LCA Tejas: News and Discussions

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 16 Jul 2015 10:16

Maybe it can take the place of the Arjun in the IA! Supersonic Tank!!

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 16 Jul 2015 10:32

^Please don't give them ideas.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Jul 2015 11:09

ramana wrote:srai, How many minutes of combat time at station can LCA do? Useful for escort role.

I think using the fuel load and the sfc one can estimate this.

From Vivek Ahuja's Blog (http://thebetacoefficient.blogspot.in/2 ... ew-of.html):

Flight time versus available fuel can be plotted using the above data to extrapolate time on station for each type of mission profile. The flight-time/available fuel plot is provided below for the LCA cruising at 20,000 ft ASL. The clean, combat and ferry conditions are illustrated. It is clear that the LCA will not be a long endurance fighter under any conditions. The maximum flight time for the LCA on its own fuel capacity in the ferry condition is around ~110 minutes from take-off to empty fuel tanks. The performance for combat conditions is much lower at ~60 minutes when carrying a 1,000 kg payload beyond the fuel

This should tell you why IAF was insisting on IFR capability on Tejas.

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 16 Jul 2015 11:48

LCA is turning out to be a great aircraft. I must say tho, my respect for the F-16 has gone up quite a bit. I understand the role is different, but the US was really able to make a more capable aircraft than LCA while being not that much bigger in size. That too almost 40 years ago. Shows what vision and proper support to the project can really do.

That being said, MKII while being confined mostly to the interceptor role will be giving pretty much every 4th gen aircraft a hard time. Are there plans to manufacture HMCS along with the helmet in India?

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 16 Jul 2015 12:11

Vivek K wrote:Maybe it can take the place of the Arjun in the IA! Supersonic Tank!!

Then it will be doomed onlee. IAF is not doing enough to dump it. Perhaps IA can manage it.

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 16 Jul 2015 12:20

Manish_P wrote:
Is it possible to use LCA in CAS role for Ground forces? In that case , Army can have its own Aviation Wing providing CAS through LCA independently of Airforce which could be freed to undertake Deep Strike Missions, CAP and controlling the Sky or Airspace dominance role.
The LCA Tejas is fighting an uphill battle to get accepted by it's primary user, the IAF... on what basis can we think that the indian army will find it suitable for it's requirements

Well , just a thought . Like IN got into LCA Navy , IA can ramp up its Aviation corp to use LCA for CAS roles. May be some changes in weapons profile could be effected. Aviation Corp is primarily Heli Unit. Once it also tries its hands on LCA MK1 IAF would get some competition. I think IA has a proposal on similar lines pending with AHQ , though not with LCA. It is opposed by IAF tooth and nail to ensure Air exclusivity. Still IA managed AAC with Helis in ground support roles, relatively young corp raised in 1986 against all opposition from IAF.

sankum · Post by **sankum** » 16 Jul 2015 13:44

Lca on full internal fuel+ max external fuel=5 T fuel (37.5% fuel fraction) will have endurance of more than 3.5hrs and not 110min as if the endurance is so low IN will not use it for carrier aviation.

srai · Post by **srai** » 16 Jul 2015 15:53

rohitvats wrote:
ramana wrote:srai, How many minutes of combat time at station can LCA do? Useful for escort role.

I think using the fuel load and the sfc one can estimate this.
From Vivek Ahuja's Blog (http://thebetacoefficient.blogspot.in/2 ... ew-of.html):

Flight time versus available fuel can be plotted using the above data to extrapolate time on station for each type of mission profile. The flight-time/available fuel plot is provided below for the LCA cruising at 20,000 ft ASL. The clean, combat and ferry conditions are illustrated. It is clear that the LCA will not be a long endurance fighter under any conditions. The maximum flight time for the LCA on its own fuel capacity in the ferry condition is around ~110 minutes from take-off to empty fuel tanks. The performance for combat conditions is much lower at ~60 minutes when carrying a 1,000 kg payload beyond the fuel
This should tell you why IAF was insisting on IFR capability on Tejas.

Isn't that on internal fuel only? If we double the fuel via external tanks, endurance will be much more. Ferry range with external tanks is 1700km and combat radius is up to 500km.

LCA Tejas Gets Initial Operational Clearance for Induction into IAF IOC of LCA a Major Milestone in Self-Reliance

...
LCA Tejas is capable of flying non- stop to destinations over 1700 km away (Ferry Range). It's Radius of Action is upto 500 km depending upon the nature and duration of actual combat.
...

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 16 Jul 2015 16:03

chaanakya wrote:
Manish_P wrote:Is it possible to use LCA in CAS role for Ground forces? In that case , Army can have its own Aviation Wing providing CAS through LCA independently of Airforce which could be freed to undertake Deep Strike Missions, CAP and controlling the Sky or Airspace dominance role.

The LCA Tejas is fighting an uphill battle to get accepted by it's primary user, the IAF... on what basis can we think that the indian army will find it suitable for it's requirements
Well , just a thought . Like IN got into LCA Navy , IA can ramp up its Aviation corp to use LCA for CAS roles. May be some changes in weapons profile could be effected. Aviation Corp is primarily Heli Unit. Once it also tries its hands on LCA MK1 IAF would get some competition. I think IA has a proposal on similar lines pending with AHQ , though not with LCA. It is opposed by IAF tooth and nail to ensure Air exclusivity. Still IA managed AAC with Helis in ground support roles, relatively young corp raised in 1986 against all opposition from IAF.

<Completely OT for the larger topic in hand>
Ummm Chaanakyaji, I wouldn't agree with that.
End of the day, however reprehensible IAF's attitude and actions towards indigenous products has been, it's still our force - so these institutional attitude issues needs to be solved, if required, by force-feeding etc. - but I'd prefer (and I'm sure most of us would agree as well), the clean-up initiative will need to come up from it's officer cadre (like Navy) itself - aka from within, and not from outside, and we need to be patient till that happens.

But solutions like cutting-off the head because of a headache, is not desirable.

End of the day IAF is a professional fighting force, barring none - albeit extreme tactical in it's outlook, but that's where the scope-of-improvement is. That competency needs to be retained (so Wing Co and below ranks) while enabling them to develop the strategic outlook (Air Cmdr and above ranks) of self-sufficiency towards product development requiring developing and nurturing the MIC ecosystem etc etc.

For e.g. you go to a good/large BRD - you will see Cpl/Sgt ranks far outweigh the officer cadre wrt professional (mostly technical) qual etc. And it's far more evident on a day-to-day work-profile.
Almost ~2+ decades back, one witnessed the M53-P2 engine test being conducted, completely end-to-end, by a group of NCOs and other airmen (max rank seen was a MWO, but mostly were WO, JWOs and Sgts) - not a single tech aphsaar were on sight (guess they were too busy, signing-off various PL/SL/ELs, in triplicate and other std baboon-giri, that is normally witnessed in Dilli corridors). When enquired, the smiles were quite instructive of what those men felt about usability of these aphsaars.

Betw, When TSarkarji quotes about a shipyard and various labor-attitudes being displayed there and it's adverse impact on shaping IAF personnel's attitudes towards civilians. In the same vein, how about the above example (and there are many such examples) and it's impact on civilians attitudes being shaped. Though I have to admit, such interface is much less possible for a civilian population given the closed nature of the armed forces activities (by design).

Anyway I think I'm digressing!!

Coming back to the topic ... good/bad/ugly IAF is OUR force and under no circumstances their primary job and thus propriety wrt offensive/defensive Fixed-Wing A/C usage-ownership for sovereign air-space defense should be diluted.
So stuff like some sqns of LCA being handed over to AAC (and stunts like a few IL-76/C-17 platforms to AAC etc) should be avoided.

Having said the I'm not so sure the same logic should/would apply to offensive and defensive rotary wing asset ownership ... not an expert here (rohitvatsji, vaibhavji, deejayji et all are), but my personal view is upto battalion-level ground-offensive-support assets (and “tactical” CAS roles) should have under one command structure. Aka the battalion commander should have the comfort feeling one of his infantry/artillery officer, one who completely knows and feels and have the first-hand experience of infantry/artillery fighting on the ground, is the one operating an offensive/defensive platform in support of his ground offensive.

So yes IMVHO, “tactical” platforms like Apache/LCH/Rudra (for offensive) and ALH/Chetak/Cheetah (for defensive) etc etc needs to be under AAC, maybe under a divisional commander level (who then can flexibly assign it at battalion level - I doubt setting up support infra at a battalion level would be tenable) – but the “strategic” CAS/Ground Attack/Air Dominance/Air Superiority etc should always firmly be with IAF and IAF alone.

Maybe the concept of flying artillery etc are not too ingrained yet in IA thinking yet ... but I think that time is fast approaching, and IA and IAF needs to introspect and start thinking about it.

Wrt what Shivji is suggesting like fixed-wing FAO/FAC, ultra-light CAS roles via HTT-40, well, that’s an interesting thought (as always when it comes from shivji), and need to think it thru. It was actually proposed by the HAL Program Manager, when IAF completely decided not to support it at any cost. Come to think of it FAC roles is completely at a divisional level, so if we are saying offensive/defensive “tactical” CAS roles should be with IA at a battalion level, why not the FAO/FAC roles as well.

Hmmm …

</Completely OT for the larger topic in hand>

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 16 Jul 2015 18:09

While the lca is ideal for point defense and short ranged multirole missions, I don't see it as best choice for long duration escort, we have more suitable platforms for that.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 16 Jul 2015 18:21

Cain Marko wrote:While the lca is ideal for point defense and short ranged multirole missions, I don't see it as best choice for long duration escort, we have more suitable platforms for that.

even with refueling pod?

we need to develop a LCA Mk2 SEAD variant like the growler

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 Jul 2015 18:26

The MKI would be your platform for that. With all that POD and the EFT's the Growler gets to about 2 hours of cruise before requiring a tanker..Its OK off of a ship if you are restricted in terms of platform but off of land you need something with more TOS.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 16 Jul 2015 18:27

I would think so, makes more sense to have mki escorting assets like aew, and let tejas do what it is primarily designed for, qra etc...where mki would be wasteful..but I could be wrong...a rambha growler variant would be truly shock n awe

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 16 Jul 2015 20:54

say i have a flanker playing mini-awac in a squadron,.. may be another flanker as backup. so, i am thinking, 2 MKIs + 15 Tejas Mk2++ + a refueler for deep strikes. what i really want is LCA to develop passive cuing from MKI. for that, tejas must demonstrate its much claimed naturally stealthy composite skins put to test so that LPI is engaged, and enemy airbornes have no idea LCA is within 100 naut range. MKIs can guide the missile launches for the tejas from say 200 nauts approx.

Eric Leiderman · Post by **Eric Leiderman** » 16 Jul 2015 21:16

With an order of 40 aircraft for the LCA1 and 1.5 , If we reach a production rate of 12 to 16 aircraft a year.
The IAF order will be completed 2-4years before the LCA 2 is ready for production.

Instead of idling the supply chain with all the negatives that it entails.
Why not the IAF have a sq or two of LCA 1.5 for CAS.
The range will not be an issue in this role.
The extra weight ballast can be used up in kevlar armour.
The canon and space for shells might need an upgrade.
A few more control surfaces for slow speed approaches, (on te same lines as the NLCA)

I think it is a brilliant idea much better than a weaponised hawk. Price comparison wise they will not be tha far off too.

Here we ard screaming for more aircraft, it would be criminal to let a production facility unused.

Though what I expect/hope to see, is the IAF coming on board and ordering 1 - 2 more sq of LCA 1.5 as an interim to the LCA 2

brar_w · Post by **brar_w** » 16 Jul 2015 21:30

One of the most important metric to measure for a CAS platform is time on station as well (much like SEAD). It would be interesting what that data is on the LCA i.e. how far can it go and hold an orbit, especially if there is a lot of low gun deployment.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Jul 2015 21:36

Cain Marko wrote:While the lca is ideal for point defense and short ranged multirole missions, I don't see it as best choice for long duration escort, we have more suitable platforms for that.

What is "short" and "long"?

After all Pakistan is about 200 Kms (north) and about 800 Kms deep down south. Most of their assets are within around 200-300 kms.

China is a different matter.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jul 2015 23:57

I apologize for the Time of Station diversion.

The short duration reflects the Mig21 replacement heritage part of ASR.
When discussing this aspect kindly look at Mig 21 TOS also.

SaiK Don't ask for unobatanium requirements.

srai · Post by **srai** » 17 Jul 2015 03:03

ramana wrote:...
saiK Don't ask for unobatanium requirements.

SEAD/EW roles are better suited for larger aircraft. You need extra power for you sensors and jamming equipment, and you need that extra loitering time to sniff out radar/SAM sites.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 17 Jul 2015 09:07

NRao wrote:
Cain Marko wrote:While the lca is ideal for point defense and short ranged multirole missions, I don't see it as best choice for long duration escort, we have more suitable platforms for that.
What is "short" and "long"?

After all Pakistan is about 200 Kms (north) and about 800 Kms deep down south. Most of their assets are within around 200-300 kms.

China is a different matter.

Time on station sir...escort roles would hinge upon this criterion...be it escort for hvas or top cover for strike packages...jmt....

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 17 Jul 2015 10:26

China is a different matter.

+1

I really do think we need to start our thinking about most, if not all, platforms from POV of China (in terms of range and capabilities).

The way things are going, Pakistan is very likely to end up as the Chinas eastern extension a la North Korea

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 17 Jul 2015 11:57

maitya wrote:

<Completely OT for the larger topic in hand>
Ummm Chaanakyaji, I wouldn't agree with that.
End of the day, however reprehensible IAF's attitude and actions towards indigenous products has been, it's still our force - so these institutional attitude issues needs to be solved, if required, by force-feeding etc. - but I'd prefer (and I'm sure most of us would agree as well), the clean-up initiative will need to come up from it's officer cadre (like Navy) itself - aka from within, and not from outside, and we need to be patient till that happens.

But solutions like cutting-off the head because of a headache, is not desirable.

End of the day IAF is a professional fighting force, barring none - albeit extreme tactical in it's outlook, but that's where the scope-of-improvement is. That competency needs to be retained (so Wing Co and below ranks) while enabling them to develop the strategic outlook (Air Cmdr and above ranks) of self-sufficiency towards product development requiring developing and nurturing the MIC ecosystem etc etc.

For e.g. you go to a good/large BRD - you will see Cpl/Sgt ranks far outweigh the officer cadre wrt professional (mostly technical) qual etc. And it's far more evident on a day-to-day work-profile.
Almost ~2+ decades back, one witnessed the M53-P2 engine test being conducted, completely end-to-end, by a group of NCOs and other airmen (max rank seen was a MWO, but mostly were WO, JWOs and Sgts) - not a single tech aphsaar were on sight (guess they were too busy, signing-off various PL/SL/ELs, in triplicate and other std baboon-giri, that is normally witnessed in Dilli corridors). When enquired, the smiles were quite instructive of what those men felt about usability of these aphsaars.

Betw, When TSarkarji quotes about a shipyard and various labor-attitudes being displayed there and it's adverse impact on shaping IAF personnel's attitudes towards civilians. In the same vein, how about the above example (and there are many such examples) and it's impact on civilians attitudes being shaped. Though I have to admit, such interface is much less possible for a civilian population given the closed nature of the armed forces activities (by design).

Anyway I think I'm digressing!!

Coming back to the topic ... good/bad/ugly IAF is OUR force and under no circumstances their primary job and thus propriety wrt offensive/defensive Fixed-Wing A/C usage-ownership for sovereign air-space defense should be diluted.
So stuff like some sqns of LCA being handed over to AAC (and stunts like a few IL-76/C-17 platforms to AAC etc) should be avoided.

Having said the I'm not so sure the same logic should/would apply to offensive and defensive rotary wing asset ownership ... not an expert here (rohitvatsji, vaibhavji, deejayji et all are), but my personal view is upto battalion-level ground-offensive-support assets (and “tactical” CAS roles) should have under one command structure. Aka the battalion commander should have the comfort feeling one of his infantry/artillery officer, one who completely knows and feels and have the first-hand experience of infantry/artillery fighting on the ground, is the one operating an offensive/defensive platform in support of his ground offensive.

So yes IMVHO, “tactical” platforms like Apache/LCH/Rudra (for offensive) and ALH/Chetak/Cheetah (for defensive) etc etc needs to be under AAC, maybe under a divisional commander level (who then can flexibly assign it at battalion level - I doubt setting up support infra at a battalion level would be tenable) – but the “strategic” CAS/Ground Attack/Air Dominance/Air Superiority etc should always firmly be with IAF and IAF alone.

Maybe the concept of flying artillery etc are not too ingrained yet in IA thinking yet ... but I think that time is fast approaching, and IA and IAF needs to introspect and start thinking about it.

Wrt what Shivji is suggesting like fixed-wing FAO/FAC, ultra-light CAS roles via HTT-40, well, that’s an interesting thought (as always when it comes from shivji), and need to think it thru. It was actually proposed by the HAL Program Manager, when IAF completely decided not to support it at any cost. Come to think of it FAC roles is completely at a divisional level, so if we are saying offensive/defensive “tactical” CAS roles should be with IA at a battalion level, why not the FAO/FAC roles as well.

Hmmm …

</Completely OT for the larger topic in hand>

Ok that's a beginning of thought process.

No I am not suggesting to cut off the head.

It needs some changes in the way we approach airforce support for Army operations and pure Airforce operations.

I was just reading Siachen by Nitin Gokhale and the role played by 114 HU which was hived off from Airforce as Army needed Heli support on daily basis to support logistics in HA Posts.

Army has many operations which require close air support and ground support. You also mentioned FAO/FAC. Airforce may not be always in a position to spare its asset of willing to undertake operations for the fear of escalation.

Induction of Airforce in to an area of army operation is thought of a offensive deployment, escalation of hostalities which could soon spiral out of control.

Airwing as part of Army might just prevent that escalation ladder. not that that would always be so.

You have classified CAS role as strategic along with air dominance, air superiority and ground attack.

I would think of it a supportive role. May be I am wrong in thinking that.

The problem with Airwing of IA as I would see is

1. having separate airfield
2. duplicating maintenance infrastructure
3.maintaining separate set up parallel to what IAF already has.
4.Making changes to warfare doctrine.
5.Training requirement and infrastructure
6.Defining mission profiles without requiring IAF support
7.common Air traffic control
8.Communication and network inter-operability
9.Use of platforms like AWACS/AEW&C
10.protocol for separation and role definition

( not in any specific order)

What I had in mind the events like 1962 war where IAF , reportedly,~~refused~~ not ordered (?) to move in or like Longewala where it had to provide CAS/ground attack. Second on Siachen. Third one specific army requirements which resulted in AAC.

There are many advanced Military that operate its Ground forces with integrated Airwings. They do have a variant of F-16s AFAIK.Its not a new concept . For India it would be new given the compartmentalised services with each having their own turf to protect.

I don't know if LCA could fulfil CAS/GS roles like the way Helis could do. May be many changes would be required. may be other A/cs would be more suitable like what shiv suggested Combat Hawk or HTT-40. If that is could we MoDiFy LCA in CAS roles easily. So instead of BVR missiles we can have more ground oriented weapons and not AAM. We may need LCA to be able to fly and land from unpaved runways and short runways as well. May be fly at low speed and low altitude. Have more body armour to withstand ground fire from HMGs.But lot of requirements which Airforce needs in LCA may not be needed for Army. so like LCA MK1 could also go to IA with some MoDification.

May be IA can develop mission specific profiles for LCAs which would cater to IA and not much worry about STR/ITR. which would be needed in air combat and air dominance or CAP roles or dog fights. LCA while in IA could shoot and scoot, strafe, bomb the area before Helis move in to in-filtrate or ex-filtrate.

Once enemy knows that Air support is not from Airforce but from Army the ladder of escalation would become that much difficult for them to justify by inducting their airforce. Of course they can always use their air elements with their Army. that will keep conflicts from getting out of hand as mission profiles would be limited.

More customers for LCAs , more desi development and more production.

if OT pardon me for thinking aloud.

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 17 Jul 2015 13:27

^^^^^^^^ Chaanakyaji, let's continue in this new thread

Abhibhushan · Post by **Abhibhushan** » 17 Jul 2015 14:33

What I had in mind the events like 1962 war where IAF , reportedly, refused to move in

I must admit that I am flabbergasted ! In 1962 I was a flight commander in a fighter squadron located in Ambala. I distinctly remember the run-up to the operations in 1962: Our senseless 'Forward Policy', the positioning of ill-equipped (nil equipped?) soldiers in penny packet posts that could never be defended, the enormous air maintenance operation to feed these hapless soldiers, hectic training to learn how to provide close air support at 20k feet at the extremities of our radius of operation effectively, spending weeks with the army in forward location to understand the nature of support the army will need, being earmarked for formations we would support and getting to know the guys (often mates from NDA) and creating a bond, and the frustrating wait for the orders to go out and actually strike, an order that never came. The frustration was more acute because we knew that application of offensive air power in the Ladakh sector would / could transform the battles in that sector to a rout of the enemy. China was not in a position to mount an air operation in that sector. We could strike effectively. The terrain was flat. No vegetation to hide from air strikes. No way to hide vehicle track on the barren land.

The GOI decided to not to use airpower, apparently on the advise of the American Ambassador. The PM did not speak to the CAS even once while deciding to withhold offensive use of air power. It was a sad day for the country. And now sir, your slander that the Airforce refused to move in is just preposterous. I am sorry if my harsh words hurt you, but I am disgusted by your IAF bashing.

You may like to look up a blog entry 'Puzzlement in 1962' at Tkstales.wordpress.com

maitya · Post by **maitya** » 17 Jul 2015 14:43

^^^^^^^^ Sir, not here - let's continue in this new thread. I've x-posted it there as well.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 17 Jul 2015 15:08

chaanakya wrote:<SNIP>What I had in mind the events like 1962 war where IAF , reportedly, refused to move in <SNIP>

You either need to provide a back-up of absolutely irresponsible statement above or edit your post and remove this part.

Indulging in flights of fancy does not extend to distorting history and slandering the name of an entire organization.

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 17 Jul 2015 15:51

rohitvats wrote:
chaanakya wrote:<SNIP>What I had in mind the events like 1962 war where IAF , reportedly, refused to move in <SNIP>
You either need to provide a back-up of absolutely irresponsible statement above or edit your post and remove this part.

Indulging in flights of fancy does not extend to distorting history and slandering the name of an entire organization.

Well it has moved to another thread.This post is edited to some extent.

Air Vice Marshal AK Tiwary in his review, quoted / linked in that thread, has detailed on why No Use of Air Combat Power in Sino Indian War

And here I found one interesting statement

Lt Gen Kaul later stated that, ”Unfortunately, it was the reluctance on the part of the IAF to be able to mount offensive sorties as a legitimate exercise of self-defence which added to the fears of Government in Delhi. If the Air Staff had undertaken to do this, the political appreciation might have been different (?)”16

No doubt the Director Operations, then Air Commodore HC Dewan advised against using combat air.

I don't know if opinion of Director Operations would have any bearing on this reported refusal. What constitutes official refusal? It also appears that Top Brass was not consulted but then whether Director Operations is "top brass" or not?

And
The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999:Restrictions on the Use of Air Power
R. Sukumaran

Air Headquarters’ Views on Offensive Air Support
The official history states that no notings or documents are available to
explain the decision to forego the use of offensive air support. However, Air
Marshal HC Dewan (retd), then Director of Operations at Air headquarters,
is quoted as saying that he had advised the CAS against the use of offensive
air support.17 In his view, the rugged and heavily forested terrain in NEFA
precluded the use of Close Air Support against dispersed infantry. Since armour
was not likely to be used, there were no worthwhile targets for air attack.
With our troops heavily dependent on air supply, it would be best not to
provoke the Chinese. As the larger Air Force, they could withstand losses that
the IAF could not. IAF resources were also to be kept in the West to deal with
a possible Pakistani threat. Lastly, he felt that India was likely to forfeit
international sympathy, if it chose to ‘escalate’ the conflict. There is no mention
of bombing targets in Tibet. It seems that only Close Air Support in NEFA
was under consideration. It was apparently felt that even within our borders,
the use of offensive air power would be ‘escalatory’.

And OMG moment.......

From brf's own archives. A blast from the past for Mods.

Close Air Support in the 1962 War

Gp Capt Anant Bewoor argues in this article that the IAF was not fully prepared to provide Close Air Support over the battlefields of the 1962 War.

Is that why the IAF top brass said we should not take part? Was our limitation hidden under the supposed fear of reprisals by the PLAAF on Delhi and Calcutta?

History is a strange beast.

Any further discussion would be OT here. I don't want to derail the thread with "Flights of Fancy" as you decreed.

Gyan · Post by **Gyan** » 17 Jul 2015 16:22

Air Headquarters’ Views on Offensive Air Support
The official history states that no notings or documents are available to
explain the decision to forego the use of offensive air support. However, Air
Marshal HC Dewan (retd), then Director of Operations at Air headquarters,
is quoted as saying that he had advised the CAS against the use of offensive
air support.17 In his view, the rugged and heavily forested terrain in NEFA
precluded the use of Close Air Support against dispersed infantry. Since armour
was not likely to be used, there were no worthwhile targets for air attack.
With our troops heavily dependent on air supply, it would be best not to
provoke the Chinese. As the larger Air Force, they could withstand losses that
the IAF could not. IAF resources were also to be kept in the West to deal with
a possible Pakistani threat. Lastly, he felt that India was likely to forfeit
international sympathy, if it chose to ‘escalate’ the conflict. There is no mention
of bombing targets in Tibet. It seems that only Close Air Support in NEFA
was under consideration. It was apparently felt that even within our borders,
the use of offensive air power would be ‘escalatory’.

OOOOOOOOOMMMMMMMMMMMMM GOD

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 17 Jul 2015 16:44

disgusting! but clearly exposes our weaknesses.

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 17 Jul 2015 18:32

Abhibhushan wrote:
What I had in mind the events like 1962 war where IAF , reportedly, refused to move in
I must admit that I am flabbergasted ! .................... And now sir, your slander that the Airforce refused to move in is just preposterous. I am sorry if my harsh words hurt you, but I am disgusted by your IAF bashing.

You may like to look up a blog entry 'Puzzlement in 1962' at Tkstales.wordpress.com

I am , too, flabergasted, sir. The link you referred me to has this. And you say I am bashing IAF. And there is a self proclaimed defender in rohitvats who says I am having flights of fancy and accuses me of making irresponsible statement. But in an open forum such things are passe. History makes one eat one's words.

All in all, in 1962, we at the front line did not know what we were required to do against the Chinese because we had never considered them to be an ‘enemy’. We had not trained for the task and had not even discussed possible tactics to be used. At the leadership level within the Service we did not know what we would want to do if we were given a free hand by the government. We also did not know what our capabilities were because we had never thought of such a fight let alone devising strategies for such a fight. The government never seriously sought our opinion and we know now that at least one opinion against use of offensive airpower was given out to the Government from the Air HQ. We also know now that the Chinese were in no position to pose a serious threat to our forces or our cities from the air. In hind sight it also seems probable that use of offensive air power in the Ladakh sector could have altered the outcome decisively. On the ground in the east we were in a mess. It was however impossible for the Chinese to supply and sustain an army of occupation in NEFA for any length of time. It is not out of the goodness of their hear that they declared an unilateral ceasefire. It is clear that the government of the day had failed the country. What troubles me is to make up my mind even in hind sight and admit, if only to myself, that we as the armed forces also failed the country. Did we? That is my puzzled uncertainty.

All that is OT ans I don't wish to make further post here or in other thread on this touchy subject. Thanks a lot.

eklavya · Post by **eklavya** » 18 Jul 2015 02:22

Here is AVM Tiwary's account, which chaanakya has quoted very selectively and distorted the message. Nothing unexpected.

No Use of Combat Air Power in 1962

It appears that at different times, Air HQ expressed differing assessment of the Chinese air threat. While one section appreciated all the advantages for India in committing its air force into war, the other section was strayed by the reasoning of political leaders and senior leadership of the Indian Army. They argued that close air support against dispersed and dug in infantry in the jungles obtaining in lower Himalayas will not be effective. In fact close air support demands from the army units in the field were raised. But these were vetoed by Army Commands and the Army HQ even though air force pilots remained on cockpit alert for the same. It was also reasoned that this action by IAF may invoke Chinese Air Force to interfere with our transport and helicopter operations which were the lifeline for forward deployed army troops. And of course in case of escalation Chinese Air Force could bomb Indian cities. No doubt the Director Operations, then Air Commodore HC Dewan advised against using combat air.

But there were officers including the Air Chief who felt India would benefit by use of combat air force. Another such officer was then Air Vice Marshal Arjan Singh, then Air Officer Administration at Air HQ. Another was Wg Cdr Raghavendran, a staff officer in Operations Directorate, who later became an Air Marshal. Having stated so it must also be emphasised that from all accounts available, that after the start of the conflict it is quite clear that Air Chief including majority of air force officers advocated use of combat air, time and again but to no avail. Some sources do mention initial reluctance on part of the Air Chief but this is at best hearsay and not based on any evidence.21 Such contradiction in professional opinion on air power matters goes to highlight the accurate description of the complexity in air warfare by Winston S Churchill during World War II. That the air warfare is one of the most complicated affair and difficult to understand even by the professionals. Therefore the need to be thoroughly air minded.

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 18 Jul 2015 02:42

^^He is justifying non use of IAF in 1962. I am more concerned about what officially transpired. Who gave official opinion not to use Airforce, Whether it was Army brass, Airforce brass, MOD or Political decision. Finally it had to be political but Official opinion came from Airforce which would have stayed the hands of Airforce. of course you are not concerned with this. So forget to read string of posts on this aspect here and in the other thread. You can't be bothered with heavy reading.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Jul 2015 02:47

There was no political direction. Nehru was listening to Galbraith who was acting for US. IAF would have responded if orders were given. They were not given.
Its a grevious insult to the young pilots who were waiting in strike aircraft and later on went to become Chiefs.
No more on this. Will ban promptly.

Kakkaji · Post by **Kakkaji** » 19 Jul 2015 04:09

Some misrepresentation, yet posting in full due to the details:

Cost worry on Rafale and Tejas

New Delhi, July 18: The "stopgap arrangement" to buy 36 Rafale fighter jets from France, as announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his Paris visit in April, is estimated to cost the exchequer about Rs 800 crore per plane plus the cost of weapons and munitions, a defence source has told The Telegraph.

In other words, the 36 planes will cost Rs 28,800 crore.

To add to the air force's worries about depleting force levels, a light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas that was recently in field trials in Jaisalmer returned to Bangalore with a major technical fault: its undercarriage was down.

The first of the Tejas aircraft had been handed over to the air force in January this year pending a final operational clearance for the plane, which, it was hoped, would come by December. That hope is receding.

The Jaisalmer incident has further sapped the air force's confidence in the LCA. A former air force chief, Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, had famously described the LCA as MiG 21-plus. The MiG 21 is of 1970s vintage.

"I wonder if you would go to a car showroom today," said the defence source, "and ask to buy a 1984 model Maruti."

The cost of the Rafale was one of the primary reasons that prompted the Modi government to rethink the contract after seven years of trials.

A contract negotiation committee is still in talks to fix the precise cost of the aircraft. The committee is not going into the technical specifications or trials of the aircraft because that is presumed to have been done during the trials through which the Rafale was selected for the air force's requirement of 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft.

But the air force is worried that the procurement process is not fast enough to meet its requirement of fighter aircraft after it "number-plates" three squadrons by the end of this financial year.

"Number-plating" of squadrons is done after the aircraft of a particular unit are phased out - retired from service - or reallocated to other units to meet their shortages. Technically, the squadrons are still "alive" but they are bereft of planes.

Typically, a fighter squadron in India's air force has 16 aircraft (plus two in reserve). By next March, the air force will have retired about 50 aircraft without adding any fighter jet to its inventory.

Defence minister Manohar Parrikar had said the government would seek to meet the requirement of the air force's fighter fleet by hastening the production of the Tejas. But the Tejas neither has the capabilities the air force requires from a medium multi-role aircraft, nor is operational.

At about Rs 800 crore apiece, the Rafale is not cheap, either. The Sukhoi 30Mki, the most modern aircraft in the air force's inventory, currently costs between Rs 420 and 430 crore, the source said. But it is the time and cost overrun relating to the LCA that is probably more expensive, cumulatively. The LCA was expected to be delivered in 1993.

member_28108 · Post by **member_28108** » 19 Jul 2015 07:21

Undercarriage was down -whose fault state it when you fly with it down?

member_22539 · Post by **member_22539** » 19 Jul 2015 07:42

To add to the air force's worries about depleting force levels, a light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas that was recently in field trials in Jaisalmer returned to Bangalore with a major technical fault: its undercarriage was down.

I bet this has never happened to Rafale or any other foreign fighter. In fact it must the first time such a thing has happened in the history of aviation itself. This must mean that we must scrap the LCA program and import some white elephant right?

Filthy presstitute scum

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 19 Jul 2015 07:50

Kakkaji wrote:Some misrepresentation, yet posting in full due to the details:

Cost worry on Rafale and Tejas

"I wonder if you would go to a car showroom today," said the defence source, "and ask to buy a 1984 model Maruti."[/b]

Kakkaji this article is not "some misinterpretation". It is unadulterated crap. I am beginning to yearn for the 1970s when you had to scour the newspapers for any defence related news. Nowadays every time a reporter needs to poop he writes a defence related article which gets published.

But there is an interesting Freudian slip here - this is the mindset of an upper middle class reporter or editor who never visits a used car showroom and considers that beneath his dignity, but he is not wealthy enough to start buying up the oldest models because of their vintage value. Amazing how peoples thoughts and inner biases come out

A Deshmukh · Post by **A Deshmukh** » 19 Jul 2015 09:33

Kakkaji wrote:Cost worry on Rafale and Tejas
"I wonder if you would go to a car showroom today," said the defence source, "and ask to buy a 1984 model Maruti."

I have to commute everyday 10 kms.
If I have the following choices:
1) walking
2) commuting on my scooter which is 25 yr old and prone to breaking down during my commute
3) buying a 1984 Maruti car
4) buying a imported Mercedes for which I do not really have the money and I can only purchase compromising my basic necessities like medicines and food and risking bankruptcy.

Given the above choices I will go with 1984 Maruti car.

Shreeman · Post by **Shreeman** » 19 Jul 2015 10:54

First, it had no radiom, the pilot would have to look out the window to fight. The it had no refueling probe, a mechanic had to hold up a "kuppi" to put fuel in it. Now the undercarriage is showing, revealing all the shirm shirm secrets to the enemy? I mean all you need is simple binoculars and the circuit diagram is right there, under the tires. They dont even paint over it or anything. You expect the air force to go to war with that?

The only thing that works is the american engine. Otherwise, its a roadways bus. No wonder defense sources think it is like a 1984 maruti. In 1985 model, at least you could run the AC when going downhill. The 84 model was a total loss.

Chinmayanand · Post by **Chinmayanand** » 19 Jul 2015 15:02

Brahmos, Agnis and Nirbhays how many of these missiles can be had in 28,800 crores? What is it that Rafale can hit and these missiles can not ?Plus we get to save money on maintenance too ?

As a mango man, i am pissed at IAF . IAF should be handed over to IN for proper maintenance and renamed to INAF.

If these same very officers were working for PLAAF , they would have been rejecting every local plane and asking for cloaking devices, warp drives and neutron torpedoes to fight the USN . China does not have quality so it's going by quantity. They try to adapt and innovate while our forces are even issuing RFI's for requirements and strategies. This is insane.

As a mango man what i understand is its not the planes that will be wrestling with each other but it will be the BVRAAMs . How does it matter whether its fired from a LCA or a Rafale ? The munitions seem to be more important than the plane itself . IAF should induct LCA with the best of munition available.

Pardon my ignorance.