Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prasad » 01 Sep 2017 17:43

Folks ignore the wumao and please read these two pieces -

1. Is Politics Really In Command of the Chinese Military?
https://politicsfromtheprovinces.blogsp ... f.html?m=1
(Got this one from one of the foreign journos in China. About pla/CPC tug of war and just how much control they exert)
2. Lessons learned and strategy for future - an analysis & election in the confrontation with india -
by Ma Xialoin (Beijing Foreign Studies University, Professor of the Arab Institute, Bo Association president Source: China Times). Pls to use Google translate for this. It's in chinese. http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-0 ... 1032.shtml

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby manju » 01 Sep 2017 18:02

manjgu wrote:a) can we have a BR code 'Dokalised' to signify what India did to China. India dokalised the Hans..vietname dokalised the Hans !! b) on the NSG entry, i dont think given the nature and rules of entry to the NSG club it can happen without chinese benevolence or some kind of quid pro quo or extreme presure on Indias behalf by the powers to be. c) I have a question..will India oppose OBOR if it passed thru Nepal into India and named CHina India Nepal corridor?


Great idea! doklamed.. sounds better i think

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby eklavya » 01 Sep 2017 18:08

Peregrine wrote:X Posted on the STFUP ThreaD

Beijing to PM Modi: Don’t raise Pakistan terror issue at BRICS

"We also noticed that India, when it comes to Pakistan's counter-terrorism, has some concerns. I don't think this is an appropriate topic to be discussed at BRICS summit," Hua Chunying, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, said at a briefing. She also indicated that raising the topic might affect the success of the summit because Chinese leaders may be forced to defend its close ally, Pakistan.


The stupidity of the Chinese foreign ministry is scaling new heights.

Just as America is calling Pakistan a drug-peddling VD-spreading wh0re, Uncle Eleven is coming to the $10 wh0re's "rescue". What does this show:

1. That the Chinese desperately need Pakistan for their counter India strategy. This is an explicit admission of Chinese weakness Vis a Vis India.

2. That China is a sponsor of terrorism and terrorists

Even when the Americans (thought they) needed Pakistan, they were not DUMB enough to defend its terrorist ways. The Chinese foreign ministry appears to be packed with total idiots.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby samirdiw » 01 Sep 2017 18:22

shiv wrote:
RajeshA wrote:China wasted several decades in not coming to an agreement with India,

Regarding India - China has been phenomenally stupid and India will make China pay for stupidity.

In the 1950s I can understand Mao's paranoia about Kuomintang and Japan. But the victories in the east and the stalemate in Korea seemed to give China the megalomania that it has now. China could have had a friend - but it might be better this way. India is a reluctant competitor but a relentless one.


Shiv, great post. Wish the forum had a + option for posts.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RajeshA » 01 Sep 2017 19:17

A different perspective showing how Congress has been screwing with India''s and Bhutan's security

Giving Bhutan its due

By Tenzing Lamsang

The Doklam stand-off, from the beginning, has been dominated by an India-and-China narrative, but a largely silent but firm Bhutan held some of the most important keys to the eventual resolution. It is important to clarify here that the popular narrative of India coming to the rescue of tiny Bhutan is not accurate. In the Doklam stand-off, it was India’s security that was at stake, its “chicken neck” on the line.

From the 1990s, China came up with a “package deal”, where in return for the smaller disputed Doklam area, it was willing to give bigger territorial concessions in disputed territories in central Bhutan. By 1996, the Chinese offer was repeated in a comprehensive way. Apart from disputed territory gains, it was an opportunity for Bhutan to solve its boundary dispute with China and also gain Chinese “goodwill”, which everybody these days, from the US to Russia, pursue.

Doklam, from the Bhutanese point of geography, is neither strategically important nor does it hold any economic value, as the stand-off area is frozen for most of the year and nothing can grow up there.


...Bhutan’s National Assembly resolutions from the late 1970s onwards show the unresolved boundary with China was giving Bhutan severe headaches in addition to an air of uncertainty. Bhutan’s pre-democracy National Assembly saw elected representatives repeatedly getting up to either complain about Chinese encroachments through herders, setting up of temporary dwellings or not being allowed to graze. There were repeated and strong calls from these representatives across the country to solve the boundary issue with China. In the face of all of this, Bhutan in 1996 turned down the comparatively generous package deal offer mainly on the basis of Indian security concerns over Doklam.

Unknown to many in India, Bhutan had to subsequently pay for rejecting this package deal as the Chinese, after this, became noticeably more assertive and active in building roads in the border areas, even encroaching into traditional Bhutanese areas.

In the 2005 session of the National Assembly, the Bhutan government, in response to queries by people’s representatives, revealed how China was building six roads towards Bhutan with four roads already intruding well into Bhutanese territory. Bhutan, as usual, protested vociferously and China, after this extensive intrusion, agreed to freeze the construction of roads.

One example of such a road is in the Phutegang ridge which has always been Bhutanese territory, but after the road construction there, China has not been willing to concede the area in the boundary talks, citing the road in that area.

Bhutan has also had to pay in another way as the Chinese, as a negotiation tactic, have laid large claims towards the Bhutanese side on even well recognised Bhutanese areas which were recognised and respected in 1958 when Nehru visited Bhutan through Chinese-controlled Tibet. China, over the decades, has applied pressure on Bhutan, using various tactics so that Bhutan lets go of the Doklam area.

The recent stand-off was, in some ways, an opportunity for Bhutan to wash its hands of the whole affair and claim helplessness with India in the face of Chinese might. However, Bhutan, once again, strongly stood on India’s side, issuing both a demarche and a statement by the Foreign Ministry. New Delhi must appreciate the kinds of pressures that Thimphu must have come under from Beijing for taking such a stand.

It was, in fact, Bhutan’s firm and uncompromising stand that the status quo should be maintained as per the 1988 and 1998 agreements, both in its public position and behind the scenes, that allowed the face-saver of a deal for both India and China.

Coming back to the bit about India rushing to Bhutan’s security, India never intervened or even raised its voice in the past, about numerous Chinese incursions into the Bhutanese side, including the more serious road-building activities. This is because they did not affect Indian security, unlike Doklam.

Also, contrary to a lot of misguided speculation, neither the 1949 nor the revised 2007 Friendship Treaty is a “security pact”, they have no provision for any “security assistance” to Bhutan. Bhutan had the option of refusing Indian security assistance, which would have severely complicated matters for India. India came into the picture this time as the road was heading down through the disputed territory towards the Zompelri ridge (not ‘Jhumpelri’) that overlooks the chicken neck.

So the ground reality (as impossible as it may seem for some to believe) is that it is Bhutan that has once again come to the rescue of Indian security and strategic interests, with risks and costs to itself.

Boundary talks between Bhutan and China are usually an annual affair but this time even though the 25th boundary talks are overdue there has been complete silence from China’s side. When and if the talks resume, it is not known what the Chinese side will say, and the position they would take after this prolonged stand-off where harsh words have been exchanged.

During the stand-off, there was criticism from some sections within Bhutan of the stand taken by Bhutan — some felt it put it at risk in a potential fight between two giants. Voices from a younger generation on the social media brought some domestic pressure on the government, especially when national elections are only a year away in 2018.

However, the government resisted such calls from some sections as a long-term and good friend not wanting to spring a surprise on India during a moment of crisis.

During the Doklam stand-off, apart from an optimistic reading of a largely neutral Japanese statement, India, for all its new and powerful allies and friends, was largely alone. It was Bhutan, which, with risk to itself, stood by India, all through, to the very end.

******

We need a security pact with Bhutan to patrol their whole boundary and we need to blast away those Chinese roads as soon as possible which intrude either into territory disputed between China and Bhutan or which really encroach into Bhutan. Doklam is politically still a fragile victory.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby anupmisra » 01 Sep 2017 19:20

chola wrote:It would be funny if Modi gets up to podium and explicitly declare Pakistan a terrorist state. It'll be, as an American would say, a deliberate "Fvck You" to the CCP hosts.


The Indian PM (or even the Indian media) would do the rest of the world a great service if he does that (call out the pakis as state sponsors of international terrorism). Let the chinis defend their client state ("the usual bluster about pakis being most affected by terrorism and all that usual paki muck"). But then the world will see a different/true image of chinasthan. That it is openly backing and protecting a globally recognized terrorist state on a global stage watched by billions.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 01 Sep 2017 20:01

If Bhutan thinks nothing grows in Dolam and ready to give up the claim, they can hand it over to India. It will become India's headache and we will manage it.

Declare that Bhutan will consider Dolam plateau security will be under Indian forces like we did just now. Any resolution on this issue will be between India and China.
The Chinese will go apesh** as they always do and we will do the usual one liner.

Despite what our resident Chinese would like to claim, Bhutan being smaller just does not have the resource to face up to China. They have no choice. It is no brilliance of Chinese plans.

Regarding this intrusion, we need to carry out counter-instrusion. You come in 1 km , we go 3 km behind you and cut you off.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby rsingh » 01 Sep 2017 20:12

RajeshA wrote:
ramana wrote:

Anup,

Even the name China is given by Indians.
Will dig up the reference.
Its from Rothermund and Kulke "History of India".

Before that they had no name.


śīna (शीन) means ice!

For Indians, people beyond the ice-covered Himalayas may have been called thus.

Chinese word for China is Zongguo. It is the Indians who used to call a people from the region, not necessarily Han Chinese as "Cina". The Indo-Iranic people in Central Asia too would have used similar terminology and have later on passed on the terminology to Middle-East and Europe.


In Europe it used to be knowen as cathy,kathy or Kitai

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RajeshA » 01 Sep 2017 21:13

rsingh wrote:In Europe it used to be knowen as cathy,kathy or Kitai


Yes, Slavs do use Khitai for China!

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 01 Sep 2017 21:17

In Europe it used to be knowen as cathy,kathy or Kitai

Logical. That is from the Malloostani word "Katthom" shortened from "Patti Katthom" which means:
Honorable Member of (Communist Politburo, then "Court of Emperor in land of Fire-Breathing Crocodile" aka Patti)
In those parts the only thing that resembles a Dragon is a gecko or a lizard or a Crocodile, the last being venerated.

I hope the Chinese postors here find this to be very useful - we at least in Mongolia and South India very much admired the ancient Chinese traditions - and their modern practitioners the CCP Politburo. Please feel free to use this term "Patti Katthom" to signify our respect for China's modern rulers.
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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 01 Sep 2017 21:23

rsingh wrote:
RajeshA wrote:
śīna (शीन) means ice!

For Indians, people beyond the ice-covered Himalayas may have been called thus.

Chinese word for China is Zongguo. It is the Indians who used to call a people from the region, not necessarily Han Chinese as "Cina". The Indo-Iranic people in Central Asia too would have used similar terminology and have later on passed on the terminology to Middle-East and Europe.


In Europe it used to be knowen as cathy,kathy or Kitai


Velly interesting. Cathay (like Cathay Pacific) comes from Turkic and Yuropean connections to northern Mongol/Manchu Cheen. China comes from India and SE Asia's connection to southern Han Cheen.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathay

Words related to Khitay are still used in many Turkic and Slavic languages to refer to China.


While Central Asia had long known China under names similar to Cathay, that country was known to the peoples of South-East Asia and India under names similar to China (cf. e.g. Cina in modern Malay).


India, especially Goa, was instrumental in establishing the modern name of China for Cheen in Yurop as well. Otherwise, we might have a Peepul's Leepubric of Cathay today.

When in the early 16th century the Portuguese reached South-East Asia (Afonso de Albuquerque conquering Malacca in 1511) and the southern coast of China (Jorge Álvares reaching the Pearl River estuary in 1513), they started calling the country by the name used in South and South-East Asia.[11] It was not immediately clear to the Europeans whether this China is the same country as Cathay known from Marco Polo. Therefore, it would not be uncommon for 16th-century map to apply the label "China" just to the coastal region already well known to the Europeans (e.g., just Guangdong on Abraham Ortelius' 1570 map), and to place the mysterious Cathay somewhere inland.
...
Most importantly, when the Jesuits first arrived to Beijing 1598, they also met a number of "Mohammedans" or "Arabian Turks" – visitors or immigrants from the Muslim countries to the west of China, who told Ricci that now they were living in the Great Cathay. This all made them quite convinced that Cathay is indeed China.[12]

China-based Jesuits promptly informed their colleagues in Goa (Portuguese India) and Europe about their discovery of the Cathay-China identity. This was stated e.g. in a 1602 letter of Ricci's comrade Diego de Pantoja, which was published in Europe along with other Jesuits' letters in 1605.[13] The Jesuits in India, however, were not convinced, because, according to their informants (merchants who visited the Mughal capitals Agra and Lahore), Cathay – a country that could be reached via Kashgar – had a large Christian population, while the Jesuits in China had not found any Christians there.[14][15]

In retrospect, the Central Asian Muslim informants' idea of the Ming China being a heavily Christian country may be explained by numerous similarities between Christian and Buddhist ecclesiastical rituals – from having sumptuous statuary and ecclesiastical robes to Gregorian chant – which would make the two religions appear externally similar to a Muslim merchant.[16] This may also have been the genesis of the Prester John myth.

To resolve the China-Cathay controversy, the India Jesuits sent a Portuguese lay brother, Bento de Góis on an overland expedition north and east, with the goal of reaching Cathay and finding out once and for all whether it is China or some other country. Góis spent almost three years (1603–1605) crossing Afghanistan, Badakhshan, Kashgaria, and Kingdom of **** with Muslim trade caravans. In 1605, in ****, he, too, became convinced that his destination is China, as he met the members of a caravan returning from Beijing to Kashgar, who told them about staying in the same Beijing inn with Portuguese Jesuits. (In fact, those were the same very "Saracens" who had, a few months earlier, confirmed it to Ricci that they were in "Cathay"). De Góis died in Suzhou, Gansu – the first Ming China city he reached – while waiting for an entry permit to proceed toward Beijing; but, in the words of Henry Yule, it was his expedition that made "Cathay... finally disappear from view, leaving China only in the mouths and minds of men".[17]


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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RajeshA » 01 Sep 2017 21:50

Actually there were two Chinas of which Marco Polo reports, northern was called Cathay and southern China was called Manji.

As an aside, in Yunnan, they even used to use cowry money and the Tai Lu people used to use a Brahmi based script.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Dileep » 01 Sep 2017 21:56

Sage Kalidasa mentions "chinese cloth" (चीनांशुकं) in the last sloka of Sakuntalam 1st Act. It is not 'chaina' as Englishized today. It is 'cheena'.

So, yes, it is us who named them.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nandakumar » 01 Sep 2017 22:33

If you spell the word in English from an Indian phonetic pronounciation it would be 'China' as the alternative 'cheena' or 'chena' was not only phonetically different that was also not how the Indian languages identified that particular region of what china passes for today. In Tamil it was always 'Chin' as in 'China Pattu'. Tamil connection to China goes back to over 2000 years of trade in silk. Kancheepuram or kanchipuram was known as 'kanchi' to the ancient Chinese.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 01 Sep 2017 22:36

The new Punti-Shivering is about India calling them out in public at the BRICS as the Terrorist Puppeteers. Plus Nuclear Terrorist Sponsors.

This is very very interesting. The other thing "we" found out is that Gobar Crimes is *****EXTREMELY****** sensitive about the primary role played by their famous Sikh Soldier Video in Teaching the Indians a Lesson and how the meek Indians learned their lesson and put up an animation of their PM worshipping WTP Premier Xi on TV prior to XiT. How they were admired all over the world (CNN, Guardian).

Both these facts must be carefully absorbed for future reference and use. :mrgreen:

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Kati » 02 Sep 2017 01:41

Man charged with trying to steal robotics firm trade secrets

[Associated Press] September 1, 2017

BOSTON (AP) — A dual Chinese and Canadian citizen tried to steal valuable trade secrets from a Massachusetts surgical robotics company, federal prosecutors said.

Dong "Kevin" Liu, 44, was spotted Monday night by the chief executive of Raynham-based Medrobotics Corp. in the company's conference room with three open laptops, according to authorities.

The CEO did not recognize him as an employee or a contractor, so asked what he was doing.

Liu kept changing his story, first saying he was there to meet with one employee, then a second, until finally saying he was there to meet the CEO, investigators said. The CEO knew there was no such meeting and called local police, who charged Liu with trespassing.

When he was arrested, he was in possession of two laptops, an iPad, two portable hard drives, 10 cellphone SIM cards, two digital camcorders, at least two flash drives, and other equipment that can be used to obtain data from computer networks, prosecutors said.

Liu was charged Thursday with attempted theft of trade secrets and attempted access to a computer without authorization in order to obtain protected information, according to the U.S. attorney's office in Boston.

He was detained after an initial court appearance. His federal public defender declined to comment on the allegations.

Investigators are still trying to determine whether Liu was able to obtain any of the company's information.

The suspect allegedly said he worked with a Chinese patent law firm.

Medrobotics manufactures and markets a robot-assisted device that provides surgeons with access to and images of hard-to-reach places in the human body for minimally invasive surgery. The company has invested millions of dollars in technology that is not yet patented.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 02 Sep 2017 02:06

^^^ Lol. Amreeki CEO sees some random chinese dude in his conference room?!

That is like the 10000th time some chini was caught stealing secrets from a company. You'd think they would send some white guy to do the job. Someone less conspicuous.

Anyone who thinks the chinis care about "face" or pride is daft on the head and would be eaten alive by the lizards. Face/pride allows companies/businessmen to make more or less moral decisions out of human decency and fear of shame.

There is a distinct lack of that with chini companies and by all likelihood their government officials.

Cheat, lie or steal. As long as the end is beneficial, any means is okay. And that includes putting poisons like melamine into baby formula for a small profit.

Beat them by making them "lose face" at Doka La? They don't have any face left to lose. You beat them by physically BEATING them in the arse (until it is black and blue.)

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 02 Sep 2017 02:08

When he was arrested, he was in possession of two laptops, an iPad, two portable hard drives, 10 cellphone SIM cards, two digital camcorders, at least two flash drives, and other equipment that can be used to obtain data from computer networks, prosecutors said.

But he was peacefully building a road in undisputed Chinese territory!

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 02 Sep 2017 03:49

http://www.catchnews.com/international- ... 79756.html
How the Doklam withdrawal was carefully choreographed
The withdrawal was monitored from New Delhi in real time – hence the reference in the statement of the Ministry of External Affairs that the process of disengagement was completed under “verification”.
According to multiple sources, this was the result of a carefully coordinated move led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the representatives of the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, the Army Chief and the National Security Advisor. They spent a sleepless Sunday night in direct communication with Indian ambassador to China Vijay Gokhale who was negotiating with a high level Chinese official in Beijing.
Gokhale had been in Delhi for consultations for the entire previous week. He was advised not to go back to Beijing till he received a call from Beijing for a meeting. Sure enough, he received a call on Saturday/Sunday, with the Chinese foreign ministry seeking a meeting. It is not clear at this point whether during the week the Indian Ambassador to Beijing was in Delhi the two sides were still engaged at a higher level.
However, once Bejing made the approach, the Indian Ambassador was advised by the government to go for the meeting by the next available flight. The flight to Beijing was, however, delayed by about three hours because international flight schedules had been disrupted by Cyclone Harvey.
When Gokhale landed in Beijing it was already Sunday night. The Chinese foreign ministry apparently wanted him to come over directly from the airport. However, Gokhale went to his residence, changed, informed Delhi and then went for the meeting.
By the time the meeting began with the Chinese it was already 10.30 PM Indian Standard Time or 1 AM Beijing time.
In Delhi, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, Army Chief BS Rawat, and the National Security Advisor were instructed at the highest level to stay up as long as the meeting in Beijing lasted with the Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj on standby to guide them.
Gokhale apparently was surprised to find that the Chinese had fielded a very senior negotiator, believed to be a confidante of President Xi Jinping. The Chinese negotiator apparently was extremely conciliatory and expressed the opinion that neither China nor India gained from the stand-off, especially when they could accomplish many things together as two responsible powers working cooperatively. This was close to the Indian position that neither side stood to gain from a military confrontation. India had suggested that a simultaneous withdrawal was the only way out
“EXPEDITIOUS” NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL
While the exact details of the negotiations are not known, the Chinese apparently suggested that instead of “simultaneous withdrawal” perhaps the two sides could agree to a “near simultaneous” withdrawal. Gokhale sought instructions and was told by his superiors in Delhi that this was acceptable if it helped resolve the stand-off.
It may be recalled that some strategic affairs experts were quick to point out that the phrase “expeditious withdrawal” instead of “simultaneous withdrawal” leaped out of the statement issued by India and that this was not merely a question of semantics.
Indeed, it was not.
India agreed to withdraw its troops to pre-June 16 position the next morning and Chinese agreed to do so a couple of hours later in the afternoon but before sun-down which is roughly at 5 PM in the Doklam area. Strict windows of two hours each – before noon for India and before sundown for China – were agreed upon.
It was also agreed that the brigadiers in-charge from the two sides would meet in the morning of the disengagement, Monday August 28. India had requested that in that meeting, the brigadier of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) should show awritten order from his superiors to his Indian counterpart instructing him to withdraw his troops to the posts they occupied before June 16, along with the road construction machinery deployed and the tents they had pitched in the area.
This was done to ensure two things. One, to ensure that the PLA did not move only a few metres back from its stand-off position and still claim that technically it had disengaged – hence the insistence that they had to move to their pre-June 16 posts. Two, all the road construction equipment and the tents pitched for accommodation had to be removed permanently.
In the afternoon, the Chinese sought half-an-hour extra for the withdrawal. Their explanation to the Indian side was that some extra digging was involved for removing the tents pitched there because their pegs were quite deep. India agreed as it has also exceeded its withdrawal time that morning by half an hour or so. By 4.30 PM the PLA had completed its withdrawal with its troops, machinery and tents being moved to pre-June 16 positions.
......

Gautam

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 02 Sep 2017 04:05

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 324701.cms
Dokalam standoff had put Trump administration in awkward position: Expert
PTI|Sep 01, 2017, 08.13 PM IST
The Dokalam standoff between India and China had put the Trump administration in an awkward position and it was not eager to get embroiled in, especially at a time when it was grappling with North Korea and seeking Beijing's assistance, an American expert has said.
India and China on Monday ended their 73-day standoff in Dokalam by withdrawing troops from the area, just days before Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to China to attend the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit.
Jeff Smith, research fellow, South Asia, The Heritage Foundation, said that the Trump administration was put in an uncomfortable position by the Dokalam crisis.
"This was not a dispute they were eager to become embroiled in, particularly at a time that they're dealing with an increasingly intractable problem in North Korea and seeking China's assistance on the matter," he said.
Noting that he has no direct insights into the internal discussions within the Trump administration on the Dokalam issue, Smith said, "If you read between the lines the Trump administration s comments on the dispute, they, like Japan, were de-facto supportive of India's position."
"If China's bottom line was a full Indian withdrawal as a precondition for negotiations, by encouraging talks without preconditions the Trump administration was essentially signaling to both parties that it supported Delhi s approach and ultimately that's what happened," said Smith, who had testified before multiple congressional committees.
"Fortunately, despite its maximalist position in public, behind the scenes China was flexible enough to negotiate and ultimately reach a mutually face-saving, sufficiently ambiguous settlement that satisfied both sides minimum requirements," he said.
.....

Before taking any panga with lizard, Injuns should take Sher Khan's permission to do so. This permission will come after the NK situation is resolved. In about 200 years, give or take. Rahu dharyam. In the meantime do not place Khan in awkward position.
Gautam
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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DavidD » 02 Sep 2017 04:24

Suraj wrote:
DavidD wrote:Well that's a pretty weak argument. "You've won everything up until now, but tomorrow is a new day!" You can repeat that phrase every day and there's no way it can be refuted with certainty. None of us is clairvoyant after all. Like I said a few posts back, the proof of posturing will be facts on the ground. Let's wait and see how the facts change on the ground.

Before shiv or ramana takes on this, let me have a good laugh at your response. "Lets see what happens" is the definition of a 'pretty weak argument'. In some Indian languages, that's called the parkalam argument.

China lost to India at Doklam. From now on we'll remember that when you take on us, despite your hopes that we'd rather think of 1962 instead - a once bigger power in the process of being cut down to size.

You haven't gotten anywhere with Pakistan after 4 decades of help from US, Saudis and China. Go ahead, ask your wife 'honey, lets go live in Karachi/Lahore/Peshawar. I heard is a wonderful safe city to raise our kids in'. She's either going to question your sanity, or if you must go to the subcontinent, insist she prefers someplace in India. Any of those TSP cities, you're risking getting killed. Or being kidnapped for ransom. And that's your greatest ally in the world.

Bangladesh has gone from yelling at us about Farrakha Barrage 20 years ago to permitting Indian goods transit through them. Myanmar just let India pursue terrorists into their territory. And little Bhutan, despite all the Chinese pressure, still doesn't budge. It's 2017 now. China wasted the best 20 years it had to permanently hobble India. You've already lost your cloak of supposed invincibility at Doklam, and you're going to keep losing more. At Rawalpindi now, they're wondering 'if we attack India in Kashmir, will China open a second front, or will they commission the Xinhua Chinese sardar guy and the whiny girl to do another video to scare India ?'

Remember, the border is not between India and China. It's between India and Tibet. It's Chinese forces trying to hold a border between a restive occupied country and a rising power. Think you're going to be able to keep holding that border long term, as the other side keeps growing in might relative to you ?


Now you're just arguing for argument's sake. I said to look at what has already happened, you started predicting the future "beginning August 2017". I called that a weak argument but relented since, as I said, there's no way to ever refute it with certainty because we're not clairvoyant. Yes, it sure as heck is the definition of a "pretty weak argument." You can agree without being argumentative, you know.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karan M » 02 Sep 2017 04:46

Look you and yours faced India down, when you are ostensibly at your strongest (PRC big economy, fancy toys, this that) & you blinked and walked away.

That's that. Every year as we speak India's position vs PRC will improve, given current trajectory.

You guys are like the naked king who constantly asks his advisors to praise him. One fine day, a stranger says, well you don't have any clothes. And the king storms off, after his advisors mutter they really can't take on the stranger.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karan M » 02 Sep 2017 04:48

"Gokhale apparently was surprised to find that the Chinese had fielded a very senior negotiator, believed to be a confidante of President Xi Jinping. The Chinese negotiator apparently was extremely conciliatory and expressed the opinion that neither China nor India gained from the stand-off, especially when they could accomplish many things together as two responsible powers working cooperatively. This was close to the Indian position that neither side stood to gain from a military confrontation. India had suggested that a simultaneous withdrawal was the only way out"

In Indian lingo, is bar "phat gayi"

David, please don't try the evil capitalist Google translate but go ahead & do ask some yindoo what it means.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DavidD » 02 Sep 2017 04:49

shiv wrote:
DavidD wrote:Your language might be crude but none of what you say is necessarily false. Consider this though, why does China "want" Dokala? It'll make an invasion of the chicken neck area easier, sure, but like you said, war is bad. I'd like to add that war across the Himalayas is more than bad, it's utterly stupid and suicidal. So does China seek to make such a war slightly less stupid or suicidal? Or perhaps China wants something else? Heck, does China really even need Bhutan? Or Nepal for that matter?

China does not need Dokala. China probably does not seek to cut "chicken's neck"

But China has built up a a healthy trust deficit by lying and obfuscation. This appears to be a Chinese cultural characteristic in which what I define as "lying and obfuscation" will be seen by the Chinese as an affront.

There are certain pointers to Chinese behaviour even in Dokala. The Chinese troops on the ground knew exactly where they were. Tracks made by Chinese troops that come from Chinese territory ended in a beautiful loop for people to turn around exactly where the border with India is marked on the map - even though there is nothing on the ground. It's just that they were walking on Bhutanese territory. And they knew that well because a perfectly developed road climbs up a forested mountainside on the Tibet/Amo Chu river valley side that goes from 2500 meters to 4000 plus meters on the Doklam plateau over a linear distance of just 4 km (the zig zag road is much longer of course). And no road on the plateau which has been "Chinese territory"

Beyond the plateau is nothing. No town. No village. Only Indian troops on one side and Bhutan on the other side - for which one has to go downhill again. Chinese comments on my videos have indignantly claimed that the Chinese were building a road on "Their own territory". This is the Chinese way - that is to see an area that appears unoccupied, claim it and build a road that strengthens the claim. And the argument is the same one as that you have made here "China does not mean harm"

Yes. China does not mean harm today. But tomorrow if the Chinese decided to create some trouble (maybe because Indians are such greedy boors?) then this road would matter. Instead of postponing war to that later date, let it be fought now. If the Chinese have patience, maybe Indians have impatience? Why postpone disputes?

Disputes do not happen. They are created. And no international dispute can be mediated. Each side will always claim that the other is wrong. Unless India disputes what China says - China wins by default. And China is welcome to dispute Indian claims - but beyond a point there will be war simply because as far as Indian thinking goes - China may need war to understand its own intent and Indian intent. That is the Indian experience.


I think your narrow focus is clouding your judgment. My argument is not that "China does not mean harm", far from it. China does mean harm, it's just that the harm won't be coming from the north.

You're someone who are very good at seeing the facts. You know better than most how little each side can gain from war in the Himalayas given the insurmountable geographic constraints there, so why do you think China has any plans to fight there? You're right that disputes do not just happen, so why do you think disputes are created there when there's no chance of it ever amounting to anything worthwhile? If China means to escalate there in the future, why would China be drastically reducing the role of the army while the IA's budget grows relative to the other services?

You saw through the Chinese rhetoric quite easily and knew the PLA had no hand to play at Doklam because you focused on the facts, look at the other facts I listed above and you'll see what Chinese intentions really are.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pandyan » 02 Sep 2017 04:50

Karan M wrote:Look you and yours faced India down, when you are ostensibly at your strongest (PRC big economy, fancy toys, this that) & you blinked and walked away.

That's that. Every year as we speak India's position vs PRC will improve, given current trajectory.

You guys are like the naked king who constantly asks his advisors to praise him. One fine day, a stranger says, well you don't have any clothes. And the king storms off, after his advisors mutter they really can't take on the stranger.


You just committed eighth scene dude :rotfl:

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 02 Sep 2017 05:04

Former NSA MKN in the CHindu writes in his piece "Understanding the Chinese mind",not to make the mistake "that China has been deterred at Doklam by India's firm riposte".

This is the general viewpoint on BRF too.MKN uses the word "obtuse" in Chinese methodology I suggest deliberate deception,duplicity,to disarm the enemy until it is too late.China also uses denunciation,diatribe,and demonisation methodology to put the enemy on the defensive.China always makes the first (surprise) move whether military or diplomatic.The vile invective and abuse used against India over Doklam was an eyeopener to our complacent
politico-babu appeasement nexus.Only a strong
mil. posture and defiant attitude can deter China

MKN says BRICS and the party congress were
major factors in China stepping back.Plus oil is
still of critical importance to it.China has only paused in its relentless goal of global domination.India must make use of the pause to militarily strengthen itseld and devise a grand strategy and tactics to defeat China's global agenda.
Last edited by Philip on 02 Sep 2017 07:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pulikeshi » 02 Sep 2017 05:55



It was a pleasure to watch Vishnu Som be reduced to "little brother" by the CGTN arsheholes! UndieTV ki Jai Ho! :P
More of such should find its way to Indian audience by DDM to inoculate and make the mango Indian better prepared for the chutiyapa from Cheena!
PS: That Rui dude almost jumps to the rescue often... fearing the worse from 'senior defense expert' :rotfl:
want Arnab to start inviting some of the Chinese retired generals and prepare them for what comes to those who speak up against the chipanda!
The brave brothers of the "unshakable papaya" may quiver at the freedom of the capitalist fifth estate! :mrgreen:

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 02 Sep 2017 06:14

https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/why-i ... ith-china/
WHY INDIA DID NOT ‘WIN’ THE STANDOFF WITH CHINA
M. TAYLOR FRAVELSEPTEMBER 1, 2017
The end of a standoff between India and China over a remote road on the Doklam plateau has prompted a vibrant discussion about the lessons learned. The emerging consensus is that India “won” and China “lost.” India’s willingness to challenge China is even viewed as providing a model that other states can use to counter Chinese coercion. If others stand up, China will back down.
Nevertheless, this consensus is misplaced. And the sports analogy of winning and losing obscures much more than it reveals.
To start, it remains unclear that India “won.” From India’s point of view, the status quo ante of June 2017 was restored, a victory. Yet from China’s perspective, Indian forces withdrew from Chinese territory (also claimed by Bhutan, but not by India). Moreover, on the ground at the site of the confrontation, Indian forces pulled back first. Meanwhile, Chinese forces remain in Doklam, even if Beijing chose not to press ahead with the road extension that sparked the standoff.
There is also no indication from Chinese or Indian statements that China had to make any concessions to convince India to withdraw its troops. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson underscored that China’s claims and behavior will not change, noting that China would “continue with its exercise of sovereign rights” in the disputed area. In other words, China will still conduct patrols in Doklam and maintain the portions of road that had been built before the standoff started in early June.
China also had other reasons to seek de-escalation, none of which can be attributed to India’s intervention. An active confrontation would have cast a pall over the upcoming BRICS summit that China is hosting in Xiamen in early September. And on the eve of the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping likely wanted to avoid any risky escalation that could affect the significant transfer of power that will occur. Once these events pass, however, China may be less constrained and more willing to tolerate risk on the border with India.
Moreover, even if India scored a tactical win by thwarting China’s road extension, it may have lost at the strategic level. Ironically perhaps, India’s actions underscored to China the importance of enhancing its military position in the Doklam bowl. Before the standoff in June, China’s permanent presence in the area had been quite limited. China had maintained a road in the area for several decades, but did not garrison any forces. In contrast, India has maintained and developed a forward post at Doka La adjacent to Doklam.
Now that India has chosen to confront China at Doklam, however, China may well seek to rectify this tactical imbalance of forces. In fact, the Chinese spokesperson suggested a move in this direction by saying China would continue to station forces (zhushou), most likely a reference to troops deployed to Doklam after the standoff began. If China does this, it would likely build facilities farther away from India’s position at Doka La, making it more challenging for India to intervene and block China next time. When India challenged China’s construction crews in June, it only had to move its forces a hundred meters from the existing border. In the future, India may be faced with the uncomfortable choice of deciding whether to risk much more to deny China a greater presence farther inside Doklam or to accept it. This will be a tough decision for any leader to make. Even if India won this round, it may not win the next one.
One could even make the case that China achieved some of its political objectives, whose importance overshadows the standoff over the road. Bhutan, always worried about being caught between its much larger neighbors, may become more reluctant to test China on territorial issues to avoid being drawn into a conflict between India and China. Despite the triumphalism from some voices in New Delhi, India likely learned that Beijing does not back down immediately or without sustained effort. The disengagement at Doklam took more than ten weeks of diplomacy, much longer than previous confrontations along the China-India border in 2013 and 2014 , which lasted only a few weeks.
The Indian intervention also does not offer a “model” that other states can apply elsewhere for countering China’s assertiveness. To start, India enjoyed tactical superiority at the site of the standoff, leveraging its well-developed forward position at Doka La and reserves of much larger forces based permanently in Sikkim. These advantages likely played a role in limiting China’s response. Moreover, if China seeks to address the tactical imbalance in Doklam in the future, India may be less successful using the same method to deter China again. Furthermore, many other states facing China in territorial disputes lack such tactical superiority precisely where it matters.
.....

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 02 Sep 2017 06:25

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/01/the ... jing-want/
The China-India Border Standoff: What Does Beijing Want?
And why has the Trump administration been so conspicuously silent in supporting a key ally?
China-India-Bhutan border dispute has come to an end. On Monday, India and China agreed to remove their troops from a disputed region called the Doklam Plateau, claimed by both China and Bhutan. (The area is not claimed by India, but it is very close to the Indian border, and of extreme strategic importance to New Delhi.) Although the dust-up failed to attract much attention from the international community, it is nonetheless worthy of note, both for what it says about a rising China’s more forward-leaning approach to its neighbors, and also for what it says about the Trump administration’s strangely inattentive approach to an increasingly restive Asia.
....
For over a decade, both the Bush and Obama administrations sought to strengthen U.S.-India political and security ties. In its first months in office, the Trump administration has sought to build on this warming trend. In fact, word of the border spat with China broke just before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid his first visit to the United States since Trump took office. During Modi’s visit, the two sides further cemented their security relationship, with the Trump administration agreeing to sell India advanced drone surveillance equipment that could be used to track Chinese naval movements in the Indian Ocean.
And yet, neither the White House nor the State Department have given a firm and clear statement on this most recent spat. The Trump administration’s reticence may stem at least in part from the well-documented disarray within the ranks of the U.S. foreign-policy apparatus: as with many other seemingly less pressing foreign policy concerns, the Trump White House may not yet know exactly how to balance competing interests and objectives, including the need to maintain good relations with China and to allay Pakistani concerns that Washington is getting too close to its arch rival.
Any effort to formulate and execute a policy response is made all the more difficult by the fact that key South Asia posts remain unfilled. Seven months into the Trump presidency, his administration has yet to nominate either an assistant secretary for South Asia or an ambassador to India, and the State Department has offered to no sign as to when these posts will finally be filled.
On Sunday, August 27, roughly 70 days after the spat began, an unnamed Trump administration official gave what appear to be the first public comments from the U.S. government on the matter. The official told an Indian newspaper that the United States is closely monitoring the situation. “We are concerned,” the official said. “We support a return to the status quo.”
A blind quote to an Indian media outlet, provided more than two months into the border standoff, can hardly be considered a robust response. The Trump administration’s reticence is unfortunate: without some sort of signal from Washington, Beijing might conclude that it can escalate its activities in the disputed area without worrying about any interference from the United States. If India responds in kind, the potential for military conflict between the two nuclear-armed regional powers will grow.
It is still too early to tell whether the latest border scuffle represents a shift in Beijing’s strategic thinking. That said, what would a more aggressive Chinese approach to the border dispute look like? First, it would include an increased militarization of the disputed border regions by China. The second prong would be a higher prioritization of political and economic ties with Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, in an effort to make those governments more open — over time — to Chinese strategic priorities in the region. Finally, it would include a decreased emphasis on the geopolitical costs of a more assertive strategy. Beijing could conclude that, as much as New Delhi is distressed over any assertive Chinese moves, India simply won’t be able to respond for fear of damaging economic ties.
A key signal to watch for: Now that this latest squabble has been resolved, will Beijing avoid any additional provocations along the border? Or will it once again seek to provoke New Delhi just a few months down the line? Absent a firmer response from Washington, it may only be a matter of time before Beijing looks to probe India’s resolve once again. At the earliest opportunity, the Trump administration should signal to all concerned that it would not look favorably on a military buildup by any party in the Himalayas, and that the United States expects all parties to peacefully negotiate a final resolution to their border woes.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 02 Sep 2017 06:34

http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/disengag ... engagement at Doklam: Why and How Did the India-China Standoff End?
Who came out on top in the Doklam standoff in the end?
By Ankit Panda
After more than two months, the tense standoff between the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on an obscure piece of Himalayan territory has come to a close. On Monday, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs each released statements noting that the situation had been resolved. The two statements varied in emphasis, but did not contradict one another.
India said the two sides had reached a “disengagement understanding,” which led to the “expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face-off site” in Dolam, part of Doklam region that is disputed between Bhutan and China. (See part one of this series for a primer on the political geography of the region.) MEA released a follow-up statement noting that the “border personnel of India and China at the face-off site” were withdrawing.
Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, confirmed in a press conference that the standoff had ended, with India withdrawing “all its border personnel and equipment that were illegally on the Chinese territory to the Indian side.” Hua added that “Chinese border troops continue with their patrols in the Dong Lang area,” using the Chinese name for the Doklam region.
The conclusion of the standoff comes ahead of a scheduled meeting of the heads of the BRICS group of countries, who will meet in Xiamen, China. The meeting will be the second between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping since they meet on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit shortly after the start of the standoff. Monday’s also brings what some analysts had seen as a much longer standoff to a close well before the Communist Party of China convenes for the first plenum of the 19th Party Congress later this autumn.
Looking from the outside in, the end of the standoff at Doklam appears to be sudden. In the days leading up to Monday’s withdrawals, Chinese state media had hardly let up on its drumbeat of opinion pieces condemning India and even threatening war. (This has continued even in the aftermath of the resolution of the standoff.)
The duration of the standoff was indeed notable for the exceptionally jingoistic coverage in the Chinese press; leaving aside the normally over-the-top coverage of the Global Times, more authoritative Chinese state media outlets, including People’s Daily and Xinhua news agency carried articles condemning India over the standoff.
In the end, however, India’s diplomatic and national security apparatus resisted any actions that would turn escalation into a self-fulfilling prophecy. (Accounts vary of the precise tick-tock involved in reaching the resolution unveiled on Monday, but diplomacy was no doubt central.) Despite the tone coming out of China throughout the standoff, which, in all fairness, was returned by many in the Indian press, quiet diplomacy behind-the-scenes prevailed in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement to pull back the armed forces of these two nuclear-armed Asian giants from the standoff point.
Given the stakes at Doklam and the several unusual features of this standoff — it was the first instance of India facing down Chinese troops on territory claimed by a third country, Bhutan — the details of Monday’s resolution merit a closer look, both as a tactical and strategic matter. In the end, did India’s mid-June maneuver yield its desired end-state in Doklam or did China gain instead?
A dispassionate look at the facts of Monday’s resolution, as presented by both the Indian and Chinese sides, suggests that New Delhi’s gamble in mid-June has paid off at least tactically. In New Delhi’s view, the threat at Doklam concerned the PLA’s attempt to extend the “turning point” of a long-standing road just west of the river known as Torsa Nala, seeking an extension southward toward Jampheri Ridge, a feature perceived to have great strategic importance for the Indian Army.
Accordingly, the standoff began after Indian troops interdicted the PLA from beginning any construction to ostensibly extend the road southward toward Jampheri Ridge. On June 30, MEA released a definitive statement outlining India’s position on the standoff. This document outlined that, in coordination with Bhutan, India opposed any unilateral changes to the status quo in the region.
The Indian statement cited a statement released by the Foreign Ministry of Bhutan, which urged “a return to the status quo as before 16 June 2017.” MEA’s June 30 statement continued: “In coordination with the [Royal Government of Bhutan], Indian personnel, who were present at general area Doka La, approached the Chinese construction party and urged them to desist from changing the status quo. These efforts continue.”
With Monday’s resolution, both India and Bhutan have successfully attained their desired end-state: a return to the status quo in Dolam before June 16. China, meanwhile, has released a face-saving statement, noting that Indian troops withdrew from the site of the standoff first — a core Chinese demand since June 16 — and that its patrols in the Dolam region continue. Chinese patrols have taken place in this region for years and their continuation does not represent any unilateral change to the status quo before June 16. Moreover, China’s statement emphasizes that it will “continue with its exercise of sovereign rights” in the area—a sufficiently broad envelope to cover future attempts at changes to the status quo, if the PLA sees it necessary and opportune.
But, as I noted in part two of this series, the Doklam standoff was never just about the question of what PLA engineers would or would not be allowed to do to a road on an obscure patch of Himalayan land. The standoff exposed the salience of larger questions about the nature of the relationship between India and China, their management of border tensions more broadly, and of Bhutan’s interests between its two massive neighbors.
Additionally, the central disagreement over the applicability of the so-called watershed principle — the fundamental origin of the India-China dispute over the position of the tri-border point at Doklam — remains as open a question as ever. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s lengthy position paper on these matters, which publicly relitigated the language of the 1890 Sino-British convention among other historical questions, has drawn considerable public attention to this issue.
While China may have conceded to a return to the status quo — an outcome rendered palatable with face-saving claims of India withdrawing first — the Doklam region won’t be off the table for future attempts at prodding India and Bhutan.
Does the Doklam sage carry lessons for other Asian states facing Chinese attempts at unilaterally changing the status quo in disputed regions? Perhaps not. India’s unique hard power advantages in the Himalayan region give its bargaining position with China something of a unique characteristic that other Asian states facing Chinese irredentism — notably Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea — do not enjoy. The closest analog to India’s position may be Japan in the East China Sea.
While India, as of August 28, does seem to have come out on top tactically, previous episodes of Chinese behavior in territorial disputes, including the 2012 episode with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal, do highlight the potential for quick defection from agreements in Beijing. Even if China does not attempt to extend the turning point of its road near Doka La, it has other options available to improve its position in any future contingency at Doklam without altering the status quo in ways that would trigger Indian retaliation.
For instance, China always has the option of fortifying PLA positions at or north of the Sinche-La ridgeline, in undisputed territory or even well in the Chumbi Valley. Another option is that the PLA chooses to fortify existing positions along its road, but east of Torsa Nala. The Torsa Nala river appears to have served as a de facto separating line between the area of the Dolam bowl where the Bhutanese and Indian armies exercise control and carry out patrols. By bolstering its position east and north of Torsa Nala, the PLA could “salami-slice” its way to a more advantageous position in the area anyway.
....

Gautam

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 02 Sep 2017 06:39

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 313542.cms
China denies it gave $20bn loan to India to disengage in Doklam
Saibal Dasgupta | TNN | Updated: Sep 1, 2017, 08:52 IST
BEIJING: China's defence ministry on Thursday refuted reports in the Chinese social media that India agreed to enter into an agreement on the Doklam issue after Beijing promised a loan of $20 billion.
Defence ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang, replying to a question, said, "On your question about China providing loans to India to withdraw troops, we have checked with the relevant authorities of the government and such reports are pure fabrication."
A similar statement, refuting India taking $20billion loan, was made by the Chinese foreign ministry, while People's Daily, the official organ of the Communist Party, ran a report about the money offer being false.
But, Chinese official agencies and media seem to be keeping up the speculation on the issue alive by repeated denials because it serves the purpose of showing that China is financially much stonger than India, which makes it a difficult competitor in a military contest, said an observer.
......

Gautam

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ArjunPandit » 02 Sep 2017 06:49

pandyan wrote:
Karan M wrote:Look you and yours faced India down, when you are ostensibly at your strongest (PRC big economy, fancy toys, this that) & you blinked and walked away.

That's that. Every year as we speak India's position vs PRC will improve, given current trajectory.

You guys are like the naked king who constantly asks his advisors to praise him. One fine day, a stranger says, well you don't have any clothes. And the king storms off, after his advisors mutter they really can't take on the stranger.


You just committed eighth scene dude :rotfl:

bring booooooooooooldozers,
Didt motor mama tell that not to do that to our neighbours?

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pulikeshi » 02 Sep 2017 07:26

g.sarkar wrote:
A blind quote to an Indian media outlet, provided more than two months into the border standoff, can hardly be considered a robust response. The Trump administration’s reticence is unfortunate: without some sort of signal from Washington, Beijing might conclude that it can escalate its activities in the disputed area without worrying about any interference from the United States.


This is a laughably ironic statement from Forigin Duplicity ~ The US elections threw up a isolationist posture and leader by design, so when an international situation worked itself out with the US essentially on the sideline - there is this rant on what Beijing and Eleven Gin Peg may conclude? :rotfl:

Them Cheena have already concluded Europe is toast and the US is checked out! The Cheena pursuing the 'Zheng He' smallish gunboat diplomacy is yet to be seen if long lasting and sustainable or fizzles out like the original eunuch's voyages! The US has been found neither in the ring, nor even an umpire! Fully expect the Chinese blundering on in "big brotherly" rewrite of history and forcing a stronger alliance between Japan, US and India! In this the Chinese already acting like the proverbial 'little brother' onlee :mrgreen:

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 02 Sep 2017 07:50

Media today said that Russia did not support China on Doklam.Remained neutral disappointing China.Russia refused to be persuaded by Beijing's efforts to malign India,according to Ambassador Denisov spkg to Russian journos in Beijing.This was unlike some western nations.

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RCase » 02 Sep 2017 07:56

UlanBatori wrote:
When he was arrested, he was in possession of two laptops, an iPad, two portable hard drives, 10 cellphone SIM cards, two digital camcorders, at least two flash drives, and other equipment that can be used to obtain data from computer networks, prosecutors said.

But he was peacefully building a road in undisputed Chinese territory!

Medrobotics is on udisputed Chinese territory. You can vely krearlee see this was in the treaty between China and the Pequot tribe of Massachusetts of 1776 and relevant company should know they are committing deadly scene and not involve third country. Relevant company should correct its mistake. Didn't your mama tell you not to take other's laptops, iPads, cellphones and SIM cards?

Remember: You can shake a chink and get tons of laptops, cellphones, SIM cards and flash drives but you can't shake the PLA (They are commie robots 8) ).

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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby hnair » 02 Sep 2017 08:06

UlanBatori wrote:
When he was arrested, he was in possession of two laptops, an iPad, two portable hard drives, 10 cellphone SIM cards, two digital camcorders, at least two flash drives, and other equipment that can be used to obtain data from computer networks, prosecutors said.

But he was peacefully building a road in undisputed Chinese territory!


Chinese are principled:
1) before the robotics company, that place was rented out by aunties Ha Pui & Yen Ding, for their massage work. Historic inscriptions of "Ha Pui-Yen Ding" times can be found on the walls and ceiling of conf room with the help of a blacklight. Which means chinese can legitimately lay claim to it in perpetuity.

2) it is the CEO and police who are trespassing since "Chinese was already there" and should withdraw before Dong reduces CEO to ashes by waving a tabloid that says so

3) laptops were there since 2002, when Dong offered to trade those memory sticks containing data he stole earlier, in exchange for the latest company document server backups

4) Police has no right to arrest him, because he said so

SriKumar
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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SriKumar » 02 Sep 2017 08:24

^^^ You seeeener. Nineth seen.
You forgot the great Dalai Lama event. The first Dalai Lama, His High Holiness in the 14th century had once visited Boston to admire the beautiful swamps by the sea. The place since then belong to China since wherever Dalai Lama visit/lived is Tibet, and Tibet has always been a part of China. The town of Boston has been referred to as Bo So Tan in Chinese maps since late 14th century, i.e. before the great sailor, Co Lam Bas first came to America. So it is the police who are trespassing.

Hari Seldon
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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Hari Seldon » 02 Sep 2017 09:40

One key take-away from the doklam denouement for other countries is this:

PRC when eyeballing a fellow nuclear weapons state, will eventually stand down.


Doesn't matter how PRC may act up (mimicking NoKo at times) prior to the downhill ski. Only.

JE Menon
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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby JE Menon » 02 Sep 2017 09:50

They made the mistake of underestimating India. Everyone does, now and then. We are easy to underestimate. We don't mind so much I think, because it is cheaper.

KLNMurthy
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Re: Neutering & defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby KLNMurthy » 02 Sep 2017 11:59

chola wrote:^^^ Lol. Amreeki CEO sees some random chinese dude in his conference room?!

That is like the 10000th time some chini was caught stealing secrets from a company. You'd think they would send some white guy to do the job. Someone less conspicuous.

Anyone who thinks the chinis care about "face" or pride is daft on the head and would be eaten alive by the lizards. Face/pride allows companies/businessmen to make more or less moral decisions out of human decency and fear of shame.

There is a distinct lack of that with chini companies and by all likelihood their government officials.

Cheat, lie or steal. As long as the end is beneficial, any means is okay. And that includes putting poisons like melamine into baby formula for a small profit.

Beat them by making them "lose face" at Doka La? They don't have any face left to lose. You beat them by physically BEATING them in the arse (until it is black and blue.)


"Face" is, I think, a mistranslation. As you say, if is usually used to mean something like honor and decency, at least the fear of being exposed as not having honor and decency. In Telugu we have an equivalent word, "moha-maatam" , or "mukha-maatam". Mukham or moham meaning face.

There is another word in Telugu which is closer to what drives the Chinese--it is lOkuva, or the fear of becoming lOkuva in someone's eyes. lOkuva means a lowered stature in a pecking order of dominance.

In a healthy and ethical society, mohamaatam and fear of lOkuva will work in tandem--social status is defined by an estimation of honor and decency.

Is this the case with China and its party leaders? Is the question we should be raising, loudly and clearly.


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