The F35 has limited EW coverage as it will use its radar for the job which limits its operational use. I can't say about the T-50.
Your understanding of EW is a bit outdated. Raw power is much less relevant for lattest generation defensive
EW jammers like Spectra: modifying (or canceling) the returning echo of an hostile radar requires high precision rather than brute force.
More precisely you are mixing offensive jamming (like the growler) which aims to disrupt coms and radars on large areas to allow other aircrafts to survive, with defensive systems like spectra which only aims to protect the fighter jet its embedded with.
>>Jamming a large areas to allow other fighter jets to fly safely in a combat area requires high power (Prowler, Growler). You need to jam all azimuth which is not very discreet.
>>For defensive jamming for a single aircraft like the rafale you need scalpel precision jamming to generate false returns (speed, location...). Jamming is not all azimuth but focused on the threat (pencil beam jamming) which is more discreet.
MACE XIII EW exercise was discussed in specialized press. You can read discussions on some results here:http://www.russiadefence.net/t2447-mace ... s300#29136
Since this involves the F-35, I will move that aspect of my response to the JSF Turkey thread in line with the moderator's wishes.
On the subject matter of "brute" vs "precise", both have their place and role in Electronic Warfare. If you look at the current trend of IAD development you are seeing an enormous development in sensors and sensor link up. From what the early Patriots or S-300's fielded even in the late 90's early 2000's to what you have now looks a world apart. Look at where the Patriot_system of the Gulf War and compare it to MEADS of 2020. Multiple sensors linked up covering an exponentially higher and ever increasing band_sphere. This is further compounded by an addition of Passive elements that add another dimension and limit your degree of freedom when it comes to "active" jamming. At the Old Crows annual get together just last year they were discussing about Decoys now being fielded (of course they didn't get into where and how many given the unclassified level) with strong electronic signatures. How do you deal with such a threat? What a brute force jammer such as the NGJ enables you to do is go after every component of the IAD and not just trying to mask yourself, or trying to focus on a few things. NGJ is there to deal with everything from radars, Data links, Communications to RF weapon frequencies etc and for this it requires high agility, high power (60KW per pod) and very large cutting edge sensors. Of course this does not in any way limit the importance of precise jamming but the point is that modern IAD's have considerably evolved with the increased computing and the general access to technology.
I have little doubt that modern electronic warfare systems do employ some sort of spoofing, masking or active cancellation. Most of the top end systems on most of the cutting edge fighters or bombers are mostly/largely classified. Its an area of interest few nations would like to share through the media. Till this day the F-22's EW system is largely classified and most reporters that have made pointed inquiries have been turned away. Same goes for systems on the F-35 and projected systems on the T-50. Yet, few are naive to think that any one nation has such a technological superiority that it can develop active cancellation for a huge/wide threat index that itself is evolving at a rapid pace. That will simply not happen. One indication comes from the fact that both DARPA and the Pentagon recently spelled out that in the future they do not expect to hold onto tactical advantage in electronics for a very long time. Chinese are moving ahead with interlinking some very sophisticated AESA radars that are not as easily fooled as those of the past. Moreover they have AESA's that are employing similar techniques, have strong computing power and are linked. Those designing aircraft to defeat this IAD net are looking at the entire spectrum of the response, from lowering fleet wide signature and RCS, to penetrative precise jamming (this is your fancy masking or active cancellation stuff that few would talk about in public - and what the USAF "secretly" refers to as the P-AEA or penetrating stand-in electronic attack
) to stand off brute jamming (something spoken off more freely but still little to nothing is known about the Next generation Jammer or about the now dead CCJ). It would be naive to think that you can go into a modern post 2020 IAD with having precise jamming ability and masking when the threat you are required to defeat to do so has multiple sensors all integrated with much more computing then what you have on your fighter. Hence you need to develop a mix of stealth, SA and Electronic warfare , and this requires a synergy because you cannot overly rely on emissions (active EW) as that negatively affects your stealth component. Moreover, it takes a lot more effort to deal with EW in the VHF domain. Even for penetrative precise jamming the wider your threat base the more power you need, hence you will see an addition of more powerful jammers integrated into the Rafale whenever the spectra gets an upgrade next. I expect the UAE to do the same on its Falcon Edge when it gets a major upgrade. A fighter would always be limited by power, whereas your IAD systems grow every decade and as things stand they are growing at a pace which is causing those confronting these systems to consider an approach to penetration much beyond simply employing a "killer" integrated EW solution.
Swinging from offensive to defensive is possible on the Growler using NGJ. The Spectra is Power limited, the Growler is not. If you want to send a sizable strike package to operate in A2AD or even contested environments (leave alone DENIED environment) you would want a safety blanket such as one provided by the Growler. Otherwise, most will do what is being done with pretty much everyone that is investing in this capability. That is develop 5th generation fighters with stealth, sensors, EA and other advantages.
To conclude, I would like to point to the designs that would be appearing in the coming years from South Korea, Japan, India and those of the 6th generation fighters emerging post 2015 from the USN. All would employ a mix of advanced sensors, EA and stealth. The AMCA would do the same. I expect the T-50 to be Russia's best attempt at stealth and integrated electronic attack. All those that have to confront the growing challenge of an IAD and A2AD elements that exist on land, in the air and indeed in space are coming to the same conclusion and adding multiple elements to survivability and A2AD penetration.
This is just the "active" portion of the threat..