Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[manju]

What to make of Chipanda CCTV showing map of India without Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh

[SSridhar]

Last night, I was listening to Shyam Saran espousing his views on the India-China border dispute in an interview with Karan Thapar. The entire episode was based on an article written by Shyam Saran. I was not sure, not having listened to the earlier portion of the interview, whether it was a recent article etc. I dug up and found two interesting articles he had written last year in Business Standard.

I post them here for the perspective it brings up because these two articles were never posted here before.

1962 - The view from Beijing - Shyam Saran, Business Standard

The release of a substantial section of the top-secret Henderson Brooks Report on the 1962 India-China border war by Neville Maxwell has re-ignited the debate over why India suffered a humiliating defeat then and whether lessons have been learnt even now, given China's relentless march towards superpower status. The refusal of successive governments in Delhi to make the report public has only made such periodic and selective leaks all the more damaging and distracting. The country's interests would be better served by releasing the full report with a commentary that identifies the lessons that have been learnt and the remedial steps taken to ensure that we do not fall into a similar and, perhaps even bigger, disaster again.

A reading of the document, now widely available on the internet, does not reveal any fresh, earth-shaking revelations or insights. Much of the report has been leaked in bits and pieces over the years and supplemented by considerable details supplied by other actors involved in this unfortunate saga. The main conclusions of earlier analyses remain valid:

* Right up to the point when China launched a major offensive, both the political and the Indian Army top brass were convinced that military engagement at the contested border would never go beyond small-scale skirmishes and limited operations. There was no expectation and hence preparation for dealing with a large-scale assault, despite mounting evidence to the contrary

* The so-called Forward Policy was a political initiative and not a military operation, designed to strengthen Indian territorial claims and forestall further Chinese ingress. China had been putting in place its own version of a forward policy through the relentless advance into the unoccupied border zones separating the two countries. This had intensified after the Tibet revolt and the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959. That same year, the first serious incidents of Chinese aggression took place, one in Longju in the eastern sector and the other at Galwan in the western sector. Chinese territorial assertiveness continued thereafter, accompanied by a significant build-up of both logistics and forces. It was only in November 1961 that the Forward Policy was adopted in response but without corresponding means in men and material to respond to a serious military attack, the capabilities for which were being steadily built up on the Chinese side. The ill-considered probing missions and the setting up of additional and mostly isolated and indefensible posts were, therefore, more in the nature of "showing the flag" operations rather than military manoeuvres.

The revelations in the Henderson Brooks Report should be examined in the light of considerable archival material that is now available on Chinese perceptions and decision-making on India-China relations leading up to the breakout of hostilities on October 20, 1962.

The first important point to note is that the India-China border dispute took on an altogether different dimension in Chinese perceptions as a result of the Tibet revolt of 1959 and the subsequent grant of refuge by India to the Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetans, who were escaping a violent Chinese crackdown. Indian statements and actions on the border were increasingly interpreted as aimed at undermining Chinese control over Tibet. Even contemporary Chinese studies of the 1962 conflict, such as those by Xu Yan and Wang Hongwei, make this point repeatedly, accusing Nehru of trying to "convert Tibet into a buffer zone" and to "instigate Tibet to leave China". In 1964, while speaking to a visiting Nepali delegation, Mao Zedong said the major problem between India and China was not the McMahon Line but Tibet, which Indians considered to be theirs.

A second conclusion to emerge from the archives is the key role played by Mao himself in the events leading up to the war. The failure of the Great Leap Forward and three years of economic distress and famine between 1959 and 1961 had forced Mao to retreat to the "second line of leadership", yielding place to pragmatists such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen. By the summer of 1962, however, Mao was already in the process of regaining his control over the levers of power, using the People's Liberation Army under a new commander, Marshal Lin Piao, as his ally. From the summer of 1962, it was Mao who was personally issuing directives on the evolving military situation on the India-China border. It was his decision in August 1962, to launch a full-scale military assault on Indian forces and to "liquidate the invading Indian army".

Interestingly, it now transpires that this decision was a contested one. A Chinese TV feature on the 1962 war, broadcast in January 2005, reveals that there were differences of opinion among the leadership with some arguing that it would be unwise to make an enemy out of India just when China was confronting both domestic and external challenges. However, according to the broadcast, these elements were denounced as "right opportunists" and the military offensive went ahead.

It is also clear now that China made a careful assessment of the regional and international situation before undertaking these military operations. There were fears in China that the US may help the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan launch attacks on China across the Taiwan Straits. These were laid to rest when China's ambassador to Warsaw, Wang Bingnan, was able to get a categorical assurance from his American counterpart that the US had no intention of supporting any Taiwanese offensive against China by taking advantage of Sino-Indian tensions. In his memoirs, Wang claims that this assurance played an important part in enabling the decision to attack India later in the year.

Similarly, fears that the Soviet Union would play a negative role on the Sino-India dispute were laid to rest as Moscow sought to obtain Chinese support in the looming Cuban missile crisis, which would burst into the open around the same time as the India-China war. This also distracted the major powers from taking full cognisance of what was happening on a remote border somewhere in Asia.

Just as the Chinese military offensive came as a rude surprise, so did the subsequent Chinese decision to withdraw from the territories it occupied as a result of the 1962 operations with some exceptions particularly in the Western sector. The Indian leadership fully believed that the withdrawal was probably due to approaching winter and extended supply lines and that a renewed offensive was likely during the summer the following year. This explains the sense of panic that prevailed in those days evident in Jawaharlal Nehru's desperate letter to US President John F Kennedy, which surfaced recently. Chinese archives, however, suggest that it was always Mao's plan that Chinese forces should withdraw after delivering a knockout blow on the Indians. The objective was not territorial. It was to forestall any threat to Chinese consolidation in Tibet, while bringing a chastened India to the negotiating table to acquiesce in a Chinese package proposal for settling the border. Neither objective was achieved in any real sense.

In 1980, the two countries resumed a bilateral dialogue on the border after a gap of two decades. In the initial phase the Chinese terms for settlement were the same as in 1960, i.e. that China would retain Aksai Chin in the West but would generally settle along the alignment corresponding to the McMahon Line, though it would never accept the legitimacy of that line. In his interview to the editor of Vikrant in 1982, Deng Xiaoping explicitly put forward the "package proposal" as the basis for a border settlement, arguing that in keeping the area currently in its occupation in the east, India was getting a very good deal. After all, he suggested, Nehru himself had described Aksai Chin as a desert where "not a blade of grass grows".

The writer, a former foreign secretary, is chairman of the National Security Advisory Board and of RIS as well as a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

India-China border dispute - Coping with asymmetry - Shyam Saran, Business Standard

In 1983, when I was serving in our embassy in Beijing, there were a series of informal and confidential exchanges on the possibility of resolving the border issue. The Chinese leadership was keen on a visit to Beijing by then India Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had also taken over the same year as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. It was pointed out to our Chinese interlocutors that such a visit would hardly be possible without the border issue being resolved in a satisfactory manner. The answer was to point to Deng's package proposal, i.e. to formalise the status quo. Our counter was that something more than the status quo would be necessary given the grievous blow to Indian psyche that the 1962 war had delivered. There was some indication that if Gandhi would be ready to visit, then some additional territory in the western sector, occupied as a result of the 1962 operations, may be conceded. Unfortunately, the Indian side did not follow up on this and the opportunity was lost.

In 1985, the Chinese side formally reinterpreted the package proposal saying that we had misunderstood Deng's words. The fresh Chinese position was that since the area of largest dispute was in the eastern sector, India had to make meaningful concessions in that sector and the Chinese side would then make appropriate and corresponding concessions in the western sector. Additionally, an explicit demand was now advanced for ceding Tawang, which the Indian side was accused of occupying at a much later date after its independence. It was pointed out to us that since the fifth Dalai Lama had been born in Tawang, the place was of special significance for the Chinese people, in particular for China's Tibetan nationality. This remains the current Chinese position on the border dispute and the Indian side, of course, rejects it.

In 1992, an informal suggestion was made to the Chinese side that India gives free access to Chinese pilgrims to Tawang, while China reciprocally gives similar access to Indian pilgrims to Kailash Mansarovar. The Chinese never responded. One reason for the insistence on Tawang being conceded may be the fear that if the next Dalai Lama were to be "discovered" in Tawang , a Chinese rival may not enjoy the same legitimacy. As will be apparent, the issue of Tibet continues to be embedded in any consideration of the border.

In 2005, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit, India and China announced a set of Guiding Principles and Political Parameters for resolving the border issue. From India's standpoint, these principles and parameters are welcome as they include those that are extremely relevant, such as the need to consider the interests of "settled populations". This would have a direct bearing on the status of Tawang. However, in typical Chinese fashion, there is a continuous attempt to reinterpret these principles to suit Chinese positions. In the series of talks between the Special Representatives of the two prime ministers, now in their 11th year, little progress has been recorded on settling the border issue, though the talks have been useful in managing the border and in advancing confidence-building measures.

Given this chequered history, what are the prospects of an India-China border settlement and what are its likely contours? One cannot see a solution that diverges significantly from the existing alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and the longer the status quo continues the more likely is the LAC to eventually morph into a settled boundary. At a recent track-II interaction, a senior Chinese army official remarked that India was unlikely to go to war to recover Aksai Chin just as China was unlikely to go to war to recover southern Tibet, or what India refers to as Arunachal Pradesh. In the meantime, he went on to add, the LAC needed to be clarified so that incidents such as the recent one at Depsang could be avoided.

Given the experience of 1962, however, one should never base one's actions on the basis of perceptions of the other side's intentions. It was the entrenched belief that China would never attack that caught Indian forces totally unprepared and virtually defenceless. Our border defences including logistics, must take into account the rapidly growing capabilities on the Chinese side. Although the size of our forces deployed at the border and its vicinity is substantial, our transport infrastructure and logistical capabilities have fallen steadily behind that of China. These shortcomings are being addressed but we need to consider ways in which we can cope with the growing asymmetry. The use of air capabilities may be one answer. There is also an urgent need to improve and extend our reconnaissance capabilities, so that there is sufficient warning time in case of an attack. Intelligence failure was one of the major causes of our failure to anticipate and respond to the 1962 crisis. The point one is making is that any prospect of sustaining the status quo at the border is dependent upon our ability to make any attempt to change it costly and risky to the other side.

It is also clear that the evolution of the Tibet issue will have a significant influence on both the prospects of an eventual border settlement with China and, in the meantime, maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC. A successful reconciliation process between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese side would be to India's advantage. There were some signs earlier last year that the new Chinese leadership was reaching out to the Dalai Lama but these seem to have lost momentum. If there are ways in which India could encourage this, it would help in managing India-China relations. A worsening of the situation inside Tibet or greater militancy among Tibetan youth in India could make the job of keeping India-China relations on an even keel more difficult.

China is likely to show restraint in dealing with India, including on the border issue, the more diversified and stronger India's relations are with other countries. China was more amenable and sensitive to India's interests in 2005 because of India's growing relationship with the US, Japan and the countries of South East Asia. The fewer options India is seen to have in its external relations, the more likely Chinese pressures on it will increase. This will be particularly relevant if the capability gap between the two countries continues to widen. Alternatively, if the forthcoming elections [this was published on April 13, 2014] throw up a political leadership that enables India to resume accelerated economic growth and pursue a more coherent foreign policy, the prospects for India-China relations will improve. One should watch carefully the changing dynamics among major powers as a result of the Ukraine crisis and the worsening of relations between Russia and the West. On balance, China appears to be a net gainer with both Russia and the West seeking its neutrality, if not support. For India, the choices are more difficult.

Much will be determined by what the Indian electorate delivers in terms of a new political dispensation later this year. In 2005, India was riding high. New Delhi was the indispensable destination for leaders from across the world and the Indian growth story was putting India in the same league as China. Permanent membership of the UN Security Council seemed to be within reach. One could feel that one had more cards to play with in dealing with the world. That is no longer the case. The impending political renewal nevertheless gives one hope that India will get another chance to get back into reckoning.

[chanakyaa]

What we are seeing is a tussle between US and PRC to woo India which has surprisingly risen despite all the dis-incentives....

Yes, but all the wooing and cooing going on so West can flood Indian markets with its high priced products/services (defense and commercial) and Chinese can flood their manufactured goods in every single household either by direct exports or indirectly through other countries. India is the last untapped consumer/professional goods/services market left in the world. Regardless of who wins the wooing, hope there are strict barriers to limit imports to India (especially from China). Otherwise, India's fragile manufacturing sector will be wiped out for good. Marginal effort needed by Chinese is small to flood Indian markets with goods at the same level they flood western markets, compared to huge mountain Indians need to climb to gain meaningful export share.

[Pulikeshi]

the pivot to Asia by US is to remain relevant in world politics.

As long as the US is able to dominate the Pacific and the Atlantic - it will remain a world power.
The US is also an Indian Ocean power - which then simply makes it uniquely a super-power.
The pivot-vivot is all banda onlee - the strategic change is to appoint managers instead of being the onlee...
Byzantine versus Rome model at a global scale...

US is egging a China-India confrontation for their pivot.
yet US has understanding with PRC about its place in world.

If you "supari" your banker (albeit you print the notes), then no one left standing to pony up the cash to

Seems like a good strategy to me!

the short answer is the simplicity imposed by post world war international order is being used to keep India down.
So the answer is bring in complexity and resulting chaos to thrive.

The attempt is to keep India down by many means, the tri-lateral dance will continue with Russia/Europe sometimes butting in to keep all of us entertained.
India would be wise to dominate the Indian Ocean and become a contender in the Pacific/Atlantic.
That requires economic growth - this then makes clear the current Indian strategy.
Their short comings some other time...

[Suraj]

What to make of Chipanda CCTV showing map of India without Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh

What to make of it ? They're doing exactly what they're expected to do - poke us and see how we respond. I don't think Modi and Doval as yet want to do something immediately reciprocal, i.e. show PRC without Tibet and East Turkestan, on Doordarshan. In fact, that might be too predictable. But I think there will be a response.

We also ignore the fact that Modi is also visiting Mongolia and SoKo. To us, it may seem not important, but to them it is. Mongolia to them is a vassal who they still remember once tore them apart, via the Mongol/Yuan Dynasty. The Mongols were the first non-Han rulers of China. To them, the Mongols and Manchus are like the Mughals to us - Sinicized, but still outsiders who wrecked their cushy 'Middle Kingdom' in the process. Just as we didn't like former US leaders tagging on a TSP stop to a visit to us, they don't like Beijing being part of a whistle stop tour, particularly not when certain countries like Mongolia, or worse, Japan, are involved.

The optics are particularly poor when a visitor leaves Beijing for a place they dislike, e.g. Tokyo. Seoul, they can sort of understand - India/SoKo economic ties are signfiicant. But Ulan Bator will upset them, even if they don't rail about it publicly. That's not their style for railing about being equated with a vassal. Doing so to them looks like they acknowledge being equated with a vassal. Instead, they pretend to ignore it and instead do something unrelated, like the map thing. Petty and vindictive, just as they see Modi visiting Ulan Bator to be.

[Pulikeshi]

Last night, I was listening to Shyam Saran espousing his views on the India-China border dispute in an interview with Karan Thapar. The entire episode was based on an article written by Shyam Saran.

SS's points seem to be (imvho) indicate that India did not and does not really want a border resolution.
All India wants status quo and tranquility on the border.

This is very understandable for various reasons - but perhaps difficult for govt. to just come out and say publicly.

[pankajs]

The think tank forum? seems to suggest that we are finally going to discuss nuke issues (& nuke CBM's) with China .... plus the proposal to have regular high level meeting (summit?)

Think the view in Bejing is changing ...

[svinayak]

the short answer is the simplicity imposed by post world war international order is being used to keep India down.
So the answer is bring in complexity and resulting chaos to thrive.

The attempt is to keep India down by many means, the tri-lateral dance will continue with Russia/Europe sometimes butting in to keep all of us entertained.
India would be wise to dominate the Indian Ocean and become a contender in the Pacific/Atlantic.
That requires economic growth - this then makes clear the current Indian strategy.
Their short comings some other time...

The pivot is to shape the outcome of the future of Asia by US

India has to create complexity in Asia in such a way that US will be unable to cope up in Asia and will back off from its pivot. India is a major card in this pivot. India will be used so that US can still hang around Asia

India needs a disruption strategy in Asia
Border war is bound to happen in 2020 and India needs a bold strategy so that entire world gets shaken up if India is attacked at the border. India needs to target the Chinese maritime trade globally to create disruption worldwide

[svinayak]

Modi may become a Richard Nixon-like statesman, says this China daily

[SSridhar]

India has to create complexity in Asia in such a way that US will be unable to cope up in Asia and will back off from its pivot. India is a major card in this pivot. India will be used so that US can still hang around Asia

India needs a disruption strategy in Asia
Border war is bound to happen in 2020 and India needs a bold strategy so that entire world gets shaken up if India is attacked at the border. India needs to target the Chinese maritime trade globally to create disruption worldwide

The ASEAN, Australia, Japan and South Korea have a deep relationship with the US and some of the individual countries have a deeper military & political relationship with the US. They are all afraid of the aggressive rise of China especially after Xi Jinping assumed power. These nations look up to the US to provide a security umbrella for them against a belligerent and rampaging China. Though they are also looking up to India as the only Asian power that has capabilities to take on China militarily, let us not kid ourselves. We are nowhere near China and are far, far away from the way US can project its power. Nobody, just nobody, is thinking of India as a replacement. Nobody wants the US to be displaced in Asia. So, I would like to know from you as to what we could do to displace the US from Asia and announce ourselves as the new hegemon?

To add to that, you are also predicting a border war in c. 2020 and you want us to take on China, disrupt its global maritime trade and all the while keeping the US completely out of the equation?

I would be interested in seeing your road-map for India to achieving such potency within the next four years.

[LakshO]

Gurus,

Any idea how power is distributed between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang? Who does what? Is it as clearly demarcated like in India?

[Bade]

But the Indian side is looking for a deeper collaboration in infrastructure development especially railways. The feasibility study on the Delhi-Chennai high-speed has commenced, but a big ticket announcement on possible Chinese participation on this project is still far away.

Giving the Delhi-Chennai corridor to the Chinese is a huge cop-out on India's part symbolically. It is almost accepting Chinese superiority in infrastructure building when we should be more like equals considering our history. A better option to dangle at the Chinese would be to offer them the possibility of a less symbolic corridor like the earlier proposed but now defunct (?) Kerala HSRL. Since they have the money to invest let them put it there. You kill two birds with one stone a local one and still keep the Chinese engaged with further carrots if they continue to behave at the border with a settlement more favorable to us.

[A_Gupta]

^^^ "It is almost accepting Chinese superiority in infrastructure building ..."

In terms of accomplishments they are ahead. Forget about symbols; the Indian economy has to grow as fast as sustainably possible.

[SSridhar]

PM Narendra Modi extends e-visa for Chinese nationals - PTI, ToI

In a confidence building measure, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday announced that India will grant e-visas to Chinese tourists.

"We have decided to extend electronic tourist visas to Chinese nationals," Modi said addressing students and faculty at the prestigious Tsinghua University.

Hours before the Prime Minister's announcement, foreign secretary S Jaishankar had said "no decision has been taken yet" on granting e-visas to Chinese tourists.

When asked about extending e-visa facility to Chinese tourists, Jaishankar this morning said, "We are expanding it bit-by-bit. With regard to China, no decision has been taken yet."

Addressing the gathering at the university, Modi said, "About 33 per cent of the world's population is either Indian or Chinese. Yet, our people know very little of each other".

"We must seek inspiration from the pilgrims of the ancient times, who braved the unknown in search of knowledge, and enriched us both," he said.

"So, we have decided to extend electronic tourist visas to Chinese nationals. We are celebrating the Year of India in China in 2015," he added.

Surprisingly Modi chose to announce this significant initiative which Chinese officials have been calling for in his address to the university not during his joint appearance for the press with Premier Li Keqiang.

The announcement came in the teeth of strong opposition from the home ministry and security agencies over security concerns of its misuse, while the external affairs ministry and ministry of tourism pressed for it.

The e-visa announcement was seen as a prelude India relaxing investment norms to China to attract large-scale Chinese investors.

OK, what did India get reciprocally? Have the Chinese abolished the stapled visa regimen?

We seem to be confused. Is e-visa for attracting Chinese tourists or for attracting investments? We do not need e-visa to attract investments. Chinese investors and industrialists, as certified by their Chamber of Commerce, can get multiple year, multiple entry visas.

[SSridhar]

Modi's China visit: PM tells China to 'reconsider' its approach on some issues - PTI, Economic Times

After voicing concern over China's investments in PoK, Prime Minister Narendra Modi today asked it to "reconsider" its approach on some of the issues and take a strategic and long term view to push the relationship which has been "complex" in recent decades.

Modi, who held wide-ranging talks with his counterpart Li Keqiang, sought tangible progress on issues relating to visa, an apparent reference to stapled visas issued by China to residents of Arunachal Pradesh, as he underlined that the two countries need to be "sensitive to each other's interests".

He stressed the need for strengthening mutual trust and confidence while seeking solutions to outstanding issues.

The two sides signed a record 24 agreements covering railways, mining, outer space, earthquake science and engineering, tourism, sister-cities and establishment of consulates in Chengdu and Chennai.

"Our conversations were candid, constructive and friendly. We covered all issues, including those that trouble smooth development of our relations," Modi said at a joint press interaction here along with Li after the talks held at the Great Hall of People.

"I stressed the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realising full potential of our partnership. I suggested that China should take a strategic and long term view of our relations," Modi said.

The statement comes a day after Modi raised concern with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their talks in Xi'an over China's USD 46 billion proposed investment in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

"I found the Chinese leadership responsive," he said, adding that the re-emergence of India and China and their relationship will have a profound impact on the two countries and the course of this century.

Noting that India-China relationship has been "complex in recent decades", Modi said the two countries have a "historic responsibility to turn this relationship into a source of strength for each other and a force of good for the world."

On the boundary question, Modi said the two sides agreed to continue to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution.

"We both reiterated our strong commitment to make all efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border region," he said

[Philip]

We cannot issue e-visas to PRC citizens while the PRC issues stapled visas to our citizens.
This would be a considerable loss of face in the Chinese viewpoint and they will feel that they have scored a major victory over Mr.Modi who has blinked first

Secondly,unless we also play the two "T" cards,as a counter to the PRC's support to Pak in its war against India,we can never be real friends. It also gives us the right to support China's enemies (my enemy's enemy is my friend) in India's interests.

The only factor that the Chinese respect is military strength. There will be nothing like a massive build up of the Indian military particularly against China that will be the only way in which they will restrain their aggression and scinching usurping Indian territory.

The DAC's decisions and its timing ( and future heavy carrier plans) has not been lost on observers,timed to coincide during Mr.Modi's visit to Beijing,a none too subtle reminder of India's mil capability and seriousness with which it wants to strengthen its military specifically to meet any threat from China.

[svinayak]

The ASEAN, Australia, Japan and South Korea have a deep relationship with the US and some of the individual countries have a deeper military & political relationship with the US. They are all afraid of the aggressive rise of China especially after Xi Jinping assumed power. These nations look up to the US to provide a security umbrella for them against a belligerent and rampaging China. Though they are also looking up to India as the only Asian power that has capabilities to take on China militarily, let us not kid ourselves. We are nowhere near China and are far, far away from the way US can project its power. Nobody, just nobody, is thinking of India as a replacement. Nobody wants the US to be displaced in Asia. So, I would like to know from you as to what we could do to displace the US from Asia and announce ourselves as the new hegemon?

To add to that, you are also predicting a border war in c. 2020 and you want us to take on China, disrupt its global maritime trade and all the while keeping the US completely out of the equation?

I would be interested in seeing your road-map for India to achieving such potency within the next four years.

All those countries you mentioned want India to fight the war and keep China in check including US. DO you think US will fight China PRC. You will be surprised. Uncle people already are saying that they will protect PRC shipping in case of major war. Why Unkil wants to be close to India navy?

Trick is for India to create a situation without fighting a war. The stakes for the global trade and global economy are high now with China at the center of it.

So, I would like to know from you as to what we could do to displace the US from Asia and announce ourselves as the new hegemon?

India will not seek hegemony but will be the stability of the Asian Indo-pacific region.

[Bade]

^^^ "It is almost accepting Chinese superiority in infrastructure building ..."

In terms of accomplishments they are ahead. Forget about symbols; the Indian economy has to grow as fast as sustainably possible.

Understood, but you do not give the crown jewels away even before you start the dance. Give it in parts. If the Japanese are going to help with the Mumbai-Abad corridor give the Chinese something similar in scale first and where it will benefit us more at this time. I cited the KL HSRL as financing is key to whether it will get done now or in another 50 yrs time. Since they have the money it can be a good bargain point while managing their control of our security concerns. It has lesser impact on us if does not pan out. In another decade or two we should be building these on our own.

[Bade]

Modi in China: It must be territory first, economics later

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) announced during President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Pakistan presents India with many strategic challenges. To begin with, the CPEC will traverse through India’s territory that has been illegally occupied by Pakistan.

Both Pakistan and China accepted in their 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement that the territory does not legally belong to Pakistan and so it has no ground to contest India’s sovereignty over that area. This Agreement throughout refers to China’s Sinkiang and “the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan”.

Article 6 of the Agreement states: “The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the boundary as described in Article Two of the present agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that in the event of the sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”.

Pakistan, in fact, concedes through this formulation that the final sovereignty over Gilgit/Baltistan may not be settled in its favour.

China’s statement that India should not worry about the CPEC as it does not impinge on the India-Pakistan dispute contradicts its 1963 position. China claims that this is a “commercial project”, when in fact it is a vital geostrategic project with serious military dimensions in future. China seeks access to the Indian Ocean through the historically Indian landmass, an ambition that was denied to Russia but is being facilitated today by Pakistan, created as the West’s protégé against Russia and China. The Gwadar port, the entry point for the CPEC from the Arabian Sea, will be controlled by the Chinese and will inevitably serve as an operational base for their navy in the Indian Ocean. The sale of six Chinese submarines to Pakistan serves their strategic objective of beefing up Pakistan’s naval capacities to protect its coastline assets as well as to erode India’s naval domination of the Indian Ocean by proxy, which is a well practised Chinese policy against India.

China is confounding matters by linking the CPEC to its so-called one belt-one road initiative. The idea of the CPEC has been discussed between China and Pakistan before China unveiled its larger initiative. China wants to deflect Indian concerns by inserting the CPEC into a larger trans-continental connectivity plan based on consultation and cooperation so that it loses its specific anti-India strategic connotation. China, however, has already created key connectivities for accessing natural resources, whether it is the oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Sinkiang or such pipelines across Russia to northern China, not to mention the connectivity through Myanmar. It is already boasting of rail transportation links across Eurasia connecting Shanghai with Lisbon. It has been investing in Sri Lanka to develop its maritime silk route strategy, much before announcing its one belt-one road initiative.

China’s huge financial resources and mounting hubris lies behind its connectivity initiative that is intended to expand Chinese power by spreading its trade links, limiting its maritime vulnerabilities through the development of overland infrastructure, and providing outlets for the overcapacity it is burdened with in various sectors because of insufficient domestic orders.

Some in India are being persuaded by Chinese propaganda about the win-win nature of the Chinese initiative and recommend joining it, forgetting that as far as India and Pakistan are concerned, the pre-Partition connectivity is there and can be revived, and new links can be forged provided Pakistan is willing to normalise relations with India. If Pakistan is unwilling to trade with India at Wagah and rejects transit rights to India through its territory to Afghanistan, what is CPEC’s relevance to us? We don’t need to trade with Sinkiang through PoK or with the Gulf countries through Gwadar.

In reality, China will not give up its claims on Arunachal Pradesh and Pakistan on Kashmir. China has now taken the major decision to invest massively in Pakistan despite the latter’s crumbling economic and political situation, with widespread internal terrorism and radicalisation of its society. Normally, countries avoid investing on this scale in unstable countries, but China is doing the opposite for wider strategic reasons. Pakistan will, unfortunately, see this flow of funds and arms, not only from China but also the US, as evidence of its successful leveraging of its geopolitical position and as a validation of its policies. One can see the consequence of this already in Pakistan’s more belligerent posture towards India. It has been buoyed further by its success with President Ashraf Ghani’s Afghanistan.

India should not lower our strategic defences because of economics. China wants to expand economic ties with India without relenting strategically. India should follow a similar policy. It would be an error to unilaterally ease visa regulations for the Chinese if Beijing continues to issue stapled visas to the people of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. Most important, India must protest against the CPEC going through territory that is legally Indian.

Kanwal Sibal is former foreign secretary
The views expressed are personal

[Tuvaluan]

As long as the e-visa is not actually implemented, just like the chinese randomly staple visas. We can say one thing in public and not actually do anything in private. I do hope this is just optics and not a one-sided granting of e-visas at a time when the chinese are not giving Indian MPs from AP a visa.

[arshyam]

But the Indian side is looking for a deeper collaboration in infrastructure development especially railways. The feasibility study on the Delhi-Chennai high-speed has commenced, but a big ticket announcement on possible Chinese participation on this project is still far away.

Giving the Delhi-Chennai corridor to the Chinese is a huge cop-out on India's part symbolically. It is almost accepting Chinese superiority in infrastructure building when we should be more like equals considering our history. A better option to dangle at the Chinese would be to offer them the possibility of a less symbolic corridor like the earlier proposed but now defunct (?) Kerala HSRL. Since they have the money to invest let them put it there. You kill two birds with one stone a local one and still keep the Chinese engaged with further carrots if they continue to behave at the border with a settlement more favorable to us.

Agreed. Personally, I would like to see the Delhi-Chennai project as proposed to be implemented by the Chinese to not fructify. It is too valuable a project to give to the Chinese, with their still new HSR tech. Plus, they only use such proposals from us to shower Pakistan with $46B in investments - why do we even do this? Finally, Chinese tech may not really sell, I was talking to a few relatives about this, and they said they will not set foot on such a train made in China

[Will post more on this topic in the Railways thread]

[panduranghari]

OK, what did India get reciprocally? Have the Chinese abolished the stapled visa regimen?

We seem to be confused. Is e-visa for attracting Chinese tourists or for attracting investments? We do not need e-visa to attract investments. Chinese investors and industrialists, as certified by their Chamber of Commerce, can get multiple year, multiple entry visas.

E visa is a carrot for the western business leaders who have the ear of the politicians. WRT Chinese, there are no independent businessmen. They are government proxies. I do not see how this helps from Chinese perspective. Another way to look at it is, opening up avenues for 'future' 'potential' dissidents to seek refuge. They don't have to be Chinese. They could be Tibetan.

[KJo]

Someone posted that the name China was given by Indians. Supposed to mean "Land to the East" in Sanskrit. how true is this?

[Suraj]

E visa is a carrot for the western business leaders who have the ear of the politicians. WRT Chinese, there are no independent businessmen. They are government proxies. I do not see how this helps from Chinese perspective. Another way to look at it is, opening up avenues for 'future' 'potential' dissidents to seek refuge. They don't have to be Chinese. They could be Tibetan.

The e-visa system is not really a carrot anymore. Effectively the entire visa issuance process is moving to this system. Modi is simply milking it by 'offering' it to each new country he visits, for political mileage. Except for TSP/BD pretty much everyone will ultimately come under e-visa system. He's just cleverly using it as a simple sop for his own negotiating work. Why give it away by boring bureaucratic announcement when he can wrap it around a grand political gesture instead.

[ramana]

Someone posted that the name China was given by Indians. Supposed to mean "Land to the East" in Sanskrit. how true is this?

http://www.quora.com/What-should-every- ... bout-China

# Historically, the Chinese name for India was Tianzhu - meaning heaven. In return, Indians called them by chin (after their most glorious empire - Qin) that eventually got caught by rest of the world now.

[chanakyaa]

....You will be surprised. Uncle people already are saying that they will protect PRC shipping in case of major war. Why Unkil wants to be close to India navy?....

The tragic part is that India is willing to open its consumer hungry market of 1bn+ people to countries without boldly demanding how they should interact or not interact with countries in line with India's interest. For example, India scaled back dealings with Eye-ran in order to not upset Amir Khan, so it can continue to have access to their markets. But, why is it okay for Amir Khan to support Bakistan, for that last 50+ years, or China in the future and expect uninterrupted access to Indian markets? This tiger is taking too much time to come out of hibernation.

[RamaY]

My read on Modi's China visit:

This visit is just a continuation of mutual assessment of Modi and Mr.Eleven that started a year ago. Both these leaders are expected to lead their respective nations for next 10yrs so neither of them are going to make sudden moves but need to understand each other. Both leaders are strong and no one can make the mistake of entering into an unnecessary fight.

Following are the key areas of concern/mutual-interest

1/ Geopolitical interests: China knows that India is its prime competitor in next decade or two. So it's trying to contain India both in the north (they China-Pak-Iran corridor) and in the south (IOR-String of Pearls).

But China must know (hopefully told in clear terms) that PoK+NA is Indian territory and India will reclaim it no matter what, whenever its ready. Whenever India makes that move, all of China's investments in Pakistan-Iran route will be of waste.

Similarly India owns IOR & China, once again wasting it's precious resources hoping against hope to contain India there.

2/ Economic Interests:
Last year there were reports of China's interest to invest $500B in India . This was reduced to some $20B over next year during Mr.XI's trip. Now they are taking about $10B agreements. I think at the most China will (be allowed) invest $10B in next 5 years.

India's annual savings are 30% of GDP that is $600B. If/when properly invested, this itself can become a sufficient enough resources to kickstart Indian economic engines.

Some think FDI is the way to control/lock-in foreign interests in India. I seriously doubt that will work because India has >$300B foreign reserves and others squeeze these balls if India plays with FDI.

3/ Cultural interests:
India doesn't benefit from Buddhism that's prevalent in Tibet. India needs the Buddhism of Burma. Hinduism is Bharat's soul and Buddhism is just part of it. If and when India exports culture to China, it should be Hinduism.

[manju]

Suraj, dhanyavad for the explanation...

[A_Gupta]

NaMo's speech at India-China Business Forum:
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/new ... 214402.ece

[A_Gupta]

An assessment of PM Modi's visit to China:
http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 790_1.html

And another:
http://www.enca.com/money/indias-modi-s ... hina-deals

Indian embassy trade counsellor Namgya Khanpa said the 21 agreements signed at the Shanghai event were "worth over $22-billion", with another five exchanged earlier.

Many of the contracts were for Chinese banks to finance Indian firms, and also included deals in the telecom, steel, solar energy and film sectors, she said.

They included an agreement for the China Development Bank to fund a power plant for India's Adani Power, as well as a steel project between Indian conglomerate Welspun and two Chinese firms, according to a list released by Indian officials. No individual deal values were given.

Modi welcomed potential Chinese investment in sectors including housing, renewable energy, high-speed rail, metro, ports and airports, adding that India was eager to draw on China's expertise in mass manufacturing.

"We are very keen to develop the sectors where China is strong," he told the business forum ahead of the signing ceremony. "We need your involvement."

[KJo]

Someone posted that the name China was given by Indians. Supposed to mean "Land to the East" in Sanskrit. how true is this?

http://www.quora.com/What-should-every- ... bout-China

# Historically, the Chinese name for India was Tianzhu - meaning heaven. In return, Indians called them by chin (after their most glorious empire - Qin) that eventually got caught by rest of the world now.

Interesting..
Now did the name China come because we called them Chin, or because they had an strong empire called Qin? In other words, were we a factor?

[schinnas]

Chinese pumping in $22B to India has a better chance of getting realized within a few years as opposed to the $45B promised investments to Pakistan. It indicates the level of cash pile Cheen has been sitting on. As shrewed businessmen, they would want to invest it where possibility of returns will be better. Over time, one would see more Cheen investments to India in areas that are win-win to both (otherwise one of the governments would not allow it). It is better to encourage it as long it does not impact our strategic interests because a much larger trade and business partnership will help moderate Cheen urge for any large scale adventurism along the border.

[RamaY]

Chinese pumping in $22B to India has a better chance of getting realized within a few years as opposed to the $45B promised investments to Pakistan. It indicates the level of cash pile Cheen has been sitting on. As shrewed businessmen, they would want to invest it where possibility of returns will be better. Over time, one would see more Cheen investments to India in areas that are win-win to both (otherwise one of the governments would not allow it). It is better to encourage it as long it does not impact our strategic interests because a much larger trade and business partnership will help moderate Cheen urge for any large scale adventurism along the border.

I doubt that.

China's comparative advantage vis.a.vis is in the following fields.
- Cash reserves
- Road construction
- HSR
- Electronics
- Manufacturing (standardized processes)

1/ Roads: If you take India's map and draw a grid of roads NS-EW for every hundred miles, you would need about 20-30,000 miles long roads in 10yrs. At $2B/1000m, we are looking at $60B investments in this and GoI is already allocating about $5B budget allocations per year. There is little scope for China to do in this other than providing loans (if it can) because we want to support local construction/infra companies using this program.

2/ Railways: China can help in this but I doubt India would prefer China to Japan/France in this. I think India has already made up it's mind in this.

3/ Electronics: This is where China can invest in India for mutual benefit. But the problem is this has national security implications (Trojans & snooping) and I wonder if India will allow Chinese investments in this field.

4/ Manufacturing: This is one field India may want China to come in they JV approach. But China would want 100% ownership (for it has cash, technology and manpower) which may not hep Modi's vision of Make in India with Indian labor.

5/ Cash reserves: This is what India needs to be honest. But $22B projects that take 3-5yrs to fruitify are nothing. Even Tata, Reliance are talking about investments in this range over 5yrs (Reliance announced RS 1L crore projects recently).

I don't think Chinese and Indian interests match in these areas. I thi China will limit its role to being a Bank to private projects.

[KLNMurthy]

Modi may become a Richard Nixon-like statesman, says this China daily

God forbid. Nixon and Kissinger handed over American economy to China.

[RamaY]

Modi may become a Richard Nixon-like statesman, says this China daily

God forbid. Nixon and Kissinger handed over American economy to China.

Nothing to worry. It's typical DDM that lionized the genociders of West and can't see any heroes beyond them. Modi will never be like any WASP leader.

[chaanakya]

E visa is a carrot for the western business leaders who have the ear of the politicians. WRT Chinese, there are no independent businessmen. They are government proxies. I do not see how this helps from Chinese perspective. Another way to look at it is, opening up avenues for 'future' 'potential' dissidents to seek refuge. They don't have to be Chinese. They could be Tibetan.

The e-visa system is not really a carrot anymore. Effectively the entire visa issuance process is moving to this system. Modi is simply milking it by 'offering' it to each new country he visits, for political mileage. Except for TSP/BD pretty much everyone will ultimately come under e-visa system. He's just cleverly using it as a simple sop for his own negotiating work. Why give it away by boring bureaucratic announcement when he can wrap it around a grand political gesture instead.

Yes, IVFRT is what is linked to e-visa now. Makes easy to track.

[member_23692]

India has lots of catching up to do

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.co ... idget_Stry

Another pseudo secularist, western stooge journalist...........what else is new

[Vriksh]

Diligence typically beats Intelligence.

I have read or observed first hand in Massa is that the East Asian Ethos (Chinese, Koreans and Japanese) engenders extreme diligence as well as rewards/channelizes intelligence. Germany also has the same ethos. There is an admirable nimbleness of thought in China that has made them what they are today. Their system works for them and has worked for them over the last 30 years.

In our system does not empower our citizens or play to our strengths (1. Innovation and 2. Out of the box thinking) and does nothing to ameliorate our weaknesses (1. Lack of Documentation 2. Scalable solutions 3. Diligence) that has to change. If I wish Indians to learn anything from Chinese it would be diligence and an ability to do gritty, focused back breaking hardwork without giving up. I don't think it is something older Indians are trained for but it is must for the younger generation to be competitive. A cursory reading of books such as "Tiger Mom" seems to indicate that Chinese raise their kids with "tough love" and in turn I find that most kids have an abiding loyalty to parents when they grow older.

Indian kids are in my honest opinion overprotected and pampered. Even kids in my family are like that and start wailing and running to parents at the first sign of adversity.

[panduranghari]

I agree Suraj. Why not milk it? It makes sense.

The tragic part is that India is willing to open its consumer hungry market of 1bn+ people to countries without boldly demanding how they should interact or not interact with countries in line with India's interest. For example, India scaled back dealings with Eye-ran in order to not upset Amir Khan, so it can continue to have access to their markets. But, why is it okay for Amir Khan to support Bakistan, for that last 50+ years, or China in the future and expect uninterrupted access to Indian markets? This tiger is taking too much time to come out of hibernation.

We are not opening up markets unless it's made in India. What is Minimum Alternate Tax after all? A tax on those who choose to take profits overseas. It's a way to make them keep funds internally on expansion within India, instead of sending the profits out. The costs of moving funds out is expensive under MAT. The carrot is hanging bait, they take the bait so they profit. They don't take the bait, someone else will. When Modi ji said make in India, he meant make in India for India.

[A_Gupta]

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 319216.cms
Gujarat CM Anandiben Patel scouts for investments in China

BEIJING: Following up on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's high-pitched campaign, Gujarat Chief Minister Anandiben Patel is scouting for more investments in China, including for the world's biggest fresh water reservoir proposed at Gulf of Khambat.

Patel, who met investors in Beijing yesterday, wants overseas investments to back the Rs 21,000-crore project that will tap water from rivers which otherwise drains into the sea.