Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

[Rudradev]

I don't know why we are even discussing a missile attack.

Between two nuclear powers there cannot be a missile attack. We replaced the Prithvi-I tactical missiles for the same reason, to avoid any misunderstanding. There cannot be ambiguity when nuclear powers are involved in wars because of the escalation ladder and the terrible consequences. This is especially true when both nations have the ability to detect a missile launch. Even missiles with TNWs cannot be fired. So, perish the thought of missile attacks.

Therefore, China cannot bring to bear upon India its vast non-conventional superiority over us. In terms of conventional weapons and tactics, we can either match the Chinese or out-match them at several places along the LAC.

SSridhar ji, not sure what you mean by "vast non-conventional superiority" here? I understand your point about nuclear signaling and the risk of accidental escalation to nuckear exchange if a conventional missile is fired by either side. But what is this "non-conventional superiority"... do you mean specifically China's nuclear arsenal?

[ramana]

Yes. Pretty clear to me. Nukes have to be kept aside.

[ramana]

Bharat Karnad likes NaMo handling Doklam showdown.

https://bharatkarnad.com/2017/07/26/wil ... drome/amp/

[ldev]

Gentlemen. A thought worthy of your consideration. If China should unleash or threaten to unleash missiles with conventional warheads, why would India want to take them at their word that these are indeed conventional ones and not nukes? Do they carry some sort of a priori certification?

The Indian response has to be "you fire conventional missiles at our infrastructure , we will detect them and we will assume they are nukes. You have thus put us in a "use them or lose them" nuclear calculus. We will fire all our nukes at you because we are indifferent as a state as to whether we are destroyed conventionally or by nuclear weapons.

So we will take you down with us if you destroy us. You have more to lose than we do. Your economy is bigger, your people are richer and your dreams of world conquest are more probable. In a knife fight with us, you will be sufficiently crippled to hand your remains to Russia and the US.

Is that what you want ?

It's a great sentiment in theory. Now to the actual practice.

How does India detect incoming Chinese missiles? Infra red sensors on DSP satellites? Do any of India's satellites possess this capability?

Early warning radars? Maybe the Greenpine and Swordfish? Has India deployed them to detect incoming missiles from the north and east?

Unless there is a clear articulation of these capabilities so that friends and foes know that India has these capabilities which will allow India to detect if an enemy crosses certain red lines, there is a huge possibility of crossed wires?

e.g. the US and USSR mutually agreed that all ballistic missiles would be nuclear armed, so no confusion, if either side detected a ballistic missile launch, each would assume it carried a nuclear warhead. Similarly, air launched cruise missiles could carry nuclear warheads, but submarine and ship launched cruise missiles would only be armed with conventional warheads. That is why Russia did not panic when Trump ordered 58-61 cruise missiles to be fired into Syria in close proximity to Russian forces there.

That kind of active signaling has been missing in the India China Pakistan equation. China has a large force of conventional ballistic missiles, they also have a large force of CJ-10 cruise missiles with a range of ~1500 kms. In the absence of a clear protocol between India and China on this issue, the Chinese could assume that they could launch conventional ballistic/cruise missiles against India. Unless India clearly specifies that any such launch will be deemed as a nuclear launch. That then makes it incumbent on India to have a robust early incoming missile detection system. Do we have such a system in operation either via satellites or early warning ground based radar? If not, such a warning is meaningless. And will India really make a 180 degree change in policy from NFU to launch on warning? Really?

Anyway, I am sure that Ajit Doval knows what he is doing and will carry the right message to China. We are only armchair generals pontificating.

[deejay]

I don't know why we are even discussing a missile attack.

Between two nuclear powers there cannot be a missile attack. We replaced the Prithvi-I tactical missiles for the same reason, to avoid any misunderstanding. There cannot be ambiguity when nuclear powers are involved in wars because of the escalation ladder and the terrible consequences. This is especially true when both nations have the ability to detect a missile launch. Even missiles with TNWs cannot be fired. So, perish the thought of missile attacks.

Therefore, China cannot bring to bear upon India its vast non-conventional superiority over us. In terms of conventional weapons and tactics, we can either match the Chinese or out-match them at several places along the LAC. Unlike 1962, our position today is not based on 'brave words' alone. In fact, we have spoken very little, none at all, this time. Behind this silence is the determination and the scheme to counter the Chinese completely. It is China, OTOH, that is into bluster and 'brave words'.

That's why I say that there will be no war, even if it disappoints a few.

Agree Sridhar ji. There will be no war. There is just not enough incentive for either side to fight.

All Rakshaks feeling worried or scared or shivering etc, about China and war, go have a Mountain Dew .

[Philip]

One quick Q. Some time ago it was a strategy of the IA to allow the Chinese to intrude and then get stuck becos of our v.poor infrastructure and their vulnerable logistic lines of supply/commns. They would then be at our mercy and picked off at leisure. That was some time ago .Our infrastructure has now improved,but not dramatically.Therefore,should the Chinese attack along the 9 poss. routes/points,what is the worst case scenario that could happen before we are able to stabilise the situ on the ground?

There is one huge difference today in that the entire country is behind the govt. of the day in fending off the Chinese. Even the "Chindu" is falling in line with the national mood and there are two v.good pieces in today's paper,one the importance of Bhutan in the current stand-off,neglected by some in the media,on maintaining the closest relationship with Bhutan-which the Chinese are trying to bully and break and the other on the huge investment China is making in Iran,making Indo-Iranian relations as important as those we have with anyone else.Will post that elsewhere.

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 361060.ece

The crossroads at the Doklam plateau
Suhasini Haidar JULY 26, 2017 00:00 IST

India must calibrate both its message and military moves to keep Bhutan on track with the special bilateral ties

There are many strings that tie Bhutan to India in a special and unique relationship, but none are as strong as the ones laid down on the ground: 1,500 km, to be precise, of roads that have been built by India across the Himalayan kingdom’s most difficult mountains and passes.

Since 1960, when Bhutan’s King Jigme Wangchuk (the present King’s grandfather) entrusted the then Prime Minister, Jigme Dorji, with modernising the country, that had previously stayed closed to the world, those roads built and maintained by the Indian Border Roads Organisation (BRO) under Project Dantak have brought the countries together for more than one reason.

A one-way street?

“All the new roads [they] proposed to construct were being aligned to run southwards towards India from the main centres of Bhutan. Not a single road was planned to be constructed to the Tibetan (Chinese) border,” recounted one of independent India’s pioneers in forging ties with Bhutan, Nari Rustomji, a bureaucrat who also served as the Dewan, or Prime Minister, of Sikkim from 1954 to 1959, in his book Dragon Kingdom in Crisis . When the Chinese presented a fork in the road, Rustomji said, “with feelers to bring Bhutan within the orbit of their influence”, Bhutan stood firm in “maintaining an independent stand”.

Just a few years later, during the India-China war of 1962, Bhutan showed its sympathies definitely lay with India, but it still wouldn’t bargain on that independent stand: when Indian soldiers retreated from battle lines in Arunachal Pradesh, they were given safe passage through eastern Bhutan, but on the condition that soldiers would deposit their rifles at the Trashigang Dzong armoury, and travel through Bhutan to India unarmed. (The rifles lie there till today.)

As India seeks to understand the Chinese government’s intentions in the Doklam stand-off, it would be obvious and natural to see them in the context of deteriorating relations between New Delhi and Beijing for the past three years, or in terms of China’s own global ambitions, and its need to show its Asian neighbours its muscular might. But any explanation that does not consider China’s desire to draw space between India and Bhutan in the ongoing stand-off will be inadequate, and simplistic at best.

The first and most important clue to this is the area involved in the stand-off itself: the Doklam plateau is an area that China and Bhutan have long discussed, over 24 rounds of negotiations that began in 1984. In the early 1990s China is understood to have made Bhutan an offer that seemed attractive to the government in Thimphu: a “package deal” under which the Chinese agreed to renounce their claim over the 495-sq.-km disputed land in the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys to the north, in exchange for a smaller tract of disputed land measuring 269 sq. km, the Doklam plateau. Several interlocutors have confirmed that the offer was repeated by China at every round, something Bhutan’s King and government would relay to India as well. While India was able to convince Bhutan to defer a decision, things did change after India and Bhutan renegotiated their friendship treaty in 2007, and post-2008, when Bhutan’s first elected Prime Minister Jigme Thinley began to look for a more independent foreign policy stance. Some time during this period, the PLA is understood to have built the dirt track at Doklam that is at the centre of the current stand-off, including the “turning point”, and the Bhutanese army appears not to have objected to it then.

During the next five years of his tenure, Mr. Thinley conducted more rounds of talks, including on the ‘Doklam package’, and even held a controversial meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (in Rio de Janeiro, 2012), suggesting that Bhutan was thinking of establishing consular relations with China, much to India’s chagrin. During this time, Bhutan also increased the number of countries with which it had diplomatic relations from 22 to 53, and even ran an unsuccessful campaign for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

By 2013, India took matters in hand, and the Manmohan Singh government’s decision to withdraw energy subsidies to Bhutan on the eve of its general elections that summer contributed to Jigme Thinley’s shock defeat. When the new Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay’s government prepared his first round of boundary talks with Beijing a few months later, New Delhi took no chances. It dispatched both National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh to Thimphu to brief him. China, it would seem, realised it could no longer press the Doklam point, and a year later even offered India the Nathu La pass route through Sikkim for Kailash-Mansarovar yatris.

With the latest stand-off, that includes the cancellation of the Nathu La route, China appears to be back in the eastern great game that Bhutan has become, or an “egg between two rocks”, as a senior Bhutanese commentator described it. India must also consider that the PLA road construction that brought Indian troops to Bhutanese territory may be what is known as a “forcing move” in chess. By triggering a situation where Indian soldiers occupy land that isn’t India’s for a prolonged period, Beijing may have actually planned to show up India’s intentions in an unfavourable light to the people of Bhutan.

The government must see that Bhutan’s sovereignty is no trivial matter, and avoid flippant comments as the one made by the Ministry of External Affairs last week, likening the question of whether Bhutan had sought the help of Indian troops at the tri-junction to “whether the ball came first… or the batsman had taken a stand before the ball was bowled”. The question does matter to Bhutanese people, and although their government has put out a gag request to newspapers on the Doklam stand-off for now, blog posts and social media write-ups by respected commentators indicate there is much disquiet over the idea that Indian and Chinese troops may occupy the plateau in a tense stalemate for months. It cannot have escaped South Block’s notice that the only statement issued by the Bhutanese Foreign Ministry during this time makes no mention of a “distress call” to India, only of its demarche to China. Finally, New Delhi would do well to refrain from differentiating between political factions inside Bhutan, unlike what it has done in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and recognise that there is no “anti-India” faction in Bhutan, even if some are calling for the establishment of ties with China.

In full view of neighbours

India must also be aware that other neighbours are watching the Doklam stand-off closely. It would be short-sighted not to recognise that Bhutan is at one tri-junction with India and China, but Nepal, Myanmar and Pakistan too have tri-junctions (at least on the map) with both countries, and China’s reference to “third country” presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is putting a spotlight on all of these. Bhutan is also the only country in the region that joined India in its boycott of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s marquee project, the Belt and Road Initiative. In China’s thinking, any reconsideration of Bhutan’s unique ties with India, forged all those decades ago in asphalt and concrete, would be not only a prize, but possible payback.

While Indian commentary has focused on the Narendra Modi government’s bilateral problems with Beijing, and India’s larger problems with China’s aggressive stance on the international stage, the truth is, this crisis is as much about the crossroads Bhutan finds itself at. India must calibrate both its message and its military moves in order to keep Bhutan on track with the special ties they share.

[pankajs]

Mountain Dew will given even more chills .. better have garam chai with cardamon .. very soothing after any kind of trauma .. helps calm nerves.

[Pulikeshi]

Sourabh "surrender monkey" Gupta on the China-India border stand-off

What is this cheen's ploblem?
PS: posting it for informational purposes onlee... the man is puke worthy!

[shiv]

Dispatch from Doklam: Indians dig in for the long haul in standoff with China

As I travel up from eastern India’s Bagdogra airport to Gangtok and then to Indian army’s Nathang base near the fraught Doklam area, I count at least six military convoys heading in the direction of Sikkim’s border with China.

At Nathang, a few kilometres from Doklam in the now-famous “tri-junction” of Tibet, Bhutan’s Doklam plateau and Sikkim’s Chumbi valley, the theatre of the o ngoing stand-off between Indian and Chinese forces , the build-up is even more palpable, even though vehicles carrying artillery pieces and light tanks slither through the night to avoid public attention.

New bunkers are being built, the ground is being mined to pre-empt Chinese attack, machine-gun nests are being placed at strategic points, and soldiers are performing battle drills at least twice a day. But restraint is still the buzzword.

“We are under clear orders not to exacerbate the tensions, so we won’t provoke a scuffle, certainly not a firefight, but we are ready for a suitable response if the Chinese get aggressive,” says a young captain of India’s famous “Black Cats” division at Nathang. The cheerful-looking captain, in his late 20s, can’t be named as he is not authorised to speak to the media. The media isn’t even supposed to be here. The Indian Army isn’t embedding reporters as yet.

Nathang serves as a base to reinforce India’s forward outpost of Lalten in the tri-junction. Lalten is located in higher ground that gives the Indians a clear view of the Chinese movements in Tibet’s Yadong zone that is part of the Chumbi Valley between Indian and Bhutanese hill territory. This part of the Chumbi Valley, at a height of 3,000 metres (9,800 ft) is likened to a broad dagger aimed at the so-called “Chicken’s Neck”, a narrow corridor that connects Indian mainland to its remote Northeast.

India is paranoid about the Chicken’s Neck for its potential vulnerability. But this is also where the Indian army has terrain and tactical advantages of higher ground and a clear vantage point in the event of a border clash. “It’s important for us to stop the Chinese here because if we fail, they will roll on to the Chicken’s Neck and can cut off our northeast,” says the captain.

At Lalten, says a lieutenant colonel, the Chinese troops crossed into Indian-held ground in June and smashed two bunkers built by the Black Cats. “We restrained our troops with some difficulty, we ensured nobody fired but we finally pushed back the Chinese physically.”

The captain says the Indian army is determined to stop construction of the C40 road (capable of carrying a 40-tonne load) that the Chinese have been trying to build through Bhutan’s Doklam plateau from Yadong to connect to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) forward post opposite Lalten.


Under its treaty obligations to Bhutan, India must come to the Buddhist kingdom’s aid in times of military need, and the Chinese efforts to build the road in this undemarcated region was seen as such a provocation. Bhutan joined India in boycotting May’s Belt and Road Summit in Beijing, which is said to have provoked China. Indian analysts believe the Chinese decided to start building the C40 road through Doklam after the summit to test India’s special relations with Bhutan.

“They are trying to show Bhutan who calls the shots in the Himalayas. So we have to ensure we are capable of defending Bhutan’s territorial integrity,” says Maj-Gen Gaganjit Singh, who commanded a division in India’s Northeast before retiring as the deputy chief of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). “We have to prove we can defend Bhutan and we are determined not to lose the current terrain and tactical advantage we have in Chumbi Valley.”

Chumbi Valley is among the few areas in India’s Sikkim state – adjoining the theatre of conflict – in the 3,500km-long disputed border between India and China.

After jettisoning its traditional, defensive “just-hold-the-border” strategy, India has spent the last four years raising a mountain strike corps of about 80,000 for a new limited offensive doctrine in the event of a war.

read it all at the link..

[SSridhar]

There is one huge difference today in that the entire country is behind the govt. of the day in fending off the Chinese. . . Our infrastructure has now improved,but not dramatically.

Apart from that, we have the ability for rapid mobilization as well with the C-130s & C-17s and the seven ALGs which have night landing facilities as well.

[pankajs]

Not that there was any doubt in my mind ..

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 764809.cms
‘Open to talks but won’t quit Doklam’

NEW DELHI: India will remain "firm and resolute" on the ground or at the military level to thwart any attempt by China to "bully" Bhutan+ , while being "reasonable" at the politico-diplomatic level to resolve the ongoing troop stand-off+ with the People's Liberation Army in the Doklam area in Bhutanese territory, say sources. [GOI wispers]

India has steadily established an "enhanced border management posture" near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction under this overall strategy, with additional soldiers being deployed after proper acclimatisation for any contingency in the region located at an altitude over 11,000-feet.

Concurrently, diplomatic channels are being kept open+ despite the almost daily dose of belligerent rhetoric from China and its state-controlled media. "Beijing should restore the status quo, which it unilaterally broke by trying to construct the motorable road in the Doklam area (physically blocked by Indian troops in mid-June)," said a source.

India wants China to adhere to the 2012 agreement between their two special representatives that the tri-junction boundary points will be finalised in consultation with Bhutan. "India came to Bhutan's aid after Chinese troops entered Bhutanese territory (Doklam) and pushed aside its soldiers at gun-point," he added.

Two days before national security advisor Ajit Doval leaves for Beijing for a BRICS meeting, which could lay the ground for simultaneous withdrawal of the rival troops from the face-off site, Army vice-chief Lt-General Sarath Chand on Tuesday said China would continue to remain a threat for India in the future. "On the North, we have China which has a large landmass, huge resources and a large standing Army... Despite having the Himalayas between us, China is bound to be a threat for us in years ahead," said Lt-Gen Chand, addressing a seminar here.

Pointing at the collusion between China and Pakistan, the senior officer said the latter chose to continuously needle India+ through low-intensity warfare rather than engage in a full-fledged war. "This suits its all-weather friend China," he said, while also slamming Pakistan for "stooping low" and deliberately targeting schools in cross-border shelling.

Much like the Line of Control with Pakistan, Indian soldiers are prepared for the long haul near the tri-junction with China as well. Apart from the already present 63 and 112 Brigades (over 3,000 troops each) in east and north-east Sikkim, the Army has moved up another 2,500 soldiers from the 164 Brigade to Zuluk and Nathang Valley in the state to further reinforce its military stance, as was first reported by TOIon July 11.

But there are just about 300-400 soldiers from each side at the actual face-off site in the Doklam area, who are engaged in showing red-flags to each other in "a non-aggressive manner" after having pitched tents there. "Our troops are much better positioned in the region, with proper logistical supply lines, than the Chinese troops," said a source.

Alarm bells ring in the Indian security establishment if major units of the PLA head southwards after crossing the 11 bridges on the Tsangpo river.

[chetak]

IMO if the dlagon sees no other way out, they will use tactical nukes on the IA positions, then deny everything. Big powers will know, but not a damn thing to be done about it.

Wow...what are we smoking here.

-M

yes, and the IA will madly scramble to retreat while the Indian people whimper in the back ground.

The Goi will then promptly disband the IA/all forces and declare ahimsa as our ever guiding foreign policy thereafter and will abjectly invite paki/beedi/nepal to take as much of Indian territory as they want.

Really, that is some pretty potent stuff you have there!!.

[chetak]

Sourabh "surrender monkey" Gupta on the China-India border stand-off

What is this cheen's ploblem?
PS: posting it for informational purposes onlee... the man is puke worthy!

prime f(uking ahole.

must be grant seeking time again.

[Philip]

PS:Good news from Sri lanka.
The GOSL passed a cabinet resolution prohibiting the Chinese from using Hambantota Port,or any other port facility for any naval/mil activity.
Pressure from India and concerned Western/Asian states,the US,Japan,etc.... not to mention India! Two entities,one for admin-controlled by the GOSL and the other for commercial only-controlled by the Chinese,will be set up.
Therefore,we'll see no more subs,etc. using SL as a logistic hub.Usual warship visits to Colombo port as in the past are expected to continue,but no subs.

Local opposition to handing over vast swathes of land in the HTota region ,has been fiercely resisted by locals, Buddhist priests,etc. who've come out onto the streets. Anti-Chinese sentiment in the island is quite high despite the generous/vested loans given to SL by the PRC.

[Iyersan]

https://swarajyamag.com/world/time-to-w ... -cent-mark
Time To Wake India Up: The Probability Of War With China Is Now Close To The 50 Per Cent Mark
Barring a few isolated voices of caution, there seems to a benign assumption in the commentariat and the Indian media that China will not risk a war over the Dokhlam standoff, where the Dragon was surprised by India’s unexpected decision to stare it down. Let’s not forget that the Dragon is breathing fire repeatedly, and at some point it may be forced by its own rhetoric to make good on its threats.

Even though the Indian Army is digging in for a long eyeball-to-eyeball situation and even a short war, the rest of India continues to live in la-la land, with the stock exchanges hitting new peaks. The Nation Stock Exchange’s Nifty crossed the 10,000-mark for the first time yesterday (25 July), when it should actually be pencilling in a war threat to the economy in the short- to medium-term. It should hold its exuberance for some time later this year.

Hope is now building around the visit of National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval’s visit to Beijing for attending a BRICS summit of NSAs, but this is unlikely to result in any immediate cooling of tensions.

The reality is that neither India nor China can afford to back down. That means war remains a strong possibility.

What can Doval offer China that will force the Dragon to pull back from the brink of war and war rhetoric? At best he can offer face-savers to allow China to get out of the corner it has painted itself into. The question is whether China will accept these face-savers.

And what could these face-savers be? They could include a new tripartite panel to deal with Bhutan-Sikkim-Tibet tri-junction demarcation, the promise of more business for Chinese infrastructure companies using the huge trade surpluses that China currently generates, a lowering of India’s opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as long as this does not include the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which transgresses into the parts of Kashmir now in Pakistani control, etc.

India cannot offer more, for once it does that, it would mean acquiescing in Chinese attempts to nibble away territories without any war. Its strategy of intimidation and war rhetoric would have won, sending a chilling message of Indian pusillanimity when it comes to dealing with that bully.

The face-savers we can conceivably offer will simply not be enough, for China could possibly have got these concessions even without raising temperatures over the Dokhlam Plateau.

The possibility of war thus needs to be analysed from the Chinese side. Having upped the ante, it is more than likely that China cannot back down from its position on Dokhlam without emboldening all the other countries that it has border problems with.

The presumption on the Indian side is that any war, whether lasting two weeks or even a month, will do China’s international position more damage and hence it will not push us too far. But this is not how the Chinese behave. Unlike democracies, which worry about economic losses in the pursuit of geopolitical and military power, China always seems willing to endanger short-term economic gains in the pursuit of long-term military supremacy.

In fact, in the current Dokhlam standoff, not going to war may seem like a loss to the generals and Xi Jinping backers, since it will damage China’s credibility as a country that backs intimidation with real military might, with a willingness to use it. Threats and intimidation are of no use if they are not actually made good on once in a while.

The argument inside China may thus be tilting towards the inevitability of a short war, even if it is not going to result in any major gains on the ground. A war validates its war rhetoric of the last month. A China that will go to war sends its own message to smaller nations, and that message may be more important than the damage it could cause to existing relationships in Asia.

If I were a betting man, I would not bet on Doval coming back with a “peace in our time” smile. The chances of war are now inching towards the 50 per cent mark from where it will become inevitable.

India has to accelerate its preparation for war, and also prepare the people for it. The Nifty should wait for clearer signals that war is off the table before heading for the 10,000-mark and higher peaks.

[SSridhar]

Miffed at a US publication's support for India, Chinese media says 'US is instigating military clash between China, India' - Shailaja Neelakantan, ToI

Ah . . . in 1971 when Nixon & Kissinger had talks with Mao and Zhou about India . . . .

[DavidD]

Gentlemen. A thought worthy of your consideration. If China should unleash or threaten to unleash missiles with conventional warheads, why would India want to take them at their word that these are indeed conventional ones and not nukes? Do they carry some sort of a priori certification?

The Indian response has to be "you fire conventional missiles at our infrastructure , we will detect them and we will assume they are nukes. You have thus put us in a "use them or lose them" nuclear calculus. We will fire all our nukes at you because we are indifferent as a state as to whether we are destroyed conventionally or by nuclear weapons.

So we will take you down with us if you destroy us. You have more to lose than we do. Your economy is bigger, your people are richer and your dreams of world conquest are more probable. In a knife fight with us, you will be sufficiently crippled to hand your remains to Russia and the US.

Is that what you want ?

It's a great sentiment in theory. Now to the actual practice.

How does India detect incoming Chinese missiles? Infra red sensors on DSP satellites? Do any of India's satellites possess this capability?

Early warning radars? Maybe the Greenpine and Swordfish? Has India deployed them to detect incoming missiles from the north and east?

Unless there is a clear articulation of these capabilities so that friends and foes know that India has these capabilities which will allow India to detect if an enemy crosses certain red lines, there is a huge possibility of crossed wires?

e.g. the US and USSR mutually agreed that all ballistic missiles would be nuclear armed, so no confusion, if either side detected a ballistic missile launch, each would assume it carried a nuclear warhead. Similarly, air launched cruise missiles could carry nuclear warheads, but submarine and ship launched cruise missiles would only be armed with conventional warheads. That is why Russia did not panic when Trump ordered 58-61 cruise missiles to be fired into Syria in close proximity to Russian forces there.

That kind of active signaling has been missing in the India China Pakistan equation. China has a large force of conventional ballistic missiles, they also have a large force of CJ-10 cruise missiles with a range of ~1500 kms. In the absence of a clear protocol between India and China on this issue, the Chinese could assume that they could launch conventional ballistic/cruise missiles against India. Unless India clearly specifies that any such launch will be deemed as a nuclear launch. That then makes it incumbent on India to have a robust early incoming missile detection system. Do we have such a system in operation either via satellites or early warning ground based radar? If not, such a warning is meaningless. And will India really make a 180 degree change in policy from NFU to launch on warning? Really?

Anyway, I am sure that Ajit Doval knows what he is doing and will carry the right message to China. We are only armchair generals pontificating.

The signaling is pretty clear from both China and India. Both keep a NFU policy, and both back it up by not keeping enough warheads stockpiled for a 1st strike powerful enough to wipe out an opponent's nuclear capabilities. As such, both countries are a step back from true brinkmanship.

[Deans]

https://swarajyamag.com/world/time-to-w ... -cent-mark
Time To Wake India Up: The Probability Of War With China Is Now Close To The 50 Per Cent Mark

Saying something has a 50% probability, is another way of saying `I don't have a fu****g clue'.

[Philip]

BRO to construct tunnels to cut down distance to China border
PTI|Updated: Jul 24, 2017, 02.45 PM IST

ITANAGAR: The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) will construct two tunnels through 4170-metre-high Sela Pass in Arunachal Pradesh, which would cut down the distance to China border through Tawang by 10 km.

"The tunnels would cut down at least an hour of travel time between the Army's 4 Corps headquarters at Tezpur and Tawang. Moreover, the tunnels would ensure that NH 13 and especially the 171 km stretch between Bomdila and Tawang, remains accessible in all weather conditions," a BRO ..

Read more at:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/art ... aign=cppst

PS:Mr. Modi should do well to remember how ABV,the then FM of India,was backstabbed by the lyellow-livered Chin when on an offical visit.China launched its invasion of Vietnam during his visit ,which he cut short and returned to India.That lesson was taught ifn full measure by the so-called "student",Vietnam,who had earlier defeated both the French and US. The Chin suffered a humiliating defeat ,suffering thousands of casualties.
A similar lesson must be dealt out to the PLA and the mandarins of Beijing and its opium-addicted warlord,Xi Gins.

[SSridhar]

The signaling is pretty clear from both China and India. Both keep a NFU policy, and both back it up by not keeping enough warheads stockpiled for a 1st strike powerful enough to wipe out an opponent's nuclear capabilities. As such, both countries are a step back from true brinkmanship.

The Chinese stance on NFU has been somewhat shaky after Xi came to power. First, he failed to reiterate the Chinese NFU policy while addressing the then Second Artillery Corps (responsible for all land-based nuclear weapons) in December 2012 (Xi Jinping had just been selected as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party) . While Chinese leaders, since Mao Zedong, have always played down the significance of nuclear weapons, Xi Jinping, contrarily, spoke of nuclear weapons creating a ‘strategic space’ for China propelling it towards a ‘great power status’. This was a significant omission of NFU coming from a person who was not only the President but also the General Secretary of CPC as well as military chief of the PLA. Later, a Chinese white paper on defence, released in April 2013, also omitted the NFU principle, again for the first time since c. 1964 when the first such paper was released. China later explained away unconvincingly the omission in the 2013 white paper as due to a change in the structure of the paper. However, in the 2015 edition of the White paper, NFU re-appeared.

The Chinese do maintain recessed deterrence, just like us. SLBMs may be exceptions But, China has also been bent on early-warning technologies, just like us, once again. This can be used for both defence as well as offence such as launch-on-warning (LoW). Now, it can be argued that LoW is not in contravention of NFU. But, already the moot point is the 'boundary-layer' issue of NFU; that is, will countries stick to their postures at the time of a crisis.

Without going into deterrence discussions, one can confidently say that these discussions are theoretical at this stage when even thoughts of a low-level skirmish are not being contemplated.

[nits]

2. Tawang: 4th corps at Tezpur, with its 3 Mountain divisions is well placed to handle any incursion.

What is the amount of air cover will the PLA units sitting on top of tawang will get? I am aware of one airbase nearby. Are there anymore.

I am thinking, as soon the first round of artillery is fired anywhere on LAC, this lot should be pounded with standoff PGM by IAF.

The capability of IAF will the key to counter any action by PLA.

See Shiv's sir's video it has this details

[AdityaM]

I posted about a reported missile test by china around our northern borders. Remarkable silence about it in media & elsewhere.

Unable to create cross link from mobile browser so posting here as well

From twitter:

https://twitter.com/hdevreij/status/889842784584294400

Dutch civilian airline pilot witnessed a presumed Chinese (ABM?) missile launch over the Himalayas. Pics copyright: Christiaan van Heijst






https://twitter.com/defconwsalerts/stat ... 2504283136
Transporter vehicles carrying equipment for the firing of a ballistic missile were seen arriving in Kusong, North Pyongan Province


More info and pics from the pilot
https://jpcvanheijst.com/blogs/2017/07/ ... over-china

http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/st ... 495336818/

[g.sarkar]

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/does ... 170726.htm
Does India need to be invaded by China to wake up?
Very few in India have heard of Taksing.
It is the last village on the Tibet (China)-Arunachal Pradesh border, and the first village likely to be invaded if Beijing retaliates.
Scarily, it takes jawans THREE days of walking to reach Taksing.
In all the noise surrounding the Doklam confrontation, Claude Arpi focuses on a crucial issue that has hardly been covered -- the construction of roads for the armed forces and the local population to reach the most remote border posts
Very few incidents have triggered so many comments as the confrontation at the tri-junction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim.
On June 16, 2017, Chinese troops entered a stretch of land at the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley to build a road on Bhutanese territory. They were stopped by the Indian Army.
Beijing's response was sharp, probably due to the surprise; China did not expect Delhi to militarily defend Thimphu.
The tri-junction is a strategic hotspot for Delhi, and by occupying it, the Chinese would have a 'view' not only of the Chumbi Valley, but also the Siliguri corridor, which is India's main strategic weakness in case of a military conflict.
On June 30, the ministry of external affairs in Delhi affirmed that in 2012 India and China had agreed that the status quo would be maintained in this area: 'The two governments had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.'
Probably getting upset with the delay in finding a solution, Beijing decided to take the matter in its own hands, as it had done earlier in the South China Sea.
Beijing has a tendency to believe in the principle that it is better to first take 'possession' and then start talking.
In all of this, one issue -- though crucial for the defence of the borders -- has hardly been covered by the Indian media: It is the construction of a decent infrastructure for the Indo-Tibet Border Police Force (ITBP), army and the local population to reach the most remote border posts.
On July 18, it was announced in Parliament that some 73 roads were being built along the Sino-India border.
According to the Press Trust of India, Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju told the Lok Sabha: 'The government has decided to undertake construction of 73 roads of operational significance along Indo-China border. Out of these, 73 roads, 46 are being constructed by the Ministry of Defence and 27 by the Ministry of Home Affairs.'The minister said 30 roads had been completed so far though all the roads had been scheduled to be completed by 2012-2013.
According to the government, the main reasons for the delay were: Limited working season, logistical issues due to high altitude, rugged and difficult terrain, natural calamities, delay in land acquisition and forest/wildlife clearances.
The last justification was surprising as the Narendra D Modi government had decided in 2014 to do away with the environmental clearance for road projects located within 100 km of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China.
...

Gautam

[TKiran]

https://mobile.twitter.com/Chellaney/st ... 9414572033

Brahma Chellaney @Chellaney

Jul 24

INACTION: As if China, not India, must address India's trade deficit, India has been "raising" the issue with China:

India expresses concern over growing trade deficit with China
deccanherald.com

N Sitaraman has no idea what she is talking. Should be fired immediately, the problem of trade deficit with China will be solved.

[JE Menon]

Chellaney knows better... But twitter has it's own attractions...

Every country raises it's trade deficit with other countries that it has a deficit with, giving them a chance to rebalance the situation of their own accord and in their own interests. Unilateral moves may then follow. Or may not.

[pankajs]

Every time I hear demand for someone "to go" I am like you are telling me that Modi does not know that? While he may not control every pearl of wisdom that comes out of these folks but seriously on policy he is unaware? Unbelievable!

BTW, I am with JEM saar on this.

Added later: The policy is continuously being tweaked on the margins. E.g. The import duties of imported cell phones have been hiked in the past year or so by 10%. I had posted a link in one other thread perhaps the Indian Econ thread. Do not expect the hammer but a scalpel and it is a continuous process.

[schinnas]

Its also a not so subtle message to Cheena that their 60 Billion a year is in jeopardy if they continue to act cute.

[Philip]

BK has some pithy advice for the China lovers of the MEA,etc.,who have been literal fifth-columnists,fighting for China's interests first rather than upholding India's sovereign rights .Mr.Modi has done v.well to stand up to the Chinese,refuse to join their OBOR plot of total Chinese Asian domination and should also reconsider the decision to join the SCO. Even BRICS is a platform where India could sue to demand Chinese withdrawal or ask for its expulsion.

https://bharatkarnad.com/

Will Doval hold the line, disregarding the ‘Beijing Syndrome’?
Posted on July 26, 2017 by Bharat Karnad

NSA Ajit Doval leaves for Beijing to confer with his opposite number on the Special Representative-level talks to resolve the border dispute, the State Counselor Yang Jiechi. But Doval is being welcomed by a barrage, to add to the verbal fusillade by the Chinese defence ministry, of rhetorical escalation now involving the Foreign Minister Wang Yi. In a censorious tone that almost sounds comical, he asked Delhi to “conscientiously withdraw its troops”. Yes, there has been an invasion, as Beijing claims, but it is by the Peoples Liberation Army elements on Bhutanese territory, and the sooner the Zhongnanhai recovers a bit of sanity and restores the status quo ante, the better it will be for China. Because already it has gone way out on a limb and, with most of the small and big states in Asia and elsewhere watching, has more face to lose when eventually it backs down from a untenable position, as it will have to.

For the first time the Indian government has shown some spine and, more, displayed considerable cunning in giving Beijing a very big stage to publicly make a fool of itself. The initial resolve to ensure the intruding PLA troops don’t have their way on the Doklam Plateau and the Indian jawans and officers standing their ground, backed by a determined build-up in the rear areas, was as powerful a move as it was unexpected, especially to the Chinese. The confusion it sowed in the Chinese ranks bubbled up all the way through the Xigatze, Chengdu military commands to Beijing and is manifested in precisely the spate of nervously impolitic statements issued by all and sundry. China has been pushed on to the backfoot and it will be good to keep it there.

This is a great call made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and his moves to-date where his government has played it so cool, have been unerringly right. The question is what has he advised Doval to do? One only hopes he has told the NSA to stick by the line laid down at the PM’s behest by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in Parliament of no preconditions and simultaneous withdrawal by the PLA to the Batang La perimeter and the Indian troops to their start-off points before any talks. There should be no flexibility, no give, in this respect because the Chinese can take a mile when offered an inch. There’s, moreover, no time guillotine coming down to arrive at a hurried compromise. It is the PLA unit out of the sub-regional command that are at the end of a fairly long logistics chain, while the Indian forward supply system is arrayed on a shorter, tighter, grid. So, if the Chinese want their soldiers to spend the coming winter at the Dok La heights, it is no skin off our backs. But the principle of the inviolability of the Bhutan border and Thimpu’s territorial claims has to be maintained at all cost by India.

So, what’s the problem? As always it is the Mandarin-speaking veterans of MEA who have pulled long stints in China and suffer from the ‘Beijing syndrome’ — the diplomatic counterpart of the ‘Stockholm syndrome’, wherein Indian diplomats begin so empathizing with the Chinese and their point of view, that they end up pushing the Beijing line to the govt of India, through the China Desk at the MEA and the ‘China Study Circle’ (CSC), which should long ago have been disbanded but is persisted with by the powers that be. These China-lovers are pushing for a compromise that will hurt the Indian national interest, and that’s the problem. This band of China lovers have reached top positions (NSA, Foreign Secretary), monopolized India’s China policy, and made a mess of it over the last 50 years, because their instincts are to adjust, accommodate, compromise, and surrender. It was CSC, for instance, that advocated participation in Xi Jinping’s OBOR project until they were firmly over-ruled by Modi. Hope the PM does not at this stage succumb to CSC advice.

Modi and India have gained a lot of admiration in Asia and the world by showing, for a change, some spirit. It shouldn’t be frittered away in the false hope that concessions by Doval will lead to peace on the border. It won’t but will rather only lead to more demands, more truculence and gross misbehaviour. Ask Yangbon, Hanoi, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul.

A sideline issue, but yesterday evening I heard some commentators on TV talk about this country not being up on the public relations game compared to China. Actually, one of the great pluses of the Indian policy so far is exactly that the Modi government hasn’t been voluble or over-hyped the situation. It’s been low key and low to the ground, leaving it to China to blow the whole thing out of proportion and face regional and global ridicule. Nothing reduces a big power as much as ridicule. The Doklam confrontation is a subject matter that the numerous comedy outfits on Indian social media should make a meal of. Much fun can be had there.

[Bart S]

Sourabh "surrender monkey" Gupta on the China-India border stand-off

What is this cheen's ploblem?
PS: posting it for informational purposes onlee... the man is puke worthy!

This is interesting, though the contents are unadulterated garbage.

After weeks of braying through Global Times etc, only to be laughed at by India and become bigger fools in the eyes of the world, they have now activated their second tier of propagandists. This guy, the Brit/Aus turd who leaked the report on the 62 war, and some Tibetan sounding guy who took the angle of India interfering in a Bhutan China dispute (Tsering Shakya is the Canadian Research Chair in Religion and Contemporary Society at the University of British Columbia, and author of The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947), all equally rabid opinion pieces but by carefully picked authors outside of China, and published in the SCMP, which is HK based. So they are trying to pull the same crap while attempting to sound a bit more credible.

[schinnas]

Is it possible for India to offer a land swap deal, where we swap equivalent area in any of our uninhabited (or sparsely inhabited) parts of North East that border Bhutan for Doklam plateau? Even 100 sq kms would suffice as the rest is already under Chinese occupation.

It does require Bhutan taking a strong stand as China considers the region disputed...But there is a precedent set by Pakistan and China in a similar scenario.

[pankajs]

The moment you make that offer you will come out looking weak .. not willing to fight for something YOU consider as strategic .. the optics would be devastating.
That would only embolden China for further salami slicing. Pretty soon you will run out of territory to swap.
And once you make that offer like that, 50 or 100 for 1, what will you offer China for Arunachal Pradesh?

The best offer still remains for both to withdraw with a pledge to maintain status-quo and regular patroling by the 3 sides to enforce that.

[schinnas]

I think you misunderstood. I was talking about a land swap between Bhutan and India. Not with China.

The Doklam is of tactical importance to us to safeguard Chickens neck area. Its better that it remains integral part of India than administered by a friendly country that doesn't have military might to defend it from Chinese.

[g.sarkar]

Is it possible for India to offer a land swap deal, where we swap equivalent area in any of our uninhabited (or sparsely inhabited) parts of North East that border Bhutan for Doklam plateau? Even 100 sq kms would suffice as the rest is already under Chinese occupation.
It does require Bhutan taking a strong stand as China considers the region disputed...But there is a precedent set by Pakistan and China in a similar scenario.

Pakistan is a client state and does not count. China is going to grab more and more land, the only way to stop it is by force. Any other method will fail. Any offer of compromise will be returned by a jhapad as in 1962 to Pandit Nehru. A nationalist leader like Shri Modi will lose his reputation and the next election.
Gautam
PS Just read your response regarding Bhutan. In this case there is no difference between India and Bhutan. Without India, Bhutan would have already lost its land. It can stare back at China only because India's support. Doklam's importance is not because of Chicken Neck, it is because the land does not belong to the lizard. India can not always retreat, it has to face the lizard somewhere.
Gautam

[chetak]

Is it possible for India to offer a land swap deal, where we swap equivalent area in any of our uninhabited (or sparsely inhabited) parts of North East that border Bhutan for Doklam plateau? Even 100 sq kms would suffice as the rest is already under Chinese occupation.

It does require Bhutan taking a strong stand as China considers the region disputed...But there is a precedent set by Pakistan and China in a similar scenario.

if tomorrow the chinese declare that bombay is disputed as they have a historic claim, would you accept it and agree to swap it for a village near tawang??

Historically, the chinese can claim that the portuguese governor of bombay habitually wore silk undies made from chinese silk and hence bombay has always been theirs??

this reach and grab "historic" claims of the chinese needs to be kicked right in the testimonials, just like what Modi is doing now. They have to learn sometime. It is not our fault that some treaties were made by the british when they colonized India.

Bullies, once put properly in their place, will behave thereafter.

[g.sarkar]

Not Mumbai, but Andaman and Nicobar is certainly disputed. China needs those islands.
Gautam

[schinnas]

Chetakji,
I guess you totally missed my point. I am not for giving Doklam to China. I am for India taking ownership of Doklam (it currently belongs to Bhutan) so that it can be better protected against Chinese aggression.

Gautam Sarkarji,
You may also have missed the point. Please read the article in Hindu regarding issues with Indian troops in Bhutan soil. What happens if a future ruler of Bhutan decides to swap that region with China? We need to preempt such a possibility given

It is not weakness in any way. In fact it would be considered as a very bold and in your face move by India against China. Weakness would be we giving regions that china disputes to China. Here i am talking about we taking regions that china disputes under our sovereignty.

[g.sarkar]

Not really. Show me one instance when China has given up land. Pakistan gave up land in POK to China, there was no swap. So did Russia. When China is friendly, it agrees to take less land than the original demand. Bhutan can not agree to swap as no land is offered in return. All it can do is to agree to give up land to China's demands to buy temporary peace for a piece . Anything can happen in future, but right now I do not see Bhutan presenting China with land that belongs to Bhutan.
Gautam

[ashish raval]

I for one moment don't think there will be any war or even skirmishes. If such things happen China can kiss good bye to any Chinese market access for next 2 generations and who will pay for billions of people needing pensions in Beijing?

It is a coercive tactic used by Chinese to show people of the Indian ocean that it can pressure 4th strongest military in the world and get the land without any opposition.

We should offer nothing on the table except a property talk to end the stalemate. India should also allow higher percentage of participation of friendly nations in defense production and setup large tunnelling and Bobby trapping the passes in certain ways known only to Indian Army in that region.

There is no greater sin than retreating from position of strength and my advice to Indian babus is show middle finger when carrying a file strategically placed to bring to of their the gleat pless of chin..their army is not equipped to defend huge territory that China has..period..

On the strategic front India should offer rest of the world a large shipping base for world navies to protect Indian ocean region and provide safe passage in the region..with hundreds of ships patrolling the lanes..in the region..to protect trade.

[nits]

Will Russia mediate between India, China?

Through the month-long India-China standoff in Doklam near the Sikkim border, Moscow has not spoken. Russian diplomacy is presumably at work. The ground is slippery, because 'territorial sovereignty' is a hugely sensitive issue. Meanwhile, top Kremlin official Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of Russia's Security Council and a close aide to President Vladimir Putin, is travelling to Beijing on July 26 ahead of the 7th meeting of BRICS High Representatives for Security Issues (July 27-28).

Patrushev is traveling a day in advance at the invitation of Meng Jianzhu, member of the politburo of the CPC central committee and secretary of the committee of the political and legal affairs under the CPC central committee, and State Councilor Yang Jiechi to attend the 4th meeting of the China-Russia law-enforcement and security cooperation mechanism and the 13th round of China-Russia strategic security consultation respectively.

trictly speaking, a China-Russia 'bilateral' focusing on 'strategic security cooperation' precedes the BRICS event. The cascading regional tensions in South Asia would have a bearing on international security. And Russia cannot but feel perturbed that relations between India and China, its two key Asian partners, have reached a flashpoint.

Moscow's big worry will be that Washington may try to fish in troubled waters. There are incipient signs already.A defense analyst in the RAND Corporation, Pentagon's think-tank, has expounded a bizarre thesis that Russia is paranoid about the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's growing stature as a security organisation and it is a platform for China to expand its influence in Central Asia.

Therefore, in the RAND analyst's opinion, Moscow will be quietly pleased that India is about to checkmate China within the SCO. The underlying schadenfreude is not at all surprising. As Winston Churchill once said about the Bolshevik Revolution, SCO is a regional organisation that the US wanted to throttle in its very cradle.

The worst strategic nightmare for the US has been that the SCO (and BRICS) might gain traction, bringing together three Asian giants under a single canopy. (It’s no coincidence that 'pro-American' lobbyists in India happen to be the most trenchant critics of SCO and BRICS.) Where the RAND analyst badly fumbled is in his naivete that Russia stands to gain if SCO gets paralysed.

On the contrary, given the deep chill in US-Russia relations, Moscow's need for strategic depth is greater today than ever before. Having said that, the RAND analyst estimates correctly that India-China tensions may slow down SCO's functioning. Chinese commentators also voice disquiet on this score.

A top Chinese think-tanker Xiao Bin, deputy secretary-general of the SCO Research Centre affiliated to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote: 'Given the tensions over China-India relations, India will bring its mentality of counterbalancing China to the SCO, and thwart initiatives favouring China.'

'India's membership at the SCO creates a structural quagmire for the organisation.' 'Soon after joining the SCO, India frequently caused friction over its border with China. For this reason, the SCO is likely to enter a strategic standstill. India's participation in the SCO will do more harm than good in the short and medium term.'

Beijing sees SCO as a key platform to address security issues affecting Xinjiang. To quote Xiao, 'At present, Xinjiang is at a critical stage in terms of stability and growth.' 'In recent years, security coordination in the SCO has been largely related to Xinjiang... However, China and India have disagreements on anti-terrorism.'

Russia and China would have a convergence insofar as it is a matter of time before the US wades into India-China tensions. (Alas, many war mongers in India are easily identifiable as people owing fealty to US interests.) Washington will wait for tensions to aggravate so that it is seen as responding to India's plea for help.

A commentary in the Global Times newspaper on Tuesday, July 25, took note of this: 'There are certain forces in the West that are instigating a military clash between China and India, from which they can seek strategic benefits at no cost to themselves.' 'Washington applied this scheme in the South China Sea disputes... In fact, neither China nor India wants a war.'

'China has addressed most of its boundary issues with its neighbours through negotiations.' The big question is how National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who joins Yang and Patrushev in Beijing on Thursday, will apprise the 'co-relation of forces'. The good part is that Doval is an old familiar face to the Russian security establishment.

The known unknown, therefore, will be what role Patrushev might play in Beijing between July 26 and 28 to ease the India-China standoff.

[g.sarkar]

The last time Russia (USSR) mediated was between Pak and India in Tashkent with Shastriji and the great Field Marshall Ayub. We know how that went, we had to return land that was won by spilling Indian blood. Mediation will mean compromise, and as China always asks for more, we will be the loser.
Gautam