickly restore law and order there. That would mean allowing international humanitarian organizations to return to areas that are currently off-limits and protecting their staff while they deliver aid. It would also require the establishment of a functional, egalitarian system of governance. The vast majority of Syrians want nothing to do with either Assad’s tyranny or the fanaticism of his Islamist opponents. As in every intercommunal civil war, the population is likely to rally behind any group that can reinstate order. The new army should thus be ready from the outset to meet people’s needs in every city and village it wins back, which would also distinguish it from its rivals.

Once the new army gained ground, the opposition’s leaders could formally declare themselves to represent a new provisional government. The United States and its allies could then extend diplomatic recognition to the movement, allowing the U.S. Department of Defense to take over the tasks of training and advising the new force -- which would now be the official military arm of Syria’s legitimate new rulers.

The United States can end the Syrian civil war on its own terms—and without committing ground troops.
Lessons from other countries demonstrate that postwar governments are most durable when they grow from the bottom up. When they are imposed from the top down, as was the case in Iraq in 2003, the outcomes can range from bad to catastrophic. But allowing the new government to take shape organically in Syria would take years. In the meantime, areas controlled by the U.S.-backed army would require a provisional authority -- ideally, a special representative of the UN secretary-general who would retain sovereignty until a new government was ready.

If history is any guide, as the new force started to beat back both the regime and the Islamist extremists, fairly administer its territory, and prove to the world that the United States and its allies were determined to see it succeed, growing numbers of Syrians should flock to its cause. This surge of public support would generate more volunteers for the army and a groundswell of momentum for the opposition movement, factors that have often proved decisive in similar conflicts.

One of the most baleful legacies of protracted civil wars is the difficulty of creating stable political systems once the fighting ends. A stable peace in the wake of intercommunal strife requires a pluralistic system with strong guarantees of minority rights. Such a system, in turn, rests on an army that is strong, independent, and apolitical. Postwar Syria would need this kind of military culture to reassure all its communities that whoever holds power in Damascus would not once more turn the security forces into agents of oppression. The best way to ensure that the army upheld these principles would be to ingrain them in its institutional culture from the very start, through the long-term process of military socialization.

Iraq offers both a powerful example and a critical warning in this regard. On the one hand, by 2009 the United States had succeeded there in building a military that, although only modestly capable, was quite independent and apolitical. Just three years earlier, the country’s security forces had been a discredited and inept institution and a source of fear for most Iraqis. Similar to the Syrian opposition today, the Iraqi army had been overrun by criminals, extremists, militiamen, and incompetent, poorly equipped fighters. Yet a determined U.S. program transformed the force, making it a welcomed, even sought after, enforcer of stability across the country. In 2008, for example, mostly Sunni army brigades were hailed as liberators by the Shiites of Basra when they drove out the Shiite militia Jaish al-Mahdi. A key factor in this transformation was rigorous training of the kind here proposed for Syria, which allowed U.S. advisers to vet local personnel.

On the other hand, a strong independent army often draws the suspicion of ruthless local politicians who try to subvert or politicize it. That is precisely how Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki turned the Iraqi military back into a sectarian militia after Washington disengaged. The resulting decline in skill and morale explains why four Iraqi army divisions collapsed in the face of the ISIS offensive in June, and why many Sunnis threw in their lots with ISIS against Maliki. The lesson for Syria is that it’s not enough to merely bring a new army into existence and help it win the war. If the United States wants to see the country develop into a stable new polity, it will have to keep supporting and shepherding the new Syrian military for some years thereafter, albeit at declining levels of cost and manpower.

WINNING THE PEACE

The biggest question about this ambitious proposal, of course, is, can it work? Although wars are always unpredictable, there is more than enough historical evidence to suggest that this approach is entirely plausible -- and in fact better than any other option for intervention.

For example, even though the United States eventually gave up on Vietnam, it did enjoy considerable success rebuilding the South Vietnamese army from 1968 to 1972, after U.S. neglect and Vietnamese mismanagement had left it politicized, corrupt, and inept. Although that force continued to face many problems, it improved so much that it managed to halt the North’s invasion during the Easter Offensive of 1972. South Vietnamese fighters did enjoy the backing of extensive U.S. air power and legions of U.S. advisers, but four years earlier, few had believed them capable of such a feat even with that kind of support.

Then there is the dramatic transformation of the Croatian army that NATO achieved during the 1992–95 Bosnian war, a conflict precipitated by ethnic and territorial tensions triggered by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The fledgling Croatian force, which was supporting the Bosnian Croats against Serbian forces, had started out hapless and incompetent in the opening months of the war. In three years, the West’s provision of training and supplies, coupled with the determination of the Croatian fighters, was enough to remake the army into an efficient fighting machine able to mount a series of combined-arms campaigns that forced Serbia to the negotiating table. (This example is particularly apt for Syria because Serbia’s forces were far more formidable than Assad’s.) Iraq’s history, meanwhile, illustrates both the ability of the United States to build a relatively capable indigenous force in just a few years largely from scratch and the perils of abandoning it to an immature political system.

In each of these cases, the factor that mattered most was commitment on the part of Washington. Where and when the United States has proved willing to make its strategy work -- in Vietnam, Bosnia, even Iraq -- it has succeeded. But where it abandoned its commitments, its progress rapidly came undone.

U.S. experience in Bosnia and Iraq also points to an effective tactic for preventing a bloodbath after the new Syrian army wins. In both those countries, the United States built up a force that was clearly capable of defeating its rivals, but then Washington was able to prevent it from taking that final step. The U.S.-backed groups fought well enough to convince their enemies of the necessity to compromise on a power-sharing arrangement. At the same time, U.S. pressure ensured that the winners accepted something less than total victory.

Past performance is no guarantee of future success, of course, and each historical analogy differs from Syria in important ways. The South Vietnamese army’s improved performance failed to forestall its collapse once it lost U.S. air cover. Croatia in the early 1990s was a proto-state fighting another proto-state, Serbia. And the Iraqi security force benefited from a massive U.S. ground presence that went well beyond what the proposed plan envisions for Syria.

The prospect that a new Syrian army could be created from scratch and lack the power of a state behind it should give policymakers pause, but these problems should not be deal breakers. The Northern Alliance (the group that helped topple the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001) and the Libyan opposition each managed to prevail with no Western support beyond advisers and air power; they certainly never enjoyed the backing of a proto-state such as Croatia. Of course, Assad’s troops are also more capable today than were either the Taliban’s forces in Afghanistan or Muammar al-Qaddafi’s army in Libya. But strong as the Syrian military may seem in a relative sense, it is hardly a juggernaut, having performed miserably in every war since 1948 and having fought only marginally better than the very lackluster opposition since 2012.

How long would it take to implement this plan? The history of similar operations in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya indicates that the United States would need one to two years to prepare the first few brigades. After their initial foray into Syria, the growing army would likely need another one to three years to defeat the regime’s forces and other rivals. That suggests a two- to five-year campaign.

Once it attained a peace deal, the new army would have to reorganize itself into a traditional state security apparatus. It might have to further expand its ranks in order to meet Syria’s long-term security needs, including the defeat of residual terrorist elements. This stabilizing role would take years longer but would be far less demanding than fighting the Assad regime, especially if the United States kept up its support for Syria’s new institutions and its economic and political reconstruction.

Critics will inevitably argue that this road map for Syria is infeasible today, coming too late to make a difference. Yet analogous arguments have proved wrong in the past. In March 2005, for example, I gave a briefing on Iraq to a small group of senior U.S. officials, presenting the strategy I had been advocating since early 2004: a shift to true counterinsurgency operations, an effort to reach out to the Sunni tribal leaders of western Iraq, the addition of thousands of U.S. forces, and a bottom-up process of political reform to encourage power sharing. My audience responded that although this plan might have worked in 2003 or even 2004, by 2005 Iraq was simply too far gone. Yet what I was prescribing was the very strategy that General David Petraeus and Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, would employ two years later -- and that would turn the tide of the conflict.

Likewise, there is no reason to believe that it’s too late for Syria. The civil war there will not end anytime soon, despite the fact that expanded Iranian and Russian assistance have allowed Assad loyalists to make significant gains. The most probable scenario is that the regime’s advances will prove limited and the resources flowing to the rebels from their foreign backers will cause a stalemate. Syria will burn on, while U.S. officials continue telling themselves that the time for action has passed.

Even if Washington adopted this course of action, many more Syrian lives would be lost before it could succeed. The only way to save those lives, however, would be to deploy U.S. ground forces -- a proposal that, given the American public’s sentiment, is a nonstarter. Barring boots on the ground, the approach described here is the best chance to avoid hundreds of thousands of additional casualties.

SUPPORT FROM THE SKIES

Another key question is whether the plan would require U.S. air power, since an air campaign would make this strategy far more expensive in both financial and diplomatic terms. At least one case, the Bosnian war, suggests that U.S. air support may prove unnecessary. During that conflict, it was a Croatian (and Bosnian) ground assault, undertaken with barely any Western air cover, that made the difference. Although NATO flew 3,515 sorties during the conflict, none was in direct support of the Croatian forces, and most of the targets were unrelated to the ground fighting. Moreover, the unclassified CIA history of the war concluded that the NATO air strikes contributed only modestly to securing Serbian acquiescence to the Dayton peace accords; Croatian battlefield victories mattered far more.

Most of the other historical evidence, however, indicates that U.S. air support would be needed. In Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011, Western air power paved the way for the opposition victories. Looking further back in time, even after the South Vietnamese army matured enough to operate without U.S. ground support, it remained dependent on massive U.S. air assistance -- albeit while battling a foe much tougher than the Assad regime.

Nevertheless, the fact that the proposed strategy could require air power does not mean that the American public will necessarily oppose it. Public opinion surveys in the mid-1990s, during the Bosnian war, showed firm and consistent opposition to U.S. intervention, even if undertaken multilaterally. Yet those same polls reported considerably higher support for air operations. Likewise, few Americans objected when the Obama administration contributed U.S. air forces to the NATO air campaign in Libya in 2011.

Beyond air power, two other variables would heavily influence the ultimate cost of the strategy proposed here: how much Washington spent on the new Syrian army, and whether it could convince its allies to shoulder a part of the burden. Given the costs of similar past operations, one can reasonably expect the new fighting force to require $1–$2 billion per year to build. The United States would need to budget an additional $6–$20 billion per year for air support and perhaps another $1.5–$3 billion per year for civilian aid.

Adding these sums together yields a total operating budget of $3 billion annually for two or three years at the lower end of the price scale. If an air campaign on the scale of that in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Libya were required, the annual price would rise to roughly $9–$10 billion for as long as the fighting continued. And if the United States were forced to provide twice as much air power as it did in those earlier wars, the cost could reach $18–$22 billion per year. Following a political settlement, Washington’s continued support for the new government would probably require $1–$5 billion in civilian and security assistance annually for up to a decade. By comparison, Afghanistan cost the United States roughly $45 billion a year from 2001 to 2013, and Iraq, about $100 billion a year from 2003 to 2011.


Of course, the numbers would come down considerably if the United States won financial support from its allies in Europe and the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf states. For years, Gulf leaders have insisted in private that they would fund most or all of such an effort. And they have paid for similar operations in the past. Saudi Arabia heavily supported the covert U.S. campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and, along with Kuwait and other Gulf states, the U.S. operations during the Gulf War. Gulf leaders also threw their weight behind the U.S. decision to intervene in Libya. There is no question that these states see the outcome of the Syrian conflict as vital to their interests; they have already spent billions of dollars backing various Syrian militias. So they would likely support the scheme outlined here -- although Washington should gauge their interest before deciding whether to pursue it.

RAISING THE BAR

If the Obama administration does decide to build a Syrian army, it should do so with its eyes open, for the strategy would entail some risk of escalation. Few, if any, wars work exactly as planned without incurring unexpected costs, and some turn out to be far more expensive, messy, and deadly than anticipated. Afghanistan and Iraq are both cases in point, and they also demonstrate that a country typically gets the worst outcome when it prepares for nothing but the best. If the United States pursued the strategy proposed here, it would need to be prepared to lose some American lives. U.S. pilots could be shot down and U.S. advisers could be wounded, killed, or captured.

The Assad regime could also launch missile strikes against U.S. allies in retaliation or mount terrorist attacks abroad. Syria’s allies Iran and Hezbollah could respond as well, likely by attacking U.S. advisers, just as they did U.S. troops in Iraq. The fear of Washington’s counterattack could deter Tehran from staging a more direct assault but might be insufficient to scare off Hezbollah, since the fall of the Assad regime would imperil Hezbollah’s very existence. And no matter what country ultimately hosted the new Syrian army during the early stages of its development, that country would need guarantees that the United States would help defend it against enemy retaliation.

Finally, the new Syrian army could still lose the war. Given the limited capability of Assad’s forces and the previous successes of Western air power in similar circumstances, such a scenario seems unlikely, but it should not be ruled out. The same goes for a slightly more realistic worry: that the opposition would conquer the country but then fail to secure it. The new Syrian army would then continue to face a grueling and destabilizing battle with extremists and insurgents while struggling to establish law and order, a challenge that undermined postwar governments in both Afghanistan and Libya.

In all these scenarios, the pressure on the United States to escalate its involvement would increase. The strategy outlined here is designed to minimize this risk, but it cannot eliminate it. No one should embrace this approach without recognizing that it could at some point confront Washington with the difficult choice between doubling down and walking away.

THE COSTS OF INACTION

Since the fall of Mosul in June 2014, the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars have become entangled. Any strategy to deal with one must also deal with the other. The region’s sectarian fault lines complicate matters further. In Syria, the Sunni majority is in revolt; in Iraq, the Sunni minority is. In both countries, the United States is seeking to separate the moderate Sunni opposition from more radical groups, such as ISIS. But only in Syria does it aim to depose a Shiite regime. In Iraq, Washington hopes to remain on good terms with the Shiite-dominated government, even as it insists that Baghdad enact immediate and far-reaching reforms.

The strategy proposed here would serve U.S. interests in both countries. Although the contemplated new Syrian army should be neutral, it would inevitably be dominated by Sunnis. Its victories over both the Shiite-dominated Assad regime and the Islamist militants in Syria would make it a model for Iraq’s moderate Sunni tribes. These groups would be key to defeating ISIS, just as their support proved crucial for the U.S. troop surge in Iraq in 2007–8. Decisive U.S. support for the Syrian offshoots of those Iraqi tribes -- coupled with Washington’s commitment to build the kind of inclusive, pluralistic, and equitable state in Syria that moderate Sunnis seek in Iraq -- could help turn Sunnis across the region against ISIS and its ilk.

Events in Iraq have starkly demonstrated the costs of inaction. Whatever choice the United States makes, it should not make it in the mistaken belief that there is no plausible strategy for victory at an acceptable cost. The United States can end the Syrian civil war on its own terms and rebuild a stable Syria without committing ground troops. Doing so could take a great deal of time, effort, and resources. It will certainly take the will to try.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Austin » 12 Sep 2014 10:51

Once Obama decides to strike Iraq Syria , CIA estimated about ISIS fighter goes up 3x times :lol:

Reminds me of GWB decision to attack Eyraq in 2003 , CIA estimates of WMD magically came up with evidence :D

CIA estimates 20k-30k fighters in Syria, Iraq after Obama pledges to destroy ISIS

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby kmkraoind » 12 Sep 2014 12:50

British female jihadis running ISIS 'brothels' allowing killers to rape kidnapped Yazidi women

As many as 3,000 Iraqi women have been taken captive in the last two weeks by the terror group.

Sources suggest that members of the all-women al-Khanssaa Brigade in Raqqa, Syria, are running brothels to satisfy the fighters’ desires.

One said: “These women are using barbaric interpretations of the Islamic faith to justify their actions.

“They believe the militants can use these women as they please as they are non-Muslims.

“The Yazidi people are being ethnically cleansed, and their women are being subjected to the most brutal treatment.

“It is the British women who have risen to the top of the Islamic State’s sharia police and now they are in charge of this operation.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Singha » 12 Sep 2014 13:21

once the bombing starts in earnest nobody will know if its Assad or ISIS who are the targets. the could use a prolonged bombing campaign to weaken both enough for their own munnas to make a move or else serve as a precursor to a invasion via jordan and iraq because WMD is sure to be found if the agencies look hard enough.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby chanakyaa » 12 Sep 2014 15:54

Wait a sec, they won't find any double-u-m-d, right because didn't they destroy chemical stuff using agreement with Russians? That would definitely eliminate collateral damage. Is it possible that air cover is intended to help FSA move forward towards A$$ad?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Singha » 12 Sep 2014 17:09

the whole unilateral nature of the op (as usual) is why Russia is calling it illegal and asking that UN authortize and monitor it. how can Syria be bombed without the syrian govt authorizing it?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Pratyush » 12 Sep 2014 17:13

Syrian govt is no longer recognized by the west. That is why they will not be asked. If the Syrian AF decides to contest the Western air forces. They will be swept out of the skies.

Which in turn will level the playing field between the rebels and the state. Very clever I tell you.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby habal » 12 Sep 2014 18:31

Russians are again playing too coy here, they must up the vigil. US must be kept out of active operations in Asia. Else they will fight in Asia till the last Asian.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby RSoami » 12 Sep 2014 19:24

Doesnt Syria have Russian anti aircraft missiles ?! Syria can down the american planes if it hits them. Besides why is America keen to bomb in Syria. Is all of Iraq back in Iraqi hands?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby anmol » 12 Sep 2014 21:13

Brother of James Foley tells Fox government 'threatened' him over ransom bid
foxnews.com | Sep 12th 2014

The brother of murdered American journalist James Foley said his family was "appalled" by the government's handling of Foley's case and accused the Obama administration of threatening him when he tried to raise funds for his brother's release from ISIS -- the terrorist group that beheaded him in an Internet video that shocked the world.

"They were actually an impedance," Michael Foley said of the U.S. government's role in rescuing his older brother, a photojournalist who was kidnapped by ISIS militants in northern Syria in 2012 and held captive for 21 months before he was executed by the terrorist group.

U.S. policy does not allow for government negotiations with terrorist organizations or ransom payments for Americans kidnapped by them. Foley, however, said the administration made it difficult for the family to privately raise funds on its own to secure his brother's release.

"They got in our way," Foley told Fox News' Megyn Kelly in an exclusive interview Thursday. "That's what really bothers me to the core."

"I was specifically threatened by the Department of State about raising funds towards ransom demands for my brother," he said. "We were smart enough to look past it but it slowed us down. We lost a lot of time."

On Aug. 19, a video produced by ISIS militants was uploaded to YouTube titled, "A Message to America." Foley, an experienced war journalist who worked for Boston-based GlobalPost, is seen in the video in an unknown desert location kneeling in an orange shirt and pants -- similar to clothes worn by Guantanamo Bay detainees. After reading a statement denouncing the U.S. government and its recent air strikes in the region, Foley is executed.

The murderer, who speaks with a British accent, then threatens to kill U.S. journalist Steven Sotloff, who had also been abducted in Syria. On Sept. 2, a video was released of ISIS beheading Sotloff, who had worked for Time magazine as well as Christian Science Monitor and other media outlets.

In the days following Foley's execution, the White House said special operations troops were deployed to Syria months earlier on a secret mission to rescue U.S. hostages, including Foley, but were unsuccessful in finding them.

"Since his capture, we have been using every tool at our disposal to try to bring him home to his family and to gather any and all information we could get about his whereabouts, his condition and the threats he faced," White House spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said last month.

While the U.S. and U.K. do not pay ransom for citizens kidnapped by terrorist groups, other countries, like France, have reportedly negotiated in secret for the release of hostages.

Didier François, a reporter with French radio Europe 1, was released by ISIS after months of captivity in April 2014. He later told reporters he shared a cell with Foley from September 2013 up until his release. France has denied reports that it paid $18 million for the release of François and three other journalists.

According to a GlobalPost spokesman, Foley's captors had demanded a ransom of about $135 million for his release.

President Obama addressed the nation Wednesday, on the eve of the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, authorizing U.S. airstrikes in Syria along with expanded airstrikes in Iraq and vowing to wipe out the group’s terrorists "wherever they exist."

"Our objective is clear: we will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy," Obama said during a 15-minute, prime-time address.

The president's speech effectively completed a dramatic turnaround from the administration's approach to the Islamic State just a few months ago, when the president downplayed the group's advances through northern Iraq. Now, he is outlining a "comprehensive" strategy for targeting the organization in Iraq and Syria, including by potentially aiding moderate factions of the Syrian opposition.

For Michael Foley, the president's words, "didn't sound like much of a plan to me." Foley said Obama's new military campaign, "certainly came too late for Jim."

"I just hope it's not too late for others," Foley told Fox News, adding that "I can't wrap my mind around" the "evil" shown in his brother's execution video.

"Jim was such a good person ... He really cared about the disadvantaged his entire career," he said. His older brother's murder was "an ending I just could never have imagined."

Foley's mother, Diane, is expected to speak with Fox News' Greta Van Susteren in a live interview Friday night.

"On The Record with Greta Van Susteren" airs at 7 p.m. EST.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby chanakyaa » 13 Sep 2014 02:39

Is all of Iraq back in Iraqi hands?
It is not. Was it supposed to be in their hands?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby RoyG » 13 Sep 2014 04:21

Russia will up the ante in Ukraine. It will be tit for tat. Proxy war is the only way the US can make big gains in Syria. If it overtly starts destroying Syrian army personnel and equipment, Putin will bombard Kiev and move on Estonia.


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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Austin » 13 Sep 2014 10:09

RoyG wrote:Russia will up the ante in Ukraine. It will be tit for tat. Proxy war is the only way the US can make big gains in Syria. If it overtly starts destroying Syrian army personnel and equipment, Putin will bombard Kiev and move on Estonia.


I dont think US will bomb Assad , this would mean the Iranians would step in and we are in for big war in Gulf.

The Shia majority Iraq wouldnt like to see Assad go either.

ME is a huge swampy mud pit no matter where you put your feet in you will end up getting dirty and getting sucked.



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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby csaurabh » 13 Sep 2014 18:09

There is a very good documentary on Jewish refugees from Arab countries who were expelled during the formation of Israel. Chilling parallels to what is happening today.


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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby KLNMurthy » 13 Sep 2014 20:07

Some analyst on CNN pointed out that Obama's insistence that Iraqis will have to do the fighting while US provides air power and advisors is like Richard Nixon's Vietnamization programme during Vietnam War.

Looks like US is ready to turn Syria into Khmer Rouge Cambodia with its not-so-secret bombing. And we know how Nixon's Vietnam war ended.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby TSJones » 14 Sep 2014 01:57

oh Russia doesn't want the US to bother ISIS in Syria? very funny! nobody is going to listen to Russian dumb a$$s but you guys. we're going to put the hammer on ISIS. get out of the way.

sanjaykumar
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby sanjaykumar » 14 Sep 2014 05:25

^^^There was also another group of forgotten refugees, the Evian Conference terminated their hopes of leaving Germany alive.

There are many forgotten histories.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Raja Bose » 14 Sep 2014 05:53

TSJones wrote:oh Russia doesn't want the US to bother ISIS in Syria? very funny! nobody is going to listen to Russian dumb a$$s but you guys. we're going to put the hammer on ISIS. get out of the way.


Yeah I guess it was finally time for the US to find an adversary of its own size. Even Afghanistan after all proved too big an adversary to defeat. Not looking good for Obama's next Nobel Piss Prize prospects... :lol:

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby anmol » 14 Sep 2014 07:21

TSJones wrote:oh Russia doesn't want the US to bother ISIS in Syria? very funny! nobody is going to listen to Russian dumb a$$s but you guys. we're going to put the hammer on ISIS. get out of the way.


Please tell these guys to get out of the way:
Obama on Iraq: 'We Will Not Be Sending U.S. Troops Back Into Combat'
Obama: "We dont have a strategy"
White House Press Secretary: "No, United States is not presently at war with ISIS".
Kerry: "U.S. not at war with ISIS"

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby anmol » 14 Sep 2014 07:32

Image
British hostage David Haines beheaded by Islamic State terrorists
by Claire Duffin, and Tim Ross, telegraph.co.uk
September 14th 2014

RSoami
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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby RSoami » 14 Sep 2014 09:35

anmol wrote:
TSJones wrote:oh Russia doesn't want the US to bother ISIS in Syria? very funny! nobody is going to listen to Russian dumb a$$s but you guys. we're going to put the hammer on ISIS. get out of the way.


Please tell these guys to get out of the way:
Obama on Iraq: 'We Will Not Be Sending U.S. Troops Back Into Combat'
Obama: "We dont have a strategy"
White House Press Secretary: "No, United States is not presently at war with ISIS".
Kerry: "U.S. not at war with ISIS"


Love US fanboys.
Obama not having a strategy is true.
And patiently deciding how to go about facing this challenge is not a bad decision either.
Like I have said earlier, Obama is more sensible than most of the fire eating `we are so macho` strategic experts in US. Had it been left to them, ISIS would have been ruling Damascus now, aided with US bombardment. They are already fighting with American weapons.
Obama is taking his time deciding how to counter ISIS. He wouldnt want to be seen as anti Sunni Islam. And its allies in the middle east, read Saudi barbaria, arent doyens of humanitarian values either.
Its not bad to have an American with some brains as president. Blame it on his non American roots.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby TSJones » 14 Sep 2014 10:10

OK, we'll leave ISIS alone in Syria. No problem......everybody chillax....

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby nandakumar » 14 Sep 2014 10:36

Raja Bose wrote:
TSJones wrote:oh Russia doesn't want the US to bother ISIS in Syria? very funny! nobody is going to listen to Russian dumb a$$s but you guys. we're going to put the hammer on ISIS. get out of the way.


Yeah I guess it was finally time for the US to find an adversary of its own size. Even Afghanistan after all proved too big an adversary to defeat. Not looking good for Obama's next Nobel Piss Prize prospects... :lol:

The Nobel Committee has already regretted its decision to award the peace prize to Obama in 2009. See the link below.
http://www.scribd.com/mobile/doc/239498391?width=1280

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Raja Bose » 14 Sep 2014 10:45

TSJones wrote:OK, we'll leave ISIS alone in Syria. No problem......everybody chillax....


Sure, try that for a change. Nothing will happen except the other terrorism supporting turds ('good/moderate' terrorists and staunch GOAT allies) will be digging holes in the sand to protect their musharrafs from the bad terrorists. :mrgreen:

On a more general note, till now I have failed to understand how an impoverished nation like India can remain true to its word and give a new nation its independence as promised without any hanky panky or extracting its pound of flesh (Bangladesh) but a rich super power like the United States cannot. Post-world war-II history is littered with burning hulks of countries where the US piously promised to bring liberation and freedom and ended up making things worse for the man on the street. I don't buy this nonsense of a well meaning but bumbling world cop.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby RSoami » 14 Sep 2014 11:26

TSJones wrote:OK, we'll leave ISIS alone in Syria. No problem......everybody chillax....

There you go. Another fast one.
No hurry. Take your time. Use your brains. Think and act.
Its not only about bombing and not bombing always.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby kish » 14 Sep 2014 12:12

anmol wrote:
British hostage David Haines beheaded by Islamic State terrorists
by Claire Duffin, and Tim Ross, telegraph.co.uk
September 14th 2014


Serves them well.

When James folley was beheaded every "White" Media was discussing it non-stop for 2 days, For steven sotloff there was some discussion. This guy(David haines) beheading gets a passing reference during the News.

Anyways, the islamic terrorists killing the "White" race is good news for the rest of the world.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Dipanker » 14 Sep 2014 12:43

TSJones wrote:oh Russia doesn't want the US to bother ISIS in Syria? very funny! nobody is going to listen to Russian dumb a$$s but you guys. we're going to put the hammer on ISIS. get out of the way.


Actually That is not the problem. The Problem is bombing ISIS in Syria may just be a subterfuge for bombing Assad forces. Once that happens jihadis will have whole Syria to themselves.

Why does US want terrorists to win in Syria?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Dipanker » 14 Sep 2014 12:50

Raja Bose wrote:
TSJones wrote:OK, we'll leave ISIS alone in Syria. No problem......everybody chillax....


Sure, try that for a change. Nothing will happen except the other terrorism supporting turds ('good/moderate' terrorists and staunch GOAT allies) will be digging holes in the sand to protect their musharrafs from the bad terrorists. :mrgreen:

On a more general note, till now I have failed to understand how an impoverished nation like India can remain true to its word and give a new nation its independence as promised without any hanky panky or extracting its pound of flesh (Bangladesh) but a rich super power like the United States cannot. Post-world war-II history is littered with burning hulks of countries where the US piously promised to bring liberation and freedom and ended up making things worse for the man on the street. I don't buy this nonsense of a well meaning but bumbling world cop.


US role in that conflict was actually actively supporting the genocide of 3 million people of Bangladesh.

‘The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide’ by Gary J. Bass
Last edited by Dipanker on 14 Sep 2014 13:10, edited 3 times in total.

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Shreeman » 14 Sep 2014 12:56

When british expats learn and repeat with other british expats what happens in saudi arabia every friday for centuries, it becomes newsworthy.

quid?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby Singha » 14 Sep 2014 13:16

Wonder if the author Ishaan Tharoor is related?

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby RSoami » 14 Sep 2014 14:00

It is impossible even for thick skinned Americans to do an absolute U-turn from their anti Assad stand less than a year ago. Assad and Iran are the ones who can put boots on the ground and stop ISIS. As stated in that link above, Saudis have `legally` beheaded 8 people in last two weeks.
American foreign policy is myopic. Its a joke.
No Sunni country will send its men to die fighting the ISIS. And their reign of terror will continue as long as they are not defeated and made to suffer the same brutalities that they are bestowing upon others.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us- ... ng_strip_4

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Re: West Asia News and Discussions

Postby anmol » 14 Sep 2014 14:38

Who’s Paying the Pro-War Pundits?
by Lee Fang, m.thenation.com
September 12th 2014


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