Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[A_Gupta]

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/c ... roops.html

New Delhi: On June 9, a day before “Ex Operation Malabar” by the navies of India, United States and Japan was set to kick off and the day deliberations over India’s bid to join the NSG were to take place in Vienna, China demonstrated its intent of claiming Arunachal Pradesh as its own by sending hundreds of its troops into East Kameng district.

Four days after the development, defence sources, admitting that a “transgression” had occurred, said it was a “temporary” one. The Army is soon expected to lodge a protest with Beijing. Defence sources also said such incursions in this sector were “not routine”.

Media reports said about 250 PLA soldiers spent nearly three hours in Indian territory before going back to the Chinese side.

[Cosmo_R]

China drives India into the arms of the US

If the dimensions of the strategic partnership worked out by India and the US seem like a grand alliance targeted at you-know-who, China had better realise that it has fathered it,' says B S Raghavan, a long time observer of China.

"Alas, China has managed to shatter that vision by continuing to behave, in relation to India, like an insensitive, intractable, impolitic, implacable dragon in the China shop. I have been disillusioned to the extent of being driven to ask myself whether all the effort that India has put in from the time of Nehru to be on its right side has been futile."

Raghavan, the answer to your belabored quest is "yes" . You don't get accommodation from a position of weakness.

To quote JRRT/LOTR:

'Surety you crave! Sauron gives none. If you sue for his clemency you must first do his bidding. These are his terms. Take them or leave them!'

You don't nuzzle up to Smaug and suggest a division of the spoils.

Raghavan his IFS/IAS clique knackered Indian foreign policy to our detriment today. Now he wants to reluctantly embrace the US to stay relevant as a writer.

Oh please!

[SSridhar]

Chinese scholars may soon get India visa easily - Bharti Jain, ToI

India may soon remove China from the prior referral category (PRC) for issuing of research visas, according to sources in the home ministry. This will follow a similar concession announced recently for conference visas sought by Chinese citizens.

"We are actively considering a proposal to relax restrictions for issue of research visa to Chinese nationals. By removing China from the list of PRC countries as regards research visa, we seek to facilitate research projects/assignments of Chinese scholars on Indian soil as their applications will no longer be subjected to elaborate scrutiny by the security establishment prior to clearance," said a home ministry official.

Research visas are given to research professors or scholars and participants attending research conferences/seminars/workshops.

China has seen major relaxations in its visa regime with India under the Modi government. Modi had last year announced launch of e-tourist visa facility for Chinese citizens. Around a fortnight ago, India took off China from the list of PRC country as regards conference visa.

"PRC restrictions will still apply to Chinese citizens seeking business or employment visas, apart from certain categories of even conference and research visas," said an officer of the security establishment.

The easing of visa regime with China comes even as India is trying hard to secure membership of the nuclear suppliers group (NSG), but is wary of running into a Chinese wall. China had earlier opposed NSG waiver for India in 2008. For long, China has been bracketed with Pakistan, apart from stateless persons, under the restricted category for granting of visas, which necessitates prior security clearance based on inputs and verification by intelligence agencies.

Incidentally, Beijing is yet to reciprocate with similar relaxation in its visa norms for Indian citizens.{It continues to issue stapled visas}

[SSridhar]

The “Asian Space Race” and China’s solar system exploration: domestic and international rationales - Cody Knipfer, The Space Review

This lengthy article analyzes the reasons behind some of China's space projects.

On April 22, the China National Space Administration announced its plan to launch a robotic Mars mission in 2020, to reach Mars by 2021. The project will involve an orbiter, a lander, and a rover. If successful, it will be China’s first visit to Mars and could mark the first Asian landing on the Red Planet, putting it in an elite group of nations that have successfully landed on the planet.

This announcement comes on the heels of a number of other Chinese space achievements and aligns with China’s other ambitious short-term space goals. In 2007 and 2010, China launched the lunar orbiters Chang’e 1 and 2. Chang’e 3, which launched, landed, and deployed a rover on the Moon’s surface in late 2013, was the first lunar soft-landing in 37 years as well as the first Asian soft-landing on the Moon.

Looking ahead at the next five years, China intends to conduct a lunar sample-return program with the lander Chang’e 5, expected to launch in 2017, and a potential Chang’e 6 mission in the early 2020s. Meanwhile, in 2018, Chang’e 4 will land on the lunar farside, the first surface exploration effort of its kind.

A common question for those studying, analyzing, and otherwise involved in space programs is that of rationale. Why do we go to space? What value do we derive from our activity, be it human or robotic, beyond the bounds of Earth? These questions go beyond the philosophical: their answers directly affect policy, planning, financing, and technological development.

Much has been made of the national security aspect of China’s space program, and for good reason: the dual-use nature of space assets and the strategic advantages of space supremacy are compelling to an increasingly assertive military power such as China. Yet unlike activity in Earth orbit, lunar and interplanetary exploration is of marginal direct national security value. Still, the Chinese government has evidently committed its political weight and financial resources to an ambitious, multi-element campaign of solar system exploration.

What motivates China’s robotic exploration aspirations? Moreover, what are the implications of those motivations for American policymakers? And more broadly, what does a “case study” of China’s efforts indicate about overall present-day rationales supporting a robotic exploration program?

Broad rationales for robotic exploration

Numerous rationales for space exploration have been issued and debated over the years. Of the more compelling arguments regarding what motivates policymakers to pursue a space program, those that highlight the prestige, national security, and geopolitical benefits are most supported by historical evidence.

Early rocketry was driven by the pursuit for ICBM capabilities. The international politics and competition of the Cold War were manifest in the Space Race, serving as leading rationales and motivations for the Apollo landings. The joint American-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz mission underscored a display of international cooperation and détente. National security rationales influenced the formulation of the Space Shuttle, a program intended in part to carry Defense Department satellites to orbit. The Soviet Buran project was a response to the shuttle, spurred by Soviet security concerns over American spaceplane capabilities. Space Station Freedom was in large part a prestige project, and the eventual cooption of Russia into the International Space Station was motivated by the national security desire to keep Russian engineers, technologies, and capabilities in “friendly” post-Soviet Russian hands.

These examples, of course, focus squarely on human spaceflight. What of robotic exploration? Non-human exploration through robotics is often seen as an “extension of human capabilities,” capable of engaging in research endeavors and pursuing a deeper understanding of the universe beyond the reach of a human presence. Accordingly, a principal motivation for robotic exploration is the pursuit of science and knowledge.

The endeavor of robotic exploration also reflects geopolitical interests and involves the pursuit of prestige, albeit with a lower profile than human missions. Discoveries and scientific breakthroughs are demonstrative of a country’s brain power, an element of its soft-power standing. Following the successful New Horizons mission to Pluto, for example, public commentators and NASA made note that the United States became the first country to visit every planet in the solar system. Arguably, Soviet and American robotic exploration post-Space Race was a “brain race,” a continuation of the technological competition and duel for soft-power influence that marked relations between the two countries throughout the Cold War. Notably, following the failure of their crewed heavy-lift N-1 rocket program, the Soviet response to the first Apollo missions was Luna 16, a robotic spacecraft that conducted a lunar sample return.

Drawing historical evidence from the Cold War era to argue that geopolitics and prestige were primary motivators of robotic exploration admittedly stands on shaky ground. Both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued human spaceflight in tandem with their robotic programs. Those campaigns of human spaceflight overshadowed robotic exploration as demonstrators of prestigious might and international superiority. Yet in the present day, the emerging space powers in Asia that lack an indigenous human spaceflight program—India, Japan, and South Korea—have evidently pursued and found robotic exploration as an equal substitute for displays of geopolitical strength and technological superiority. After all, as an “extension of human capabilities,” robotic exploration involves the elements of prestige and power that come associated.

As is increasingly apparent and as noted by multiple commentators and sources, a “space race,” involving significant competition through solar system exploration, is blossoming between these Asian space powers and China.

Today’s robotic space race

India became the first Asian power to successfully reach Mars orbit with its Mars Orbiter Mission, or Mangalyaan, probe in 2014. Looking to the future, India and France have signed a cooperative agreement for a joint mission involving a Mars orbiter in 2020, and have signaled that a Mars lander wouldn’t be far off. Meanwhile, India deployed the Chandrayaan 1 lunar orbiter and impactor in 2008 and has plans to launch Chandrayaan 2, featuring a lunar orbiter, lander, and rover, in late 2017.

Japan’s Hagoromo lunar orbiter, deployed in 1990, reached orbit but ceased transmitting enroute. The country’s SELENE orbiter and impactor, launched in 2007, was a success and Japan now has plans to land a rover on the Moon’s surface in 2018. Though the Nozomi spacecraft sent to Mars, launched in 1998, was a failure, Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency has been considering plans for a robotic sample-return mission to one of Mars’ moons in the early 2020s. Meanwhile, Japan has embarked on a successful campaign of asteroid exploration, with the Hayabusa spacecraft returning a sample of asteroid material in 2010 and the Hayabusa 2 spacecraft, launched in 2014, scheduled to return more asteroid material in 2020.

South Korea has its own Moon campaign, with hopes to reach the Moon with an orbiter by 2018. A subsequent Moon lander is planned for 2020 or sometime shortly thereafter. The lander phase of the program will correspond with the development of a new, heavier-lift South Korean launch vehicle.

Lending credence to the idea that these campaigns of robotic exploration constitute a “space race” is that these countries’ efforts, running simultaneous with each other, occur at a time of significant tension, conflict, and competition between them and China. Just as the Earthly politics of the Cold War influenced American and Soviet space policy and prompted rationales for programs, politics influence the current intent and aspirations of Asia’s space powers. China’s space efforts fit neatly and understandably within the emerging robotic space race.

The motivations of the geopolitical environment are of great significance for China’s space program, and to understand the domestic and international rationales behind China’s robotic exploration a brief discussion of China’s context is necessary.

China’s context

The People’s Republic of China is a rising global power seeking to establish political, military, and economic hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese leadership is motivated by two principal concerns. First, the government is intent on asserting Chinese power, both hard and soft, to achieve those international aims. Second, as a single-party undemocratic state built upon the Chinese Communist Party’s legacy, the leadership seeks to tangibly demonstrate progress that resonates with the Party’s narrative of continual economic prosperity, scientific achievement, and national pride and unity so as to legitimize continued one-party rule.

Crucial among the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative is the legacy of “national humiliation” and the subsequent aspiration to achieve “great power” status. Drawing from the past half-century’s precedent of superpower capabilities, China’s leadership has concluded that, for China to be seen as a great power in the eyes of its own population, its neighbors, and the broader international community, the country must possess the features characteristic of one, such as an advanced technology sector, a force-projecting blue water navy, and a space program.

These motivations feed directly into the domestic and international rationales underlying China’s space efforts, including its robotic exploration of the solar system.

Domestic rationales

China’s space efforts and high-profile space activities, such as the Chang’e 3 lander and the upcoming plans for lunar sample return and a Mars rover, seek to tangibly and propagandistically validate the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and entrench its hold on power. They are conducted to demonstrate that the Chinese Communist Party is the best provider of material benefits to the Chinese people and the best organization to propel China to its rightful place in world affairs.

A nation’s rhetoric is indicative of its rationales and motivations. Space missions are routinely described in the Chinese media and in government statements as advancing and enhancing China’s power and prestige, rousing national ethos, and inspiring people of all of China’s ethnic groups for “the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics.”

In its “Space Activities in 2011” white paper, the Chinese government laid out its rationale for actively pursuing a space program. The paper stated, “Space activities play an increasingly important role in China’s economic and social development. [Now is] a crucial period for China in building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform and opening-up, and accelerating the transformation of the country’s pattern of economic development. China [pursues space] to meet the demands of economic development, scientific and technological development, national security and social progress; and to improve the scientific and cultural knowledge of the Chinese people, protect China’s national rights and interests, and build up its national comprehensive strength.”

In 2007, following the success of the Chang’e 1 orbiter, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao issued statements on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission (CMC), three leading organs of the Chinese government. He said that Chang’e 1 “demonstrates that our comprehensive national strength, our creative capabilities and the level of our science and technology continues to increase, with extremely important practical implications… for strengthening the force of our ethnic solidarity.”

During the landing of Chang’e 3, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang were at the Beijing Aerospace Control Center to hear the mission declared a success. In a congratulatory message, the Communist Party’s Central Committee, State Council, and the Central Military Commission called the mission a “milestone in the development of China's space programs and a new glory in Chinese explorations.”

A commentary in the state-run Xinhua news agency opinioned that the success of Chang’e 3 was a realization of China’s space dream, “a source of national pride and inspiration for further development, [that makes] China stronger and will surely help realize the broader Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.”

In another Xinhua article, describing China’s Mars plans, a leading motivation for the upcoming mission is that “exploring the Red Planet and deep space will cement China’s scientific and technological expertise. The knock-on effect is that innovations and independent intellectual property rights will surge, and, as a result, China's core competence will increase, pushing development in other industries.”

This economic and scientific rationale is a key motivator for China’s robotic exploration program. As President Xi Jinping stated in a speech (note: link is in Chinese) to the Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2014, China is “closer than at any other time in its history of reaching its mighty goal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese people” and must “continue by resolutely implementing the strategy of using science and education to rejuvenate the country and innovation to drive development and unswervingly continue on the road of making China into a strong science and technology power.”

To that, the robotic lunar exploration program is a “major strategic decision by the Party Central Committee, State Council, and CMC taking a broad look at our country’s overall modernization and construction by grasping the world’s large science and technology events and promoting our country’s space enterprise development, promoting our country’s scientific and technological advancement and innovation, and improving our country’s comprehensive national power.”

China’s scientific exploration of the Moon has centered around the composition of the lunar surface. The country’s researchers are particularly interested in helium-3, with the hope that Chinese excavation of the material could eventually power a nuclear fusion reactor.
As can be seen in the Chinese rhetoric issued on its robotic exploration, China’s intent on becoming a “rejuvenated” and “great” power underlie these motivations. To that, they feed into the international rationales for Chinese exploration, as too does the geopolitical environment in which China currently exists.

In the words of the head of China’s first phase of lunar exploration, “Helium-3 is considered as a long-term, stable, safe, clean and cheap material for human beings to get nuclear energy through controllable nuclear fusion experiments. If we human beings can finally use such energy material to generate electricity, then China might need 10 tons of helium-3 every year.” More to the point, he continued with “the harvesting of Helium-3 on the Moon could start by 2025. Our lunar mining could be but a jumping off point for Helium 3 extraction from the atmospheres of our Solar System gas giants, Saturn and Jupiter.”

Clearly, a myriad of development, technological innovation, economic prosperity, and national pride rationales influence the Chinese government’s plans and aspirations for robotic exploration. As can be seen in the Chinese rhetoric issued on its robotic exploration, China’s intent on becoming a “rejuvenated” and “great” power underlie these motivations. To that, they feed into the international rationales for Chinese exploration, as too does the geopolitical environment in which China currently exists.

International rationales

China’s ambition for space achievement is driven by a belief that the technological, economic, and prestige benefits that result increase China’s national power, thereby enhancing China’s overall influence and giving China more freedom of action.

This is critical for China’s standing and position in the international community. China is pursuing hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, prompting major security concerns among its neighbors, but does so at its own risk: China’s neighbors are among its top trade partners, and are thereby responsible for China’s continued economic growth. This requires a delicate strategic balancing act in which China must minimize confrontation with potential foes and regional competitors, lest conflict undermine its critically important development goals and thereby sour the Communist Party’s legitimizing narrative, while at the same time strengthening economic ties with them. In turn, China’s neighbors are pursuing hedging strategies in which they strengthen security ties with China’s main military competitor—the United States—while continuing to seek beneficial economic arrangements with China.

In light of this strategic posturing, China’s hope is to arrive at a position of such eminence and clout through its economic dominance and soft-power influence that its neighbors simply defer to its wishes instead of confronting its rise. The successful execution of this strategy would avoid a regional or global conflict that would lay ruin to the interconnected and co-reliant economics of the Asia-Pacific. China’s pursuit of robotic exploration and the prestige of achievement is a method by which it seeks to arrive at that eminence.

Comments from leaders in China’s space sector and government reflect that intent. Ye Peijian of the Chinese Academy of Sciences wrote that, with China’s Mars mission, “we are not the first Asian nation to send a probe to Mars, [but] we want to start at a higher level.” Primer Wen Jaibao noted that Chang’e 1 was “raising our international standing.”

Space cooperation in the robotic sphere supports China’s goal of establishing a multipolar world, undermining the global unipolar hegemony currently enjoyed by the United States.

China’s neighbors, of course, understand the Chinese strategy and have thus pursued their own robotic exploration programs as a method to undermine China’s rising influence. Chinese achievement in space is less prestigious, and carries less weight in regional geopolitics, when its neighbors have succeeded with equivalent missions in a similar timeframe. Hence, the Asian space race.

It’s important to note that China’s rhetorical explanation for space exploration emphasizes its peaceful nature, an attempt to posture and portray the country as being on a “peaceful” rise, one which its neighbors should not fear. China’s 2011 space white paper notes that “China will work together with the international community to maintain a peaceful and clean outer space and endeavor to make new contributions to the lofty cause of promoting world peace and development.” Following Chang’e 3, President Xi Jinping noted that the mission was an “outstanding contribution of China in mankind’s peaceful use of space.”

Finally, there is an element of international cooperation within China’s robotic program that serves China’s purposes. While some commentators have rightly pointed out opportunities for deeper cooperation between China’s space agency and others (see “Time for fresh thinking about collaboration in space”, The Space Review, May 2, 2016), it is important to note that space cooperation does not drive relations on Earth but rather reflects them. The Apollo-Soyuz program, for example, was a result of increasing détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, not the catalyst. Nonetheless, space cooperation can strengthen China’s international position, increasing its influence among less developed countries and building China’s reputation as that of a reliable and attractive space partner.

To that end, space cooperation in the robotic sphere supports China’s goal of establishing a multipolar world, undermining the global unipolar hegemony currently enjoyed by the United States. In no position yet to compete with the United States for global hegemony, China hopes to arrive at a position of rough equality, or at least similar influence, in the international balance of power so as to shape and define it to fit its national interest.

As an example of this: China’s longest cooperative space relationship is with Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. Notably, Russia in the present day is also seeking to disrupt the United States’ dominance of the global order through its actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. China has a long-term cooperation plan with Russia resulting in technology transfer, agreements, and cooperation on deep space exploration. China’s first attempt at a robotic Mars mission, the Yinghuo 1 orbiter, was launched attached to Russia’s Phobos-Grunt probe, which ended in failure. Even still, Russia is receptive to cooperating with China on the future exploration of the Moon and Mars.

Meanwhile, the European Space Agency and China have begun to seek out and identify areas in which the two can cooperate on future robotic space science missions and exploration.

These international rationales for robotic exploration, along with the domestic, drive Chinese space policy. China’s space policy, meanwhile, is an element of its broader policies and strategy for regional hegemony, “great power” status, and domestic development. For the United States—whose hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is at risk by China’s rise—the implications of China’s robotic exploration should be carefully considered. As with trade and economic policy and national security strategy, this consideration is necessary to develop policies that sustain and preserve the United States geopolitical leadership.

Implications for American policymakers

In China’s robotic exploration, three principal implications arise for American policymakers.

First, China’s campaign of solar system exploration is a reflection of its quest for domestic economic and technological development—facets of China’s pursuit of “great power” status—and should therefore be regarded as a metric to gauge China’s progress toward that status. China’s leadership has calculated that robotic exploration is one foundation by which to build the nation and has accordingly poured financial resources into that exploration. So long as China’s present-day strategy remains the country’s guiding plan, this robotic exploration will continue.

As such, changes in China’s intention for robotic exploration will indicate a change in Chinese grand strategy, signal a change in the rhetorical narrative underpinning the Communist Party’s legitimacy, or reflect a major downturn in the economic strength and technological capabilities supporting the Chinese effort. The particular details and ramifications of any of these changes have yet to reveal themselves, but would undoubtedly necessitate a major strategic reaction or shift by the United States.

Sino-American cooperation in robotic exploration may be one method by which the United States could to co-opt China’s rise and quest for influence.

Second, China’s campaign of solar system exploration is a reflection of its quest for international standing and regional influence. So long as that quest continues, so too should China’s robotic efforts. As such, so too will the competing space efforts of China’s wary neighbors. If the United States wishes to undermine China’s rise to regional hegemony, the opportunity to do so through heightened cooperation with or support for the space programs of U.S. Asian allies—Japan, India, and South Korea—presents itself as a strategically available and beneficial option.

Third, China’s campaign of solar system exploration involves elements of international cooperation which may undermine US leadership in space and, as a result, leadership on Earth. Countries not sharing the United States’ security concerns may turn to China as a partner with which to pursue space exploration. China may seek out avenues for cooperation with countries it is building relationships with, at the detriment to US influence with those countries. More importantly, one of the United States’ most established and prominent allies, the European Union, has sought deeper ties with China in space. Though international cooperation is space does not directly influence relations on Earth, this is a reflection of a gradually shifting balance of power where a multi-power world, in which multiple great powers with space exploration capabilities seek cooperation with each other, is emerging from the current one dominated by United States technological and geopolitical hegemony.

This point invariably prompts discussions of Sino-American cooperation in space exploration. That is too broad a discussion, with too many positives and negatives in favor of and opposed to the idea, for the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, the rationales behind China’s exploration program will motivate any change in current law preventing cooperation in space between the United States in China or lend credence to the preservation of the legal status quo.

It is the opinion of the author, however, that Sino-American cooperation in robotic exploration may be one method by which the United States could to co-opt China’s rise and quest for influence. China will invariably pursue solar system exploration for its national interest; without the opportunity for cooperation with China in space exploration, the United States stands by idly as the Chinese pursue other partners and objectives at the detriment to American global influence. If the Chinese are seeking to rise in the international system so as to change it and are doing so in part through solar system exploration, it may be wise strategy for the United States to cooperate with—and co-opt—the Chinese in order to preserve the American national interest and international status quo to the greatest extent possible.

China as a case study

Though the domestic and international context supporting them are unique to the country, China’s rationales for robotic exploration are indicative of the present-day motivations for programs of solar system exploration.

Whereas the rationale for human spaceflight in the 1960s and early 1970s was to win a space race, so too is the rationale for robotic spaceflight in the 2010s and beyond.

Robotic exploration goes beyond the pursuit of science and knowledge, though those are key goals for and benefits derived from such exploration. It directly connects to a country’s goals of economic and technological development, national pride, and international influence and clout. To that end, robotic exploration supports a country’s broad grand strategy—its geopolitical posturing and domestic planning.

For countries that lack programs of human exploration, robotic missions serve as equivalent substitutes through which they derive the prestige and political benefits that manned spaceflight provides. India, Japan, and South Korea have pursued relatively ambitious programs of robotic exploration at least in part to compete with China, just as the Soviet Union and the United States pursued human spaceflight and human Moon missions to compete with each other.

To that end: some have argued that the United States and China are not nor will be in a space race. It is true that the United States and China will likely not be locked in competition for equal achievement and prominence in human spaceflight; the United States remains the predominant spacefaring country in the world. Yet the thesis of those arguments miss the mark: more than just competition in space, a space race is an element of broader geopolitical competition, such as what the United States and China—and India, Japan, South Korea, and China—now find themselves in. So long as geopolitical tensions and shifts to the regional and global balance of power continue, so too will these countries find themselves racing in space to support and satisfy their race on Earth. Whereas the rationale for human spaceflight in the 1960s and early 1970s was to win a space race, so too is the rationale for robotic spaceflight in the 2010s and beyond.

[SSridhar]

Malabar 2016: Chinese spy ship shadows Indian, US, Japanese naval drill in the Western Pacific - Reuters

A Chinese observation ship shadowed the powerful US aircraft carrier, John C. Stennis, in the Western Pacific on Wednesday, a Japanese official said, joining warships from Japan and India in drills close to waters Beijing considers its backyard.

The show of American naval power comes as Japan and the United States worry Beijing will look to extend its influence into the Western Pacific with submarines and surface vessels as it pushes its territorial claims in the neighbouring South China Sea.

Beijing views access to the Pacific as vital both as a supply line to the rest of the world's oceans and for the projection of its naval power.

The 100,000 ton Stennis, which carries F-18 fighter jets, joined nine other naval ships including a Japanese helicopter carrier and Indian frigates in seas off the Japanese Okinawan island chain. Sub-hunting patrol planes launched from bases in Japan are also participating in the joint annual exercise dubbed Malabar.

The Stennis, which has been followed by the Chinese ship since patrolling in the South China Sea, will sail apart from the other ships, acting as a "decoy" to draw it away from the eight-day naval exercise, a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force officer said, declining to be identified because he was not authorized to talk to the media.

Blocking China's unfettered access to the Western Pacific are the 200 islands stretching from Japan's main islands through the East China Sea to within 100 kilometres of Taiwan. Japan is fortifying those islands with radar stations and anti-ship missile batteries.

By joining the drill Japan is deepening alliances it hopes will help counter growing Chinese power. Tensions between Beijing and Tokyo recently jumped after a Chinese warship for the first time sailed within 24 miles (38 km) of contested islands in the East China Sea.

The outcrops known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China lie 220 km (137 miles) northeast of Taiwan.

Wary of China's more assertive maritime role in the region, the US Navy's Third Fleet plans to send more ships to East Asia to work alongside the Japan-based Seventh Fleet, a US official said on Tuesday.

For India, the gathering is an chance to put on a show of force close to China's eastern seaboard and signal its displeasure at increased Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean. India sent its naval contingent of four ships on a tour through the South China Sea with stops in the Philippines and Vietnam on their way to the exercise. {In a few years' time, Philippines & Vietnam would also be part of Ex. Malabar}

[Gyan]

Article XXI

How do the efforts to liberalise trade square with the provisions under Article XXI that allow a country to impose sanctions, and hence restrict trade, in order to ensure its national security interests? The short answer to this would simply be that they don’t. The reality, however, is somewhat more complex.

http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=100

Economic Sanctions and the WTO


What does Article XXI on security exceptions say? It states that

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The WTO provisions in Article XXI thus entitle a member to interrupt its trade relations immediately, without prior notice and without leaving much room for the target country to dispute the measures under the relevant dispute settlement procedures.

http://www.wl-tradelaw.com/wto-rules-an ... ian-trade/

s drafted, the Security Exceptions in Article XXI(b) and (c) are qualified. Article XXI(b) allows a WTO member to take any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other establishment; and taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations. Article XXI(c) allows a WTO Member to take any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Although these exceptions are qualified, many have taken the view that WTO Members have an absolute right to rely on the Security Exceptions to justify any action that violates WTO obligations.


https://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb5/ ... huetzt.pdf

Is on the point that China cannot do much if we show them the middle finger and ban their imports

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=g-u ... ns&f=false

Another link on similar issues

[SSridhar]

No incursion into Arunachal Pradesh; it is our land: China - PTI

China today rejected allegation of incursion by its troops in Arunachal Pradesh, saying the Sino-India border has not yet been demarcated and the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army were conducting "normal patrols" on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control.

"China and India border has not yet been demarcated," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Lu Kang told media briefing here answering a question of reports of 250 Chinese troops entering Yangste, East Kameng district on June 9.

"It is learnt that China's border troops were conducting normal patrols on the Chinese side of the LAC (Line of Actual Control)," Lu said.

The big contingent of PLA soldiers stayed in the area for few hours and left for their base, the reports said.{I hope the Indian Army reciprocates such behaviour.}

The incursion into Arunachal Pradesh came at a time when China is opposing India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on the ground that India has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Beijing, which is reportedly backing Pakistan's application into the 48-member nuclear club controlling the nuclear commerce, is calling for consensus about admission of the new members.

On the issue of incursions, China has been maintaining the same stand whenever its troops crossed into the Indian side of the LAC stating that both countries have difference perception about it.

While both sides in recent years managed to reduce tensions between the troops patrolling the disputed areas with various mechanismS, China has not responded positively to India's proposal to demarcate the 3,488 km of the LAC to avoid border tensions.

The two countries have so far held 19 rounds of boundary talks by Special Representatives. {I think we should show no interest in these useless boundary talks, citing Chinese incursions}

[SSridhar]

China shaken of US, India, Japan triumvirate: Chinese spy ship sneaks into Japanese territorial waters tracking Indian ships - PTI

TOKYO: A Chinese navy spy ship today entered Japan's territorial waters for the first time in over a decade while tailing two Indian naval ships during trilateral Malabar naval exercise attended by the US, India and Japan.

Japanese P-3C patrol aircraft spotted the Dongdiao-class intelligence vessel sailing in territorial waters to the west of Kuchinoerabu Island at around 3:30 AM (1830 GMT Tuesday), Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroshige Seko told reporters.

The ship travelled on a southeasterly bearing and left Japan's territorial waters south of the prefecture's Yakushima Island around 5 AM, Kyodo news agency quoted Seko as saying.

It was for the first time that a Chinese spy ship was detected in Japanese water since a submarine was spotted in 2004. The latest intrusion came less than a week after another Chinese naval vessel sailed near islands at the centre of a Tokyo-Beijing sovereignty dispute in the East China Sea.

"The Chinese military vessel moved in after an Indian ship sailed into Japan's territorial waters as it participated in a Japan-US-India joint exercise," Defence Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters.

A senior Foreign Ministry official lodged a protest with the Chinese Embassy here over its military activities in view of latest intrusion.

"We are concerned about the Chinese military's recent activities," Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida told reporters.

Japanese officials said they are analysing China's possible motives behind the two actions.

"The government will continue to exert every effort in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding the country," Seko said.

As to the spy vessel's case today, the Defense Ministry said it entered the waters while tracking two Indian naval ships that were participating in ongoing Malabar naval drills.

In Beijing, Chinese officials defended the naval vessel's entry into the waters, saying the passage was in line with the principle of freedom of navigation and international rules.

Under international law, ships of all countries, including military ones, are entitled to the right of "innocent passage" through territorial waters as long as it would not undermine others' security.

"There is no need to provide notification or to get authorisation in advance," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said in Beijing.

"So if Japan insists on hyping up this issue in the media, we have to question its motives."

[jagga]

Scuffle at border as Indian troops counter aggressive Chinese incursions in Arunachal Pradesh

During the normal banner drill, the PLA troops striking an aggressive posture tried to attack the Indian Army personnel physically but were overpowered immediately, official sources said today.

[member_23370]

The chinese are rattled to the core. Before the NSG meeting I expect a few more CVN's to fins their way to SCS. Obama is using Bush's strategy. The only thing missing are the Ohio's.

[svinayak]

The chinese are rattled to the core. Before the NSG meeting I expect a few more CVN's to fins their way to SCS. Obama is using Bush's strategy. The only thing missing are the Ohio's.

The extent of the US India agreement being elaborate and broad based was a surprise for PRC China

There are some hidden aspects of the agreement which only China understands. More later on that.

Before PM Modi arrived in US there was back door diplomacy and lobbying by China Pak lobby in DC
They wanted to find the text of the agreement and also omit anything which would impact them. PRC could manage the removal of south china sea.
But they are still unhappy since India get support for all the things which China was wary about.

There may have been evil eyes on PM Modi visit to DC. PRC has activated its army at the Indian border even before Modi visit. The threat and the blackmail to India is overt to get a direct veto on the US India agreement.

All these postures are to test the relative strengths of PRC on one side against India US standing together.

There has been previous threat before.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world ... nsion.html

He added, however, that growing cooperation with the United States had forced China to take India more seriously.

Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, dismissed the idea that the grouping could be revived, and said that India would not join such a network for fear of Chinese retaliation.

“China actually has many ways to hurt India,” he said. “China could send an aircraft carrier to the Gwadar port in Pakistan. China had turned down the Pakistan offer to have military stationed in the country. If India forces China to do that, of course we can put a navy at your doorstep.”

[member_23370]

China has no functional aircraft carrier. Heck the Vikrant with harriers would be enough for that floating junk yard they have.

[SSridhar]

Lost in the palace of Chinese illusions - G.Parthasarathy, Business Line

New Delhi appeared shocked by China’s recent veto of action against the chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Maulana Masood Azhar, when there was widespread support in the UN Sanctions Committee to act against him for his role in the Pathankot attack. The UN declared the Jaish-e-Mohammed a terrorist organisation in 2001.

The former director-general of the ISI, Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, acknowledged in Pakistan’s parliament in 2004 that the Jaish-e-Mohammed was responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament — an action that took the two countries to the brink of war. This veto was, however, not an isolated action by China, which has long backed Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India.

Old news

China’s contacts with radical Islamic groups backed by the ISI is nothing new. It was one of the few countries that had contacts with high-level Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, during Taliban rule between 1996 and 2000. There was even a Chinese offer to establish a telephone network in Kabul during this period. Moreover, after the Taliban was ousted from power in 2001 and was hosted by the ISI in Quetta, the Chinese maintained clandestine contacts with the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura. China recently joined the ISI to sponsor a so-called Afghan-led peace process with the Kabul government.

Beijing appears convinced of the need to have an ISI-friendly government in Kabul. The mandarins in Beijing evidently favour such a dispensation in the belief that the ISI will rein in Taliban support for Uighur Muslim militants in Xinjiang.

While India received overwhelming international sympathy and support during the 26/11 terrorist carnage, the Chinese reaction was one of almost unbridled glee, backing Pakistani protestations of innocence. The state-run China Institute of Contemporary International Relations claimed that the terrorists who carried out the attack came from India. Moreover, even as the terrorist strike was on, a Chinese ‘scholar’ gleefully noted: “The Mumbai attack exposed the internal weakness of India, a power that is otherwise raising its status both in the region and in the world.”

Not to be outdone, the foreign ministry-run China Institute of Strategic Studies warned, “China can firmly support Pakistan in the event of war”, adding, “While Pakistan can benefit from its military co-operation with China while fighting India, the People’s Republic of China may have the option of resorting to a strategic military action in Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh), to liberate the people there”. Rather than condemning the terrorists and their supporters, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang urged India and Pakistan to “maintain calm” and investigate the “cause” of the terror attack jointly. The visiting chairman of Pakistan’s joint chiefs of staff general, Tariq Majid, was received in Beijing like a state dignitary by Chinese leaders, with promises of support on weapons supplies ranging from fighter aircraft to frigates.

Powerful lobbying

China has developed strong lobbies in Indian business. Political parties, journalists and academics act as apologists for its actions even when such actions constitute what can only be described as unrelenting hostility towards India’s national security concerns. Even the ‘ayatollahs’ of nonproliferation in the US who rant and rave against India’s nuclear and missile programmes, suddenly lose their tongue when it comes to condemning Chinese actions. They have documented evidence on how China initially provided nuclear weapons designs to Pakistan for its enriched uranium warheads and also upgraded Pakistan’ uranium enrichment capabilities. More ominously, China provided a range of designs and materials for Pakistan to develop plutonium reactors, heavy water plants and plutonium separation facilities in the Khushab-Fatehjang-Chashma nuclear complex. This has enabled Pakistan to make light plutonium warheads and embark on the production of tactical nuclear weapons.

This development has seriously enhanced the prospect of Pakistan triggering a nuclear conflict by the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan now no longer speaks of a “credible minimum deterrent” but of possessing a “full spectrum deterrent”. There has been no other instance in the contemporary world of such largescale and unrestrained transfer of nuclear weapons capabilities as what transpired during the past four decades between China and Pakistan. Worse, while China balks at backing India’s entry to the Missile Technology Control Regime {China has not done that because it is itself not a member of MTCR} , virtually every ballistic missile in Pakistan’s inventory today is of Chinese origin. The 750-900-km Shaheen 1 is a variant of the Chinese DF-15 missile. Shaheen 2 and Shaheen 3 with a range of 1,700 km and 2,750 km respectively, are evidently variants of the Chinese DF-21A.

Strategic containment

New Delhi should have no doubt that Beijing’s ties with Pakistan are primarily motivated by a burning desire for the “strategic containment” of India. New Delhi appears to be still looking for a coherent strategy to pay back China in its own coin and raise the strategic costs for Beijing’s unrelenting hostility towards its security interests. India needs more pro-active coordination of its policies with those of key regional powers such as Japan and Vietnam, to meet the challenges China now poses. India, Vietnam and Japan should jointly seek to coordinate these efforts with the US. Washington, unfortunately, has a track record of striking its own deals with China, with scant regard for the interests of its partners. Moreover, while dealing with these maritime and strategic challenges, India has to simultaneously strengthen confidence building measures (CBM) on its land borders with China. These CBMs have been useful, especially after President XI Jin Ping’s visit to India, in maintaining peace along the Sino-Indian border. It is going to take a long time before the border issue is sorted out with China, in accordance with the Guiding Principles agreed to in 2005.

It is astonishing that in all these years there has been no significant or sustained diplomatic effort by successive governments in India to focus attention on these developments. And the less said about our journalists and academics visiting the Middle Kingdom, the better. They are generally busy singing the praises of their hosts than bothering about such issues. While the invitation to Chinese dissidents for a meeting in Dharamsala could have been handled more professionally, China should be made to pay a price for meddling in developments in our north-eastern States.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan

[RKumar]

No incursion into Arunachal Pradesh; it is our land: China - PTI

China today rejected allegation of incursion by its troops in Arunachal Pradesh, saying the Sino-India border has not yet been demarcated and the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army were conducting "normal patrols" on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control.

"China and India border has not yet been demarcated," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Lu Kang told media briefing here answering a question of reports of 250 Chinese troops entering Yangste, East Kameng district on June 9.

As Sino-India border has not yet been demarcated, what is stopping us to perform "normal patrols" few kilometres deep in Tibet. It will give some energy to Tibetans living in Tibet

[SSridhar]

As Sino-India border has not yet been demarcated, what is stopping us to perform "normal patrols" few kilometres deep in Tibet. It will give some energy to Tibetans living in Tibet

For all you know, that may be happening too. It is for China to publicize such 'intrusions', but they may choose not to do so for various reasons. On its own, India would not talk about that because, after all, it is on its territory !

[arun]

Fu Xiaoqiang a “research fellow with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations” writing in the P.R. China Government Controlled paper Global Times on India’s Nuclear Supplier Group aka NSG membership.

Presuming Fu Xiaoqiang is parroting the Communist line, P.R.China seems happy to accept India’s NSG membership in exchange for India subordinating her foreign policy to toeing P.R.China’s line:

As long as all NSG members reach a consensus over how a non-NPT member could join the NSG, and India promises to comply with stipulations over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while sticking to its policy of independence and self-reliance, China could support New Delhi's path toward the club.

Beijing could support India’s NSG accession path if it plays by rules

[RKumar]

For all you know, that may be happening too.

I disagree with your above sentence. We might be visiting our land controlled by Sino but doing "normal patrols" few kilometres deep in Tibet via AP route .... na na. I am highly doubtful with our current military preparedness. Because of our Dharmic values, we don't try to snatch others valuables/land. But this is not we can expect to get back in return.

It is for China to publicize such 'intrusions', but they may choose not to do so for various reasons. On its own, India would not talk about that because, after all, it is on its territory !

I completely agree with your comments.

[Prem]

Fu Xiaoqiang a “research fellow with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations” writing in the P.R. China Government Controlled paper Global Times on India’s Nuclear Supplier Group aka NSG membership. Presuming Fu Xiaoqiang is parroting the Communist line, P.R.China seems happy to accept India’s NSG membership in exchange for India subordinating her foreign policy to toeing P.R.China’s line:

As long as all NSG members reach a consensus over how a non-NPT member could join the NSG, and India promises to comply with stipulations over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while sticking to its policy of independence and self-reliance, China could support New Delhi's path toward the club.

Beijing could support India’s NSG accession path if it plays by rules

IOW, They want surrity about Vietnam and Other Naams in China's neighborhood.

[DavidD]

For all you know, that may be happening too.

I disagree with your above sentence. We might be visiting our land controlled by Sino but doing "normal patrols" few kilometres deep in Tibet via AP route .... na na. I am highly doubtful with our current military preparedness. Because of our Dharmic values, we don't try to snatch others valuables/land. But this is not we can expect to get back in return.

It is for China to publicize such 'intrusions', but they may choose not to do so for various reasons. On its own, India would not talk about that because, after all, it is on its territory !

I completely agree with your comments.

Except you did try to snatch those lands, in '62, and just like now, the people of India were unaware of it and were caught off guard when the Chinese responded in kind.

[RKumar]

Except you did try to snatch those lands, in '62, and just like now, the people of India were unaware of it and were caught off guard when the Chinese responded in kind.

1) Which land are you talking about? Historically, India had no border with China till 1958-59 till China forcefully occupied a peaceful nation Tibet. And due to world's as well as India's stupidity no one protested against China's action.

2) We never tried to snatch any land. But world should support the Tibet to get freedom from China.

3) We have to take back our land which is forcefully occupied by Pak, China.

[SSridhar]

Except you did try to snatch those lands, in '62, and just like now, the people of India were unaware of it and were caught off guard when the Chinese responded in kind.

DavidD, can you substantiate your claim?

[sanjaykumar]

Wha? These Chinese are demonstrably robotised, denied information by their own great firewall of China, sponsored to parrot the party's position. Read something other than Global Times, or do you get sent to Turkestan (without a pistol) for that?

[BharadwajV]

Looks like someone got their history books from the

[sanjaykumar]

More likely they get their information from the back of a box of tea.

[SSridhar]

X-post from India Foreign policy thread.

India to export missile systems to 'certain' friendly nations: Manohar Parrikar - PTI

Government has decided in principle to allow export of missile systems to 'certain' countries who have friendly relationship with India, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said on Friday.

"The government had taken a very conscious decision about 4-5 months ago that 10 per cent of the missile capacity will be permitted to be exported if producers manage to get export orders subject to parameters set by the Union government and external affairs ministry," he told reporters here.

Policy of export was always existing earlier, but the problem was lack of spare capacity after meeting requirement of the country's armed forces, he said, adding that the production capacity for various missile systems like ' Akash ' had been been improved now.

"In-principle decision has been taken to allow exports to certain countries who are in friendly relationship with us... if they manage to export, then we would enhance the capacity by 10 per cent so that the forces are not deprived," he said.

Parrikar, here [Bengaluru] for the inaugural flight of indigenous basic trainer aircraft Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-40), was responding to a question on export policy.

On possible export of BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, which he had visited earlier this month, he said the southeast Asian country had expressed interest and a group would be set up to discuss about their requirement.

[deejay]

...

Except you did try to snatch those lands, in '62, and just like now, the people of India were unaware of it and were caught off guard when the Chinese responded in kind.

China snatches lands. China grabs what belongs to others. Communist China does not know geography. It does not know history. Worst! it takes the world to be same as the robotized Chinese it lords over. It could have been a friendly neighbor to India but the company China keeps tells its own story, no?

China has 02 friends only - One is NoKo and for someone to call NoKo friendly is a statement about that "someone".

Here is another friend of NoKo


Then there is the other friend of China - Tallel, sweetel, deepel, highel, stlongel - PAKISTAN! It really is a friendship which defines the Chinese mindset of identifying with what it thinks is good - exploit, grab, snatch. It starts as in the left cartoon and will end as in right cartoon. China snatches land just like Hitler snatched land for greater Lebensraum. It tried with India in 1962 and met its match. China can only exploit Pakistan and NoKo like states.

Here David for yours eyes to 2C

[SSridhar]

Silk Road to (economic) heaven - Talmiz Ahmed, Former Indian Ambassador to KSA

New Delhi is concerned about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project (CPEC), part of the new ‘Silk Road’, but it need not despair as India is an important part of the existing multi-polar Asia architecture.

The signing of the Chabahar port development agreement and the tripartite pact on a trade and transit corridor linking India, Afghanistan and Iran during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Iran has re-opened the discussion in New Delhi about what position it should adopt on the Chinese-sponsored logistics project, One Belt, One Road (OBOR).

Some background to this would be useful.

In September 2013, during a visit to Kazakhstan, China’s president, Xi Jinping, announced a Chinese initiative — the setting up of connectivities across the landmass of Eurasia and the waters of the Indian Ocean that would collectively be known as the OBOR. He anchored this vision in the old ‘Silk Road,’ which in his view had originated with the encounters of imperial envoy Zhang Qian (200-113 BC) with Central Asian civilisations over two millennia earlier.

Since then, the OBOR has become the most important element in Chinese economic and political diplomacy, as its leaders, officials and academics attempt to fine-tune their thinking and get more supporters — governments, officials and the corporate – on board for this dramatic enterprise that has the potential to fundamentally transform the world’s communications, and its economic and political landscape.

The old Silk Road

The old Silk Road had a vibrant life of over three millennia, linking Asia with Europe and emerging as the principal conduit for the movement of global trade, merchants, preachers, professionals and intellectuals. It was marked by hundreds of market towns: Xian, Chengdu, Kunming and Kashgar in China; Khotan, Samarkhand and Bokhara in Central Asia; Taxila, Persepolis, Bagram, Kandahar and Merv in India and Iran, and Tyre and Antioch in the Mediterranean.

The sea routes linked the ports of Northeast, Southeast and South Asia with the Arabian Peninsula, and then through the West Asian caravan routes, and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea routes, went westwards to the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires and culminated in Greece and Rome.

The impact of these connections was both material and civilisational: China and India, as the US academic Craig Lockard has noted, “were the great pre-modern centres of world manufacturing, producing iron, steel, silk, cotton and ceramics for world markets”. Beyond commerce, over the centuries these land and sea routes also facilitated the movement of religious and civilisational concepts – beliefs and practices of Zoroastrianism, Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam interacted with each other through these time-honoured links and shaped the civilisations of Mesopotamia, Persia, India and China and imbued western culture with these ancient Asian reflections and belief-systems.

The new Silk Road connections

The old Silk Road ceased to have much regional importance from the 15th century onwards on account of political and military disruptions across Eurasia, and the discovery of sea routes from the West to Asian markets. These sea routes in time led to western military and political control of the high seas, including the Indian Ocean, as also of almost all of the Asian lands, which now came under British, French or Dutch control. Thus, the main economic links of Asian countries were now with European states, with the centuries-old intra-Asian commercial and civilisational connectivities now consigned to the margins of their day-to-day experience.

This scenario of western political and economic domination of Asia began to change after the end of the Cold War. First, from the 1990s, Asian countries such as China and India began to achieve high growth rates and emerge as major economic powers. Second, these high growth rates in Asia generated a substantial increase in demand for energy resources, particularly for oil and gas. These were available in plenty in West Asia, leading to a shift in energy supplies from west to east. This surge in energy demand also meant that the West Asian producers came to enjoy extraordinary inflows of financial resources for domestic infrastructure and welfare development, and to invest in world markets.

The third factor that served to change the global power equation was the emergence of the Central Asian republics as sovereign states and their ability to play an independent role in the global energy and geopolitical scenario. These developments together brought an end to Western hegemony over Asia and for the first time in two hundred years gave Asian countries the opportunity to re-establish age-old connectivity with each other.

These new connections were in the areas of energy, trade and investment, and were shaped at a time of great economic resurgence across Asia. Thus, a decade before Xi’s announcement of the OBOR, a thriving “Silk Road” connectivity had already come to link the Asian countries and constitute their most important economic relationship. The OBOR thus proposes giving a physical shape to the existing rich and substantial ties.

The OBOR routings

Reflecting at the land and sea routes of the old Silk Road linkages, the OBOR has land and sea dimensions that converge at certain points, which together constitute an extraordinary seamless connectivity that embraces all of Eurasia and the Indian Ocean littoral. The Eurasian land connection, known as the “New Silk Road Economic Belt” or simply the “Belt,” is made up of railways, highways, oil and gas pipelines, and major energy projects.

Beginning at Xian, the legendary starting point of the old Silk Road, the OBOR will have two routings: one, across China to Kazakhstan and then Moscow, and the other through Mongolia and southern Russia to Moscow. Both routes will merge and then go on to European cities — Budapest, Hamburg and Rotterdam. The southern route will branch into one that will cross Iran and Turkey, and end at Budapest. It will have another branch from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar in the western province of Xinjiang.

The sea route, known as the “Maritime Silk Road” or simply the “Road,” made up of ports and coastal development, begins from China’s eastern ports and goes on to Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and then on to West Asia and the Mediterranean, embracing Greece and Venice and ending at Rotterdam. Both routes, again recalling the old Silk Road, will have a series of loops and branches, with the two main routes also meeting at important junctions, such as Gwadar, Istanbul, Rotterdam and Hamburg.

According to Korean scholar Jae Ho Chung, when completed, the OBOR will include 60 countries, with two-thirds of the world’s population, 55 percent of the global GDP and 75per cent of global energy reserves. It will consist of 900 infrastructure projects, valued at about 1.3 trillion US dollars. Much of the funding is expected to come from Chinese banks, financial institutions and special funds. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post has described the OBOR as “the most significant and far-reaching project the nation has ever put forward”.

Promoting the OBOR

The OBOR initiative has captured world attention for the sheer range and audacity of the concept, the extraordinary ambition that lies at its base and the significant resources — technological, human, financial and political — that will need to be garnered globally to realise the vision. Since the first announcement, Chinese officials and commentators have debated the project, fleshed out several loose ends and sought to bring as many countries as possible on board as partners.

These have included a series of engagements with policymakers in countries on the OBOR routes. The OBOR was of course initiated in Central Asia and China has obtained the support of these republics with promises of massive investment for regional development. Xi has said China will support the construction of 4000 kilometres of railways and 10,000 kilometres of highways in Central Asia, with nearly 16 billion US dollars of Chinese funding.

The next most important interaction China has had on the OBOR is with Russia. China has benefited from Russian estrangement from the West following the events in Ukraine – and the consequent abandoning of the Russian “Greater Europe” project that would have linked Vladivostok with Lisbon – and developed energy, financial, technological and defence ties with Moscow. This has led to Russian acceptance of China’s presence in Central Asia and the merging of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union project with the OBOR.

In October 2013, Xi reached out to the ASEAN countries and sought to bring them within the fold of the maritime route by invoking 14th century Chinese mariner Zheng He (1371-1433/35), who explored South and Southeast Asia, and proposing the building of a close-knit China-ASEAN community. Following this, Xi met a Gulf Cooperation Council delegation in January 2014 and attempted to make West Asia a partner in the OBOR as well.

The drivers of the OBOR

In promoting the OBOR, China is being driven by domestic and foreign considerations. The urge to achieve development in all of China’s 31 provinces is a major factor and all provinces have already affirmed their active participation in different aspects of the enterprise. The western province of Qinghai has indicated that it will build a rail, highway and aviation network to link the provinces and countries along the OBOR; Guangdong province along the coast will execute some major infrastructure projects, such as a power plant in Vietnam and an oil refinery in Myanmar.

The realisation of the OBOR will of course see the western province of Xinjiang playing a major role – its cities of Urumqi, Kashgar and Khorgos will be at the centre of many of the proposed routes. OBOR-related projects will also provide an outlet for China to use its overcapacity in steel, cement and construction materials, as also its surplus financial reserves.

Chinese scholar Tingyi Wang of Tsinghua University has explained that while the OBOR is prompted by China’s interests in energy, security and promotion of economic ties, it is actually driven by the vision of a “greater Eurasian idea” that calls for “strengthening economic and cultural integration” across this whole swathe of territory and building “a new type of international relations underpinned by win-win cooperation”. Wang summarises the Chinese strategy as “to guarantee its interests in this region and at the same time cooperate with the other powers”.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran sees the OBOR not just as economic initiative but one that has clear political and security implications; it is for Saran “a carving out by China of a continental-marine geo-strategic realm”.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The one aspect of the OBOR that has caused the greatest concern in India, both in regard to its land and maritime implications, is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Finalised in April 2015 on the basis of 51 agreements, the CPEC consists of a series of highway, railway and energy projects, emanating from the newly developed port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, all of which taken together will be valued at 46 billion US dollars. These projects will generate 700,000 jobs in Pakistan and, when completed, add 2-2.5 per cent to the country’s GDP. The CPEC has been described as a “flagship project” for the OBOR.

Gwadar will be developed as a deep-water port capable of handling 300-400 million tonnes of cargo per year. A new 1100-kilometres motorway from Karachi to Lahore will be completed, while the Karakoram Highway from Rawalpindi to the Chinese border will be re-constructed. Railway lines across the country will be thoroughly upgraded and expanded, with the road and railway network reaching Kashgar in Xinjiang. Oil and gas pipelines will be constructed, including a gas pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah, carrying gas from Iran. Most of the money will be spent on energy projects – about 10,400 MW of electricity will be developed between 2018-20, besides renewable energy, coal and liquefied natural gas projects. An 800-kilometres optic fibre link to boost telecommunications in the Gilgit-Baltistan region is already under construction. These projects will promote national economic development through industrial parks and special economic zones.

Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations described CPEC as “part development scheme, part strategic gambit” in a recent report. By investing heavily in Pakistan’s development, particularly in its backward regions, China is clearly addressing its own concerns relating to security problems whose roots are in Pakistan. The most important of these is the threat from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), made up of Chinese-dissident Uighur militant groups that have taken sanctuary in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas and are said to be linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The ETIM aims its violence at targets in China and also at Chinese interests in Pakistan.

Gwadar port, which will be developed and operated by Chinese companies will have both economic and strategic advantages for China. It will enable China to route the oil and gas purchases from the Gulf through pipelines that would bypass the West-dominated Malacca Straits, thus providing China with one more alternative route, besides the Sittwe-Kunming pipeline in Myanmar. Again, control over Gwadar would give China a permanent naval presence in the western Indian Ocean and a commanding position at the mouth of the Gulf. This dramatic expansion of the Chinese naval forces into what India sees as its home-ground is a matter of long-term concern for India.

India’s response to the OBOR

India’s official response to the OBOR has been cautious and relatively muted, but a perusal of academic writings and news reports affirm that India has deep concerns about the implications of the OBOR for its strategic interests. India shares the view of several countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia that far from being an enterprise founded on wide and substantial cooperation, the OBOR could in fact be the vehicle for China’s influence, if not hegemony, across Asia. After all, China is promoting the OBOR just when it is flexing its muscles in East Asia, particularly in regard to asserting its territorial claims unilaterally in the South China Sea.

India has more immediate and specific concerns, which pertain to the CPEC. The CPEC was announced within a month of the publication of the OBOR vision and action plan document, which had highlighted the need for extensive consultations across Asia. Clearly, no such consultations took place with India and the CPEC was presented Chinese-dissident Uighur. While India might share China’s position that extremism should be countered with development, it cannot accept that the CPEC’s logistical projects should pass freely through large parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Officially, India has focused on the absence of consultation from the Chinese side. Speaking at the inauguration of the Raisina Dialogue on “Asian Connectivity” in Delhi in March, Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar said, “The key issue is whether we will build our connectivity through consultative processes or more unilateral decisions. … we cannot be impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices”.

India’s connectivity projects

However, the logistics scenario in Asia is not as bleak from the Indian perspective as it might appear at first sight. While the OBOR captured global imagination when it was first announced over two years ago, it is important to recall that India is itself at the centre of major regional connectivity projects; these might lack the dramatic value of the OBOR, but taken together, they bring a number of solid partners and have the capacity of transforming the regional economic and geopolitical landscape to India’s advantage. India, thus, has little need to feel insecure about the OBOR.

The most important Indian connectivity project is of course the trade and transit corridor from Chabahar in Iran to Afghanistan, to link with the highway network of the latter; India has already contributed to this network with the Zaranj-Delaram highway.

This project has the greatest economic and strategic value for India since it provides unimpeded access to Afghanistan, enables India and Iran to contribute together to the economic development and political stability of Afghanistan, besides of course confronting the depredations of the Taliban. Over the long term, India would be in position to limit Pakistan’s quest for so-called “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, an aspiration that has caused great death and destruction in that country.

But, the importance of this project goes well beyond Afghanistan: it provides a highway across the relatively peaceful northern part of Afghanistan to all the Central Asian republics, culminating at Almaty in Kazakhstan.

The other connectivity project with which India is associated is the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC). Initiated in September 2000, over a decade before the OBOR, the INSTC had initially brought together India, Iran and Russia in an effort to create multi-modal links (ship-rail-road) from India to Europe, via the Gulf, Central Asia and Russia. The partnership was later expanded to include Turkey and the other Central Asian republics. A dry-run to check its viability was also successfully conducted in August 2014, after which transit and customs agreements were approved in September 2015.

These connectivity projects received a boost recently when the Indian cabinet approved India’s accession to the Ashgabat Agreement. This multi-modal transport agreement, that brings together India, Oman, Iran and the Central Asian republics, was initiated in April 2011, two years before the OBOR was announced. Its routing will be linked closely to the INSTC projects.

Closer home, India is looking at a number of connectivity proposals: these include the development of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal into a maritime hub, including a dry dock and a ship-building facility. Again, at the Sri Lankan port of Trincomalee, India has been looking at setting up a petroleum hub, besides activating the 80-year old tank farm in the strategically-located port city. India has also announced that it will develop a number of connectivity projects in South Asia, valued at 5 billion US dollars.

An OBOR-related project that involves India directly is the “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor,” or “BCIM-EC”. It will involve a combination of infrastructure and trade facilitation arrangements between the four countries, as road, air and water links are set up from Kolkata to Kunming in Southeast China at a total cost of 22 billion US dollars. Conceived in the 1990s, the BCIM-EC was formally endorsed by the four countries in December 2013 and is viewed as a part of the OBOR connectivity projects. While India will benefit in terms of the development of the Kolkata port and the opening up of the economic potential of the northeast states, China will obtain one more route bypassing the Malacca Straits.

China clearly does not have the monopoly for envisaging major connectivity projects in Asia, and India is fully capable of leading a number of important projects for its economic and geopolitical benefit.

Other extenuating factors

Besides the fact that India is a major role-player in a number of strategically important connectivity projects in its neighbourhood, there have been a number of developments relating to OBOR-related projects that constitute a reality check on Chinese ambitions and encourage a more cooperative mind-set on its part.

First, there is little doubt that China has recognised the need for more extensive and intensive dialogue with principal role-players such as India, whose participation in the OBOR would be crucial for the success of the project. Thus, Chinese officials and academics are anxious to remind us that the OBOR is still an evolving concept; in a paper presented in August last year at the Cambridge Research Meeting, Wang said, “[The] OBOR is still an unclear and unspecific conception, without an authoritative definition.

Actually, lots of debates and discussions about this new Silk Road are still going on inside and outside China.” He recognised the numerous challenges that the project faced, particularly from “complex religious and ethnic issues, active terrorism and extremism”, historical divisions across the region and competing geopolitical interests.

Similarly, according to Jia Qingguo,member of the standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and dean of international relations at Beijing University, “the idea is still at the planning stage. It will take years to come to fruition and will face many serious challenges along the way”. Finally, Lu Xiankun, a former Chinese trade negotiator, pointed out that the “OBOR is far from a fixed blueprint with detailed actions to be taken by all countries along the OBOR” and that many aspects need to be “developed, designed and consulted” before concrete actions can take place.

Second, China has already begun to understand the daunting challenges that would need to be addressed before the OBOR can become a reality. Wang, in his paper on OBOR’s connections with the Arab Gulf countries, noted the deep knowledge-gap between China and the Arab world, and even quoted a western observer who referred to their ties as “unnatural”.

Besides the geopolitical issues noted above, almost all the OBOR projects will be imbued with operational, financial, legal and regulatory, and sovereign risks on account of the wide diversity in the countries involved, and their geographical, political and economic situations. Thus, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s April 2015 report on the OBOR pointed out that just changes in governments following elections could place certain approved projects in jeopardy, as in Sri Lanka, or local activist groups could question certain projects on environmental grounds, as has happened recently with dam projects in Cambodia and Myanmar.

Hence, not surprisingly, while early writings on the project seemed to be China-centric, the principal focus of present-day comment by Chinese writers is on the need for participating countries to work closely together. Thus, Huang Yiping, a journalist for Caijing, and Chu Yin, associate professor of international relations at Tsinghua University, warned that the vision would not move forward if China were to adopt crude “great-power diplomacy” and excessive centralised planning.

Zhang Yuanyuan, speaking at a conference in Ulaanbaatar in October 2015, emphasised the “three togethers” in implementing OBOR – designing together, working together and sharing benefits together. Xiankun made this point robustly when he said, “OBOR emphasises a lot the need to integrate itself with the development strategy of OBOR countries, instead of imposing dragon claws on them.”

These considerations have led Yuanyuan to note that five points will govern China’s approach to project execution – policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, free movement of goods, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. Thus, Yuanyuan is echoing the remarks of Jaishankar who said Asian connectivity would need to take into account “institutional, regulatory, legal, digital, financial and commercial connections”, besides “the common cultural and civilisational thread that runs through Asia”.

Third, the problems that are already hampering the CPEC projects in Pakistan should reassure India that it is much easier to draw lines on the map than it is to realise projects on the ground. As of now, almost every aspect of the CPEC is mired in some controversy or difficulty. There have been criticisms in provincial assemblies over the routing of the railways and highways, and over non-transparency in financial matters.

There has also been opposition from Baloch nationalists and Gwadar residents. While the Balochis fear large-scale migration of outsiders and have attacked Chinese projects and workers, the people of Gwadar fear eviction from their homes. A dedicated force of 10,000 personnel has been deployed to protect the Chinese workers.

While both China and Pakistan remain committed to the successful completion of the proposed projects, this “flagship” proposal does exemplify the daunting difficulties that other OBOR projects will face as well. To divert attention from these problems, Pakistan’s army chief General Raheel Sharif declared that India has “openly challenged” the CPEC and is “blatantly involved in destabilising Pakistan”.

Fourth, interactions with other countries appear to have made clear to China that there are misgivings about the OBOR in several Asian capitals. Hence, Chinese writers are at pains to assert that the OBOR is nothing like the Marshall Plan: it is not the result of occupation; it will not be a “tool of geopolitics”; and all countries, the US, Japan, Russia and India, are welcome to join it.

To allay regional misgivings, Yan Xuetong advocated that China needs “to improve its image and expand friendly relationships” through a “new diplomatic approach” in the neighbourhood. Chinese comment now tends to play down the geopolitical aspects of the OBOR: the need for greater sensitivity and accommodativeness is the central feature of the “vision” document and action plan. The paper upholds the centrality of policy coordination across Asia, the need for trade liberalisation and financial integration, and above all, the importance of promoting “people-to-people links”. It recognises that the OBOR would be meaningless without policy coordination in crucial areas such trade, finance and investments.

Thus, though initiated by China, the OBOR can no longer be a Chinese project; for its success, it now needs to be an Asian enterprise.

Multi-polar Asia

In his remarks at the inauguration of the Raisina Dialogue, Jaishankar urged that China eschew the unilateral approach in promoting its connectivity projects on account of their obvious geopolitical implications. In this context, he observed that such a cautious approach was particularly important in Asia “in the absence of an agreed security architecture in Asia”. Instead, he advocated a “multi-polar Asia,” which he felt would be best achieved through “open-minded consultations on the future of connectivity”.

Jaishankar’s intervention has placed the connectivity issue at the heart of emerging regional and global strategic scenarios, highlighting the importance of matters such as — the nature of the world order that is taking shape at present, what role India will assume to define it, and where it will finally fit itself in these structures. Unfortunately, the discussion on these issues, in India and in several other world capitals, is often distorted by “zero-sum” thinking, a simplistic view that separates “us” and “them” into firm dichotomous categories. This is also what informs much Indian academic response to initiatives and projects with which China is associated.

There is little doubt that, as a major country, with pride in its history and civilisational values and the sense of its own destiny, China will be India’s rival and will compete for influence in different sectors — geographical, political, economic, cultural and ideational. But, this will still leave huge spaces where there will be a convergence of interests, and it is here that the two nations will explore how they can coordinate their capabilities to achieve the best results. Such cooperative efforts will take place both bilaterally and within multilateral fora, such as the BRICS, G-20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and even the UN Security Council; they can also take place in regard to the OBOR.

Both countries accept the importance of expanding connectivities in Asia, a continent that is rich in resources but unable to move these to markets where they are required. If connectivity projects were to be negotiated among the various stakeholders and decisions taken in accordance with the cooperative spirit, the strategic value of the projects would increasingly give way to their more important economic value, which would be the true “win-win” that Chinese policymakers have been emphasising lately. This would open the space for an active Indian role in respect of projects that serve its interests, such as BCIM-EC and those that would promote links to Central Asia and Russia.

This would apply to the security scenario as well. In coming years, it is most unlikely that a neat Asian security architecture will be put in place. At the same time, no sharp, dichotomous lines are likely to divide major world powers immutably. We will continue to have several polarities representing diverse interests, with different poles coming together from time to time to support specific issues. India will of course need to manoeuvre actively among the various interest groups, depending on the issues at stake.

Thus, while India has every reason to watch developments relating to Gwadar with close attention, there is no reason to despair: India is not without assets of its own in the shape of its place at Chabahar and its naval partnership with Oman. Indeed, India enjoys far greater influence in the Gulf than China does and is a more acceptable role-player in addressing the security concerns of that region in conflict. The major powers in the region – Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey – will also avoid firm alliances with world powers and, like India, will generally pursue policies of flexible alignment. A multi-polar Asia already exists and India is an important part of it.

There is no need to fear the OBOR—both the OBOR and China need India as a partner.

This was originally published in The Wire, India

[deejay]

^^^ Reacting to the general tone of what is written, I do not think there is any "fear" with regards to OBOR or CPEC in particular. There are concerns and they are logical. These have to be aired by the GOI (which it is doing). China has these mega / ambitious plans of connectivity but the result is more Chinese military in the area, be it IOR, CPEC corridor (Chinese troops in POK) or elsewhere. In this background the whole Chinese initiative appears military with some commercial civilian spin offs and not vice versa.

Even the use of Gawadar as an economically viable route for trade into China and Central Asia is not clear.

Further, India's concern is Chinese use of Indian territory of POK for bilateral agreements with Pakistan and deployment of its military in that region. Now, it is not a fear of CPEC which drives Indian reactions but the fallouts of not contesting Chinese action at this stage of the plan.

[SSridhar]

India : US :: China : US – Cyber and Bilateral Visits - Munish Sharma, IDSA

Cyber has been one of the key discussion items during both Prime Minister Modi’s just concluded visit to the United States and President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US some nine months back. After Xi’s visit, China and the US signed a Cyber Agreement in October 2015. India and the US will ink a cyber agreement in the next sixty days. Notwithstanding these similarities, the intent of and expectations from these two agreements are fundamentally different; the former is an attempt to manage insecurity and the latter is a quest for security. An analysis of the joint statements issued at the end of the Modi and Xi visits to the US highlights the contrasting differences in India and China’s bilateral ties with the United States in the cyber realm.

China : US - Cyber and State Visit

Xi Jinping’s state visit to the US took place in the shadow of a massive cyber-attack on the Office of Personnel Management (December 2014), which compromised the fingerprint records of 5.6 million people and Social Security numbers and addresses of around 21 million former and current government employees. 1 The US has been accusing China of theft of intellectual property targeted against its defence industries, private sector and key governmental functions; amounting to economic espionage. Accusations in this regard go back to 2004, when a series of coordinated attacks – dubbed as Titan Rain – targeted the computer networks of Lockheed Martin, Sandia National Laboratories, Redstone Arsenal, and NASA. Cyber espionage featured in every high-level talk and security report. The issue became more complex when the US Department of Justice indicted five officers of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) on the charges of hacking and economic espionage directed at US entities in the nuclear power, metals, and solar products sectors. This was the first time that the US judicial system had accused state actors of hacking and hurting the national interest in the cyber domain.

When Obama and Xi met, the two countries already had a history of a decade and a half of cyber confrontation, accusing each other of hacking and cyber-attacks. Moreover, the discord in approach towards Internet governance is also distinctly visible at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), where China is contesting the US stand on multistakeholderism, which China believes to be an encroachment upon its cyber sovereignty, and instead advocating multilateralism. The states’ role is supreme in China’s notion of multilateralism, while multistakeholderism professes equal role for businesses, civil society, governments, research institutions and non-government organizations. Cyber sovereignty for China encapsulates the right to censor and restrict information2 as well as maintain control over infrastructure, while the US advocates internet freedom.

Given all this, the China-US Cyber agreement is better seen in the context of conflict management or risk mitigation, although the two nations accepting cyber as a key security issue between them is noteworthy. The US desperately wants China to put an end to industrial or economic espionage, carried out at the behest of the PLA, and the agreement was precisely intended to do that. Following the agreement, in principle, the US and China have agreed to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.
India : US - Cyber and the Modi Visit

In contrast, India-US cybersecurity cooperation dates back to almost the same time as the beginning of China-US cyber confrontation. The India-US Cyber Security Forum was established in 2002. After slack activity for a decade, the dialogue on cyber between India and the US has gained considerable pace. The Fourth US-India Cyber Dialogue was held in August 2015, led by the US Cybersecurity Coordinator and Special Assistant to the President Michael Daniel and India's Deputy National Security Advisor Arvind Gupta, encompassing a range of cyber issues including cyber threats, enhanced cybersecurity information sharing, efforts to combat cybercrime, Internet governance issues, and norms of state behaviour in cyberspace.3 These efforts have been further strengthened during Modi’s just concluded US visit when cyber was placed high on the agenda.

India : US - Converging Interests

For India and the US, the security of cyberspace emanates from a common threat perception, democratic values and growing dependence. Both have reaffirmed their commitment to an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet, underpinned by the multistakeholder model of Internet governance.4 There are numerous non-government agencies in both countries that are working to support this cause. And the governments deem private sector to be a key partner in the governance and security endeavour primarily because most of the technology underpinning the Internet and critical information infrastructure, such as energy, transportation and financial services, lies in private hands. The private sector manufactures Information and Communication Technologies; designs, develops and deploys Information Technology solutions for governments as well; provides services such as Internet and Telecommunications and leads the research in cybersecurity. Therefore, India and the US reiterate the role of the private sector in Internet governance and cybersecurity, in contrast to China where the state retains control on critical information and Internet infrastructure.

Similar to the US, the Indian defence establishment and the ministries or agencies dealing with border security and foreign affairs have been key targets of hacking attempts originating from China. The emails of several high-ranking officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) were hacked into in 2013.5 India was a prime target of Ghostnet – a Chinese cyber espionage operation – unveiled in 2009. Cyber espionage operations and attacks of Chinese origin, aimed at India and the US, have been frequently termed as Advanced Persistent Threats, placing them high on the common threat perception, in addition to terrorism.

India and the US have been at persistent risk from terrorist attacks and the growing capabilities of terrorist outfits to conduct an array of operations in cyberspace, such as recruitment, fund raising, communication and coordination. This has given impetus for the two countries to share information and simultaneously persuade major players like Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook to swiftly respond to requests from Indian security agencies. As per the transparency reports from the second half of 2015, compliance with respect to information requests from Indian law enforcement agencies was only 42 per cent in the case of Twitter6 and 50.87 per cent for Facebook.7 And for the first half of 2015, Apple complied with only 19 per cent of device requests,8 one of the lowest in the world. As cooperation matures further, India would expect an increase in compliance from tech firms based in the US for legal information requests and prompt response to security related cases.

As the framework for Cyber security awaits formal inking, both India and the US have some wrinkles to iron out. The US would want India to join the Budapest convention, the legally binding mechanism to address cybercrime and develop norms for quick response. But India has some apprehensions in this regard especially given that it was not a part of the drawing process of the treaty. India, with the second largest Internet user base in the world, would certainly seek a larger role at ICANN. Moreover, given the American emphasis on military aspects of cyber, India and the US might not be on the same page on the question of applicability of international law to state conduct in cyberspace. Certainly, China would be watching this closely, as India and the US come forward in the cyber realm to address key security issues, discuss governance modalities, and forge cooperation over terrorism and crime counter-measures. China might learn that cooperation rests on trust, and trust would not fructify if it continues to intrude into other countries’ networks for espionage on economic and security issues.

[Austin]

US 'Hypocrisy' And Chinese Cash Strengthen Beijing's Hand In South China Sea

World |Simon Denyer, The Washington Post

Beijing: The latest was Kenya. Before that: Lesotho, Vanuatu and Afghanistan.

The list of countries backing Beijing's stance in the South China Sea just keeps growing - China's foreign ministry boasted this week that nearly 60 had swung behind their country's rejection of international arbitration in a case brought by the Philippines.

The numbers are questionable, while the idea of gaining the support of distant, landlocked Niger in a dispute about the South China Sea could seem faintly ludicrous.

Yet China's frantic efforts to rally support ahead of a ruling from an international tribunal in The Hague may not be as meaningless as they might seem. Cold, hard Chinese cash and what many see as American double standards are undermining efforts to build a unified global response to Beijing's land reclamation activities in the disputed waters and employ international law to help resolve the issue.

The lure of Chinese money is having an impact in the Philippines, where President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has made wildly contradictory comments on the issue but has suggested some openness to bilateral negotiations - if China builds railways there.

A farcical display of disunity from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this week was another case in point. On Tuesday, China sensed a mild rebuke when ASEAN appeared to issue a statement expressing "serious concerns" over rising tensions in the South China Sea, urging restraint in land reclamation and full respect for international law.

Within hours, the statement had been retracted for "urgent amendments." No revised statement ever emerged.

Beijing, experts said, was riled because the statement was issued at a meeting held in China and at a sensitive time in the run-up to the arbitration ruling, expected at any time in the next three months. It was withdrawn after China lobbied close ally Laos, an official at the talks told Bloomberg News.

Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, called it another "embarrassing" episode of ASEAN disunity.

"China didn't create the disunity in ASEAN, but it does exploit the divisions and uses its economic clout to try to get its way," Storey said. "China didn't want ASEAN to in any way support the arbitration process."

The Philippines took China to court in 2013 after the Chinese navy seized control of Scarborough Shoal, set amid rich fishing grounds off the main Philippine island of Luzon. Among other things, it wants the court to rule on whether China's "nine-dash line" - under which it claims most of the South China Sea - is consistent with international law.

China vehemently rejects arbitration and says it will ignore the court's rulings. It argues the Philippines had previously agreed to settle the dispute bilaterally and that the court has no jurisdiction over issues of territorial sovereignty.

Julian Ku, a professor of constitutional law at Hofstra University, says Beijing has "a very weak" case. The court, he points out, has already spent a year considering the question of jurisdiction and ruled that it does have the authority to consider many of the issues raised by the Philippines.

"While I have expressed strong criticism of the Philippines' use of arbitration (and the U.S. role in supporting it) from a strategic perspective, I don't have any such criticism of their legal arguments," Ku wrote in a blog post. "China's claim that it can legally ignore the pending arbitral award is not only wrong, it is legally insupportable."

The weakness of China's legal case may explain the vehemence of some of its propaganda. Officials portray China as the victim of a "vicious" and deceptive legal case. They accuse the United States of militarizing the region through President Barack Obama's strategic rebalance to Asia and encouraging Asian nations to seek confrontation with China.

"The U.S. cannot tolerate others challenging its global hegemony," China's ambassador to ASEAN, Xu Bu, wrote in the Straits Times, calling Washington "dictatorial and overbearing."

But legality is only part of the argument, since the court is not in a position to enforce any rulings. In the end, the matter will be settled militarily, in the chess game of global power relations or in some notional court of global public opinion.

And this is where American double standards come in. Despite efforts from the Bush and Obama administrations, the Senate has never ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

So when the United States, the European Union and Japan urge China to respect a "rules-based" international system, the admonishments often come across here as insincere.

Japan, experts point out, has ignored a 2014 ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against its whaling operations, and the United States ignored a 1986 ICJ ruling against the Reagan administration's support for Contra rebels in Nicaragua.

"More importantly, because the United States has never ratified UNCLOS, countries that have maritime disputes with it are unable to take it to legal arbitration," said Storey, arguing that the issue has become "even more glaringly apparent" in the run-up to the ruling.

Although the U.S. government says it follows UNCLOS as "customary international law," its failure to submit itself formally to its provisions rankles many nations - especially China.

"China is trying to emulate components of American exceptionalism that place the U.S. above other nations and international law," said Yanmei Xie, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. "The U.S. not ratifying UNCLOS just proves China's point."

Wang Dong, an associate professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University, underlined China's frustration with American "hypocrisy."

"Big powers rarely subject themselves to international law," he said. "That's the reality we have to face."

Aside from Russia, experts note that none of China's supporters are major maritime powers, while some question Beijing's tally. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that only eight countries have explicitly supported China's position, while Cambodia, Slovenia and Fiji have disavowed China's description of their views.

"The 60-country claim is complete nonsense," said Gregory Poling, head of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. "The vast majority have made very vague comments - in support of peaceful resolution or that negotiations are the best way to deal with conflict - and China takes that and says, 'See, they side with us in the arbitration.' "

Nevertheless, China's ability to get poorer countries on its side could be important if the issue ever comes up at the United Nations.

"China can also portray this as the West against the Third World, of the developed world bullying the developing world," Xie said. "The narrative matters."

But however the arbitration panel rules - and however Manila reacts - China won't be giving an inch on its territorial claims in the South China Sea. A move to declare an Air Defense Identification Zone - under which foreign planes would be asked to inform Chinese authorities before entering airspace above the South China Sea - would be seen as provocative and seems unlikely for now, but Beijing won't be letting up in its drive to expand its military presence in the South China Sea, experts say. That spells more tension with the United States.

© 2016 The Washington Post

(This story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)

[SSridhar]

^ China has effectively used Laos & Cambodia to cause disunity within the ASEAN. This was not the first time that a joint ASEAN statement regarding China led to issues. A few years back, the ASEAN could not issue a joint statement after their annual meeting in Cambodia. That was the first time in ASEAN's history that a meeting ended without a joint statement due to differences. The sticky point again was Indo-China Sea (ICS). The subversion was carried out by Cambodia which rejected any reference to ICS in a joint ASEAN statement claiming that disputes were bilateral, a Chinese position.

Now, on the upcoming ITLOS arbitration, it is not going to be completely against China. The expectations should be suitably tempered. The ITLOS may even claim some of the issues raised by the Philippines are sovereignty issues that come under the International Court of Justice. It will therefore be only a partial victory for the Philippines. But, China will reject that and nobody can do anything about that. Possession is nine-tenths of the case and China is militarily and economically threatening all its neighbours who simply cannot stand up to it. That's why it insists on bilateralism in the ICS issue and is sabotaging a united ASEAN stand.

China is a direct and ominous challenge to world order.

[member_28442]

Even if asean issues a strong worded statement, it's not like the Chinese are going to care much.

These are just optics, asean countries will be stuck in getting strong statements out instead of any real action, just an extra hurdle to jump, but a pointless one

[SSridhar]

Even if asean issues a strong worded statement, it's not like the Chinese are going to care much. These are just optics,

In the end, we know that China is one of the biggest violators of all treaties that it signs. But, that is another matter. Optics do matter internationally and that is why countries go to extraordinary lengths to justify their misdeeds even when they are so obviously wrong. In the case of the ASEAN meet at Phnom Penh, the Chinese mounted enormous pressure on that country to sabotage the issue. If one reads about that, one will understand. If they didn't care so much, they did not need to have done all those things. Even in the ICS issue, though PRC decided not to attend the ITLOS arbitration, it has answered all the charges against it one way or another.

. . . asean countries will be stuck in getting strong statements out instead of any real action, just an extra hurdle to jump, but a pointless one

ASEAN countries have no power to challenge China and they know it, we know it and the world knows that too. What do you want them to do, just buckle under Chinese aggression without even putting up a pretence of a fight? The ASEAN countries have to do what they have to do just as the Chinese have to appear to be sticklers for international covenants, agreements, conventions etc.

[DavidD]

ASEAN countries have no power to challenge China and they know it, we know it and the world knows that too. What do you want them to do, just buckle under Chinese aggression without even putting up a pretence of a fight? The ASEAN countries have to do what they have to do just as the Chinese have to appear to be sticklers for international covenants, agreements, conventions etc.

At the current trajectory (i.e. rise of China), buckle is probably what they'll have to do. One doesn't win wars by fighting battles they can't win. Of course, the current trajectory may not hold, which is why they're still putting up a fight. Not a pretense of a fight, mind you, an actual fight. It may not be a hot war but it's a fight with a clear goal in mind, which is the delaying the buckling and waiting for a possible change in trajectory. This ain't no optics, this is geopolitics.

[Cosmo_R]

quoting Talmiz " ....There is no need to fear the OBOR—both the OBOR and China need India as a partner."

Another Raghavan/MKB. The IFS was infested with these guys who have gone on to write the fifth columns in DDM. Termites.

[hnair]

DavidD, wanted to check with you, there seems to be an acute shortage of chinese URL-posters in these forums. Earlier days, there used to be a lot of posters, a few perfunctory trolls and at least one pesky troll. Any thoughts?

[kmkraoind]

India's bid for NSG: Members countries talking about alternate plan if China remains unmoved - Economic Times

Perfect strategy. Now China cant run with hares (India's trade surplus) and hunt with hounds (Pakistan). NSG event will shape future geopolitics of Asia. I think NaMo opening up of defence FDI is a signal to west that, India not a competitor, but a collaborator.

With this in mind, India has pursued a 'peeling the onion' strategy. This meant systematic targeting of possible naysayers through its key backers. So if it leaned on us to bring countries like Mexico on board, it had Germany work on Switzerland and Australia on New Zealand. Gradually, numbers have dwindled with only a few doubtful cases. India's calculations hinge on peeling the onion in a way that China remains the last country standing.

New DELHI, sources said, is working to take the situation to a point that Beijing will have to explain why it's opposing India's aspirations. And also why such a move could be a permanent setback to the India-China relationship. That's where Prime Minister Narendra Modi's possible meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of the SCO summit a day before the NSG main plenary is crucial, added sources.

[kit]

Good one .. I doubt China will let that "last man standing" happen. It would be a shameful loss of face diplomatically they won't let that happen unless very stupid !

[DavidD]

DavidD, wanted to check with you, there seems to be an acute shortage of chinese URL-posters in these forums. Earlier days, there used to be a lot of posters, a few perfunctory trolls and at least one pesky troll. Any thoughts?

Not sure really, but I know BRF is blocked in China. I've tried it in a 3rd-tier city in southern China and I've tried it in multiple locations in Beijing. According to past posters, there might have been an easy workaround with mobile internet, which I didn't try, so perhaps that got shut down as well? Just my guess, but I definitely noticed the same thing.

[kmkraoind]

Indonesian president sails to South China Sea islands in stern message to Beijing - Japan Times

President Joko Widodo’s visit along with his chief security minister and foreign minister was described by Indonesian officials as the strongest message that has been given to China over the issue.

A presidential palace statement said Widodo intended to hold a Cabinet meeting aboard the warship.

“In the course of our history, we’ve never been this stern (with China). This is also to demonstrate that the president is not taking the issue lightly,” Chief Security Minister Luhut Pandjaitan told The Jakarta Post newspaper.

I think CPC is sensing its losing grip on Chinese economy, and they are raising bush fires all over, so that one may become big and they can intervene militarily, and rally Chinese around it. If not, why China is foolishly poking every neighbor?