Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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UlanBatori
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 06 Aug 2017 22:36

Singha, that is the worst kind of fry tlap. If they start coming there through the mountains they will lose half their force. Pretend not to notice. Air attack, just as they are massed for attack, will shatter their forces, and then as they start the retreat, is when Indians need to shed the long-held chivalrous notions, and masacre the whole lot.

For ppl who ask about chinese dead on the Winter Retreat from Tezpur:
The Chinese buried the dead. Maybe tossed them into ravines. Many of the deaths were from altitude sickness, cholera, dysentry, Yellow Fever, pneumonia etc. They would have forced the North Dharmasala civilians to dig the mass graves.
The Winter Retreat was basically the same as Napoleon's and Hitler's EXCEPT For one thing: Indian disinterest in killing Chinese needlessly.
Even recently this persists. In the Nathu La debacle, the PLA, after losing over 722 soldiers, retreated with what was left, and the Indians WERE ORDERED TO HOLD FIRE. Same at Tezpur: US Amb. Galbraith and our netaship agreed not to use the airforce to finish off the PLA in the Himalayas.
World "hysterians" such as John Garver are too full of themselves to recognize that Indians exercised extreme restraint and "Insaniyat" over "Insanity" in not killing many more Chinese. Since the Chinese were running away, it was hoped that better sense would ultimately prevail and the two countries could go on as amicable neighbors instead of creating another 1947-type genocidal hatred for generations. Frankly I think this was far-sighted policy, the only downside is that too many ppl are idiots who only care about Body Counts. In the long run, Indians have nothing against Chinese people - sure they are not trustworthy but heck, what's new about that, look at our own "kin" to the west... :roll:

The absolutely enraging aspect of Rezang La was that those heroes died DEFENDING AN AIR STRIP. But no IAF arrived to even help them massacre the invaders, or at least airdrop bullets to them. Of course this is because the Baboon at Dilli HQ were asleep. Watch the videos posted b4, and listen to the surviving heroes' shock: When they related the events, the Army brass threatened to court-martial them if they spoke of it again!!! But I still wonder why the IAF was not around at least to do recon. Oh wait! I take that back, it was in the middle of a blizzard at 18000 feet!
All those WW2 and Cold War fiction stories can't hold a candle to the real history of the Indian Armed Forces. We need temples built to deities such as Shaitan Singh and Avestha. And their more recent brothers who won the Kargil War. The soldier "Sangram", wrestling champ, breaking chinese heads by banging them together as he himself was dying, reminds me of Bhima of the MB.

Someone who is fluent in Hindi needs to make a detailed transcript of those interviews. Can't believe that Stinker Dupatta actually found such people. How many more are left? Any way to capture their memories?

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby vasu raya » 06 Aug 2017 22:55

some observations,

regarding the cyber attacks, most of them are masked and its not always possible to fingerprint the attack so there are many who like to see a Indo-China conflict with cyber strengths too. Recently the 'WannaCry' attack was ascribed to NK while the zero day exploits list they leveraged came from NSA. So, even if China were to start a cyber war the subsequent attacks could be hijacked and China still holds the can, if China were to care about the consequences of 1962 redux they may not want to initiate one

taking a long term view of this conflict, an effort must be made to move the developing scrummage lines inside Tibet into the trade domain. so, if $50B/year or which ever figure it builds to can only be allowed if China places its forces outside Tibet which should be a no mans land and any encroaching would draw proportional trade restrictions and the current LAC means zero or negative trade deficit and eviction of the Chinese embassy staff. Manasarovar has Indian access, Chinese get to have an embassy. They cannot have it both territory and trade in their favor.

Maybe Tibet as a no mans land can be underwriten by Indian rocket artilery capable of targeting any part of Tibet likewise to China.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 06 Aug 2017 22:58

Karthik S wrote:
Singha wrote:put google earth in 3D mode and follow the precarious road as it winds its away across the hills and then clings to the western valley side of the Lohit river going to walong after a eternity. there is no way in hell we can resupply or hold that place unless we station some 10,000 cannons into caves in the hills north korea style .
https://earth.google.com/web/@27.875962 ... 90746t,-0r

this is one area where we might have to accept losing territory

however before i disrobe my lungi, let me say the chinese have it even worse with a vast mass of snow capped mountains in eastern tibet and roads snaking along the sides of deep valleys. https://earth.google.com/web/@28.517223 ... 616708t,0r

so perhaps this region will see no action at all.


With air power advantage on our side, won't it be costly for the chinese to hold onto any territory they capture?


At the risk of getting banned:

Not only because of the airpower advantage but simple logistics. The vaunted chini logistical system we are so afraid of ("human waves") is not real in Tibet and was never real.

They have at most counts around 50K troops in Tibet. This is not because they don't want to put more there but because they can't.

We outnumber the PLA by upwards of 20 to one across the length and breadth of the border.

At Doka La, there are 30 to 40 pampered chini border guard to 400 IA regulars. This at the point of focus where they are making all this noise.

Chini cannot gain ground with what they have now. They cannot hold ground with what they have now.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Prasad » 06 Aug 2017 23:14

Does anyone have any figures for which divisions and how many men were needed to drive around and wave the flag in cities to enforce lockdowns during "disturbances" in the past few years. Might give us a good idea of how much can be tied up if needed.

anupmisra
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby anupmisra » 06 Aug 2017 23:33

Found this topographic map online. Is this the region (where India/Bhutan/China meet) the crux of the standoff? If you click on the map, you can zoom in.

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/indi ... ng45-4.jpg


Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby DrRatnadip » 06 Aug 2017 23:51

http://m.timesofindia.com/india/doklam- ... 945037.cms

Doklam row: India reasonably sure China does not want war despite angry rhetoric

Rajat Pandit | TNN | Aug 6, 2017, 10:48PM IST

NEW DELHI: Far away from the actual faceoff site at Doklam, where rival soldiers are close enough to literally smell each other in the rarefied air of the high-altitude region, the Indian security establishment is reasonably sure China will not risk a war or even "a small-scale military operation" despite all its belligerent rhetoric.
A "face-saving" workable option is for both India and China to simultaneously withdraw their troops from the Bhutanese territory of Doklam (called Dong Lang by China) near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction, said sources in the security establishment.

[ we dont need face saving.. Its chini problem if they want to save their face or as*.. :evil: ]

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 06 Aug 2017 23:56

Asked this question earlier. Can we defend a offensive by pla in to northern Bhutan?

China might force Bhutan to ask India to leave Dolam for returning Northern regions.

As we are in dolam on Bhutan' behalf... So they could publicly ask us to leave.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 00:15

I think at the bottom of the present khulji is the realization that IA/Bhutan/Vietnam/SoKo/Myanmar/Laos/Cambodia/Tajikistan/Russia can coolly move into PLA-occupied territory, doing back to them what they have been doing to everyone. Not much the PLA can do about it except rant, if a really determined army decides that they are not going to leave. They can really only defend the Han heartland.

P.S. Cholaji, pls desist onlee. PRC put at least 1.3million, probably more, troops across the Yalu river in winter at high altitudes. A few years before 1962. Q.E.D. There is no question about this. Some one million are believed to have been killed. They did not have technical superiority or air superiority, they just had superiority in numbers wherever they attacked, which, absent tremendous mobility or quantum teleportation, can only be done by just having massive numbers. "Human wave" refers to repeated attacks by large numbers, ignoring the inevitable massive casualties, until the defenders simply run out of bullets and ammo or collapse from exhaustion.

Compared to Yalu case, Himalayan attack was far harder. So only 400,000 could be sent. At the time they were terrified that India+US would take revenge for Korea and invade Tibet and be at the doors to the Yangtze plains in no time (still possible..). Indian Army was considered a successful and mobile, highly-trained and highly feared force after WW2 North Africa and Burma campaigns.
And losses were equally high, even worse because of the extreme altitude and treacherous terrain.

Look at losses of Indian Border Roads Organization, Indo-Tibetan Police etc in PEACETIME in those parts. Terrible. Chinese are not superhuman, gravity and hypoxia work on them the same as on anyone else.
I don't know what they can today, but the history is clear.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby anupmisra » 07 Aug 2017 00:37

nam wrote:As we are in dolam on Bhutan' behalf... So they could publicly ask us to leave.


If there is self-interest based on security and threat involved, India could deny Bhutan's request. Plenty of examples. Let China take the matter to the UN (which it wont).

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 07 Aug 2017 00:41

Chola good post.

You got the gist of it. With China it's tactical or military logic. Need overwhelming force to prevent aggression. Relying on strategic or geopolitical logic leads us astray.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ramana » 07 Aug 2017 00:43

Nam
, Bhutan security is Indian responsibility. Don't fall for Karat type rhetoric.
It's Indian all the way.

Also I think:

It's very possible that China came up with escalation of Doklam scenario to teach US a lesson. To show how relying on India for the Asian pivot is wrong strategy. Meantime Trump has NoKo and Indo China Sea issues. Win for China eould be India retreats in Doklam and China holds ground in Indochina Sea and NoKo remains unbeaten.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Pulikeshi » 07 Aug 2017 00:43

ramana wrote:Pullekeshi

What are China's war aims?


Sorry do not understand this question. China has no war aims! It's been two months and my buffalo is still grazing in Doklam :mrgreen:

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 07 Aug 2017 00:50

Bhutan security is Indian responsibility, that I agree
. However do we have enough forces to hold off a Chinese offensive in this area?

UlanBatori
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 01:15

Why think of "holding off" anything? Any attack anywhere should trigger the liberation of Uttar Dharmasala and Aksai Hind, + the road north to Urumqi. Occupied North Bhutan should be liberated by Indian forces going north of that.

By the way, I was thinking the other day: There used to be a Magnitude 8+ earthquake every 2 years in China. Must be way overdue for 2 or 3 of those. I think breaking the 3 Gorges should do it. May cause slight flooding in Assam and a good washing of Kolkatta too.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby g.sarkar » 07 Aug 2017 01:17

Well, let me put a question, if China decides to withdraw from Dhokla and return to status quo what are the implications it is going to face with this loss of face?
1. China’s apparent superiority in dealings with India will be weakened. It has to climb down from its high perch.
2. China-Pak, China-Nepal, China-Lanka, China-Afghanistan and China-Bangladesh relations will be affected to a great degree. As these countries will have other alternatives with a stronger India.
3. China’s relations with the rest of Asia, including Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Japan, and Australia etc. will weaken, as China’s peaceful rise to a super power status will now be put to question. This will encourage outsiders to immediately challenge China in SCS.
Gautam

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby AdityaM » 07 Aug 2017 01:18

chola wrote:They have at most counts around 50K troops in Tibet. This is not because they don't want to put more there but because they can't.
We outnumber the PLA by upwards of 20 to one across the length and breadth of the border.
At Doka La, there are 30 to 40 pampered chini border guard to 400 IA regulars. This at the point of focus where they are making all this noise.


Why would the IA devote 400 regulars to face 40 lowly guards? Why not use the Armed police constabulary instead.
Doesn't the IA know that the Chinese can't put more men on ground.
Which is funny since many people on BRF know much better than the army it seems.

For years I have heard of so called china experts saying that we do not have good intelligence capabilities to find out what's happening there.

And suddenly for last 2 months brfites are taking the battle into Tibet, since the poor Chinese capabilities is not a secret here on this board.

When the Chinese say that they have the capabilities for rapid deployment, are they completely bluffing?

I hope what Chola says is true; but is their policy also to hold/dominate the ground which requires massive troop presence? Or is their strategy for massive punitive strikes by leveraging their heavy missile numbers.
What is their strategy?

Parts of Tibet bordering India up to 100-200 km are perhaps not of as much existential importance to Chinese, as much as parts of India within 100-200 on range are to India itself.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Suresh S » 07 Aug 2017 01:52

Tx shiv today I read about Lt Col Brahmanand Avasthy . Some soldiers in the group were wounded per this record. I wonder if the Indian army got some account of this great battle from them. I would like to know if anyone was awarded gallantry awards from this battle. It seems the only witness was the former head Lama of Laygala Gompe Monastry. Imaging woman , the wife of the colonel she died in 2011 and was cremated near his grave at Laygala Gompe.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby IndraD » 07 Aug 2017 02:30

Pls allow to share this news about Chinese troops from 2016
UN peacekeepers refused to help as aid workers were raped in South Sudan – report
Chinese troops abandoned their posts rather than engage in fighting and protect civilians, says US-based rights group
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ ... ers-report

On contrary Indian army saved many lives in Sudan
How the Indian Army saved the day in South Sudan http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sout ... 14802.html

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 04:59

Chinese very good at athletics.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chanakyaa » 07 Aug 2017 05:32

g.sarkar wrote:Well, let me put a question, if China decides to withdraw from Dhokla and return to status quo what are the implications it is going to face with this loss of face?
1. China’s apparent superiority in dealings with India will be weakened. It has to climb down from its high perch.
2. China-Pak, China-Nepal, China-Lanka, China-Afghanistan and China-Bangladesh relations will be affected to a great degree. As these countries will have other alternatives with a stronger India.
3. China’s relations with the rest of Asia, including Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Japan, and Australia etc. will weaken, as China’s peaceful rise to a super power status will now be put to question. This will encourage outsiders to immediately challenge China in SCS.
Gautam

Gautum saar, Dokala, is paper tiger's The last Kodak moment, sort of. The situation is the plateau is far from over, but, partly, does it really matter, what paper tiger does? Paper tiger's initial actions in the contested area, India's response, and demonstration of how standing up against a stronger opponent with the help of necessary military tools in the back pocket can be done. Our actions and opponents reactions should have already sent enough signals. And, samzhne wale ko eeshara kaphi hai... If Asean's attendance at the Republic Day is still on track, then I'm sure making the best use of microphone, when the world is listening, is properly planned.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 05:48

Do u think cheen's meek genuflection to Impeliarists in UNSC, selling out Kim-bin-NoKo, is direct plea to mend western fences? Signs that General Wee Dong, chief of PLA sweatshops Inc is exerting the stick up the musharraf of Gen. Wei Poo, chief of PLA DlagonBleath? Or just making peace on the West to concentrate on the East?


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Manish_Sharma » 07 Aug 2017 07:18

UlanBatori wrote:But no IAF arrived to even help them massacre the invaders, or at least airdrop bullets to them. Of course this is because the Baboon at Dilli HQ were asleep.


Maybe not baboons but that jerk nehru and that pervert commie bf of his krishna Menon. :x

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 07 Aug 2017 07:19

Singha wrote:put google earth in 3D mode and follow the precarious road as it winds its away across the hills and then clings to the western valley side of the Lohit river going to walong after a eternity. there is no way in hell we can resupply or hold that place unless we station some 10,000 cannons into caves in the hills north korea style .
https://earth.google.com/web/@27.875962 ... 90746t,-0r
.

Check the Chinese road S 201 meter by meter and measure the distance to their nearest major bases and count where all the helipads are there on both sides

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 07:22

Manish_Sharma wrote:But no IAF arrived

Weather was terrible: probably precluded IAF operations in those days. You can't come under the clouds when the ground is at 18,000 feet...

Our chamchagiri-based Top Establishment was too shell-shocked to react and realize in those days, but I suspect that the clearing weather had everything to do with Mao's order to cease fire and run back ASAP from Tezpur. TOTALLY uncharacteristic behavior by commies, esp. PLA.

Hope this is not a problem today. Should check with Mullah Shivullah and write the GPS address of each target on a bum carefully while the weather is clear, then just send them over when the time comes.
Last edited by UlanBatori on 07 Aug 2017 07:24, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chanakyaa » 07 Aug 2017 07:22

Throwing its little brother, NoKo, under the bus was the best strategy for paper dragon and Ruskies; thus buying peace on the eastern front. The last thing paper dragon and Ruskie want is unnecessary fire works in Koreas, whatever remote the chances were. More importantly, all the NoKo drama looks like a silly dog and pony show. DT's admin does not have too many accomplishments in the international affairs to brag about. Senate elections are coming up next year. Need to show accomplishments. Paper dragon and Ruskie happy to go along. As far as NoKo's sanctions, it pushes the country more into paper dragon's arm, which may not be a bad outcome for business; and paper dragon's track record of spitting on honoring sanctions is known. In the meantime, sh!tscared SoKo, has allowed new multi-bullion mili base for unkil. All P5+1 is happy.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 07 Aug 2017 07:22

snahata wrote:Tx shiv today I read about Lt Col Brahmanand Avasthy . Some soldiers in the group were wounded per this record. I wonder if the Indian army got some account of this great battle from them. I would like to know if anyone was awarded gallantry awards from this battle. It seems the only witness was the former head Lama of Laygala Gompe Monastry. Imaging woman , the wife of the colonel she died in 2011 and was cremated near his grave at Laygala Gompe.

They were all killed to the last man AFAIK

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 07:27

In that respect the Sivaji Ganesan movie told the story honestly too.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 07 Aug 2017 07:28

shiv wrote:
Singha wrote:put google earth in 3D mode and follow the precarious road as it winds its away across the hills and then clings to the western valley side of the Lohit river going to walong after a eternity. there is no way in hell we can resupply or hold that place unless we station some 10,000 cannons into caves in the hills north korea style .
https://earth.google.com/web/@27.875962 ... 90746t,-0r
.

Check the Chinese road S 201 meter by meter and measure the distance to their nearest major bases and count where all the helipads are there on both sides

viewtopic.php?p=968744#p968744
After 7 years the following post made by Air Cdre Tikoo Sen aka BRFite Abhibhushan may make sense to the jernails and kernails of BRF
Abhibhushan wrote: While all of you go all out to design a 5th gen ++ super duper fighter, I want to take a detour and come up with some thing that my pongo friends would love to see in the sky.

There is one huge battlefield that might one day call me in for offensive air support which I am unable to provide today. I need an aircraft that can operate over Wallong and Along and perhaps a hundred kilometres north of it for releasing weapons in marginal visibility and if possible even by night. I need an aircraft that will take off from Leh or Chshul with one and a half tons of ordnance and be able to operate comfortably with full load at 20000 feet or more. I want an aircraft that can have a radius of action of 200 km flying at 15000 feet above sea level.

Let me now design this beast.

Take a basic Kiran. Retain the wings/tail. Build it as light as possible using composites. Redesign the main body for a single pilot and lots of internal fuel. Give it an internal bay for carrying about 50 x 68mm or 57mm unguided rockets and four hard points fit for 350 kg class loads. Give it a light contour mapping / imaging radar slaved to an HMS. Replace the 2 machine guns of the Kiran Mk 2 with one GSh23. Give it a glass cockpit and a DARIN III fit. Give it an integral laser target designator. Power it with an unreheated Adour (as used in the Hawk). Play around with the wing structure a little to improve its low speed turning performance. See if the RCS can be reduced by tinkering with the intakes. If possible, give it one or two short range light air to air missiles carried over the wing like the Jaguar. Give it a self defence electronic suit. If the Adour is unable to lift all this load then make it really an overpowered beast by fitting an unreheated Kavery!

Produce it in 36 months. Test and certify it in the next 24 months. Produce it in large numbers. In 1962, we could not / did not use offensive air power. Let there not be a repeat of that situation.

PS. I do not foresee a dense air defence air presence in the projected hostile area. If one comes along, I shall need top cover by the air dominance fighters you all are designing.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Singha » 07 Aug 2017 07:42

You just described the combat hawk that has put up with bae.
There are a few more incl propeller driven.

But how survivable will they be vs vshorad of a regular army is open to question and they will need constant top cover

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby UlanBatori » 07 Aug 2017 07:44

HS 748 is probably better suited for this. Turboprops retain thrust to rather high altitudes without needing to go very fast and have good endurance. Or take a few much-dissed IL-76s. Proven high-altitude cold-weather performance.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 07 Aug 2017 08:40

Singha wrote:You just described the combat hawk that has put up with bae.
There are a few more incl propeller driven.

But how survivable will they be vs vshorad of a regular army is open to question and they will need constant top cover

I did not make that post.

Look at it this way. Suppose IAF get scared of air defence missiles - should the army give up territory as you have suggested in your post? I suggest that at least army helos should be used with counter measures rather than declaring defeat without fighting.

The worst possible thing in war is to lose territory with nearby air bases full of unused aircraft that did not fight for fear of air defences.

Loss in war means lost aircraft. Lost men and finally lost territory. Not Banditjis model of lose territory and keep IAF out

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 07 Aug 2017 08:48

UlanBatori wrote:HS 748 is probably better suited for this.

Except for turn radius in narrow valleys. HTT 40 maybe but my uncle Googal tells me that turboprops are better at attracting Infra red SAMs. Don't know. Mine is Wiki Level knowledge.

Anyhow I am currently reading an ebook about aircraft design an will know more about design in a few days.. just saying..

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Manish_Sharma » 07 Aug 2017 08:54

UB ji, Singha ji, For high attitude like Walong wouldn't cranked Delta Tejas do better? Use underpowered Kaveri instead of GE engine. Use 2 tons of ordinance alongwith 2 Astra missiles. This way no need for escorts too.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 07 Aug 2017 09:33

AdityaM wrote:
chola wrote:They have at most counts around 50K troops in Tibet. This is not because they don't want to put more there but because they can't.
We outnumber the PLA by upwards of 20 to one across the length and breadth of the border.
At Doka La, there are 30 to 40 pampered chini border guard to 400 IA regulars. This at the point of focus where they are making all this noise.


Why would the IA devote 400 regulars to face 40 lowly guards? Why not use the Armed police constabulary instead.
Doesn't the IA know that the Chinese can't put more men on ground.
Which is funny since many people on BRF know much better than the army it seems.

For years I have heard of so called china experts saying that we do not have good intelligence capabilities to find out what's happening there.

And suddenly for last 2 months brfites are taking the battle into Tibet, since the poor Chinese capabilities is not a secret here on this board.

When the Chinese say that they have the capabilities for rapid deployment, are they completely bluffing?



+ 1.

In this context please read this great quote I came across recently. I certainly am no exception to it:

In the age of the Internet
The wide availability of very shallow knowledge
Has led to the illusion of profound understanding

Singha
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Singha » 07 Aug 2017 09:48

the 2nd part of my post was the reverse dhoti shiver mantra that they face the same problem in that region. my theory is ground attack a/c like jaguars dropping 1 ton bombs at a few select points will make the roads unusable on their feeder network too, and there is not much of pre stocked bases in the mountains there, so we should be able to enforce a 'draw' even if they choose to attack like in 1962. the walong ALG however is in artillery range and will be out of service when the shooting starts. that we anyways know and plan for.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Paul » 07 Aug 2017 09:53

For those who were saying bringing BD into the equation is an overkill, read the gist of this article. If it is not slyly anti India, I have an elephant here for you to buy.

http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/ ... angladesh/

What does the China-India standoff mean for Bangladesh?

Syed Zainul Abedin Ashis Biswas Shahariar Sajib
Published at 02:47 AM August 07, 2017

Chinese and Indian military forces have been in a standoff in the Doklam area at the tri-junction of the India-China-Bhutan border. The latest round of dispute started on June 18, 2017 when Indian troops opposed the building of a road by Chinese forces at Doklam, which is under China’s control but is claimed by Bhutan.

The two countries have never been so close to a confrontational situation since 1962.

The crisis began when China claimed the Doklam plateau, located in the north of Bhutan, as part of its territory, to build a link road which would allow China access to the Chumbi valley from where the Siliguri Corridor, aka Chicken’s Neck Corridor of India, would be within the range of Chinese artillery.

Apart from its responsibility to maintain Bhutan’s territorial integrity as part of a long-term agreement, India would never want to lose its control over the Siliguri Corridor as it is the sole route that connects the northeast of India with the rest of the country.

The standoff between the two mighty neighbours puts Bangladesh in precarious situation, not in the least because it has extensive ties with both countries on the political, economic and military front.

Security experts in Bangladesh and India are already speculating that in the event China takes the Doklam plateau, India would want to use Bangladesh as a transit for military purposes, which would leave Bangladesh in a serious predicament.


Bangladesh is heavily dependent on India for water, trade, and even food security, not to mention the two countries share a more than 4,000km border, one of the largest borders between two countries.

On the flip side, China is en route to becoming the single largest individual investor in Bangladesh. Recently, the two countries have signed a $13.6bn worth of deals in trade and investment, and China has promised to provide Bangladesh with a loan assistance of $20bn. Ever since the fiasco surrounding the financing of the Padma Bridge project, Bangladesh has become increasingly dependent on China for its infrastructure and development projects. According to Bangladesh government statistics, a total of $61 million was channelled from China into Bangladesh as foreign direct investment in 2016.

Being a relatively weaker country in what can become a reasonably volatile region, Bangladesh cannot afford to put all the eggs in one basket. It is also not clear that how long India’s Nehruvian defence policy would last, especially amidst the ongoing rise of right wing politics in India, with BJP often playing up anti-Bangladesh sentiments in the east and northeastern India.

Surrounded by a highly militarised zone – northeastern India and a semi-hostile neighbour in Myanmar – Bangladesh needs some degree of military preparation in the event it finds itself in any worst-case scenario. In that case, ironically, Bangladesh would have to resort to Chinese armaments for their affordability and reasonable standard. Recently, Bangladesh has procured two submarines from China for $203 million. On the flipside, Bangladesh signed a comprehensive defence agreement with India during the Prime Minister’s latest tour to India. Although details of the agreement are yet to be made public, media reports suggest the India’s underlying motive for the agreement is to have some sort of supervision over Bangladesh’s defense cooperation with China.

Not all is however lost for Bangladesh. There are a couple of scenarios which could lead both the parties to avoid such hostility. Firstly, India is a whopping $1.2bn market for Chinese goods and products. Secondly, the growing Indian economy will go through massive infrastructural development for which it would have to resort to Chinese products and technology. Thirdly, both of the countries might stay away from engaging in a conflict fearing prolonged regional instability and involvement of other foreign nations.

infograph

According to security expert Maj Gen (retd) Abdur Rashid, the area of contention is very remote and almost impassable as it remains under snow for eight months in a year. As a result, the cost for operating a war in that region would be huge for both the countries.

“But if the countries do engage in war, it may cause regional polarisation throughout Asia. Japan and the ASEAN states might take the side of India owing to the aggressive advancement of China towards the South China Sea.”

“In that case, it would be difficult for China to carry out the One Belt, One Road initiative,” the security expert added.

The risk of a confrontation cannot be completely ruled out as it involves the image of China at the global level.

M Shahiduzzaman, a professor of International Relations at Dhaka University told the Dhaka Tribune: “If China compromises on the issue of Doklam, it has to compromise on its territorial claims forever, including Arunachal.”

He also opined that India’s economy would collapse within a week if it goes to a war with China.


According to former ambassador Humayun Kabir, both the conflicting parties should consider the interest of Bhutan as it would suffer the most should any confrontation take place.

“India is pressing the Bhutanese government to get back to the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal motor vehicles agreement (BBIN MVA) on one hand, while China is looking forward to building a link road in its territory, on the other. But no one is considering the threat to Bhutan’s integrity because of these projects,” the former diplomat added.

Government officials of Bangladesh however said the BBIN agreement may end up being a connecting route between Bangladesh and India, as Bhutan and Nepal has already expressed reluctance to be a part of this endeavour.
Last edited by Paul on 07 Aug 2017 09:57, edited 1 time in total.

Deans
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Deans » 07 Aug 2017 09:56

nam wrote:Bhutan security is Indian responsibility, that I agree
. However do we have enough forces to hold off a Chinese offensive in this area?


The Chinese have to first amass a force to threaten North Bhutan. That takes time, given that every unit of the PLA
(facing Arunachal, Sikkim and now Bhutan) has to be supplied through 1 highway and there is a limited road network from the regular roads in Tibet to the Bhutan border.
Apart from the Royal Bhutanese army which is already present, we can move a IA Mountain division either from Binaguri or Rangia, much faster than the PLA and without affecting our defense of Sikkim /Siliguri corridor or Tawang.

shiv
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 07 Aug 2017 10:14

Singha wrote:the 2nd part of my post was the reverse dhoti shiver mantra that they face the same problem in that region. my theory is ground attack a/c like jaguars dropping 1 ton bombs at a few select points will make the roads unusable on their feeder network too, and there is not much of pre stocked bases in the mountains there, so we should be able to enforce a 'draw' even if they choose to attack like in 1962. the walong ALG however is in artillery range and will be out of service when the shooting starts. that we anyways know and plan for.

The Lohit river valley is a place where the Chinese could create a significant diversion while a main thrust goes on elsewhere. That will have to be defeated using air power as well as ground forces. They may be able to provide some air cover from bases 700 km away in the east like Chengdu - so that will have to be factored in

Singha
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Singha » 07 Aug 2017 10:17

the lumbering H6 (licensed Tu16 badger) bombers while standing no chance in range of bvr aams, are still a potent and unreachable threat to us due to flying over well defended airbase over sichuan, north tibet and yunnan and releasing ALCMs which are hard to track once they drop to low levels. not that ground TELARs will not do same strikes but having a bomber opens more surprise and qrt/pinprick options. they could program the ALCMs to fly a indirect route over myanmar and bangladesh to strike at targets in west bengal like panagarh and kharagpur

it wins no prizes over the venerable B52 but its there and it works.


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