Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[manjgu]

immediate !! naval ships ??i think they need to argument artillery...road infra...adequate stocking ... the chiniks are upto their usual tricks.. bluff bluster...

[chola]

We need to go war, regardless of Cheen does because right now, we own all advantages along the border and in the IOR where we can cut off trade to a trading power in a way that can stunt their strategy of grow and intimidate.

Chola ji,

What are the political objectives that India wishes to achieve for going to war? I am sure you also agree that we should be prepared but to go to war without any clear objectives, what is the point?

Our objective should be VERY clear:

Give Cheen a crushing military defeat along the border and, ideally, create suffocating chaos for the chini economy by cutting off its trade routes in the IOR.

Because Cheen is a rational trading power with non-military culture, a short war is possible especially if we overwhelm them in the theaters of our choice and give them no incentive to pursue further hostilies by limiting territorial gains to what we lost in 1962 and bit more in defensible positions. It won't go long term or total war if we don't get victory disease and attempt to detach Tibet as a whole. They'll settle down to making money again once we magnanimously release our chokehold on the IOR and trade flows again.

For us, this victory over Cheen would instantaneously vault us to the position of top power in Asia and number 2 in the world behind the US. It would be our Spanish-American, Franco-Prussian or Russo-Japanese War (the three signature wars which made the US, Germany and Japan into great powers.)

Three victories over TSP gave us nothing in terms of reputation or status as a great power because it is such a shitty failure of a nation. Cheen is a P5 and considered a peer rival of the US but like Imperial Spain, post-Napoleon France and Czarist Russia in those other wars it is a perfect opponent -- top flight reputation but weak militarily under the hood.

The objective is great power status.

Conversely, if we do not fight then we will not see India overtaking Cheen in our life time. I posted the calculations earlier. Cheen adds far more every year to its economy than we do to ours even with a higher growth rate. The GDP gap is widening and will widen for decades. The arms gap will widen, they have built four 12K ton Type 055s in parallel and that is on top of a flood of Type 054 frigates and Type 052D destroyers. Where are our P15Bs? And that's only the surface fleet. We are worst off on the submarine front and when their Type 002 and 003 carriers come out, we'll be behind in naval air as well. This will change the calculus of our stranglehold on their trade routes.

What are Chinese political objectives for going to war?
1. To show rest of Asia, they are top dog and everyone should pay a tribute to Beijing.
2. To continue OBOR unabated
3. All conflicts with neighbouring states, just disappear ONLY if India is soundly defeated.
4. G2 becomes a reality and the world acknowledges it as such.

All four points you listed is better off without war for Cheen.

The PRC is already the top dog in Asia (after the US.) As I written above, without war we won't be able to overtake Cheen in our lifetime. War provides India with an opportunity but Cheen with a risk.

OBOR happens unabated WITHOUT war, with war it goes on hold.

Defeating India would not change their conflucts with Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam or Korea. It didn't in 1962 and it won't today. And in fact would spur them to arm themselves more furiously.

G2 is dependent on the US. Why would it grant Cheen the privilege after a war with another democracy? The US public won't let it happen.

There is nothing that war can help Cheen with which is why I don't think they'll fight. They want to intimidate and grab a defensible position on the cheap.

But it is not in our interest to allow them to just back off when we currently own overwhelming advantages aling the border and in the IOR.

Advantages that will disappear over time as OBOR and CPEC kick in and their naval programs mature and their printing press buys their bases around the IOR.

We must take this opportunity to fight now.

[panduranghari]

Noob thoughts - How important is chicken's neck corridor in case the war does break out? Would we not use north BD (for NE) or Nepal (for Sikkim) as transit if, and this is a big IF (given the force balance is in our favor), Siliguri does comes under arty range? War means political boundaries remain only on map. I am not saying that it is not important, the rail and road infra developed is a vital link to NE but it should not be considered as the only link. So what could be the tactical objective from their perspective? They surely cannot hold this area even if they come down the hills. It would at best be a pain in the neck for us.

There was a news report earlier in the thread where the army brass stated that they have gamed this scenario. I would trust they know what they are doing and we do not need to worry about chicken neck being cut.

[chola]

Please share your insights. What do you think it means?

Trying to move international opinion in their favor. To their viewpoint on Doklam
To gain consensus on any eventuality ... Whatever may be the endgame
To show to the world that they have been very patient with the obdurate Indians

.... Further points can be added by the rest of the members in the forum

To add to the pressure by using third countries. It is a scare tactic. Their primary objective is to get the GOI to blink.

Don't blink but instead punch him in his f-king nose (Mountain Strike Corps) while he is huffing and puffing. It will leave him stunned. Then a swift kick to the gonads (IOR blockade) will send him to the ground before magnanimously dusting him off and leave him crying for his mommy.

[Iyersan]

Sikkim standoff: China rapid escalation is limiting India's diplomatic options; can New Delhi hold its nerve?
http://www.firstpost.com/india/sikkim-s ... 27257.html

[Bade]

Of course in a war scenario, we would use both Nepal and Bangladesh for access. No doubts about it, even if you do not read it in the press.

Even when Tibetans were air dropped (?) or sent to Bangladesh in '71 in Chittagong, Myanmar was used I believe.

[Iyersan]

India should withdraw troops to avoid escalation of tension: Chinese FM
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017- ... 453355.htm

[jagga]

I didn't know until now that Chinese wants to raise a future dispute on Andaman's and Nicobar Islands
Devious Plans Of China To Bring In Issue Of Andaman And Nicobar Islands Ownership – Analysis (A year old article)

[pankajs]

^
Can they also dispute Bangalore, Kerala? The Chinese have gone bonkers!

There are two issue here ...
1. The Chinese belief that calling anything disputed automatically makes it disputed.
2. The Chinese think that calling anything disputed will put the fear of god/devil [take your pick] into the other party.

They have started to behave like a petulant 5 year old child.

[jagga]

^
Can they also dispute Bangalore, Kerala? The Chinese have gone bonkers!

Don't you know that Chinese fishing net's are being used in Kerala. And what about all the software you write on made in China computers. Hence, they both are disputed tellitolies.

[Chinmayanand]

To get a black belt , one has to beat a Black belt .So, to get a P5 status, one has to beat a P5 member. Who, better than China :d
Bring it on. Let us beat the Hans down and reclaim our seat in UNSC.

[Peregrine]

China must admit India is a force to be reckoned with: Former US diplomat Biswal

WASHINGTON: Amid the ongoing standoff between Indian and Chinese troops at the Doklam area in the Sikkim sector, a former US diplomat has said that China needs to acknowledge that India is "a force to be reckoned with" and countries in the region are unsettled by Beijing's behaviour.

"China, I think, needs to acknowledge the fact that there is growing strategic and security capability across Asia, and certainly India is a force to be reckoned with," former US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha Desai Biswal told PTI in an interview.

Biswal, who was Obama Administration's point person for South and Central Asia in its second term, said that there has been a fair degree of assertive actions and signals being sent from China across many different border points, maritime and land, across its geography.

"While I understand that sentiment within China, that I think seeks to try to assert China as a dominant player across the Asia-Pacific, I think China has to content with the fact that across its geography, throughout the Asia-Pacific region, countries are unsettled by its behaviour and by its unilateral actions," she said.

"China has more to gain through diplomacy and dialogue than it does through these kinds of actions, which create a great deal of unease and uncertainty," Biswal said responding to questions on India-China border stand-off.

Biswal said across Asia, nations are stepping forward to assert their interests and their rights.

"So now is an important time to create some greater codification of the rules and, to create more channels for dialogue and diplomacy to address some of these areas of tension and differences on how various boundary and maritime claims are resolved," she said.

She exuded confidence that the leaders of the two countries would be able to prevent further escalation of the situation.

"China is a very mature and calibrated power. It's not a rogue actor, in any sense of the word. And certainly I think that the Indian side has also acted with a great deal of resolve and a great deal of restraint," she said.

"While there are tensions afoot, I do believe that both countries have it within themselves to resolve those tensions, to defuse those tensions. It is in the interest of both countries, in their security interest and in their economic interest, to manage these tensions and to ensure that there are avenues for peaceful and amicable resolution," she added.

The US, she noted, certainly has a role to play in it by ensuring that the international rules are followed.

"Certainly, I think that the US, by standing firm on its commitment towards the rules-based international order and the importance of dialogue and dispute resolution, can signal its own strong preference for these kinds of mechanisms to de- escalate and to resolve differences," she said.

"The US has stood very firmly against the kinds of unilateral actions to settle disputed claims, which we have done very strongly with respect to maritime claims, and which we continue to stand behind with respect to land boundary claims," Biswal said.

"India has proven itself to be willing and be able to resolve issues through arbitration, through negotiation, through dialogue and diplomacy, and, we would hope and expect that China would show itself capable of doing the same," she said.

Implications, of any further escalation, are grave, she warned in response to a question.

"I think it's not useful to speculate on escalation. The implications are very grave. I think that as two very responsible military powers and nuclear powers, that both countries understand that. They understand the obligation that they have to manage tensions and to de-escalate, and we have a firm belief and expectation that they will do so," she said.

Cheers

[ramana]

At 9:00, they talk about immediate necessity to augment naval shipyards and ship building capacity by bringing onboard SoKo and Taiwan.

What a bullshit narrative being peddled.

The threat is near term and land based and they want to build ships and enrich South Korea and Japan.

Pox on these chatteratti.
What is need is put more funds to raise another MSC.

[ramana]

Marten, Now that Iyersan has shared his views what are your views?

[Pratyush]

Why hasn't china attacked India. What is it waiting for ? The provocation is there the loss of face is there and yet china has not kicked the sorry behinds of SDRE all the way to Delhi.

Could it be that it is just a paper dragon.

[ramana]

X-posting the War on Rocks post by Philip with my own highlights......

https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/high- ... t-doka-la/

HIGH NOON IN THE HIMALAYAS: BEHIND THE CHINA-INDIA STANDOFF AT DOKA LA
JEFF M. SMITH
JULY 13, 2017

If you’re struggling to make sense of the latest standoff between the Chinese and Indian militaries 10,000 feet in the Himalayas, don’t fret: You’re in good company. The showdown at Doka La is the product of a multi-layered, multi-party dispute steeped in centuries-old treaties and ambiguous territorial claims. Only recently have sufficient details emerged to piece together a coherent picture of the crisis and we’re still left with more questions than answers. However, one thing is clear: While stare-downs at the disputed China-India border are a common affair, the episode now underway is an altogether different, potentially far more dangerous, beast.

This crisis began in mid-June when Chinese forces were spotted constructing a road near the disputed tri-border linking India, China, and Bhutan, prompting an intervention by Indian troops in nearby Sikkim. Nearly a fortnight later, over 100 soldiers from each side are eyeball-to-eyeball, with India moving thousands more into supporting areas. Each passing week has seen a further hardening of each side’s position.

On July 5 China’s ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, described the situation as “grave” and insisted and there was “no scope for compromise.” A vitriolic outburst from China’s Global Times followed, accosting “Cold War-obsessed India” for “humiliating the civilization of the 21st Century.” It mused:

[T]he face-off in the Donglang area will end up with the Indian troops in retreat. The Indian military can choose to return to its territory with dignity, or be kicked out of the area by Chinese soldiers…India will suffer greater losses than in 1962 if it incites military conflicts. We hope India can face up to the hazards of its unruly actions to the country’s fundamental interests and withdraw its troops without delay… The more unified the Chinese people are, the more sufficient conditions the professionals will have to fight against India and safeguard our interest. This time, we must teach New Delhi a bitter lesson.

India’s Ministry of External affairs has been less strident but sent a clear signal about the stakes by claiming China’s activities “would represent a significant change of [the] status quo with serious security implications.”

A History of Non-Violent Standoffs

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the China-India border dispute, traveling to secluded locales dotting the Himalayan frontier like Leh, Tawang, and Pangong Lake. I’ve interviewed dozens of diplomats, experts, and military officials from both countries. And I’ve written at length about the subject. A holistic account of the dispute and its arcane origins are beyond the remit of this article (there is an abundance of literature on the subject, including John Garver’s Protracted Contest and my book, Cold Peace) though some points of context are in order.

First, the de-facto border, the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is a magnet for standoffs between Chinese and Indian border patrols. Unlike the turbulent Line of Control with Pakistan in Kashmir, however, an elaborate series of bilateral mechanisms has kept the LAC free of any fatal exchanges for decades. Only once since 1962 has a standoff turned bloody. That’s the good news. But there is also bad news: That fatal exchange, the Nathu La incident of 1967, unfolded near the site of the current crisis.

Second, the peace that has prevailed at the border masks a disconcertingly ambiguous tactical situation along select portions of the LAC. Not only is the roughly 3,500-kilometer border unsettled and un-demarcated, there are roughly a dozen stretches along the frontier where the two countries cannot even agree on the location of the LAC. These are the source of hundreds of relatively innocent “transgressions” by Chinese border patrols annually. (China doesn’t publicly track Indian transgressions). On occasion, these devolve into more serious “intrusions,” as witnessed in 2013 and 2014 when the People’s Liberation Army spent several weeks camped across the LAC in the Western Sector.

Third, there are several reasons the current episode differs materially from these common transgressions and even the more serious intrusions. It’s distinguished by the location of the standoff, the conduct of the two sides, and the public messaging from both capitals.

This Time is Different

Whereas the vast majority of incidents at the LAC occur in the disputed western and eastern sectors at Askai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, the current standoff is not even technically a product of the Sino-Indian border dispute, but is rather related to the Sino-Bhutan border dispute. Nevertheless, India has become intimately embroiled by virtue of its special relationship with Bhutan and the geographic proximity of the standoff to its vulnerable “Chicken’s Neck” – the narrow stretch of territory connecting the majority of India to its more remote northeast. For all practical purposes, the standoff has become an extension of the China-India border dispute.

Beijing’s public messaging was the second indication this standoff differed from its predecessors. Whereas the Indian media covers each border skirmish with hyperactive zeal, China often avoids public commentary altogether. When it does comment, Beijing’s messaging is generally bland and de-escalatory, noting the ambiguous nature of the LAC and appealing for patience and dialogue. Not this time.

China’s Foreign Ministry has called the standoff “essentially different from the previous border frictions…in undefined areas.” Unlike previous stare-downs along the LAC, Beijing says this dispute is unfolding on Chinese territory, on which India has “illegally trespassed.” What’s more, China has refused to negotiate a resolution until its “pre-conditions” are met: namely, a complete withdrawal of Indian forces. On July 11, the popular CGTN talk show “Dialogue with Yang Rui” featured Chinese analysts urging Beijing to escalate the situation. The recommended that China begin using the term “invasion” to describe India’s activities at the tri-border and issue Delhi an ultimatum to either depart the area or be evicted. They stated that China should modify its position on the Kashmir dispute and encourage Bhutan to hold a referendum on whether it wants to be an Indian “puppet state.”

Finally, China has matched its rhetoric with retributive action by canceling an upcoming pilgrimage to Tibet and deactivating a historic border crossing near the site of the standoff. Closed since the 1962 war, the Nathu La crossing was re-opened only in 2015 as a confidence-building measure. Beijing insists its fate “totally depends on whether the Indian side can correct its mistake in time.”

He Said, Xi Said

So, what really happened? Following an uptick in Chinese activity in the region, on June 16 a Chinese military construction team was spotted building a road near Doka La, several miles south of Batang La, where India and Bhutan place the border, but several miles north of Gamochen, where Beijing places the tri-border.

According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, “a Royal Bhutan Army patrol attempted to dissuade them from this unilateral activity.” When that failed, Indian military personnel from neighboring Sikkim intervened some 48 hours later. In “close coordination” with Bhutan, they then “approached the Chinese construction party and urged them to desist from changing the status quo.”

China’s Foreign Ministry corroborates this account but argues the standoff “is located on the Chinese side of the boundary and belongs to China.” Beijing insists the tri-border junction was fixed at Gamochen through an 1890 convention signed by the British Raj and the Qing dynasty. It claims India’s intervention is “a betrayal of [the] consistent position” held by Delhi since Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Delhi has indeed affirmed the validity of the treaty in the past but maintains that in 2012 the two agreed the tri-border was unsettled and would be resolved through consultations with all three parties. Any attempt to “unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.”

Second, as former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon notes, China’s claim is likely based on flawed colonial mapmaking: The watershed principle Beijing uses as justification for the tri-border actually favors Batang La – Bhutan’s and India’s position – over Gamochen. Third, Bhutan was not a party to the 1890 convention and, on June 29, told China its border activities violated two agreements signed in 1988 and 1998 committing both sides to abstain from any unilateral actions that would alter the status quo.

High Peaks, High Stakes, and the Border

Unsurprisingly, there is more at stake in the Doka La standoff than a few dozen square miles of desolate Himalayan frontier. There are grander geopolitical dynamics and ambitions driving the dispute related to the balance of power at the LAC, the broader Sino-Indian rivalry, a struggle for Bhutan’s loyalties, and the strategic vulnerability of India’s “Chicken’s Neck.”

For several years Beijing has been floating a proposal to freeze the operational status quo at the Sino-Indian border — an idea Delhi has flatly rejected. Buttressed by superior infrastructure and more favorable geography, China enjoys a substantial tactical advantage along the LAC — though Iskander Rehman persuasively argues the gap may not be as formidable as is commonly portrayed.

In the decades following the Sino-Indian war India pursed a strategy of deliberate neglect toward its border areas, convinced a scarcity of infrastructure would hamper any invasion force from the north. In the late 2000s, Delhi acknowledged the futility of that strategy and ordered massive border infrastructure upgrades that received additional support from Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For the time being, Delhi appears unwilling to enshrine its tactical disadvantage at the LAC and it’s plausible Beijing is using the border tactics to pressure India to the negotiating table on a “freeze-of-forces.”

Some analysts have speculated that China’s border incursions are the product of rogue actors in the PLA, a theory rejected by most seasoned China analysts. One senior Indian diplomat formerly responsible for high-level negotiations with China recently explained to me that the PLA’s border activities were unquestionably orchestrated from Beijing. They are designed to embarrass India’s leadership, he suggested, and to show the Indian public and the world that China can operate at the border with impunity while underscoring Modi’s inability to secure India’s sovereign borders.

China has indeed built a lengthy resume of launching border incursions at politically sensitive junctures. A two-week Chinese incursion into Ladakh in 2014 overlapped with President Xi Jinping’s inaugural visit to Delhi, spoiling bilateral atmospherics at the outset of the Modi-Xi era. Perhaps it’s no coincidence the world learned of the Doka La standoff just as Prime Minister Modi was in Washington meeting with President Donald Trump.

The Rivalry

The Xi-Modi era has witnessed an intensification of the Sino-Indian rivalry, particularly since Modi’s frustration with Beijing seemed to reach critical mass in 2016. After an unsuccessful attempt to forge a strong personal relationship with Xi, Modi balked at China’s efforts to block India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers group and shield Pakistan-based terrorists from U.N. sanctions last year.

Since then, Indian policy toward Beijing has assumed sharper, more confident edges. It is possible Beijing is signaling its displeasure with any number recent Indian initiatives, including Delhi’s decision to boycott Beijing’s highly-touted “Belt and Road” summit in May, allow the Dalai Lama and the U.S. ambassador to visit Chinese-claimed Arunachal Pradesh, and vocally support an arbitration that ruled decisively against Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. Since the standoff began, Indian firms have renewed an oil exploration contract with Vietnam in waters disputed by China and the Indian press has highlighted a trip to the LAC in Ladakh by the prime minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama and these Tibetan leaders in Dharamsala has been a major source of contention with Beijing for decades.

Yet perhaps no issue has generated more friction in recent years than China’s creeping inroads into both the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent. Since 2005 smaller neighbors like Nepal and Sri Lanka have substantially expanded their relationships with China, heralding the appearance of Chinese submarines in Colombo and crackdown on Tibetan refugees in Nepal. In capitals across the region China and India have been waging a shadowy but intensifying struggle for the loyalties of local political and economic elites. It is possible China sees an opportunity for a breakthrough in India’s last subcontinental stronghold, Bhutan.

The Neighbor

The tiny Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan served as a virtual Indian protectorate after Delhi assumed control of the country’s foreign and security policies in a 1949 treaty. The “Friendship Treaty” was revised in 2007 to accord the Bhutanese nominally more control over their foreign affairs but maintained the two sides would “cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.” India still accounts for all of Bhutan’s defense trade as well as 75 percent of its imports and 85 percent of its exports. Remarkably, Bhutan receives over two-thirds of all Indian foreign aid.

By contrast, Bhutan remains the only Chinese neighbor yet to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Together with India, it’s also one of the only countries to host an outstanding land border dispute with China. Beijing claims several hundred square kilometers in Jarkarlung and Pasamlung in north-central Bhutan, and several hundred more at the Doklam plateau along Bhutan’s western border with Tibet, the site of the current crisis.

Sino-Bhutan border negotiations began in 1984, with India initially negotiating on Bhutan’s behalf before withdrawing to a supervisory role. In the mid-1990s, China offered Bhutan a “package deal” whereby it would renounce its claims in the north in exchange for control of the Doklam plateau. Bhutan demurred, not least due to India’s fierce opposition.

Like many Indian analysts, Abhijnan Rej believes “one of the key Chinese objectives in initiating the Doklam standoff seems to be testing India’s resolve to stand by Bhutan.” Beijing’s public diplomacy lends some credence to the view that it’s trying to drive a wedge between the two countries. China’s first public comment on the Doka La standoff claimed Bhutan was unaware Indian troops had entered the Doklam plateau and accused India of wanting “to infringe on Bhutan’s sovereignty.”

On July 9, The People’s Daily doubled-down, insisting India had “affected Bhutan’s independence by intruding into Chinese territory and using Bhutan as an excuse.” Bhutan’s media, it said, “have long been criticizing India’s interference in its domestic affairs. Their infuriation should be understood.”

While a border incursion would appear an unusual negotiating tactic, it tracks with the peculiar mix of carrots and sticks China has employed in an attempt to simultaneously wean Bhutan away from India while pressuring it to cede the Doklam plateau and establish formal diplomatic relations. “When stakes are high, Beijing has shown no hesitation in mounting military pressure along the border,” says Bhutanese analyst Talik Jha, who describes China’s strategy as one of “military intimidation followed by diplomatic seduction.”

Meanwhile, the tug-of-war for Bhutan’s loyalties has been intensifying in recent years, albeit gradually. An international conference in Rio in 2012 witnessed an impromptu, first-ever meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries, raising hackles in Delhi. Shortly thereafter Bhutan imported 15 buses from China. Ahead of a national election in Bhutan the following year, India suspended fuel subsidies to its eastern neighbor. The vote produced a more emphatically Indophile government and an apology from Delhi over the “unfortunate technical lapse” in the provision of subsidies.

While Bhutan’s outreach to China has cooled since, border talks and surveys have continued. The People’s Daily claims India’s involvement in the Doka La standoff is a product of its concern over advancing China-Bhutan negotiations.

The Chicken’s Neck

Delhi has kept a close watch and tight grip on the Sino-Bhutan border negotiations for the same reason it joined the fray at Doka La: Chinese control over the Doklam plateau would represent a grave strategic threat. The Chinese-controlled Chumbi valley bisecting Sikkim and Bhutan cuts toward the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow, strategically-vulnerable strip of territory connecting the main mass of the Indian subcontinent to its more remote northeastern provinces.

A Chinese offensive into this “Chicken’s Neck” could sever India’s connection to the northeast, where China still claims up to 90,000 square kilometers in Arunachal Pradesh. China’s Global Times seemed to acknowledge as much, and further stoke Indian anxieties by arguing “northeast India might take the opportunity to become independent” if Delhi’s fears were realized and China launched an operation to “quickly separate mainland India from the northeast.”

The topography of the region further elevates the strategic value of the Doklam plateau, and helps to explain how India bloodied China’s nose during the nearby skirmish at Nathu La in 1967. Whereas China holds a tactical advantage along the vast majority of the LAC, the Chumbi Valley is arguably the only position along the de facto border where China’s position is deeply compromised. As Indian analyst Nitin Gokhale observes:

Chinese forces in the narrow Chumbi Valley are currently in the line of sight and fire of Indian forces poised on the ridges along the Sikkim-Tibet border. Aware of this vulnerability, the Chinese have been eyeing the Doklam plateau since any troops stationed there will be away from visible observation and beyond artillery range of Indian forces either based in North or north-east Sikkim.

In other words, control over the Doklam plateau constitutes a “win-win” for the PLA; both a knife to India’s jugular and shield to blunt its sharpest spear. With existential stakes for Delhi, and Beijing posturing growing more uncompromising by the day, there’s no end in sight to the longest standoff at the China-India border in over three decades.

Jeff M. Smith is the Director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century.

To me it is very clear Dokhlam Plateau is a strategically important location for India.
I think this is the primary reason and all others are secondary reasons.

I submit this is not just a border dispute but a Chinese Operation Grandslam to sever North East from India.
Dokhlam will be our Asal Uttar.

I think that China is planning to cut off North East as a fait accompli with road aggression.
Roads are not built overnight.

Shiv's maps show that the road was started in ~2014 and not overnight.
This was hedging to protect CPEC in Pakistan in case India moves to tear asunder Pakistan.

I wouldn't put it past US deep state for the planning as Chinese are not strategic planners.

[ramana]

Why hasn't china attacked India. What is it waiting for ? The provocation is there the loss of face is there and yet china has not kicked the sorry behinds of SDRE all the way to Delhi.

Could it be that it is just a paper dragon.

Did you read the posts or just woke up?

China is at a tactical disadvantage at Dokhlam.
Hence they are appealing to disloyal India media and opposition politicians to give up that location which is a strategic suicide for India as it will lead to loss of North East.

[Rampy]

I think China mistook India to be Georgia ( ex USSR), Russia was able to call US bluff and Georgian Govt could not react. China assumed that with US behind us we will try to challenge and wanted to call US bluff, unfortunate that Modi never believed that US will come for support. As Doval ji said we have built our weight and punching as per our weight not fake boost as Pakis, China looked India from 62 / Nehru view point

[Pratyush]

Did you read the posts or just woke up?

China is at a tactical disadvantage at Dokhlam.
Hence they are appealing to disloyal India media and opposition politicians to give up that location which is a strategic suicide for India as it will lead to loss of North East.

I know and have read all the posts. But couldnot resist this dig on the SYRE. And the emerging super power.

[ramana]

Everyone:
Please resist the digs, innuendoes and what not.
Too many tempers are flaring, members get pissed off and leave.
Some report each others like in kindergarten and get huffy if reports are ignored.

So for sake of everyone give it a rest and stick to the topic.
Not a time to indulge in petty stuff.

Thanks,
ramana
People are getting ban is GDF of all places.

[Iyersan]

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_66 ... 8507.shtml

Q: According to media reports, the Chinese government has given a briefing on the situation to foreign diplomats, saying that although China has been very patient so far, China's patience will not last forever. Can you give us any details of your briefings that you have been giving to foreign journalists? Or can you confirm China's patience will not last forever on this issue?
A: This case has already drawn wide attention from the international community. Some foreign diplomats in China, feeling shocked and confounded, reached us for facts through diplomatic channels. I want to stress that the facts behind this case are clear. The Sikkim section of the China-India boundary is demarcated, which is recognized by both China and India. The nature of this case is that Indian troops illegally trespassed the demarcated boundary into Chinese territory. People will reach the just conclusion. If Indian wants to achieve its political purposes by sending military personnel across demarcated boundary, China urges India better not to do so.

[Suresh S]

agree with chola to some extent but fighting now is very risky. I would decapitate pakis in about 5-6 yrs. We will be ready than. lot of items on order, Rafael, arty, carrier, subs, lca, air defense and ballistic missile defense(may be s-400 or equivalent and our aad/pad, barak-8, extended range akash) etc. Once pakis are taken care of I am all for going after these jokers one to one , I do not need even an excuse.Defense budget needs to go up big time as soon as 2019 elections are over, I mean north of $100 billion per yr.

[Singha]

>> would decapitate pakis in about 5-6 yrs. We will be ready than. lot of items on order, Rafael, arty, carrier, subs, lca etc.

this perfect readiness never comes sir, because not all goes acc to plan and its quite easy for 3.5 fathers to keep the TSP armed forces moving.

the vietnamese as you know fought 3 far superior foes , because they had to fight.

[ramana]

I think China mistook India to be Georgia ( ex USSR), Russia was able to call US bluff and Georgian Govt could not react. China assumed that with US behind us we will try to challenge and wanted to call US bluff, unfortunate that Modi never believed that US will come for support. As Doval ji said we have built our weight and punching as per our weight not fake boost as Pakis, China looked India from 62 / Nehru view point

Rampy,

Hence I always look at time line to come to root cause.

Shiv in his image analysis of Google maps showed that the road building started in 2014 circa.
Planning must be before that.
Dokhlam is a strategic location for India and China wants to cut that off so they can sever North East.

All explanations that fit should be validated to determine if the dots connect to reveal a kitten or a tiger.

[Suresh S]

Agree Singha just like prep for exams u are never ready but I would continue with my preparations and if as may happen war comes before we are ready than so be it. But I will not fire and continue my prep at full speed. war is coming, it is multifactorial as to when it may happen and results no one can predict.

[ramana]

>> would decapitate pakis in about 5-6 yrs. We will be ready than. lot of items on order, Rafael, arty, carrier, subs, lca etc.

this perfect readiness never comes sir, because not all goes acc to plan and its quite easy for 3.5 fathers to keep the TSP armed forces moving.

the vietnamese as you know fought 3 far superior foes , because they had to fight.

+108*786

The logic of strategy is hit when you have to and not wait for another day for that gives the opponent time to build up and the same opportunity wont come again.

Again I emphasize Dokhlam is a must win for India's North East.

Its not about maps or borders.

[chetak]

I think China mistook India to be Georgia ( ex USSR), Russia was able to call US bluff and Georgian Govt could not react. China assumed that with US behind us we will try to challenge and wanted to call US bluff, unfortunate that Modi never believed that US will come for support. As Doval ji said we have built our weight and punching as per our weight not fake boost as Pakis, China looked India from 62 / Nehru view point

Rampy,

Hence I always look at time line to come to root cause.

Shiv in his image analysis of Google maps showed that the road building started in 2014 circa.
Planning must be before that.
Dokhlam is a strategic location for India and China wants to cut that off so they can sever North East.

All explanations that fit should be validated to determine if the dots connect to reveal a kitten or a tiger.

the hans have been supporting the insurgency in the northeast for quite some time now. This is one of the levers that they are going to use to pressurise India on aurnachal pradesh. Chicken neck is a choke point, just like the malacca straits.

Tit for tat??

[ramana]

Worse.
Malacca only threatens Chinese sea lanes.
Chicken Neck threatens Indian territory.

[Karthik S]

From Shiv ji's videos and other discussions, gurus please add your inputs, two things we need to do first in the event of conflict, take out the bases that Chinese have built 1000 KM from the border and cut the veins i.e. highways and roads that feed into the bases. I believe we'd need Nirbhays and Rafales in numbers. At our side of border we'd need Pinakas, Smerches and ATAGS to pound the valleys and points that touch the border.

[chola]

Worse.
Malacca only threatens Chinese sea lanes.
Chicken Neck threatens Indian territory.

That is like saying the U-Boats "only" threatens the UK's sea lanes in both world wars. Both times they came within a hair's breadth of knocking Britain out of the war.

Sea lanes are life giving arteries for trading powers and Cheen is the biggest trading power on earth. Cut them and they will bleed all over the place.

[Karthik S]

More than trade, their fuel supply lines run right under our noses, they have tried to mitigate the risk by entering into oil deal with Venezuela. This is the reason we need to beef up our SSN and SSK capabilities first.

[Rudradev]

Does anyone know the approximate scale of the deployments (ours and PRC) on the Doklam plateau at this time?

Not exact numbers obviously, but on what order of magnitude? Few companies each? Few battalions each? One or more brigade each?

[Paul]

Brahma Chellaney‏ @Chellaney 2h2 hours ago

To fight the next war inside China, India needs two strike corps. It should prioritize raising XVII Corps, not making wasteful arms imports.

Chellaney too thinks India China war is all about Tibet and more MSCs.

We are approaching our 1965 movement, this time with China.

[hanumadu]

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/201 ... W5EYXbytxh

Finally a statement from Bhutan.

Bhutan, one of the world’s smallest nations, has protested that the Asian colossus, China, is chipping away at its territory by building a strategic highway near the Tibet-India-Bhutan trijunction in the Himalayas.

[prasan]

Worse.
Malacca only threatens Chinese sea lanes.
Chicken Neck threatens Indian territory.

Cant we ask bangladesh to give access through their territory to move men and materials.

[g.sarkar]

Another point that strikes me is certain similarities with the current situation and 1962. Mao and his sidekicks did not like the importance given to Pandit Nehru and his ideas of Non-alignment, India leading the third world and the respect he was given in the West as a freedom fighter. The 1962 conflict was also a piskilogical attempt to reduce India's profile in the world. I am sure China does not appreciate the successful trips Modiji is making, the treaties he is signing and the trade deals he is making, and above all the improvements he is making to the Indian military. These activities are taking away from the face China should have gained by the activities of Eleven. Obviously, they would have been happy with MMS as our PM. A quick and brutal and above all successful Chinese attack on India will show the world who is the boss in Asia.We all remember what happened to Pandit Nehru after 1962. They want to seal Modiji’s fate in a similar way. I remember that certain warnings were given not to get too close to Japan or the US.
Before (and also after) the 1962 war there was a great deal of Chinese propaganda to make India acquiesce to the Chinese demands, however absurd they may be. Current Chinese propaganda is quite similar to that, demands and threats are being made on Askai Chin, Bhutan, Arunachal, and even Andaman and Nicobar islands. Winning by threats and demands is better than a war. I am also expecting the Indians on Chinese pay to start their campaign in ernest. Many readers of BRF comment that India has a strategic advantage at Dhokla, perhaps. But China may attack at other places too where this advantage falls to the Chinese. In 1962 China attacked in more than one place.
Gautam

[Paul]

Unlikely, during 1987 Sumudrumong Chu crisis then President Ershad promised Deng Bangladesh would not allow transfer of men and material through their territory. Haseena will not risk her interests by putting their eggs in India's corner.

[pankajs]

Many readers of BRF comment that India has a strategic advantage at Dhokla, perhaps. But China may attack at other places too where this advantage falls to the Chinese. In 1962 China attacked in more than one place.
Gautam

I have myself often fallen into the trap of thinking that only the opponent has options but that is not so. Bakis discovered that to their horror in 1965 and had to rush forces to shield Lahore.

I have no idea what the GOI/IA plans are but if I was in charge and I had to yield to the Chinese in an area to their advantage, I would ask the IA to grab an equivalent area where we have advantage e.g Chumbi valley.

In fact Chumbi would be quite a prize given out chicken neck concerns. It is also critical for the Chinese because this is the shortest and most feasible route to Lahsa. Join the top of Sikkim to the top of Bhutan and then calculate the distance to Lahsa. IIRC it should be around 300km as the crow flies.

[AdityaM]

Around the 2009 elections it was said that 2017 would be a probable timeline for a sino Indian war.
Seems that those predictions are coming closer to realisation.


If a war is to be imposed on us, what could be the definitive preceding signs of that:

- sudden surge of attacks in Indian mainland on northeast students etc. Thus creating strife in the east. Like in the past, northeast students ran from Karnataka
- sudden anti India protests in Nepal. Like it once happened, attributed to Hirthik Roshan
- elimination of Royal Bhutanese family & replacement with Chinese lovers. Like it happened in Nepal
- anti India protests breaking out in Bangladesh or repeat of BDR led attacks on Indian posts, which forecloses Bangladeshi cooperation in case it is needed for transit rights
- Gorkha struggle getting violent
- Flooding of vital areas. Like 2008 Kosi river flood. Which will make troop transport impossible
- or sudden discharge of waters in Bhramaputra
- possible unexplained failure of power grids, financial systems(stock exchange/payment gateways), communication infra etc

Would the window of opportunity / timeline of attack coincide with natural disasters which always happen in peak monsoon & overlap the near future time period
- cyclone which ravage anytime from now to October
- Brahmaputra flooding that gets worse in peak monsoon
- when Doval visits China. Considering Chinese like to make mischief everytime some delegation visits each other
- when Modi next travels out of the country

[sanjaykumar]

In fact Chumbi would be quite a prize given out chicken neck concerns. It is also critical for the Chinese because this is the shortest and most feasible route to Lahsa. Join the top of Sikkim to the top of Bhutan and then calculate the distance to Lahsa. IIRC it should be around 300km as the crow flies.

The garrison in the Chumbi valley is already dead, there is no egress unless by air evacuation. And then only if India chooses not to escalate.