Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

shiv
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Postby shiv » 04 Mar 2005 07:18

Sorry if I am diverting from the thread topic by some general thoughts that I will post here. Parakram and its post-mortems are important in terms of "taking care" of the military aspects of Pakistan's designs on India.

It is important to make the military threat from Pakistan the easiest to deal with. That has been Pakistan's strongest hand.

Ultimately - as events in Iraq are showing us, overwhelming military superiority does not necessarily lead to a clear conclusion.

If overwhelming military superiority does not lead to a "clear conclusion" of a conflict what does? Ideology, politics and the ability to change lives of a large number of people on the ground play a long term role in overall "victory".

The statement that "there can be no military resolution" to differences between India and Pakistan carries an added threat to Pakistan as Indian military superiority builds up. Indian military superiority can be more of an advantage when we do not use it because:

a) Using it will not lead to a clear conclusion
b) The superiority makes the Pakistani military more wary of severe punishment if they commence military action

In my opinion, Pakistani leaders are faced with some stark choices now. One is to accept Indian dominance and gradually watch as oily. filthy Indianness seeps into Pakistan through every pore rendering decades of Pakistani purity worthless.

The other is to force India to make military moves to prove that India is a military threat to the neighbourhood. Paradoxically a stronger military may actually make India a smaller military threat to others as capable military power has powerful dissuasive influence.

What Pakistani leaders can do and probably WILL do, is to ally themselves forever with some great power - perhaps the US and promise all possible help forever in opposing India at all cost and at all times in favor of US (or other) geopolitical interests.

This is not a new idea. But it has inherent disadvantages that put the Pakistani state at risk. Islamism and the neglect of basic human needs in Pakistan in favor of geopolitical alliances to oppose India make Pakistan a weak state.

The worst nightmare of Paki leaders will be for them to face a militarily strong India that has no intention of fighting and offers cultural, religious and family attractions to the Pakistani population that the US (or China) can never hope to match.

India - the picture of a sexually attractive woman with a machine gun. That is the way forward.

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Postby RayC » 04 Mar 2005 07:40

Sanjay wrote:.

India's military PR ( sorry Ray Sahib and co. ) is pretty bad at times and was really bad in the 1990s. However, I don't see Athale as being responsible for this in any way.


I just gave Athale's details as I knew it.

Defence PR is the worst thing that could hit the universe. Most of them are 9 to 5 blokes and do private work rather than meet the media. Ocassionally have the General's photo in the news and that's it! :(

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Postby Sanjay » 04 Mar 2005 12:16

Ramana, you really should know that I don't judge people that harshly by now!

Ray Sahib, in period 1995-1998, the J&K conflict was heating up. The RR units were still finding their feet and the BSF was a bit ham-fisted at the time.

However, whenever anything happened, the Army PR office was contacted and could not give a presentable or clear answer. Even if wrong, a clear answer goes a long way in PR.

Regarding Colonel Athale, his efforts to achieve a PhD shows a clear effort on his part to improve both his understanding and his knowledge beyond his service tenure. That combination is very formidable - especially if he has kept his finger on the military pulse.

BTW, did you get that photograph of the future Indian infantryman that I e-mailed you ?

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Postby RayC » 04 Mar 2005 17:17

Sanjay,

I haven't got the photo.

My vsnl account has expired.

The new id you may try is:

rayc17m@yahoo.co.uk

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Postby AmanC » 04 Mar 2005 17:21

Rayc17m. My, my, Ray. You are turning into a teenager or what? You must be the life of the chatrooms. heh heh. :D

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Postby Rajput » 04 Mar 2005 18:07

I'd be interested in hearing more details on what happened to LtG Kapil Vij. Replacing a core Corps Commander during such tensions is unheard-of, unless there was serious dereliction of duty. Not much has been said about this. And I really admire the tremendous self-discipline shown by him by not commenting on it whatsoever.

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Postby RayC » 04 Mar 2005 19:22

Aman,

Ray is such a common name it appears that it is never available. But 17 m is not 17 Male. It is 17 MAHAR - the unit that I commanded. ;)

Sorry to be such a dsappointment I presume.

Teenage chat? Who has the time?

The bold lettering giving the e mail id was to tell you all who have some communication with me is that it is not that I am not replying , but some hassles are happening at the vsnl id.

Cheers

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Postby Sanjay » 04 Mar 2005 19:46

Ray Sahib, it's been sent.

Hope you like.

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Postby ramana » 04 Mar 2005 20:31

Sanjay, Congrats on your joint article with Arun_S in IDR. I hear it made lot of waves at Aero India where 1500 copies of preprints were distributed.

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Postby Manne » 04 Mar 2005 21:26

Raysaab,

Of email IDs, what happened to Salim? :wink:

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Postby RayC » 05 Mar 2005 01:49

Ah Salim!

That is my pet name.

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Postby Sanjay » 05 Mar 2005 11:29

Ramana, that article has only one teeny-weeny problem - I have't got my copy yet !!!

Seriously, I just want to know whether or not the range estimates made were accurate or not. I do know that we did err on the side of caution.

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Postby viveks » 07 Mar 2005 03:33

I can really undertand how much the army men wants to crush our neighbours (paki)....be it even their civilians. Here is another example of urdan vegetables.....

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 042520.cms

It looks like there were many flash fires in delhi. You really feel like coming out and abusing. It becomes very hard to control....

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Postby Raj Malhotra » 07 Mar 2005 18:33

I think operation Parakaram was again a failure of the brass to come up with a viable operational plan to hit Pakistan hard in a “given geopolitical context”. It is futile to say that political leadership chickened out. One has to live in the world and play by the rules.

Parakaram was launched in the context that IA had ample warning to the extent that some units had mobilized around Oct 2001. The parliament attack came in Dec 2001. Thereafter it took IA around 20 days to get ready. Which was simply too much. The window of opportunity lasted around 1-4 days only.

Parakaram showed and proved the off quoted platitude that Generals plan for the last war. So we did see operation Brasstacks being replayed again.

Now the new theories are about replay of Kargill war, with what say you, “military attrition and wall of fire”. Off course not with a little (perhaps) help from pimps of arms sellers who propagate theories that result in arms sale.

While we have put a lot of spot light on the failure of intelligence and IA in Kargill, but what about IAF? Inspite of observing the Afghanistan war at close quarters and reasonably knowing the orbat of Pakistan, it failed to have ample supply of flare dispensers.

Then it had not built up adequate quantities of PGMs inspite of ordering Su-30MKIs.

If it had not built up the trajectory tables of bombs at high altitude then how was it going to help IA in Siachin if the conflict escalated or more importantly on Indo-Chinese border?


I think when the things got going the IA gritted its teeth and was ready for long haul. The policy planning and equipment deficiencies of IAF were perhaps more glaring.


Now we have to plan for the next conflict. The constraints are more than obvious. We have to react to a provocation within 1-12 hours.

It is only possible if the IAF and IN play the lead in the conflict. The IA will have to play the supportive role. Its SF will go in deep and pin-point the targets, the rest of force will only play the harassment role at the border, while continuing to deal with COIN and providing protection to important installations.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby ramana » 02 Nov 2011 22:12

Now that texmati has written her memoirs there is blog in Hind Times by Shisir Gupta

bharatiya wrote:Interesting take on war plans post Parliament attack and post Kaluchak

"The fact is that American diplomacy worked post Parliament attack as Indian military and not political leadership faltered."

http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside- ... tan-twice/


Shishir Gupta brings forth some new information to understand along with his comments.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 02 Nov 2011 23:25

Quite interesting timing of the article by Shishir Gupta and the information shared...and how convinient to blame the military brass when the book by Rice may show NDA decision makes in poor light.

But good he wrote the article - this might force the other parties to come out with what ever little information they can share.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Sanku » 03 Nov 2011 00:29

rohitvats wrote:Quite interesting timing of the article by Shishir Gupta and the information shared...and how convinient to blame the military brass when the book by Rice may show NDA decision makes in poor light.

But good he wrote the article - this might force the other parties to come out with what ever little information they can share.


Not possible, its in HT, even if a blog.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 00:32

^^^^Meaning?

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Sanku » 03 Nov 2011 00:35

rohitvats wrote:^^^^Meaning?


Meaning there are cases where the messenger is more important than the message, HT and its associated channels are such.

Why would they give space to a opinion which would spin things to show NDA favorably? HT is not known for its impartial stance.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 00:41

As far as I am concerned, it is clearly a hit job on the services. By whom, remains to be seen.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Ankit Desai » 03 Nov 2011 00:47

ramana wrote:Now that texmati has written her memoirs there is blog in Hind Times by Shisir Gupta

bharatiya wrote:Interesting take on war plans post Parliament attack and post Kaluchak

"The fact is that American diplomacy worked post Parliament attack as Indian military and not political leadership faltered."

http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/inside- ... tan-twice/


Shishir Gupta brings forth some new information to understand along with his comments.


There is some confusion regrading dates and some contradictions.

All right, so when CCS decided to go on war for Parliament attack in Dec 2001.

NDA leadership under Atal Behari Vajpayee had given a green signal to Indian military to strike at Pakistan in December 2001 and then again in May 2001 (I think it is 2002) but the military brass failed to deliver.


Didn't IAF realize that it is short of laser guided bombs and night pods in Dec 2001? Which it happened to be realized in May 2002.

The CCS met yet again on May 18, 2002 and gave a nod for strike to the military, which was seething with revenge. This time again the Indian Air Force delayed the proceedings as it ran short of laser guided ammunition and night vision pods. New Delhi gave a SOS to Tel Aviv, which sent three C-130 J Hercules full of laser guided bombs and pods on June 5, 2002 at Palam airport with Israeli Director General (Defence) Amos Yaron on board. But a fortnight delay was too much for the international community to let go.


Edited later:- I agree with rohit on this if above is not true.

-Ankit

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Surya » 03 Nov 2011 01:02

The CCS met yet again on May 18, 2002 and gave a nod for strike to the military, which was seething with revenge. This time again the Indian Air Force delayed the proceedings as it ran short of laser guided ammunition and night vision pods. New Delhi gave a SOS to Tel Aviv, which sent three C-130 J Hercules full of laser guided bombs and pods on June 5, 2002 at Palam airport with Israeli Director General (Defence) Amos Yaron on board. But a fortnight delay was too much for the international community to let go.




I checked with friends spread out in the Western sector in half a dozen units. They had more bombs then they knew what to do with by February - so this makes NO sense and seems like the crap the FAS write.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby SaiK » 03 Nov 2011 01:42

While we will have to wait for Mishra’s memoirs to find out what happened on Raisina Hill those days, it is certain that NDA leadership under Atal Behari Vajpayee had given a green signal to Indian military to strike at Pakistan in December 2001 and then again in May 2001 but the military brass failed to deliver.
http://www.bharatrakshak.com/NEWS/newsr ... wsid=16376

!?

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby ramana » 03 Nov 2011 01:56

You should have bolded May 2001! Just think:

Does IAF go and buy hardware or the politicians and babus?

So when they didn't do the buying how can military brass and copper fail to deliver?

What we need is Bharatiya Ram sene.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby eklavya » 03 Nov 2011 01:57

SaiK wrote:
While we will have to wait for Mishra’s memoirs to find out what happened on Raisina Hill those days, it is certain that NDA leadership under Atal Behari Vajpayee had given a green signal to Indian military to strike at Pakistan in December 2001 and then again in May 2001 but the military brass failed to deliver.
http://www.bharatrakshak.com/NEWS/newsr ... wsid=16376

!?


The implication being that somehow the IAF forgot :-? to order enough LGBs. What a ridiculous statement. The IAF asks for many things, but it is the civilians in the Government that have the power to agree with / deny the requests or sit on the files while they work out their arrangements. If the IAF was under-equipped, the political leadership and the MoD bureaucracy of the time is to blame, plain and simple.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby SaiK » 03 Nov 2011 02:38

ramana wrote:What we need is Bharatiya Ram sene.

If we can mobilize 10% of Indian population totally focused on elimination of enemies, and owns advanced weaponry, is all that is required.

next generation platoon could be all robots. babooze have to just press the button from the cnc room.

--

what if some secret missions are sent without anyone's knowledge using BRS?

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby svinayak » 03 Nov 2011 02:42

That article is a joke. No such news reports are made by other countries

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Cain Marko » 03 Nov 2011 03:16

Yes lots of bunk mixed with possible truth in that article, some discrepancies that caught my eye:

While we will have to wait for Mishra’s memoirs to find out what happened on Raisina Hill those days, it is certain that NDA leadership under Atal Behari Vajpayee had given a green signal to Indian military to strike at Pakistan in December 2001 and then again in May 2001 but the military brass failed to deliver.


This somewhat cooincides with the article by Col. Athale - the Army was ready only by Jan 7. Is this what above author alludes to when saying that the Army "failed" to deliver?

Post 26/11 attack, the Indian mood was ugly but there was no plan on the table to attack Pakistan or Lashkar headquarters at Muridke, Lahore even though Mukherjee read the riot act to Islamabad. When Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major talked about a missile strike or air strike on Pakistan post 26/11 at a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting, he was dismissed as being too emotional. However, the Indian posture post Parliament attack was really angry and meant business. Two days after the Parliament attack, the CCS under Vajpayee ordered full scale mobilisation of forces on the western borders. The window for limited war in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) was last week of December but the military took its own sweet time to mobilise and was just about prepared to go across by December 28, 2001


Patent bunk - F Major was not the ACM then! Probly Tyagi and possibly Krishnaswamy.

Thing is, India did not have anything like the Brahmos LACM in those days, I wonder if the induction of this missile could change the situation in terms of response times. For e.g. let us say pariliament attack occured and the the political leadership of the day gave a green signal to the services for an attack ASAP. Would they be able to strike targets like Muridke on the very same day (a few hours)? And to what effect? What might be the repercussions thereof from - Pak, International media, and India?

CM

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Ankit Desai » 03 Nov 2011 03:34

Cain Marko wrote:Patent bunk - F Major was not the ACM then! Probly Tyagi and possibly Krishnaswamy.

Thing is, India did not have anything like the Brahmos LACM in those days, I wonder if the induction of this missile could change the situation in terms of response times.


When he said 26/11 than it is mumbai attack not the parliament attack so, at 26/11 F Major was ACM. So when F Major talked about Missile attack than it is in 2008 and we had Brahmos in 2008. Story about surgical strike was going around at 26/11 time.

That is why whole narration and date references are misleading in " blog ". If it is copied from Rice's book than don't buy the book.

-Ankit

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby shiv » 03 Nov 2011 06:35

SaiK wrote:
While we will have to wait for Mishra’s memoirs to find out what happened on Raisina Hill those days, it is certain that NDA leadership under Atal Behari Vajpayee had given a green signal to Indian military to strike at Pakistan in December 2001 and then again in May 2001 but the military brass failed to deliver.
http://www.bharatrakshak.com/NEWS/newsr ... wsid=16376

!?

India reaction post Kaluchak
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=16376
The CCS met yet again on May 18, 2002 and gave a nod for strike to the military, which was seething with revenge. This time again the Indian Air Force delayed the proceedings as it ran short of laser guided ammunition and night vision pods. New Delhi gave a SOS to Tel Aviv, which sent three C-130 J Hercules full of laser guided bombs and pods on June 5, 2002 at Palam airport with Israeli Director General (Defence) Amos Yaron on board. But a fortnight delay was too much for the international community to let go.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Aditya_V » 03 Nov 2011 12:22

Sanku wrote:
rohitvats wrote:^^^^Meaning?


Meaning there are cases where the messenger is more important than the message, HT and its associated channels are such.

Why would they give space to a opinion which would spin things to show NDA favorably? HT is not known for its impartial stance.


This yet anther hit job to demoralise the forces. Some in Media, I have noted over the last 5 + years seem to take grat relish in running down and going against our defense forces.

They wanted a Air Vice chief marshall fired for an AN-32 violating the Loc by 1 KM while they want no accountability for themselves.

Besides in May 2002 how could we go to war? the whole country was divided and shambles after the Gujarat riots- The NDA was fire fighting the issue.

I know people dont like to discuss this, but whoever started the Godhra train burning wanted to take the pressure of Pakis and wanted to Polarise the Indian population and keep many Indians on the defensive.

The whole anti-pak feeling which the country felt after IC814, Kalunchak and Parliament attack and host of other events vanished with what happened in Godhra at the end of Feb 2002.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby bmallick » 03 Nov 2011 12:49

Aditya_V wrote:I know people dont like to discuss this, but whoever started the Godhra train burning wanted to take the pressure of Pakis and wanted to Polarise the Indian population and keep many Indians on the defensive.

The whole anti-pak feeling which the country felt after IC814, Kalunchak and Parliament attack and host of other events vanished with what happened in Godhra at the end of Feb 2002.


Then doesn't it show a failure on part of the NDA & BJP govt in Gujrat, that they failed to see put down the fire at the very earliest, rather than "let people vent their anger" , so as to ensure that the country does not get polarized. Also a swift and strict control of the situation would not have made it the issue it now has become. It would have remained a much smaller law & order case. Didn't our leaders then played into the hands of the enemy here. You have to vent some anger at your brother on the family, well the time for that is not when you are war is at your door step. Maybe the BJP state leadership was not exactly in tune with that of the Central one, but still the central leadership should have looked at the bigger picture and acted accordingly. Handling of Godhra has been a strategic blunder by BJP in more than one ways, one we lost the whole anti-pak feeling and moral strength to go to war with Pak and secondly that scepter still haunts BJP's from providing the right candidate as next PM.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Aditya_V » 03 Nov 2011 13:10

bmallick wrote:
Aditya_V wrote:I know people dont like to discuss this, but whoever started the Godhra train burning wanted to take the pressure of Pakis and wanted to Polarise the Indian population and keep many Indians on the defensive.

The whole anti-pak feeling which the country felt after IC814, Kalunchak and Parliament attack and host of other events vanished with what happened in Godhra at the end of Feb 2002.


Then doesn't it show a failure on part of the NDA & BJP govt in Gujrat, that they failed to see put down the fire at the very earliest, rather than "let people vent their anger" , so as to ensure that the country does not get polarized. Also a swift and strict control of the situation would not have made it the issue it now has become. It would have remained a much smaller law & order case. Didn't our leaders then played into the hands of the enemy here. You have to vent some anger at your brother on the family, well the time for that is not when you are war is at your door step. Maybe the BJP state leadership was not exactly in tune with that of the Central one, but still the central leadership should have looked at the bigger picture and acted accordingly. Handling of Godhra has been a strategic blunder by BJP in more than one ways, one we lost the whole anti-pak feeling and moral strength to go to war with Pak and secondly that scepter still haunts BJP's from providing the right candidate as next PM.



Boss, Most of unjustified actions by Hindus killing Muslims happened withing the first week, army was called in March 1. They did the best they could when they were caught on the back foot, sure the admin actions in controlling the violence was far from perfect.. They let them vent their anger was pure BS for propaganda purposes. Remember 255 Hindus also died in the post Godhra violence.

Yes but there is a difference is someone lighting a fire and not fire fighting it properly.

Besides it still means the faults in Parakram were Political related and not forces related. It was the Politicians who made the decesion not to go to war.

Besides one forgets that the Paki forces came so much worse off in the escalated violence along the LOC that after 14 years since starting their cover fire to militants they suddenly down Hill skied and asked for ceasefire in late 2002.

On of the key components in busting Paki Bunkers in those exchanges was the then inducted recoil less rifles from Denel whose contract was promply cancelled when government changed in 2004.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby SSridhar » 03 Nov 2011 13:28

A remark made by ABV after Kaluchak was "We should have gone to war in December". There was enormous pressure on GoI as Tora Bora was getting affected and Pakistan was using this as an excuse to wriggle out. The UK and the UK decided that if a high-ranking British or American official was present in Delhi, the Indian Government would not launch an attack and they ensured that an almost continuous presence of one or another in New Delhi until January 12 when Musharraf gave his nation a speech and India was taken in by the promises. Clearly, Musharraf's speech was taqiyyah as he reportedly told the Americans later that the quid-pro-quo was American involvement in resolving the Kashmir dispute. GoI was immensely pleased with Musharraf's speech. It is my suspicion that Musharraf himself delayed that speech until mid-January so that Indian war efforts would be thwarted. The Americans and the British kept telling our political leadership that Musharraf was about to make an important u-turn in his policy and India should not rush into a war, thereby ensuring the military efforts were blunted.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 14:15

There is a lot that needs to be written about Operation Parakram and may be, this article by Shishir Gupta is the trigger which will lead to information coming out. As I said earlier, IMO, this is a hit job on the Services and the timing is suspect on two accounts -

(1) The book be texmati which is likley to show NDA (or specific actors like Brajesh Mishra) in bad light and Shishir Gupta is batting for someone here

(2) The recent opinion of IA on AFSPA and how there might be a need to put Services back in their place.

However, apart from above, there are questions which are not answered by the simple narrative given by the Shishir. Let me make some points:

(a) What kind of limited war window was being envisaged in December 2001 against POK? Given the geography in the region and snow fall at that point in time, the IA may have contemplated shallow thrusts into POK, limited SF raids, fire assaults and strike by IAF on certain visible target with good psychological impact. To say that IA was not ready by last week of December 2001 to take the above action may be stretching the argument. I know for a fact that key reserve formations were in J&K proper under Northern Command much before 25th December 2001. So, in my opinion, there were formations available under Northern Command for punitive actions across POK.

b) If one reads the first page of this thread, one comes across post by Sunil which says that IA was on general alert before December 13, 2001. And this is correct. IA moved out like an arrow from a stretched bow the moment mobilization order was given. Formations were moved with rapid pace which surprised the Pakistanis. It was movement of 21 Corps which got delayed. And as per article by Col Athale, the formations were all in place by end of 1st week of January and Pakistan at this time was seriously off balance (quoting Major General Ashok Mehta). So, the point is, if we had forces in J&K before the so called window for actions in POK and forces all along Western border for larger conflict, what prevented GOI from giving the way ahead in first week of January or thereafter?

c) Let us look at the above argument from different perspective – it says that international pressure forced Musharraf to give his January 12, 2002 speech. Now, if as per author the window for punitive strike was over in last week of December 2001 itself, what was it that forced Musharraf to go on air? If the PA was in position to thwart the Indian offensive across POK or Western border in general, what threat was held out against TSPA which forced Musharraf’s hand? And why was TSP still going about rattling the nuclear saber if all its formations were in place and it could have dented Indian offensive? And I hope people remember the January 11, 2002 press conference by General Paddy? Pakistan was on its way to become the munna and it was surely not out of love for Indian sentiments that Musharraf did what he did– if anything, the threat from India was very credible

d) In my opinion, there can be two reasons for GOI deciding against war in January 2002 – (a) GOI never wanted to go to war but wanted the threat to seem credible to get the Americans to force Pakistan’s hand. To say that the window of opportunity was missed in December 2001 but yet, American’s forced Musharraf to give his speech is nonsense. Unless, the threat was credible and for everyone to see and take seriously in January 2002, particularly Americans, there was no way Pakistan would have acted in the way they did. After all, Lt. General Vij, 2 Corps Commander was removed in January 2002. What prompted that action on part of GOI? To me, it seemed as a CBM to assure the Pakistanis that India will not attack after they had given the January 12, 2002 speech. (b) the government got foxed into believing that Pakistan will mend it’s ways by the Americans and called off the assault. And this is what is likely to come out from the book and is being protected against by the ghost-writers.

e) In both the above cases, the threat from India was credible – this is what pushed the Americans to push the Pakistanis. As they say, “Bhaye bin hot na preet”…to translate curedly, “No respect without fear”

f) Now, coming to May 18, 2002 decision and remark on the IAF. Does the author want us to believe that IAF was sitting idle all this while? It would have know from day one of mobilization about the status of PGM and designation pods. Also, if SOS was sent to Israelis, why did they take 3 weeks to deliver? Unless, they ran a 24hours shift production batch which is quite nonsense. In all probability, they pulled the stuff from their stock – and this should not have taken 3 weeks.

As I said, there is a lot to be written on this episode. This article attempts to side step any criticism that may comes NDA’s way after the book hits stands in India.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby Lalmohan » 03 Nov 2011 14:15

^^^ and what has happenend now is that the paquis have not made good their promises and unkil has run out of fig leaves for his chai-biskoot sessions in dilli and babus are giving them cold smirking yindoo condescending looks

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 14:48

Look at the irony of the situation. The same Shishir Gupta wrote something completely different on Operation Parakram in 2002.

Check this out: http://orbat.com/site/agtwopen/india_pakistan_confrontation2002.html

Some excerpts:

Part I

Orders were immediately issued to mobilise troops-more than those in the runup to the 1971 war. Considering that it would take three to four weeks for deployment on the western borders, the armed forces planned action for the second week of January 2002. After much debate, the service chiefs opted for a limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in PoK. It would essentially entail air force strikes to pulverise zones with a high concentration of camps-that's where the Tiger Squadron came in. A limited ground offensive by special forces of the army would further neutralise the camps and help occupy dominant positions on the loc (see graphic on previous page). D-day was tentatively fixed for January 14.

In Delhi's war calculus, limited action in PoK made sense as it would not only convey the Indian resolve to Pakistan but also keep international retribution to manageable levels. India, after all, was only taking a leaf out of the ongoing US action against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan. The daunting prospect of Pakistan launching an all-out offensive in response to the Indian action weighed heavily on the CCS. But the intelligence assessment that the Pakistani Army was not well prepared loaded the dice in India's favour. This meant that the chances of Pakistan launching a full-scale war were minimal. The Indian plans were also backed by a sound economy that was bolstered by low inflation, high forex and petroleum reserves. Sinha went on record saying the economy was prepared for war even though it was the last option.

A limited strike was a clever tactical option. The build-up indicated to the world, especially the US, that India was serious. If Pakistan wasn't reined in, India would have no option. Delhi also stepped up the diplomatic offensive, recalling its high commissioner and banning civilian flights from Pakistan. Picking up the war signals, Pakistan went into hypermode: it began mobilising forces and exchanged frantic calls with the US, getting President George W. Bush into the act. Secretary of State Colin Powell called India and Pakistan to cool down temperatures. British Prime Minister Tony Blair even flew to India in the first week of January to say that they were leaning on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. As proof, the US declared LeT and JeM as terrorist groups. Advani, meanwhile, flew to the US on January 8, where he was briefed on the contents of Musharraf's impending landmark speech. The speech finally came on January 12, when Musharraf declared that terrorism in the name of Kashmir was unjustified. Practically giving in to Indian demands, he also announced plans to regulate madarsas and ban known terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan.

Besides Musharraf's speech, there was another factor that shot down the CCS plans of an immediate war when it met on January 13. Satellite imagery revealed that Pakistan had moved out most terrorist training camps from PoK in January, implying that the Indian forces would have to cross the international borders to achieve militarily significant results. This was risky as it would show India as an aggressor and could invite global intervention on Kashmir. So the CCS decided to give Musharraf another chance but keep the armed forces fully mobilised for war. And in a symbolic gesture on January 14, the Tiger Squadron destroyed an "enemy" bunker at Pokhran in Rajasthan with a laser-guided bomb.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 14:49

Part II

June 10, 2002 Second Shot

The readiness strategy paid off when Pakistan's terrorist groups struck again on May 14. Storming into the army residential quarters at Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu, they killed 22 women and children. Even before the killings, India had accused Pakistan of failing to keep its promise on ending cross-border terrorism. A day after the massacre, a visibly tense Vajpayee told Parliament, "Hamein pratikar karna hoga (We will have to counter it)." On May 18, Vajpayee, along with Fernandes, was briefed on military preparedness by Director-General Military Operations Lt-General S.S. Chahal and Military Intelligence Chief Lt-General O.S. Lochab. Later, after a two-hour meeting, the ccs favoured military action against terrorists in Pakistan.

The political leadership apparently wanted limited action similar to the one in January. But after evaluating various military options, it was decided that action in PoK was not viable as Pakistan had beefed up its forces across the loc. Any action limited to forays across the loc would translate into minimum military gains and would risk attrition in the Indian forces. The military, however, favoured an all-out offensive that would stretch Pakistani troops across the international borders and give India an opening in PoK. So the armed forces came up with a daring plan: destroy Pakistan's war-waging potential and pulverise the terror factories in PoK. The June canvas was bigger than the January one, since Pakistan had packed areas north of Chenab with forces and military logic dictated the battle should not be confined to the loc. But there were serious limitations to the plans that worried the political bosses. With the monsoons imminent, the armed forces warned that the window for attack was extremely narrow. Any miscalculation could see the offensive bogged down with disastrous consequences.

Even as the debate raged, the military made its plans. The launch of the offensive was entrusted to Strike Corps I led by Lt-General J.J. Singh, who had directed military operations in Kargil war. The IAF, along with Strike Corps I, would initiate action in the Shakargarh bulge and engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) spread from Muzaffarabad in PoK to the Shekhopura-Lahore area. The idea was to lock Pakistan's key strike corp in battle that was essentially a boxer's feint. The real offensive would be in PoK by strike formations moved in from the east and tasked to capture strategic points used by Pakistan to push in terrorists (see graphic).

The period considered for limited strikes was between May 23 and June 10. On May 22, at Kupwara brigade headquarters near the loc Vajpayee declared that "it was time for a decisive battle". A day later, the CCS met to assess the readiness of the country's key sectors in the event of a war. An economic review was also undertaken: Sinha said India's economy was a hundred times stronger than Pakistan's to bear hostilities, and RBI Governor Bimal Jalan pointed to a low inflation rate of 1.56 per cent and all-time high forex reserves of $55 billion (Rs 2,64,000 crore) to tide over the crisis. The crude oil and petroleum stock reserves, which should sustain the country for more than a month in a war, were also sufficient.

With the CCS endorsing a strike, Vajpayee wrote to Bush, Blair, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Jacques Chirac, saying Musharraf had failed to deliver on his January 12 speech and that India's patience was running out. Hectic diplomacy followed as Bush, Putin, Blair and even Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called and pleaded with Vajpayee not to take the extreme step. The global community conveyed to Delhi that it would impress on Musharraf to clarify his promise on stopping cross-border infiltration.

That June was an option considered seriously by the Vajpayee Government is borne out by the Defence Ministry's SOS for defence supplies to Israel during the month. But the global community urged restraint as it was worried Pakistan would use the nuclear card to address its conventional asymmetry against the Indian armed forces. Musharraf had already played the nuclear brinkmanship-hinting he would use nukes against India-in an interview to German magazine Der Spiegel in April. Pakistan had even tested three missiles-Ghauri (N-capable), Ghaznavi and Abdali-between May 25 and 28 as a deterrent to India's posture.

This belligerence forced India to review its N-capability to strike back-Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Defence Research and Development Organisation Secretary V.K. Aatre reportedly participated in a CCS meeting in late May. In the absence of any formalised strategic force command, the nuclear strategy was handled on a need-to-know basis by Mishra, who reportedly attended an AEC meeting on May 24 in Chennai and later flew to Manali to brief Vajpayee.

Pakistan's nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him. Bush sent Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistan on June 5. He apparently asked Musharraf three times whether he would "permanently" end cross-border infiltration and help dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. He conveyed Musharraf's commitment to Powell while flying to Delhi on June 6, and to India, on arriving. On June 10, Powell disclosed Musharraf's promise to the world, by which time India had already called off its strike plans. The political logic was understandable as a full-frontal attack would translate into war. It was better to give Musharraf another chance. Or perhaps, the build-up was a shrewd ploy by India, not only in June but also in January, to force Pakistan as well as the world community into action.

Last week, Fernandes denied (to India Today) that India had been on the brink of war, claiming that at no point had the ccs given directions to the armed forces to take action against Pakistan. He, however, did not put it beyond the army generals to prepare for contingency plans. Mishra, on the other hand, reiterated that India had indeed been "close to war" in January and May. While refusing to disclose dates, he pointed out that on June 23, Vajpayee had said in an interview to the Washington Post that it was a "touch and go affair".

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 14:55

And gentlemen, please do read the assessment by Pravin Sawhney at the end of that article.

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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Postby rohitvats » 03 Nov 2011 15:32

A 2004 interview with General Padmanabhan (posting in full):http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-470792,curpg-1.cms

In a throwback to the days of Indo-Pak tensions following the terror attack on Parliament, the then Army Chief Gen S Padmanabhan today said "favourable circumstances and tides" were allowed to "pass" during the year-long full-fledged army deployment in Operation Parakram which was "conceived for specific operational purposes".


Gen. Padmanabhan at a press mee on Monday. (AP photo)

Strongly rebutting a suggestion that Pakistan's nuclear deterrence had acted as a "dampener" to any cross border operations by India, he said, "Pakistan's response had been adequately studied and factored in. No, they had nothing. We had them by the tail".

The former Army Chief was speaking to reporters about his yet-to-be-released book India Checkmates America 2017'

While refusing to go into specific war plans saying that service restrictions did not allow him to disclose them, he said that during the operation "circumstances and tides were very favourable to India. They passed time and again".

He said Op Parakram deployment was "cogent" and in place by January 8 and said whether to launch or not to launch operations was political.

Asked if US intervention had stalled the operations at the last moment, Padmanabhan said, "I would not like to talk about it".

For the first time, the former army chief said that during the operation even army commanders were not given the nuclear button which remained with the Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee who held it for political high command.


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