Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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vasu raya
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 24 Jul 2017 23:46

Its often hinted here that the best way for a face saving exit for China is to capture another location along the LAC to allow for exchange at Doklam, a more aggressive version of that can be to keep India guessing where those location(s) could be, so it might have deployments stretching all along the LAC, bringing in the intimidation factor, indulge in few skirmishes but in reality make a move in the Ladakh/Siachen area, the Pakis do their bit and make an attempt to takeover Siachen from the western side, if that gambit succeeds India goes back to getting hyphenated with TSP and the Doklam H&D issue becomes inconsequential for them. Rest of the skirmish contact points do not give them as much bang for the buck. Any success India has along the LAC will only be recovering the already ceded land and given the self announced 10 day timer, they may hope to sustain only that long.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 24 Jul 2017 23:52

How are the Chinese going to move on Ladakh especially when IA is alert *all along the LAC*?

Do they suddenly pop out of beneath the ground? Or Does the IA vacate the Ladakh sector to enjoy the weather and eat dokla at Doka La?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 24 Jul 2017 23:56

nam wrote:The PLA might do a token mobilisation and carryout standoff missile and PGM attacks. If they do, we need to hammer every PLA units on the border with everything we have.

They can't fire missiles at Doka La with their soldiers in close proximity. Too risky. OTOH, they can fire a few round into the surrounding mountains just for the heck of it. Fine ...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 25 Jul 2017 00:02

yensoy wrote:Oh please do come to Kashmir. We don't take shelter under all sorts of niceties there ("no bullet has been fired in 30 years"), so you will get to enjoy first-hand the heat of 105mm shells and ATGMs. If you're lucky, you might also get to "embrace martyrdom" with your chelas.

Idiot "professor" using an illegal instrument of communication (gmail). And they don't see the irony in it.

Chinese mangos are unable to come to grip with reality now that the cocoon at they used to inhabit has suddenly ruptured, *middle kingdom* under heaven and all that ..

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 25 Jul 2017 00:14

pankajs wrote:
nam wrote:The PLA might do a token mobilisation and carryout standoff missile and PGM attacks. If they do, we need to hammer every PLA units on the border with everything we have.

They can't fire missiles at Doka La with their soldiers in close proximity. Too risky. OTOH, they can fire a few round into the surrounding mountains just for the heck of it. Fine ...


Apparently it is Dholam. Dhoklam plateau in up North.

Not on the front line troops, if they attack Dholam. The reserve/backup which are behind the front-line. The front-line troops would receive small arms and artillery.

They might choose to attack some other locations along the LAC on build up/storage areas. Even then the missile attacks are only effect on flat areas, not on reserve slopes where most of our deployments would be. They might attack comm links like bridges and train etc as part of "teaching lesson" and quickly call for ceasefire.

In terms of army action, because they cannot mobilise large divisions they might try to restrict the attacks to minimum number of points, which they can sustain and provide defence if required.

This is where I said earlier about making up CFV stories and attack any such staging areas, before the PLA attacks. If we prefer to hold off until PLA initiates action, then we need to go full hog and hammer every PLA unit on LAC for couple of days and then call for ceasefire, as PLA rushes in reserves to help the border units.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 25 Jul 2017 00:23

pankajs wrote:How are the Chinese going to move on Ladakh especially when IA is alert *all along the LAC*?

Do they suddenly pop out of beneath the ground? Or Does the IA vacate the Ladakh sector to enjoy the weather and eat dokla at Doka La?


do they stop just because you are alert? assume they are prepared for attrition and then LAC is a humongous line talk about stretching IA's defensive positions, if we are going on the offensive thats a different game, so far GoI isn't signaling those intentions
Last edited by vasu raya on 25 Jul 2017 00:25, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 25 Jul 2017 00:25

nam wrote:This is where I said earlier about making up CFV stories and attack any such staging areas, before the PLA attacks. If we prefer to hold off until PLA initiates action, then we need to go full hog and hammer every PLA unit on LAC for couple of days and then call for ceasefire, as PLA rushes in reserves to help the border units.
Couple of observations.

1. We would see *fresh* deployment way ahead of any major action. So chance of *large scale* surprise is minimal.
2. They can do some *limited* attack with missiles and we should be able to hammer the proportionally. We have the Brahmos deployed on the China border.

India does not want to / will not escalate. It is not in our interest to initiate an skirmish / local fight / full front fight / all out war.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 25 Jul 2017 00:31

vasu raya wrote:
pankajs wrote:How are the Chinese going to move on Ladakh especially when IA is alert *all along the LAC*?

Do they suddenly pop out of beneath the ground? Or Does the IA vacate the Ladakh sector to enjoy the weather and eat dokla at Doka La?


do they stop just because you are alert? assume they are prepared for attrition and then LAC is a humongous line talk about stretching IA's defensive positions, if we are going on the offensive thats a different game, so far GoI isn't signaling those intentions

Do they get a free pass because they are Chinese? Are they superhuman?

We are defensive and the Chinese will need 1:5/9 in the mountains for any success. Last I heard we are matched, perhaps better in strength on the LAC. The LAC is humongous for both or is it just for us *poor Indians*?

So how are the Chinese going to walk into Ladakh?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 25 Jul 2017 00:40

the LAC is where it is because we are defensively poised, they can beef up their side at any point on LAC to create feints, they need a takeaway at the end of this war, it could be Siachen since the Pakis and Chinese can converge while your own logistics are based on a air bridge

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 25 Jul 2017 00:41

pankajs wrote:
India does not want to / will not escalate. It is not in our interest to initiate an skirmish / local fight / full front fight / all out war.


It will be an escalation if PLA is left with units or reserves to fight . If they did not mobilise, then IA hammering every PLA units, means PLA has nothing left to fight with. To prevent this, they have to mobilise. If they do, then they can attack anywhere on the LAC.

Either ways it will be a full LAC fight. If we dont escalate, PLA gets away with fighting a localised war and gains on it's biggest weakness. Numbers!

If we live in constant fear that PLA can attack anywhere on LAC, why shouldn't this be applicable for PLA as well?

India could attack anywhere or whole of LAC.... so they better mobilise.. taking months.. :D

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 25 Jul 2017 00:52

vasu raya wrote:the LAC is where it is because we are defensively poised, they can beef up their side at any point on LAC to create feints, they need a takeaway at the end of this war, it could be Siachen since the Pakis and Chinese can converge while your own logistics are based on a air bridge

So India will sleep while they *beef* up their side of LAC at a particular point? Say at Ladakh/Siachen?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 25 Jul 2017 01:00

Of the 100 or so possible contact points on the LAC, the Chinese can choose say 10 and fight, however of these 10, they might really play in 1 or 2 points which they think they can win, even if you have advantage in the other 90 points will you go in and claim your territory? and if you do are you willing to take it say more than 50kms inland Tibet?

we wouldn't be doing it random either, we will plan to pursue some goals if we do at all and they will know that...

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 25 Jul 2017 01:10

vasu raya wrote:Of the 100 or so possible contact points on the LAC, the Chinese can choose say 10 and fight, however of these 10, they might really play in 1 or 2 points which they think they can win, even if you have advantage in the other 90 points will you go in and claim your territory? and if you do are you willing to take it say more than 50kms inland Tibet?

we wouldn't be doing it random either, we will plan to pursue some goals if we do at all and they will know that...

So China would win at 1 or 2 of the 10 choose points by just showing? The assumption build in is that they would be successful in holding back IA at the other 8-9 other contact points.

You realize that the *current* Chinese troop deployment is less than IA's and the offensive team needs 5-9 times the defensive team. So unless the Chinese are super humans this is just you fantasy. Please have it by all means.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 25 Jul 2017 01:16

what does a win mean to you at the other 8 points? holding the Chinese at the LAC or going on the offensive and claim territory?
Last edited by vasu raya on 25 Jul 2017 01:16, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 01:16

If I were Gen. Pee Lai, I would be facing some pressure from Politburo on why I failed to protect my road-building crews and allowed the loundeyes to creep up and block the road. Pickaxe and Mao coat beckon along with ticket on Cattle Car #1313 on the Gobi Le-Education Expless.

So I have 3 choices:
1) Use massive force to make loundeyes withdraw and resume road-building. Small problem: If loundeyes grew up eating lice like I did, they would have dynamited all bridges and put a few IEDs in the road by now.
2) Get Comlade Poo Lai to launch an attack somewhere else to grab territory to exchange for loundeye withdrawal. Yes, I know. Will have to kiss his stinking boots big-time, and make his idiot son my second-in-command.
3) Get Blothel-in-raw Poo Pee to do something nasty in some completely different sphere, like fund more Maoists, or give major grant to Alundhati Loy and Angana Chatteljee. Or put spontaneous combustion material inside the sleeper coaches of Sabalmati Expless to show rage. Maybe dynamite NH-1 in 20 places to isolate Siachen forces.

So problem for Loundeyes is 1) Make damn sure that road can't be rebuilt without major effort and at least 6 months.
2) Forget about simply stopping LAC incursions/feints: have a determined plan and prepare to grab major territory in Aksai Chin/ cut the OBOR/ finish off the Karakoram Hwy. IMO deal with incursions by aerial bombing/strafing.
3) Feint by seeming to go for a liberation of tee-bet.

Surely the Mullah Shivullah in his extensive pilgrimages north of the LAC has seen many places that should be permanently renamed? Think hundreds of square kilometers, not Strategic Points.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 25 Jul 2017 01:22

We don't have to go deep in Tibet, which is not our strong point, nor is it worth it...

We do a 62 on the Chinese. Our turn to "teach a lesson" and come back to our lines and say "we will defend our border"..

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Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Peregrine » 25 Jul 2017 01:26

‘India-Mongolia cooperation signals to Beijing that India can play the geopolitical game in China’s backyard’

Along with its land border dispute with India and sea boundary disputes with several other neighbouring countries in the South China Sea, China also has tensions with Mongolia. The recent election of China critic Khaltmaa Battulga as Mongolia’s new president has strategic implications and PM Narendra Modi has already reached out inviting him to India. J Mohan Malik, professor at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Honolulu spoke to Saibal Dasgupta on the changing nature of China-Mongolia relations, why it matters to India and the region’s changing security architecture:

What were the goals and benefits of the recent India-Mongolia military exercises? What economic moves is India making in the region?

India-Mongolia bilateral ties have been growing against the backdrop of Beijing’s growing influence and New Delhi’s efforts to find a balance. President Battulga’s victory provides an opportunity for strengthening bilateral ties which are now part of the broader spectrum of the Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry for the support of small and middle powers.

India-Mongolia relations have been on an upswing since PM Modi’s May 2015 visit. During this visit, India extended a credit line of $1 billion to Mongolia.

India and Mongolia have been cooperating in the security arena. A civil nuclear deal was concluded in 2009. The India-Mongolia Joint Working Group for defence cooperation meets annually and India contributes to training of Mongolian military officers. Both conduct joint military exercise called ‘Nomadic Elephant’. India is a regular participant in the multilateral exercise ‘Khan Quest’ in Mongolia.

Strategic counterbalance against China in Asia is part of PM Modi’s “Act East” policy. Faced with growing Chinese pressure, Mongols look to India as a new power to countervail Beijing. Stronger ties with India provide Ulan Bator with options that it would otherwise not have in its dealings with Beijing.

Following the 2016 blockade of Mongolia by China, Beijing took note of India’s $1 billion credit line to Mongolia. Significantly, Beijing termed it as a bribe while Mongolia’s request for help from India was described as politically hare-brained by the Chinese official media. Though neither side wants to provoke, India-Mongolia cooperation nonetheless signals to Beijing that as China expands its footprint in South Asia, India can play the geopolitical game in China’s backyard.

Has China been encouraged by Nepal’s move to get closer to it while distancing itself from India to pressurise other small countries like Bhutan and Mongolia?

For historical reasons, Mongols fear and loath the Chinese more than the Russians.

Therefore, irrespective of what Nepal or Bhutan may or may not do, Mongols will continue to hedge their bets.

Should Battulga follow through on his anti-China campaign rhetoric, Beijing will use all means at its disposal, blandishments and bluster to ensure Mongolia does not go too far.

Does China eye Mongolian territory as it does with another small neighbour Bhutan?

Mongolia has always been suspicious of its southern neighbour that Beijing would one day reclaim Mongolian territory. Beijing has not forgotten that the Qing dynasty ruled Mongolia until 1911. Whenever an opportunity has presented itself, the Chinese have tried to reassert their power and influence over Mongolia. Over the last two decades, this has been mainly through economic tools, i.e. investments in Mongolia’s mining sector and infrastructure development.

Now, the victory of a self-confessed Russophile and “China-wary” leader Battulga, the incoming president, who expressed concern over Mongolia’s trade dependence on China during the election campaign, must worry Beijing. He is likely to impose curbs on Chinese investments and exercise greater state control over the mining sector. In a 2014 interview, Battulga reportedly said that when his country runs out of resources, there will definitely be conflict between the Mongolians and the Chinese. Much to China’s chagrin, since the end of the Cold War, Mongolia has also pursued a ‘third neighbour policy’ – which includes India along with the US, Japan, Germany in order to diversify its trading partners.

Is China putting undue pressure on Mongolia?

By choice or by necessity, Sino-Mongol trade relations follow a pattern of Chinese domination. Whenever Mongolia is seen as taking actions contrary to Chinese interests, Beijing exercises its economic leverage and geographic proximity to punish Ulan Bator, as was done for inviting the Dalai Lama in 2016 by imposing a blockade on the supply of essential goods. It brought Mongolia to its knees and made the Mongols pay a heavy economic price for putting religious freedom over economic necessity.

Battulga wants Mongolia to diversify and reduce overwhelming dependence on China. Despite its natural resource wealth, mismanagement of the economy in recent years has led to deflation and a $5.5 billion IMF bailout package.

Cheers Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 01:31

Yeah, we dare to get our entire yak herds to step across the border to go #2.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 01:44

Armchair Jarnails! What is the area seen on Googal, north of Bhutan, that is marked by a dashed line? Is it Bhutanese territory already swallowed by dlagon? Eastern end of this region is Kula Kangri. Map actually says Dlagonistan is only north of this dashed line, but then why the dashed line on the south side of it? "Gejag Kangri" is inside the region. A peak, obviously in need of properly renaming.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 25 Jul 2017 02:48

Another day another vitriolic editorial from the safety of Beijing.

I think the Chinese are yellow.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ArjunPandit » 25 Jul 2017 04:59

sanjaykumar wrote:Another day another vitriolic editorial from the safety of Beijing.

I think the Chinese are yellow.

I am left wondering are they this stupid? After all their talks of being the next superpower, a strategic culture of (f)art of war. They have demonstrated that they've become truly yellow [Red(commie) + green(paki)=Yellow].

On the face of it they have lost
1. the element of surprise by making noises for so long, cartosart and IA etc will be pouring through the images of satellites and drones to see if they are moblizing
2. int'l support through their acts in Indo china sea and needling through NoKo, and so many other activities
3. their notional H&D through these (f)articles in global times and intransigence
4. their judgment of this Indian govt, esp after Surgical strikes and continous slamming of pakis on western border
5. the '62 humiliation/scare factor in the minds of common public too. As they say never engage the same enemy the same way for long. They have done it the same way for far too long.

The question is are they really that stupid? Would have been far better that they had kept quite and let poor us dhoti shiver rather than truly opening their mouth and expose their situation in front of entire world.

My hunch based on how things are going so far is that we will see this thing stretch into next year as well. They might do some incursions/fight here and there and return to pre Jun2016 status quo (after all, people are expendables and in no shortage for communist regimes) to save their little H&D.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 05:14

Maybe they read BC and BRF? :) After all, these are spewings of some professor here or some editor there. They even brought out a FORMER Consul-General to threaten to kill Indian soldiers. Or else, they may be busily digging a tunnel under Mt. Everest to invade Katmandu while GOI is focused on Bhutan chicken neck.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 25 Jul 2017 05:25

That was actually a triple pun.

Skin colour, journalism and cowardice.

Yellow in American can mean cowardly.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sum » 25 Jul 2017 05:42

India and Mongolia have been cooperating in the security arena. A civil nuclear deal was concluded in 2009. The India-Mongolia Joint Working Group for defence cooperation meets annually and India contributes to training of Mongolian military officers. Both conduct joint military exercise called ‘Nomadic Elephant’. India is a regular participant in the multilateral exercise ‘Khan Quest’ in Mongolia.

IIRC, we also have a intel agreement where NTRO gets to tap all traffic going through Mongolia ( which is mostly Chinese of course)

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 25 Jul 2017 06:08

UlanBatori wrote:Maybe they read BC and BRF? :) After all, these are spewings of some professor here or some editor there. They even brought out a FORMER Consul-General to threaten to kill Indian soldiers. Or else, they may be busily digging a tunnel under Mt. Everest to invade Katmandu while GOI is focused on Bhutan chicken neck.

I am certain that they take inputs from all Indian social media because that closed commie society probably think that everything said out in the open is "officially sanctioned" - so if we start a a thread on nuking China you will soon see the Chinese responding to that as if the GoI has said it.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ArjunPandit » 25 Jul 2017 06:45

UlanBatori wrote:Maybe they read BC and BRF? :) After all, these are spewings of some professor here or some editor there. They even brought out a FORMER Consul-General to threaten to kill Indian soldiers. Or else, they may be busily digging a tunnel under Mt. Everest to invade Katmandu while GOI is focused on Bhutan chicken neck.

1. I thought, they would be throwing with swarms of drones equipped with laser guns.
2. Their entire behavior till now is like of a school kid saying "hat ja warna maroonga, bahut maroonga....".
3. Nevertheless, what is BC?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 07:00

Actually I do dhoti-shiver that they will adopt a completely different response than what we might expect. Including that swarm of whatever. They have several times the number of aircraft, and maybe orders of magnitude more missiles than India does. It may be quite their intention to do a demonstration of their military prowess against India, kicking up a ruckus as provocation, in order to impress the others with whom they have disputes. So it may be worthwhile for them to pull forces from the standoffs in the Spratlys, on the NoKo border, Vietnam border and Siberian border, and throw a huge barrage against India. It is useful to remember that they have some few thousand tactical nuclear artillery shells on the Russian border.
I don't think (and never said) that they have laser guns. Yet. But they will, soon, since such things have been demonstrated and the blueprints must have reached Beijing by now. But right now, if they choose to launch 500 planes and a swarm of missiles against Indian north/northeast and J&K bases, it will be one-sided after the first few days. IOW, maybe this time they will do nothing to grab more territory. Just cause havoc.

P.S. BC is Brahma Chellaney. Most active Indian Strategic Mouth.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 07:06

if we start a a thread on nuking China you will soon see the Chinese responding to that as if the GoI has said it.

Hmmm! :idea:
I think the bigger story that seems to have been suppressed, is that Chinese nuclear weapons are very dangerously defective and unstable. After numerous instances of radioactive leakage and a few outright explosions along the Russo-China border near Ussuri River, the Chinese tactical nuclear (artillery) inventory is down to practically nothing. They are desperately trying to remove the fissile material before the stuff explodes due to poor workmanship. So I think Chinese forces in Tibet are highly vulnerable to Indian tactical nukes, and have no way to deter, much less retaliate. A few divisions of PLA and numerous squadrons of PLAF stand to get annihilated. It is a criminal shame, due entirely to corruption at the top of the Politburo. No names mentioned.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 25 Jul 2017 07:14

Note that Chinese H&D is under severe threat. US has 2 carrier groups off NoKo, and is nearly certain to do a decapitation strike on NoKo. Nothing much that PRC can do about that. Phillippines is saying book to Chinese island occupation. The "security zone" that PRC tried to establish, is being ignored. OBOR is a road going to nowhere, since the entire MidEast is boiling. Economy is shaky too. So a good morale-boosting Surgical Strike against Indian airbases and army bases, would be great for their economy.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SSridhar » 25 Jul 2017 07:23

ArjunPandit wrote:The question is are they really that stupid?


Even the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson gives such answers all the time.

Whether it is admission into NSG or Masood Azhar case or CPEC or claim over Arunachal Pradesh or Brahmaputra or oil exploration in Vietnamese waters or matters of Indo-China sea, the Chinese spokesman gives statements that are so funny & illogical that they can be turned against them easily. That is because their positions are so defenceless in these matters. If cornered, which has happened on a few occasions by Indian reporters, their replies become even hilarious and more illogical.

I remember that when questioned as to why China disputed India’s presence in oil exploration in Vietnamese EEZ while she herself was building dams and roads in disputed PoK, all that the Chinese FM spokesperson could say was that the latter was an economic activity!! They give the same answer when asked why a China which is so sensitive about sovereignty issues advises India to join CPEC through POK.

They would always take a morally 'superior' position, asking us 'to work with them to defuse tension' (after they would have incurred into Indian territory!) or ask us 'not to complicate matters further' (after they would have complicated matters enough). This is a manifestation of almost uninterrupted imperial arrogance of two millennia. They are not stupid; they are arrogant. That comes partly from history and partly from their sense of 'exalted' Confucian position in world order. That is pure 'tian xia'.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chanakyaa » 25 Jul 2017 07:36

UlanBatori wrote:Note that Chinese H&D is under severe threat. US has 2 carrier groups off NoKo, and is nearly certain to do a decapitation strike on NoKo. Nothing much that PRC can do about that. Phillippines is saying book to Chinese island occupation. The "security zone" that PRC tried to establish, is being ignored. OBOR is a road going to nowhere, since the entire MidEast is boiling. Economy is shaky too. So a good morale-boosting Surgical Strike against Indian airbases and army bases, would be great for their economy.

I'm sure smart people can talk some sense into Chinese (or Pakis for that matter) and convince them against any adventures. But, in general, when I think about how our response should be reminds me of a quote often attributed to YooS defense sec.

"Mag Dog" Mattis: "I come in peace. I didn’t bring artillery. But I’m pleading with you, with tears in my eyes: If you fccuuk with me, I’ll kill you all."

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 25 Jul 2017 07:52

Doklam: Keeping the Powder Dry!

A very comprehensive article on what the Indian military and political leadership needs to do to really prepare for a wide scale war by:

Gen JS Bajwa
Editor Indian Defence Review and former Chief of Staff, Eastern Command and Director General Infantry. He has authored two books
Modernisation of the People's Liberation Army and
Modernisation of the Chinese PLA


And given his background his views specially regarding what military preparations are needed is thought provoking.

It will be naïve to assume that China would have commenced the road construction activity from south of Yatung in the Chumbi Valley up towards the Doklam Plateau, an area where similar standoff had take place earlier too, without adequate back up forces in the rears areas to be able to effectively respond in case of a flare up. Therefore, India must take it for granted that those units and forces which were inducted into TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region) this summer for regular training and live fire exercises were actually inducted with the aim of being prepared and ready to react to such a contingency that has come to pass. It thus becomes so obvious that China had planned this action in Doklam in 2016 to be executed in 2017.


The recent case of the Chinese Ambassador meeting various opposition politicians shows our inherent ‘strategic immaturity’. While it may be a normal practice for Ambassadors to meet politicians of all hues, in this particular circumstance, the Ambassador was subtly gauging the nation’s political solidarity to give a feedback to his Government. Had these politicians refrained from meeting the Ambassador in view of the Doklam standoff, China would have got a very different message about India’s resolve and support to the government by all political parties. This was not to be due to the limited political vision.


Reverting back to the issue of ‘hard-power’ preparations – the R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing) and NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation), it can be expected, would have geared up their resources for more specific surveillance of the whole of TAR especially the three main road highways entering Tibet, the railway line from Golmud to Lhasa, the airports and movement south across the bridges on the Tsang Po.
Alongside, NIA (National Intelligence Agency), IB (Intelligence Bureau), and State SIB’s (Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau) would have spread their tentacles to counter any threats being fostered internally. It is also expected that CERT-In (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) and military cyber units under DIA have also been placed on round the clock alert and optimally prepared for a likely crippling offensive CNO (Cyber Network Operation) that China can unleash on India. This may seem unnecessarily hawkish to the peacenik conformists, but India can ill afford to rely on some unrealistic, intuitive advice like that of the IB Chief Mullick overlooking the ground realities of the events leading up to the 1962 war. It is a truism that in being prepared for war a nation will prevent a war.


Dwelling on how China will initiate and launch the initial phases of its war is being kept out of this article. Suffice to say that the country and armed forces must be prepared for a heavy dose of civil and military CNO followed by or along with a concentrated assault with conventional missiles in a phase that may be termed ‘non-contact’ war. [This is one area which IMO is the biggest unknown i.e. how will India and it's people respond to a large scale conventional missile attack numbering say 1000-1500 missiles against both military and civilian targets. China will do this to avoid getting into a large scale ground war using it's stand-off conventional missile superiority to evoke "shock & awe" and to ensure that public response to civilian destruction deters India from further action] The book on “Unrestricted Warfare” will give insight into his aspirations, which may not be practical in many cases, but needs to be factored in.


The Army across the entire Northern border should have, by now, reinforced their forward posts. The personnel on the posts should have carried out live firing of the personal weapons and crew served support weapons at the local adhoc firing ranges in the vicinity of their posts. They will be carrying out regular patrolling and laying ambushes in the gaps between the posts. Anti-personnel mines would have been moved up and prepared for the eventuality of these being laid. Supporting Artillery would have prepared their various types of gun positions and their Observation Post Officers carried out a check registration of Defensive Fire targets by the method of ‘silent ranging’.


Signal communications would be laid with duplicate and triplicate communication alternatives. All communications would have been strictly routed only through fixed line or OFC (Optical Fibre Cable). Logistic preparations for sustained operations built up even if it means depleting reserves held with the military theatres along the western border. At the ‘operational level’ plans for counter-offensive and riposte would be worked out, forces warned and loose ends tied up. At the strategic level, dual tasked forces would have been warned for mobilisation. The Mountain Strike Corps would be honing its contingency plans and preparing accordingly. Similarly adequate orders would have been given to the Strategic Forces Command. Also one can assume that the triad would be in place.


The Air Force would be coordinating with the Army for its requirement of strategic air-lift, C 130J for SOF operations and intra theatre relocation of forces and wherewithal.........

The Air Headquarters would be revising the list of strategic targets it will engage when given the word ‘go’. The special weapons it will utilise for these missions would be accordingly prepared. The Air Force would be monitoring the build up of air resources on the air fields in TAR and forward relocation of radars, surface to air missile units and detachments and anti-aircraft artillery. The Air Force would be maintaining round the clock strategic surveillance through the dedicated military spy satellite and its SU 30MKI’s. [China has already demonstrated an ASAT capacity sometime ago. I would not be surprised by a Chinese ASAT attack to try and knock out Indian military satellites to further shock & awe] The active operational airfields would have got their compliment of Army Air Defence units for close protection. PGM’s would have been relocated to the air fields that are planned to be activated.


The Navy has an onerous task to protect the vast coast line. The vulnerability of Andaman and Nicobar Island to clandestine occupation by even a small Chinese force will be high on their agenda. They will carry out sea denial operations and through extensive missions of P-8I’s Poseidon Long Range Patrol aircraft monitor Chinese PLAN submarines prowling in the Bay of Bengal in particular. The Navy would be required to dominate the 200 km wide Nine Degree Channel in the Lakshadweep, 150 km wide Ten Degree Channel in the Andaman’s and the exit of the Malacca Straits.


According to the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for – Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation. Further, according to the Homepage of the MoD web site, it is stated that – “The responsibility for national defence rests with the Cabinet”.


To ensure a coordinated effort by the country in such a crisis – the Military Operations (MO) Directorate should be constituted as the sole source of orders for execution of armed actions. The Chairman COSC (Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee) also should be operating through the MO Directorate (till such time India has a fully functional War Room and Chief of Defence Staff is appointed). To deal with the current situation in Doklam, all the internal and external intelligence civil and military agencies should be meeting daily to take stock of the situation. The Cabinet Committee on Security should be meeting at least once a week.


It will be evident from the foregoing, that preparing for war is a whole lot more serious than making statements in the media. If India is not undertaking these measures already, as elaborated above, then statements of being ready for ‘two and a half front war’ is utter balderdash.

NRao
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby NRao » 25 Jul 2017 08:14

^^^^^

All that is per specs - in triplicate.

I very much doubt things will evolve in that way. That is too scripted.

BUT, good to know for sure.

ldev
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 25 Jul 2017 08:21

NRao wrote:^^^^^

All that is per specs - in triplicate.

I very much doubt things will evolve in that way. That is too scripted.

BUT, good to know for sure.


Maybe, but I feel that China will do it's utmost via shock & awe to deter a large scale ground conflict for which they are not geared given their long supply lines. And to do that they will launch a large scale attack via conventional ballistic missiles and cruise missiles such as the CJ-10, definitely an intense simultaneous cyber attack and an attempt, whether successful or not to knock out Indian military satellites. All designed to stop India in it's track from pursuing further hostilities. And India has to be able to respond to such a scenario effectively.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pulikeshi » 25 Jul 2017 08:27

Guys - if you were China here is the Hobson's choice - India is on its way!

  1. The standoff goes on forever: China looks like a wuss...
  2. The standoff is ended with China giving India a bloody nose: A defeated but vengeful India now has options to open Tibet, unilaterally attack and occupy PoK, become a formal US ally, etc. etc. all really downers if you were China...
  3. The standoff is ended with India giving China a bloody nose: A new balance of power equation in Asia, actually this is not a good strategic option for India... better to have CHIPAK for another 10 yrs to get the world moving in the direction of India :mrgreen:

Even a semi-sub-continental Chola Empire gave the Chinese a run for their money... what real options do the Chinese have?
The Chinese are screwed either way - so then ask yourself why are they so shrill?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Guddu » 25 Jul 2017 08:34

Most of the discussion on brf has been about land invasion across LAC. What are our capabilities re: counter ing a missile salvo.

ldev
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 25 Jul 2017 08:35

Pulikeshi wrote: so then ask yourself why are they so shrill?


Because, assuming my scenario of a Chinese effort for shock & awe via a large scale missile attack does happen and does cause destruction in Indian cities (much more than hardened Indian military targets) and if India holds on to it's nerves through this initial barrage, then that opens up options for India such as blocking the Malacca straits which will in a few weeks shut down China's economic engine and cause a revolt against the CPC or a large scale Indian invasion into Tibet which will also cause a factional fight within the CPC and an overthrow of Xi Jinping. Short of going nuclear, the present Chinese leadership will be screwed. And so the shrill warnings are to try and back India down without a fight.

It is possible that large scale civilian and infrastructure destruction and consequent dislocation of basic services will cause the Indian public to rise against the Indian Government to stop the war. On the other hand, it is possible that public resolve will be strong and will back GOI into a continuation of the war. If that happens, then the CPC is in trouble. Nobody can predict in advance how public opinion will turn out and it's a gamble China IMO does not want to take unless it has to.
Last edited by ldev on 25 Jul 2017 08:54, edited 1 time in total.

ldev
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 25 Jul 2017 08:36

Guddu wrote:Most of the discussion on brf has been about land invasion across LAC. What are our capabilities re: counter ing a missile salvo.


Military targets especially IAF bases are protected, Indian cities and towns and the civilian infrastructure such as power plants, phone exchanges not at all. And so the Chinese effort to shape Indian public opinion against a continuation of the war via ballistic/cruise missile targeting of civilian infrastructure. Imagine no power, no phones in cities, at least in north India, maybe also in the South if some Chinese submarines manage to launch cruise missiles from the Indian Ocean into South India.

Also that article I posted above indicates that the IAF via military satellites and SU-30s will be monitoring the build up of resources in the Tibet region. However the standoff ranges of Chinese missiles, both ballistic and cruise missiles, targeting India will be more than 1000 kms. As such for any warning of attacks via missile salvos, India has to check on the movement of Chinese missile regiments located as much as 1000 kms from India's borders.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby yensoy » 25 Jul 2017 09:14

UlanBatori wrote:... It may be quite their intention to do a demonstration of their military prowess against India, kicking up a ruckus as provocation, in order to impress the others with whom they have disputes. So it may be worthwhile for them to pull forces from the standoffs in the Spratlys, on the NoKo border, Vietnam border and Siberian border, and throw a huge barrage against India...


Never try to "demonstrate your military prowess" against a neighbour squarely and evenly pitted against you. If they do then it's folly of the highest degree. Does the US declare war directly on Russia, or China, or Saudi? No, they pummel relatively minuscule states to show who's boss.

Somebody in Zhongnanhai made a bad choice. Some other entrenched interests are egging that person on, even when we have facilitated a very reasonable face saving back-down for them.

At this point they are holding on to a tiny sliver of territory that "could be used" to sever the North-East, and are willing to go for an all-out war for that. Isn't it ironic that we are talking about a much larger scope of war than the actual damage here which is Doka La control that can potentially give them an arguably superior way to cut the chickens neck? Panda military calculus has gone all wrong.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudradev » 25 Jul 2017 09:16

ldev wrote:

It is possible that large scale civilian and infrastructure destruction and consequent dislocation of basic services will cause the Indian public to rise against the Indian Government to stop the war. On the other hand, it is possible that public resolve will be strong and will back GOI into a continuation of the war. If that happens, then the CPC is in trouble. Nobody can predict in advance how public opinion will turn out and it's a gamble China IMO does not want to take unless it has to.


Nope. I predict, here and now and with absolute certainty... once hostilities begin the Indian public will back the GOI whatever happens. They did in '48 and '62 when the peril was so much greater, scarcity so much more widespread, and the fabric of nationhood still in its infancy. No amount of missile blitzing or cyber warfare will change that... it didn't dispirit the Iraqis or Afghans facing a far greater power differential than we would.

That's not to say there won't be 5th columnists. Even in '62 we had Mani Shankar Aiyar (then a Communist) denouncing India and publicly backing Mao. But let's remember, war brings a state of Emergency. There might be opportunities to move against internal traitors in ways the constitution prohibits during ordinary times... and with huge public support.

The great rebuilding that would have to come afterwards may also provide an opportunity to inspire a fervent sense of national mission that often loses out to indifference in comfortable times.
Last edited by Rudradev on 25 Jul 2017 09:19, edited 1 time in total.


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