Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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rohiths
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by rohiths »

Whatever they do they will have to do before winter. Winter is unbearable in the Himalayas.Hence a potential window of 3 months for any attack.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Singha »

^^ they can use their Mi17 helis to airlift troops into doklam after the long sword missile attack.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Arjun »

amit wrote:I personally am coming to the conclusion that China badly miscalculated at Doklam.
True that...there are a number of cards that India has that have barely been used. We just need the right excuse to get them out into the open...and this includes trade, CPEC and Tibet to mention a few.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Mort Walker »

shiv wrote:
Singha wrote:a chinese attack to show india its place need not mobilize anything locally. it could be a surprise missile attack released from 100s of km away onto our camps in the doklam region. and there is really no onsite defence or even warning system to control this.
Have you checked our positions in Doklam and their vulnerability - like Taliban got killed by US cruise mijjiles?

And if they don't mobilize at the border - we will simply over run their positions elsewhere. By all means shiver, but think and shiver

Then India will be viewed as the aggressor. The Chinese may use missiles to hit Indian positions in Sikkim and Assam. It is something to ponder.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

^^ they can use their Mi17 helis to airlift troops into doklam after the long sword missile attack.
would the Chumbi valley be spared then by India ? So getting to Doklam via airlift gives them not much. Why cannot they be targeted subsequently by India at Doklam by standoff missiles ? This could be done without hitting Chumbi valley too...just mildly move up the escalation ladder.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Mort Walker »

Arjun wrote:
amit wrote:I personally am coming to the conclusion that China badly miscalculated at Doklam.
True that...there are a number of cards that India has that have barely been used. We just need the right excuse to get them out into the open...and this includes trade, CPEC and Tibet to mention a few.
The easiest thing to do is quit buying Chinese junk. India-China trade balance is hugely in favor of China.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Rudradev »

Singha wrote:^^ they can use their Mi17 helis to airlift troops into doklam after the long sword missile attack.
http://www.ausairpower.net/PLA/CJ-10-GL ... 009-1S.jpg
With what escorts? Khatara F7s and J10s huffing and wheezing under puny max loadout. Blowing PLA troops out of the sky in their Mi17s will be even more fun for our MKI guys than raining hell on them as they file down the Chumbi valley.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^They may have far more working khataras that would be enough. At some point quantity has quality of its own. In the mean time India has been sleeping with the LCA Tejas. There should have been several hundred LCA by today. Instead India buys a few dozen Frenchie junk that won't show up until 2020.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

It is raining in the mountains for the next 10 days. Expect no action at least for two weeks.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Karthik S »

Mort Walker wrote:
Arjun wrote: True that...there are a number of cards that India has that have barely been used. We just need the right excuse to get them out into the open...and this includes trade, CPEC and Tibet to mention a few.
The easiest thing to do is quit buying Chinese junk. India-China trade balance is hugely in favor of China.
+108, OTOH their mobile companies are the fastest growing in Indian market. They are bidding for undersea cable contracts. We have one dysfunctional system.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Mort Walker »

Bade wrote:It is raining in the mountains for the next 10 days. Expect no action at least for two weeks.
Weather does not stop stand off attack weapons launched from ground-ground missiles or aircraft. I would suspect the IA and IAF are in a heightened state of readiness.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Dumal »

I am starting to think this is more of a diplomacy/negotiation play than a military confrontation at this time. Our FS repeatedly says diplomats in touch and we can solve this through talks. The Australian FM chimed in to say they preferred to see a peaceful resolution. The US SD prescribes dialogue.

I suspect over the coming weeks, we will have some behind-the-scenes diplomacy going and if there is at least a temporary resolution, a mutual stand-down agreed, we may see both sides walk away from the brink with reputations largely intact. However, in doing that, I hope we don't give in even an inch of on-the-ground position, though there may be gives and takes in any negotiation. Also it will be a monumental task to secure an even-handed resolution with the Chinese through negotiations. I hope our folks are up to it.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by shiv »

Singha wrote:^^ they can use their Mi17 helis to airlift troops into doklam after the long sword missile attack.
1. From which airfield?
2. The airlifted material will have to appear at that airfield. From where?
3. How will those troops be resupplied?
4. What is the load carrying capacity of Mi 17 at 4500 meters
5. Will Indian troops 2 km away watch all this with thumb in youknowhere
6. Are Indian troops sitting massed up on mountaisides to get hit by mijjiles?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by shiv »

Is anyone actually reading articles published by retired generals and linked on here. Has anyone read Lt Gen Panag's article linked earlier?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

India is building a civil airport in Pakyong, just south of Gangtok and to the west of Doklam plateau to be ready by next year. I am sure it will also service mil planes. This is another reason why India will not budge from its position, due to the clear line of sight from Doklam.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Mort Walker »

Dumal wrote:I am starting to think this is more of a diplomacy/negotiation play than a military confrontation at this time. Our FS repeatedly says diplomats in touch and we can solve this through talks. The Australian FM chimed in to say they preferred to see a peaceful resolution. The US SD prescribes dialogue.

I suspect over the coming weeks, we will have some behind-the-scenes diplomacy going and if there is at least a temporary resolution, a mutual stand-down agreed, we may see both sides walk away from the brink with reputations largely intact. However, in doing that, I hope we don't give in even an inch of on-the-ground position, though there may be gives and takes in any negotiation. Also it will be a monumental task to secure an even-handed resolution with the Chinese through negotiations. I hope our folks are up to it.
This is a dangerous assumption. It must assumed that China will attack at any time for the sole purpose of saving face and giving India a bloody nose without actually taking any territory. The PLA and Politburo may not be on the same page. Where the PLA is taking a more aggressive stance.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by shiv »

Dumal wrote:. Also it will be a monumental task to secure an even-handed resolution with the Chinese through negotiations. I hope our folks are up to it.
Chinese? Even handed? Forget about it. They are against India. Nothing new. They have supported Pak terrorists and opposed India on NSG. Only this time their only sons will have to come and get killed.
Last edited by shiv on 19 Jul 2017 09:43, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by khan »

Rudradev wrote:
Singha wrote:a chinese attack to show india its place need not mobilize anything locally. it could be a surprise missile attack released from 100s of km away onto our camps in the doklam region. and there is really no onsite defence or even warning system to control this.
Bingo. The missile blitz will be the first and only offensive move. Not anything involving CQB. The PLA wants to demonstrate that they can shock and awe puny India and lay waste to our troops as the TFTA Amrikis and Russians do with third world foes. Using uber tech advantage from standoff distances, to which they are betting we cant or wont reply.

The newly deployed forces in North Tibet will rush in following the massive wave of missile strikes to occupy all of Doklam once our camps there have been destroyed.

Lesson taught. Unless we do something they don't expect. But what?
I am sure India has a few missiles with the GPS co-ordinates of bridges on their side programmed in to prevent exactly this type of thing from happening.

Given the hilly terrain, taking out the correct 2-3 bridges will put a stop to that strategy - while the survivors & reinforcements commence the slaughter of the Chumbi Valley.

I wouldn't count on their airforce being able to do much - while IAF has any kind of planes. As soon as the first missile hits - pilots will take off. I am sure as I type this, squadrons of pilots are sitting in their planes on the runway and on alert - waiting for the order.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by shiv »

I would say that a sudden missile attack
1. Will not come without some signs of preparation and shrill warnings
2. Would be a bad tactic unless they are ready to hold back Indian troops at the LAC

Never forget how effective American missiles have been in eliminating the Taliban
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by khan »

Here is the second part of that diplomat article: http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/whats-dr ... at-doklam/
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Baikul »

Let's hope that the dhoti shivering does not extend to the decision makers who may talk/shiver themselves into the conviction that the Chinese will roll over us onlee.

If they hit us, so can we, as hard. They grab land elsewhere, so do we- there are lots of elsewheres.

FWIW, there seems to be a lot of consensus - across institutions - in the establishment that we cannot back down. And on the other side, the Chinese with their hysterical displays have IMO underestimated the Indian public mood as well.

So less of what they' can do to us, because we can do unto them also.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Mort Walker »

shiv wrote:I would say that a sudden missile attack
1. Will not come without some signs of preparation and shrill warnings
2. Would be a bad tactic unless they are ready to hold back Indian troops at the LAC

Never forget how effective American missiles have been in eliminating the Taliban
You can not rule out the inbred idiots to the west to create trouble at the LoC either. A two front war is still a possibility.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by khan »

shiv wrote:I would say that a sudden missile attack
1. Will not come without some signs of preparation and shrill warnings
2. Would be a bad tactic unless they are ready to hold back Indian troops at the LAC

Never forget how effective American missiles have been in eliminating the Taliban
I disagree with #1 (India probably have no idea where their road mobile missiles are - just as they might find it hard it keep track of India's missiles).

I agree with #2 - it would be dumb for them to do a missile strike and not expect retaliation. If they do a missile strike, it will probably be a part of a bigger operation.

American missiles against the Taliban is an apples to oranges comparison for me - because the Taliban had no air-force.

They aren't going to be shooting missiles towards some goat f***ing goat-hoarders with AK-47's. India has many many escalatory options.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Bade »

shiv wrote:Is anyone actually reading articles published by retired generals and linked on here. Has anyone read Lt Gen Panag's article linked earlier?
That is a must read, to get a quick historical context on Chumbi valley access to Bhutan from India.

Not in that article, but also note that the easiest access to Tawang via a valley without going through Sela Pass is also through Bhutan's southern side from India...close to Manas National Park at the border via Trashigang in Bhutan. A road access does not exist now I think, but this would be the natural choice if it is built.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Baikul »

And FWIW again, because this is personal information which is worth not much, I spoke to two reasonably in -the -know chaiwallahs in the fields of foreign policy and intelligence, Obviously I neither asked nor did they speak of sensitive issues. But both were absolutely forthright in their opinion that you can speak to the Chinese government in many languages, but if one of the language isn't one pf power, you may as well be mute. In short they always push the boundaries (pun unintended) of any argument, and cannot, will not, do not listen unless you have the regiments and brigades to back up your argumentation. So if we back down now, we may as well turn around and bend over too.

Coming as this opinion did from two of the most liberal ex-JNU types I have known, this summary was unexpected.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by g.sarkar »

World’s largest empire was the British Empire, and it succeeded due to the Indian army, with the valor of the Indian soldiers and led by British officers. The Empire could not exist without the professional Indian army. The value of the life of a soldier was negligible and the British did not have to pay any consequence for the loss of Indian lives, they could be replaced. This was not true for any other army. The money for running the empire came from doing business with India, where a very large market was opened up for importing goods while the local manufacturing was throttled and killed. Large amounts of raw materials were exported cheaply to Great Britain at very low prices to run their factories. The rest of the world could not do business with India directly.
Chinese Empire, to succeed, have to acquire India and exploit its market and resources. Without the Indian market to control and exploit, they cannot succeed in becoming a world power. Other Asian countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Burma, Korea etc. do not fit the bill, they will drain the Chinese economy. African and South American countries bring their own problems and are under the influence of other powerful countries. India, if exploited properly, will give China all that it desires. It is at the right distance from China and has the required man power, mineral wealth and finances to be a market for China for the near future and generate great profits. If left with an independent policy and anti China attitudes, it will become a focus for other Asian countries to band together and sink China on the long run. India's cooperation and quiescence is necessary for China to become a world power.
India has to be very careful and prepare for a brutal and short war that China has to win outright to keep its position in Asia.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by pankajs »

Rudradev wrote:
Singha wrote:a chinese attack to show india its place need not mobilize anything locally. it could be a surprise missile attack released from 100s of km away onto our camps in the doklam region. and there is really no onsite defence or even warning system to control this.
Bingo. The missile blitz will be the first and only offensive move. Not anything involving CQB. The PLA wants to demonstrate that they can shock and awe puny India and lay waste to our troops as the TFTA Amrikis and Russians do with third world foes. Using uber tech advantage from standoff distances, to which they are betting we cant or wont reply.

The newly deployed forces in North Tibet will rush in following the massive wave of missile strikes to occupy all of Doklam once our camps there have been destroyed.

Lesson taught. Unless we do something they don't expect. But what?
Bhai log, the Indian and the Chinese forces are a few meters apart at Doklam. How would a missile attack work without hitting ones own troops? Heck I wouldn't even use Brahmos with its pinpoint accuracy in such a scenario.

OTOH, other Indian camps that support the Doklam deployment are on Indian territory. Such an attack would constitute an act of war and would free Indian to escalate in the Doklam/Chumbi valley. Indian deployment around the Doklam area are much close and greater in number than the Chinese forces on Tibet.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by williams »

Signal should be send in the NPA circles if China preps for a missile attack, Indian will make Budha smile again. That will be enough for Uncles and Aunties to push China to be reasonable. India should already have prepared military targets set in Tibet to do equal-equal with Brahmos. If the missiles hit our cities, we have the moral right to hit theirs with BMs. CM vs BM does not matter as long as we have the range. I don't think our current govt cares about commie/lib civil society making noises. We will have louder noises made by common Abduls.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Philip »

Point of view from an expert.

[quote]BHOPINDER SINGHThe writer is former lieutenant-governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry
Why 2017 is not 1962
Published Jul 19, 2017,

The Chinese are past masters of both muscle-flexing and impressive posturing.
The recent stand-off at the Doklam plateau, and the inevitable parallels that are being drawn, makes it worthwhile to take another look at this conflict.

When Chinese editorials of its controlled media were baying for Indian blood and suggesting that Indians should “not forget history lessons” of 1962, the sharp rebuttal from defence minister Arun Jaitley that “the situation in 1962 was different, the India of today is different”, was not a political tit-for-tat but a cold reality that needs to be reiterated, stripped of any hyper-nationalistic import. The defence forces of India are specially guarded and weigh each word thoroughly through the prism of hard facts, as opposed to any political posturing. Herein the underpinning calculus of the Indian Army Chief’s stoic comment — that “India was ready for a two-and-a-half-front-war” — was a further confirmation of the Indian preparedness towards any eventuality. This is a fact, despite the numerical and material superiority that China has maintained over India since the 1962 war, and even during the 1967 border conflict at Nathu La and Cho La, as indeed now in 2017. It is equally true that China’s military investments are approximately thrice that of India’s ($151 billion as opposed to $51 billion for India in 2017), and that its standing Army is nearly twice that of India’s (2.3 million to 1.3 million), or even that its estimated nuclear warheads are more than twice that of India’s (260 to 110).

However, none of these statistics count in a restricted war in an isolated theatre. Intrinsically and perversely, the reality of nuclear warheads at the disposal of both the Chinese and Indian regimes fundamentally alter the dynamics as compared to 1962. It acts as a deterrent against escalation to a full-scale war — no two nuclear-armed countries have ever gone to a full-scale war. Principles of “calculated ambiguity” and “second-strike capability” in nuclear doctrines militates against any unilateral approach to undertake one decisive strike, using both conventional and nuclear arms. So, in essence, the equanimity afforded by the joint nuclear status constrains conflicts between warring nations to be restricted to a limited theatre, like Doklam. Excerpts from the leaked Henderson Brooks report, which studied the debacle of 1962 in detail, plot the morass that afflicted the Indian preparedness in 1962 at various levels, like organisational, policy, planning and overall preparedness. From blatant political interference in key command positions, lack of quality intelligence by the agencies, amateurish “forward policy” (overruling professional military concerns from the field commanders) and an overall lack of investment and equipment was reversed and corrected as soon as 1965. For those who state that the 1965 war was an India-Pak war and therefore cannot be equated with the Sino-Indian war dynamics, the following 1967 conflicts at Nathu La and Cho La entailed the Sino-Indian dynamics and the Indian forces came up victorious fair and square in the “restricted” theatre. The high point of Indian military’s professionalism was in 1971 and reiterated in “Kargil” in 1999. So 1962 was a forgotten chapter by 1965 itself, let alone 2017.

The ongoing steely stare down that is playing out in Doklam sector today, involving 6,000 foot soldiers, has more in common with a similar standoff in 1967, when a People’s Liberation Army attack on Nathu La was successfully repulsed, leading to a bloody nose for the PLA. No amount of numerical “paper strength” mattered for much in the eventual outcome that led to a humiliating fatality count of 400 PLA soldiers and an estimated 70 fatal casualties for the Indian infantry battalions. Significantly, the Chinese are not oblivious to the professionalism of the Indian soldier when they state in their columns, “India’s military has more experience in mountain combat”. Localised logjams like Doklam have their own dynamics and operational imperatives that are bereft of the “paper strengths” of hypothetical full-scale wars. Structurally also, the independent PLA is a potential threat to its own regime of the Communist Party of China. Hence, the PLA swears its allegiance to the CPC and not to the country! So the “party Army” necessitates that all company-level PLA officers are also CPC members, and they have “political officers” as apparatchiks to ensure control. The non-military advisory CPC committee members have major say on military matters as opposed to the PLA itself. Amidst all this, “political work” is a significant part of the PLA training that entails wasteful propagandist indoctrination of the CPC’s, civilian sensibilities.

Unlike the Indian armed forces, who have been frequently involved in cross-border wars and insurgencies since 1962, the Chinese have had no major combat experiences. Its famed technological prowess is “reverse engineering” at best with unproven efficacy, whereas the bulk of Indian defence equipment and composition has either been bloodied in combat or is of a credible Western technological origin with proven capabilities. Never mind India, China’s perennial bug bear Taiwan has defied all Chinese belligerence and military bullying — three waves of “Taiwan Strait Crisis” have not altered Taipei’s resilience or sovereignty. With all its numerical strength, supposed “blue water” Navy capabilities, cutting-edge military platforms like the fifth generation Chengdu J-20, burgeoning nuclear weaponry, world’s largest army of cyber warriors and hackers, second largest fleet of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles — Chinese remain unsuccessful in their quest to wrest Taiwan, which is hardly 100 nautical miles from their mainland, equipped at a fraction of China, but with just about enough to give the Chinese a bloody nose!

It is in this context and realm of holding ground approach of the Indian narrative as opposed to the “expansionist” instincts of the Chinese that the Doklam standoff needs to be evaluated and appreciated. The Chinese are past masters of both muscle-flexing and impressive posturing. However, it is with the careful analysis of the PLA track record, evolution of the emerging global dynamics (India-US angularity) and the inherent battle preparedness of the Indian armed forces that the statements made by the Indian defence minister and the Chief of Army Staff need to be decoded. Like the last Sino-Indian skirmish in 1987 in the Sumdorong Chu Valley, it is expected that the thaw will soon ensue and diplomacy will take over to de-escalate tensions. However, history also suggests that the same happens with the Chinese only when the opposing nation has reciprocated the bullying and expansionist tendencies, like in Doklam.[/quote]
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Yagnasri »

We know that Communists (and peaceful) will only listen to the language of force and change their actions under the threat of force. They will never listen to reason. It is good that we are not issuing stupid statements other than saying that this is not 1962. My mango gut feeling is that there will be a war. We have to see what it will do to NM. 1962 destroyed Nehru. With no MoD full time, we are not showing serious political interest in this issue.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Pratyush »

This will end in a war. Unless one of the parties decides to go home and stay home for a long time.

India has no option but to stand firm. China has no option but to push India back after defeating us. As a stailmate is a defeat for China and a win for India.

So I guess it is time to start having a poll as to when the PRC will attack.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Iyersan »

Pratyush wrote:This will end in a war. Unless one of the parties decides to go home and stay home for a long time.

India has no option but to stand firm. China has no option but to push India back after defeating us. As a stailmate is a defeat for China and a win for India.

So I guess it is time to start having a poll as to when the PRC will attack.
Even if it does. They wont do anything until the 1 August as it is the PLA 90 th Anniversary
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by SSridhar »

China unusually aggressive in its stand on Dokalam: Foreign Secretary Jaishankar tells parliamentary panel - New Indian Express
China's stand on the recent Dokalam dispute in Sikkim sector has been unusually aggressive and articulate, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar told a parliamentary panel today, according to some committee members.

Jaishankar, who was briefing the panel on external affairs, maintained that New Delhi is engaged with Beijing in defusing tension through diplomatic channels. The comments were relayed to reporters by some of the 20 members who were present in the meeting.

The foreign secretary told the panel that India has clearly outlined its position on the border and Chinese have their own position, but they are misinterpreting it so India was trying to clarify it.

He said that India has been maintaining the same position since 1895 as per an Anglo-Chinese agreement.


"Jaishankar told us that China's aggression and rhetoric on the recent standoff is unusual but it is not that complicated as it is being projected in some quarters. We will continue to engage with them through diplomatic channels," one of the members said.

The words like "war-like situation or conflict" were not used by the Foreign Secretary as he stuck to the word standoff to describe the current situation at Dokalam, another member said.

Both members spoke on condition of anonymity because of the confidential nature of the meeting.

During the meeting, Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi, who is also member of the panel, asked if China was trying to send a message to Bhutan that India could not help it, according to one of the members.

Congress leader Shashi Tharoor, the panel chairman, CPI (M) MP Mohammad Salim, TMC MP Sugata Bose and BJP MP Sharad Tripathi were among those who attended the briefing
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Paul »

In a few weeks we will come to know who our friends are and the extent of our relationship with the Russians and Americans.

Modi's visit to Israel must be seen in this context.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by TKiran »

Gurus, why the British India had to do agreements with Chinese but not Tibetans (Tibet was a sovereign country)? What are those agreements?

Or is it that the British India made agreements​with Tibet, but that there's no more British India and Tibet, all those agreements null and void?

Is Jaishankar guilty of (due to pusillanimity) using the word China in place of Tibet? Why can't we state a historical truth that there was agreements with Tibet and not with Han China?
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Paul »

Need to keep close watch on bangladeshi troop movements as well.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Karthik S »

Good, this time we should be wise enough to add acres to our Indian map.
Shanmukh
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Shanmukh »

Paul wrote:Need to keep close watch on bangladeshi troop movements as well.
We have been overly & stupidly generous with Bangladesh. Just a threat to deport all their nationals summarily will be enough to bring them to heel. There is no way Bangladesh can absort 1.5-2 crore people if they are summarily deported. If that is not enough, we have excellent reasons to claim Tetulia & Patgram as compensation for the enclaves we gave them two years ago - that was the original proposal, BTW, since these two regions were Hindu majority in 1947. Same for Barlekha & Srimangal in (the then) Sylhet.
pankajs
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by pankajs »

Why are we expanding the envelope of the current standoff in our minds?

First it was local
Then it was one front
then it became two front
then it became 2.5 front
and now it has morphed into this 3.5 front monster.

I am all for keeping an eye on all fronts / having contingencies for all fronts but did anyone, lets say Bangladeshi in this case, give us any reason to expand our focus?

Added later: To quote a post from the NGO thread. I couldn't have articulated this better. I have left out the name of the poster because I am not sure how he would feel my using his words in the current context.
Unfortunately IMHO there is a sort of seige mentality which results in an atitude that everybody is an enemy unless proven otherwise. That's exactly what the well oiled left liberal propaganda machine - not just in India but globally - wants to feed <snip>
This is exactly the path the Chinese would *hope* Indians will travel. Pretty soon the whole world will look like it is against India. This is classic psyops.
Paul
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Post by Paul »

A little googlnig would in finding the answer

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=0_O ... sh&f=false
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