Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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nam
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 23 Jul 2017 00:06

ldev wrote:https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/888784097203671040

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 2h2 hours ago
More
Replying to @IntelCrab
Footage was taken along state route 109 which runs from #Beijing to #Lhasa. (Credit to 南越楚卿少校 on @SinaWeibo)


Don't know if real or mere posturing and propaganda.


PR. No sensible army will send wheeled APCs on thousand mile road trip in to Lhasa from other parts of the country. But then it is PLA, you may never know.

The mobilisation, if it happens will be by train.

There must be a garrison in Lhasa linked by train, to receive units. Hopefully some GE experts here can pin point this garrison.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 23 Jul 2017 00:26

Third Dash wrote:
sanjaykumar wrote:
India didn't crush Pakistan not because of the strong mustachioed Punjabi army men in the PA, but because of American backing.

India did in fact launch a war on Pakistan, and created a new nation.


That is just apologetic excuses. We were just as much American darlings till 1965. In 1998, again Pakistan got away with invading India. And what US backing ? The only time US actually threatened to enter war on Pak side is the time when we actually got something done. What more would US do that it didn't do at the time of India hater Nixon when his ally was cut in half.
Also, I never said it was because of paki soldiers. The reason is complete lack of political will on our side.



I find when formulating a thesis, it helps to have facts. Please do look up Krishna Menon and report back your findings on the US view of same.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sudarshan » 23 Jul 2017 00:29

I got to say, if India had gamed all this (which could be possible), we couldn't have trapped China better. Xi was merrily building islands in the SCS, cocking a snook at the combined might of all the neighbors there. He had more room in that cavernous mouth of his, so he went off on an adventure to the south (Bhutan). That should have been a tasty additional morsel, well within the capacity of said cavernous mouth. Instead, India, which could always be relied upon to back off in the past, turned out to be the kabab-mein-haddi, and now all of a sudden Xi is finding he's bitten off more than he can chew. Spitting out any part of it, whether on the Bhutan front, or the SCS front, will be loss of face, not spitting it out could lead to loss of teeth and tongue. Some loss to the facial region seems to be guaranteed in any case. What to do onlee?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Trikaal » 23 Jul 2017 03:47

sanjaykumar wrote:
Third Dash wrote:
That is just apologetic excuses. We were just as much American darlings till 1965. In 1998, again Pakistan got away with invading India. And what US backing ? The only time US actually threatened to enter war on Pak side is the time when we actually got something done. What more would US do that it didn't do at the time of India hater Nixon when his ally was cut in half.
Also, I never said it was because of paki soldiers. The reason is complete lack of political will on our side.


I find when formulating a thesis, it helps to have facts. Please do look up Krishna Menon and report back your findings on the US view of same.


I don't know what you are talking about. America suspended military aid to Pakistan 1965. India was the biggest aid receiver from US. Perhaps you can point me to a direct link. And even if I am wrong in that statement, the fact remains that hiding behind the American excuse is wrong. The condition couldn't have been worse than in 1971 when America almost declared war on India. Yet we returned 1950 sq km for 550sq km including strategic places like haji put pass. Shastri had ayub by the balls and then let go. this shows the historic peace loving mindset of Indian leaders. We negotiate for peace even in victory. Forget about actually starting a war for once.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karan M » 23 Jul 2017 03:54

nam wrote:The CAG report on OFB annual production is fascinating.
Despite all the screams about shortages, the target for 155MM is 50k/year. I30MM meet the target in 2015, slowed down last year.

No numbers on 105, which is the most used.

The most interesting is tank rounds. The target is zero for 125MM sabot rounds! We don't produce any 125MM sabot!. 120MM sabot only 2k. This must be for Arjun,but that is less than 20 rounds per deployed 124 tanks! Really does not make sense.

Either OFB is waiting for 125 & 120 MM MK2 production or we are importing them. 125MM probably from Israel and Russia. But 120MM, from where? I have a feeling Arjun can fire 120MM Israeli round.

The most troubling is the fuze production.

All in all, I think this has been released to make way for some OFB cleansing. I remember a newsreport on PMO asking for OFB targets and production rates. This is what such a report might look like.


OFB is a mess, no doubt, but some smoke and mirrors definitely.
T-90 primary anti tank armament is Reflek missile. We have many of those.
125mm ammo was stopped in India because of IA disinterest. DRDO round is in trials. Now, rest are being imported - somewhat obsolete BM42 rounds, but should at least give T-72s some teeth.
Around a 1000 T-72s have received TISAS, and similar numbers for BMP.

So IA is not completely toothless.

Arjun rounds are likely placeholders since definitive new 120mm round recently developed (FSAPDS). Earlier was 90's vintage.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 23 Jul 2017 05:05

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1057507.shtml
"The ongoing border tension is testing China's patience, and if the border tension remains until September, it would be very embarrassing for Indian leaders to come to China to attend the BRICS summit. This is bad for both China and India as well as other BRICS members," Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times in an earlier interview.
:rotfl:

But do check the comments, not a single Chinese reader has commented. Amazing censorship at display !

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Guddu » 23 Jul 2017 05:15

Found this interesting
"The US move will keep Chinese navy busy in the region and make it difficult for Beijing to deal with territorial disputes with other countries"
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/china-under-pressure-as-trump-gives-us-navy-more-freedom-in-south-china-sea/articleshow/59716369.cms

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby phillydesi » 23 Jul 2017 05:22

ramana wrote:Now Chindu trawls WeChat blogs to bolster China position against India.
Look at the road pictures that Shiv posted, do they look like something to support a watchtower?
Moron presstitute.


Thanks for that reference. A direct link would be awesome.

Same goes for the youtube or other media referenced by others in follow on posts.

Looks like I'm not the only one that questions whether the journos know exactly where the "action" is happening on the ground. In the first few days when the story broke, various news media were pointing to a disputed section of the Bhutan-China border on the western section of Bhutan... since then, the apparent issue is land much further south.

This youtube channel, which i recently came across, has been the most useful. Is it one of the BR folks? Great job.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6IXlLdtKIxQ

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chanakyaa » 23 Jul 2017 05:31

Bade wrote:http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1057507.shtml
"The ongoing border tension is testing China's patience, and if the border tension remains until September, it would be very embarrassing for Indian leaders to come to China to attend the BRICS summit. This is bad for both China and India as well as other BRICS members," Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times in an earlier interview.
:rotfl:

But do check the comments, not a single Chinese reader has commented. Amazing censorship at display !

Boss, is it really the censorship or no one gives a damn about GlobalTimes in China? Or is GlobalTimes, like Sputniknews of Russia, primarily meant for World English readers and everyone in China perhaps know it? I casually checked some non-India and China related articles and don't see any comments posted by anybody. Looks like GlobalTimes, like its peer Paki Yawn.com is worse than Roopart My-dock's tabloids.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SBajwa » 23 Jul 2017 05:36

brvarsh wrote:
Such corruption in defense sector should have a sedition charges.



High treason is what it is.


and they should be tried by military courts with death sentence in less than a month!

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby fanne » 23 Jul 2017 05:40

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-bu ... hina-20875

A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia. A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause thousands of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy. Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory.
India and China border one another in two locations, northern India/western China and eastern India/southern China, with territorial disputes in both areas. China attacked both theaters in October 1962, starting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground.


Both countries’ “No First Use” policies regarding nuclear weapons make the outbreak of nuclear war very unlikely. Both countries have such large populations, each over 1.3 billion, that they are essentially unconquerable. Like all modern wars, a war between India and China would be fought over land, sea, and air; geography would limit the scope of the land conflict, while it would be the air conflict, fought with both aircraft and missiles, that would do the most damage to both countries. The trump card, however, may be India’s unique position to dominate a sea conflict, with dire consequences for the Chinese economy.
A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over the area. People’s Liberation Army Air Force units in the Lanzhou Military Region would fly against Punjab, Himchal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and from the expansive Chengdu Military region against India’s Arunachal Pradesh. The Lanzhou district is home to J-11 and J-11B fighters, two regiments of H-6 strategic bombers, and grab bag of J-7 and J-8 fighters. A lack of forward bases in Xinjiang means the Lanzhou Military Region could probably only support a limited air campaign against northern India. The Chengdu Military Region is home to advanced J-11A and J-10 fighters but there are relatively few military airfields in Tibet anywhere near India.
Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India. China could supplement its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces. The PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles into positions adjacent to India. These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East China Seas.










Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts. While the war would take place on China’s sparsely manned frontier, New Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier. India’s air fleet of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers, sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s are competitive with or even better than most of China’s aircraft in theater, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational. India likely has enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan’s Air Force at the same time. India is also fielding the Akash medium-range air defense missile system to protect air bases and other high-value targets.
While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.
The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite the opposite. Both the western and eastern theaters are in rugged locations with little transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through. Massed attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through well-known valleys and mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained.
The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.
The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities.
A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. Both sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a war for more than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.
Image: French Air Force Mirage 2000D at Kandahar Airfield. Wikimedia Commons/SAC Tim Laurence/MOD

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SBajwa » 23 Jul 2017 05:50

These are the reason that Chinese are not upping the ante are that

1. They are probably getting more soldiers acclimatized and getting more equipment (hope we are doing the same with better numbers and not concentrated in one area).
2. They are getting their slaves like Bakis to do more action (hence increased BAT actions in Kashmir).
3. Watching USA and its next move (recent trade embargo).
4. Watching/trying to get some other countries to back them (apart fro Bakis, Saudis and North Korea)

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SBajwa » 23 Jul 2017 05:58

The only time US actually threatened to enter war on Pak side is the time when we actually got something done. What more would US do that it didn't do at the time of India hater Nixon when his ally was cut in half.
Also, I never said it was because of paki soldiers. The reason is complete lack of political will on our side.


US foreign policy listens to Israeli foreign policy and both are in sync . Israel is against Iran while we are against Saudis (USA/Europe gets oil from them which is increasingly getting smaller and smaller due to shale gas, alternative fuels, sun/wind/etc power) ., so currently the world power looks as following India-Japan-USA(France, England, Germany, Canada, Singapore, Australia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Myanmar,etc) vs China-Bakistan-Saudi while Russia is sitting in the middle. Let's hope that Russia is also on the India's side due to long historical relations!!

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby fanne » 23 Jul 2017 07:01

Mort Sir, let me just point out the current LCA deficient (which does not make it bad, the program must continue and 100 be made) -
The radar is not yet selected and the one present is not adequate. No BVR or any radar guided weapon is integrated. Perhaps one can live with the current envelope it can fly, but FOC is at least a year away and full operational readiness many years ago. If we had pursued it with some more purpose and intent, it may have been, but not in the number you say. Designing and flying a plane is one thing, producing it in number is quite another. IAF, in my humble opinion should have had 42 approved SQ no matter what (imported or indigenous) and then pursued LCA. In that respect, A bison is better than a LCA that is not ready (yes when ready it will be few generations ahead but only when it is ready). We should have gone for additional 100-150 SU30MKI (and ignored the argument of being top heavy, a good IAF is the one that can win a two from war, irrespective of the mix or the origin of the aircraft), as that was the only modern platform available and we already had infra and training for that.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Manish_Sharma » 23 Jul 2017 07:53

http://idrw.org/in-2-years-armed-forces ... hort-wars/
It will take the 15-lakh strong Indian armed forces another couple of years to become “fully fighting fit” with “optimal” stockpiles of ammunition, spares and reserves for “short and intense wars” under the Rs 23,700 crore worth of deals inked over the last 10 months, say sources.......

But the CAG report does not take into account the flurry of contracts for ammunition and spares inked by Army (19 deals worth Rs 12,000 crore), IAF (43 deals for over Rs 9,200 crore) and Navy (37 deals for over Rs 2,500 core) under emergency revenue financial powers granted to them after the terror attack at Uri in September last year. These deliveries from Russia, Israel and others to ensure stockpiles for at least 10 days of “intensive” fighting, however, will take time. The Army, for instance, will get the bulk of its Smerch rockets, Konkurs anti-tank guided missiles, 125mm APFSDS (armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot) ammunition for its T-90S and T-72 tanks and the like by March 2019, with the rest coming by early-2020.


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SwamyG » 23 Jul 2017 08:05

If I am not mistaken, Harpreet is a BRFite. What I earlier said, Indian Ocean is called for nothing the Indian Ocean.

@CestMoiz
Those who think India needs merely to be a predominantly continental power & not a maritime one, think again!

Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pratyush » 23 Jul 2017 08:46

Edit later I get it.
Last edited by Pratyush on 23 Jul 2017 10:57, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby hanumadu » 23 Jul 2017 09:33

Pratyush wrote:The map is upside down. Please fix it. I will delete this post when done.


It was intended to be like that :)

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Vivek K » 23 Jul 2017 10:06

fanne wrote:Mort Sir, let me just point out the current LCA deficient (which does not make it bad, the program must continue and 100 be made) -
The radar is not yet selected and the one present is not adequate. No BVR or any radar guided weapon is integrated. Perhaps one can live with the current envelope it can fly, but FOC is at least a year away and full operational readiness many years ago. If we had pursued it with some more purpose and intent, it may have been, but not in the number you say. Designing and flying a plane is one thing, producing it in number is quite another. IAF, in my humble opinion should have had 42 approved SQ no matter what (imported or indigenous) and then pursued LCA. In that respect, A bison is better than a LCA that is not ready (yes when ready it will be few generations ahead but only when it is ready). We should have gone for additional 100-150 SU30MKI (and ignored the argument of being top heavy, a good IAF is the one that can win a two from war, irrespective of the mix or the origin of the aircraft), as that was the only modern platform available and we already had infra and training for that.

LCA's current radar (with the old and the new radome) is better than the Kopyo on the Mig-21. LCA has completed A2G payload trials long ago. Derby ER is being integrated because the R-77 turned out to be a dud. In every respect the LCA is better than the Mig - availability, safety, ease of upgradation etc. FOC will occur when it does - that does not stop operationalization. Squadron formation is on. So please report facts and not personal biases.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 23 Jul 2017 10:17

EXCLUSIVE: China Moving Troops Along Border Under Garb Of 'military Exercise'
http://www.republicworld.com/s/3363/exc ... y-exercise
With the stand-off between India and China over the Doklam issue set to continue till National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval's visit to Beijing on July 27 for a BRICS meeting, Republic TV has learnt that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has moved more than 5000 troops into areas along the Indo-Tibetan border — all under the garb of military exercise.
As per sources, the PMO and Home Ministry have been apprised of this development in no less than four reports by the NSA himself. They are also aware that along with the troops, thousands of tonnes of military supplies have been moved in via road and rail, including military equipment and army vehicles.
The Doklam stand-off, which has caused a souring of ties between India and China, has to do with China's PLA's attempts to build a road that encroaches upon Bhutan's sovereignty, which India has been the primary guardian of since 1949. While the NSA's report makes clear that there has not been any incursion by Indian troops that have stopped the disputed road's construction, China, with its contrary and expansionist definition of what constitutes an incursion, feels otherwise.
Republic TV has also exclusively learnt that since the situation came about, the PLA has conducted five military practice exercises using live ammunition and has been preparing itself for the quick delivery of troops to hilly and strategically consequential areas. This unusual activity has been taken as a sign of provocation.
There are a number of aspects of this deadlock that are unprecedented. A lot now depends on the NSA's visit to China's capital.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Deans » 23 Jul 2017 10:41

kapilrdave wrote:Just blocking underinvoiceing will deal a great blow to the cheap imports. How to do it is an another matter though.


It's easy to do by imposing a `floor price' on the value of imports. The floor price can be based on the average of import prices (or average of selling prices with some allowance for trade margins). Thus if a i-phone is imported for 40k, a Samsung high end phone for 20k and 2 Chinki phones for 5k each, the floor price on which import duty will be levied will be (40+20+5+5)/ 4 or 17.5k per phone.
This is WTO compliant. The same thing has been done to a lesser extent with steel imports (dumping) from China.

20% of ALL our imports from China are mobile phones and components. Just a 10% higher import duty (same duty at double the value) gives us
at least $ 1 billion more in revenues. This suggestion can be made to commerce ministry, copy to PMO.
Last edited by Deans on 23 Jul 2017 10:43, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 23 Jul 2017 10:43

Pratyush wrote:The map is upside down. Please fix it. I will delete this post when done.



Its on purpose to make one think. India projects into Indian Ocean,
Vice Admiral M.N> Roy (R) made this very point in US Naval Institute Proceedings in mid 1990s

I don;t understand the penchant of members to take offence very quickly as if they know everything,

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pratyush » 23 Jul 2017 11:02

It is about a lack of comprehension of what is intended to be conveyed. Not mearly because of out of outrage.

Now that it is clear what was intended to be conveyed. The genius of it is self evident.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Deans » 23 Jul 2017 11:15

Mort Walker wrote:
fanne wrote:Having said that, can someone give a little more primer, what are the fronts, men/division committed to that, logistic constraints etc. Please all from open sources.


Start by watching Shiv-ji's videos on YouTube. He lays it out pretty clear. From there we need to look at Chinese ORBAT and PLAAF divisions. The Chinese western theater has at its availability of roughly 7 PLAAF divisions consisting of at least 70-120 combat aircraft each. They don't have heavy lift air cargo, but do have a well established rail and road link into the Tibetan Plateau.


The authorised strength of a PLAAF regiment for most types of aircraft is 24 (excl trainers). 3 regiments make up a division. So its a max of
72 aircraft per division. Most of these are J7's. The PLAAF has a max of 288 modern J10/ 11 aircraft in the Western theatre. These will either have
to operate with a severe payload penalty operating from high altitude airstrips, or 1000+ km from a LAC at lower altitude bases outside Tibet.
There is inadequate air to air refueling capability.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ricky_v » 23 Jul 2017 11:16

This is not the right thread, but the china watch thread is locked .
https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-chinas-traditionalist-restoration/
In 1934, confronted with rising pro-communist sentiments in his country, Chiang Kai-shek, leader of China’s Nationalist Party, launched the neotraditionalist New Life Movement (新生活运动) as part of a comprehensive anti-communist program that sought to use traditional values as a counterweight against Bolshevik-inspired revolutionist ideas. Fast forward to today’s China and the head of China’s Communist Party is actively promoting a wave of neotraditionalism. Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the need to “advance and enrich outstanding traditional Chinese culture (中华优秀传统文化)” (CCP News, July 22, 2015).In addition to immediate political aims, Xi’s neotraditionalist policy is part of a long-term vision to remake Chinese culture and society by weaving together selected traditional values with contemporary national consciousness.
In politics neotraditionalism means “the deliberate revival and revamping of old cultures, practices, and institutions for use in new political contexts and strategies” (Encyclopedia Britannica). After assuming the presidency, Xi has repeatedly touted traditional Chinese culture to the public. Xi’s emphasis on culture mirrors the strategy of his fallen rival Bo Xilai, whose signature campaign as the party secretary of Chongqing was the neo-Maoist “Sing Red and Strike Black (唱红打黑),” a revival of Mao-era culture and the suppression of criminality. While comparable to Bo on the “strike black” front, Xi’s cultural policy is less about “singing red,” yet it appeals to a much broader base of Chinese conservatives rather than just the extreme Left.

While Xi has emulated Mao’s statecraft in many ways, his neotraditionalism deviates from the Maoist path (China Brief, March 6, 2015). In sharp contrast to the iconoclastic Mao, who viewed the “old society (旧社会)” with contempt, Xi declared traditional thought and culture the “soul (灵魂)” of the nation (Xinhua, August 8, 2016). “Outstanding traditional culture is a country and nation’s basis for continuation and development. Losing it is the same as severing a country and nation’s lifeline” (Phoenix News, September 5, 2016). Thus, “A country and nation’s power and prosperity must always be supported by a flourishing culture. The prosperous development of Chinese culture is the prerequisite to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Phoenix News, September 5, 2016).

Xi goes much further than his predecessor Hu Jintao, who also used Confucian rhetoric. Xi believes outstanding traditional culture is the “foundation” of the Party’s culture and “vital wellspring” of the Party’s set of socialist core values (社会主义核心价值观)—an astonishing statement that positioned traditional culture as the basis of the official code of behavior that governs all party members (Guangming Online, June 21; Qiushi, September 13, 2016). In a November 2016 speech to the country’s writers and artists, Xi urged them to “devote major efforts in propagating traditional culture…. Extract essence and draw energy from the treasure vault of Chinese culture…. [And] not to blaspheme ancestors” (Xinhua, November 30, 2016).

Xi’s analog to the “little red book,” titled Classical Aphorisms by Xi Jinping (习近平用典) was published in 2015. The preface, “Draw Power from Chinese Culture” trumpets Xi as a role model in learning and applying traditional ethics, and calls on the nation to build the present and future with those values in mind. Unusually for a book dedicated to speeches and writings of the Communist Party’s general secretary, the volume contains zero quotes from Marx and Mao. Instead, reading like an emperor’s handbook, it is divided into chapters on various aspects of governance filled with Xi’s favorite classical maxims.

Marxism and its various incarnations has lost all appeal with ordinary Chinese. The arcane language and concepts of Marxism were never popular with the public to begin with. Even during the heydays of socialism from 1949 to 1978, people were encouraged to read Mao’s vernacular essays rather than Marx or Lenin’s works. The Chinese additions to Marxism—Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the Scientific Development Concept—although still serving as guiding ideologies to the Party, spark minimal interest with the common people.

(Interestingly, the author of many of these ideologies is a close confidant of Eleven)

The breakdown of morality (道德) is an issue concerning many Chinese. According to a survey conducted by China Youth Daily, 89.3 percent of respondents believe there is “cultural deficiency” in present-day Chinese society, among which 45.7 percent think the “deficiency” is “very serious” (Guangming Online, March 7). A majority of Chinese feels that there is no moral constrain on the behavior of anyone. Even soft-spoken ex-Premier Wen Jiabao remarked: “the downward spiral of morality has reached a very serious point” (Sina News, April 18, 2011). While this “spiritual vacuum” has multiple origins, the yearning for restoration of traditional virtues is common. Research shows cultural conservatism (文化保守主义) is making a comeback. In response to the question “How would you evaluate the role of traditional Chinese culture in contemporary everyday life,” 28.9 percent of 2,976 survey participants chose “very important,” 47.4 percent “important,” and only 3.5 percent chose “unimportant.” [2] In an era of materialism and greed, many are searching for spiritual fulfillment (PRI, May 5).

As a conservative and an outspoken critic of decadence, Xi has a personal interest in curing China’s social ills by bringing back time-tested values (Xinhua, January 16, 2014). [3] Politically, however, Xi’s investment in the “spiritual market” repositioned himself as the defender of traditional China in a kulturkampf against corrosive social vices and foreign cultures—which almost one-in-three (28.9 percent) Chinese believe have “adversely affected traditional Chinese culture” (Guangming Online, March 7). Aligning himself as defender of traditional values fortifies his personality cult with more substance and appeal. This is a calculated move on part of Xi, as it enhances his popularity as a crusader for conservative aspirations, and diverts criticisms against the Party’s disastrous cultural policies in the past that are largely responsible for today’s spiritual crisis.

Xi Jinping’s China is witnessing the unfolding of a cultural revival campaign. Although state-driven cultural revival is a win with the mostly conservative Chinese, the Party-state’s leading position in the campaign means it has all the power to determine what is an “outstanding (优秀)” element of traditional culture. It is therefore very unlikely that China can truly achieve a cultural renaissance based on the principle of “let a hundred schools of thought contend (百家争鸣)”. Yet perhaps this campaign can open up forums for debate about culture in contemporary China—then the possibility is endless. In the coming months, expect more on the cultural front from China’s highest-ranking neotraditionalist.

More broadly it means that Eleven is looking to bolster his own political base, along with the Princelings support and hard core Xi'ists who are slated to come to power this congress. He is looking to move away from the turpan beholden to Hu Jintao and the now much diminished Shanghai Clique of Jiang Zemin.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Guddu » 23 Jul 2017 11:23

[quote="fanne"]http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-26-billion-people-go-war-india-vs-china-20875

"Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war."

Is it true that our ballistic missiles are only for nuclear missions?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 23 Jul 2017 11:47

ramana wrote:http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-th ... on-2510941
The Whimper of the Dragon: New Delhi's response has rattled Beijing into 1962 hysteria
China believed India wouldn't dare a face-off with it in Bhutan, a third country's territory. New Delhi's response has rattled Beijing into 1962 hysteria. But China must realise that India of 2017 — though still committed to peace and resolution of all disputes through dialogue — is radically different today
Tension between India and China had been building up over the past two years, with Beijing vetoing UN sanctions against JeM chief Masood Azhar, blocking New Delhi's entry into the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group, and aggressively pursuing its economic corridor that runs through PoK. Beijing kept fuming at New Delhi's public embrace of the Dalai Lama. India's military ties with the US and Japan also left China worried.
But a serious turn came on June 6, when a Chinese patrol demolished an Indian bunker at a rare tri-junction where the borders of India (Sikkim), China and Bhutan converge. Chinese troops entered the plateau — called Donglong by China, Doko-La by India and Doklam by Bhutan — to build a road in Bhutanese territory. The road would give China greater access to India's strategically vulnerable Siliguri corridor that links the seven north-eastern states to the Indian mainland. Bhutanese soldiers confronted Chinese counterparts and asked them to return. On June 20, Bhutan also registered a diplomatic protest.
Indian soldiers came down from Doko-La post in coordination with the Bhutan government. While the Bhutanese have gone out of the area, the Indian and Chinese armies have remained locked face-to-face, reinforcing troops and calling each other to back down. In 2012, India and China agreed that the tri-junction boundaries would be decided in consultation with the countries concerned. India has accused China of trying to violate the status quo through road-building. China has blamed India for intrusion into its territory.
Both countries have been unable to agree on their 3,500-km border, over which they went to war in 1962. On April 15, 2013, Chinese troops camped in Ladakh. Indian soldiers set up their own camp around 300 metres away. The stand-off continued till May 5. In September 2014, a similar face-off in Ladakh lasted 16 days. Again in March 2015, Chinese troops came to north of Ladakh twice in a week. But they were thwarted.
Why the current stand-off is different
It's the rhetoric from Beijing. Chinese ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui has said that India has to "unconditionally pull back troops" for peace to prevail. Chinese state media has reminded India of 1962, declaring that if India "stirs up conflicts it must face the consequences of all-out confrontation with China.
....

Gautam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 23 Jul 2017 12:02

ramana wrote:
Pratyush wrote:The map is upside down. Please fix it. I will delete this post when done.



Its on purpose to make one think. India projects into Indian Ocean,
Vice Admiral M.N> Roy (R) made this very point in US Naval Institute Proceedings in mid 1990s

I don;t understand the penchant of members to take offence very quickly as if they know everything,



We own every advantage against Cheen in this ocean today. But with time those advantages will be eroded as surely as the tide does to sand on beach.

Look at the state of our naval projects versus theirs. The IN might not get a third carrier in 15 years. The PLAN has a clearly charted path of 6 carriers, our Navy is begging quarterly to MoD for third. The situation gets worse with core surface ships like destroyers, frigates and corvettes. They've launched 13 Type 052Ds to our 4 P15A/Bs. Forget comparing the workhorse frigates and corvettes, those classes are launches in the 20's and 30's. Submarines, worst of all. They already have a 68 to 15 advantage with the world's largest nuke sub factory just built while where are we with P75i and Kalvari (the compromised Scorpene data)?

But none of that matters if we go to war right now. Because right now, the PLAN cannot put more than 14 ships into the Indian Ocean every two months. They would be annihilated piecemeal.

Waiting means chini bases in Djibouti and Gwardar being commissioned. It would mean Type 055s 12k tons DDGs and Type 002 CATOBAR carriers and new SSNs from that factory.

Why wait? Why give them time to build up? The chinis are giving us this opportunity to go Shiva the Destroyer on their arses. They have given us an excuse to put our foot up their collective rear.

If we dhoti shiver now when we every advantage on both land and sea then what would we do when they finally spill over from SCS and put real numbers into the IOR?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudraksh » 23 Jul 2017 12:53

fanne wrote:Chola sir, not convinced by 20:1 advantage. Thier land army is 2.5 times our in size. Not all high altitude acclimated, and not all against the Indian border, but they cannot be so less to give us 20:1 advantage. If anything, plaa has more men trained or can be aclimatized in few weeks giving them the advantage. Mountain warfare is different and with our mountain divisions and men we should score over plaaa plains army converted to fight in the mountains but their mountain divisions maybe as effective. In spite of your 20:1 advantage, I think if we dig deep enough ( hence my question to those who follow these kinds of stuff) the advantage could be 1:.7.
By its nature not big wars can be fought in these mountains and it is going to be slow with technology playing not that big an advantage. All these favor us. Moreover, Chinese can only win few more 1000 sq km, after that they have to step into Indian proper land where their supply lines will be heavily interdicted. Whereas we can win a million sq miles and logistically be in the same footing or better than the plaa. My take, given leadership and objective we cannot be taught a short lesson and long war is what China cannot win.
With tsp in the mix, jk is a possible play. Chinese gain nothing, tsp does, but I think we have decent advantage over tsp. We may or may not loose k but can severe sindh and Baluchistan (in case tsp army is concentrated in k, to overwhelm us they have to leave southern side unguarded). Tsp may gain k but would become a land locked country. Of course new clear detergent is not in play until now.


Chhota muh badi baat but PLAA is not as big as it is claimed to be. Ravi of Orbat fame had posted numbers a few years ago that compared divisional strength of PLA to IA and it appeared that Indian Army had more fighting men than the PLA. I'm trying to find those numbers and will post if I find them.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 23 Jul 2017 14:12

Military training must be made mandatory in schools and colleges with 2 year military service.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 23 Jul 2017 14:14

SwamyG wrote:If I am not mistaken, Harpreet is a BRFite. What I earlier said, Indian Ocean is called for nothing the Indian Ocean.

@CestMoiz
Those who think India needs merely to be a predominantly continental power & not a maritime one, think again!

Image


Always helps to look at things differently.

Kaplan in one of his talks inverted the map of China and its relation to the Indo-China Sea. We can see the scale of the problem facing China there.

Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 23 Jul 2017 14:20

Pratyush wrote:It is about a lack of comprehension of what is intended to be conveyed. Not mearly because of out of outrage.

Now that it is clear what was intended to be conveyed. The genius of it is self evident.


The idea was to help us think strategically. I read on BRF sometime back, the professionals look at geography. I paraphrase it but it was a wonderful statement. Anyone if they recall it, can you please post it?

Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby panduranghari » 23 Jul 2017 14:36

chola wrote:We own every advantage against Cheen in this ocean today. But with time those advantages will be eroded as surely as the tide does to sand on beach.


Sigh!

Demographics:
To repeat again, 2030 is the year when officially Chinese demographic decline gets set in stone. It becomes irreversible sans inward migration from foreigners. Even if the Chinese start reproducing like rabbit from today, it will be back to where they are today by 2037 the earliest. It essentially means they have to start running the fastest they can to stay where they are. If the get tired, they start falling back.

Debt:
China since 2009 has added more debt internally than the US did in 150 years. If you believe in mathematics, you will know the outcome is only one.

Deflation:
Chinese economy intricately linked to the amount of debt they create. If they do not create more debt, people do not enjoy the feeling of prosperity. CCP has promised by 2049 i.e. 100 years of CCP rule, the Chinese dream (based on the American dream) will be complete. If we understand the basis of the miracle of American dream, it becomes clear that debt has to grow even more from here on.

Too much dhoti shiver for no reason. Sometimes bidding time like Chinese have done is not a bad policy. It does not mean GOI become MMS or IK Gujral type GOI.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudraksh » 23 Jul 2017 14:42

Chola ji, if India does attack today and gives the Chinese a bloody nose. How does it negate all the doomsday scenarios you have mentioned? I don't think the GoI plans to conquer or break China. At most, we might give the Chinese a solid punch on the nose and get them into a chokehold. They squeal and we let them go. But will that stop China from adding huge military muscle (as you mentioned) in the next 15 years? And once they have it, they will be itching for revenge for 2017 like we have been itching for a revenge for 1962.

As much as I too want a solid nose breaking punch to the Chinese, we should remain calculated in our approach until & unless we have clear long term advantage over the Chinese. Right now, I don't see India catching up the Chinese military or economic engine in the next 20 years. If we do catch up to them by 2040, then we should play this game.

jmtc.
Rudraksh

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 23 Jul 2017 17:00

Tx Pandu and others for using calling the "Indo-China Sea" what it is! The "dagger" projecting into the IO ,has for long been dinner table discussion in at least one naval household of yore.Chinese intrusion/squatting in the IOR predicted 25 yrs ago, Pak allowing access to the Arabian Sea too,but the wholesale "sale" of Pak to China as is happening now unexpected. 3 decades ago,the IN never had enough moolah to leverage its unique geography. Funds were so scarce.It was the visionary Sov. Adm.Gorshkov who helped us a lot. Giving us missiles,missile boats,Rajput DDGs ,Kamovs,and Bear LRMP aircraft plus Kilo subs. He helped us achieve some of the dreams of our IN chiefs.sadly,we allowed our large advantage both in numbers and capability to lapse,doing B-all during the UPA's "lost decade-2".

The Latest IT has on the cover a Chinese "hen" and its Paki "chick".The total involvement planned by China for Pak is stunning.Pak has truly become a Chinese province. The Chinese empire has begun. Now to see that the empire "lives in interesting times".

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 23 Jul 2017 17:47

New Delhi didn’t draw lesson from 1962 border war
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1057632.shtml
By Long Xingchun Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/23 19:08:39

The border standoff between Chinese and Indian troops has lasted for more than five weeks. There are widespread worries that the standoff may escalate into an armed conflict.

China doesn't want a war. Many Indian media outlets and analysts put all the blame on China for the standoff and conclude that China had plotted to provoke the conflict in an attempt to divert attention from its internal problems. The reports even related the face-off to the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress to be held later this year. This bookish analysis reflects what little knowledge of China some Indian media and scholars have.

So far as I know, there are no more than 200 China experts in India, of which 10 percent, at most, can read or speak Chinese. Most of these experts study China based on publications from the US and Europe and a few English publications published by China, but sadly they believe that they have been well informed about China.

Indian reporters in China barely understand Chinese. Some of them even describe the neighbor as "Communist China," which feels like a term from 40 years ago. Regrettably, it is these people that shape India's understanding and judgment of China.

China does have many domestic problems, nonetheless they are no more serious than what's facing India internally. In fact, to prepare for the 19th Party Congress, China needs domestic harmony and a peaceful international environment rather than conflict, a point which may be hard for Indians to understand.

Some Indian experts I met insisted that the 1962 border war between the two countries was waged by China in a bid to divert attention away from its problems at home. I replied: Assume that's true, why did China choose India?

With the most countries along its border in the world, China has resolved its land boundary issues with all its neighbors except for India and Bhutan. Isn't this thought-provoking?

It serves China's national interests to prolong the peaceful period of strategic opportunity. Although Indian border troops crossed into the Chinese area of Doklam, the Chinese government has exercised restraint. Neither does India need a war, though its Chief of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat has claimed that the army is ready for "a two-and-a-half-front war" and some Indians consider their troops strong enough to defeat the Chinese army and wipe out their disgrace from the 1962 war.

India had an economy equal to China's in the early 1980s, but now its GDP and per capita income is just one fifth of China's. The reform and development in the past 20 years has laid a sound foundation for the Indian economy and it is embracing a period of rapid growth due to the reforms by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and a favorable international environment.

If India fights a large-scale war with China now, it will not only scare away foreign investment, but also disrupt India's economy. Even if a war is brief, China and India may still be locked in a standoff for a long time. In this case, India will have its economic momentum disrupted and lose its opportunities to rise.

That said, a war is not completely impossible. There are a great deal of precedents of unnecessary battles fought at the completely wrong time and place. So far, it is the prime goal of diplomats of both sides to prevent a war that neither wants. To this end, they must not bluff. The 1962 war, triggered as India operated the Forward Policy, has left Indians hostile toward China for decades. A larger war today may give rise to strong animosity between the two sides for centuries.

Even if the standoff is resolved diplomatically, it has already crippled the bilateral relationship. This will have a long-term impact on Sino-Indian ties.

The bright side is, the standoff has enabled the two governments to begin to know each other. If one insists the other is a strategic menace, it will lead to a self-fulfilling of prophecy and eventually confrontation. But there is also a silver lining if the two sides can dispel their misunderstandings through communication and take measures to enhance official and people-to-people exchanges, so as to improve bilateral ties.

The author is a research fellow at The Charhar Institute and director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 23 Jul 2017 17:50

India’s SCO membership threatens West China security
By Xiao Bin Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/23 19:03:39
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1057631.shtml

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 23 Jul 2017 17:54

India’s attitude may hinder Tibet’s B&R involvement
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1057630.shtml

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Cosmo_R » 23 Jul 2017 18:02

I hope this has not been posted before. I could not find it.

http://www.wsj.com/video/china-takes-ad ... 26BAD.html

Unable to Buy U.S. Military Drones, Allies Place Orders With China

"The U.S. has long refused to sell the most powerful U.S.-made drones to most countries, fearing they might fall into hostile hands, be used to suppress civil unrest or, in the Mideast, erode Israel’s military dominance. The U.K. is the only foreign country that has operated armed Predators and Reapers, the most potent U.S. systems for offensive drone strikes, according to people familiar with U.S. sales.

The Obama administration, while seeking to facilitate exports under close regulation, led efforts to forge a global “drone code” that would curb proliferation and keep the weapons from misuse.

But China is filling the void. State companies are selling aircraft resembling General Atomics’s Predator and Reaper drones at a fraction of the cost to U.S. allies and partners, and to other buyers.

.......


"The Pentagon estimates China could produce almost 42,000 aerial drones—sale value more than $10 billion—in the decade up to 2023.

Beijing’s drone program began with old Soviet designs; more recently, U.S. officials say, China used espionage and open-source material to reverse-engineer U.S. drones. Beijing denies that.

U.S. armed drones are still overwhelmingly considered the most capable, in part because the U.S. satellite infrastructure that controls them is superior. Israel has been the top military-drone exporter for years, according to SIPRI. But Israel has largely avoided selling them in its own Mideast neighborhood.

A Wing Loong, meanwhile, costs about $1 million compared with about $5 million for its U.S.-made counterpart, the Predator, and about $15 million for a Reaper, whose Chinese competition is the CH-5."

WSJ (Paywall)

https://www.wsj.com/articles/unable-to- ... 1500301716

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Yagnasri » 23 Jul 2017 18:04

http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 332496.ece

Chennai edition of Peoples Daily report. Seems Dragan is hoping that visit of the Pigeon will help them to get out of the mess they got themselves in.


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