Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

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Kashi
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Kashi » 26 Apr 2016 16:50

rkhanna wrote:
Hence the current state of affairs in the great JNU saga has its genesis in Pathankot..


Lol i tried replying to your post a couple of different ways. But basically I have no idea what you are saying.


That's the ticket.

shiv
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby shiv » 26 Apr 2016 17:06

I think this thread deserves euthanasia. The topic has become a chronic sore and the discussions either irrelevant or OT for this forum

My vote is for IB4TL

SSridhar
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby SSridhar » 21 Jun 2017 08:58

IAF inquiry into Pathankot attack finds serious lapses - The Hindu
A Court of Inquiry (CoI) by the Indian Air Force (IAF) into the terror attack on the Pathankot Air Force Station last year has found serious lapses in the air base’s security as well as its handling of the incident. The then Commander of the Air Force Station J.S. Dhamoon , who has been named in the inquiry, has taken Pre-mature Retirement (PMR) on his own accord.

The IAF inquiry, conducted by Air Vice-Marshal Amit Dev, found lapses in the base’s security. The report noted that had the terrorists been pinned down by IAF Garud commandos, the lives of the five Defence Security Corps personnel could have been saved. Six heavily armed terrorists from Pakistan attacked the Pathankot Air Force station in the early hours of January 2, 2016. The ensuing encounter lasted five days and claimed the lives of seven security personnel.

No big plan

The inquiry is also learnt to have observed that despite having prior intelligence of the attack, a comprehensive plan was not put in place. There was failure to even detect the ropes used to scale the perimeter wall and the personal clothing item and food left behind by terrorists despite the base being on high alert. It also pointed out that the standard operating procedures to secure installations had been violated — guard posts were not properly maintained and flood lights and other systems were not functioning properly. [b]The report faulted the Garud Commandos for their failure in handling the situation and said that they were ill-prepared for the task. As a result, it has now been decided to deploy them in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir to gain experience.

“The Garuds are a competent force but they need to battle-hardened. Based on the inquiry report, the government has decided to deploy them in J&K for battle inoculation,” defence sources said.[/b] IAF sources said the CoI is still on.

ramana
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 21 Jun 2017 09:28

I wish the inquiry on how the terrorists reached the base is also released and action taken.

I.commend the IAF for the through inquiry and fixing accountability along the chain of command.

Bravo.

rkhanna
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby rkhanna » 23 Jun 2017 14:38

>>I wish the inquiry on how the terrorists reached the base is also released and action taken.<<<

What and implicate the Politicians and their drug dealers?! Yea right

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby SSridhar » 25 Sep 2017 07:48

The inside story on Pathankot - Nitin A Gokhale, Business Line
This extract reveals the run-up to the successful NSG counter-offensive that overcame the terrorists

September 24, 2017:

1700 hours, 1 January 2016, 7 Race Course Road

In New Delhi meanwhile, even as Deo (Air Marshal Shirish B Deo, Western Air Command Chief) was on his way to Pathankot, NSA Doval drove to the Prime Minister’s residence to brief him on the emerging threat. ‘I told the PM what had transpired so far and the measures that had been taken. I also remember telling him that our assessment may be completely off the mark, but we were not going to take any chances,’ Doval tells me while remembering the incidents of that crucial day.

I asked the NSA what the Prime Minister’s reaction was. Was he disappointed that soon after his attempt to reach out to Pakistan (the PM had made an unscheduled stopover at Lahore just a week prior, to meet his counterpart Nawaz Sharif), the Pakistanis had chosen to launch another terrorist attack? ‘Well, he was quite cool and composed. He knew a serious problem was at hand and his resolve to meet the threat squarely was quite visible. He gave specific directions and wanted us to ensure that our vital air assets and personnel were protected. The Prime Minister also wanted us to redouble our efforts to locate and neutralise the terrorists. Though he wanted us to clear the area of the terrorists at the earliest, the Prime Minister did not betray any anxiety. I thought it was his implicit faith and confidence in the ability of our forces. I do not remember him mentioning anything about his Lahore visit. He was focussed on nothing but the problem at hand,’ the NSA told me.

But why wasn’t the Cabinet Committee on Security — the highest decision-making body on security matters in the country— convened, I asked the NSA. The NSA’s answer reveals his practical side. ‘Assuming that CCS was called, what would have been the question in front of the CCS to decide? Whether to take immediate counter measures and neutralise the attack? Could it have said anything else except to issue instructions to counter the threat and neutralise it?

The process would have only delayed the whole process by several hours and if terrorists had fired one bullet, it would have been impossible to land an aircraft (at Pathankot). The NSG, Garuds, and army commandos would have potentially reached there hours after the terrorists had taken position. So the whole criticism is misdirected. There was no option but to take the decision right then and there. In an emergency, on-the-spot decisions need to be taken. The country has trained and positioned us to take the responsibility. If we do not take that responsibility when the country’s vital security interests are endangered, what is the justification for us to be there,’ he wondered.

Doval, who led the negotiating team in the infamous Kandahar hijack episode in December 1999, had clearly learnt his lessons. That time the Crisis Management Committee and the CCS took an inordinately long time to arrive at a decision. By the time it was convened, the plane had already taken off from Amritsar when it could easily have been neutralised in Amritsar.

Delay and dithering in decision-making at the highest level in Delhi and the bumbling security establishment on the ground had forced India to release Masood Azhar and others in exchange for passengers on the Indian Airlines plane. Doval still simmers with anger on the shameful handling of the hijack crisis because affected families, instead of showing patience and faith in their security agencies, virtually forced the Government to wilt under the pressure of the public mood. Many people in official positions insisted on following protocol when the need was to take urgent action. Doval was mortified to witness the release of Masood, the dreaded terrorist. The same Masood would then go on to form the Jaish-e-Mohammad, whose operatives were now about to launch an attack on a military installation in Pathankot.

Clearly, Doval was not about to repeat the mistakes of 1999, convention be damned.

2100 hours, 1 January 2016, Pathankot

Back at the base, Air Marshal Deo, having finished the tour and inspected the measures taken by the AOC, came to the officers’ mess to stay put. He had ordered that Mi-35 helicopters and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPA) be launched in the evening to enhance surveillance and detection in the dark. A C-130 flight was due to arrive later that night to further increase surveillance across the vast air base. The RPAs and C-130 were both equipped with night vision capability.

At Pathankot

Deo also knew that an NSG team was on its way to Pathankot on the dedicated IL-76 plane that is always on standby at Palam for them...The NSG’s counter-terrorism task force I (CTTF-I) or 51 Special Action Group (SAG) contingent consisted of 140 specially selected and trained soldiers on deputation from the Army. The NSG squad was capable of tackling both terror and hijack situations. The operational commander of the 51 SAG was Brig Gautam Ganguly.

The decision to send the NSG to Pathankot was to save the day. By the time the NSG team alighted with all their special equipment, it was past 2200 hours on January 1, 2016. They were supposed to have driven out of the Pathankot base and stayed at an accommodation arranged for them at the nearby Mamun Army cantonment.

‘Somehow, to me it didn’t seem right to leave Pathankot since I knew the base had valuable air assets and did not have enough protection,’ Brig Ganguly recalls thinking that night. On that pure hunch — call it gut feeling, describe it as instinct honed by years of experience — the NSG squad stayed back on the base and was assigned to secure the technical area where the aircrafts are parked. That one hunch was to prove decisive in the next few hours.

Excerpted with permission from Bloomsbury Publishing India

Aditya G
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 25 Sep 2017 12:52

Pathankot crisis was a mix of good and bad 'luck', for lack of a better word;

- Counter terrorism elements were in place in advance for a change.

- Garuds engaged the jehadis, but couldn't kill them. Took casualties but on positive side fulfilled it's core mission. Remember it was created in response to attacks on air force stations and srinagar airport. Had their bullets landed at the right place the encounter would have been over.

- DSC engaged the jehadis, but couldn't finish off the attackers. Also lost men.

Ultimately no strategic assets were lost. However the behavior of the press who was out only to paint a picture of poor handling by goi left a bad taste


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