SSridhar wrote:I think that it is also time for India to go shriller on CPEC passing through sovereign Indian territory currently under Pakistani occupation.
China's words and comments may be hilarious at times and they may be shooting-at-their-own-feet most of the times (and when cornered, they offer no explanation), but their actions are hardly made on an impulse and hardly not well thought-through.
Usually, they have multiple aims so that at least a few would succeed. One technique is that they claim your territories and then 'concede' in one place asking you to reciprocate in the other place where they are vitally interested. In Bhutan as well, they claim Bhutanese territory elsewhere (up north), which they are willing to barter for, Dokalam plateau in West Bhutan, for example.
But, Doka La is another case altogether. Among the aims of China that I can think of in the present stand-off are:
- Drive a wedge between Bhutan & India
- Fortify a claim for territory that is not China's
- Threaten a small state like Bhutan directly
- If a 'threatened' India surrenders, a strategic piece of real-estate is acquired for a future use against it
- Displace India incrementally from heights disadvantageous to China in the tri-junction area
- Probe the Indian resolve
- Retaliate against India over its OBOR stand which significantly dented its image in the May BRI Conference
- Convey to other nations, especially US,Japan & ASEAN, that China pursues vigorously its territorial claims and is not afraid to use appropriate means against any country
- Expose the 'fragility' of the emerging informal alliance in Asia and show up to nations that it is better to hitch with Chinese imperialism than the US
But, there could be also another aim which is to justify Chinese intervention in case of a future war between India & Pakistan. This was openly hinted at by a Global Times analyst (though we discount the usual frothing-at-mouth-corners type of analysts that Global Times employs). A few days later, China's Foreign office 'offered' its good offices to sort out differences between India & Pakistan. Since 1962, China has been toying with the idea of generating some noise at India's eastern borders whenever Pakistan attacked on the western borders. Though it was not significant and the Chinese have been more circumspect on the ground than in the media, the fact remains that they do entertain such a thought.
Now, Pakistan has become a Chinese province (or 'protectorate' according to how one sees it). The CPEC is the template for and the most critical component of OBOR, for the success of both land and sea corridors. Xi has staked personally on this. China wants Gwadar badly and the hinterland route to it from Kashgar. He is getting doubts whether India would let that happen, through its possible covert (sabotage) & overt (war) actions as India has firmly opposed this. He wants to be ready to intervene if India attacks G&B. He is preparing the ground and would use this stand-off to gain concessions from Pakistan citing possible risks that China could not allow. Pakistan may even enter into a special agreement to give China a status similar to what India enjoys with Bhutan.
Xi is also tightening his noose around the Politburo, dismissing a 'Wen Jiabao' faction member from the highest governing council two days back. The upcoming CPC Congress is important because many posts would need to be filled up and Xi would naturally stuff his supporters in. He would ratchet up nationalism in the run up to the Congress, a usual Chinese tactic. He would therefore like the decibel-level of the rhetoric to go up a few notches. He would be glad if GoI reacts because that would give him an opportunity to raise the heat further. But, he would be careful not to go to war because it may spin out of his control as India can effectively counterpunch in a limited engagement. That would be the end of Xi's 'China dreams'. There are too many knives out for him within the Party & PLA.
Fascinating perspective as always from SSridhar garu.
The bolded statements (the last item on the bullet list, and the next two paragraphs) are particularly thought-provoking.
In essence:
1) There is a competition between the US and China for geopolitical influence, particularly in Asia, as we all know.
2) The new player that has entered the ring is India. In our immediate neighbourhood, we have begun to assert our role as a third player also competing against China for influence (in Nepal, BD, SL, Myanmar, and Bhutan).
3) The current focus of this three-way contest is to establish who is the most reliable senior partner/protector for lesser powers to enter into subsidiary alliances with.
4) In the case of Bhutan, India has proved itself more a assertive ally than at any time in the past. If Xi thought he could accomplish the triple goals of (a) creating a Bhutan-India divide, (b) keeping other nations away from Indian influence by proving that India was a meekly submissive weak state, (c) grabbing a piece of land that could be strategically useful against India in future... he has failed on all three counts. Note he HAS FAILED. There is not one good move left to him in Doklam... hence all the sound and fury in the Chinese Media, because that is all they have.
5) In terms of Pakistan, China has already emerged as the protector-in-chief (with CPEC, etc.) Meanwhile the US seems to have continued the late Obama-era policy of steadily pulling back from its role as a sponsor of Pakistan. Today the Pentagon yet again put the brakes on military aid $$ to Pakistan, something we saw Ashton Carter do many times before, but has now been authorized by James Mattis for the first time. So Pakis are more exclusively dependent on China than at any time before.
6) Xi sees that he has failed at the goals outlined in (4). Now, to best equip himself for political success at the CPC Conference later this year, he must quickly change his declared target and maximize perceived gains with a different set of goals. The lowest hanging fruit is Pakistan, which is also the home of his showcase project CPEC.
7) Xi has three potential targets in Pakistan. All will increase his prestige as President of PRC to one extent or another, and all will seek to "punish" India to some extent for our tough stand in Doklam. However, depending on the path he chooses, the benefits accruing to him will range from the cosmetic to the profound. Meanwhile the risks will correspondingly increase from current (status-quo), to sharp repercussions on the India-China trade front, to military conflict and nuclear exchange with India.
(A) He can go for the easiest, safest route: as SSridhar ji suggests, get Pakistan to make the protectorate relationship with China official. Also, get Pakistan to officially declare all of G&B and PoJK as integral Pakistani territory, and hence as Chinese protectorate territory where the PLA can be deployed to "defend against invasion".
(B) He can go for the intermediate route: Do all of (A) and also throw the full weight of China openly behind the separatist movement in Indian J&K, as well as multiple other secessionist movements in India wherever possible. In terms of direct material support, funding, diplomatic support
(C) He can take the most risky route: Do all of (A) and (B), plus attempt to provoke an all-out conflict wherein Pakistan and China militarily attempt to sever all of J&K, permanently, from India.
Here is the question I would like to ask fellow forumites.
If you were Xi Jinping, which path would you take and WHY?
