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Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 15:33
by rohitvats
IMO, the expoure to American shenanighans during Op. Parakram may have been the trigger for the good general to write his book and which was so aptly named.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 15:56
by Lalmohan
i think we said at the time that it was only massive american intervention that prevented parakram from going hot
now we know that it is massive pressure applied to the political class that did it - and blame is indeed being shifted
so, unkil must have promised us something in exchange...

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 16:19
by SSridhar
Lalmohan wrote:. . . unkil must have promised us something in exchange...

One can only guess, but there are enough pointers to validate the guess work. The US must have promised to ask Pakistan rein in terrorists and change Musharraf's attitude towards terrorism as a state policy. To Musharraf, the US would have promised to get deeply involved in Cashmere (Clinton had already made a similar promise during Kargil time) and nudge India and resolve the dispute (in Pakistan's favour ?)

The US did not keep the promise made to India. either for lack of trying or due to Pakistani perfidy or both. It has more than kept up with the promise made to Pakistan though.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 16:23
by Lalmohan
i don't think unkil seriously believes that india is ever going to give up kashmir, so unkil is teasing munna with it anyway
munna is increasingly seeing the wood for the trees, and maybe even contemplating a scenario where only deepa-talwar friend will give them a moth-eaten kashmir to go with their moth-eaten country

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 16:43
by SSridhar
Who knows what kind of adjustments would be made at the border ? There is a Parliament decision to retrieve the entire state of J&K and that could be the saving grace for Indians who are in the dark otherwise about the machinations. It is not the question of gifting Kashmir that the US may be working at or not. It is the fact that the US effectively interposed itself in an affair that we have steadfastly refused to accept a third party involvement for various valid reasons for over five decades. A disinterested and less-powerful third party offering to help in this matter might have been another matter. But, the sole superpower has extensive geostrategic & geopolitical interests which cloud its approach, keeping its self interests alone supreme. We have seen already how US pressure forces GoI to act in ways that are not entirely to Indian interests. That is the detrimental part. Musharraf claimed, rightly or wrongly, that Kargil was to force the US to get involved in Kashmir. Only time will tell if December 13 attack also had a similar motive.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 16:51
by Lalmohan
i am sure that it did. but munna doesn't actually want the status quo altered - achieving peace only negates the role of the army. munna is truly psychotic - wants to prolong the state of chaos for as long as possible. kill the funding and lets see how long the jihad lasts

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 17:41
by jimmy_moh
can somebody explain during the operation we suffered 500+ casualities.. is there any direct fight happend with TSP army during the time

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 17:56
by Pratyush
IIRC none of the losses were a result of enemy action. Most were a result of ammunition doing what it is meant to do. Why it did that is something I don't know.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 19:27
by shiv
jimmy_moh wrote:can somebody explain during the operation we suffered 500+ casualities.. is there any direct fight happend with TSP army during the time


Do you have a cite or ref for this. I don't recall having read that so many did in a mere mobilization.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 19:38
by atreya

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 19:46
by Aditya_V
atreya wrote:Shiv garu, the source for that
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... n-parakram


And what conveniently covered up was the Paki casualties and it was only after these exchanges after 14 years(DDM passed this as Paki goodwill) of exchanging fire along LOC Paki army asked for a ceasefire. In fact Paki army even tried winning sympathy in Jan 2002 by showing 4-5 burnt Pak Army trucks and claiming they were civilian vehicles, but one clearly see a jeep and 4-5 miltary trucks. in that one incident alone they lost a 100 soldiers plus a high ranking officer in a jeep. Just like Kargil, these casualties will never appear in the media.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 03 Nov 2011 19:48
by Gaur
We had unfortunately suffered a lot of causalities while laying mines and many more in demining operations. There was a lot of cross border firing and shelling not to mention accidents.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 04 Nov 2011 14:25
by Virendra
Neighbors had in recent months released a list of their fallen in Kargil war. Figures float around 500 only though.
http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... i-soldiers

Regards,
Virendra

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 04 Nov 2011 14:31
by Lalmohan
from memory over 80 soldiers were killed in one ammunition/mine related accident alone

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 04 Nov 2011 14:46
by Aditya_V
Virendra wrote:Neighbors had in recent months released a list of their fallen in Kargil war. Figures float around 500 only though.
http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... i-soldiers

Regards,
Virendra


That list is only a tip of iceberg with only gallantry award winners.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 04 Nov 2011 15:12
by Marut
Lalmohan wrote:from memory over 80 soldiers were killed in one ammunition/mine related accident alone


Ammo fire at Pathankot & Suratgarh?

Added later: Could be this incident as well

Picking mines on the border
Eighteen soldiers died at Longewala in Rajasthan, close to the Pakistani border on December 28, 2001, when one of the mines that they were checking exploded, detonating 96 others. The same day, 15 Armymen from the Bombay Sappers and the 16 Dogra infantry unit, besides three civilians, died near Atari, adjoining Amritsar.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 05 Nov 2011 06:54
by abhishek_sharma

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 05 Nov 2011 14:39
by Aditya_V
Yes. Operation Parakam was yet anther reactionary mistake from our Political leadership lead by ABV, there is no cold calculative plan for the Paki animal.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 05 Nov 2011 21:05
by sum
^^ True but wondering which is better: our post-parliament attack stance or our post 26/11 stance ( which was basically carry on like nothing happened)? :-?

Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons learnt.

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 10:20
by Shrinivasan
Gentlemen,

I have been researching on Operation Parakram for some time, I wonder why Operation Parakram was labeled a failure even when it rattled Pakistan (and even the west), another big crib which we keep hearing is the 3 weeks time taken by IA to mobilize etc... I want to revive a discussion on this as this has implication to the options before India even today for retaliating against Pakistan...

Let Roll guys...

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 13:27
by rkhanna
My Take

1\ Took so long to move the pieces in place that the West was able to Force a Diplomatic Solution on us. We lost any 'High Ground' we had post the parliament attack.

2\ Even then the Mobilization was half effective for a sustained conflict. Logistics were still not 100% in place and full of holes

3\ We lost some 800 odd soldiers in just Mine Laying ops. A total of some 1500 soldiers were injured or wounded in Total. NOt a single shot was fired in anger. If this alone was not a failure I dont know what else is.

PS. IBTL?

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 16:54
by Pratyush
Why is Op Parakram considered a failure? This is one question that would like to have an answer for.

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 17:50
by vinod
Well, what was real objective of Operation Parakram? I'm yet to find a clear objective that was defined at the start of this operation. It seemed like a knee-jerk reaction.

I like to look at the valuable lessons learnt. Cold Start doctrine came into being and now we are in a better position than then in terms of equipment and placement. Having said that Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons as a counter!

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 18:10
by Gyan
Real Objective was to win UP elections but electorate was unimpressed.

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 21:14
by member_27581
Shrinivasan Sir,

Just curious, there are multiple threads on BRF with debates on this topic. They are very easily searchable.
I found them very informative about the points that you are trying to bring up e.g. key objectives, why it took us so much time or whether or not it was a failure. That said, RohitVats always brings amazing posts, who knows what he comes up with now..
Shrinivasan wrote:Gentlemen,

I have been researching on Operation Parakram for some time, I wonder why Operation Parakram was labeled a failure even when it rattled Pakistan (and even the west), another big crib which we keep hearing is the 3 weeks time taken by IA to mobilize etc... I want to revive a discussion on this as this has implication to the options before India even today for retaliating against Pakistan...

Let Roll guys..

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 21:44
by Aditya_V
rkhanna wrote:My Take

1\ Took so long to move the pieces in place that the West was able to Force a Diplomatic Solution on us. We lost any 'High Ground' we had post the parliament attack.

2\ Even then the Mobilization was half effective for a sustained conflict. Logistics were still not 100% in place and full of holes

3\ We lost some 800 odd soldiers in just Mine Laying ops. A total of some 1500 soldiers were injured or wounded in Total. NOt a single shot was fired in anger. If this alone was not a failure I dont know what else is.

PS. IBTL?


Really on BRF what BS. Please see news articles during that time. the LOC was super hot, we used anti tank missiles. Pakistan never came up with its details of casualties. BUT after 15 years of LOC artillery exchanges asked for CEASFIRE on LOC which was agreed in end of 2003. GO figure.

USA wanted Gen Padmanabhan booted out

Musharaf declared LET and JEM terror orgs, it was huge back step for them.

ANd Stop spreading lies like 800 men died in mine laying, majority died in fierce fighting along the LOC when Pakistan never admitted causualties but asked for ceasefire and was crying in front of international journatlists where a convoy of military looking jeeps and trucks destroyed by Indian anti tank missiles in Neelam valley was shown as "CIVILIAN casualties. ONly about 100 killed were in Mine laying

And the operation fizzled out only after a mysterious incident where 59 people were burnt alive exactly 1 day after UP elections ended, 3 neighboring state chief ministers refusing state troops, and many of those convicted persons now have had Pakistani women fall in love and marry them even though they are in jail??

One can just judge by the sheer amount of malicious propaganda by Delhi based media, where 1874 causlties are reported as 2000 killed that it had its successes while it exposed our limitations in dealing with Pakistan. Sadly even though termites were exposed the people of India believed in the Termites.

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 25 Mar 2015 23:32
by sudeepj
1. Op Parakram was the first real threat of full scale war in the Indian subcontinent after Brass tacks.
2. It was the first crisis in the subcontinent with definite nuclear overtones. In a way it was our Cuban missile crisis.
3. If the operation had gone on to a full scale war, it would have blown to smithereens the post cold war order US has been trying to put in place through multilateralism at the UN. It would not have been a war sanctioned by the UN, and therefore, if India won decisively (and this was not in question), it would have legitimized war as an instrument of state craft again.
4. The objective was to coerce Pak to give up the use of urban terrorism against India. To a certain extent, it succeeded.
5. In the absence of 'terrorist spectaculars' which were out of the question after Parakram, the terrorists turned their attention to the less pious among themselves, who were stopping them from major attacks on India, while nurturing them at the same time to be used at a later date.
6. But it did not resolve the use of terrorist insurgency against armed forces in Kashmir or deniable terrorist activities by Indian muslims (IM/SIMI).
7. It also did not resolve the Pakistani narrative of Islamism.
8. It did not solve the political issue of Kashmir by making Pak give up its claim.
9. In a cold number counting, the casualties in Kashmir were running at the rate of nearly 5000 per year when Parakram happened. A much greater number of lives were saved in the subsequent peace in Kashmir than the lives of 1500 soldiers sacrificed in that operation. A humble salute to those who achieved Veergati. They gave their present, to secure our future.

Looking ahead,
10. There is nothing that Indians can do to change the internal Pakistani narrative except be 'the shining city on the hill'. It is a battle for Pakistanis to fight and sort out among themselves.
11. To match the continuing Pakistani pin pricks, the Doval doctrine is an appropriate answer. Enough said.
12. Cold Start is a good deterrent against terrorist spectaculars.

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 26 Mar 2015 05:40
by Shrinivasan
ramana wrote:BRF has many threads on Operation Parakram.
Eg:
viewtopic.php?f=3&t=1085

I don't see the need for this thread and will merge them later today.

ramana

Thanks Ramana... please merge the thread. we can continue the analysis on this thread (you listed above)...
Many new theories are coming up...

One of the most important development in our doctrine following Parakram was Cold Start Doctrine...

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 26 Mar 2015 13:14
by rohitvats
At the expense of blowing my own trumpet, I realized I had penned some thoughts on the topic in some other context.

If it pleases you, please spend some time reading this:

http://vatsrohit.blogspot.in/2012/08/strategic-importance-south-punjab-and.html#more

Re: Operation Parakram: What actually happened, Lessons lear

Posted: 26 Mar 2015 16:09
by Mukesh.Kumar
@Rohitvats- Just went in and read the series of posts. Thank you very much, for putting it down in such detail. Coming out with a whole new perspective.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 28 Mar 2015 00:47
by ramana
Up

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 07 Jul 2015 00:27
by ramana
X-Post....
satya wrote:^^^ Went through the 'thoughtful paper' cited above & quoted in article . What's thoughtful in stating the obvious ie total numbers ( soliders , tanks & so on on ) , terrain and man-built fortifications . Why he forgot to mention that 1/3rd of the TSPA divisions assets failed to mobilize during Op. Parakaram due to lack of spares , non-functioning transport vehicles ( include armor if what i heard is true ) and serious lack of war -reserves = Mushy's Kargil Downhill skiing again ( man ! he is stubborn ) . Is this what Brits taught TSPA GHQ about logistics and war reserves ? Where is the equal equal in manpower quality as the author hints at ?
Again author sings the same old tune of TSPA's advantage of shorter line of communication , first to reach the spot but what happen next ? What if at same place , the first to arrive TSPA's troops receive an unexpected prize from IA's artillery/MBLRs rounds already in waiting ? Don't tell me that how we know where they will gather as if its a big secret for there are not many places left given the level of urbanization on their side . Did the author ever wonder who will stand up to welcome IA's strike corps post artillery's first place prize ceremony ? Here's the thing in my simple understanding : You reach early you are dead (artillery ) , you reach late we declare party over(wait for IA's CSD to do its business )= ceasefire /loss of face for TSPA hiding far far away from border ? Did he missed the obvious left behind artillery pieces near border by IA's exercising troops just like that he glosses this over again open sources . Its one thing to gloss over but its another when reality bites back , he better ask those who did downhill skiing in Kargil .
Author ignores TSPA's serious lack of AAD cover whatever it has is rudimentary but he makes it look like at par if not better than IA's .I can go on but let's leave it at that . I am not going to talk about his air force assessment for its simply childish . But then what to expect from a Brit other than finding nothing wrong in loyal servants quarters ie TSP . If only if NDA-2 can get artillery in massive number combined with good AAD cover we can do a cold start doctrine on tractors borrowed from Punjab farmer for transportation . Just get numbers and range in artillery right sooner the better.
Anpther thought : TSPA's AAD will always suffer for neither US nor PRC would like their air -defense systems get known by the other so all TSPA will get is 'export-version' . No wonder India began getting serious offers on air defense systems once Akash became a reality .

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 07 Jul 2015 02:13
by sudeepj
shiv wrote:
jimmy_moh wrote:can somebody explain during the operation we suffered 500+ casualities.. is there any direct fight happend with TSP army during the time


Do you have a cite or ref for this. I don't recall having read that so many did in a mere mobilization.


IIRC, Several hundred soldiers died in Rajasthan in one mine laying mishap alone. There was a **one column** news about it in the newspaper, Hindustan Times IIRC.

Added later: Perhaps my memory is playing tricks.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 016284.cms

"The number of Army personnel killed or wounded in Jammu and Kashmir and the western sector during the mobilisation, Operation Parakram, from December 19, 2001 to October 16, 2002, was 1,874," said Defence Minister George Fernandes.

This, by any benchmark, is a truly staggering figure for a 10-month period, even if the counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir are taken into account.

In the initial phase of Operation Parakram itself, after the December 2001 Parliament attack, over 100 soldiers were killed and 250 injured during mine-laying operations. Vehicle accidents, artillery duels with Pakistan and other incidents led to many more casualties.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 07 Jul 2015 03:43
by Sid
^^ IA has intensive mine fields along the border. Maps for such mine fields were lost/misplaced due to neglect, that led to high casualties when troops started to move to forword locations.

Also there were lot of fatalities due to road accidents.

Although units on regular basis practice troop movement but we never had to do such huge mobalization for more then a decade. Plus our logistics were falling apart due to lack of investment during 90s.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 07 Jul 2015 06:15
by sudeepj
Sid wrote:^^ IA has intensive mine fields along the border. Maps for such mine fields were lost/misplaced due to neglect, that led to high casualties when troops started to move to forword locations.

Also there were lot of fatalities due to road accidents.

Although units on regular basis practice troop movement but we never had to do such huge mobalization for more then a decade. Plus our logistics were falling apart due to lack of investment during 90s.


As far as I know, the international borders in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab do not have permanent minefields. Only parts of the LOC do. These were new minefields laid in Op Parakram, and to its great credit, IA removed these after the mobilization was called off.

Re: Operation Parakram: Another Analysis

Posted: 02 Nov 2015 22:11
by SaiK
http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/the-stra ... -exercise/
The Strange Silence Surrounding an Indian Military Exercise
The government has been unusually quiet about an exercise involving one of the country’s strike corps.

By Ali Ahmed
November 02, 2015

From India’s conventional doctrine and exercises, it cannot easily be discerned if India is sufficiently cognizant of the nuclear reality. Its doctrine is of post-Kargil War vintage, though officially adopted after Operation Parakram in 2004. Much water has flown under the nuclear bridge since, including vertical proliferation and the addition of TNW to Pakistan’s arsenal in 2011.

India’s military, in exercising two field armies and two strike crops this year, is indicating that it can activate the border theater, from the semi-developed terrain abutting the northern part of Rajasthan to the desert terrain in the south. Strategically, it is projecting to Pakistan that it is not deterred by TNWs.

Such muscle flexing cannot be seen merely as going about what armies normally do in peace time: train. This could well imply that India has an answer to TNW that enables it to believe that it can persist with conventional operations.


well how much ever pakis would take this as paki-centric victory over use of TNW, the fact of silliness and stupidity is enough to laugh at them in one angle, while on the other the deep silence could also mean the stage is being prepared for moving towards MAD!

why is it hard for the pakis to understand this?