vina wrote:Ah. NOW we come to the crux of the problem and I had written about this earlier. The STRUCTURAL problem we have is that we developed a "Soviet" style command and control org setup . The ADE/ADA/NAL /CSIR/Univs will do "research and development" while the "manufacturing" will be done by "HAL/Shipyards/OFB" .. The IAF /IA/Navy will be the swaggering "Pshaww.." -- "Koi Hai" Harrumping throwing weight types, who cannot build a screw or change a flat tyre if their lives depended on it . Throw in Huge Organisational egos , with a layer of IAS Baboons and Mantri Mahodays.. this is a god awful mess , both in the defence side and R&D on the govt PSU side (little wonder those heroes of yesteryears are mostly dead, except the monopolistic oil marketing sector) . Such a structure CANNOT succeed, despite herculean efforts.
You're right here. What is required is a Program Office, like ATV project, where a Rear Admiral headed a joint IN (design, sourcing, final assembly at SBC), BARC (reactor), DRDO (missiles, sonar, communication), L&T (Fabrication). etc reporting to the Prime Minister. We need this kind of cross functional Program Offices. However, getting good program managers who command respect from different agencies other than their home agency is rare. APJ Abdul Kalam was such a universally accepted leader. Commodore Balaji is one such person, who coming from the Navy, was accepted by ADA rank & file as a leader.
vina wrote:I have written on this multiple times over the past 10 years on the exact same thing on multiple occasions on the VERY same thread. What the Tejas program is using is the traditional , "old as the pyramids" engineering methodology of the west , popularly known as the "Waterfall Method" with huge layers of Indian bureaucracy and artificial command control org driven idiocy thrown in.
This is all so 1930s. Even when I was in undergrad (I am middle aged now, RBose claims he is young, but he is not though..if I am middle aged), industry globally had moved on to
Concurrent Engineering
Vina, concurrent engineering works only when there is maturity in all domains and you get everything right in the first iteration.
If you do not get some or all things right in the first iteration, then concurrency goes for a toss.
Concurrency definitely does not work when you're doing something for the first time and the chances of getting it not right is high.
Even with seasoned developers, concurrent engineering carries risks. Take the following example of cracks in F-35 bulkhead
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ds-391647/
“During a recent inspection of the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing ground article used for durability testing, two cracks were identified in one of the ground article’s four primary wing carry-through bulkheads,”
http://aviationweek.com/defense/more-cr ... fe-testing
Cracks on an F-35B’s primary support structure found last year are more extensive than previously thought, triggering a halt in ground-based durability testing until the fourth quarter of this year.
The initial cracks were found on section 496, a primary wing carrythrough bulkhead, last fall, prompting officials to stop the ground-based testing at hour 9,400 during the second life’s worth of use — or second 8,000 hr. of equivalent flight hours — to investigate the issue.
Since then, cracking also has been discovered on adjacent bulkheads, according to Joe Dellavedova, spokesman for the F-35 Joint Program Office. “Subsequent inspection of surrounding structures in light of this discovery found additional cracks in two of the other adjacent bulkheads,” he says.
The section 496 bulkhead is the same structure found in 2010 to have had a crack at the 1,500-hr. mark; this temporarily halted flight testing until a fix was implemented.
Now, since manufacturing commenced before testing was completed, there is a good number of aircraft flying with section 496 bulkhead. If the way section 496 bulkhead is produced is changed, only new built planes will have it. They will have to use patches that will need to be applied to all aircraft built.
Assume the problem was more serious. Then all F-35 built during concurrent engineering would need to undergo rebuild that is financially expensive & operationally time consuming. Or have to be relegated to second line duties, that is operationally unsuitable. Or scrapped, that is a complete waste of money, time & effort.
Lets take the case of NP-1 landing gear designed by HAL AR&DC. The primary function of the landing gear is to take the impact of aircraft slamming on the deck. While they achieved it, they results of the first iteration was too bulky and heavy.
https://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2011/10/l ... layed.html
“In September 2010, we observed that the undercarriage was over-sized. During traction-retraction and the undercarriage's incorporation into the fuselage, there were many surprises awaiting us. This is a very critical piece with the hitting impact on the ship going to be much higher,” an official with HAL's Aircraft Research and Design Centre (ARDC) said.
The Landing Gear for NP-2 had more weight reductions.
Now, how would concurrent engineering help here?
The engineers at AR&DC had to first solve the impact issue. Once that had been addressed, they could confidently reduce weight.
There was no other way to design the landing gear but iterative. The traditional waterfall method
If they did concurrent engineering and designed a lean landing gear, and it didnt meet its primary function of absorbing the impact, and this was discovered later, then all prototypes and production units built would need redesign and rebuild. That would've further slowed down the program.
Or built prototypes / production units with the heavy landing gear. Then the aircraft built during concurrent development would've been operationally inefficient.
Concurrent engineering doesnt work in all circumstances.
vina wrote:FIRST, ACCEPT responsibility of piss poor project management skills and temprament with all humility and confess that they dropped the ball in their part of program management and that their active hostility and indeed sabotaging of the project deserves condemnation. Accept with all humility that they aren't the Gods when it come to designing and building aircraft and where their input was most needed (in terms of weapons fit, capability, ownership and maintainability etc) , the simply dropped the ball.
This is an incorrect emotional rant on your part.
What can Navy do if HAL AR&DC does not get the landing gear impact strength, weight & volume optimized in the first iteration?
Water down impact load requirements? Then the plane wont be able to land on a carrier
Waive off weight requirements? Then the plane wont be able to take off from a carrier with a useful load.
By your Lockheed Logic and Martin Mathematics, IN should have ordered thousand's of NP-1 standard aircraft. That would give HAL AR&DC "incentive" to re-design the landing gear.
It would also get LCA Navy quickly in service, fulfilling H&D.
However, you forget that NP-1 is so heavy that with a full payload, it wont be able to take off from an aircraft carrier.
The landing gear was an example. Similarly, no way IAF could've helped in technical R&D issues that needed to be iteratively solved and no number of orders would've helped.
Lockheed Martin tom toms concurrent engineering because building and selling half baked planes helps it make money part of which goes to lawmakers. HAL has no such hang-ups.
Point is wherever Tejas is today, its because of everyone's hard work. It has happened with all the speed it could. 9 women conceiving wont deliver a baby in a month.