Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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nirav
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by nirav »

@managing the Chinese threat.

We are severely lacking in the propagandu aspect.
The Khan's are past masters of it and are very good at formenting trouble in hostile countries.

We meanwhile have enough haramis in our own media who are excellent at such propagandu.

We need to launch a large effort to reach out and influence Chinese dhimmis. In a country of a billion+ I'm sure their dhimmis would be large in numbers.

A combined Indo US effort on this front can cause major takleef for the Chinese.
China threat must be 'managed' from within China.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Chandragupta »

Unlike Indian dhimmis, you can't put out your message easily to Chinese dhimmis and even if you could, those dhimmis can't do live randi rona on their national TVs like our dhimmis do 24x7.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by nirav »

Chandragupta wrote:Unlike Indian dhimmis, you can't put out your message easily to Chinese dhimmis and even if you could, those dhimmis can't do live randi rona on their national TVs like our dhimmis do 24x7.
we forget, even way back there was that brave/foolish chinese guy who stood infront of tanks @ Tienanmen square..
let there not be Chinese dhimmi discussions on their TV channels .. there are many ways to instigate people. we can incite tibetans, encourage them to pick up arms .. incite the always ready to eggsplode beards in xinjiang .. give them diplomatic and moral support for their human/religious rights being violated daily by the chinese ..

if India and US so decide, we can foment way too much trouble in Chinese mainland that they'd have their hands full.
We've sufferred this for long. Its time to give some action to the Chinese.
Divert "Ford foundation" funding and activities to China for starters ..
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by GopiD »

pankajs wrote: My take on this is slightly different.

Unlike the bakis we, as a nation and people, have many competing interests and that is one reason that even BJP/Modi hasn't tried to grab POK by force. Now, if it did't make sense to make a play for POK with a relatively peaceful Indo-Chinese border, does it make sense to go that route while the Indo-Chinese front is hot?

It is no ones interest, certainly not in India's, to provoke a wider conflict. Just check the careful messaging from India during the surgical strike or even now wrt the Doklam area form our side. It however makes sense to use any opportunity, provided by the bakis, to demolish the bridges built to bypass the attabad lake. That will cut the CPEC artery and delay that project for about 2-3 years. It will also send a message to both Bakis and China on our intent and capacity to take on CPEC while still keeping things localized.
That's a valid point Pankaj ji, but think about this. If ever we make a dash towards POK, there will always be a big chinese element to it because of CPEC. Also, if we ever touch the CPEC infra, its not localised anymore. Both Bakis and Chinese have invested too much political and financial capital on CPEC to let it go. I am willing to trust our IA chief when he says we are ready for 2.5 front wars. I am pretty sure, it would be a hold policy on the east and thrust policy in the west. I am sure the plan involves all the force allocations to this end.

All I am saying is the thrust might give us an opening to central Asia. As much we would like to keep it local, they wouldn't let it be one if we touch CPEC.

Isn't it strange that things are awfully quiet in our west, especially now that we have locked horns with the dragon. I think, more than us, the dragon would want us to keep this local and not touch CPEC. And, maybe this why the deeper than ocean friends have asked the Bakis to not provoke us this time around. JMT.

P.S., I am not dhoti shivering. I am just saying that we should take the invite and make it our party.
Last edited by GopiD on 07 Jul 2017 15:21, edited 2 times in total.
Iyersan
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

No Sabre rattling I say for today, The chini media is too silent
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by chola »

Unless we go to war with this opportunity regardless of what the PRC does, the long term strategic position of India is left to chance.

They've already opened up their front in OBOR. That is war by economics. That is Cheen's strength. We can't challenge them in this, not when OBOR alone is as much as half the Indian GDP.

We must fight where WE hold the advantage and that is in real warfare and in our theater.

If we don't fight now, we are pretty much just hoping that OBOR fails and that we don't wake up in a world full of chini rail, roads and ports all around us with ships and aircraft in endless streams from their factories backed by an endless printing press.

Hoping is not a strategy. Not against that printing oress and that industrial complex.

We need to fight. We need to go war. Making Cheen lose "face" has no strategic value since the US, Japan, Taiwan, both North and South Korea make them lose "face" at their doorsteps all the time. What is missing is the actual breaking of the PLA.

The USSR was a military power that the US took down with economics by bankrupting it through arm races. Cheen is an economic power that we can break through war.

We need to go to war with Cheen. Waiting for OBOR and all the other chini projects to just happen is no strategy.

We need to fight.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by pankajs »

GopiD wrote:That's a valid point Pankaj ji, but think about this. If ever we make a dash towards POK, there will always be a big chinese element to it because of CPEC. Also, if we ever touch the CPEC infra, its not localised anymore. Both Bakis and Chinese have invested too much political and financial capital on CPEC to let it go. I am willing to trust our IA chief when he says we are ready for 2.5 wars. I am pretty sure, it would be a hold policy on the east and thrust policy in the west. I am sure the plan involves all the force allocations to this end.

All I am saying is the thrust might give us an opening to central Asia. As much we would like to keep it local, they wouldn't let it be one if we touch CPEC.

P.S., I am not dhoti shivering. I am just saying that we should take the invite and make it our party.
No one can read your posts, at least the last couple, and make that assumption. Rather, you would be classified on the hard option side. OK, lets move to the meat of your points.

IA chief, when he talks of 2.5 front war, is referring to a *defensive* posture where the cost of holding enemies at bay is cheaper than talking the war to the enemy. Offensive in a mountainous region is even more expensive.

Lets revisit the surgical strike for answers. Indian force infiltrated into Baki held territory and after operations retreated back. So there is you first hint. Modi GOI does not have plans to extend India's hold to territories under baki control, at least now right now. The messaging to the world in general too was to buttress that point.

Was the surgical strike escalation? Most definitely. Could Bakis have escalated? Most definitely. That they did not was their choice but holding on to a chunk of territory under their control most definitely would have prompted a *direct* response.

Did we pull back to avoid a direct response? Most definitely. Even if the bakis had choosen to respond, given the terrain and that we were in the defensive would have worked to our advantage.

If we take out the bridge(s) on CPEC, will it escalation? Most definitely. Could Bakis/cheenis escalated? Most definitely. But again it will be their choice and we will be in defensive posture and they will required 3-9 times our force to even make a decent play with the chance of THEIR failure very high.

OTOH, if we make a play for POK, we will need to field 3-9 times their combined forces in POK to make a decent show but the chance of OUR failure will be very high.

The odds favor a targeting of CPEC without going for an all our POK grab. Perhaps they too will lob a few missiles into Kashmir, perhaps targeting a bridge or two.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Karthik S »

chola wrote:Unless we go to war with this opportunity regardless of what the PRC does, the long term strategic position of India is left to chance.

They've already opened up their front in OBOR. That is war by economics. That is Cheen's strength. We can't challenge them in this, not when OBOR alone is as much as half the Indian GDP.

We must fight where WE hold the advantage and that is in real warfare and in our theater.

If we don't fight now, we are pretty much just hoping that OBOR fails and that we don't wake up in a world full of chini rail, roads and ports all around us with ships and aircraft in endless streams from their factories backed by an endless printing press.

Hoping is not a strategy. Not against that printing oress and that industrial complex.

We need to fight. We need to go war. Making Cheen lose "face" has no strategic value since the US, Japan, Taiwan, both North and South Korea make them lose "face" at their doorsteps all the time. What is missing is the actual breaking of the PLA.

The USSR was a military power that the US took down with economics by bankrupting it through arm races. Cheen is an economic power that we can break through war.

We need to go to war with Cheen. Waiting for OBOR and all the other chini projects to just happen is no strategy.

We need to fight.
Can you imagine how strong we would have been if BJP came to power atleast in 2009? That lost decade is haunting us now.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Pratyush »

What do you know eleven and modi met at g 20 summit. What ever happened to atmosphere not being conducive to the meeting.

Blow 2 modi :((
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by sudhan »

Isn't this meet already a loss of face for the Chinese??

I hope NaMo gave 11 with one of his 'bone-crusher' handshakes, to put some sense in him and his minions..
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Karthik S »

Image
Gopal Baglay‏Verified account @MEAIndia 56m56 minutes ago
At d BRICS leaders' informal gathering @ Hamburg hosted by China, PM @narendramodi and President Xi had a conversation on a range of issues
Cheen is embarrassing itself. That's all.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

Modi meets Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit and discusses a range of issues. De-escalation???
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by amit »

^^^
I think the expressions of the Indians (including the PM) vis a vis the Chinese (including Eleven) in this picture says it all. :-)
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by nirav »

doval saars smirk is priceless :rotfl:

meanwhile the eleven led chicoms, sab ke muh pe baara baje hain :mrgreen:
Last edited by nirav on 07 Jul 2017 16:47, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by amit »

Iyersan wrote:Modi meets Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit and discusses a range of issues. De-escalation???
Unlikely they would talk about the border standoff during a Brics summit. What probably happened is China got trapped in its own rhetoric. If it had refused to meet then it would have slighted the entire Brics summit, which China wants to use as one of the vehicles to increase its influence. And hence, despite the announcement of no meeting Eleven had to shake hands and look happy. Someone from the Chinese side is going to have a very, very bad hair day.

Just have a look at AD's expression in the picture. :-)
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/dokl ... 96466.html

Doklam dispute: China says 'nothing to do with 1962', India has 'ulterior motives'

As the stand-off in the Doklam plateau which abuts the three countries continues, Beijing has reiterated its view that Indian troops were in its territory and had crossed the India-China border, and that a withdrawal was a precondition for dialogue.
Ananth Krishnan | Posted by Nivedita Dash
Beijing, July 7, 2017 | UPDATED 15:18 IST



China today denied it had violated any understanding with India over the China-India-Bhutan tri-junction point, suggesting India had "ulterior motives" in raising concerns and that had successive Indian governments had "recognised" the 1890 Sikkim-Tibet treaty.

As the stand-off in the Doklam plateau which abuts the three countries continues, Beijing has reiterated its view that Indian troops were in its territory and had crossed the India-China border, and that a withdrawal was a precondition for dialogue. India and Bhutan see this territory as Bhutan's, and said China was building a road and thus altering the status quo.

Asked if there were any agreements on the trijunction between India and China after the 1962 war - which itself was a major alteration in the status quo along the India-China border - the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said, "The Indian government has repeatedly recognised the effectiveness of the 1890 Convention on the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim. It has nothing to do with 1962 war since it has already been recognised by the Indian side. Once it has been recognised, the convention has been effective and it has nothing to do with passing of time or changing of governments."

While China claims the 1890 convention establishes the trijunction at Mount Gipmochi (Gyemo Chen), which is south of where India and Bhutan see the point near Batang La, India has pointed out that it accepted the convention only insofar as the "basis of alignment" of the boundary.

Moreover, in 2012, India says China had recognised the dispute over the trijunction when both sides reached a common understanding that trijunction boundary points will be finalised in consultation "with concerned countries". Bhutan, for instance, was not party to the 1890 convention. Delhi also said that "any attempt to unilaterally determined the trijunction points" is in violation of this understanding.

Geng rejected this argument, saying, "There is no violation of the 2012 understanding. "The so-called trijunction point as its name implies is a point instead of a line or area. The convention between Great Britain and China relating to Tibet and Sikkim in 1890 says the Sikkim section commences in the east at Mount Gipmochi. The illegal trespass by Indian border troops in the Sikkim section is 2000 metres from Mount Gipmochi."

"So it has nothing to do with trijunction point," he added. "In disregard with the boundary convention, the Indian side takes the entire Doklam region as part of trijunction. That is out of ulterior motives. The Indian side introduced idea of trijunction point into the incident and attempts to enlarge the point into an area. That is absurd and out of ulterior motives."
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by pankajs »

There is a lot of khujali in the Indian media. They go out of their way to bring the Chinese point to the Indian masses. I don't see a similar effort by the Chinese media.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

pankajs wrote:There is a lot of khujali in the Indian media. They go out of their way to bring the Chinese point to the Indian masses. I don't see a similar effort by the Chinese media.
Pankaj Sir,
Incase you follow Ananth Krishnan on Twitter, you can find a live video of a Chinese rail metro station showing comparision details of China and Indian armed forces.
Chinese have stated the public PR :evil:
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

One way to manage the border in the Sikkim area around the tri-junction is for India to ask Bhutan for a border re-alignment with India so as to be able to encircle the Chinese all the way up to the disputed region by them with Bhutan...almost close to Yadong/Yathung in the valley. This way Bhutan which is finding it tough to deal with Chinese incursion on their own, will have better security and India also gets what it wants complete encirclement of the Chumbi valley area. Bhutan can still remain independent with this minor adjustment. All Bhutan loses is small parts of its two districts at most.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

China in a Fix Over India as War Clouds Gather in Doklam

Times are changing! Many years ago, the then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was asked an unexpected question by his Japanese counterpart during their summit meeting in Tokyo: “How do you deal with China?”

Manmohan Singh's sedate answer was: Stay engaged with China with normal diplomatic and trade ties and keep on discussing all bilateral contentious issues without pushing them under the carpet.

The Japanese Premier's question indicated that Tokyo was at its wits end in figuring out how to deal with a resurgent China, which stepped up flexing its military muscles in South China Sea in an alarming manner since 2010. Then Japan was confused how to deal with China.

Today it’s China which is confused about how to deal with India.
The unprecedented over-a-month-long still-ongoing eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the armies of India and China in Doklam near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction is a case in point. This is the worst flashpoint stretching for so long without a resolution yet since the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

India has refused to budge from its unusual hard position of not letting the Chinese build a motorable road in Doklam close to Bhutanese territory, despite warnings from the Chinese foreign office and the People’s Liberation Army and crude threats handed out by the state-controlled Chinese media couched in humiliating and abusive language.

Instead, India has dispatched hundreds of additional troops to Doklam, though in a non-combat mode, wherein the nozzles of their modern rifles are pointed downwards.

China’s Uneasiness
The Chinese are utterly confused by the ‘sudden’ hardening of India’s stance towards China.

China has been monitoring with unease the way the Narendra Modi government has beefed up its China-specific military muscle. India is going to raise a second division of the China-specific Mountain Strike Corps, named 17 Corps, despite financial crunch and is to be headquartered at Pathankot in Punjab.

The second Division alone may cost anywhere between $6 billion to $8 billion and is likely to be completed by 2021. The first Division of 17 Corps, headquartered in Panagarh, West Bengal, has already been set up at a cost of around $6 billion. The 17 Corps will hold its first exercise in Ladakh in August-September this year. A corps normally has 45,000 personnel and three Divisions of 15,000 men each.

India’s Stern Stand

On 30 June, the Ministry of External Affairs came up with a rare statement on China-related issues and what was more remarkable was that it was a hard-hitting, poke-you-in-the-eye kind of statement. This statement alone conveys the hard Indian stance vis a vis China.

Two relevant points in the longish statement confirm India's tough stand:
•India is deeply concerned at the recent Chinese actions and has conveyed to the Chinese government that such construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India.
•In this context, the Indian side has underlined that the two governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.

BrahMos Missiles, the Game Changer

What has unsettled the Chinese most is that India has recently deployed the BrahMos missiles in the Chinese theater. BrahMos is going to be inducted in Indian Air Force soon and will be the biggest gamechanger of a strategic asset in the Indian military arsenal.

This missile will then acquire the formidable capacity to be launched from air, land, sea and sub-sea and aim at very well shielded Chinese military assets in sea and on land targets while simultaneously being capable of evading the Chinese air defence systems due to its variable trajectory.

The 17 Corps is in the process of deploying such lethal weapons as BrahMos and Agni missiles, US-made M-777 howitzer guns and Apache helicopters.

IAF Chief's Call to be Prepared For a 15-Day War With China

Incidentally, China has not failed to notice that India's tough posturing has come weeks after Indian Air Force Chief BS Dhanoa, while addressing the IAF Commanders Conference in New Delhi (19-21 April), asked his commanders to be prepared for a possible 10-day war with Pakistan and a 15-day war with China.

The IAF chief reportedly told the commanders to be ready for a possible “short but intense” war with China and Pakistan and directed them to keep their men and machines – including fighter aircraft, radar systems and missiles – in a state of combat readiness. This is something extremely unsettling for the Chinese as they have never come across Indian military leadership making such strong observations. Times have indeed changed.

Now, China can indulge in a bit of sabre rattling, but cannot walk its talk because at a time when Beijing is busy implementing President Xi Jinping's ambitious One Belt One Road project – under which China is going to invest over $90 billion in international connectivity projects and trade corridors – the Chinese can hardly afford to wage war with anyone.

(Rajeev Sharma is a strategic analyst and columnist who tweets @Kishkindha. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by chanakyaa »

nirav wrote:What actual use will the Alliance be in case of a India China war?

I do not see American and Japanese troops fighting the Chinese along with Indian troops on our borders.
Nor do I see their navies attacking the PLAN on the high seas.

It's useful for posturing, but moment actual full scale war starts they will quickly RTB. The first to go would be the Aussies.
+1

I would go even a step further and say that in case of a wider conflict uncle will come to rescue of China and prevent serious damage. Western economic ties with China are much much deeper and wider than India, including Australia. All that SCS posturing is nice meat for the MSM but realities are much different, I'm afraid. But, if China make inroads in India, there may be token help from Uncle, but it will end up in UN/UNSC football that will be negative for India. They would rather India do the dirty work, and provide superfluous support from behind. All that China needs to know is that if you touch India, several parts of both countries may turn into nooklear ash that won't help either civilizations. So, stare in the eye of the pu$$y lizard and say f^&#% off .
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

Just because Xi is smiling and shaking hands with Modi, does not mean he is not sharpening the knife. This handshake is the biggest feint, and we have even nationalists here falling for it.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

Bade wrote:Just because Xi is smiling and shaking hands with Modi, does not mean he is not sharpening the knife. This handshake is the biggest feint, and we have even nationalists here falling for it.
Just like Mao did to Nehru. Modi is far superior btw
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1055412.shtml

India uses Bhutan to secure New Delhi's interest
Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/7 18:45:27

Editor's Note:

The recent face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at the Sikkim section of China-India border has raised speculation over India's real intention behind its provocation. Wangcha Sangey, a legal consultant from Bhutan, recently published an article in his blog titled "Understanding Sino-Bhutan border issues at Doklam. Search for truth," which provides a look into the incident from another perspective. The following is an excerpt from his article.


The recent Doklam event has many versions. The Indian media naturally had the versions of their government though they shared what the Chinese also said.

The best way to see the truth is to visit history of various events relating to Sino- Bhutan Border and compare with this recent inflated and manipulated Doklam incident.

1. Initially from late 1960s and through 70s, the Government of India made attempts to discuss with China on the issue of China- Bhutan international border demarcation.

2. China rejected all such attempts by India. China maintained that Bhutan which is a sovereign Kingdom should stand for herself and deal directly with China.

3. So India had to permit Bhutan to directly deal with China on the border issue. That was how the Border Talks began between Bhutan and China from the 1980s. Since then 24 rounds of Talks have taken place in most cordial manner. And much progress have been achieved. India was always kept in the loop by Bhutan.

4. It is possible that the public of Bhutan feel that the Talks are taking too long. Similar views also have been aired in the National Assembly of Bhutan . I understand the innocent frustrations. Under the past absolute Monarchy system, people are used to instant decisive decision of a King. Many do not understand the complexities involved in international boundary demarcation. The case is more perplexing since the Government is in no position to bare all the uncomfortable truths including heavy pressures from India to demand more strategic land from China.

5. Also the Indo- Bhutan international boundary in the South was demarcated so quietly. The public did not hear anything about Bhutan negotiating with India regarding her international border in the South with India. It is possible that Bhutan was in no position to negotiate. Bhutan is more vulnerable to a takeover by India than by China. Also Bhutan has no access to outside world except through India. And moreover, Bhutanese economy and commerce are totally dependent on India including travel from West Bhutan to East Bhutan in the South of the Kingdom. Against such geopolitical constrictions, Bhutan probably had to accept at where ever the Survey of India decided to lay the Indo- Bhutan international boundary pillars. Thus the quiet smoothness and the speed when one side makes decision for two sides.

6. The fact that China is willing to negotiate with Bhutan on the international boundary of the two nations is I believe a giant step forward for Bhutanese sovereignty. I am grateful to China for this sovereign courtesy. I am even more grateful to India for all the economic assistance and freedom of trade and transit that enabled Bhutan to develop thus far. But I do love Bhutan ever more.

7. There is no doubt in my mind that Bhutan would want to finalise the Sino- Bhutan Border Talks and sign the Agreement. Bhutan has to be fully aware of the limitations of demands we can make upon China. And at the same time Bhutan is in no position to ignore the strategic interests of India. There is too much pressure. That is why Doklam the tri-junction Plateau is drawing multi attentions. It will be a blessing in disguise if China or India forcefully just takeover Doklam Plateau. The so called status quo is endangering the status of whole of Bhutan.

8. For Bhutan, Doklam holds no extra strategic significance than any other part of the Kingdom. But for both India and China, this Tri- junction is considered most vital. Unfortunately for India, the international boundary between Sikkim India and Tibet China at the Doklam Tri-Junction was decided long time back. So as vital as whole of Doklam Plateau is for Indian military strategic interest, there is not much that India can do through her State of Sikkim. The Sikkim door which India possessed is closed.

9. India, therefore, is pushing Bhutan to claim as much as possible the part of Doklam Plateau in the Sino- Bhutan Border Talks. India knows that she has the clout to use Bhutanese territory to serve her strategic interest. So what India herself had forfeited in negotiation with China, she now wants Bhutan to re-claim. This places Bhutan in a very difficult position. Every inch of Bhutanese land is sacred. To claim land for our own is justifiable. But to demand disputed land from China for Indian strategic purposes could endanger Bhutan. In demanding more, Bhutan loses the moral ground to even claim what is rightfully hers.

9. Bhutan is placed in a near impossible position. China will never surrender the strategic position that she had already gained at Doklam Plateau during negotiation on international boundary with India ( State of Sikkim ). And India is insisting upon Bhutan to wrest from China larger portion of Doklam Plateau that India could not get whilst negotiating with China on Sikkim-Tibet international boundary.

10. China wants to have better relation with the sovereign Kingdom of Bhutan. And wants to settle the border dispute in the interest of promoting closer ties including diplomatic relationship. And China has shown willingness to accommodate Bhutanese requests/ stand in other parts of the northern border. But not at the Tri-Junction where China shares border with Indian State of Sikkim and Bhutan. It seems that China had made her position clear to India in regards to Doklam status even when negotiating with India on the internal boundary of the State of Sikkim which borders Doklam along with Tibet and Bhutan. There is no way that China will give in to India through Bhutan front. The Government of Bhutan knows this and wants to be realistic and conclude the negotiations without further adieu and sign the Sino- Bhutan Border Agreement. But Bhutan does not dare to sign the Agreement without the nod from India. In the end, China will keep exercising jurisdiction over Doklam Plateau and Bhutan always at merciful generosity of India.

11. India is worried about the security of her so called chicken neck of the Siliguri corridor and thereby, the Eastern Frontier States. Maybe that was the reason of takeover of Sikkim. In the same manner, China is worried about the future security of her narrow Chumbi Valley stretch and thereby the whole of Tibet. China seems to considers Doklam Plateau as vital to her as Sikkim is to India. I feel we have to face the reality. China may not wait forever for Bhutan to get Indian clearance. Chinese security concerns would out weigh any ties including with Bhutan.

12. Presently the international boundary in eastern Bhutan has not been demarcated even with India . The sticking point is that Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet) is on the other side. And China claims part of Arunachal. So later, like Doklam, there is bound to be similar Tri- Juction situation. And there, too, China would not be compromising her national security for friendship with Bhutan. So considering all aspects, it may be also in India's interest to let Bhutan sign the Sino-Bhutan Border Agreement. The gesture could contribute towards reaching reasonable agreement towards drawing the Sino- India Arunachal border demarcation. Confidence building is a must in negotiation.

13. China will not budge in Sino - Bhutan Border negotiation where Bhutan is deemed to act as a proxy for Indian strategic interests. At times during Sino - Bhutan Border Talks, China may have been suspicious of India directing the negotiations from Bhutan side. And this time with India openly declaring that she had interfered on behalf of Bhutan at Doklam confirms that all along Bhutan has been actually acting as a proxy for Indian Doklam interest. This will harden Chinese resolve.

14. The Bhutanese Army at Doklam would not approach the Indian Army stationed on the Sikkim side in regards to any issue with China. Bhutan is well aware that directly involving India is an act of surrendering sovereignty to another nation. It took many years and much diplomatic and political maneuvering to convince India to let Bhutan negotiate directly with China. Bhutanese leaders must demonstrate more courageous wisdom and resolve if Sino- Bhutan Border Agreement is to be successfully signed.

I know for a fact that Bhutanese soldiers at Border out -posts take their responsibility sincerely and courageously and independent of Indian Army. It is an insult to RBA and the nation to even insinuate that Bhutanese officers and soldiers, on their own, cannot deal with Chinese forces at the border. I had, therefore, objected to Tenzing Lamsang's narration to the Bhutanese public the foreign propaganda materials that glorifies Indian Army at the expense of Royal Bhutan Army. RBA may be trained and funded by India but our Defence Force has independant Bhutanese national heart and responsibility. RBA has always fulfilled the task of securing Bhutanese Borders and cleansing the nation of any intruders including from India.

Conclusion:

Royal Bhutan Army outposts at the Sino- Bhutan border are there to carry out their defence tasks. Our officers and soldiers are not posted there to warm the chilly mountain air with their breath. They do not run to Indian Army to seek help to execute their own national defence task. Numerous Sino- Bhutan incidents have taken place in the past. And in all those incidents, the Royal Bhutan Army, the Chief of Operations or the Supreme Commander has never sought help of Indian Army to face Chinese troops at the Sino- Bhutan Border.

For general readers. I have one point of clarification. It is true that within Bhutan, there are Indian military presences as declared by India. And yes, Bhutanese Army is trained by India and even funded by India. But all this is not for defence of Bhutan. It is for the security of India. In the defence strategy plan of India against China, India counts on Bhutan's ability to secure her international borders with China. So Indian military is in Bhutan for defence of India. And likewise Indian Army's recent action at Doklam Plateau has nothing to do with Bhutanese national interest or with Bhutanese Security Force at Doklam.

The demarche issued on 20th June by Bhutan Embassy in New Delhi to Chinese Embassy is a normal happening. Both China and Bhutan follow this diplomatic procedure to air any misgivings or clear any misunderstandings at the borders. The soldiers of China and Bhutan do not engage in unruly jostling or play kapadi kind of pushing and catching game at the Sino- Bhutan border. It must also be noted that the Bhutanese Government referred to road being built in "disputed area". Not " inside undisputed " Bhutanese territory. It said " maintain status quo" which is different from allegation of encroachment into Bhutanese Security Force manned Bhutanese territory.

The Press Release by Bhutanese Foreign Ministry on 29th June is out of norm. A kind of political " cry Wolf ". Bhutan usually acts quietly with dignity. Who was Bhutan appealing to in the Press Release with all the history ? If it was China whom we were addressing then there was no need of history as they are party to all the history. This unusual propaganda type of Press Release may have been issued at Indian request to consolidate their weak stand in the international arena. Unfortunately, in so doing, the Bhutanese Government may have further complicated a complex issue.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

^^ Dangerous turns. Chinese instigation within Bhutan
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

Commentary: Immediate withdrawal is only wise move for India
Source: Xinhua| 2017-07-07 16:05:32|Editor: Zhang Dongmiao
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- ... 425742.htm
BEIJING, July 7 (Xinhua) -- After a three-week stand-off with China on Chinese territory, India should immediately pull back its trespassing troops.

The face-off was caused by Indian border guards who crossed the border at the Sikkim section into Chinese territory and obstructed routine road construction in the Doklam area of China's Tibet Autonomous Region.

In contrast to previous confrontations, the current border dispute is at a long-demarcated section of the China-India border, where no incidents had occurred over the past years.

India has tried to justify its incursion in the name of protecting Bhutan, arguing that Doklam is Bhutanese territory.

However, according to the Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890), Doklam undoubtedly belongs to China. The agreement was inherited by India after its independence and has been repeatedly confirmed in writing by successive governments of the former British colony.

Documents between the Chinese and Indian governments show former Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confirmed several times, on behalf of the Indian government, that the Sikkim-Tibet border was defined by the 1890 convention.

It is a basic principle of international law that binding treaties must be executed in good faith.

India's sudden disregard of the 1890 convention runs counter to the ongoing position of the Indian government. It has breached the basic norms of the UN Charter and international laws and will pose a significant threat to bilateral relations.

By creating disputes in Doklam, India seeks to obstruct border negotiations between China and Bhutan, and follow its own ulterior motives in the area.

The claim can not hold water. Doklam has long been under the effective jurisdiction of China. Both Bhutan and China have a basic consensus on the functional conditions and demarcation of their border region.

Moreover, India has no right to interfere in China-Bhutan boundary issues, nor is it entitled to make territorial claims on behalf of Bhutan.

India's current actions have not only encroached on China's territorial sovereignty, but also impaired the independence of Bhutan, one of the world's smallest countries, which is closely allied with India.

India has also argued that Chinese construction would represent a "significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India" in a statement by its Ministry of External Affairs. That argument is unconvincing.

Chinese construction is being conducted within its own territory. It is India that has broken the status quo by trespassing onto Chinese soil. It is not acceptable to any sovereign country that India has crossed a demarcated border into another country on the grounds of its "security concerns."

Indian troops should immediately withdraw to the Indian side of the border as a precondition for any meaningful dialogue between the two countries.

It is clear that if the "Chinese Dragon" and the "Indian Elephant" co-exist harmoniously and achieve peaceful, cooperative development, it will benefit not only their combined 2.7 billion people, but also those living beyond their borders.

Otherwise, a spiral of bilateral rivalry would definitely result in a slow down in their growth
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by anupmisra »

sudhan wrote:I hope NaMo gave 11 with one of his 'bone-crusher' handshakes, to put some sense in him and his minions..
How about a "panda" hug...and don't let go?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by anupmisra »

amit wrote:I think the expressions of the Indians (including the PM) vis a vis the Chinese (including Eleven) in this picture says it all. :-)
Note Doval's facial expression. He knows that he has won.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by anupmisra »

pankajs wrote:There is a lot of khujali in the Indian media. They go out of their way to bring the Chinese point to the Indian masses. I don't see a similar effort by the Chinese media.
That's the difference between free and controlled media.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Yagnasri »

Funny that Lizards remembering the treaty with the UK now on Bhutan and they do not remember that Indian has postal rights etc in Tibet in the same situation.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by sudhan »

Been trawling the interweb trying to find info on Chinese deployments in actual war zones.. Saw some reports of their peacekeeping missions in Africa (along with some cheque book diplomacy of course).. Came across a report of Chinese peacekeepers abandoning posts, leaving behind weapons and ammo :eek: , trying to ascertain the veracity of it.. So far 16 (corrected as per the report) Chinese soldiers have been halaled in ops, apparently.. resulted in unbelievable amounts of Takleef amongst the Chinese propaganda fed abduls..

https://qz.com/728566/china-reacts-to-t ... -and-rage/

The current Chinese sabre rattling Reminds me of the peace mission the venerable Tamil Poetess Avvaiyar undertook, between the kings, Adhiyamaan and Thondaimaan.. Thondaimaan had publicly sworn to go to war against Adhiyamaan. Avvayar stops a pissed off Adhiyamaan from declaring war and offers to be the peace emissary.

Thondaimaan shows off his army and his weapons to Avvaiyar in hopes of impressing her and in turn intimidate Adhiyamaan. Avvaiyar, deftly points out to Thondaimaan how mightily impressed she is by the weapons in his armory, where all his weapons are new, shiny and blemishless, while 'poor' Adhiyamaan's armory is filled with mangled, blood crusted weapons which need constant repair.. As per the story, Thondaimaan realizes his folly and sues for peace..
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

That was a great find, Iyersan. Almost reveals what India needs to do. :-) So a border re-alignment as I said is in the offing, this is what India has been saying regarding the tri-junction settlement, but couched in diplomatic language. We have not seen the end of this crisis as India needs to encircle the Chumbi valley completely. There are no two ways about this. This is not Aksai Chin or even Arunachal border encroachment. This in my opinion, is the biggest strategic issue facing India since the invasion of Tibet by China.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by RKumar »

7. There is no doubt in my mind that Bhutan would want to finalise the Sino- Bhutan Border Talks and sign the Agreement. Bhutan has to be fully aware of the limitations of demands we can make upon China. And at the same time Bhutan is in no position to ignore the strategic interests of India. There is too much pressure. That is why Doklam the tri-junction Plateau is drawing multi attentions. It will be a blessing in disguise if China or India forcefully just takeover Doklam Plateau. The so called status quo is endangering the status of whole of Bhutan.
Interesting post ... I dont know how much money or other worldly benefits this guy got from China. But his statements are directly benefiting China. So it seems the PR war has already started.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Patni »

Iyersan wrote:^^ Dangerous turns. Chinese instigation within Bhutan
Huh! It's from a private blog by its own admission! Really where is turn? I only see chini attempt to bolster up its side for public saving of HnD. Fact remains they tried to build road in disputed area and were hoping to get away with it but couldn't.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by TKiran »

Just replace "Bhutan" with "Tibet" and "India" with "China".

Tibet always signed agreements with British India as a sovereign country, so all the treaties between India and Tibet doesn't automatically inherit to imperial China. So 1890 treaty is null and void.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by GopiD »

pankajs wrote: IA chief, when he talks of 2.5 front war, is referring to a *defensive* posture where the cost of holding enemies at bay is cheaper than talking the war to the enemy. Offensive in a mountainous region is even more expensive.

Lets revisit the surgical strike for answers. Indian force infiltrated into Baki held territory and after operations retreated back. So there is you first hint. Modi GOI does not have plans to extend India's hold to territories under baki control, at least now right now. The messaging to the world in general too was to buttress that point.

Was the surgical strike escalation? Most definitely. Could Bakis have escalated? Most definitely. That they did not was their choice but holding on to a chunk of territory under their control most definitely would have prompted a *direct* response.

Did we pull back to avoid a direct response? Most definitely. Even if the bakis had choosen to respond, given the terrain and that we were in the defensive would have worked to our advantage.

If we take out the bridge(s) on CPEC, will it escalation? Most definitely. Could Bakis/cheenis escalated? Most definitely. But again it will be their choice and we will be in defensive posture and they will required 3-9 times our force to even make a decent play with the chance of THEIR failure very high.

OTOH, if we make a play for POK, we will need to field 3-9 times their combined forces in POK to make a decent show but the chance of OUR failure will be very high.

The odds favor a targeting of CPEC without going for an all our POK grab. Perhaps they too will lob a few missiles into Kashmir, perhaps targeting a bridge or two.
Thanks for the reply Pankaj ji. Always a pleasure to read your sober posts.

I apologise in advance for the below book :D

I totally agree with all your points and as I understand, all I am trying to do is just state the unstated points here.

In the case of surgical strikes (SS), we were dealing only with Pakistan. Our escalation was after too many chai-biscoot and dossier sessions. We had to do something different and announce the arrival of a new government. SS had two components to it.
1. To hit POK terror modules and give our army the satisfaction of retaliation and avenge their brothers deaths in pathankot and other attacks.
2. Psyops - By announcing and accepting that we hit the terrorist camps in PoK, we delivered customised messages to different audiences. For the global and local audience, we signalled that we are perfectly capable of handling our defences and its no more dossier business as before. The messaging to the pakistani army and the ISI was that we will physically hit you hard and we will hit your H&D too and there is nothing they can do. No matter how many terrorist incidents Pakis create after SS, they can never redeem themselves from that ignominy of having been slapped publicly and not able to even lift a finger at us publicly.

Let’s say that pakistan reacted after the surgical strikes in other sectors of IB or LOC, what would have IA done? Are we saying that we always knew how Pakistan would react after the surgical strikes and the IA didn’t game plan an actual counter strike from Pakistan elsewhere in the border? If we say that, then we are underestimating IA’s strategies and war planning. On the contrary, if we accept that IA would have game planned every possible scenario after SS and was prepared for any outcome, then we can be reasonably sure that IA will not hit CPEC just because we are fighting the chinese in the east.

Hitting CPEC and chinese infra is whole different ball game only because China is not Pakistan and if we ever hit CPEC in POK, we are officially opening a second front and that’s how it will be perceived. With the fog of war in front all the three players of the game, neither the pakis nor the chinese would think that we are only hitting the bridges and CPEC nodes and not actually opening a second front. With the amount amount of time, money and political capital that china has invested in OBOR/CPEC and the amount of propaganda that pakistanis have created around CPEC, they would most definitely open up other sectors in LOC and LAC and it would be an actual war.

IA would have game planned these moves and counter moves in advance. IA wouldn’t want a war in two fronts only because they got an opportunity to hit CPEC nodes. My assumption is, If we ever hit CPEC in any conflict with China, then it means that we are ready to take back POK. Until then, we won’t touch CPEC and its nodes. This is why China would want us to keep this conflict local and this is why there is total silence on the western front.

My assumption is, China will be given some kind of face saver and they will return to their original positions earlier to 16th June in Doko La. Or if the chinese want a fight, they will make sure its local.

For us, we won’t hit CPEC until we are ready to take back that area forever.


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by vasu raya »

Since they made a false move they have to pay a price and how far we go depends on our priorities, bottomline we drop the one China policy and thereafter

Can we draw and defend a line beyond Mount Kailash?
Can we go further and secure the water sources serving the Indus basin?

Germany was divided post WW2 and some 50 years later they have unified, Kashmir is ripe for unification, its the turn of Tibet now to be divided first with all leverages that China has removed.

Its so ironic that a Tibet origin soldier fights for the Chinese side and an exiled Tibetian fights the Chinese from the Indian side...

we should target their mechanized forces, any mauling they take causes a big PR issue for them relating to their mil exports especially to the Ummah world and if its the Infantry, the more body bags the better like their conflict with Vietnam 1979 for 27 days resulted in 28k Chinese troops dead, with today's demographics thats just worst case scenario for them and to cause that the frontage has to be expanded and not localize to the one sector where they can manage with Tibet origin soldiers.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by SwamyG »

anupmisra wrote:
amit wrote:I think the expressions of the Indians (including the PM) vis a vis the Chinese (including Eleven) in this picture says it all. :-)
Note Doval's facial expression. He knows that he has won.
Exactly, I was looking at Doval's face as well. Look at Modi's grip as well. Anyway Modi would have hugged Eleven, and all these forgotten and sent to history's footnotes onlee.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Neela »

sudhan wrote:Been trawling the interweb trying to find info on Chinese deployments in actual war zones.. Saw some reports of their peacekeeping missions in Africa (along with some cheque book diplomacy of course).. Came across a report of Chinese peacekeepers abandoning posts, leaving behind weapons and ammo :eek: , trying to ascertain the veracity of it.. So far 16 (corrected as per the report) Chinese soldiers have been halaled in ops, apparently.. resulted in unbelievable amounts of Takleef amongst the Chinese propaganda fed abduls..

https://qz.com/728566/china-reacts-to-t ... -and-rage/

The current Chinese sabre rattling Reminds me of the peace mission the venerable Tamil Poetess Avvaiyar undertook, between the kings, Adhiyamaan and Thondaimaan.. Thondaimaan had publicly sworn to go to war against Adhiyamaan. Avvayar stops a pissed off Adhiyamaan from declaring war and offers to be the peace emissary.

Thondaimaan shows off his army and his weapons to Avvaiyar in hopes of impressing her and in turn intimidate Adhiyamaan. Avvaiyar, deftly points out to Thondaimaan how mightily impressed she is by the weapons in his armory, where all his weapons are new, shiny and blemishless, while 'poor' Adhiyamaan's armory is filled with mangled, blood crusted weapons which need constant repair.. As per the story, Thondaimaan realizes his folly and sues for peace..
Nice anecdote.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Deans »

sudhan wrote:Isn't this meet already a loss of face for the Chinese??

I hope NaMo gave 11 with one of his 'bone-crusher' handshakes, to put some sense in him and his minions..
Huge loss of face for the Chinese, since it was they who announced the cancellation of the meeting and said atmosphere was not
conducive...
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