Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

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NRao
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby NRao » 12 Jan 2016 22:54


Significantly there are no mention of H&D .. samjota terror .. Pakis are the biggest victims etc.. from Bad of good Sharif


IIRC, Modi/Shariff had come to an agreement that they would not bad mouth each other.

So far so good. Anything to sideline - as far as possible - the PA.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Sid » 12 Jan 2016 23:28

shiv wrote:http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/t ... 093707.ece
There were five to six airmen on the first floor of the building, and they were swiftly evacuated.[/b]

These men should be able to say how long the Pakis were in there because I am not aware of djinn technology in Pathankot, but if airmen were on the 1st floor and terrorists on the ground floor, the airmen must have gone in there earlier


They may have been instructed to remain indoor until someone could extract them or till operations were officially over. Notice that particular area was still being combed for rodents and not clear.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby chetak » 12 Jan 2016 23:53

Pakistan’s Terror Game

Pakistan’s Terror Game

January 7, 2016 C. Christine Fair and Seth Oldmixon

Coming on the heels of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore last month, the attack on Pathankot Air Force Station in Indian Punjab by Islamist militants on January 2nd is seen by many as an attempt to derail the nascent peace process between the two countries. This is a serious misunderstanding of this particular attack and such thinking obfuscates adequate appreciation of how Pakistan employs its jihadi assets to prosecute its varied strategic interests in the region. Rather than being a spontaneous response to recent developments, the attack on the Pathankot Air Base is the latest manifestation of a Pakistani national security strategy that addresses its own internal challenges while also pursuing its revisionist agenda against India.

Why Pakistan Uses Militants

This attack was not meant to spoil a peace process for the simple reason that there can be no meaningful peace process with Pakistan. Prior to the partition of the sub-continent in 1947 key Muslim political leaders argued that Muslims were a separate, but equal nation and required their own state because they could not live with dignity and security under a Hindu majority state. Leaders such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah were able to garner adequate support for the “Two Nation Theory” such that the British agreed to create two new states when they decolonized the sub-continent. Pakistan believed that it was entitled to the territory of Kashmir because it was a Muslim majority state in British India. However, as the Indian Independence Act of 1947 makes clear Pakistan was never entitled to the territory. In fact, Kashmir and the hundreds of other so-called Princely States were allowed to choose the dominions they would like to join.

Most of the princely states made their choices prior to partition in August 1947. Three did not. One was the enormous, princely state of Hyderabad which accounted for much of southern India’s land mass, with a Muslim sovereign who governed a Hindu majority. The sovereign opted for independence and staged an increasingly sanguinary rebellion to retain his sinecure. India forcibly annexed it in a police action. The second hold out was Junagarh with a Muslim sovereign and a Hindu majority population. He opted for Pakistan even though the territory was well within India’s borders and even though most of his subjects were Hindu. India forcibly annexed Junagarh as well.

The third holdout was Kashmir. The Hindu sovereign, Hari Singh, presided over a Muslim majority. His territory abutted both Pakistan and India. He wanted independence and even signed a stand-still agreement with Pakistan to preclude it from invading. However, fearing that Kashmir would remain independent or join India, the nascent state of Pakistan dispatched militants to forcibly seize the state. Singh’s own militia forces were unable to stop the advance and sought India’s help. India agreed to defend Kashmir provided that Singh accede to India. Singh signed the instrument of accession and India began air lifting troops in defense of what had become sovereign Indian territory. When this first “Indo-Pak” war ended in 1948, Pakistan controlled about one third of Kashmir while India controlled the rest. Pakistan initiated wars again in 1965 and 1999 to secure more territory but failed to make permanent gains in both cases.

In 1948, the United Nations Security Council passed its 47th resolution calling for a plebiscite to be held to discern the desires of the Kashmiri people. But before any plebiscite can be held, the UN outlined specific conditions that both Pakistan and India were required to fulfill. Pakistan must first evacuate all Pakistani personnel from Kashmir. Conditional upon Pakistan withdrawing its forces, India was required to withdraw the majority of its forces, retaining only a defensive contingent. Only then, upon fulfillment of both of these conditions, the resolution called for a plebiscite to be held under international auspices. Pakistan never demilitarized nonethless Pakistanis, including senior political and military leaders, continue to call for a plebiscite in accordance with the resolution while ignoring the Pakistani actions that were required to enable it.

Pakistan has sustained a low intensity conflict in Kashmir to wrest the territory from India since 1947. Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir are predicated on ideological concerns rather than security concerns. Without Kashmir, Pakistan is incomplete per the jalebi-like logic of the so-called Two Nation Theory. For Pakistan to concede Kashmir and forge an enduring peace with India, Pakistan and its citizenry must evolve their interpretation of the Two Nation Theory. For generations raised on Pakistan’s intertwined narratives of Islam and nationhood, particularly those in the military, this is a price too high to pay. In fact, during a recent visit to Washington D.C., Pakistan’s army chief Raheel Sharif made it clear that “surrendering” Kashmir was something he would never be prepared to do. Since the military exercises de facto control over Pakistan’s foreign policy—not politicians and elected officials such as Prime Ministers—no peace process is currently possible. In fact, if Pakistan wanted peace it could have peace. India has no interest in Pakistani territory as India is a territorially status quo power notwithstanding some Hindu nationalists’ assertion of the bizarre geopolitical notion of an undivided India, known as “Akhand Bharat”.

So why does Pakistan continue with its use of terrorism? It’s remarkably easy to explain. First, it’s inexpensive. Compared to Pakistan’s defense budget of some $7 billion, operating militant groups such Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is mungphalis. Second, it requires no commitment of Pakistani troops to combat. Third, it provides the cover of plausible deniability. Fourth, Pakistan never suffers any material consequences for its jihad habit because of its ever-expanding nuclear arsenal, inclusive of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons deter India from undertaking military action and ensure that the international community, always afraid of Pakistan failing, stays engaged politically and financially. These are weapons of coercion—or blackmail by another name.

Finally, and most importantly, Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks in India immediately prompt international calls for “India and Pakistan” to resolve all outstanding disputes peacefully. This may be the most important outcome yet, given the low cost of this strategy. When the international community imposes this false equivalency over the two states, Pakistan’s version of history is vindicated. Along similar lines, when India reaches out an olive branch to Pakistan and agrees to discuss “outstanding disputes,” India invariably plays into Pakistan’s hands by allowing Pakistan to claim that even India recognizes the legitimate nature of Pakistan’s claims. As long as Pakistan continues to garner these benefits while incurring virtually no costs, these attacks will continue.





An Attack That Was Long in the Making

Following initial reports of the attack, Pakistan’s media, notoriously under intense pressure from the military, immediately went into damage control, mocking their Indian counterparts for jumping to the conclusion that the attackers were from Pakistan. Major news outlets in Pakistan suggested that the attack was an Indian “false flag” operation, a quotidian conspiracy theory that contends that India actually attacks itself to defame Pakistan, Muslims or some other sinister domestic agenda.

Later, the United Jihad Council (UJC), a coalition of Kashmir militant groups with close ties to Pakistan’s military, claimed responsibility for the attack. This too may be an effort to foster the illusion that the attack was about the so-called “Kashmir dispute.”

Increasingly, evidence suggests that the attack was perpetrated by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which is not a member of the UJC. JeM is a Deobandi Islamist terrorist groups with close ties to the Deobandi Afghan Taliban, anti-Shia groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi/Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, and al Qaeda. If JeM conducted this attack, it would underscore a serious development in terrorism in South Asia.

JeM was founded when Pakistan’s ISI allegedly worked with several Deobandi terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen to hijack Indian Airlines flight 814 in late 1999, which departed Kathmandu in Nepal for New Delhi. The plane eventually landed in Kandahar, the base of Afghanistan’s Taliban, where terrorists agreed to free the surviving passengers upon the release of three Pakistani terrorists incarcerated in India: Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar. Indian officials delivered these terrorists to Kandahar where they were refused asylum by the Taliban and given 10 hours to leave the country. The three terrorists and the hijackers received safe-haven in Pakistan. Omar Sheikh later became notorious for the killing of Daniel Pearl three years later in Pakistan. Azhar become famous when he announced the formation of JeM in Karachi only a few days after his departure from Kandahar.

Pakistan raised JeM with Azhar as its leader to up the ante in Kashmir and to serve as a competitor to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which the ISI also raised and deployed to Kashmir in the early 1990s to escalate violence. While LeT pioneered the “high risk mission,” JeM pioneered the use of suicide attacks in Kashmir in April 2000 in Badami Bagh.

JeM’s coherence was short-lived: The organization split in late 2001 when its leadership disagreed on whether the organization should stay loyal to the Pakistani state or begin attacking it to punish it for helping to bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban shared JeM’s Deobandi ideological orientations and represented the only regime that enforced the version of sharia they all espoused. Many Deobandi militants that Pakistan’s deep state had nurtured were furious that their patrons in uniform had seemingly turned their back on the Afghan Taliban. However, despite the pressure from his confederates to defect, Masooz Azhar remained loyal to the state and reported the developments to the ISI and, as such, he remained a high value asset to the ISI. The new organization launched from the remnants of JeM under the name of Jamaat ul Furqan began a series of deadly suicide attacks and were the fundament for what would emerge as the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban).

Even though JeM and its leader Masood Azhar are explicitly proscribed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, among other entities, Pakistan persisted in its support for the organization and its leader, who freely operated in his home town of Bahawalpur in Southern Punjab. In fact, despite being technically proscribed by Pakistan, the organization actually expanded its stronghold. This was not an accident. Since at least 2011, Pakistan’s intelligence agency had been rehabilitating JeM as a part of its internal security management strategy. By 2013, one of the authors learned during fieldwork in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, that Pakistan had resolved to take the Pakistani Taliban seriously and begin launching military offensives against them in Pakistan’s tribal areas. After months of warning, Pakistan’s military formally commenced a selective campaign against those militants in the tribal areas attacking it in June 2014 under the operational name of Zarb-e-Azb. Prior to the onset of these operations, Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies sought to persuade elements of the TTP to abandon the fight against Pakistan by either rejoining the fight in Afghanistan to help the Taliban or to rejoin the JeM to kill Indians. Those members of the TTP who could not be so rehabilitated to fight the external enemies and remained committed to fighting Pakistan were deemed enemy combatants who must be eliminated.

Revivifying JeM was a cornerstone of Pakistan’s strategy of managing its own internal security challenges. Officials with the United Nations office tasked with monitoring these groups told one of the authors that JeM activists have long been poised for infiltration into India. Thus, the only thing surprising about this JeM attack is that it didn’t happen sooner given the imperatives of recuperating this group as a means of diverting TTP terrorists away from targeting Pakistanis towards targeting Indians. Thus denervating JeM is not only a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy of nuclear blackmail to achieve ideological objectives in Kashmir, it is a critical part of Pakistan’s internal security strategy to rehabilitate TTP militants. The JeM is Pakistan’s own “ghar vapasi” program for bringing errant terrorists back into the fold.



Pakistan’s Regional Strategy



While most commentators on this attack focus upon the contested disposition of Kashmir this is a narrow vision of Pakistan’s continued strategy of employing Islamist terrorists under its nuclear umbrella as part of a broader national security posture that arches across the countries of South Asia, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka as well as throughout India. In fact, it remains a goal of Pakistan-backed militant groups to operate outside of Kashmir. In the wake of the Pathankot attack, Indian intelligence has warned of the possibility that militants are planning to carry out similar attacks targeting Indian air bases in the Eastern part of the country. Attacks on targets in the Eastern part of India would less likely be carried out by infiltrators from Pakistan than Bangladesh, where Pakistan-based militants have been recruiting and organizing for years.

Members of the Pakistani Punjab-based militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba have been arrested in Bangladesh, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) has had close ties with JeM, which has operated in Bangladesh for years. In the past year, two Pakistani diplomats were expelled from Bangladesh for allegedly operating as ISI liaisons with jihadi militant groups, and Pakistani militants are regularly arrested in raids on jihadi militant groups in Bangladesh. Pakistan’s militant groups such as LeT and JeM have cultivated based in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal in effort to encircle India with bases from which persons can be recruited or launched for operations within India. Ultimately, Pakistan’s Islamists believe that they can coerce Bangladesh into rescinding its independence gained after a hard fought war in 1971. Hafiz Saeed posted on Twitter on the 2013 anniversary of Bangladesh’s liberation that “#WeWillNeverForget #1971 – History has not ended yet, will be rewritten,” and last March told a crowd of supporters that “the implementation of Sharia will make Pakistan a model state attracting even Bangladesh to rejoin Pakistan.”

Pakistan’s interests with regards to India are not exclusive to wresting all of Kashmir; rather, Pakistan has arrogated to itself the retardation of India’s projection of power in South Asia and beyond. As is well-known, Pakistan’s obsession with controlling events in Afghanistan by backing a Islamist militants such as the Taliban are due in considerable measure to Pakistan’s interest in denying India access to Afghanistan and stemming India’s larger ability to compete with it in Central Asia. Pakistan’s ISI continues to encourage groups such as the Jalaluddin Haqqani Network and LeT to attack to Indian assets and personnel in Afghanistan. Pakistan-backed terrorist groups have attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul twice in 2008 and 2009 and several consulates including those in Herat and Kandahar in 2014, Jalalabad in 2013 and most recently in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. In addition to other attacks on Indian personnel working in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s larger goal of preventing India’s rise requires analysts to stop viewing these groups beyond the buzz word of Kashmir and endeavor to understand the larger context in which they function as a force multiplier in Pakistan’s broader national security strategy. Allowing jihadi militant groups groups to operate semi-autonomously and nominally dedicated to jihad in Kashmir provides the Pakistani state plausible deniability, and masks the militants’ full role in the region.

An Action Plan

In an ideal world, India and the United States-among other interested parties—would be able to cooperate to contain the various threats that Pakistan poses through uses of military, economic, diplomatic and political tools of national power. However, India lacks the offensive capabilities to decisively defeat Pakistan in a short war and has been reticent to invest in the requisite military modernization and personnel policies required to decisively defeat Pakistan. The United States for its part seems unable to find any other policy approach to Pakistan that does not involve handsome emoluments in hopes of securing even marginal cooperation with Pakistan. The sad truth is that both countries are blackmailed by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and are loathe to move away from status quo policies.

This does not mean that there is nothing that can be done. One of the simplest things that the United States and its international partners can do is change the way it talks about Pakistan and its terrorist clients attacking India. Americans and Indians who advocate engaging Pakistan at all costs, need to understand that what Pakistan craves is attention to its joint causes of Kashmir and standing up to a hegemonic India. When the international community predictably calls for both sides to settle their outstanding disputes peacefully, they unwittingly reward Pakistan while punishing India by imposing a false equivalency across the two. If the international community instead called for Pakistan to accept the status quo – a reality even Pakistan’s former Army Chief Gen. Musharraf had come to accept, and stop using terrorism and nuclear coercion as tools of foreign policy, Pakistan would be deprived of the benefits its seeks even if it does not incur costs for its behavior. Until the time comes when the international community is prepared to punish Pakistan for transgressing international norms, refusing to reward it is a good place to start.



C. Christine Fair is an associate professor at Georgetown’s Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She is the author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War(Oxford University Press 2014). Her twitter handle is @cchristinefair.

Seth Oldmixon is a DC-based political communications consultant who served in rural Bangladesh as a Peace Corp Volunteer. He is the founder of Liberty South Asia, an independent, privately funded campaign dedicated to supporting religious freedom and political pluralism in South Asia. His twitter handle is @setholdmixon.

member_27581
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby member_27581 » 13 Jan 2016 00:46

Apologies Ramana Sir, eagerly waiting for RV article. Have few points to make but perhaps not the right time/place

KLNMurthy
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby KLNMurthy » 13 Jan 2016 00:48

BRAdmins,

Can the Divya Kumar Sotti article from Indiafacts be linked on the first page of the STFUP thread? It really is quite comprehensive.

http://indiafacts.org/the-fatal-flaw-ni ... -pakistan/

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby ramana » 13 Jan 2016 02:34

quote="chetak"
Pakistan’s Terror Game

Pakistan’s Terror Game

January 7, 2016 C. Christine Fair and Seth Oldmixon

Coming on the heels of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore last month, the attack on Pathankot Air Force Station in Indian Punjab by Islamist militants terrorists on January 2nd is seen by many as an attempt to derail the nascent peace process between the two countries. This is a serious misunderstanding of this particular attack and such thinking obfuscates adequate appreciation of how Pakistan employs its jihadi assets to prosecute its varied strategic interests in the region. Rather than being a spontaneous response to recent developments, the attack on the Pathankot Air Base is the latest manifestation of a Pakistani national security strategy that addresses its own internal challenges while also pursuing its revisionist agenda against India.

Why Pakistan Uses Militants

This attack was not meant to spoil a peace process for the simple reason that there can be no meaningful peace process with Pakistan. Prior to the partition of the sub-continent in 1947 key Muslim political leaders argued that Muslims were a separate, but equal nation and required their own state because they could not live with dignity and security under a Hindu majority state. Leaders such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah were able to garner adequate support for the “Two Nation Theory” such that the British agreed to create two new states when they decolonized the sub-continent. Pakistan believed that it was entitled to the territory of Kashmir because it was a Muslim majority state in British India. However, as the Indian Independence Act of 1947 makes clear Pakistan was never entitled to the territory. In fact, Kashmir and the hundreds of other so-called Princely States were allowed to choose the dominions they would like to join.

Most of the princely states made their choices prior to partition in August 1947. Three did not. One was the enormous, princely state of Hyderabad which accounted for much of southern India’s land mass, with a Muslim sovereign who governed a Hindu majority. The sovereign opted for independence and staged an increasingly sanguinary rebellion to retain his sinecure. India forcibly annexed it in a police action. The second hold out was Junagarh with a Muslim sovereign and a Hindu majority population. He opted for Pakistan even though the territory was well within India’s borders and even though most of his subjects were Hindu. India forcibly annexed Junagarh as well.

The third holdout was Kashmir. The Hindu sovereign, Hari Singh, presided over a Muslim majority. His territory abutted both Pakistan and India. He wanted independence and even signed a stand-still agreement with Pakistan to preclude it from invading. However, fearing that Kashmir would remain independent or join India, the nascent state of Pakistan dispatched militants to forcibly seize the state. Singh’s own militia forces were unable to stop the advance and sought India’s help. India agreed to defend Kashmir provided that Singh accede to India. Singh signed the instrument of accession and India began air lifting troops in defense of what had become sovereign Indian territory. When this first “Indo-Pak” war ended in 1948, Pakistan controlled about one third of Kashmir while India controlled the rest. Pakistan initiated wars again in 1965 and 1999 to secure more territory but failed to make permanent gains in both cases.

In 1948, the United Nations Security Council passed its 47th resolution calling for a plebiscite to be held to discern the desires of the Kashmiri people. But before any plebiscite can be held, the UN outlined specific conditions that both Pakistan and India were required to fulfill. Pakistan must first evacuate all Pakistani personnel from Kashmir. Conditional upon Pakistan withdrawing its forces, India was required to withdraw the majority of its forces, retaining only a defensive contingent. Only then, upon fulfillment of both of these conditions, the resolution called for a plebiscite to be held under international auspices. Pakistan never demilitarized nonethless Pakistanis, including senior political and military leaders, continue to call for a plebiscite in accordance with the resolution while ignoring the Pakistani actions that were required to enable it.

Pakistan has sustained a low intensity conflict in Kashmir to wrest the territory from India since 1947. Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir are predicated on ideological concerns rather than security concerns. Without Kashmir, Pakistan is incomplete per the jalebi-like logic of the so-called Two Nation Theory. For Pakistan to concede Kashmir and forge an enduring peace with India, Pakistan and its citizenry must evolve their interpretation of the Two Nation Theory. For generations raised on Pakistan’s intertwined narratives of Islam and nationhood, particularly those in the military, this is a price too high to pay. In fact, during a recent visit to Washington D.C., Pakistan’s army chief Raheel Sharif made it clear that “surrendering” Kashmir was something he would never be prepared to do. Since the military exercises de facto control over Pakistan’s foreign policy—not politicians and elected officials such as Prime Ministers—no peace process is currently possible. In fact, if Pakistan wanted peace it could have peace. India has no interest in Pakistani territory as India is a territorially status quo power notwithstanding some Hindu nationalists’ assertion of the bizarre geopolitical notion of an undivided India, known as “Akhand Bharat”.

So why does Pakistan continue with its use of terrorism? It’s remarkably easy to explain. First, it’s inexpensive. Compared to Pakistan’s defense budget of some $7 billion, operating militant groups such Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is mungphalis. Second, it requires no commitment of Pakistani troops to combat. Third, it provides the cover of plausible deniability. Fourth, Pakistan never suffers any material consequences for its jihad habit because of its ever-expanding nuclear arsenal, inclusive of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons deter India from undertaking military action and ensure that the international community, always afraid of Pakistan failing, stays engaged politically and financially. These are weapons of coercion—or blackmail by another name.

{Then how did India launch Operation Parakram in 2002 while there were US troops in Pakistan and the very same nuclear weapons were available since 1992!}

Finally, and most importantly, Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks in India immediately prompt international calls for “India and Pakistan” to resolve all outstanding disputes peacefully. This may be the most important outcome yet, given the low cost of this strategy. When the international community imposes this false equivalency over the two states, Pakistan’s version of history is vindicated. Along similar lines, when India reaches out an olive branch to Pakistan and agrees to discuss “outstanding disputes,” India invariably plays into Pakistan’s hands by allowing Pakistan to claim that even India recognizes the legitimate nature of Pakistan’s claims. As long as Pakistan continues to garner these benefits while incurring virtually no costs, these attacks will continue.

{The international community is the US State Department with its Arabists running the policy of Arab Muslim appeasement for Israel creation. This is the false equivalence. No other country cares for the terrorists. Israel right to exist is regardless of any appeasement of Muslim terror.}




An Attack That Was Long in the Making

Following initial reports of the attack, Pakistan’s media, notoriously under intense pressure from the military, immediately went into damage control, mocking their Indian counterparts for jumping to the conclusion that the attackers were from Pakistan. Major news outlets in Pakistan suggested that the attack was an Indian “false flag” operation, a quotidian conspiracy theory that contends that India actually attacks itself to defame Pakistan, Muslims or some other sinister domestic agenda.

{Former President Bill Clinton promoted this theory in his forward to Madeline Albright memoirs when he made false reference to Chattisingpora massacre by Paki terrorists!}


Later, the United Jihad Council (UJC), a coalition of Kashmir militant groups with close ties to Pakistan’s military, claimed responsibility for the attack. This too may be an effort to foster the illusion that the attack was about the so-called “Kashmir dispute.”

{UJC comprise of the very same terrorists LeT and JeM in its brood}


Increasingly, evidence suggests that the attack was perpetrated by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which is not a member of the UJC. 8) JeM is a Deobandi Islamist terrorist groups with close ties to the Deobandi Afghan Taliban, anti-Shia groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi/Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, and al Qaeda. If JeM conducted this attack, it would underscore a serious development in terrorism in South Asia. :rotfl:

JeM was founded when Pakistan’s ISI allegedly worked with several Deobandi terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen to hijack Indian Airlines flight 814 in late 1999, which departed Kathmandu in Nepal for New Delhi. The plane eventually landed in Kandahar, the base of Afghanistan’s Taliban, where terrorists agreed to free the surviving passengers upon the release of three Pakistani terrorists incarcerated in India: Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar. Indian officials delivered these terrorists to Kandahar where they were refused asylum by the Taliban and given 10 hours to leave the country. The three terrorists and the hijackers received safe-haven in Pakistan. Omar Sheikh later became notorious for the killing of Daniel Pearl three years later in Pakistan. Azhar become famous when he announced the formation of JeM in Karachi only a few days after his departure from Kandahar.

{Pak ISI renamed Harkat Ul Ansar (HuA) the previous version as JeM after Mohd Azhar was released as part of Kandahar hostage exchange. JeM is also now renamed}


Pakistan raised JeM with Azhar as its leader to up the ante in Kashmir and to serve as a competitor to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which the ISI also raised and deployed to Kashmir in the early 1990s to escalate violence. While LeT pioneered the “high risk mission,” JeM pioneered the use of suicide attacks in Kashmir in April 2000 in Badami Bagh.

{LeT mission is all of India and the world. Its minions were in Australia, Somalia etc. Both use suicide attackers}


JeM’s coherence was short-lived: The organization split in late 2001 when its leadership disagreed on whether the organization should stay loyal to the Pakistani state or begin attacking it to punish it for helping to bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban shared JeM’s Deobandi ideological orientations and represented the only regime that enforced the version of sharia they all espoused. Many Deobandi militants that Pakistan’s deep state had nurtured were furious that their patrons in uniform had seemingly turned their back on the Afghan Taliban. However, despite the pressure from his confederates to defect, Masooz Azhar remained loyal to the state and reported the developments to the ISI and, as such, he remained a high value asset to the ISI. The new organization launched from the remnants of JeM under the name of Jamaat ul Furqan began a series of deadly suicide attacks and were the fundament for what would emerge as the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban). :?:

Even though JeM and its leader Masood Azhar are explicitly proscribed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, among other entities, Pakistan persisted in its support for the organization and its leader, who freely operated in his home town of Bahawalpur in Southern Punjab. In fact, despite being technically proscribed by Pakistan, the organization actually expanded its stronghold. This was not an accident. Since at least 2011, Pakistan’s intelligence agency had been rehabilitating JeM as a part of its internal security management strategy. By 2013, one of the authors learned during fieldwork in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, that Pakistan had resolved to take the Pakistani Taliban seriously and begin launching military offensives against them in Pakistan’s tribal areas. After months of warning, Pakistan’s military formally commenced a selective campaign against those militants in the tribal areas attacking it in June 2014 under the operational name of Zarb-e-Azb. :rotfl: Prior to the onset of these operations, Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies sought to persuade elements of the TTP to abandon the fight against Pakistan by either rejoining the fight in Afghanistan to help the Taliban or to rejoin the JeM to kill Indians. Those members of the TTP who could not be so rehabilitated to fight the external enemies and remained committed to fighting Pakistan were deemed enemy combatants who must be eliminated.

Revivifying JeM was a cornerstone of Pakistan’s strategy of managing its own internal security challenges. Officials with the United Nations office tasked with monitoring these groups told one of the authors that JeM activists have long been poised for infiltration into India. {Did the UN share this with India!} Thus, the only thing surprising about this JeM attack is that it didn’t happen sooner given the imperatives of recuperating this group as a means of diverting TTP terrorists away from targeting Pakistanis towards targeting Indians. Thus denervating JeM is not only a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy of nuclear blackmail to achieve ideological objectives in Kashmir, it is a critical part of Pakistan’s internal security strategy to rehabilitate TTP militants. The JeM is Pakistan’s own “ghar vapasi” program for bringing errant terrorists back into the fold. :rotfl:


{The analysis here has a sense of inevitability of TSP using JeM in Punjab. I would note JeM area of operations has been Kashmir and most of its members are Kashmiri terrorists. LeT was already used in Gurdaspur early in the year around July 2015 and hence its exposed. Another use at Pathankot would not have provided plausible deniability. The use of JeM is desperate move on part of TSP.


Also Ms unFair is using Indian words to paint the wrong picture. Ghar Wapasi is not about terrorist but to reconvert those Muslim and Christians who want to return to Hindu roots. Its not a terrorist rehabilitation program}




Pakistan’s Regional Strategy



While most commentators on this attack focus upon the contested disposition of Kashmir this is a narrow vision of Pakistan’s continued strategy of employing Islamist terrorists under its nuclear umbrella as part of a broader national security posture that arches across the countries of South Asia, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka as well as throughout India. In fact, it remains a goal of Pakistan-backed militant groups to operate outside of Kashmir.{I]{Kashmir is out of bounds because of the efforts of Indian Army and not the reluctance of TSP!}[/I] In the wake of the Pathankot attack, Indian intelligence has warned of the possibility that militants are planning to carry out similar attacks targeting Indian air bases in the Eastern part of the country. Attacks on targets in the Eastern part of India would less likely be carried out by infiltrators from Pakistan than Bangladesh, where Pakistan-based militants have been recruiting and organizing for years. :?:

Members of the Pakistani Punjab-based militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba have been arrested in Bangladesh, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) has had close ties with JeM, which has operated in Bangladesh for years. In the past year, two Pakistani diplomats were expelled from Bangladesh for allegedly operating as ISI liaisons with jihadi militant groups, and Pakistani militants are regularly arrested in raids on jihadi militant groups in Bangladesh. Pakistan’s militant groups such as LeT and JeM have cultivated based in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal in effort to encircle India with bases from which persons can be recruited or launched for operations within India. Ultimately, Pakistan’s Islamists believe that they can coerce Bangladesh into rescinding its independence gained after a hard fought war in 1971. Hafiz Saeed posted on Twitter on the 2013 anniversary of Bangladesh’s liberation that “#WeWillNeverForget #1971 – History has not ended yet, will be rewritten,” and last March told a crowd of supporters that “the implementation of Sharia will make Pakistan a model state attracting even Bangladesh to rejoin Pakistan.”

{And Sheikh Hasina has replied by hanging a principal collaborator years after the fact.}


Pakistan’s interests with regards to India are not exclusive to wresting all of Kashmir; rather, Pakistan has arrogated to itself the retardation of India’s projection of power in South Asia and beyond. As is well-known, Pakistan’s obsession with controlling events in Afghanistan by backing a Islamist militants such as the Taliban are due in considerable measure to Pakistan’s interest in denying India access to Afghanistan and stemming India’s larger ability to compete with it in Central Asia. Pakistan’s ISI continues to encourage groups such as the Jalaluddin Haqqani Network and LeT to attack to Indian assets and personnel in Afghanistan. Pakistan-backed terrorist groups have attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul twice in 2008 and 2009 and several consulates including those in Herat and Kandahar in 2014, Jalalabad in 2013 and most recently in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. In addition to other attacks on Indian personnel working in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s larger goal of preventing India’s rise requires analysts to stop viewing these groups beyond the buzz word of Kashmir and endeavor to understand the larger context in which they function as a force multiplier in Pakistan’s broader national security strategy. Allowing jihadi militant groups groups to operate semi-autonomously and nominally dedicated to jihad in Kashmir provides the Pakistani state plausible deniability, and masks the militants’ full role in the region.

An Action Plan

In an ideal world, India and the United States-among other interested parties—would be able to cooperate to contain the various threats that Pakistan poses through uses of military, economic, diplomatic and political tools of national power. However, India lacks the offensive capabilities to decisively defeat Pakistan in a short war and has been reticent to invest in the requisite military modernization and personnel policies required to decisively defeat Pakistan. The United States for its part seems unable to find any other policy approach to Pakistan that does not involve handsome emoluments in hopes of securing even marginal cooperation with Pakistan. The sad truth is that both countries are blackmailed by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and are loathe to move away from status quo policies.

{Incorrect premise. India can beat Pakis despite its nuke weapons. Us on the other hand is not a good faith player and is using TSP to check mate India in accordance with its policy of preventing rise of any regional power. Very soon Middle East politics will change and the reason to support Muslim terrorists as trade for Israel support will vanish. }

This does not mean that there is nothing that can be done. One of the simplest things that the United States and its international partners can do is change the way it talks about Pakistan and its terrorist clients attacking India. Americans and Indians who advocate engaging Pakistan at all costs {These are same group! Indians who want to appease US by playing this politics}, need to understand that what Pakistan craves is attention to its joint causes of Kashmir and standing up to a hegemonic India. When the international community predictably calls for both sides to settle their outstanding disputes peacefully, they unwittingly reward Pakistan while punishing India by imposing a false equivalency across the two. If the international community instead called for Pakistan to accept the status quo – a reality even Pakistan’s former Army Chief Gen. Musharraf had come to accept, and stop using terrorism and nuclear coercion as tools of foreign policy, Pakistan would be deprived of the benefits its seeks even if it does not incur costs for its behavior. Until the time comes when the international community is prepared to punish Pakistan for transgressing international norms, refusing to reward it is a good place to start.

{Nice prescription. Its like telling a patient who has been force fed drugs to give it up! Pakistan has to cease to exist in its present form. The idea for Pakistan has passed over by the force of history. Its better if US academics convince their leaders of this reality.}



C. Christine Fair is an associate professor at Georgetown’s Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She is the author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War(Oxford University Press 2014). Her twitter handle is @cchristinefair.

Seth Oldmixon is a DC-based political communications consultant who served in rural Bangladesh as a Peace Corp Volunteer. He is the founder of Liberty South Asia, an independent, privately funded campaign dedicated to supporting religious freedom and political pluralism in South Asia. His twitter handle is @setholdmixon.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby irutavias » 13 Jan 2016 04:10

http://bharatkarnad.com/2016/01/10/chasing-the-bandicoot-all-tactics-no-strategy-a-no-change-regime-after-pathankot/

Chasing the “bandicoot”: All tactics, no strategy, & a no change-regime (after Pathankot)

Posted on January 10, 2016 by Bharat Karnad

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inspection tour of the Pathankot air base yesterday — the scene of the usual, snafu-ridden, effort to subdue the infiltrating JeM terrorist team, and his endorsement of his NSA Ajit Doval’s handling of the crisis situation (“Noted with satisfaction the decision-making and its execution, the considerations that went into our tactical response. Also noted coordination among various field units”) suggests that, as that song in ‘3 Idiots’ went — “Aaall is welll!!”, nothing needs to be changed.

Implicit then is the belief that because everything worked tickety-boo there is no requirement for reviving the anti-terrorism centre (National Counter-Terrorism Centre) as the central decision-making and coordinating agency, and for instituting SOPs (standard operating procedures) that would apply across situations so every agency with interest/jurisdiction hews to the same response plotline rather than each organization going off on its own or, as happened in Pathankot, standing down, doing very little, awaiting instructions, and being aware enough of Doval to not take initiative for fear of upsetting whatever plan he may have up his sleeve.

In the event, the Pathankot response was a meandering one, wasted valuable time, involved misuse of available resources — airlifting NSG troops rather than using the army units in the immediate vicinity as the cutting edge of the effort (with the Lt. Col. heading the NSG effort ignoring the obvious possibility of the JeM militants boob-trapping their bodies to increase adversary attrition post-their elimination and losing his life in the bargain).

Perhaps, it was silly to expect things would be different after this newest terrorist event. Or that Doval would suppress his RAW/IB “field agent’s” impulses and not insert himself centrally into the proceedings, forsake direct control of the unfolding event by not dispatching NSG rather than working with the proximal army unit through the army line of command, and hence being forced to share the credit, rather than monopolize it. Of course, the downside of this approach is what actually happened — the profusion of command and control mistakes, and the confused ops to flush out and corner the JeM jihadis that prevailed, which is being laid at Doval’s door.

True, Modi had no option than to back Doval and the manner in which the latter tackled the unraveling events. After all as PM, he cannot be expected to be conversant with national security matters in any great detail. Which is all the more reason for PMs to pick persons as NSAs who are conversant with the larger issues in the strategic context. The danger of appointing policemen or militarymen to the apex position is reflected, say, in General Pervez Musharraf’s Kargil adventure — commendable tactics, bad strategy. The negatives were apparent — and so analysed in my new book ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ during another policman MK “Mike” Narayanan’s tenure as NSA to Manmohan Singh. Mike was mostly preoccupied with placing which policeman in what billet in RAW, IB, here and abroad, etc. When he did venture into the external realm, he ended up pushing the nuclear deal with the US to the detriment of the country’s thermonuclear pretensions and its deterrence stance.

Doval is more ambitious but his limitations are not dissimilar to Narayanan’s in that he believes every problem has a tactical, policing, small-time solution when, in fact, national security policy making should properly be concerned with an instinctive understanding of internal, regional and international developments that meshes with historical understanding of how circumstances may pan out. Doval has been nothing if not vocal. Hear his numerous videographed speeches on youtube.com, and what you come away with are ideas that have been there in the public realm for a while but now packaged with lashings of Hinduistic ideology and Pakistan-bashing.

And that’s the whole problem right there in a nutshell, isn’t it? Beating up on Pakistan rhetorically and in public speeches, promising retribution, is good theatre but does not make for sustainable national security thinking and policy, not when China is right there, standing with a club in its hands while Delhi chases the local “bandicoot” and ruffles the scenery.

The more debilitating aspect of the Indian reaction to the more important undercurrents is to rely on Washington to “read the riot act” to Islamabad and get it to to respond appropriately. Can there be a more de-spiriting and national self-defeating response than this?

Deal with Pakistan on its own terms with relentless covert warfare actions. Don’t squawk and complain, and act the supplicant, and plead with America to bring the Pakistanis in line. Seeking out Washington’s help in absolutely any circumstances is what Delhi should not ever do because it hands Washington the leverage to use against India. India should take care of its business by itself — the one thing Delhi and Indian governments/political leaders since independence have not done nor, after repeated bad experiences, have learnt to do.
Last edited by irutavias on 13 Jan 2016 05:01, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby sum » 13 Jan 2016 04:50

^^ Didnt get what Bharat Karnad is trying to imply in his article :-?

What has Doval done to all these guys that he is being attacked with such vitreol which even Pakis arent?

Or that Doval would suppress his RAW/IB “field agent’s” impulses and not insert himself centrally into the proceedings, forsake direct control of the unfolding event by not dispatching NSG rather than working with the proximal army unit through the army line of command, and hence being forced to share the credit, rather than monopolize it. Of course, the downside of this approach is what actually happened — the profusion of command and control mistakes, and the confused ops to flush out and corner the JeM jihadis that prevailed, which is being laid at Doval’s door


The danger of appointing policemen or militarymen to the apex position is reflected, say, in General Pervez Musharraf’s Kargil adventure — commendable tactics, bad strategy. The negatives were apparent — and so analysed in my new book ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ during another policman MK “Mike” Narayanan’s tenure as NSA to Manmohan Singh. Mike was mostly preoccupied with placing which policeman in what billet in RAW, IB, here and abroad, etc. When he did venture into the external realm, he ended up pushing the nuclear deal with the US to the detriment of the country’s thermonuclear pretensions and its deterrence stance.


. Doval has been nothing if not vocal. Hear his numerous videographed speeches on youtube.com, and what you come away with are ideas that have been there in the public realm for a while but now packaged with lashings of Hinduistic ideology and Pakistan-bashing.

And that’s the whole problem right there in a nutshell, isn’t it? Beating up on Pakistan rhetorically and in public speeches, promising retribution, is good theatre but does not make for sustainable national security thinking and policy, not when China is right there, standing with a club in its hands while Delhi chases the local “bandicoot” and ruffles the scenery.


Errr, Isnt this what present govt is doing?
Deal with Pakistan on its own terms with relentless covert warfare actions. Don’t squawk and complain, and act the supplicant, and plead with America to bring the Pakistanis in line.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby arun » 13 Jan 2016 05:06

X Posted from the STFUP thread.

Cartoonist Alok Nirantar’s take on the terrorist fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s reaction to India’s Pathankot dossier providing links of the Islamic Republic’s link to terrorism in India besides earlier dossiers on 26/11 etc.:

Image

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby shiv » 13 Jan 2016 06:36

chetak wrote:Pakistan’s Terror Game

Pakistan’s Terror Game

January 7, 2016 C. Christine Fair and Seth Oldmixon
Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir are predicated on ideological concerns rather than security concerns. Without Kashmir, Pakistan is incomplete per the jalebi-like logic of the so-called Two Nation Theory. For Pakistan to concede Kashmir and forge an enduring peace with India, Pakistan and its citizenry must evolve their interpretation of the Two Nation Theory. For generations raised on Pakistan’s intertwined narratives of Islam and nationhood, particularly those in the military, this is a price too high to pay. In fact, during a recent visit to Washington D.C., Pakistan’s army chief Raheel Sharif made it clear that “surrendering” Kashmir was something he would never be prepared to do. Since the military exercises de facto control over Pakistan’s foreign policy—not politicians and elected officials such as Prime Ministers—no peace process is currently possible. In fact, if Pakistan wanted peace it could have peace.


This too should go into the first post of the Paki thread. How many Indians have this degree of understanding? No one in the Congress party and few people in the media are able to speak about shitistan with so much clarity, unselfconsciously using words like "jalebi" in a very appropriate manner.

Don't know about others but I am thankful to this lady for the eyes she persistently attempts to open to reality

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Prem » 13 Jan 2016 07:15



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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby partha » 13 Jan 2016 08:45

sum wrote:^^ Didnt get what Bharat Karnad is trying to imply in his article :-?

What has Doval done to all these guys that he is being attacked with such vitreol which even Pakis arent?

This is clearly a hit piece without any analysis. Ajit Doval is being singled out by all and sundry. Even usual Modi detractors ignored Modi and went for Doval this time. Most vocal are those that are part of defence community. Doval might have reduced access to arms lobby which has pissed them off? Whatever it is, Modi and Doval should ignore empty vessels and continue to focus on the larger problems.


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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby shiv » 13 Jan 2016 09:23


Virtually simultaneous attacks on India and Afghanistan emanating from Pakistan is a clear signal of planning within Pakistan to try and provoke India into reacting is some way.

I just wonder what reaction from India would be beneficial to the attackers. Cancellation of talks does not seem like such a great outcome because the talks themselves could not have been expected to achieve a lot.

If India had retaliated militarily how would it have benefited Pakistan or a sub group within Pakistan?

My own analysis has always been that the Pakistani army is behind all this, with support from jihadi groups and a wink and a nod from Sharif - but I must relook and rethink my own analysis to see if it can explain all the observed facts.

Of course the most obvious reason for such attacks is what CFair says - Pakistan's ideological jalebi that requires them to keep hitting India at least as a symbolic indicator of their resistance to the Hindu kafir even if no ultimate goal is achieved. But the question arises is there is a fissure within Pakistan and a "peace lobby". (Maybe the peace lobby of Pakistan is one that needs to see only tens of dead Indians rather than hundreds, but that is a separate subject)

If such a fissure could be conjured up within Pakistan it could be conjectured that the ideological war lobby seeks to provoke India to react in a way that will convince the Pakistani peace lobby that India is not to be trusted and must be fought all the time. This is exactly the argument made by the Indian peace lobby/kandle kissers

India itself has such a split in civil society where there is a "peace with Pakistan at any cost" lobby and a "Pakistan must feel pain" lobby. Indian policy hovers between the demands of these two lobbies with the peace at any cost lobby generally dominating the action on the ground. The "Peace at any cost" lobby of India uses the argument that the ideological war lobby in Pakistan is empowered by an aggressive stance taken by India and that "war lobby" of Pakistan s made weaker by India being friendly despite provocation. But what is not made clear is the actual stance of the peace lobby in Pakistan. The peace lobby of Pakistan may not want war now, but they may still be trying to dictate the shape of the Indian nation so I would call the Paki peace lobby such as exists as "Conditional peace lobby"

Who is better for India? The Pakistan war lobby or the conditional peace lobby?

Indian governments have for long given Shitland a long rope to try and empower the conditional peace lobby and let them prevail over the ideological war lobby. Why is that not happening? It appears that the imaginary or real peace lobby in Pakistan is unable to prevail over the war lobby. The war lobby survives like iSIS, with funding and support from various sources. I doubt of there can be peace with Pakistan by imagining that some peace lobby might prevail, without drastic changes in the way Pakistan's war lobby receives external support.
Last edited by shiv on 13 Jan 2016 09:28, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Philip » 13 Jan 2016 09:25

Latest Def procurement "made in India",offsets,policy has drawn both boquets and brickbats from Ind. industry.Medi report.One top Ind. industrialist hit out against it saying that it was drawn up by "babus and retd. babus" with little knowledge of the industry's problems. The only int. thing is a new category of designed in India,made in India with a min 0f 40% local input. I don't think that the NSA can be blamed for an MOD policy.

The pigs appear to have recd. considerable local help. The amt of ammo recovered indicates that it was already in Punjab before they crossed the border.There must be sev. such arms caches all over the state and in J&K too. Pak would've planned for sending in swarms of jihadis to accompany a mil strike on India,and with these caches already hidden,easy for the jihadis to recover and use in suicide attacks as seen at PKot. The aim is to hit India as hard as poss. with non-state assets causing max damage. 26/11 redux.

I am surprised at our HM's repeated 'respect" for Pak! It is the rogue state of rogue states.It simply cannot be trusted.Even the US house now wants to block the sale of F-16s to Pak,fed up with its chicanery. I feel that the Modi govt. has invested too much of "Piss in our time" with Pak ,which will prove very unhealthy for the govt. It simply CANNOT deliver on pak.In fact NO Indian political party can deliver a peace with Pak, The Paki uniformed tribe is saturated with hatred for India,since 1948 and this has permeated its DNA to such an extent that it cannot be genetically altered.

P'Kot has yet again exposed the flaws in the Indian approach to Paki terror,right from govt policy,diplomacy,to defence of installtions,border security,command and control,media handling/propaganda war,etc. We need to study WW2 wartime experience,how both the Germans and Allies countered each other using ingenious propaganda methods.Oue media blitz should be a slick affair,well presented with facts.

PS:If the deadline has not yielded results,severe diplomatic sanctions should be imposed.NO more pussyfooting around.It will diminish Mr.Modi's credibility significantly.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Prem Kumar » 13 Jan 2016 09:29

Ajit Doval is the new Amit Shah. Recall how presstitutes, Congis, AAP etc all went after Shah when he seemed all-conquering. They even made laughable attempts at how "Modi is good & Shah is bad". Now that Shah has been humbled a bit by the election results, those noises have died down.

They're trying same thing with Doval. This time with ISI's backing. Would'nt be surprised if there are more attacks by ISI just to have presstitutes show Doval in bad light. But its a dicey game. Overplay your hand and he might just cut loose. So, ISI might prefer a back-stabbing, low burn battle of attrition with just enough ammo fed to presstitutes.

I just hope Doval says "balls to you" and authorizes covert strikes in Shitistan. Will shut everyone up. As some Chinese leader said: "A loud fart is more eloquent than a 1000 speeches"

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby sum » 13 Jan 2016 09:54

I just hope Doval says "balls to you" and authorizes covert strikes in Shitistan. Will shut everyone up. As some Chinese leader said: "A loud fart is more eloquent than a 1000 speeches"

Since covert is by definition deniable and hidden, doubt we will hear about it for a few years at least!

Am sure all the preparations were kicked off ( after years of neglect) and sign off had been done long ago and before these attacks when NaMo was sworn in.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby chetak » 13 Jan 2016 10:16

Punjab police ‘slip-up’ may have delayed Pathankot operations




Punjab police ‘slip-up’ may have delayed Pathankot operations
VIJAITA SINGH

Central intelligence agencies were unaware that the phones belonging to former Gurdaspur Superintendent of Police Salwinder Singh and his jeweller friend Rajesh Verma were in the custody of the terrorists till they dialled a Pakistani number already under the surveillance of agencies here using one of these phones.

The Punjab police did not inform the Central agencies about the snatched mobile phones that were later used by the terrorists to make calls to their handlers in Pakistan. It could have averted the delay in planning the operation at the Pathankot Air Force base, a top government official told The Hindu.

This delay or lapse is being viewed seriously by the Central government. “It was only after a call from an Indian number was made on the number under surveillance that we realised the enormity of the situation. Had we known about the snatched phones, they could have been put under surveillance immediately and the location could have been known since they had already reached the air base, almost 24 hours before they struck,” said the official.

Though Punjab Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal said that the Centre was informed around 7.30 a.m. on December 1 about the possible entry of terrorists to Gurdaspur, officials said that the Centre was informed only around noon as the Punjab police, for the first few crucial hours, refused to believe Mr. Singh’s version because of his “colourful background.”

“It is to be seen whether the delay was deliberate or not. It could also be the case that Salwinder Singh did not inform his counterparts about the snatched phones at all. All these aspects are being looked into. We had asked Punjab for a report, they are yet to get back to us,” said the official.

The terrorists had four phones with them, two belonging to Mr.Singh, one to Mr.Verma and a fourth belonging to taxi driver Ikagar Singh who was killed hours before the terrorists reached the air base. Only one phone, that of Mr.Verma, was used to make the calls to Pakistan.

A senior defence official said Mr.Singh, who was questioned for the second consecutive day by the NIA, was a likely complicit in smuggling activities rampant across the international border. There is a strong possibility that he helped the terrorists thinking they were smugglers, one official said. There may also have been insider help for breaching the base.“We are not satisfied with replies given by the former SP. He is changing his statements too often,” said a Home Ministry official.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby sum » 13 Jan 2016 10:29

^^How does one keep a number outside Indian territory under surveillance?
That would be only possible if there is physical access to Paki telecom provider?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby rajithn » 13 Jan 2016 10:35

sum wrote:^^How does one keep a number outside Indian territory under surveillance?
That would be only possible if there is physical access to Paki telecom provider?


Not necessarily. In simple terms: At any point in the connectivity cycle, if the comms is in the ether, so to speak, they can be vacuumed up. If they are hard cables, access at some point can be obtained - even without the knowledge of the telecom service provider.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby ArmenT » 13 Jan 2016 10:44


Wonder if Mr. Modi can call on his new friend, Mr. Zuckerberg, and get his hands on IP address logs from Facebook. IP addresses could be traced to reasonably small geographic areas.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Karan M » 13 Jan 2016 10:47

^^ Is this National Intelligence Agency or National Press Release agency?? Been multiple days after Pathankot attack and they are busy leaking info to press about phones, SP etc. Instead of taking action on latter without fuss? If this is the quality of personnel Modi/Doval have to lead, they have a tough time on their hands.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Picklu » 13 Jan 2016 10:54



Putting a copy here for posterity



Calls from Pathankot: Digital trail leads to Pakistan
The Indian Express used publicly available online resources to verify the phone numbers, locate Facebook accounts they were linked to, and identify their service providers.

Written by Praveen Swami | New Delhi | Updated: January 13, 2016 11:25 am

pathankot attack, evidence of pathankot, pathankot investigation Pathankot attack: The Facebook profile of Saad Mughal, whose number was among the five dialled by the terrorists.

Five phone numbers called by the terrorists who attacked the Pathankot airbase last week track back to individuals whose Facebook pages identify them as residents of Pakistan. In one case, an individual had posted images of armed Jaish-e-Muhammad operatives; another number was one used in advertisements for its charitable front, al-Rahmat.
The Indian Express used publicly available online resources to verify the phone numbers, locate Facebook accounts they were linked to, and identify their service providers.

Watch video Pathankot Attack: The Rise Of Jaish-e-Muhammad

Indian investigators recorded only three snippets of conversation, one by a terrorist using the single name ‘Nasir’, who spoke for several minutes with his mother and brother. The other Pakistan numbers were found by investigators as they studied the two carjacking victims’ mobile phone records.
The five numbers were called by the attackers using phones taken from slain taxi driver Ikagar Singh, and jeweller Rajesh Verma, friend of Punjab SP Salwinder Singh.

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Earlier this week, Pakistani media reported that investigators in that country had said the numbers were “not registered”, suggesting that they did not exist. All Pakistani mobile phone SIM cards are sold only after biometric data is provided by their users.
The numbers were conveyed by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, highly-placed government sources said, to his counterpart Lt General (retd) Nasir Janjua earlier this week.
The first among the five numbers is identified by Truecaller as belonging to an individual called “Saad” — Truecaller harvests data from users’ address books, and uses them to build a database of information that helps reliably identify calls from unknown numbers.
The number, operated by cellphone company Mobilink, was also linked to a Facebook account operated by Saad Mughal, a resident of Sahiwal in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Mughal’s Facebook page identifies him as a one-time student of the Government High School in Arifawala. He describes himself as working at “Islam”.
Incidentally, Mughal’s Facebook profile picture is of the Jaish-e-Muhammad’s chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, an internationally-proscribed terrorist wanted, among other things, for the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight to Kandahar in 1999, and the 2001 attack on Parliament House in New Delhi.
Mughal’s Facebook page also contains several photographs of armed individuals who appear to be jihadists operating in Kashmir, safehouses equipped with weapons, and propaganda posters vowing war on India.
The second number is identified by Truecaller as belonging to an individual using the name “Kashif”, and is operated by Telenor. The same number was used by an individual named Kashif Jan to operate a Facebook page. The page identifies Kashif as a former student of the University of Karachi, and states he was born on January 30, 1982.
Kashif’s Facebook page lists Mughal as one of his contacts and also contains propaganda material for Islamist causes, notably a campaign to free Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin of former Punjab governor Salman Taseer.

Watch Video: How Wires Got Crossed in Delhi

Mughal is also connected, though Facebook, to a third individual called by the terrorists. The number, provided by Warid Telecom, is identified by Truecaller as belonging to “Molana”, a possible typographical error for Maulana.
The number links to a Facebook page operated by Usman Sarwar, who claims to be a former student of the Lahore University of Management Sciences and Lawrence College, Murree, and says he works full time at “Dawah (proselytisation) calling to Allah”.
Sarwar, incidentally, is linked to both Kashif and Saad Mughal through several common friends-and also hails lives in Sahiwal.
In one case, there is an explicit connection with the Jaish. Truecaller identifies the user as “Jashe Islam”, a possible misspelling of Jaish-e-Islam, or army of Islam. The number appears in advertisements that have appeared several times in Jaish-related publications, as well as the website banateayesha.com, asking for contributions for the jihadist group’s charitable front, al-Rahmat.
Ever since 2010, al-Rahmat has solicited contributions to an account at the National Bank’s Satellite Town branch in Bahawalpur, held by a Ghulam Murtaza. In advertisements, the trust — sanctioned by the United States, United Arab Emirates and other countries — has said it provides funds for jihad veterans and religious causes.
The fifth number identified in Truecaller records as “The Truth is Out There”. Each of the five numbers now appears to be switched off, or out of service.

- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... 3m9On.dpuf



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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby member_28352 » 13 Jan 2016 11:04

shiv wrote:I just wonder what reaction from India would be beneficial to the attackers. Cancellation of talks does not seem like such a great outcome because the talks themselves could not have been expected to achieve a lot.

I think the RAPE's in Pakiland have realized the danger of the tanzeems to their own self interest and wellbeing. All said and done the RAPE's are few in number and a heavily militarized aam abdul with the fervour of jihad and training from the Pakjabi tanzeems is the most direct danger to RAPEs. I must give it to the RAPEs that they are brilliant. So for a while they kept the tanzeems busy by sending them off to Kashmir. Now most tanzeem fighters, unless they're SSG level recruits, are shot at the border itself. If the Pakjabi tanzeems are now within Pakjab then they pose a very direct threat to the RAPEs. So what's to be done? If I were a RAPE ISI officer I'd have a couple of choices. One, plan attacks of the scale of 26/11 on civilian targets within India. This keeps the tanzeems happy but has the risk, albeit very remote, that someday India will actually act militarily against Pakistan and the biggest losers from this misadventure would be the RAPEs themselves. The power of the RAPEs comes from ARN/ARS and the tactical nukes in their possession all of which will be severely degraded in the post war scenario. Post Indian attack, Pakistan will become an overt theocracy like IS/Daesh. The Pakjabi RAPEs fear this outcome more than India attacking Pakistan. So what's to be done. The other plan is to train the best of best tanzeem recruits to SSG/SF levels and send them against military targets in India. Now India can't launch a cataclysmic war against Pakistan as it won't have international approval as enough civilians didn't die. Also in the pecularities of the situation, of having Modi as PM of India who must show some action or else be risked being compared to MMS, the only alternative course is for India to launch special forces attacks against the Pakjabi tanzeems within Pakistan. From media reports, Pakistan's 3.5 fathers, including Unkil, also seem to endorse this plan. So, what does this achieve for the RAPEs? Their immediate threat, the tanzeems are eliminated by India. In effect Indian SF act a henchmen of the RAPEs!!!. Now how should India actually respond. It should respond by bringing extreme pain to the RAPE elite including its top military and ISI officers. It doesn't matter to India if Pakistan becomes second Daesh. Rather it becomes a target for the entire world. However the RAPEs are also aware of this. Profit sharing has been offered to Indian elitemen in the CPEC projects for mutual preservation of the elites of the Indian sub-continent. The other option is conventional war and elimination of any effective Pakistan offensive military capability. In both cases the RAPEs should be made the losers. The RAPEs created Pakistan and they should bear the full consequences of their choices.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby ramana » 13 Jan 2016 11:42

Pravin swami has changed?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Philip » 13 Jan 2016 11:45

Every Paki terror outfit will have its ISI handlers,with a sr. officer in charge.It is inconceivable that the Paki mil establishment will allow free unrestricted ops by the jihadis who may take a swipe at establishment figures whom they dislike. Therefore, all this examination of info,etc. is mere hogwash. The Pakis are simply buying time until some other crisis hits the media front pages.The world will then forget about Pkot and move on.The GOI will be left holding the terror corpse in its hands ,made the laughing stock of teh intl. community yet again.

When such attacks happen,retribution must be almost immediate and swift.We've a lot to learn from the Israelis. They don't give lengthy statements about "befitting" replies!

Unless and until the Pakis find bullets and bombs shafting their backsides,they will not change tack. Orchestrating our covert ops will taek time,we have to be patient,but must tighten up loose ends to prevetn as much infiltration as poss. The simplest method of responding to Paki terror is massive IA arty/rocket barrages to atke otu targets of opportunity in Swineistan.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby ramana » 13 Jan 2016 11:47

C Fair is stating views of the war faction in US.
Also her choice.of words is Orientalist.

American expressions like peanuts, pretzels are translated as mungphali, jalebi...

Akin to British usage of chota peg etc..

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby partha » 13 Jan 2016 11:53

Indian Army chief defends decision to send in NSG, says NSG is the best force to deal with hostage situations.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby habal » 13 Jan 2016 14:09

after trawling through pakistani media and native sources, there is a certain something that is going on there. For the first time, in Pakistan's history the current Herr General Saddam Hussain clone has given order to an army controlled accountability + corruption bureau called NAB (National accountability bureau) to prosecute General Kayani's brother in a Defence Housing scam in his watch.

So this is curious, for first time that something like this is happening in TSPA, accountability being sought of an ex-COAS, who was also for a long time head of ISI and under whose watch 26/11 was prosecuted. He is being targeted for accountability by the incumbant COAS. So there you have a disgruntled group who wants to target both NS and present COAS. And for a change it is possible that NS and Jernail Saddam clone would like to really get to the root of this issue to see who is working for whom and who gave the call for tandem attacks.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby RajeshA » 13 Jan 2016 14:40

shiv wrote:

Virtually simultaneous attacks on India and Afghanistan emanating from Pakistan is a clear signal of planning within Pakistan to try and provoke India into reacting is some way.

I just wonder what reaction from India would be beneficial to the attackers. Cancellation of talks does not seem like such a great outcome because the talks themselves could not have been expected to achieve a lot.

If India had retaliated militarily how would it have benefited Pakistan or a sub group within Pakistan?

My own analysis has always been that the Pakistani army is behind all this, with support from jihadi groups and a wink and a nod from Sharif - but I must relook and rethink my own analysis to see if it can explain all the observed facts.

Of course the most obvious reason for such attacks is what CFair says - Pakistan's ideological jalebi that requires them to keep hitting India at least as a symbolic indicator of their resistance to the Hindu kafir even if no ultimate goal is achieved. But the question arises is there is a fissure within Pakistan and a "peace lobby". (Maybe the peace lobby of Pakistan is one that needs to see only tens of dead Indians rather than hundreds, but that is a separate subject)

If such a fissure could be conjured up within Pakistan it could be conjectured that the ideological war lobby seeks to provoke India to react in a way that will convince the Pakistani peace lobby that India is not to be trusted and must be fought all the time. This is exactly the argument made by the Indian peace lobby/kandle kissers

India itself has such a split in civil society where there is a "peace with Pakistan at any cost" lobby and a "Pakistan must feel pain" lobby. Indian policy hovers between the demands of these two lobbies with the peace at any cost lobby generally dominating the action on the ground. The "Peace at any cost" lobby of India uses the argument that the ideological war lobby in Pakistan is empowered by an aggressive stance taken by India and that "war lobby" of Pakistan s made weaker by India being friendly despite provocation. But what is not made clear is the actual stance of the peace lobby in Pakistan. The peace lobby of Pakistan may not want war now, but they may still be trying to dictate the shape of the Indian nation so I would call the Paki peace lobby such as exists as "Conditional peace lobby"

Who is better for India? The Pakistan war lobby or the conditional peace lobby?

Indian governments have for long given Shitland a long rope to try and empower the conditional peace lobby and let them prevail over the ideological war lobby. Why is that not happening? It appears that the imaginary or real peace lobby in Pakistan is unable to prevail over the war lobby. The war lobby survives like iSIS, with funding and support from various sources. I doubt of there can be peace with Pakistan by imagining that some peace lobby might prevail, without drastic changes in the way Pakistan's war lobby receives external support.


There are only two songs that are played in Islam - victimhood and victory!

Victory has actually a very low threshold in Islam. A terrorist attack is a victory. A minor retaliation is victory. Radicalizing an Indian Muslim is victory. Converting a Hindu to Islam is victory. Raping a non-Muslim girl is victory. Vandalizing some non-Islamic symbol is victory. Even a public claim of victory is victory. So regardless of how bad India retaliates, Pakistan is going to claim victory.

Pakistani Islamists would actually love to get India embroiled in some occupation of Pakistan, where Indians do nation-building and Pakis do some guerrilla warfare. Then Pakis can claim victory everyday, they kill, maim or abduct an Indian jawan! That is the proverbial paradise for Islamists - as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.

That would provide work for all those lazy jihadis rotting away in Pakistan.

What however is not a victory for Pakis, is if India simply takes over some Pakistani land permanently and cleanses it of Pakis altogether. That is most definitely a big thapparh.

That however is victimization! Islamists love that too! Bangladesh defeat allowed Paki Army to motivate many new recruits to Jihad.

Basically whatever a civilized India can do against Pakistan in retaliation to terrorist attacks, mostly everything ends up benefiting Islamists in Pakistan.

So what can be done, where India can claim victory and justice?

a) Take over some Paki land, cleanse it of Pakis
b) Kill ten Pakis for every Indian, AND flaunt it publicly with glee
c) Take away the women of all jihadi-minded Pakis forcefully, and ship them for "rehabilitation" to places in India with screwed up gender ratios.
d) Take away young children of Pakis forcefully and wean them over to do daily Murti-puja and hate everything Paki
e) Be more brutal than any Jihadi can be
f) Last but not least, give peace a chance, break Pakistan into 5-6 pieces with lots of border disputes.

All this constitutes victory for India. Most of everything else is a quagmire for India and a victory for Pakis.

However civilized thinking stands in our way! If we can't do rethinking on that, it is better we do nothing against Pakistan.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby shiv » 13 Jan 2016 15:29

ramana wrote:C Fair is stating views of the war faction in US.
Also her choice.of words is Orientalist.

American expressions like peanuts, pretzels are translated as mungphali, jalebi...

Akin to British usage of chota peg etc..


LOL! :lol: I was going to make a post about this.

Somehow I get the impression that the reaction of Indians in the US to CFair is different from my own. I find, consistently that my "loyalty and support" to CFair's statements is not echoed and there is always scepticism and hyphenation, and sometimes dismissal. I have not managed to figure out why. Does CFair come across differently for US based folks?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Karan M » 13 Jan 2016 15:30

Anantha Krishnan M
✈ Retweeted
Manu Pubby ‏@manupubby_ET 4h4 hours ago

On questions on whether NSA was micromanaging the Pathankot ops, Army Chief says Western Army Commander was in overall charge.
24 retweets 6 likes
Anantha Krishnan M
✈ Retweeted
Manu Pubby ‏@manupubby_ET 4h4 hours ago

Army chiefs says reports that only 2 columns deployed in Pathankot incorrect. Says 8 column were on ground under command of a Brigadier.
13 retweets 4 likes

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby shiv » 13 Jan 2016 15:31

RajeshA wrote:There are only two songs that are played in Islam - victimhood and victory!

Victory has actually a very low threshold in Islam. A terrorist attack is a victory. A minor retaliation is victory. Radicalizing an Indian Muslim is victory. Converting a Hindu to Islam is victory. Raping a non-Muslim girl is victory. Vandalizing some non-Islamic symbol is victory. Even a public claim of victory is victory. So regardless of how bad India retaliates, Pakistan is going to claim victory.

Pakistani Islamists would actually love to get India embroiled in some occupation of Pakistan, where Indians do nation-building and Pakis do some guerrilla warfare. Then Pakis can claim victory everyday, they kill, maim or abduct an Indian jawan! That is the proverbial paradise for Islamists - as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.

That would provide work for all those lazy jihadis rotting away in Pakistan.

What however is not a victory for Pakis, is if India simply takes over some Pakistani land permanently and cleanses it of Pakis altogether. That is most definitely a big thapparh.

That however is victimization! Islamists love that too! Bangladesh defeat allowed Paki Army to motivate many new recruits to Jihad.

Basically whatever a civilized India can do against Pakistan in retaliation to terrorist attacks, mostly everything ends up benefiting Islamists in Pakistan.

So what can be done, where India can claim victory and justice?

a) Take over some Paki land, cleanse it of Pakis
b) Kill ten Pakis for every Indian, AND flaunt it publicly with glee
c) Take away the women of all jihadi-minded Pakis forcefully, and ship them for "rehabilitation" to places in India with screwed up gender ratios.
d) Take away young children of Pakis forcefully and wean them over to do daily Murti-puja and hate everything Paki
e) Be more brutal than any Jihadi can be
f) Last but not least, give peace a chance, break Pakistan into 5-6 pieces with lots of border disputes.

All this constitutes victory for India. Most of everything else is a quagmire for India and a victory for Pakis.

However civilized thinking stands in our way! If we can't do rethinking on that, it is better we do nothing against Pakistan.

Difficult to find fault with this

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby shiv » 13 Jan 2016 15:36

Karan M wrote:Anantha Krishnan M
✈ Retweeted
Manu Pubby ‏@manupubby_ET 4h4 hours ago

On questions on whether NSA was micromanaging the Pathankot ops, Army Chief says Western Army Commander was in overall charge.
24 retweets 6 likes
Anantha Krishnan M
✈ Retweeted
Manu Pubby ‏@manupubby_ET 4h4 hours ago

Army chiefs says reports that only 2 columns deployed in Pathankot incorrect. Says 8 column were on ground under command of a Brigadier.
13 retweets 4 likes

Also

It was a good operation. To ensure less casualties we had to take time to complete operation: Army Chief Dalbir Singh

LtCol Niranjan best suited for job.Had handled over 3500 kgs of explosives last year. Followed SoP. V difficult to say what went wrong: COAS

NSG task at base was preemptive action,if there would have been a hostage situation bcz there were many civilians in the base:Ind Army Chief

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Sachin » 13 Jan 2016 15:45

3.The NIA is also trying to establish the identity of local residents who provided army fatigues and a walkie-talkie to the six terrorists after they infiltrated into Punjab, possibly on December 30.

It may be worth while to check the frequencies configured on the walkie talkie. To be frank IAF was a bit casual on this front. The "bird watchers" at a base in Bangalore was actually using a frequency allotted to the Amateur Radio Operators (HAMs).


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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Karan M » 13 Jan 2016 15:47

Thanks Shiv saar. Had missed those.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Karan M » 13 Jan 2016 15:48

Commanders on the ground in Pathankot were given full liberty and independence, no interference - Army Chief Gen Dalbir Singh

Army Chief says there was good coordination on the ground between Army and NSG with latter also giving cover fire to former at Pathankot.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analyisis-I

Postby Karan M » 13 Jan 2016 15:52

Looks like there are people who are seeing through the open mouth, insert motivated foot attempt by gentlemen like Shri Panag.

Tarmak/Anantha Krishna M

Sharing a well informed retort (unedited) to the public rant put out by Lt Gen H S Panag (Retd) & Maj Gen P K Mallick (Retd). Please note that this is NOT written by a civilian or a journalist.

------------------------------------------------------------------

"IT LOOKS LIKE YOU CHOOSE TO STAND TALL
ON TRAGIC MISFORTUNES THAT HAVE HIT US"

Dear Generals,

A great Indian mind once said, that the problem with the Indian society is that we have far more opinion than information. Dear Sirs, with offence meant if it has to be, your opinions on the Pathankot terror attack epitomise this wise opinion. While I seek to indulge in a point to point rebuttal, what worries me is the fact that before a competent body has dwelled into investigation, your rant flavoured with with incorrectness is out in public space. It is this dangerous and gross misrepresentation of fact by you that deters the confidence of normal citizens that I seek to correct.

Garuds, the Special Forces of the IAF, you say is poorly trained. While passing a value judgement without ever having worked with them or knowing what they have done in Pathankot is queer. It becomes apparent that you have no knowledge of what the Garuds do or have done in the past. The Special Forces of the IAF was raised and trained by the Indian Army. So much so that over 70 percent of this Special Force has been trained by this great institution that you once swore allegiance to.

In casting aspirations on the Garuds, are you doubting the ability of your own Army in empowering a sister service ? If yes, then the war fighting capability of our Army is worrisome. If no, then it looks like you did afterall bite your own tail.

What you may not know, but maintained strong opinions on is a fact that only a very small number of IAF Special Forces were staged at Pathankot. They initiated the encounter and prevented colossal damage to strategic assets stationed at the air base. Your misplaced value judgement shrouds the martyred Corporal Gurusewak in insult of the worst kind. I wonder, is that a stature a former General carries?

The above question often gets increasingly worrisome when you cast a net of doubt on the Defence Service Corps by branding them 'rag a tag'. These brave men in Khaki, most if not all, former Armymen with adequate combat exposure are the first line of defence that such bases have. One of them grappled bare handed, snatched a rifle and killed a terrorist before he was gunned down. It is odd..very odd...that a former Army man who in the right earnest should stand by his fallen colleagues, chooses the martyrs moment of reckoning to express his personal misgiving. It looks like you choose to stand tall on tragic misfortunes that have hit us. It only adds to the insult on injury...Sir.

Sir, as leaders of stature, we expect a mature disposition. Jumping into conclusions with little or no data to back you up is definitely not in the right earnest. Do we as a nation consider ourselves lucky that such an incident did not occur when you held high office in our prestigious organisation ? After all, jumping to conclusions prematurely only reflects doubtful leadership and it is fortunate that through this incident that occurred in Pathankot, the leadership of the Army and the IAF held their heads firmly on their shoulders and successfully thwarted colossal damage.

It would do us as a country a lot of good if you both choose to opine in public using factual data and not self concocted hypothesis which are far from facts.

Jai Hind!


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