http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2017/08/d ... o.html?m=1On Friday, with China’s defence ministry warning New Delhi that: “restraint has its bottom line”, Indian Army officers participating in the Doklam faceoff have provided Business Standard the first detailed accounts of how the situation has evolved.
They say the Doklam bowl – which is disputed between China and Bhutan – currently has an extended, 200-metre long line of Indian infantry soldiers confronting a smaller number of Chinese border guards. Just one metre separates the two lines.
At any time, there are about 40 Chinese border guards in the disputed valley, facing off against three times that number of Indian jawans.
Backing up the Chinese front line are another 1,500 troops, a mix of border guards and regular People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers. These are positioned outside the disputed Doklam area, but cross in and out of the disputed area, relieving those on the front line at regular intervals.
Indian troops standing guard in Doklam are similarly relieved by a full infantry battalion (600 troops), located in Indian territory to the west. Backing up this battalion is a full infantry brigade (2,000 troops), ready to respond to any military moves from China.
In addition, a second fully acclimatised infantry brigade, slightly further away, stands ready to respond to a crisis.
“We fortunately had two brigades training in high altitudes nearby, so we have plenty of acclimatised troops. If needed, we can muster far more forces than the Chinese in Sikkim. This would never be an area where they start something”, says a senior Indian commander.
According to these officers’, tension began in early June, when Indian forces in the vicinity observed Chinese patrols reconnoitring the track in the disputed Doklam bowl. Intelligence assessments concluded that China was going to try and extend the road towards the Jampheri Ridge, at the farthest edge of China’s claim line.
Indian commanders strongly rejected yesterday’s statement by China’s foreign ministry, which claimed that India had been notified on May 18 and June 8, “out of goodwill through the border meeting mechanism”, that China would be building a road in Doklam.
They say, the Indian army reported to Delhi that road building seemed imminent, and were granted permission to cross into Bhutan-claimed territory to stop construction.
When India crossed into Doklam and confronted the Chinese construction parties, “they were taken completely by surprise and offered no resistance”, says an officer privy to events. “These are no soldiers; they are conscripted border guards, who live in heated barracks and periodically patrol the border in vehicles. They don’t walk much”, says an Indian commander.
“Our soldiers, in contrast, live a far tougher life. In Doklam, they stand guard without moving, while the Chinese keep breaking the line and going back for cigarette breaks. Indian morale is sky-high; soldiers know they are participating in something unprecedented – crossing a border to defend an Indian ally”, says the Indian officer.
Eventually, the Chinese had to send in a political commissar, recount Indian officers. “The commissar ordered up martial music and the hoisting of Chinese flags to stiffen resolve. They clearly had problems”, he says.
In the macho manner of militaries, the Indian Army is using a large number of Sikh and Jat soldiers to man the line in Doklam – in the expectation that their height and sturdiness would intimidate the smaller Chinese.
Army officers are elated also at having kept the confrontation out of the media for a full ten days, until Beijing was forced to make the incident public. “The Chinese have always complained that India’s media is too shrill and pro-active. This time, China had to mobilise their media, because we were there on the ground and nobody knew.”
Indian soldiers also point out that China has begun building bunkers and creating defences on the border. “That’s another first. They are recognising our capability to act decisively”, says an officer.
According to a senior Indian general: “The situation in Doklam has plateaued. Militarily, the Chinese know they can do nothing here. Eventually it will have to be a negotiated withdrawal, or the Chinese will have to open a front in another sector.”
With Beijing warning on Friday that “Chinese armed forces will resolutely protect the country's territorial sovereignty and security interests”, the PLA could choose its next move anywhere on a long, 3,500-kilometre border that stretches from Ladakh to Myanmar.
Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Doklam : The word from ground zero
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Sorry but what kind of oiseules are in Army HQ and Dilli baboondom? This shoo-klaw bugger seems like a complete idiot to report something like that.“Our soldiers, in contrast, live a far tougher life. In Doklam, they stand guard without moving,
Why don't they send up a few rocking chairs, a tea-shop, a few Portoilets and a mobile giant movie screen so the Chinese can watch some good movies? No imagination and no humanity, these Jarnails and Baboon. Also let them watch India-Sl crikit unless SL starts scoring runs.
Also use the commercial breaks to teach the commies something about their own pathetic history. Like Red Guard goons beating up 1962 war survivors. Falun Gong being used for organ extraction. Political Commissars beating up old UttaraDharmasala Buddhist monks, and UD people struggling over the mountains to seek refuge in India.
Let them watch "Rakta Tilakam" starring Sivaji Ganesan. How his team killed thousands of Mao-coated commies in 1962. How the brave Revolver Rita who was a RAA agint in BomdiLa, fa**ted and the entire Red Chinese firing squad died instantly.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
My CT is that NaMo did this to get even with elevn. I think early part of NaMo's tenure he tried to be great host and be a friend to everybody. And Xi embarassed him at the worst time. NaMo is prob just telling him, look we both cannot do full scale wars, so why not chill, because everybody can play stupid games and embarass everybody else. Apologize if this has been mentoned before. Only jsut started following this thread.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Doesn't war make WTO obligations null and void? If so, can such exceptions be permanent?
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Cou ... 8-R1-E.pdf
https://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/Cou ... 8-R1-E.pdf
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Add to that the personal equity he invested in the NSG with eleven Jinn. I am checking bhutan's news articles. They are unusually silent on this issue.RajeshG wrote:My CT is that NaMo did this to get even with elevn. I think early part of NaMo's tenure he tried to be great host and be a friend to everybody. And Xi embarassed him at the worst time. NaMo is prob just telling him, look we both cannot do full scale wars, so why not chill, because everybody can play stupid games and embarass everybody else. Apologize if this has been mentoned before. Only jsut started following this thread.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Gautamhttp://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 921533.cms
Dokalam standoff: No easy answers as China quotes 1890, India 2012 pact
NEW DELHI: As the India-China border standoff swings between warnings and signs of thaw, ET looks into the claims on either side of the Dokalam plateau in the Himalayas where the build-up of troops for over two months now has been making headlines.
While Beijing maintains that the 1890 pact between Great Britain and China on Sikkim and Tibet has delimited (settled as per Chinese version) Sino-Indian boundary along Sikkim, India refers to a 2012 written understanding between special representatives (SRs) on India-China boundary alignment in the Sikkim sector, and says the 1890 pact is the basis for future agreement for final demarcation of boundary in this region.
India’s concerns emanate from Chinese action on the ground which have implications for the determination of the tri-junction boundary point between India, China and Bhutan and the alignment of India-China boundary in the Sikkim sector.
Both these aspects of tri-junction points and India-China boundary alignment in the Sikkim sector had been earlier addressed in a written common understanding reached between the SRs on the boundary question in December 2012, when then NSA Shivshankar Menon was SR.
Point 13 of the common understanding states that “the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries”.
Since 2012, India and China have not held any discussion on the trijunction with Bhutan. The Chinese action in the Dokalam area is, therefore, an attempt to bilaterally (Bhutan) address the issue, bypassing India in violation of Point 13 of the written understanding.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
My post above referred to low partial pressure of oxygen.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Chinmayanand wrote:
Bakri mulk? Which rent the fortress of Islam in two? These Muslims really need to stop breeding with their sisters.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
while still awaiting formal confirmation reports of China winding off..China has started winding down its forces and also lowering the ante at Doklam, highly placed sources said. India continues to maintain that it would not relent on its demand for a simultaneous withdrawal.
http://www.oneindia.com/india/doklam-st ... 14520.html
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I am actually beginning to see the reason for the cheen khulji. It is the sheer surprise at the new ***POLICY** of the NaMo sarkar. GOI is showing the willingness to do unto them before they do unto us. But b4 the poor dears leave, I HOPE the GOI is reading this: set up Appu's chaikada and distribute hot tea and laddoos to them. They've never seen "tea" any better than the concoctions that they make from worms and dog-poo and grass.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I like the 2 points mentioned above.
1. It may be worthwhile to study how China waged war in previous border disputes
2. That China put 3 month vs 6 month hold, might be significant, though Google searchshows thathey ave done 3mth holds before. They probably want to lift the hold on Mazoor inlieu of face saver provided by India.
based onthe above, war is unlikely, as Cina seeks a facesaver
1. It may be worthwhile to study how China waged war in previous border disputes
2. That China put 3 month vs 6 month hold, might be significant, though Google searchshows thathey ave done 3mth holds before. They probably want to lift the hold on Mazoor inlieu of face saver provided by India.
based onthe above, war is unlikely, as Cina seeks a facesaver
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Not good, such a face-saver. Means PRC can conjure up a card to play against India at will.Guddu wrote:I like the 2 points mentioned above.
1. It may be worthwhile to study how China waged war in previous border disputes
2. That China put 3 month vs 6 month hold, might be significant, though Google searchshows thathey ave done 3mth holds before. They probably want to lift the hold on Mazoor inlieu of face saver provided by India.
based on the above, war is unlikely, as Cina seeks a facesaver
How many terrorsh1ts there are in Pak and how many can be used as cards to bargain territory related stuff with India, hain jee? Delhi should reject any link whatsoever. Should use trade as a bargaining chip in turn, methinks.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Come again? You were the one who misrepresented what I said and then proceeded to wax lyrical about how the nation as a whole would feel the loss. First you were wrong about what I said and then wrong again with your prose. There is a vast difference between a memorial erected by private individuals (touching as that is) and that made by a nation. By this metric the Army itself has memorials at command level and regimental centres. Is there a difference or not? This country(the same one that dedicates acres of prime land to every-known-gandhi samadhi) couldn't care less about the men who fall. They will fall nonetheless in the defense of our country. I started out airing frustration at folks who call for war without understanding what it will entail. I see now the error in my ways.shiv wrote:This complaint is a moving of goalpost from the first one about poor leadership and men dying. I do not want to get ito a discussion but since you ask, there is at least one memorial that specifically records the names of the martyrs of Op Pawan in Sri Lanka.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
OK so their idea could be to rain our acclimated - fit troops with missiles, both Cruise and ballistic.missiles. Then they bring there troops to pick those dazed survivors in smoldering heaps of destruction.schinnas wrote:However, China seems to have relied on a rocket-heavy strategy and actual troop levels close to the border are considerably lower compared to Indian troop concentration near the boundary. In the event of an infantry led attack with an aim for terrain grabbing or holding, high troop concentration is an advantage. However, if enemy is not interested in additional terrain grab at this point, but wants to inflict casualties, high troop concentrations can become a liability as well. I was wondering why China wasnt augmenting its troop levels and bring in more elite troops. Now thinking about it, this could be a very deliberate strategy given their terrain disadvantages and they may have stationed more elite troops in little more interior stations.
But is it actually doable? Won't the mountainous and hilly terrain with cloudy weather make missiles inaccurate?
Are the army garrison in Himalaya tightly knit in one place presenting itself as a juicy target?
Why Bharat can't fire Prithvis and Brahmos on their "waiting in wings"army acclimatizing tents, airports and Hans density areas?
If 6 Prithvis hit there Tibetan railway station and various tunnels + bridges. How much military and financial and prestige loss will be there?
Now add escalation level and we start raining Agony missiles
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Possibly other places along with Porkis.Iyersan wrote:They might not attack on doklam. They will open all the front from Aksai chin to Arunachal... is doklam an isolated incident or a part of a bigger game in Indo china sea?
I thin Army and Doval knows it. When I was learning Tai chi years ago, my instructor used to never tire of saying when explaining the postures and movements "... Remember we are chinese we need er show our attacking hand..."
But this time they don't have surprise and stealth on there side, they are doomed.
Ijjat bhi jaayegi aur air plateau bhi!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Iyersan, Do you know the graphic organizer tool called Mindmap. I suggest taking the 20 points of Mr Remade and put them in that format. Makes it easy to compare to 1962. I think this is 1962 redux which got stopped dead in its track.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Oh fuggedabahtit..
Post deleted.
Post deleted.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
This one from NYT, but nothing new:
Gautamhttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/worl ... sions.html
China Tells India That It Won’t Back Down in Border Dispute
By CHRIS BUCKLEY and ELLEN BARRYAUG. 4, 2017
BEIJING — China’s military has warned India not to underestimate its resolve to hold a mountainous piece of land at the heart of a standoff between the two Asian powers.
The comments from the Chinese Ministry of National Defense on Thursday were the most blunt yet from Beijing in the dispute and indicated that the diplomatic quarrel could still fester or escalate, even if armed conflict seems unlikely.
“India must dispel any illusions that it can hold out for a change,” Col. Ren Guoqiang, a spokesman for the Chinese Defense Ministry, said in a statement online. He repeated China’s demand that India withdraw its troops from the disputed area.
The warning capped days of official comments and editorials from Beijing defending its claim to the 34 square miles of disputed land at a corner where China, India and the small kingdom of Bhutan meet. India does not claim the land but says it has been acting on behalf of Bhutan.
The area in dispute is small and remote, but the geopolitical stakes are high.
“No country should underestimate the confidence and ability of the Chinese military to fulfill its duty of defending peace,” Colonel Ren said. “Nor should it underestimate the determination and will of the Chinese military to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests.”
As if to underline the warning, a Chinese newspaper reported Friday that the People’s Liberation Army had recently held artillery exercises with live ammunition in Tibet, the region near the disputed land. Global Times, a popular party-run paper, said on its website that the exercises, at 15,000 feet above sea level, included simulated long-distance attacks on armored units and missile launchers.
In a separate editorial, Global Times said India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, had failed to grasp that Chinese military forces would crush Indian border forces in a conflict.
“If war breaks out, the Liberation Army will use its thunderous might to deliver a painful lesson to India,” the paper said on Friday. “The Modi government should understand the powerful delivery capabilities and overwhelming firepower of the Liberation Army.”
As the rhetoric from Beijing has escalated in recent days, India has sought to play down the risks of a continued standoff, saying, without offering specifics, that its diplomats were actively engaging with China behind the scenes. In a statement this week, China said that India was already on the retreat, having drawn down the number of troops engaged in the confrontation to less than 50, from 400.
Indian officials have privately dismissed that assertion, suggesting that Indians outnumber Chinese three to one at the point of confrontation, but they have said nothing in public.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I knew they weren't going to fight because that is their modus operandi: encroach, intimidate and steal during peacetime while avoiding a real fight at all cost.
But still, what a bunch of loud-mouthed faggots when you can go on and on and on with these threats for a month and not do anything. So irritating.
Only thing more irritating is the guy with the muscles who refuses to punch the loud mouth out when he is given all the excuses and opportunities in the world to do so.
Just fvcking fight already!
But still, what a bunch of loud-mouthed faggots when you can go on and on and on with these threats for a month and not do anything. So irritating.
Only thing more irritating is the guy with the muscles who refuses to punch the loud mouth out when he is given all the excuses and opportunities in the world to do so.
Just fvcking fight already!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://defencenews.in/article/China-May ... dia-283526
New Delhi: The Chinese media ratcheted up their rhetoric on Friday on the current standoff with India over the Doklam issue, saying China may undertake "a small-scale military operation to expel Indian troops within two weeks."
Two Chinese ministries - the defence and the foreign - and four other institutions released statements and commentaries on a standoff that entered its 50th day on Friday.
"The series of remarks from the Chinese side within a 24-hour period sends a signal to India that there is no way China will tolerate the Indian troops' incursion into Chinese territory for too long. If India refuses to withdraw, China may conduct a small-scale military operation within two weeks," state-owned Global Times quoted Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, as saying.
Hu, however, added that China will inform India's foreign ministry before undertaking any such operation.
China has repeatedly exhorted India to pull back the "trespassing troops" back to Indian side of the boundary and address the matter in a proper manner to restore peace in the region, a defence ministry spokesperson said in a statement.
China Central Television (CCTV) on Friday reported that Tibet military region conducted live fire exercises in recent days in Tibet.
"The exercises are a sign that China could use military means to end the standoff and the chances of doing so are increasing as the Indian side is still saying one thing and doing another," Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times.
Zhao warned India that the patience of China was withering away, and it doesn't want the ongoing faceoff to cast any influence on the forthcoming BRICS Summit.
Chinese media's aggression came a day after External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said that war was not a solution, wisdom was to resolve the issue diplomatically. Swaraj had noted that "military readiness is always there as the military is meant to fight wars".
New Delhi: The Chinese media ratcheted up their rhetoric on Friday on the current standoff with India over the Doklam issue, saying China may undertake "a small-scale military operation to expel Indian troops within two weeks."
Two Chinese ministries - the defence and the foreign - and four other institutions released statements and commentaries on a standoff that entered its 50th day on Friday.
"The series of remarks from the Chinese side within a 24-hour period sends a signal to India that there is no way China will tolerate the Indian troops' incursion into Chinese territory for too long. If India refuses to withdraw, China may conduct a small-scale military operation within two weeks," state-owned Global Times quoted Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, as saying.
Hu, however, added that China will inform India's foreign ministry before undertaking any such operation.
China has repeatedly exhorted India to pull back the "trespassing troops" back to Indian side of the boundary and address the matter in a proper manner to restore peace in the region, a defence ministry spokesperson said in a statement.
China Central Television (CCTV) on Friday reported that Tibet military region conducted live fire exercises in recent days in Tibet.
"The exercises are a sign that China could use military means to end the standoff and the chances of doing so are increasing as the Indian side is still saying one thing and doing another," Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times.
Zhao warned India that the patience of China was withering away, and it doesn't want the ongoing faceoff to cast any influence on the forthcoming BRICS Summit.
Chinese media's aggression came a day after External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said that war was not a solution, wisdom was to resolve the issue diplomatically. Swaraj had noted that "military readiness is always there as the military is meant to fight wars".
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The objective is to have your way, which is to ensure road doesn't get built. No point picking a fight and then waiting for the cops to show up. It is starting to irritate them no end that we hold on to our position, neither pulling back nor escalating and you can see it in all these so-called "academics" sounding out their views. Now we have a 2 week deadline being given by another think-tanker.chola wrote:Only thing more irritating is the guy with the muscles who refuses to punch the loud mouth out when he is given all the excuses and opportunities in the world to do so.
Just fvcking fight already!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
A lot of folks here don't understand the outline of an India-China war.Manish_Sharma wrote:Why Bharat can't fire Prithvis and Brahmos on their "waiting in wings"army acclimatizing tents, airports and Hans density areas?
If 6 Prithvis hit there Tibetan railway station and various tunnels + bridges. How much military and financial and prestige loss will be there?
Now add escalation level and we start raining Agony missiles
1. Tibet is incidental to China, taking out installations in Tibet won't hurt the Chinese in any major way; but retaliation (and one can be assured that will happen) will hurt us worse just because (i) we have higher population densities on our side of the border and (ii) we actually care about the citizens living in those areas.
2. If we were to escalate to hit places which would hurt China, it will lead to all-out war. I'm not even sure we have the capability to engage in this kind of warfare - our missiles don't have the necessary ranges and numbers to reach the kind of damage that they can reach on us. Of course it will be a big hit to their economy which could unravel the Party, and therein lies the deterrence.
3. Nuclear war... well that's the last resort, I don't think either side is even thinking of taking it so far.
4. Limited border war, kind of firing in the areas which we consider our own (or Bhutan's). That is a possibility - we have seen how cross LOC firing has been justified by us (after all we are only firing on military targets in our illegally occupied land), and we can apply those parameters to the LAC/undemarcated Tibet border as well.
We are stronger in a limited border war, but it is in our interests to keep it limited and keep it from escalating. Air force only for surveillance and air cover for our troops, only artillery, no missile hits, these are the parameters in which we need to operate this round. No crossing our version of the border.
Now longer term, we very much need to beef up capability to strike deep inside China, as well as maintain credible nuclear deterrence. That is a different story. If all-out war was on the cards, all the Western news sources would have this story on the front pages, daily.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
As much as a lot of us are spoiling for a fight - me included - we should not be the first to fire a bullet. By standing firm we already scared the heck out of Cheen and TSP. If we stand resolutely and not let them encroach and build roads and other structures in Doklam we win. If they initiate kinetics, then we must thank god and finish the job of taking back Aksai Hind and dismantle the Han infrastructure in Tibet and elsewhere. So far, India has not done any dhoti shivering and handling the situation very well to the chagrin of the Dlagon. In time, Chola ji, in time we will get our chance for badla and more.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China's elite have begun their game of thrones — here are some of the potential winners
Five of the seven members of China's most powerful ruling body are due to retire in a massive leadership change that happens twice a decade
For President Xi Jinping, the changeover is an opportunity to install loyalists and shore up his legacy.
The Chinese leadership composition could have global implications as the world's second-largest economy continues to reform.
Here's a look at a few candidates who experts say might be up for promotion into the standing committee:
Li Zhanshu: Director of the general office of the Communist Party; often called Xi's right-hand man
Zhao Leji: Head of department of organization, which prescreens candidates and compiles short lists for key government posts. Prior to Zhao, five out of the eight people who had this job made it into the standing committee
Wang Huning: Head of China's central policy research office; thought to be close to Xi and an architect of major policy initiatives; said to be behind "Chinese Dream" campaign; specialist in U.S. politics
Hu Chunhua: Party secretary of Guangdong; in his mid-50s and the youngest of the bunch; regarded as a rising star
Han Zheng: Party secretary of Shanghai; that's a position often tipped for promotion
Wang Qishan: China's current anti-corruption czar and a close ally of Xi; believed to have significant clout; already on the standing committee and is of retirement age, but there's speculation he could see another term
Wang Yang: Third-ranked vice premier of State Council, which is part of the executive branch; two-term Politburo member and due to rise
Liu Qibao: Head of the propaganda department, a very powerful division; that's traditionally a position that gets promoted
And here are some people of interest who have a shot at the top, but are more likely to head for the wider 25-member Politburo:
Liu He: Vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission; oversees the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs; economist by training and top economic advisor to Xi
Chen Min'er: Party secretary of Chongqing; recently named to new post after a potential Xi successor was ousted; previously worked under Xi when he was Zhejiang party leader.
More on the process here,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/03/chinas- ... nners.html
Five of the seven members of China's most powerful ruling body are due to retire in a massive leadership change that happens twice a decade
For President Xi Jinping, the changeover is an opportunity to install loyalists and shore up his legacy.
The Chinese leadership composition could have global implications as the world's second-largest economy continues to reform.
Here's a look at a few candidates who experts say might be up for promotion into the standing committee:
Li Zhanshu: Director of the general office of the Communist Party; often called Xi's right-hand man
Zhao Leji: Head of department of organization, which prescreens candidates and compiles short lists for key government posts. Prior to Zhao, five out of the eight people who had this job made it into the standing committee
Wang Huning: Head of China's central policy research office; thought to be close to Xi and an architect of major policy initiatives; said to be behind "Chinese Dream" campaign; specialist in U.S. politics
Hu Chunhua: Party secretary of Guangdong; in his mid-50s and the youngest of the bunch; regarded as a rising star
Han Zheng: Party secretary of Shanghai; that's a position often tipped for promotion
Wang Qishan: China's current anti-corruption czar and a close ally of Xi; believed to have significant clout; already on the standing committee and is of retirement age, but there's speculation he could see another term
Wang Yang: Third-ranked vice premier of State Council, which is part of the executive branch; two-term Politburo member and due to rise
Liu Qibao: Head of the propaganda department, a very powerful division; that's traditionally a position that gets promoted
And here are some people of interest who have a shot at the top, but are more likely to head for the wider 25-member Politburo:
Liu He: Vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission; oversees the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs; economist by training and top economic advisor to Xi
Chen Min'er: Party secretary of Chongqing; recently named to new post after a potential Xi successor was ousted; previously worked under Xi when he was Zhejiang party leader.
More on the process here,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/03/chinas- ... nners.html
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Air force only for surveillance and air cover for our troops, only artillery, no missile hits, these are the parameters in which we need to operate this round. No crossing our version of the border.
are you banditji back in disguise? if we continue to tie ourselves in red tape we might as well crawl back in doklam tail firmly tucked between legs.
PLA general will laugh crudely at you as he orders the CJ10 GLCM and WS3 ER MLRS to engage.
Aksai Chin is a great place to start reaccumulating our own land again....nobody on the international scene will give a s*** about cheen bleatings over aksai chin, they will have to come and take it back themselves if they want it back.
any other part of tibet proper we can claw off will be the seat of the FTG - Free Tibet Govt.
are you banditji back in disguise? if we continue to tie ourselves in red tape we might as well crawl back in doklam tail firmly tucked between legs.
PLA general will laugh crudely at you as he orders the CJ10 GLCM and WS3 ER MLRS to engage.
Aksai Chin is a great place to start reaccumulating our own land again....nobody on the international scene will give a s*** about cheen bleatings over aksai chin, they will have to come and take it back themselves if they want it back.
any other part of tibet proper we can claw off will be the seat of the FTG - Free Tibet Govt.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
No. No longer the case. The "tibet" that consists of lhasa and everything south of it doesn't contain anything strategic for the prc. Outside of this area but within the tibetan plateau is where their strategic missile systems and nuclear labs and stores are. Atleast a good bunch of them. Others are in the area that our resident yakherder wants to ribelate. So yes driving into lhasa on an opentopped jeep with the dalai lama and doorknob providing breathless commentary is a fun image but its not so cut and dry.yensoy wrote:A lot of folks here don't understand the outline of an India-China war.Manish_Sharma wrote:Why Bharat can't fire Prithvis and Brahmos on their "waiting in wings"army acclimatizing tents, airports and Hans density areas?
If 6 Prithvis hit there Tibetan railway station and various tunnels + bridges. How much military and financial and prestige loss will be there?
Now add escalation level and we start raining Agony missiles
1. Tibet is incidental to China, taking out installations in Tibet won't hurt the Chinese in any major way; but retaliation (and one can be assured that will happen) will hurt us worse just because (i) we have higher population densities on our side of the border and (ii) we actually care about the citizens living in those areas.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I will differ with you a little bit on this. the CPC had checks and balances and though they had one man at the helm, it also had the semblance of some sort of shared power. Eleven is changing / trying his best to change it. Question is: Will CPC allow that to happen by slowly eroding an inch of territory to Eleven every single time and allow him to go completely unchecked.shiv wrote:
The CPC is always led by ONE MAN. That one man has to consolidate and hold power. For this he has to be ruthless and appear strong. What will happen if his center of power is devastated? Will he still hold on to power and appear strong in a China that always back the top dog?
https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/words/eleven
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Militarily China is confident that India will never capture Lhasa.
At the maximum India after initial losses, would bray for Han blood, and there would be no Han to hunt in scores. They will be sitting inside tanks close to Lhasa and if at all Indian army has to come upto Lhasa also, they would seal Lhasa, like in Bahubali movie. It will take enormous amount of effort to dislodge PLA from Lhasa. In the meantime they will put international pressure and the PLA would offer ceasefire. We may lose 10 times more in human loss, still have to accept the ceasefire and go back.
That's their confidence and perhaps right also. If the conflict can prolong for 1year and all their supplies depleted, then there could be a victory àla Bangladesh. But that may not happen is their confidence.
At the maximum India after initial losses, would bray for Han blood, and there would be no Han to hunt in scores. They will be sitting inside tanks close to Lhasa and if at all Indian army has to come upto Lhasa also, they would seal Lhasa, like in Bahubali movie. It will take enormous amount of effort to dislodge PLA from Lhasa. In the meantime they will put international pressure and the PLA would offer ceasefire. We may lose 10 times more in human loss, still have to accept the ceasefire and go back.
That's their confidence and perhaps right also. If the conflict can prolong for 1year and all their supplies depleted, then there could be a victory àla Bangladesh. But that may not happen is their confidence.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
vasu raya wrote:Still playing the red team, they have a desperate need to keep IAF occupied elsewhere as India can use it as a wild card anywhere on the LAC and in depth, likely choice is have PAF conduct sorties so IAF is vigilant along the western border and if they can't utilize their air force PLAAF to a good potential over theTibetN. Dharmashala plateau, they can station many squadrons of PLAAF in TSP so as to drain the IAF squadrons available on the Eastern sector. The hundreds of fighters can serve as Optics even if not actually fighting.
Bombing TSP is not on this year's Calendar...
I don't think FizzleYa has the cojones to conduct sorties on the Chingadyas' behalf, not just yet anyway. But the stationing of PLAAF assets in Paki bases to dilute IAF's efforts/availability is certainly something they might try. Certainly would help neutralize a major threat PLA would expect to face.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
in the worst case the Chumbi valley, protected by india on 3 sides can be the seat of the FTG - free tibet govt - close to tawang - we will build a road through bhutan for that. it must have some monasteries and relics being a ancient trade route.
we will build a Westeros type Nord wall across its top from Sikkim to Bhutan to keep the whitewalkers out. it bespeaks of the cheating and beggaring cheen mentality that after grabbing an area bigger than india in tibet+turkestan they to keep nibbling more and more land when India was not at all interested in these border violation and creeping forward games.
we will build a Westeros type Nord wall across its top from Sikkim to Bhutan to keep the whitewalkers out. it bespeaks of the cheating and beggaring cheen mentality that after grabbing an area bigger than india in tibet+turkestan they to keep nibbling more and more land when India was not at all interested in these border violation and creeping forward games.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
chola. Enough war mongering.
One more and you get a ban.
ramana
One more and you get a ban.
ramana
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Jaichand's in India media are being employed to propogada Chinese agenda, intimidate and craft Indian public opinion to achieve the aims and objectives of communist china. Some say China's 11 trillion economy to huge compared to ours 2trillion. Correct it gives them strength / resilience but it's a liability too. A small ball and a big ball both afraid of getting punchered. Some say we are not prepared militarily compared to china. We are not well prepaired. My reply to morons " in the middle of night when someone trespass your house with the intention of evicting you from your house and the life / property of self and family at stake. Will they run away or confront the intruders with all might withing the limitation of surprise / not prepared with tools and equipment etc. If you run away you lose all the self respect / lose everything and die everyday. If you fight/ hold on the intruder /make noise and ensure your neighbors are also woken up there are good chance you make the intruder retreat. Just esclate the local theory at international geopolitical level. Some say Chinese limited war. We can't use our airforce / our missiles / we can't hit their nerve center / costal region . It will lead to esclation. Well if Chinese slap us on left and we are expected to slap them only on their left side. Most hilarious conditions propogada by Jaichand's. We will slap them with same intensity but at place and choice based on our own strength and limitations to inflict maximum pain. if we can send our probe to mars with limited financial and technical resource. I know our planners either in civil or military might have devised ways and means to inflict maximum damage to costal economic region of our beloved eastern neighbour. Lastly a nation without self respect and character cannot remain a nation for long. So brief / short/ long / intense, any type of Chinese aggression will be countered with what ever preparation we have and what ever sacrifice required to ensure they retreat.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
In a shooting war, I don't believe we are in any position to liberate Tibet - or Aksi Hind for that matter. It will vastly complicate our already
fragile supply chain and involve us in a grinding battle of attrition where China has the advantage. However, I believe we can and should focus
on realistic objectives, where we take territory from China (huge loss of face for the PLA, because no one has one that so far), vastly improve
our defensive posture, while increasing the threat to the PLA. At the same time the International community (and the PLA) see the gain of territory as
not too significant to act against us. These objectives in the Western part of the LAC, IMO are:
1. Advance about 25 km from Demchok, South East, along the Indus river, to Zhaxigangxiang. From this line, we would have to the West (behind us), a virtually impregnable mountain ridge. In front of us is relatively open ground, where a Mechanised force can cut off the G219 highway and threaten Ngari, both just 40 km away. The Indus becomes a natural boundary to the North. It forces the PLA to deploy a large force to defend the G219 and Ngari, rather than threaten us.
2. Advance some 10 km East of our current position in Chushul (reclaiming what we lost in 1962), so that we are in control of 2/3rd of Pangong lake, instead of the current 1/3rd that we control. It cuts Chinese communication between the 2 lakes and shortens our front. Huge morale booster, by reclaiming what we lost in 1962. (a lot of the remained of Aksai Hind was occupied by the PLA prior to 1962).
3 Push 5km East (to the next defensible line) of our current position at DBO. It reduces the threat to Siachen/DBO and increases the threat
that an Indian mechanised force can quickly push East.
4. Take the high ground around the Niti pass, on the LAC, near Barahoti. Without control of the pass, we are on the 'edge of a table' and will be
on the defensive in Uttaranchal.
3 & 4 might be done even now, by an acclimitised commando force, doing a Kargil in reverse, while still taking the position that we are in our
territory only.
fragile supply chain and involve us in a grinding battle of attrition where China has the advantage. However, I believe we can and should focus
on realistic objectives, where we take territory from China (huge loss of face for the PLA, because no one has one that so far), vastly improve
our defensive posture, while increasing the threat to the PLA. At the same time the International community (and the PLA) see the gain of territory as
not too significant to act against us. These objectives in the Western part of the LAC, IMO are:
1. Advance about 25 km from Demchok, South East, along the Indus river, to Zhaxigangxiang. From this line, we would have to the West (behind us), a virtually impregnable mountain ridge. In front of us is relatively open ground, where a Mechanised force can cut off the G219 highway and threaten Ngari, both just 40 km away. The Indus becomes a natural boundary to the North. It forces the PLA to deploy a large force to defend the G219 and Ngari, rather than threaten us.
2. Advance some 10 km East of our current position in Chushul (reclaiming what we lost in 1962), so that we are in control of 2/3rd of Pangong lake, instead of the current 1/3rd that we control. It cuts Chinese communication between the 2 lakes and shortens our front. Huge morale booster, by reclaiming what we lost in 1962. (a lot of the remained of Aksai Hind was occupied by the PLA prior to 1962).
3 Push 5km East (to the next defensible line) of our current position at DBO. It reduces the threat to Siachen/DBO and increases the threat
that an Indian mechanised force can quickly push East.
4. Take the high ground around the Niti pass, on the LAC, near Barahoti. Without control of the pass, we are on the 'edge of a table' and will be
on the defensive in Uttaranchal.
3 & 4 might be done even now, by an acclimitised commando force, doing a Kargil in reverse, while still taking the position that we are in our
territory only.
Last edited by Deans on 05 Aug 2017 15:04, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Several. The anti-corruption campaign is more about targeting the people who could rival 11 than about corruption.shiv wrote:Fair enough. That is a very credible analysis.Rudradev wrote:
IMO Xi Jinping's personal power, if he survives, will be augmented by 4 nukes on Beijing. Going by what happened to G W Bush's personal power after 9/11. I know, I know, different societies, different polities, different systems. But I am willing to bet that some dynamics of social and political cohesion are universal in this regard. Rallying around a leader when severe damage is inflicted in the heartland and serious vulnerabilities are exposed in a single sharp attack (though perhaps NOT in a protracted attritive conflict) is one of them.
To put two and two (or my own biases) together I can say 'Although Xi Jinping has had to play hardball to augment his personal status as supreme leader, he will not have to fight to retain that status in case of an isolated nuclear attack on Beijing (by Martians)"
This conclusion goes in the face of opinions expressed in the China threads that the Chinese show no sympathy for people who appear to be losers if there is someone who appears tougher.
Is there someone in China whom Xi has had to sideline or whose power he has had to clip to reach his exalted status? Would that person also be sympathetic to Xi Jinping if the latter's actions lead to nukes on Beijing?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Shiv, Going over 1962 analysis, the Chinese figured that India could not and would not escalate in retaliation to their aggression for various reasons the principal one being inadequate forces near the borders. Rest of reasons are secondary and tertiary.
This time they know India has adequate forces in the vicinity and the whole area.
GOI is sending journalists to publicise the force levels so there is no ambiguity.
Treat Shuklaji article in that vein.
This time they know India has adequate forces in the vicinity and the whole area.
GOI is sending journalists to publicise the force levels so there is no ambiguity.
Treat Shuklaji article in that vein.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Good plans Deans ji
The chumbi valley should also be swarmed from all sides until ewe get a straight line border from sikkim to bhutan
I looked up walong its very vulnerable and we might lose it which is a fair bargain for more strategic pieces you listed. We can pound the place to dust though to render it unsuable for 300 years
The chumbi valley should also be swarmed from all sides until ewe get a straight line border from sikkim to bhutan
I looked up walong its very vulnerable and we might lose it which is a fair bargain for more strategic pieces you listed. We can pound the place to dust though to render it unsuable for 300 years
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I peed in the Tibetan hinterland when I was out there switchbacking and trekking. That land belong to me! Its even more recent than the Chinese four fathers who marked it earlier several generations agovnms wrote:China's SOP has been to claim some piece of land as theirs by stating some bs like those regions used to pay tribute to China and hence, they are justified in retaking those lands.
I wonder what their reaction would be if Mongols claimed all of China as theirs. May be, leaving out the song empire region for later.
-- The only other place where I see this kind of comparison and reasons for territory is in the Cat family. I am embarrassed and ashamed that a country can be part of the UN permanent member and act with impunity and no other country actually challenges that. It goes completely against even the UN mandate and the spirit and no other member dares question.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Deans-ji, there are a few additions.
Extend Arunachal border all the way north till Brahmaputra and if possible a little beyond.
Take over Shaksgam valley to fortify Siachen and also threaten GB.
Extend Arunachal border all the way north till Brahmaputra and if possible a little beyond.
Take over Shaksgam valley to fortify Siachen and also threaten GB.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I fully expect that PLA unit 61398 are already browsing MoD communications and will shortly attempt to disrupt BSE operations and GST transactions.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
On a purchasing power parity basis, PRC economy is less than 3x Indian economy. Then you consider the access we have to Western and Russian technologies. Our command and control structure is also more adaptable/flexible, plus our leadership has democratic legitimacy.
Xi Jinping must have been shocked when Indian foreign minister says we still have 350 men on the Bhutanese plateau. His own army is lying to him and said it is only 48. No one tells the truth to anyone in PRC. All lies, all the way up the chain. How can Xi Jinping have any faith in what PLA says and in what they can do (apart from civil engineering projects).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of ... _GDP_(PPP)
IMF data for 2017: India $9.5tn, PRC $23.2tn. So the ratio is more like 2.4x, and shrinking rapidly.
The CPC and PLA are morally bankrupt. If they take on a country of our size, strength and global standing, CPC/PLA will be history in no time. The Tibetan and Chinese people will forever will be grateful to us for liberating them.
Xi Jinping must have been shocked when Indian foreign minister says we still have 350 men on the Bhutanese plateau. His own army is lying to him and said it is only 48. No one tells the truth to anyone in PRC. All lies, all the way up the chain. How can Xi Jinping have any faith in what PLA says and in what they can do (apart from civil engineering projects).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of ... _GDP_(PPP)
IMF data for 2017: India $9.5tn, PRC $23.2tn. So the ratio is more like 2.4x, and shrinking rapidly.
The CPC and PLA are morally bankrupt. If they take on a country of our size, strength and global standing, CPC/PLA will be history in no time. The Tibetan and Chinese people will forever will be grateful to us for liberating them.
Last edited by eklavya on 05 Aug 2017 14:15, edited 1 time in total.