Aviral Singh @aviralsingh99
@livefist @ShivAroor Cold War Days...Rare Pic from 1980s. Indian Tu142 being escorted by US F14 Tomcat after it spooked US Carrier.
Didn't know Indian planes spooked khan's carriers once upon a time.
Aviral Singh @aviralsingh99
@livefist @ShivAroor Cold War Days...Rare Pic from 1980s. Indian Tu142 being escorted by US F14 Tomcat after it spooked US Carrier.
Periscope: Indian Navy’s 4 critical needs
This year’s defence budget has shown a marginal eight per cent increase over the previous years (to cater for inflation), and continues the trend of the last four years, of remaining below 1.8 per cent of GDP, thus leaving practically no money for any new inductions, which means that if no contracts are signed in 2018, then given the 2019 elections, the nation will need to wait for 2021, to sign any major contracts, given the lead time taken to process the cases and contract negotiations. While shortages of the Air Force (300 fighter jets, 200 helicopters), Army (artillery, infantry weapons, 300 helicopters, etc.) are a major cause for worry, this article deals with four critical items for the Indian Navy, which have very serious implications on our sea-going combat capability, at a time when Pakistan and China are rapidly building up their naval capabilities in our backyard, the Indian Ocean. China has established a maritime base in Djibouti and is expected to set up naval-cum-airbases in its funded and built ports in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka).
Chinese warships and submarines routinely deploy to the Indian Ocean. All the four items required by the Navy would need contracts to be signed by March 2018, and an additional annual allocation of about $4-$5 billion for the next decade. The first item in this list (all four items are equally important for a three-dimensional service like the Navy) is to select and sign a contract for indigenous construction of six modern, long-range conventional submarines, under Project 75 (India), which was approved by the Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) in 1999, under the “30-year submarine building plan”. At today’s costs, these six submarines would cost a total of about $10 billion. Out of the 13 conventional submarines presently in commission, 11 have completed their service life of 25 years, and are being “kept alive” by refitting them in Indian and Russian shipyards (two Kilo-class subs have been sent to Russia already for a 30-month refit and modernisation) well beyond their service life, and, hopefully they will “plug the underwater combat capability gap” till we make six new Project 75 (India) indigenous subs. If by some miracle, a contract for these proposed Project 75 (India) submarines is signed by 2018 (before the six-month “election restriction” sets in), then the first of these submarines would be inducted only by 2026, when the only “new and reliable” subs in service would be the six new (1,500-tonne each) Scorpene subs being presently built by Mazagon Dock Ltd (Mumbai) under Project 75 — the first of these long delayed subs, the ‘Kalvari’ is expected to be commissioned by May-June 2017, and the sixth by about 2023. It may be noted that our neighbour, Bangladesh, inducted two Chinese-built conventional subs in January this year, while Thailand is signing a contract with China for three conventional subs. In the meantime, China has signed a contract with its strategic ally Pakistan to induct four large (4,000-tonne each) conventional subs from China by 2024 and simultaneously making four at the Karachi shipyard. These new Pakistani subs will each have the capability to fire three or more 500-km range nuclear-tipped cruise missiles against crowded Indian coastal cities like Mumbai.
Thus our backyard will soon be full of foreign submarines. The second item on the Navy’s critical list is the long-delayed indigenous construction at Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) of 12 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), which are needed to clear the entrance to our ports of sea mines laid by enemy submarines, aircraft and other vessels. If a single ship is sunk or damaged due to an enemy mine (which can have 200 to 400 kg of high explosive), most merchant ships will avoid ports, thus resulting in shortage of important supplies like oil, LNG, etc. Safely locating and destroying enemy sea mines in our muddy, saline waters, is a very dangerous and difficult task, requiring very high-technology ships with “almost zero acoustic, magnetic and water pressure signatures” along with very high-tech equipment. For the last 35 years, the task of wartime sea mine clearance was carried out by 12 Russian-origin obsolete MCMVs, of which barely three to four are available today, and these are long overdue for the scrapyard. The tragedy is that after the normal international bidding procedure was gone through, and a shipyard in South Korea won the contract about five years ago, some complications set in (GSL apparently did not get the “assurances for transfer of technology”), and the contract, worth about $5 billion is yet to be signed. Here also, if the contract is finally signed by mid-2018, then the first locally-built MCMV may be commissioned only by 2022-23, leaving a huge gap in our capability to counter enemy sea mines in times of war.
The third item on the Navy’s critical list is the decade-long pending case to import 16 medium multi-role shipborne helicopters of about 12 tonnes each, to be used for detecting and destroying enemy submarines and ships. Here also, some complication has set in, after an American firm won the contract, and over two dozen of our frontline warships are left with a total of 26 obsolete helicopters (10 Russian origin which may be modernised and 16 of British origin). The actual immediate requirement of such 12-tonne helicopters is closer to 50. In addition to this, the Navy needs another 200 indigenous shipborne three-tonne light utility helicopters (LUH) to replace its obsolete fleet of Chetaks. An additional $10 billion would need to be earmarked over the next decade, if the contract for the 16 12-tonne helicopters is signed, and local manufacturer of the LUH is authorised by the government. In any case, its high time the Navy takes on the case for indigenous manufacture of a suitable 12 to 14-tonne multi-role helicopter, which could also meet the needs of the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, BSF and for civil aviation.
The fourth critical item on my list is the need for government authorisation for indigenous construction of six nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) which are needed for long-range high-speed operations to “deter, detect, track and in case of war to destroy” enemy aircraft-carriers and submarines, not only in the vast reaches of the Indian Ocean Region, but in the distant East and South China Seas, where they will be the only effective challenge to the growing Chinese Navy in the dragon’s backyard. This project, if approved, would require a second nuclear submarine production line (the first nuclear sub-production line, being the Arihant class strategic nuclear subs or SSBNs), and additional funding of about $12 billion over a 24-year period. In the interim period, the Navy would need to manage with its lone SSN (INS Chakra) inducted on 10-year lease from Russia in 2012, and, later, its media reported successor SSN from Russia, which would replace it by 2022 for another 10-year lease. The Navy has a proud record of indigenisation, and given the complexity of these projects, the government needs to take early decisions, as not only new additional infrastructure and money is needed but also skilled manpower for the Navy (which designs its warships and nuclear subs) is needed by the shipyards who will build the conventional subs, MCMVs and SSNs.
carriers are not necessary vs TSP and not going to help vs PLANAFs throw weight in SCS
Bala Vignesh wrote:I believe we need another import of the DE subs. We may have all the capabilities and the capacity to design and build our own sub but our requirement for this was as of day before yesterday and ti design test and certify our own design would be a long drawn program which would not meet our urgent requirement.
Instead we can start development of a desi SSK and iron out any issues that we face in the program while we also order a limited number of good enough subs like the upgraded Kilo's as a stop gap measure. The total SSK requirement is about, conservatively, 16-18(13 existing subs requiring replacement and 3-5 subs additional to increase force strength and capabilities). Of the above we have the Scorpene's taking up almost 1/3 of the lot. Of the remaining 9-12 we can import about 3-4 as immediate requirement, with options for 2 more with ToT if required, and the remaining can be replaced with the desi SSK we develop.
Just my 2 paise..
Indian Navy’s all-women team is likely to set sail for journey around the world in June, Vice Admiral R. Hari Kumar said on Thursday.
The all-women crew will be making their circumnavigation on INSV Tarini, the sailboat recently inducted in the Navy.
The team has already sailed INSV Mhadei to Visakhapatnam from Goa for the International Fleet Review 2016 and thereafter to Mauritius and back.
Following that, they sailed the boat on a gruelling voyage to Cape Town in December 2016.
Viv S wrote:sohamn wrote:If we have to import DE subs then I suggest we get ToT for advanced kilos ( make Philip part of negotiation committee )
For which side?
Jaitley also released two other products developed by DRDO, namely IP-based secure phone and the Gallium Nitride Technology.
Singha wrote:carriers are not necessary vs TSP and not going to help vs PLANAFs throw weight in SCS
Given its Mahanian outlook and superior surface fleet, the Indian Navy would, in any future war with Pakistan, seek sea control over the northern Arabian Sea by sending one, or even two, CBGs to destroy or degrade Pakistan’s surface fleet. With that done, the attack would shift to coastal installations and to supporting the land battle through amphibious landings
Yet, sea control must go hand-in-hand with sea denial. While CBGs seek battle with Pakistan’s navy, Indian submarines would cut oil supplies and war material from Pakistan’s West Asian allies; and bottle up shipping in Karachi, Gwadar and the new naval base at Ormara. For this, Indian submarines would lurk outside this ports, while also deploying in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz.
In establishing sea control across the northern Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy would fight a tricky battle in coastal waters against the Pakistan Navy. The latter, outnumbered and outgunned, knows it would get quickly wiped out on the open seas. It is likely, therefore, to withdraw close to the Pakistan coast where the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) would provide it air cover.
To close in with this fleet, India’s CBGs must have the air defence capability to beat off the PAF. Key to this would be the MiG-29K fighter, flying from aircraft carriers; and air defence systems like the Barak, and the much-awaited new Long Range Surface to Air Missile.
One of the most significant events during 2001-2002 was the enhanced deployment of the Indian Navy against Pakistan. The Indian Navy had deployed more than a dozen warships including the aircraft carrier INS Viraat in an offensive posture. The ships were on a high alert, fully armed and carrying out regular patrolling in the Arabian Sea. Five warships from the Eastern Fleet were also rushed to the Arabian Sea to contribute to the naval build up. The Navy was in a high state of alert in the shortest ever time frame. The high operational availability of its material assets i.e. ships, submarines, aircraft, naval support infrastructure was amply demonstrated.
Earlier, a similar deployment had forced the Pakistan Navy to stay close to its harbours and hastened the end of the eleven-week Kargil intrusion in 1999. The Indian Navy had forward deployed frigates, destroyers and submarines within striking range of Karachi harbour, through which more than 90% of Pakistan's trade, including oil supplies, are received. This display of force was aimed at challenging Pakistan to vacate the Indian territory in the Kargil sector in North India. The build up was also aimed at imposing a naval blockade of Karachi port.
The Indian fleet conducted offensive manoeuvres in the Arabian Sea resulting in the Pakistan naval fleet sticking very close to its coast. Pakistan had interpreted the initiatives to mean that the Indian Navy was preparing to enforce a quarantine or blockade of Karachi and prevent the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. Naval planners in Islamabad have remained preoccupied with the Indian threat of a naval blockade of Pakistan's seaports. As a matter of fact, the threat of a naval blockade finds a prominent place in the Pakistan Navy's strategic thinking and tactical plans. This is primarily due to past experiences during the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars
arshyam wrote:chola wrote:If we want to keep naval aviation, if we want to project power in keeping with our global aspirations we need to push for the pinnacle in the field and that is launching fully-loaded aircraft from a CATOBAR carrier.
I keep hearing this bolded phrase off and on, but never understood what it means. Could you kindly elaborate?
What the Navy wants is a deck-based fighter, but the LCA Navy Mk1 doesn’t meet that requirement. Its power-to-weight ratio, the thrust the engine generates [are insufficient] and it’s underpowered for the airframe. Unfortunately, even the Mk2 variant doesn’t qualify. That’s why we took this case up to the Defence Ministry.
spooked them with a monotonous regularity
chola wrote:If it takes us longer to build a SSK of our own then so be it. We are not in desperate straits. We are not surrounded by first military powers. Dhoti shivering has killed our military-industrial base by redirecting our treasure to phoreners. Let's not continue this self-defeating trend.
Viffing, the move demonstrated here, in the first episode of James May's Big Ideas, was put to devastating use in the Falklands War fought between Argentina and the UK in the Austral winter of 1982. Using this technique, Harrier pilots chased by Argentine Mirages could slow their jets very rapidly in flight and get behind their attackers in an instant, a decidedly handy maneuver in air-to-air combat. Handy it was for the British: no Harriers were lost in dogfighting during the war.
Philip wrote:N,partly met by P-8Is,but leaves a capability gap in LR strike with advanced missiles.sub-sonic Harpoon ASMs cannot compare with a BMos capability.
Such a carrier will cost as said before upwards of $12B
IAC-1,using either upgraded MIG-29Ks (with problems solved or naval Rafales) and acquiring more LRMP strike aircraft which can carry BMos,etc.
The larger cat carrier with EMALS will require N-propulsion,safer as the reactor could be designed for the life of the vessel,thus not relying upon petro power,could be designed at leisure and built to arrive sometime around 2030.about 5 years after IAC-2 arrives.
Philip wrote:True! Sea Harriers would simply hide stationary behind clouds with their VIFF capability in exrecises,then pounce upon the hapless pursuer,scaring him sh*tless! Their time to height capability to cos of vectored thrust was awesome.
Pratyush wrote:It Philip so he gets a free pass. Never mind that radars loosing track and the the harrier if it's radar is on then the enemy not seeing it self getting locked up by harrier.
It pure bs based on someone's over active imagination.
I am sure that we are about to be regaled with the mirage 3 vs harrier. Without an understanding of why the harrier succeeded in that specific conflict.
Harriers Could Gain the Upper Hand in a Dogfight by Literally Stopping Midair
Posted on February 19, 2017
escalate costs, impact Indian Navy: CAG
IANSJul, 31 2016
New Delhi: The delay in delivering an indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC) will adversely impact the Indian Navy, with one of its two carriers in the process of being decommissioned, the government auditor has pointed out.
The Comptroller and Auditor General, in a report tabled in Parliament this week, also pointed out that there was "continuing disagreement over project timelines between the Indian Navy and Cochin Shipyard Limited (where the IAC is being fitted out), with realistic dates for delivery yet to be worked out".
The delay has also resulted in the cost escalating beyond the originally sanctioned Rs 19,341 crore, the report said, adding that the overall physical progress of the carrier was not assessable.
The shipyard says the carrier will be delivered in 2023, five years behind schedule.
Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carrier
The Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers have an expected procurement cost of £5,900 Million.
Their annual operating cost has been quoted as £44 Million per ship.
Over the expected 50 year service life of the two aircraft carriers,this gives us a lifecycle cost of £10,300 Million and an annualised lifecycle cost of £206 Million or £103 Million per ship per year.
A $13 billion U.S. aircraft carrier is about to hit the open seas.
It’s the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the most expensive and most advanced warship ever built. The ship was christened in November 2013 and is scheduled to be commissioned this summer, said Lieutenant Jesus Uranga of the Navy Office of Information. It had been slated to be commissioned this month.
The Naval behemoth can house more than 4,500 people and weighs 90,000 tons. The CVN-78 is the lead ship in the Ford class of aircraft carriers, replacing some of the U.S. Navy’s existing Nimitz-class carriers
Russia builds deadly missile 'capable of destroying Royal Navy warships in ONE strike’
RUSSIA has developed a nuclear-capable missile which could sink the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers in one strike, according to reports.
By Nicole Stinson / Published 26th March 2017
Vladimir Putin Putin and the nuclear-capable Zircon missileGETTY/AFP
DEADLY: Vladimir Putin's military chiefs have built a new deadly nuclear-capable missile
Vladimir Putin’s military chiefs claim they have built an anti-ship cruise missile capable of travelling at between five and six times the speed of sound - 3,800 mph to 4,600mph.
Now British defence and navy officials believe the nuclear-capable Zircon could be a “game changer”.
The experts also fear the deadly Zircon, could sink the Royal Navy ’s two new £6bn state-of-the air aircraft carriers in a single strike
Russian Navy debut 'sizzler' missiles to DESTROY US Navy
The lethal missile – which can be fired from land, sea and submarines – can reportedly cover 155 miles in just 2.5 minutes, which is faster than a bullet from sniper's rifle.
One senior Naval source told the Sunday Mirror: “Hypersonic missiles are virtually unstoppable. The whole idea of the carrier is the ability to project power.
"But with no method of protecting themselves against missiles like the Zircon, the carrier would have to stay out of range, hundreds of miles out at sea.
"It’s planes would be useless and the whole basis of a carrier task force would be redundant.”
The HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrierGETTY
NAVY: One of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers the HMS Queen Elizabeth
“Hypersonic missiles are virtually unstoppable”
One senior defence source described the Zircon as a “potential game changer”.
A swarm attack with a dozen Zircon missiles against the world’s most modern warships would be devastating, experts claim.
It is understood to have a range of up to 500 miles and is said to be capable of being fitted a series of warheads from high explosive to nuclear.
Testing of the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile began this year and it is believed they could be fitted to a nuclear-powered cruiser by 2022.
RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile CNN
LETHAL PAIR: The RS-28 Sarmat "Satan 2" intercontinental ballistic missile is also being tested
NATO forces MASS on Russian border in deterrent against resurgent Putin
Pete Sandeman, a naval expert, said: “Defence against hypersonic missiles presents a huge challenge to surface ships.
"There is so little time to react that even if detected, existing defences may be entirely inadequate.
“Even if the missile is broken up or detonated by close-in weapons, the debris has so much kinetic energy that the ship may still be badly damaged.”
A Royal Navy spokesperson said: “We keep threats under constant review but do not comment on Force Protection measures”.
“TU-142M aircraft have had a distinguished service with over 30,000 hours of accident-free flying. During its service life, the aircraft underwent several modifications and retro fitments to keep up with evolving technology and changing requirements of the Navy,” the official added.
The official further said, “As a result, the aircraft throughout its service life has been participating in and has been a major factor during all naval operations. Despite being in its twilight years, the aircraft performed exceptionally well during the recent Naval Exercise TROPEX in March 2017.”
Philip wrote:The cost of a QE carrier as built is around GBP 6B,,which is around $7.5B. These figs are for a ski-jump carrier .EMALS was estimated over 5 years ago at being around $600M.
Under the revised agreement, the total capital cost to Defence of procuring the carriers will be £6.2 billion, a figure arrived at after detailed analysis of costs already incurred and future costs and risks over the remaining seven years to the end of the project. ~ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)
Providing a major boost to the maritime security capabilities of the Navy and Coast Guard, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has cleared a proposal worth around Rs 8,000 crore for acquiring 32 made in India ALH Dhruv helicopters to be built by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.
"The Navy is also planning to equip the choppers with some low frequency SONARs which would be developed by the force with the help of an advanced DRDO laboratory," the sources said
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