Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby yensoy » 04 Aug 2017 21:38

Singha wrote:>> Actually we should absolutely continue to import below-manufacturing-cost type of items like those related to nonconventional power generation. This is a productive use of our money.

how will domestic industry develop in such strategic sectors then?


What domestic industry in solar cells? Buy the wafers, cut and package them? Not much value add, since anyway you are importing the wafers from China.

We do have a decent wind industry, maybe this is more worth protecting.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 04 Aug 2017 21:46

UlanBatori wrote:(Yawn).

Ramana, lock the thread. Ain't nuthin happening. Chinese are just following the advice of Confucius' Three Sounds of China:
F**t, Lie, Whine

Batoriji I have already sounded the battle drums, you can't close the thread. I am decked for war and my axe raring for Han blood

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prem » 04 Aug 2017 21:52

rajpa wrote:
sudhan wrote:@ Rajpa ji
Let me help you out here..
"Shaking a mountain is easy, Shaking the PLA is hard"
The PLA speechwriters can make quite a name for themselves writing Punchlines for movies..

Indeed, their fabled response may very well be on the western border, near the ramparts of Bollywood.


PLA= Puking Lizard Assholeatoeliosis

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 04 Aug 2017 21:57

I suggest an expedition to Askai Hind and up into Uttara Dharmasala as Parasu-Iyersan. Start early, time's a-wasting.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudradev » 04 Aug 2017 21:59

rsingh wrote:This is how it is done. Even the smallest details are exploited to get psychological advantage over adversaries. Compare this to conclusion of great strategists here who are shivering in dhotis.


Right. No use doing red-team exercises to anticipate what course of action the Chinese might take, or how it could be prevented/responded to/ turned to our advantage. That is == "dhoti shivering".

Better to sit behind a computer far away, talk big, and pretend that this war can be won Jeetendra ishtyle (by other people doing the actual fighting, of course).

छोटी मुँह बड़ी बात

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 04 Aug 2017 22:15

China May Undertake Military Operation to Expel Indian Troops, Says Media Report
Two Chinese ministries - the defence and the foreign - and four other institutions released statements and commentaries on the Doklam standoff that entered its 50th day on Friday.
http://www.news18.com/news/india/china- ... 83175.html

New Delhi: The Chinese media ratcheted up their rhetoric on Friday on the current standoff with India over the Doklam issue, saying China may undertake "a small-scale military operation to expel Indian troops within two weeks."

Two Chinese ministries - the defence and the foreign - and four other institutions released statements and commentaries on a standoff that entered its 50th day on Friday.

"The series of remarks from the Chinese side within a 24-hour period sends a signal to India that there is no way China will tolerate the Indian troops' incursion into Chinese territory for too long. If India refuses to withdraw, China may conduct a small-scale military operation within two weeks," state-owned Global Times quoted Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, as saying.

Hu, however, added that China will inform India's foreign ministry before undertaking any such operation.

China has repeatedly exhorted India to pull back the "trespassing troops" back to Indian side of the boundary and address the matter in a proper manner to restore peace in the region, a defence ministry spokesperson said in a statement.

China Central Television (CCTV) on Friday reported that Tibet military region conducted live fire exercises in recent days in Tibet.

"The exercises are a sign that China could use military means to end the standoff and the chances of doing so are increasing as the Indian side is still saying one thing and doing another," Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times.

Zhao warned India that the patience of China was withering away, and it doesn't want the ongoing faceoff to cast any influence on the forthcoming BRICS Summit.

Chinese media's aggression came a day after External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said that war was not a solution, wisdom was to resolve the issue diplomatically. Swaraj had noted that "military readiness is always there as the military is meant to fight wars".

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 04 Aug 2017 22:17

Har har Mahadev!!! Destination Aksai hind then Lhasa

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 04 Aug 2017 22:27

I must say I always thought the Chinese were a dignified, circumspect race.

They really do set the metric for tiresome bombast. This ridiculous verbiage was stale in Korea, propaganda to be effective needs to meet some rules. The first is try not to be comical. The Chinese sound like a parody of themselves.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Ashokk » 04 Aug 2017 22:29

Singha wrote:some 58 telecom fraud suspects brought back from indonesia

The chinese want to do everything in a shaqinaw manner but end up looking stupid like this
Image
or this :mrgreen:
Image
Ducking for cover before the bradmins arrive with Hellfires :P
Last edited by Ashokk on 05 Aug 2017 00:52, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby schinnas » 04 Aug 2017 22:51

Thanks, Iyersan, for posting Jayadeva Ranade's article in full. It was a great read. This is the first Indian commentary available to mango Indians that is very comprehensive, detailed and precise in its analysis.

Based on what i have read so far through BRF and otherwise, I conclude the following:

1. The highest decision making bodies in China (both CCP and PLA) have decided to take a very strong line and portray this as an issue of invasion / intrusion into sovereign Chinese territory and not a confrontation of a disputed border area.

2. Many highly placed leaders with vested interests (from Xi to military commanders of Western theatre) have staked their reputation on this line and they cannot back down.

3. The fact that Gobar Times articles appearing after a day or two repeated the lines used by Chinese diplomats briefings to Indian counterparts earlier in private meetings, indicate that not only Gobar times was given a free hand to use provocative languge, but also the line to be taken has been clearly spelt out to the 't' and needs to be taken as reflecting of Cheeni view point but in rather uncouth language and with a degree of deniability should that be needed later for whatever reason.

3. There is a clear understanding that it is nearly impossible to wage any war, limited or otherwise, after September due to weather conditions in the area.

4. Some Chinese are making a clear distinction between other areas of the border where boundary is considered disputed and mechanisms exist to resolve tension vs Dolam plateau which China has taken a public stand as sovereign chinese territory that has been occupied by India. This makes it likely that China will do their best to take back this area if they can or at least remove Indian soldiers from that area if they could. At the same time, chinese are op

5. Some Chinese commentators had earlier mocked Indian analysts who pointed to numerical superiority of Indian army in the region citing their capability for rapid deployment and long range rocket forces and substantial MIC that can churn out necessary equipment and ammunition to scale up / prolong the conflict which India may not have to the same degree.

6. Chinese are not interested in full scale war and also are likely to not open up the conflict to multiple areas if it can be avoided.

With these observations, the chances of Chinese initiating a limited assault in August or early September is very high. PLA knowing their tactical limitations with India occupying higher ground, are likely to resort to long range, sustained rocket fire (and artillery if they have place to mount guns at vantage points) on Dolam plateau with the intention of removing Indian presence and not allowing Indians to re-take the territory. Post September, they expect that winter will anyway prevent India from moving in and they can declare victory and occupy it again in early Spring.

Remember, Chinese think they would win if they make Indians move out and not occupy it back successfully. They don't need to or may not even try to occupy the place (where they would get bombarded) to declare victory.

Indian army needs to be very very guarded in terms of protecting men and material on the plateau and its reserve forces camping nearby. In general, in mountain regions, army camps are situated in areas protected by peaks and large rock formations. Accurate cruise missiles are a danger, especially those with vertical descent capabilities. Less accurate but area saturation rockets are a big concern as well.

Our intelligence needs to have 24x7 lookout for any rocket and missile force movement or activation in an area about 100 kms radius from Dolam.

BRFites - what rockets are chinese likely to deploy in the area in the event of a limited conflict.
Last edited by schinnas on 04 Aug 2017 22:57, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Chinmayanand » 04 Aug 2017 22:52


Iyersan
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 04 Aug 2017 22:58

schinnas wrote:Thanks, Iyersan, for posting Jayadeva Ranade's article in full. It was a great read. This is the first Indian commentary available to mango Indians that is very comprehensive, detailed and precise in its analysis.

Based on what i have read so far through BRF and otherwise, I conclude the following:

1. The highest decision making bodies in China (both CCP and PLA) have decided to take a very strong line and portray this as an issue of invasion / intrusion into sovereign Chinese territory and not a confrontation of a disputed border area.

2. Many highly placed leaders with vested interests (from Xi to military commanders of Western theatre) have staked their reputation on this line and they cannot back down.

3. The fact that Gobar Times articles appearing after a day or two repeated the lines used by Chinese diplomats briefings to Indian counterparts earlier in private meetings, indicate that not only Gobar times was given a free hand to use provocative languge, but also the line to be taken has been clearly spelt out to the 't' and needs to be taken as reflecting of Cheeni view point but in rather uncouth language and with a degree of deniability should that be needed later for whatever reason.

3. There is a clear understanding that it is nearly impossible to wage any war, limited or otherwise, after September due to weather conditions in the area.

4. Some Chinese are making a clear distinction between other areas of the border where boundary is considered disputed and mechanisms exist to resolve tension vs Dolam plateau which China has taken a public stand as sovereign chinese territory that has been occupied by India. This makes it likely that China will do their best to take back this area if they can or at least remove Indian soldiers from that area if they could. At the same time, chinese are op

5. Some Chinese commentators had earlier mocked Indian analysts who pointed to numerical superiority of Indian army in the region citing their capability for rapid deployment and long range rocket forces and substantial MIC that can churn out necessary equipment and ammunition to scale up / prolong the conflict which India may not have to the same degree.

6. Chinese are not interested in full scale war and also are likely to not open up the conflict to multiple areas if it can be avoided.

With these observations, the chances of Chinese initiating a limited assault in August or early September is very high. PLA knowing their tactical limitations with India occupying higher ground, are likely to resort to long range, sustained rocket fire (and artillery if they have place to mount guns at vantage points) on Dolam plateau with the intention of removing Indian presence and not allowing Indians to re-take the territory. Post September, winter will anyway prevent anyone from moving in.

Remember, Chinese think they would win if they make Indians move out and not occupy it back successfully. They don't need to or may not even try to occupy the place (where they would get bombarded) to declare victory.

Indian army needs to be very very guarded in terms of protecting men and material on the plateau and its reserve forces camping nearby. In general, in mountain regions, army camps are situated in areas protected by peaks and large rock formations. Accurate cruise missiles are a danger, especially those with vertical descent capabilities. Less accurate but area saturation rockets are a big concern as well.

Our intelligence needs to have 24x7 lookout for any rocket and missile force movement or activation in an area about 100 kms radius from Dolam.

BRFites - what rockets are chinese likely to deploy in the area in the event of a limited conflict.


Schinnasji Chinese have already stated that they will attack in 2 weeks and Indian foreign ministry will be informed. I say like Sir Desai said..... There will be war....A full scale war and I will reap the Han souls with my axe

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ricky_v » 04 Aug 2017 23:02

vijaykarthik wrote:Nope. Wang Quishan might get re-elected. And Xi can get into trouble because of that. We (me and a few of my mates) have been following that closely and it is perhaps likely that Wang Quishan can also get more powers (he has a plum post already).

There are two ways of looking at it: If Xi wins this round, the knifes, though shielded, will be out and waiting for the opportune moment. All it takes is some long period of restive populace, unrest, setbacks in limited wars etc and he could be hounded out. Alternately, Xi can consolidate his power even more as the days go by.


Quishan is 69,and by convention should be replaced. This rule can be ignored by eleven off course if he wants a third term in 2023 but why would he do that if the anti corruption chief is on his case now? Also in a super populated country where only a handful are installed in the inner sanctum, blocking a seat for a period of 5 years after your allocated time is up, is a giant f***U to others and to the oiled institution.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 04 Aug 2017 23:11

Troops withdrawn to chai-kada
Last edited by UlanBatori on 04 Aug 2017 23:16, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Singha » 04 Aug 2017 23:12

Since the frontal contact is two lines of troops 2 meters apart any attack will have to be on the batallions now camped nearby but deeper within indian line

Unless they withdraw or kill their own troops the exact area of confrontation cannot be shelled

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 04 Aug 2017 23:12

Got the point won't repeat it

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RamSuresh » 04 Aug 2017 23:19

schinnas wrote:
With these observations, the chances of Chinese initiating a limited assault in August or early September is very high. PLA knowing their tactical limitations with India occupying higher ground, are likely to resort to long range, sustained rocket fire (and artillery if they have place to mount guns at vantage points) on Dolam plateau with the intention of removing Indian presence and not allowing Indians to re-take the territory. Post September, they expect that winter will anyway prevent India from moving in and they can declare victory and occupy it again in early Spring.



Since there are about 200 or 300 chinese guards nearby, will their retreat precede the assault and will it be the first sign of impending chinese attack? If India also withdraws troops simultaneously behind the ridge, would it portray that Chinese have acceded to the original Indian demand for simultaneous withdrawal? What is the retaliation option India has even if it is in the limited region of assault and how will China try to portray Indian retaliation? What happens if India decides to go up north on the road that chinese have built so far?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 04 Aug 2017 23:24

They might not attack on doklam. They will open all the front from Aksai chin to Arunachal... is doklam an isolated incident or a part of a bigger game in Indo china sea?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby schinnas » 04 Aug 2017 23:32

Singha wrote:Unless they withdraw or kill their own troops the exact area of confrontation cannot be shelled


Per reports, the Chinese recently have reduced their troop levels who are involved in eyeball to eyeball confrontation to just 40.. compared to Indian strength of close to 200.

This, along with the incorrect Chinese claim that Indians have reduced their troops strength to 40 was widely considered as Cheena signaling for face saving formula for mutual retreat.

It could also be a prelude to a sudden rocket / missile attack. We need to be very very prepared 24x7.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby rsingh » 04 Aug 2017 23:34

Rudradev wrote:
rsingh wrote:This is how it is done. Even the smallest details are exploited to get psychological advantage over adversaries. Compare this to conclusion of great strategists here who are shivering in dhotis.


Right. No use doing red-team exercises to anticipate what course of action the Chinese might take, or how it could be prevented/responded to/ turned to our advantage. That is == "dhoti shivering".

Better to sit behind a computer far away, talk big, and pretend that this war can be won Jeetendra ishtyle (by other people doing the actual fighting, of course).

छोटी मुँह बड़ी बात


Abe when an army is taking care of small things, it is obvious that they have taken care of tactics and strategy. No wonder....... Ok mein kuch nahi bolunga. Salam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 04 Aug 2017 23:38

schinnasji, I have an opposite view from reading all the stuff, but far more from the famed InDepth Analysis of UBC about our bloated neighbor.
1. The incident was the result of a very local commander's initiative, without authorization.
2. Initial armed brushoff of Bhutanese traffic police was a blunder.
3. Indian sensitivity about Chicken'sNeck was conveyed strongly and entirely missed by Top until too late.
4. Indian decision to act rather than send Strong Protest Note, came as a shock to locals.

OK, given the above, they reacted like the ill-brought-up brats that they are. Loss of Face far outweighs common sense. They reasoned that getting India out of there by threat is the best bet. Again, this is largely mid-level Beijing Brats. Eleven stays aloof and watches.

As time goes on, the Brats are facing reality. Seen this happen too many times with these BB. They have no sense to de-escalate.

But ultimately, decision to go to war is with Eleven, and will involve more careful assessment of cost.

So I say that all-out citizen boycott to ramp up the costs, is the best response, while the military prepares to launch a riposte through Indus and Akshay Hind. Unfortunately there is no such thing as Iyersan's Limited Jhapad possible. If they attack, defense is a stupid option. Massive 3-pronged invasion cutting off entire Han force in Uttar Dharmasala (UD) is the best bet, as extreme as the immediate cost will be to India in the short term. Extend the LAC to the northern/eastern borders of UD.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby schinnas » 04 Aug 2017 23:44

RamSuresh wrote:
Since there are about 200 or 300 chinese guards nearby, will their retreat precede the assault and will it be the first sign of impending chinese attack? If India also withdraws troops simultaneously behind the ridge, would it portray that Chinese have acceded to the original Indian demand for simultaneous withdrawal? What is the retaliation option India has even if it is in the limited region of assault and how will China try to portray Indian retaliation? What happens if India decides to go up north on the road that chinese have built so far?


Good point. Recent reports are that China has reduced its troops engaged in arms length confrontation to just 40 in the past 48 hours. You are right that if India also employs a gradual retreat, it becomes a face saving formula with Chinese claiming that Indians retreated first. However, our government does not want to give such a face saver... My expectation is Chinese are bound to launch an attack if they don't get a face saver.

In terms of retaliation, India will be well justified to attack the PLA troops stationed in the rear. However, China seems to have relied on a rocket-heavy strategy and actual troop levels close to the border are considerably lower compared to Indian troop concentration near the boundary. In the event of an infantry led attack with an aim for terrain grabbing or holding, high troop concentration is an advantage. However, if enemy is not interested in additional terrain grab at this point, but wants to inflict casualties, high troop concentrations can become a liability as well. I was wondering why China wasnt augmenting its troop levels and bring in more elite troops. Now thinking about it, this could be a very deliberate strategy given their terrain disadvantages and they may have stationed more elite troops in little more interior stations.

I would leave it for more informed (chai-wala connected) members to comment on India's options for retaliation. Some key questions to consider:
- Should / would India open additional fronts if faced with large scale rocket / missile attack on its troop formations in Dolam plateau and near by Nathu La in Sikkim?
- Should India go into undisputed Tibetan / Chinese territory and try to hold it?
- Should India try to get back and occupy territory in Akshai Chin that China occupied in 1962?
- Should India shell Karakoram highway or lob few missiles to close few key tunnels near PoK - China border?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby schinnas » 04 Aug 2017 23:51

UlanBatori-ji,
I hope your assessment is right. Though part of me wants a conflict so that Cheena can be administered a slap for the whole world to repeatedly watch and mock the superl powel, better option might be for Cheen to lose face and there not be an armed conflict for now.

Agree that when faced with attack, our posture shouldn't be defence - defence. Any Indian territory occupied by China in 1962 is fair game and no UN / international pressure can make us give it back. I doubt if we can liberate Tibet with our current relative force levels... that could get to the nuclear threshold and all our major cities attacked. However, getting our own territory in Ladakh back should be fine. For negotiation purposes, we can also grab some of the territory that Shiv-ji has been calling out.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby RamSuresh » 05 Aug 2017 00:04

schinnas wrote:In terms of retaliation, India will be well justified to attack the PLA troops stationed in the rear. However, China seems to have relied on a rocket-heavy strategy and actual troop levels close to the border are considerably lower compared to Indian troop concentration near the boundary.


Some of the airstrips near the border (especially near Manasarovar that is shown in Shiv's video, appear like a nice retaliatory option. If India keeps retaliating, where does it leave Chinese claim that they have taught India a lesson. The fact that India choose to retaliate will itself diminish chinese image, isnt it? especially if even after all the hits they cant ensure that IA reoccupies the plateau; and if we manage to grab some land elsewhere it gets worse for them.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rudradev » 05 Aug 2017 00:05

UlanBatori wrote:s

But ultimately, decision to go to war is with Eleven, and will involve more careful assessment of cost.

So I say that all-out citizen boycott to ramp up the costs, is the best response, while the military prepares to launch a riposte through Indus and Akshay Hind. Unfortunately there is no such thing as Iyersan's Limited Jhapad possible. If they attack, defense is a stupid option. Massive 3-pronged invasion cutting off entire Han force in Uttar Dharmasala (UD) is the best bet, as extreme as the immediate cost will be to India in the short term. Extend the LAC to the northern/eastern borders of UD.


Exactly right.

The thing is: CPC Dons understand very well that ANY purely conventional attack against India will (in a strategic sense) only lead to a loss for them. IF they try to fight us in a muh-thod, frontal-attack kind of way that is being anticipated by some: rockets, MRBMs, invading across the LAC etc. the big picture outcome for them will not be good. This is doubly true if they try a frontal attack in the Doklam theatre, where our conventional advantage is maximum, but broadly it is true if they try it in any theatre from Ladakh to Walung.

Best case for China: it will be a stalemate. Many military casualties on both sides, attrition of assets/infra on both sides, but in the end they will have no significant territorial gains to show for it. Politically it will be a loss, because it will completely explode the supel-powel myth of being able to enforce their national will through massive superiority. If Clinton (or Bush, or any of the globalist order) had been in power in the US, Beijing could have relied on American (and broadly Western) media/stink-tank support to try and pass the whole thing off as a "victory" for them on the world stage. Nowadays, they will be happily exposed as the same paper dlagon that got its butt whipped by Vietnam in 1979.

Worst case for China: their attack leads to a gang-bang on multiple fronts where the US, SoKo, Japan, India, and perhaps other countries all get their kicks in, cleaving off huge chunks of claimed territory and humiliating the PLA/PLAN/PLAAF thoroughly. And/or, the N-word. Either way, dreams of becoming the 21st century supel-powel go completely down the drain.

Therefore: whatever they do will not be purely (or even mostly) a conventional muh-thod attack. It may have some component of conventional air-land strikes, missile/rocket attacks or whatever. But they will rather try and follow the example of the Russians in their recent wars: Georgia 2008 and Ukraine/Crimea 2013-present. 4GW. Non-state actors, proxy fighters, attacks on economic interests, information warfare, backed up by actual PLA muscle only when the exhaustion and demoralization of their enemy gives them a clear field of advantage in certain theatres of choice. And always, always, with a well-defined goal in mind.

Two well-defined goals for them would be (1) Arunachal Pradesh, esp. Tawang (2) J&K, with the intent of securing CPEC.

I would think about future scenarios with the above caveats in mind.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby salaam » 05 Aug 2017 00:14

Chinmayanand wrote:


Some noteworthy points (Translation) of Mad Suar(Swine) Pak General's talk:
- India acted militarily instead of dialogue and got China by surprise.
- If Ch wanted to do something, they would have done something by now.
- This is a big setback for Ch, and win for India. Also, a setback for Pak as an extension of this geo-political-military activity.
- A nation with a Goat's hear (sick reference to India) has changed and has run China ragged.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 05 Aug 2017 00:18

Securing CPEC would make sense as the most obvious. IIRC India holds Siachen heights there as well, so attack on that front is a likely scenario. How to ripose that by expelling them from all Xinjiang is a good question. Then again, Xinjiang is likely to become next ISIS breeding ground if Han power is destroyed but even that is OK if Handom can be shrunk significantly. At least the UD/Xinjiang road must be cut before snows set in.

Indian goals would be (1) clear Akshay Hind (2) Push the Tawang/Arunachal LAC way up north and (3) clear the whole Doklam triangle and the occupied Bhutanese territory north of Bhutan. Without significant losses of any present posts.

Handom's claim to all of "Tibet" needs to be reversed. To me from ArmChair, it seems temptingly easy to clear all of Xinjiang and UD up to 100 deg. E. Longitude. Hardly any population.But that task is far beyond capability of today's Indian forces, let's be realistic about that.

The more feasible objective is to inflict enough cracks on Han military capabilities to open up Color Revolutions in Xinjiang and UD. Dare to dream of a happy time when the Warlords of Beijing and Shanghai are at full-scale internal war with each other.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 05 Aug 2017 00:22

4GW can work IMO with UD and Xinjiang quite well.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 05 Aug 2017 00:31

schinnas wrote:With these observations, the chances of Chinese initiating a limited assault in August or early September is very high. PLA knowing their tactical limitations with India occupying higher ground, are likely to resort to long range, sustained rocket fire (and artillery if they have place to mount guns at vantage points) on Dolam plateau with the intention of removing Indian presence and not allowing Indians to re-take the territory. Post September, they expect that winter will anyway prevent India from moving in and they can declare victory and occupy it again in early Spring.

Remember, Chinese think they would win if they make Indians move out and not occupy it back successfully. They don't need to or may not even try to occupy the place (where they would get bombarded) to declare victory.

Many assumption that don't make sense to me.

1. Sustained rocket/arty fire. And IA will be sitting on its haunches?
2. IA will not know when big guns and rocket launchers start moving into firing position.
3. IA does not have similar firepower in the area.
4. Chinese troops / support Infra is not within Indian retaliatory fire range.
5. Do we know if the IA vacates its Doka La post in the winter? After all the current standoff location is just 100-200 meters downhill. How much time will it take for IA to rush downhill and intercept any Chinese in the area or re-establish itself in the plateau.
6. That IA moving out of the Dolam bowl is victory for the Chinese.

sanjaykumar
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 05 Aug 2017 00:34

Given the large areas and potential for dispersal of troops, thermobaric explosives may be preferred weapons. However what is the effect of the low partial pressure at 10,000 ft of such explosives? Perhaps they are less efficient than more conventional explosives.

What is the inventory of thermobarics in the Indian army, infantry and artillery, and attack helicopter fleet?

sanjaykumar
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 05 Aug 2017 00:35

sanjaykumar wrote:Given the large areas and potential for dispersal of troops, thermobaric explosives may be preferred weapons. However what is the effect of the low partial pressure at 10,000 ft on the yield of such explosives? Perhaps they are less efficient than more conventional explosives.

What is the inventory of thermobarics in the Indian army, infantry and artillery, and attack helicopter fleet?

sanjaykumar
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby sanjaykumar » 05 Aug 2017 00:36

duplicate

Karthik S
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Karthik S » 05 Aug 2017 00:36

UlanBatori wrote:Securing CPEC would make sense as the most obvious. IIRC India holds Siachen heights there as well, so attack on that front is a likely scenario. How to ripose that by expelling them from all Xinjiang is a good question. Then again, Xinjiang is likely to become next ISIS breeding ground if Han power is destroyed but even that is OK if Handom can be shrunk significantly. At least the UD/Xinjiang road must be cut before snows set in.

Indian goals would be (1) clear Akshay Hind (2) Push the Tawang/Arunachal LAC way up north and (3) clear the whole Doklam triangle and the occupied Bhutanese territory north of Bhutan. Without significant losses of any present posts.

Handom's claim to all of "Tibet" needs to be reversed. To me from ArmChair, it seems temptingly easy to clear all of Xinjiang and UD up to 100 deg. E. Longitude. Hardly any population.But that task is far beyond capability of today's Indian forces, let's be realistic about that.

The more feasible objective is to inflict enough cracks on Han military capabilities to open up Color Revolutions in Xinjiang and UD. Dare to dream of a happy time when the Warlords of Beijing and Shanghai are at full-scale internal war with each other.


We have numerical advantage in terms of troops and topology favors us. But Any such scenario you've mentioned above would need good amount of air power. Do we have enough air power, can't help to thing that the lost decade or more in the MRCA saga will pinch us now.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Rishirishi » 05 Aug 2017 00:38

I think this must be viewed in a greater context. First it was the south China sea, then Japan and now Bhutan. It is somewhat likely that India has USA, Japanease and even Russia backing, as these countries do not like the idea of a China which is a bully.

If China backs off, they risk loosing their Gonda status. If they resort to power, it may turn the world against them, causing great harm to the economy.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 05 Aug 2017 00:56

This is getting boring .. The Chinese are hellbent on faking a face saver.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 918942.cms
Sikkim standoff: China insists 'only few Indian soldiers remain near border'

BEIJING: Chinese defense ministry is insisting that only a few Indian soldiers are left in the area near the border standoff to give the impression that India is gradually withdrawing from the disputed area. "After more than one month, 48 Indian border troops and bulldozer still illegally remained in the Chinese territory," it said in a statement.

Indian officials rejected a similar view from the Chinese foreign ministry, which earlier put the figure of Indian troops at 40. India has said that there are 400 troops in the area.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 05 Aug 2017 01:02

http://www.asianage.com/world/south-asi ... -side.html
Amid border stand off, China says India building up troops along its side
Beijing: China's Foreign Ministry on Thursday said India has been building up troops and repairing roads along its side of the border amid an increasingly tense stand-off in a remote frontier region beside the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan.

The stand-off on a plateau next to the mountainous Indian state of Sikkim, which borders China, has ratcheted up tension between the neighbors, who share a 3,500-km (2,175-mile) frontier, large parts of which are disputed.

"It has already been more than a month since the incident, and India is still not only illegally remaining on Chinese territory, it is also repairing roads in the rear, stocking up supplies, massing a large number of armed personnel," the foreign ministry said in a statement. "This is certainly not for peace."

India has denied any such military buildup and, in a statement to parliament on Thursday evening, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj urged dialogue based on a written common understanding regarding the border intersection reached in 2012.

"India always believes that peace and tranquility in the India-China border is an important pre-requisite for smooth development of our bilateral relations," Swaraj said, according to a transcript of her remarks released by her office.

"We will continue to engage with the Chinese side through diplomatic channels to find a mutually acceptable solution."

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 05 Aug 2017 01:03

The brilliant, surprise move here would be a NaMo-Eleven Bhai-Bhai Final Demarkation of India-China Border, that accommodates Chinese need for UD-Xinjiang road, Indian concerns about Akshay Hind, and general disengagement everywhere else. Can't be a straight line for topological reasons, but using rivers and wastersheds would make sense, without displacing any communities. Such a simple solution would permit armed forces to step back and go kill Pakis or Uighurs respectively. "No heavy weapons or fighter-bombers within 100 miles on each side of the border" etc. (except to fight terrorists).

In the long run Indians have no interest in being mad at Chinese. Such a disengagement would probably permit much greater liberatization in ND as well, with a massive boost to tourism.

Oh well... back to dreaming of less wild things.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 05 Aug 2017 01:08

I can't see the drama here. I would have thought it is India that says: "No no no no yaar, our troops are having chai-biscoot in Shimla onlee". Why is GOI rubbing in the fact that Indian troops are there in force? New NaMo orders to actually ACT on Indian territorial claims?

In fact I would have said:
There is not, and never has been, a single Indian soldier on any territory of the Peopre's Lepubric of China. We deeply respect the territorial integrity of our neighbors. In unrelated news, we have 4000 personnel participating in a Joint Workshop with the Royal Bhutanese Army on emergency services and Mountain Traffic Management and Infiltrator Detection, stationed in Bhutan's DholaLam Plateau.
Last edited by UlanBatori on 05 Aug 2017 01:10, edited 3 times in total.

pankajs
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby pankajs » 05 Aug 2017 01:08

The Chinese have extended the technical hold on Masood Azhar by 3 months. IIRC their normal practice was to extend 6 months at a time. A data point that may not mean anything.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 05 Aug 2017 01:15

Still playing the red team, they have a desperate need to keep IAF occupied elsewhere as India can use it as a wild card anywhere on the LAC and in depth, likely choice is have PAF conduct sorties so IAF is vigilant along the western border and if they can't utilize their air force PLAAF to a good potential over the Tibet N. Dharmashala plateau, they can station many squadrons of PLAAF in TSP so as to drain the IAF squadrons available on the Eastern sector. The hundreds of fighters can serve as Optics even if not actually fighting.

Bombing TSP is not on this year's Calendar...


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