Indian Navy News & Discussion - 22 April 2015

[Multatuli]

Russia offers India a super submarine

Russia could offer to build its latest nuclear submarine, possibly the multi-purpose ‘Yasen’ class sub suitably modified for India, analyst Zachary Keck wrote in an article for The National Interest.

A modified ‘Yasen’ class submarine, Russia’s latest nuclear sub, could be built specially for India, a report in the Indian ‘Economic Times’ newspaper suggested. The ET was quoting the analyst Zachary Keck who, in an article in ‘The National Interest,’ said it was possible that the new submarine would be one of the multi-purpose ‘Yasen’ class submarines, equipped with cruise missiles, or a modification of the Yasen.

http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/07/13 ... 44197.html

[Karthik S]

As much I want our SSNs to be Indian designed and built, I agree with Austin. Given the present day scenario, 15 years is too long a period even without delays. Better we buy or modify Yasen class and call it Yasen MKI and produce it in numbers.

[Philip]

Whatever commonality with the Akula class in the new sub design would be welcome,as we'll be operating so many sub types a maintenance nightmare. Standardisation of the new sub type into the programme for the 6 SSSNs to be built in India would be the best solution,a alrger number of subs of the same class for cost-effectiveness all round.

Here's a good essay on the advantages of smaller conventional AIP subs in the littorals in the Chinese context of annexing Taiwan and the threat from the USN.Good analysis of the Soryu, Song and Yuan classes. The same holds good for IN subs in the littorals.

http://news.usni.org/2015/07/08/essay-c ... wan-strait?

Essay: China’s Submarine Solution for the Taiwan Strait
By: Henry Holst
July 8, 2015

2010 photo of a Type-39A Yuan-class submarine. CRS Photo
2010 photo of a Type-39A Yuan-class submarine. CRS Photo

While several Chinese security-scenarios are discussed in defense circles, China’s Taiwan dilemma is still the primary driver for Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) acquisition.

Resolving China’s Taiwan issue has been the PLA’s justification for double-digit budget increases over decades. The force needed to deal with a U.S. military intervention during a Taiwan contingency far outweighs that required to handle China’s other external security goals.

The Taiwan issue is reflected in the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) undersea force structure, which in recent years has heavily prioritized the construction of Type-39A Yuan-class conventional submarines (SSK). According to Naval War College professor and PLAN watcher Lyle Goldstein, the Yuan is “one of the sharpest spears in China’s maritime arsenal.”

The Yuan was primarily designed to deal with U.S. forces during a Taiwan contingency and is the only SSK that China is currently producing. The recent pace of Yuan construction has been staggering. Between 2010 and 2011 the PLAN launched eight Yuans and in 2012 alone laid down five new Yuan keels. There are currently 13 Yuans in service and seven more being constructed. The PLAN may construct up to 20 more. Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) recently stated “within five to eight years [The PLAN] will have about 82 submarines in the Asia Pacific area.”

A graph from the Office of Naval Intelligence’s recent report on the PLAN, shown below, anticipates China’s continued prioritization of SSKs over the next decade.

Given that submarine lifetimes run between 20-30 years, a substantial portion of this force will be Yuan-class. The Yuan will remain a key aspect of PLAN force structure through the 2030s and 2040s. If a conflict occurs between the U.S. and China around Taiwan or in the South China Sea, the Yuan will play a critical role in Chinese area-defense area-denial (A2/AD). Therefore, understanding of the Yuan’s design philosophy—what it was designed to excel at—is important for U.S. policymakers and the defense community at large.

Trade-off analysis is derived from the reality that weapons can never be everything or do everything perfectly and economically. Compromises must always be made. Understanding what capabilities the Yuan’s designers were willing or unwilling to sacrifice gives an analyst suggestive-insight into the goals and mindset of the PLAN.

A trade-off analysis on what little public information is available on the platform suggests the PLAN designed the Yuan to be a small, quiet, slow-moving anti-surface warfare platform. While the Yuan is undoubtedly capable of traditional SSK mission roles such as regional intelligence-gathering and coastal defense, trade-off analysis suggests the Yuan was designed primarily as an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) platform capable of hiding submerged for long periods of time in difficult-to-access shallow littorals.

Japan’s Soryu-class SSK provides an ideal contrast with the Yuan. The Soryu is 84 meters long, with a draft (height from water line) of 10.3 meters, a beam (width) of 9.1 meters, and a crew of 70. In contrast, the Yuan is 73-75 meters long, with a draft of 5.5 meters, a beam of 8.4 meters, and a crew of 58. Various sources report different submerged displacements for the Yuan. Comparatively, it is far smaller than the Soryu: The draft is 4.3 meters shorter, the length around 10 meters less, and 0.7 meters thinner in width.

Water pressure and hydrodynamic drag place a premium on submarine internal volume. Increasing an SSK’s capabilities, such as magazine (ammunition) depth, range, stealth, or speed, for example, no doubt has an upward-spiraling effect on platform size. Likewise, shrinking a submarine’s size would put substantial downward pressure on every onboard system, such as crew size, habitability, fuel storage, magazine depth, etc. Make no mistake: the Yuan’s designers accepted capability reductions in various areas in order to maintain a small size.

The Yuan’s small profile takes a new significance when compared to its non- air independent propulsion (AIP) equipped predecessor — China’s Song-class SSK. The AIP-equipped Yuan and non-AIP Song have extremely analogous dimensions.

AIP — which produces propulsion power underwater without taking oxygen from the surface — is a significant force-enhancing technology because it enables between 14 to 25 days submerged (depending on AIP-engine type and propulsion activity), thus enhancing survivability by decreasing the frequency with which the SSK needs to “snorkel” (recharge batteries using primary engines), which exposes the submarine to detection. Yet important to this analysis is the fact that AIP systems are large and take up internal volume. PLAN naval architects deliberately maintained the Song-class’s size even with the installation of an AIP system.

Pakistan’s Agosta-class SSK’s MESMA (Module d’Energie Sous-Marin Autonome) AIP system hull insertion-section is 8.6 meters long. Greece’s type214A (German-made) SSK’s 240 kW Fuel Cell system weights 1,800 kg and takes up a 1000-liter volume.

Installing a Stirling-AIP hull insertion into Sweden’s Gotland-class SSK fleet required an 8 meter hull insertion. While the Yuan’s Stirling-AIP system is non-modular (which is more efficient as it is included in the Yuan’s design ground-up, as opposed to a sectional hull-insertion, which is less space-efficient), there is no doubt that the inclusion of an AIP system required capability reductions elsewhere in order to maintain the Song’s size.

While there is a possibility that advances in automation may have contributed to the Yuan’s maintaining of the Song-class’s length, this is improbable, given the Song and the Yuan’s comparable crew sizes (60 and 65, respectively). For context, on board crew is actively minimized during submarine design so as to increase space available for other systems. Much of a submarine’s crew exist to make up for gaps in automation. Therefore given the two submarines’ probable similarity in automation technology and highly analogous dimensions, PLAN naval architects clearly placed such high value on the Yuan’s small profile that even with an AIP system the Song’s platform size was maintained. Why did the PLAN emphasize small platform size, when there are clear, immediate capability benefits to a Soryu-sized platform?

Advantages of a Small Platform: Shallow Operations

There are two advantages to small platform size: shallow operations and cost. The Yuan’s small size enables it to take fuller advantage of the shallow littorals that pepper the area around Taiwan and the South China Sea. The PLAN certainly has accurate surveys of China’s local ocean floor geography, water-temperature trends, and reef locations. PLAN submarine captains are undoubtedly adept at negotiating these features; they are forced to regularly. The Yuan’s small size allows it to maneuver more easily within shallow and confined littoral regions.

This is key, as shallow littoral’s bottom composition has a diminishing effect on sound propagation, sonar-target strength and noise levels — all of which acoustically shield submarines. The phenomenon a growing concern of the U.S. Navy.
“Picking up the quiet hum of a battery-powered, diesel-electric submarine in busy coastal waters is like trying to identify the sound of a single car engine in the din of a major city,” said U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Frank Drennan in a March story in the U.K. Daily Mail .

Given that SSK’s do not have the speed and longevity to evade quickly once detected, the Yuan’s terrain accessibility is a critical part of its survivability and operational ability. The advantages of shallow terrain are increased by the Yuan’s AIP system, which as mentioned before enables weeks of submerged time. This complicates U.S. anti-submarine warfare efforts, as snorkeling exposes SSKs to counter detection and is “the Achilles heel of the modern [conventional submarine].”

Nuclear attack submarines (SSN) like the U.S. Virginia-class (SSN-774) operate with comparatively greater difficulty in this type of terrain. While SSNs have enormous advantages over SSKs, shallow terrain partially limits the SSNs’s primary advantage: diving deep at high speeds after firing and thereby evade detection. Furthermore, maritime geography may circumstantially limit larger submarines physical maneuverability. It is conceivable that an adept PLAN submarine captain (A Chinese Günter Prien) could take advantage the Yuan’s shallow draft and wedge the SSK into a difficult-to-access channel or maritime feature, and thereby forcing higher-technology SSNs to fight on unfavorable terrain whose geography and acoustic signatures favor the defender.

The idea that PLAN naval architects designed the Yuan primarily for chokepoint control and anti-surface ASCM warfare is buttressed by the PLAN’s decision to maintain the Song-class’s double-pressure hull (two hulls: an inner and outer hull, rather than just a single-hull).

For technologically inferior navies like the PLAN, the main benefit to double-hull designs is the additional surface areas where sonar-absorbing, sound-dampening anechoic tiling can be placed. While double-hull designs were used in the past to increase survivability (Russia’s Kilo-class’ double-hull achieved 32 percent reserve buoyancy, which enabled it to remain buoyant even when one of the submarine’s six compartments and adjoining ballast tanks were flooded), it is extremely unlikely that a double-hull would keep the Yuan operational after being hit with a modern torpedo like the U.S. Mark 48.

Double hulls come at a significant capability trade-off: they are costly, difficult to repair, and increase platform size, which in turn increases hydrodynamic drag, lowers engine efficiency, cruising range, and therefore longevity. Efforts to limit size expansion would necessitate internal volume reductions, which would reduce platform capability in areas such as magazine depth, fuel supplies, habitability, for example. In contrast, single-hull designs are lighter, faster, have a higher internal volume-to-displacement ratio, and yet are less stealthy, given likely PLAN technology (The United States has used single-hulls for decades because of advanced U.S. quieting technology).

The PLAN was clearly willing to accept capability limitations and reduced range and speed in order to improve the Yuan’s stealth. The use of a double-hull reinforces the Yuan’s status as a chokepoint guard, rather than a platform that would use AIP to “act like an SSN for a day” and seek-out targets in blue water.

The PLAN may have accepted this trade-off because the Yuan does not need catch up with fast-moving surface ships in order to threaten them: the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile has a range of 180 kilometers. The Yuan is also able to use the PLA’s new supersonic ASCM (YJ-18). The YJ-18 “has been described as having a cruise range of 180km at Mach 0.8 and a sprint range of 40km a Mach 2.5 to 3.0.” An estimate from the Pentagon’s most recent Chinese military capability report places the maximum range of the YJ-18 at 250 nautical miles. This is significant, as supersonic sprinting speeds reduce the reaction time available to and complicate the work of a ship’s countermeasures. An estimate from the

ASCM’s free Yuan captains from spending crucial electrical reserves in attempts to maneuver into torpedo range (Yu-6 torpedo range est. 45 km), after which the Yuan could potentially be left with little power left. Furthermore, the crew proficiency needed to excel in ASCM-based anti-surface warfare is less than that needed when prioritizing torpedo-use. The latter requires complex maneuvering based on imperfect information, all the while leaving the very littoral areas that partially shield them from higher-technology SSNs.

Advantages of a Small Platform: Cost

While higher-technology nuclear attack submarines like the U.S. Virginia-class have great advantages over SSKs and could root out hidden Yuan’s over time, delousing SSK’s is complicated by their relatively “cheap” cost. Navies like the PLAN that (thus far) prioritize SSKs can field larger numbers of platforms than would be the case with a purely nuclear-submarine (SSN) force like the U.S. Navy.

The AIP-equipped French Scorpène and Russian Lada-class submarines, both dimensionally similar to the Yuan, have an export price of $450 million. The larger Japanese Soryu costs around $540 million (That is the sixth Soryu’s cost, which benefited from pre-existing designs and a well-established shipyard: a situation the Yuan shares). The cost of the Yuan is unknown. Various reports have priced Pakistan’s recently purchased Yuan-class SSKs between $250 and $325 million, or above $500 million. However, these early-reports are likely inaccurate. Moreover, Pakistan’s purchased Yuans may in fact be its smaller (cheaper), non AIP-equipped export version called the S-20. Lastly, such reports do not shed light on the cost-per-unit for the PLAN. A wide range of economic and political factors influences weapon export prices, to say the least about the variability of domestic production costs.

Generally speaking, the Yuan’s production cost is likely comparable to it’s dimensionally similar Lada-class and Scorpène-class counterparts. That puts the Yuan’s probable cost around 1/6 of a Virginia-class SSN ($2.8 billion). While SSK capabilities are in no way comparable to SSNs, such comparatively low-costs directly contribute to the PLAN’s two-to-one undersea platform quantitative advantage vis-à-vis its U.S. counterparts and the rapid pace of Yuan-acquisition, as shown previously. In the event of a conflict, PLA undersea numerical superiority may slow U.S. efforts to clear areas like the South China Sea of Yuan-class SSK’s. This would buy precious time for the PLA to accomplish its goals during a Taiwan contingency or territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

Delousing an area of SSKs is complicated by the fact that AIP increases the Yuan’s range, giving the Yuan more areas to hide or position themselves. Sweden’s Stirling-engine equipped (150kW system) Gotland-class can maintain 5 knots for 14 days submerged, which translates into a 1,680 submerged nautical mile range. While the Stirling AIP-equipped Yuan is larger than the Gotland, Taiwan is only 95 NM from China, the Senkaku islands only 200 NM, and even the Spratly Islands only 634 nautical miles.

Important to this discussion is the close proximity of Taiwan. With Chinese shores relatively close-by, Yuan captains may feel freer to expend energy reserves chasing their targets. Even when low on power AIP would likely enable a Yuan to creep back to the relative safety of China’s close littoral regions. It is conceivable that a fully fueled and charged Yuan could conduct operations around these areas while only rarely having to surface and recharge.

Furthermore, AIP expands the areas that would have to be searched, thereby slowing and complicating surface naval activity in the targeted area. This scenario will only grow worse, as improvements in battery technology enhance the range and longevity of conventional submarines.

Conclusion

The Yuan was designed be a small, cost-minimizing, quiet ASCM platform intended to excel at anti-surface warfare. The PLA may be seeking to deter or defeat U.S. intervention and rectify its weakness in ASW by producing a large number of expendable anti-surface warfare-specialized SSKs. The PLAN’s large SSK fleet would complicate U.S. ASW even if the pace of SSK elimination were high. Such a scenario would buy precious time for the PLA in a Taiwan contingency. The PLA may be seeking the ability to force a situation where the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet would be required to either accept a high level of risk, or operate further away from Taiwan.

However, such generalized conclusions do not take into account the effectiveness of U.S. missile defense, ASW, C4ISR, space and cyber abilities. In other words, trade-off analysis suggests what the PLA may hope it’s submarine force can achieve tactically, operationally, and strategically; not what it is guaranteed to be capable of. Nevertheless, the Yuan and its AIP system are the harbinger of greater challenges to U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific.

[member_22539]

As much I want our SSNs to be Indian designed and built, I agree with Austin. Given the present day scenario, 15 years is too long a period even without delays. Better we buy or modify Yasen class and call it Yasen MKI and produce it in numbers.

Maybe no one is interested in giving us license building for SSNs and the price of buying one is too exorbitant, so going slow on that.

In the end, the only real solution might be making our own, which will of course take a long time.

[srai]

As much I want our SSNs to be Indian designed and built, I agree with Austin. Given the present day scenario, 15 years is too long a period even without delays. Better we buy or modify Yasen class and call it Yasen MKI and produce it in numbers.

15-years is nothing in bigger scheme of things. If India wants to acquire the know-how's and whys of building SSN then it must slog it out on its own (with some guidance from experienced consultants).

No one is going to give critical ToT. Do you think if India had SSN technology that it would give it away in ToT to another country? Besides, ToT doesn't build national capability. It only gives you screwdriver capability and you pay a ransoms to get it. Negotiation to get ToT will take a long long time; case in point, look at Rafale deal that fell through after 3 years of negotiation. Do you think it was easy to get ToT and at what price?

If the IN needs SSN quickly, then an option is to get 2-3 more via 10-year lease. In the meanwhile, continue with indigenous efforts to build 6 SSNs.

[Philip]

SRai,yes,that's the mosts ensible solution.Get about 4 SSGNs on lease while building our own at home,first finishing the required no. of larger SSBNs for the 10K ICBM.

[SaiK]

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a ... 422398.ece

The Israeli-supplied Barak-1 point defence missile system and the Russian-origin AK-630 close-in weapon system, borrowed from a to-be-decommissioned Godavari-class ship, were installed on the carrier.

$2.3b!!!

[VinodTK]

Biggest warship project: Russia selects Anil Ambani's Pipavav to make frigates for Indian Navy

The Russian government has chosen Anil Ambani's Pipavav shipyard for a 'Make in India' naval frigate order that is likely to exceed $3 billion, making it the private sector's biggestever warship-building project.

With public sector shipyards tied up in executing current orders and the Indian Navy battling to increase fleet strength, the government has been in advanced talks for the past several months with Russia for three to four upgraded Talwar class frigates, classified as Project 11356 vessels. Moscow, which has been keen to build the frigates at a Russian shipyard, was firmly told last year that the order would only be placed through the Make in India route but it would have the flexibility to choose an Indian partner for the project.

After an evaluation of several Indian shipyards, including that of Larsen & Toubro, Russia has formally informed the defence ministry that Pipavav has been chosen as its Indian partner for the project. Officials said a formal ..
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[Karthik S]

$3 billion for 3 frigates? Although almost twice the size, Visakhapatnam class ships cost about the same. What are the advantages of these additional Talwars over P 17As?

[uddu]

What's happening here is Russians charging the Indian public for allowing to setup a Private shipyard in India to build frigates.
The solution can be simple that instead of ordering 3 or 4 vessels of P17A atleast 6 ships be build in one go by each shipyard, so that after the first lot is build the delay in starting the next is closed and there are more number of ships. The P17A's are build by two shipyards and each building 3 and 4 why cant this be increased to 6 each and and 12 frigates build in one go. Dont this will cut time, cost and bring commonality? The Navy and GOI must stop this 3-4 orders for any project public or private, from now on and any order must be in the range of 6 warships minimum.

[uddu]

A nation which is building frigates for long and currently capable of building world class frigates, destroyers and even aircraft carrier do have to rely on some other nation to build a light frigate? Even now why cant the Shivalik design be used in the construction of frigate at Pipavav? The Russian Natasha lobby is very active.

[JE Menon]

Don't know if this has been posted here, apologies if it has:

Govt. has approved six new nuclear attack submarines
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... aign=cppst

[Vivek K]

Second Uddu's post above.

[rkhanna]

Biggest warship project: Russia selects Anil Ambani's Pipavav to make frigates for Indian Navy
Quote:
The Russian government has chosen Anil Ambani's Pipavav shipyard for a 'Make in India' naval frigate order that is likely to exceed $3 billion, making it the private sector's biggestever warship-building project.

Shiver runs up my spine that something Anil Ambani influenced is manufacturing critical equipment for our armed forces, Not the mention Pipavav... Oh well Fingers crossed.

[Philip]

Should be essential weaponry on our P-8Is as well."Low and slow" anti-sub warfare is best suited to turboprops like the Il-38s,P-3 Orions,maritime ATRs,etc. This is an excellent development,cost factor to be seen though,but I don't think that there will be any problem acquiring the same fro the US which has sold us the aircraft ,4 more in the pipeline.

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articl ... rpedo.html

Boeing to make flying torpedoes able to attack enemy submarines from 30,000 feet
April 4, 2013

By John Keller
Editor

WASHINGTON, 4 April 2013. Airborne weapons experts at the Boeing Co. got the go-ahead Wednesday to start building add-on kits for the U.S. Navy Mark 54 lightweight torpedo that will enable the weapon to glide through the air from altitudes as high as 30,000 feet and enable the Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol jet to attack enemy submarines from long ranges.

The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington announced a $19.2 million contract Wednesday to the Boeing Co. Defense, Space & Security segment in St. Charles, Mo., to design and build the High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapon Capability (HAAWC) Air Launch Accessory (ALA).

The HAAWC ALA turns the Raytheon Mark 54 torpedo into a glide weapon that the P-8A aircraft can release from high altitudes. As the flying torpedo reaches the water, it jettisons wings and other air-control surfaces and takes on its original role as a smart torpedo that detect, track, and attack enemy submarines autonomously.

The Mark 54 always has been able to be launched from aircraft, but before the HAAWC add-on kit air crews had to release the torpedo from altitudes no higher than about 100 feet.

The HAAWC will enable the P-8A aircraft -- a Boeing 737 passenger jetliner modified for maritime patrol -- to maintain optimum surveillance altitudes without wasting the time and fuel necessary to drop to low altitudes to attack targets and then climb back to high patrol altitudes.

Related stories

-- Boeing to provide torpedo defense systems to Navy

-- Sippican to improve shallow-water performance of MK 48 submarine-launched torpedo

-- Ultra Electronics joins Navy program to develop NGCM submarine torpedo defense system.

Attacking from high altitudes also enables the P-8A to reduce the time between target acquisition and attack, as well as launch anti-submarine weapons outside the ranges of shore-based anti-aircraft defenses.

When launched from 30,000 feet the HAAWC-equipped Mark 54 torpedo will glide for seven to 10 minutes before entering the water.

While in flight the HAAWC will be completely self-contained. The HAAWC adaptor kit includes a flight control computer, a GPS-based navigation system, and power sources. When near the water the system sheds its wings and activates a parachute that lowers the torpedo to the water to begin its run toward the target.

HAAWC program requirements require Boeing to build an add-on kit that requires little or no modifications to the Mark 54 torpedo or to the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Boeing's HAAWC contract includes options that could bring the value of the program to as much as $47 million.

Coincidentally, Boeing officials announced this week that they have handed over the seventh production P-8A Poseidon to the Navy on schedule March 29, marking the first delivery from the second low-rate initial production contract awarded in November 2011. The P-8 is scheduled to replace the ageing Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion four-engine turboprop maritime patrol plane.

The Mk 54 is an all-digital lightweight torpedo that has advanced software algorithms from the larger submarine-launched Mark 48 torpedo.

Boeing engineers reportedly will fit the Mark 54 torpedo with the wings designed for a Standoff Land-Attack Missile-Expanded Response cruise missile to enable to torpedo to glide to the ocean's surface. The HAAWC tail assembly is to include the guidance kit designed for the Joint Direct-Attack Munition (JDAM), which contains a GPS navigation system.

Boeing also could fit the HAAWC with a data link to transmit target position updates while in flight. Boeing will do the work on this contract in St. Charles, Mo., and should be finished by April 2016.

Good news about the extra Talwars to be built at Pipavav. Mr. Ambani sped to Moscow to cement the deal,which was first mooted 3 years ago. The speed with which the "R" co. has dashed across the "finishing line" is truly amazing! They snapped up Pipavav and have 3 defence co. startups including one for aircraft. I think that L&T has been earmarked for the larger N-sub/subs programmes.

$3B for the frigates. They are supposed to have more advanced weaponry,sensors,sonars,etc. than the last batch of Talwars,so there will be an extra cost factor from the last batch. What we have to compare is the cost worked out for the P-17As that have been ordered with MDL and GRSE. If you examine the final costs of the DDGs and FFGs built in India,there has been at least a 200+% cost escalation,with no penalties to the DPSUs. Russia paid several years ago a penalty of approx. $40M for delays in the first batch of Talwars.The 17-As total cost is supposed to be (Wik) $10B for 7 ships,that works out to more than $1.3B each. If BMos hyper SSM is also featured as some reports say,,the costs will be higher,but what capability! These new 17-As are really in the DDG class ,size and capability (6,000t) when you compare them with RN DDGs.The first ship is expected to be commissioned only by 2022.

The reason for the extra Talwars appears to be the longer gestation time for the P-17As to materialize (12 yrs for the first P-17s) ,with some newer tech to be incorporated including hyper BMos? The 3-4 improved Talwars should all arrive around 2020 if one tales 3 yrs to build one (2.5 in Russia),after which the first P-17As will start entering service ,2022 mentioned in reports. The new Talwars will replace the 3 "G" class. The IN does not want its capability reduced in any manner,in fact plans a major expansion of about 25% in its inventory by 2027.

By then,the IN should have a total of approx. 20-24 FFGs,of two classes,Talwars and Shivaliks, approx. 10+ of each.In addidtion,there will be 10-12 Delhi class DDGs,half the number of FFGs.When the new new batch of 4 P-15Bs arrive,the Rajputs ,which have done great service,will be retired. Another 20+ ASW corvettes/light frigates,NOPVs will make up an equal number of escorts,with a further 16-20 shallow water ASW corvettes to sanitise the coastline. Add to this another 20-24 missile corvettes and the IN will have a truly formidable number of surface combatants apart from the capital ships,CVs,amphibs and subs.

[deejay]

Biggest warship project: Russia selects Anil Ambani's Pipavav to make frigates for Indian Navy
Quote:
The Russian government has chosen Anil Ambani's Pipavav shipyard for a 'Make in India' naval frigate order that is likely to exceed $3 billion, making it the private sector's biggestever warship-building project.

Shiver runs up my spine that something Anil Ambani influenced is manufacturing critical equipment for our armed forces, Not the mention Pipavav... Oh well Fingers crossed.

Ditto here.

[amit]

^^^^^

You know, I wonder why? Is it because Anil Ambani is considered a traitor or is it because he's incompetent? Or is it that the fear is he will conspire with the Russians to fleece India?

Or is it that you belong to that school of thought which thinks only the government is competent enough to take care of the really high tech stuff that's needed?

This is not an endorsement for Anil Ambani and his company - personally I would have liked L&T to have been chosen. However, if we do want private sector involvement then it will have to be from companies which have the deepest of pockets and project management expertise. And don't forget his shipyard is the biggest in India.

To assume that the ships will be of inferior quality or standard is to cast aspersions on the Indian Navy. Surely you realise that the ships would be built under direct Navy supervision?

Dhoti shivering is a good exercise, it helps you to keep your date with your Pakistan every morning. But let's not overdo it.

[deejay]

^^^

Traitor / Incompetent is not how I would describe Mr. Ambani or his team. Please do not jump to conclusions. Neither is it dhoti shivering but a fairly well understood position.

I just hope his / their approach to defence contracts are different than to other contracts.

[amit]

^^^

Traitor / Incompetent is not how I would describe Mr. Ambani or his team. Please do not jump to conclusions. Neither is it dhoti shivering but a fairly well understood position.

I just hope his / their approach to defence contracts are different than to other contracts.

Aha I see!

I guess you can't argue with something like this: "fairly well understood position".

More power to your understanding. And no shivering please!

[Pratyush]

The problem is not Anil Ambani. The problem is that the Russians have chosen Pipav out of their own initiative to make the talwar class ships.

However, a domestic design is ready. All that is needed is, for that the design to be passed on to the domestic yard and have it built.

But what we are seeing now are news reports of Pipav getting a 3 billion $$ order without going through competitive bidding.

That is a problem in my view.

[amit]

The problem is not Anil Ambani. The problem is that the Russians have chosen Pipav out of their own initiative to make the talwar class ships.

However, a domestic design is ready. All that is needed is, for that the design to be passed on to the domestic yard and have it built.

But what we are seeing now are news reports of Pipav getting a 3 billion $$ order without going through competitive bidding.

That is a problem in my view.

Look boss I'm no fan of the Ambanis even though one has to say that they have a reputation of getting things done.

From my understanding of the deal (please correct me if I'm wrong) India talked with the Russians for 3 upgraded Talwars for $3 billion. The Russians wanted to build in one of their own shipyards. We said No, you build in India under the Make in India programme but you get to choose the shipyard. The Russians chose Pipavav shipyard - maybe because they have already dealt with it or maybe because it's the biggest in India.

There is no question of competitive bidding here.

I think it's pretty clear by now that the government wants L&T and Pipavav involved in shipbuilding with the former concentrating on submarines and the latter on surface vessels. In aerospace they want the Tatas and Mahindras to build expertise.

In this case I have no personal beef for Anil Ambani but I do object to this immediate assumption that where he's involved there has to be hanky panky. Look I know he and his brothers have used influence, money and everything in the book and some outside it to bag contracts. But nobody can fault their execution IMO.

Why prejudge them in this case? Pipavav has great infrastructure, maybe Ambani can make full use of it. If he can't well then we cross the bridge when we come to it.

Also I think he's far better equipped to handle Russian hanky panky than any of our public sector shipyard bosses. Also time overruns will result in lower profits, that's something IMO he'll try to prevent, even though as a first effort there could be some slippages.

[Pratyush]

Amit, fair enough.

As I said, Anil Ambani is not a problem. Quite frankly, the entire Indian business class in the INC era had to do some thing similar to what the Ambaines did. In order to just survive. So that, is not my problem.

My problem is the non building of additional the P17, in place of the Talwar class. Let 3 additional P 17 be build by the Pipav yard, I would not object.

But no more Talwar. Either made in India or made in Russia.

[amit]

My problem is the non building of additional the P17, in place of the Talwar class. Let 3 additional P 17 be build by the Pipav yard, I would not object.

But no more Talwar. Either made in India or made in Russia.

Agree with you on the Shivalik vs Talwar point. I dunno but may be the Navy wanted a smaller ship in the 4000 ton class rather than the 6000 ton Shivalik which is more closer in terms of size and tonnage to the P-17A of which we will get 7.

Also, with Russian involvement in the shipbuilding that may result in some new capacity absorption by the local shipyard in terms of processes and best practices. Even though the Russian record is not so great in international terms, they do build faster than what our government shipyards do.

Building the Shivalik would have required Mazgaon Docks handholding Pipavav instead of the Russians. As its first effort Pipavav will need handholding, that's for certain. This brings in fresh capacity to build surface combat ships into India. Right now only Mazgaon and Garden Reach have the capacity to build frigates and destroyers within India. Handholding by Mazgaon would not have brought any new processes and best practices into the country.

I think this deal is more about capacity building than about the ships themselves.

[Karthik S]

My problem is the non building of additional the P17, in place of the Talwar class. Let 3 additional P 17 be build by the Pipav yard, I would not object.

But no more Talwar. Either made in India or made in Russia.

Agree with you on the Shivalik vs Talwar point. I dunno but may be the Navy wanted a smaller ship in the 4000 ton class rather than the 6000 ton Shivalik which is more closer in terms of size and tonnage to the P-17A of which we will get 7.

Also, with Russian involvement in the shipbuilding that may result in some new capacity absorption by the local shipyard in terms of processes and best practices. Even though the Russian record is not so great in international terms, they do build faster than what our government shipyards do.

Building the Shivalik would have required Mazgaon Docks handholding Pipavav instead of the Russians. As its first effort Pipavav will need handholding, that's for certain. This brings in fresh capacity to build surface combat ships into India. Right now only Mazgaon and Garden Reach have the capacity to build frigates and destroyers within India. Handholding by Mazgaon would not have brought any new processes and best practices into the country.

I think this deal is more about capacity building than about the ships themselves.

If it were about ship building capacity, Mazagaon could have acted as consultants to L&T or Pipavav. Government can not spend $3 billion just to train a private shipyard on shipbuilding.

[Aditya G]

We are bdg 7 project 17 alphas

....

My problem is the non building of additional the P17, in place of the Talwar class. Let 3 additional P 17 be build by the Pipav yard, I would not object.

But no more Talwar. Either made in India or made in Russia.

[amit]

If it were about ship building capacity, Mazagaon could have acted as consultants to L&T or Pipavav. Government can not spend $3 billion just to train a private shipyard on shipbuilding.

Err, last I checked - and please correct me if I'm wrong - we are also getting 3 improved Talwars armed with Brahmos missiles for that $3 billion.

Can you please elaborate what new capacity building, technology transfer and know how the county would have acquired with Mazagaon acting as consultants?

[Pratyush]

The Indian navy needs a lot more than 20 or so frigates it is going to have by 2030. And it needs to start thinking about getting them in bulk. The best way is to do so through Indian designs and Indian yards.

As who knows, how much of the best practices of a foreign yard for a foreign design can be absorbed by an Indian yard for an Indian design.

[amit]

We are bdg 7 project 17 alphas

....

My problem is the non building of additional the P17, in place of the Talwar class. Let 3 additional P 17 be build by the Pipav yard, I would not object.

But no more Talwar. Either made in India or made in Russia.

Yes we already have 3 Shivaliks, with the addition of the Alphas we would have 10 of these beasts. The P17A will in many way be a more capable ship than the Kolkata class and are frigates only because the India Navy chooses to call them so.

I don't claim to know what the Navy is thinking but I can speculate that perhaps it thinks that the 4,000 improved Talwars would be sufficient for the Pakistani Navy, particularly considering it will be equipped with Bhramos?

[Austin]

The IN and MOD must have done their own due diligence before opting for 3-4 Talwar type to be built at a pvt yard , its not that they are not aware of P-17 and the workload on the PSU yards that atm is full with more than 50 ships being built.

The cost of $3 Billion for each ship looks high but most of the cost would also go into building the infra in the yard that builds the ship and cost involving TOT etc ,as besides building it in India they have also asked for TOT.

The scorpene deal is a good example when first purchased in 2005 it was costing around $3.8 Billion or so but today MOD is willing to spend $11-12 Billion for 6 P-75I an escalation of 3-4x times .........even Indian ships built by PSU have gone through their own revised estimates multiple times ...mostly its due to Military Inflation YOY and TOT cost that makes the cost sky rocket.

[amit]

The Indian navy needs a lot more than 20 or so frigates it is going to have by 2030. And it needs to start thinking about getting them in bulk. The best way is to do so through Indian designs and Indian yards.

As who knows, how much of the best practices of a foreign yard for a foreign design can be absorbed by an Indian yard for an Indian design.

Boss I think the key is to absorb the manufacturing process and best practices. In a best case scenario the Pipavav will be able to do so with the 3 ship build. Once they can do that it should be relatively easier for them to then build an Indian design.

I would tend to think that timelines would be better met by Pipavav and L&T than the unionised Mazagoan and Garden Reach shipyards.

[srin]

$3B for the frigates. They are supposed to have more advanced weaponry,sensors,sonars,etc. than the last batch of Talwars,so there will be an extra cost factor from the last batch. What we have to compare is the cost worked out for the P-17As that have been ordered with MDL and GRSE. If you examine the final costs of the DDGs and FFGs built in India,there has been at least a 200+% cost escalation,with no penalties to the DPSUs. Russia paid several years ago a penalty of approx. $40M for delays in the first batch of Talwars.The 17-As total cost is supposed to be (Wik) $10B for 7 ships,that works out to more than $1.3B each. If BMos hyper SSM is also featured as some reports say,,the costs will be higher,but what capability! These new 17-As are really in the DDG class ,size and capability (6,000t) when you compare them with RN DDGs.The first ship is expected to be commissioned only by 2022.

Nice spin on the costs ... This is what you'd said two days ago:

Costs: A KOl class DDG last cost 3-4 yrs ago around $900M.A P-15B Vizag class DDG will cost around $1B. Total cost for 4 ships is reported to be $5B,that makes it $1.25B per ship.

P-17A Shivs to initially cost around $650M,total of 7 to cost $10B. That makes just one P-17A which is around 2500t smaller than a P-15B,around $1.40+B /ship,more expensive?!

A Talwar-3 class FFG today should be somewhere in the region of around $500M.We'll have to see what the fig. is when the deal is done,but if as hinted more advanced weaponry,etc. is going to be installed,then the costs would increase.

So - by your estimate, do you feel that it is worth getting Talwar-3 which costs nearly as much as a P-15B ?

[amit]

The cost of $3 Billion for each ship looks high but most of the cost would also go into building the infra in the yard that builds the ship and cost involving TOT etc ,as besides building it in India they have also asked for TOT.

Austin,

I'm sure it was just a typo but the cost of $3 billion is for the 3 ships not one ship.

With that kind of money we could have made an aircraft carrier!

Rest of comment - I fully agree.

[Austin]

I don't claim to know what the Navy is thinking but I can speculate that perhaps it thinks that the 4,000 improved Talwars would be sufficient for the Pakistani Navy, particularly considering it will be equipped with Bhramos?

I can hazard a guess and says the latest Talwar would be similar to the newer class built for Russsian Navy , In that would be come with Brahmos missile and VLS Shtil-1 , the older one had single arm launcher.

For CIWS I think they would standardise on AK-630/Barak-1 over the Kashtan system

But the launcher of older Talwar can also accomodate Brahmos instead of Klub

[Austin]

Austin,

I'm sure it was just a typo but the cost of $3 billion is for the 3 ships not one ship.

With that kind of money we could have made an aircraft carrier!

Rest of comment - I fully agree.

Indeed its for 3 or 4 frigate , we need to see the final numbers and cost that comes once deal is signed right now its a bit speculative , I am not sure how much Pipav yard is prepared Infra and Manpower wise to build a frigate of talwar class.

[Philip]

If you read the info about the P-17As and the fact that foreign yards are being roped in for consultancy,it means that our experience of building the first 3,which took 12 years,with huge cost overruns,lacked a lot. Secondly,the 17As have more exotic weaponry currently not ready,like BMos-2,the hyper version. Weaponry,sensors,sonars,etc- one report said that AEGIS was being offered by the US,means that the follow on class will be a quantum leap ahead of the first batch. 2022 is the date given for the first to arrive (launch?).If it is only the launch,then fitting out will take at least a year,trials,etc,and only later on will the first ship be commissioned. So the extra Talwars are needed asap because we're retiring the old "G" class FFGs,etc.

The upgraded Talwars,Adm.Grigorivich is being churned out like Russian black sausages in Russia,in just 2.5 years time. That's phenomenally fast for any yard worldwide.If Pipavav can absorb the tech,skills,etc. and build FFGs at around 3 years/ship,it will be fantastic for us. DPSU yards will have to buck up.In addition,penalties,bonuses can be factored into the agreements so that the taxpayer does not suffer. As mentioned above,the whole exercise will be under the watchful eyes of the IN which is the most capable of the three services as far as indigenisation and building at home is concerned. Mr A will also be on the job as he wants to make a name for his co. and prove that they can be reliable defence industry giants in the future. Finally,if this succeeds as one hopes,Indian corporate giants will be enthused at the success and more cos. will invest into defence undertakings,widening the industrial base of the country making the absorption of high-tech defence tech easier and increasing the % of defence ware built inside the country.

[Cain Marko]

What I am not sure of is this piecemeal order tradition..why just three when more are obviously needed. Is it because of the new design or because of the novel approach?

[mody]

The second lot of Talwars already have Brahmos. The main new weapon system will be the VLS Shitl or Barak 8 on the new talwars.

Actually a new lot of Talwars from Russia would probably cost the same as the second lot. There is price escalation and inflation, but at the same time, the Russian rouble has decreased in value against the dollar by 30-40%. So even if one considers a 40% price escalation from the second lot, in dollar terms the price would remain the same.

I have failed to understand the $10 Billion price tag for the 7 P17A's and fail to understand the $3B price tag for 3-4 talwars. There is a limit to ToT that we can get from abroad. Its the same as paying for the ToT for the U209's and then again paying for ToT and building from scratch at a higher cost and 4 year delay the Scorpene's and now still willing to fork out $10 Billion for ToT to build P75I. The cycle never ends.
We are assuming that the russian's will teach everything to Pipavav, that MDL cannot teach or that they will teach them new advanced modular construction methods that we don't have otherwise. Offcourse, we will once again pay top dollar to learn the same at GRSE and MDL, to build the P17A.

Normally ToT means that everything comes from the parent country and only screw driver assembly takes place at our end. No vendors for any of the systems will ever get developed in India. India built the super Dvora boats at GSL with ToT from Israel. I had asked about supplying certain items for this project to the purchase officers at GSL. The answer was that this is a ToT project. We are mandated to buy even the nuts and bolts from designated Israeli or foreign suppliers only. Otherwise the design provider says that the warranty could be void. We built 8-12 of these boats. Did we learn how to make the ultra light hulls or the powerful engines or how to make the boats cut through the water and achieve 45-55 Knot speeds. Can we build anymore of these on our own, without help from the Israeli's?
This is same as building T-90 in India, more then what the Russian themselves are using, but if you want to use your own ammo with it....sorry sir no can do.

I would like to know how many Indian vendors supplied material or sub systems for Scorpene subs. The answer would be very very small. Hence if we want to build a follow on order for Scorpene's, the construction and assembly can take place at MDL, like the first lot, but most of the sub systems would still have to come from abroad.

Same will be case with this new deal for Talwars. We can spend $3 billion for 3-4 Talwars. But, thereafter if Navy places an additional order of 3-4 Talwars with Pipavav, can they build them with 70-80% indigenous content and any modifications that Naval Design bureau comes up with and with no help from the Russian's? I doubt it.

[narmad]

2 hours ago New Delhi, Delhi
DefMin @manoharparrikar releases Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan; to help industry achieve #MakeInIndia Initiatives.


Huge opportunity for Indian Inc. as Navy focusses on indigenisation: R K Dhowan


Dhowan said a warship can be divided into three segments - float, move and fight. In the float category, the Navy has achieved an indigenisation of 90 per cent. He said that it is matter of great pride that warship grade steel is now being manufactured in India.

"In the move segment, we have achieved 60 per cent of indigenisation. There is a huge opportunity for Indian industry as well as small and medium enterprises...," he said, inaugurating a seminar on indigenisation.

Lamenting that there has been only 30-40 per cent indigenisation in the fighter segment, weapons and sensors, he said this is an area of focus for the Navy.

Dhowan said that the Indian Navy's air fleet strength of 223 aircraft and helicopters is on the threshold of transformation, both in terms of numbers and capability.

"This is one area where there is a huge opportunity for indigenisation of our future naval aviation assets," he said.

The Navy chief said that the force has prepared a 15-year indigenisation plan up to 2030, in order to synergies efforts towards indigenisation.

"This is ready now and will be shared with Indian industry. We have also articulated and formulated the science and technology roadmap in coordination with DRDO. This is for indigenisation of future technologies," he said.

[srin]

Okay - I'm going to put my foot right in the mouth now

People on these forums keep talking about how great the Navy with R&D and some people have also posted that having Navy folks heading shipyards is a model IAF should also follow.

Now, this Talwar-3 topic shows up some warts in the arguments:
a) The naval shipyards despite being headed by ex-Admirals have lousy building rates.
b) The indigenous warships are as expensive (or more) compared to Russian ones.
c) We want a foreign-designed warship but locally manufactured instead of a locally designed one. So, despite experience of designing multiple classes of ships, our local designs aren't upto the mark yet.
d) The IAC and Arihant have been delayed for a long long time. They are as ab-initio development as LCA.

And yet - I don't see any criticism of Shipyards nor do I see any criticism of directorate of naval design.

Absence of criticism doesn't mean absence of problems. The IN model may be more palatable to us because it doesn't involve the public bickering of IAF vs HAL vs DRDO or IA vs CVRDE/DRDO, but it doesn't mean it is effective.

[Shreeman]

DND more or less stops at the hull. All the rest is imported. Down to shaft and propeller. Rajputs, Talwars, Kilos, Vik. All fixed wing and rotary the same.

The Navy appears different because it jumps at the chance to buy local -- shivalik, kolkota, delhi, kamorta. It is working within a pocket lining system, the same overall procurement as the rest of the branches. Delays are inevitable. Also Navy probably had zero control over the ATV development. Or IAC funding. The IAC itself isnt going to be 10+ years late.

However, the main reason for lack of criticism have been their tendency to not crash/burn/sink. That has been changing lately. So the future may hold a different media perception.