Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Y. Kanan
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Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 16 Dec 2003 03:54

Since there seems to be a dearth of information on Operation Parakram, I thought I'd start a thread where info can be collected. This is something I haven't seen discussed in detail on BR before. I'm interested not so much in whether or not Op. Parakram was a strategic failure, but rather, the military details. Tactics, logistics, equipment, lessons learned, what worked, what didn't work, that sort of thing. Anyone with good military (not political) info on Op. Parakram please chime in.

I'll start with this link, which I found rather interesting (the stuff about how "degradation operations" were to be conducted):
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/news680.htm

Army delays degradation operation

25 May 2002: The Indian military leadership has been directed to hold back a major offensive operation planned against Pakistan in the first week of June, top officials said.

Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the military at the meeting of the cabinet committee on security on Thursday after returning from Jammu and Kashmir to delay its so-called "degradation operation" against Pakistani defence positions in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Military officials said that Vajpayee told them in characteristic style to "wait" a little longer.

Vajpayee said in Kashmir after visiting frontline troops and hospitalised victims of the Kaluchak massacre that the sky had cleared but lightening could fall.

The degradation operation has been conceived to disable Pakistan's capacity to fight a "cohesive, responsive, and defensive" battle in the area of Indian offence (See Special Report, "India to degrade Pak military along LoC," 24 May 2002).

The operation will precede a military offensive and would involve complete destruction of a large military zone 50 square kilometres or more in size using artillery, missiles, rockets, fighter aircraft and even tanks.

Officials said that the degradation option is more or less closed with early monsoons forecasted for northern India in the first week of July.

"There is perhaps a small window of opportunity in June still left," a senior official said.

"If that is closed, we begin the long wait for the next campaigning season."

The army has already deployed newly-acquired military hardware for degradation operations.

New equipment include the US gun-locating radar ANTPQ, Israeli Searcher 1, Searcher 2 and Hiron UAVs, Israeli anti-infiltration sound sensors, and the Russian multi-barrel rocket system SMERCH.

Multi-barrel rocket systems were enormously effective during the Kargil War.

The degradation operations were designed to be part of Operation Parakram III launched after the Kaluchak massacre.

The Indian Army had commenced impressment of vehicles for the impending war with Pakistan under Operation Parakram III.

"This has been put on hold," an official said.

The Indian Army has also delayed certain strategic manoeuvres in the Punjab plains.
This is also an interesting piece (is the Johann Price mentioned the same Johann that frequents this board?)

http://orbat.com/site/agtwopen/india_pakistan_confrontation2002.html

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 17 Dec 2003 00:14

I'll bump this up with another addition since it's relevant to this topic:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...how?msid=283543

excerpt:
A year after its ignominious termination, the true story of Operation Parakram can now be told. The Indian threat of war was an empty boast, the Indian armed forces had neither effective plans, nor the wherewithal to punish Pakistan.

The armed forces blame their political and bureaucratic masters for not having provided them adequate resources, but the armed forces alone are to blame for not having a workable strategy.

After the terrorist attack on Parliament, the cabinet asked the forces to act against Pakistan. There was just one condition — action must be immediate and should not go beyond two weeks. That nothing happened is now history. There have been claims that they were ready to act in early January and again in June 2002. The reality is that they were unready when the only window available was open — from December 13, the day of the terrorist attack, to January 2, 2002 when Tony Blair announced his visit to the subcontinent.

According to reports, the first Army plan was for several thrusts across the Line of Control, to be launched in early January. The second, after the Kaluchak massacre, was for a deep strike into Pakistan through the Rajasthan border. Both plans were infirm. India did not have the numbers and firepower to punch across the LoC, or sufficient special forces to undertake the task in an effective manner. The second plan’s strategy of thrusting deep into Pakistan would have meant an all-out war with its attendant risk of the use of nuclear weapons.

Confronted by the cabinet mandate, the armed forces wanted a month’s time frame, a window that was simply not available. Indeed, it has not been for a long time. The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted 22 days, and the 1971 conflict for 14. As the record now shows, on both occasions India came under enormous pressure from the UN and the great powers to stop fighting.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Babui » 17 Dec 2003 00:28

Has anybody read "Operation Parakram - The War Unfinished" by V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney ? If you have, then can you review. Should contain alot of details.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby JCage » 17 Dec 2003 01:22

Originally posted by Babui:
Has anybody read "Operation Parakram - The War Unfinished" by V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney ? If you have, then can you review. Should contain alot of details.
I ahve read it, what do you want? Costs Rs 250/- some nice parts, then usual Sawhney bilge rehashed from articles- sample: " Unlike the IAF, PAF does not crash its planes"..which as we know, is..pure horse puckey. Their attrition is pretty high as well, to say the least. Many such bloopers.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Umrao » 17 Dec 2003 01:25

one is from our famous BRF (erst while member) another By Times of Islamabad.

No unknown miscreants.

Did you see the Last Samu_rai_saab (* Tom C)

you need to study the enemy not just fight.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 17 Dec 2003 08:48

I apologise to people who may be offended by my frequently vulgar analogies - but I do see some analogies as appropriate.

Operation Parakram was a "would have been war" just like coitus interruptus can be described as "would have been baby"

"Operation Parakram" has been attempted to be summed up by some people in one of two words. Some say "failure". Others say "success"

Allow me to add one more word to these: "Experiment"

After 1971 - or perhaps after Brasstacks the Indian armed forces have never really had the oportunity to get together and mobilize for total war. Being merely an "enthusiast" rather than a military expert I may get some figures wrong - but I have heard that it takes 7 to 10 men at the back to support and maintain one man who does the fighting. The logistical tail for a million man army and a huge Air Force and Navy is complex and huge.

Rifles, mortars, artillery, 5.56 mm ammo, 7.72 mm ammo, mortar ammo, artillery shells, spares, jackets, shoes, socks, blankets, binoculars, batteries, torches, comm equipment, spares, toolkits, generators, Petrol diesel, kerosese, lubricants, tires, tanks, trucks, jeeps, helmet, rice, dal, fresh meat,, poultry, goats, horses, camels, mules, fodder, explosives, timers, bulldozers, roadlayers, fuel, tar, tents, beds, stretchers, bandages, pain killers, intravnous fluids, antibiotics, emergency lamps, bins, surgical instruments, needles, syringes, bugles, flares, bridgelayers, tank transporters, tracks, cranes, chocolates, biscuits, blood transfusion equipment, barbed wire, chairs,tables, typewriters, computers, radars, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, anti aircraft missiles, UAVs, engineers, cooks, motiorcycles, pens, paper, glasses, spoons, plates, towels, axles, springs, radiators, water, water tankers, mines, min detectors, mine clearing equipmen and a whole lot of other things have to be moved and positioned so that sudden or planned demands are met as seamlessly as possible.

At any given time I estimate that at leat 250,000 men would have been on duty, doing some work, for one year. That is 250,000 x 365 x 24 man-hours of work done, The figure is 2.19 x 10^9 i.e 2,190,000,000 - over 2 BILLION man hours of work were done.

An "analysis" of operation Parakram requires and analysis of these 2 billion man hours of work.

Some things must surely have been done well. Some were surely done badly. We, the general public may never know all the details. But surely some lessons will hopefully be learnt and implemented.

JMT

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 17 Dec 2003 10:19

Originally posted by Amarnath.G:
Like a typical BR-ITE : Blood Ell !.That is one eck of a list ......how much time did you take to type it ? :)
About 10 minutes.

After I typed it, I was reminded of that old story/nursery rhyme whatever about a kingdom being lost for want of a nail.

For want of a nail, the horseshoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider the battle was lost. For want of the battle the kingdom was lost. All for the want of a litlle nail.

It seems that this story carries more wisdom than appears at first.

It is likely that 60 or 70% or perhaps more of the men and equipment involved in Op Parakram woudl have done EXACTLY the same things - war or not because apart from the actual "cutting edge" fighting war is all about logistics and comunication. These guys would have got a chance to sharpen their skills.

Besides - I have read description right here from indian and non -Indian armed force people speaking of lve war experience being pretty much like all the exercises and practice they had - except for live rounds.

Some years ago - due to circumstances that were beyond my control I got involved in a property dispute in which local murderous mafia had encroached on someone's property. It all got settled amicably - but the fear of that gang was very very real and palpable. The tension was enough to make one want to give up and run. I can sit back now and say "Hey I was brave" etc etc

Recall that this is exactly what the Pakis are saying now - and we have Indians agreeing with them. When the operation started - the fear and tension it caused in Pakistan and echoed by travel advisories etc was very real and palpable and visible in the news reports on thsi forum. These things tend to get forgotten.

In fact the more I look at my list - the more incomplete it seems. Maybe forum members can mention things I have left out. I left out stoves, autoclaves, clocks, razor blades, nuts, bolts, chains and more.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Shankar » 17 Dec 2003 10:36

The objective of this thread is lost even before it has started -personal cynicism cannot generate a valid military objective understanding .Use of strong language cannot substitute a clear presentation of facts that are well known and those notso well known.

What was the main object of the operation -to destroy pakistans military machine -if that is the case then it failed totally at a cost of multi billion dollar and billions of defense manhours and equipment used up for nothing.

If the objective was to stop Kashmir infiltration -then also it was a failure simply because it did not achieve the goal.

If the objective was to draw global attention -then it was only partly sucessfull -but the attention could have been grabbed by few bobastic nuclear laced speeches in parliament also.

The crux of the matter is the political leadership was not ready to go to war but wanted to present a brave face to the elctioning public and project a macho image to the rest of the world.The armed forces was just a dumb helpless instrument in the alter of political ambition.

Only problem in the whole game was -it could have very quickly and easily gone out of control -thousands of young lives would have lost and millions of border families uprooted for no specific and valid national objective.

Thank God it did not turn that way.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Abhijit » 17 Dec 2003 11:05

In a game of chess, the objective is to win. Or is it to inflict maximum damage to the opponent's pieces? Or is it to lose least no. of pieces ? or is it to control the central 4 squares on the board? or is it to never let the opponent checkmate you? Or is it to make such moves as to keep the opponents strength under constant barrage and to advance every inch in order to deny a victory and if possible defeat the opponent? Or is it all of the above?
Op. Parakram had multi-facted objectives - it was a chessboard set up by us and we controlled it so that the opponent had to behave in certain ways or face a checkmate. We compelled the opponent to sit across the table and play the game. We laid down the rules and we were the only ones who could call off the game or take it to the next level. It is not possible to describe the objective of such a massive exercise in a single word.
As Shiv says, there were many positives, doubtless several negatives. Some lessons learnt, some performances vindicating the strides made so far.
India-Pkistan war or struggle is not something that can be finished off in a few weeks or months time. There will be several 'parakrams' before we can destroy this satan of a country called Pakistan.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby arun » 17 Dec 2003 12:09

A long (23,699 words no less) article by Lt. Gen Kamal Matinuddin on the subject.

Some interesting points, minus the obligatory jibes :

1. “The move from peacetime locations to the forward areas took a much shorter time than before”

Good to know the speed took the PA by surprise.

2. “It will be noticed that the Indian forces had to move on the average a distance of 800 kilometers to reach their forward locations from their peace stations”

Equipment pre-positioning? Cantonments closer to the border?

3. “Approximately 52,000 hectares of land along the international border, working boundary and the Line of Control was mined. Around one million mines were laid.”

Why not permanent mine fields? Reduces the causalities of demining and simultaneously checks infiltration.

Worth a read including annexure’s, particularly D, which has the IA’s orbat for Operation Parakram listed out based on “ Source: Reliable”.

India-Pakistan Standoff.

NOTE : Amended on Jan 5 2004 for new URL as below

New URL.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 17 Dec 2003 14:54

Why not permanent mine fields ?
Well good idea to have Korea Line bw I & paki land but then most of the land is fertile (in Punjab) and mining them means taking the lands away from the petty farmer

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby ramana » 17 Dec 2003 21:06

The TSP Gen's analysis is impressive. Will comment after reading it carefully.

There was a report that IA is interested in smart mines after the long and ardous demining ops post Op PK.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby debjani » 17 Dec 2003 21:44

Shiv,

The 'enthusiastic' analysis hit the nail on the head.

Thus, the shoe was not lost et al and the rider was not lost!

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Babui » 17 Dec 2003 22:38

This is the area of Matinuddin's paper that needs to be speculated on - "By moving to forward positions and carrying out military exercise close to the border the Indian armed forces revealed their operational plans to some extent. Strategic and tactical surprise was lost as the deployment was in full view of their adversary. The time it took for complete mobilisation and the location of their strategic forces and likely objectives were all given away, more so when the troops remained on the border such a long time." Was 1, 21, and 2 Corps to be used in a hammer and anvil kind of fashion with one of the Corps facing Pak's strategic reserve and the other two Corps wheeling in from behind ? or was it going to be a limited excursion with the idea of inflicting unacceptable attrition on Pak reserves ? or was it a race to the Indus ?

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Ashutosh » 17 Dec 2003 22:43

I doubt that article has any personal contributions as such from the author - it just looks like some interesting ideas picked up from here and there, laced with TFTA language, and sprinkled with erroneous details to make up a paper ...

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Abhisham » 17 Dec 2003 23:38

Prakram 2 was a nice reminder to one and all that war is not just about force mobilisation and logistics; it requires the right conditions for it to succeed. Success obviously in this case is not merely an advance on the LOC or some manouvering space when the eventual ceasefire occurs. Parakram was the first post nuclearised deployment by us. Kashmir no longer remains a conflict area alone, it is a nuclear flashpoint in the eyes of the western media and thus the west in general. And for us, the success in other ways more than justified a long term and otherwise wastefull mobilisation.

In my opinion, though this success could have been otherwise achieved, it was a more sincere show of restraint than not deploying at all vis-a-vis the nuclear speech in parliament

However, it reamins to be seen if we still continue to view or forces apart from our state policy. The government in general treats the military in a sanctified manner whenever in trouble, as if it is not part of the rest of India. This attitude was very mush visible when the forces were expected to remain mobilised for such a long period. The common view in India is that the army is there to protect them from any and every eventuality. If the next time around we forget to integrate our forces with the rest of the aspects of government, and cheat them of the share of the power-pie they so richly deserve, we will continue to make these mistakes. The army must have a greater say in the way things are run during peace time, only then can we effectively respond to national emergencies like parakram.

Ironically, it was the forces who were blamed for not doing enough whilst they were slogging it out on our borders for a year.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby JCage » 18 Dec 2003 04:02

Originally posted by Babui:
This is the area of Matinuddin's paper that needs to be speculated on - "By moving to forward positions and carrying out military exercise close to the border the Indian armed forces revealed their operational plans to some extent. Strategic and tactical surprise was lost as the deployment was in full view of their adversary. The time it took for complete mobilisation and the location of their strategic forces and likely objectives were all given away, more so when the troops remained on the border such a long time." Was 1, 21, and 2 Corps to be used in a hammer and anvil kind of fashion with one of the Corps facing Pak's strategic reserve and the other two Corps wheeling in from behind ? or was it going to be a limited excursion with the idea of inflicting unacceptable attrition on Pak reserves ? or was it a race to the Indus ?
Babui,
Am off to blighty in a couple of days so excuse me for not typing reams, but Gen SOod appears to note- in prev ref book- that we were off for a huge attack in the Thar, becuase our hand was exposed in J&K, somewhat like Matinuddin claims, and because the Mtn Divs/inf from NE would need to be reequipped with a new TOE + training, esp ATGM cos for regular ops. Book postulate is that nukes deterred us.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Vick » 18 Dec 2003 04:44

Could there have been the possibility that the govt told the Army to mobilize for some sort of war. So, the Army mobilized for war, thinking that war was inevitable. And basically executed a pre-war drill, exposing itself in the process. If it turned out to be a real war, it wouldn't have mattered because showing the Pakistanis the hammer right before it struck wouldn't have helped the PA very much. But now, the hammer was shown but not used.

What I am driving at is that the govt didn't quite let the Army know that the mobilization was part of diplomacy and war was not imminent or at least inevitable.

Hence after the mobilization, the Army Chief lamented that the Army was out of the loop on what the govt's objectives were.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 18 Dec 2003 09:02

Originally posted by Vick:
Could there have been the possibility that the govt told the Army to mobilize for some sort of war. So, the Army mobilized for war, thinking that war was inevitable. And basically executed a pre-war drill, exposing itself in the process. If it turned out to be a real war, it wouldn't have mattered because showing the Pakistanis the hammer right before it struck wouldn't have helped the PA very much. But now, the hammer was shown but not used..
I don't think it works that way Vick. You prepare for war, but you may or may not fight that war depending on a whole lot of circumstances.

"Showing one's hand" happens to an extent in any mobilization - but to that extent a war is like a boxing match. You go into the boxing ring knowing that the other chap is going to hit you and knowing that you have to hit him. But despite the warning you may not see the left upper cut the guy delivers on your chin and the whop on your face a millisecond later that floors you.

The India armed froces KNOW that their moboilization will be observed and you can be dead sure that their process of mobilization will be designed to show just what they want seen, and they will not show how or where they are going to hit.

The next time the India army mobilizes there is no knowing whether they will follow the same pattren, or if they do, there is no knowing what they will do exactly. When you are in the business of fighting, you are also in the business of trying to outwit and win and preserve yourself. The knowledge and ability to plan for that is the credit that one has to give to the professional in the business.

The funny thing is that a lot of this information is freely available, but we are relatively uninformed in this area.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Shankar » 18 Dec 2003 10:50

More interesting is the deployment of IAF during this operation .The extensive deployment of strike aircraft in forward bases was perhaps the most intelligent and effective move -for the first time Pakistani radars could actully see the depth and flexibility of IAF war machine in all its colours .With more than 250 nuclear capable fighter bombers next door TSP may just have lost its nerve.It appears we were preparing for an air land battle concept in the sub continent with multiple strike in a fluid time bound manner with plenty of air cover and helo support .

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 19 Dec 2003 20:00

<a href="http://www.strategypage.com/search.asp?target=d:\inetpub\strategypageroot\fyeo\qndguide\docs\archives\ind03a.htm&search=parakram">link</a>

May 2, 2003: With information more accessible than ever before, 21st century populations all over the world are demanding accountability for their military's dead, wounded and missing. Between December 2001 to October 2002, India and Pakistan had up to a million troops along their mutual border as tensions simmered just below the boiling point. "Operation Parakram" (the mobilization of Indian forces in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament) was neither discussed or debated in Parliament, which remained a sore point with many Indians. During this period, the Indians suffered 1,847 casualties on their western and northern sectors.

How and why so many soldiers were killed (whether to minefield accidents or while carrying out unspecified tasks) will not be officially revealed, since the Indian military considers that classified information. Not knowing "why" is hard on a casualty's family and can have serious moral implications for future recruiting. It's one thing to lose men during a declared conventional war or terrorist hunt, but detractors point out that the Indian military stationed on the border was on alert for 300 days with no stated purpose and no stated military objective.

In early January 2003, the Indian Army denied reports that stress and fatigue took their toll on troops during "Operation Parakram". They also denied that the old minefields along the Pakistani border had resulted in large-scale casualties (there were reports that the Pakistanis had also suffered from those mines). In 2002, the Indian Defense Ministry blamed most of accidental blasts on outdated stocks of mines and defective fuses. In many areas of Punjab and the Jammu region, heavy rains had displaced the mines.

By comparison, during three years of counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir (from January 2000), there were only 982 Indian soldiers killed and 2,507 wounded. During the 1999 Kargil war, there were 481 men killed and 1,151 suffered combat-related wounds. A retired Indian General who recently wrote a book on the Kargil conflict praised the Pakistani troops, noting that their artillery fire was particularly effective and inflicted heavy casualties. While Pakistan initially denied that it's troops were involved, after the hostilities were over they announced 92 gallantry awards for troops fighting in the Kargil. The estimated number of Pakistani dead at Kargil was between 597 and 1,000.
I'm still not clear on this figure. The normal definition of "casualties" includes both dead, wounded, missing, and non-combat injuries/ailments. But often the word "casualties" is misused to mean "killed". I wonder what the case is with regard to Op. Parakram. Did we suffer 1800+ killed or does this number include the injured?

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 19 Dec 2003 21:04

Originally posted by Y. Kanan:
<a href="http://www.strategypage.com/search.asp?target=d:\inetpub\strategypageroot\fyeo\qndguide\docs\archives\ind03a.htm&search=parakram">link</a>

When an article is well intentioned, when the writer has "his heart in the right place" I MUST NOT be a ba$tard and pass bitchy comments.

But what if I AM a ba$tard?

21st century populations all over the world are demanding accountability for their military's dead, wounded and missing.
Indian army recruits are from 21st century populations? Like the Mullahs of Pakistan are 21st century popluations

Not knowing "why" is hard on a casualty's family and can have serious moral implications for future recruiting.
Who was not told why? The author, or the relatives. Were any relatives interviewed?

detractors point out that the Indian military stationed on the border was on alert for 300 days with no stated purpose and no stated military objective.
The way we all view events is different. Perhaps some people thought the military was playing pool by the border. I was under the inpression that the military was waiting for a political decision to wage war.

The estimated number of Pakistani dead at Kargil was between 597 and 1,000.
I'm sure. I'm sure. I wonder why Nawaz Sharif, who was Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict stated that 1700 Paksitani soldiers were killed and that the Norther Light Infantry was practically wiped out? 21st century populations wait for an answer. Not knowing why can have serious moral implications for future recruiting in the Pakistan army.

On a less ba$tardly note
Of course we must know why soldiers should die in the absence of war. And of course that must be kept down to a minimum - even if it is "unavoidable" like MiG 21 peacetime attrition. But for an irritable old joker like me who has NO LESS INTEREST in the welfare of our armed forces than the "well meaning" author of this article - I think the questions could have been asked in a manner that sounds less sarcastic, less ill informed and in a manner that gives less of an impression that the "well meaning" author has an agenda beyond mere answers to the questions he ostensibly asks.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Atish » 20 Dec 2003 00:31

The 1847 figure seems extremely high. Where does this fgure come from?

Also I was wondring does death from disease etc natural causes included in this.

Atish.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 22 Dec 2003 03:36

Originally posted by Atish:
The 1847 figure seems extremely high. Where does this fgure come from?

Also I was wondring does death from disease etc natural causes included in this.

Atish.
Supposedly, this figure comes from a statement made by George Fernandes to parliament earlier this year.

Regarding the agendas or lack thereof behind those who pose these questions, I think that's best left out of this discussion. I don't really give a **** about various writers' personal agendas. Like I said in the first post, I was hoping for a more constructive thread that concentrates on facts, not a whinefest.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 22 Dec 2003 13:12

A victory has a thousand fathers while a defeat is always an Orphan (or a B@st@rd if you please). Seeing the response in owning up of Op. Parakram it's open for anyone to decide on its success.

Our Beloved thieves (or politicians, which ever one would choose to call them) decided that the parliament was attacked and that's it, we have to mow our enemy. But then how exactly are we going to do it, sir? What happens on the day after?

Well for the idiots in Delhi, they know little or care less or both of the above. Being a democracy it does help to have multiple inputs before committing oneself in an act of war (not universal as it seems to be not applicable in the upper or lower banana republics).

However like any other military failures, Op Parakram did teach us a lot lessons. Soldiers went back home knowing what a gift it is to be alive and be with the family. Commanders have got busy to better understand the logistics (including randomized, unjustifiable inputs from ignorant over lords), which perhaps was one of THE reasons for saving the nation the cost of war.

Finally to quote Sun Tze, "So there are three ways in which a civil leadership causes the military trouble. When a civil leadership unaware of the facts tells its armies to advance when it should not, or tells its armies to retreat when it should not, this is called tying up the armies. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military affairs but shares equally in the government of the armies, the soldiers get confused. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military manoeuvres but shares equally in the command of the armies, the soldiers hesitate. Once the armies are confused and hesitant, trouble comes from competitors. This is called taking away victory by deranging the military."

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 22 Dec 2003 16:32

Originally posted by chanakya:
A victory has a thousand fathers while a defeat is always an Orphan (or a B@st@rd if you please). Seeing the response in owning up of Op. Parakram it's open for anyone to decide on its success.

Our Beloved thieves (or politicians, which ever one would choose to call them) decided that the parliament was attacked and that's it, we have to mow our enemy. But then how exactly are we going to do it, sir? What happens on the day after?

Well for the idiots in Delhi, they know little or care less or both of the above. Being a democracy it does help to have multiple inputs before committing oneself in an act of war (not universal as it seems to be not applicable in the upper or lower banana republics).

However like any other military failures, Op Parakram did teach us a lot lessons. Soldiers went back home knowing what a gift it is to be alive and be with the family. Commanders have got busy to better understand the logistics (including randomized, unjustifiable inputs from ignorant over lords), which perhaps was one of THE reasons for saving the nation the cost of war.

Finally to quote Sun Tze, "So there are three ways in which a civil leadership causes the military trouble. When a civil leadership unaware of the facts tells its armies to advance when it should not, or tells its armies to retreat when it should not, this is called tying up the armies. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military affairs but shares equally in the government of the armies, the soldiers get confused. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military manoeuvres but shares equally in the command of the armies, the soldiers hesitate. Once the armies are confused and hesitant, trouble comes from competitors. This is called taking away victory by deranging the military."
Chanakya

How easly did you ignore the fact that every major decision during op.parakram was taken after CCS delibrations ?. Every word of COAS was listened to.I dont suppose our netas in Delhi are that dumb or deaf for that matter

How easily you forgot that the J&K elections were relatively peaceful a part of reason being the mobilised forces ?

The idiots in Delhi way back in 1971 had taken up the advice of the then COAS Manekshaw and waited for 10 months after mobilisation to launch the offensive.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 22 Dec 2003 17:19

1. Am I to think that you take "idiots in Delhi" as purely the Netas? If you had, I'm sorry you are way off the mark.

2. I suppose you didn't mean that conducting of elections require mobilizing the entire army, cancelling of all the courses and death of jawns.

3. I didn't quiet get your point on 1971 war. I suppose you don't mean the squandering of hard earned victory of our forces was at the behest of Manekshaw!

4. How easy it is to be ignorant while the nation is lead and commanded by bandicoots in the name of God or "family name"?

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 22 Dec 2003 17:38

>Am I to think that you take "idiots in Delhi" as purely the Netas? If you had, I'm sorry you are way off the mark.

1.I am not concluding that all leaders in Delhi are Netas.But just that all decision taken during parakram were not for political stunts and they did mean action.If you can recall media reports of how the Nation was at the brink of war but was held back by diplomacy and a few promises by Musharaff.Tony Blair and then a host of few others who travelled to India to mediate woudnt come when the armed forces are in the barracks.
As somebody on BR[Shiv?] said once upon a time : Uncle has India and lootastani balls in his hands.A gentle squeeze then and now prevents things from happening.[not a word by word quote though] ;)
By saying this i am indeed defending the political decision made post 13/12 and the leaders who made it happen

>I suppose you didn't mean that conducting of elections require mobilizing the entire army, cancelling of all the courses and death of jawns.

2.You have guessed it right.That is why i added the bold tags before and after the word "part".Certainly those pakjabis wouldnt dare to do a lot of mischief during the elections which could in turn lead to a major conflict or something.ISI i suppose woudlnt be at the back of it.Now Kaluchak was a exception.anyway CB-Infiltration across IB and LoC could have reduced due to the build-up.

>I didn't quiet get your point on 1971 war. I suppose you don't mean the squandering of hard earned victory of our forces was at the behest of Manekshaw!

3.IIRC Indira Gandhi reportedly wanted 'quick action' when the cabinet meet for the first time to discuss the 'refugee' crisis a good 10 months before the actual war.Manekshaw did not accept it and asked the govt to wait until december.The politicians were correct in giving in to his opinions.Now i am weak in history and only 19 years old.May be more learned members can enlighten us on this.But the "core issue" i am trying to say is this point 3.

Link
After giving her firsthand assessment of the situation in East Pakistan and the Indian border, she turned to Manekshaw and bluntly asked, 'What can the Indian Army could do in this situation?' Manekshaw, in his inimitable cryptic style, replied, 'Nothing.'

Gandhi's entourage, consisting of a few ministers and bureaucrats, were shocked at the general's abrupt answer. No one had ever dared to respond to the PM in this manner. The army chief went on to explain it took time to launch military operations and the army was not ready. The PM said, 'I want the army to launch an offensive into East Pakistan as early as possible. You should be prepared to attend a Cabinet meeting in two days' time and outline your plans.'

Later, Manekshaw attended a Cabinet meeting where the PM repeated she wanted the armed forces to invade East Pakistan as quickly as possible so that a pro-Mujibur Rehman government could be installed and millions of refugees returned to their homes. The general explained there were over 90,000 Pakistani troops in East Bengal and he needed to move two army corps into the area, one into Bengal and the other into northeast India. These moves could not be completed in less than two months. The PM kept quiet but her ministers protested and said the economic and political situation in the states adjoining East Pakistan had become intolerable and he must act more quickly.

Read the whole article to understand that the Indian leadership in the past was indeed wise.Now this has nothing to do with Op.Parakram.But then you made a sweeping assumption that our leaders have been so and so Blah Blah. ;)
>How easy it is to be ignorant while the nation is lead and commanded by bandicoots in the name of God or "family name"?
4.When was the nation lead by the name of god and bandicoots ? and what family name ?.Please elaborate

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 22 Dec 2003 20:51

Amarnath,

Good for (and typical of) a teen (if you really are one)!

By saying this i am indeed defending the political decision made post 13/12 and the leaders who made it happen
1. When you know "your balls" are in someone else's hand why try to run a 100m dash? If there was an offensive "planned", then go for it, even if you have to sit it out for a year to get the right conditions. To mobilize an Army and have it on the edge for over a year only to retreat in my book (and in that of Sun Tse's) is plain and simple tying up of the army and taking away future victory's by deranging the military.

2. It is my opinion that satellite TV educated teens, corrupt businessmen (who would benefit from it), ignorant party men and indifferent countrymen would be the lot that "support" such decision. Thank you for being an evidence to prove my opinion right.

3. It's understandable that at your age, you wouldn't know the difference from being separated from family and sitting on the fence waiting to be killed from leading a peacetime military life. But it is unpardonable for the "idiots in Delhi" to behave in the same way. Wonder what they would be doing if they have their sons and daughters serving in the forces.

4. I had not used the word "leaders" anywhere for "idiots of Delhi". I suggest you spend some time reading what I have written before you post.

5. IF “Peaceful” elections are a by-product or a fleeting opportunity it may be worth a mention (still not acceptable) but by design is a costly, bloody and short sighted experiment. Either way, neither you nor I know the genesis to comment on this topic.

6. Please do read carefully before you (make an) Ass_u_me what my assumptions are.

7. You certainly have to brush up your history when you talk about history. 93K odd prisoners taken, a country deep in war debt, allies checked from interference and the ceasefire agreement still doesn't solve the problem of the victor. Now that is the ability of the then "idiots in Delhi". I suggest you spend some time digging on what happened in the late 40's and 71 before shooting of your next reply.

8. I'm sorry if your vocabulary hasn't improved to include words like "bandicoots". As for the God, it seems to be just one with many names and there is none but one family name whose brand equity would be worth the nation. If you still don't know what it is, do spend some time reading before posting.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 23 Dec 2003 06:36

two chankians locked in battle.

I need to think about this, and will take no action for now. But it may be that I will have to ask both of you to change your login names.

It just will not do for two people to have the same name - and a name that causes admin headaches because we get a lot of emails asking why someone has some name or the other - including chanakya.

I will mull over this for a while - but please be prepared to change your forum handle and make a post on here that you changed it. Not that many forum stalwarts including Rudra Singha, Jumrao, Kapil and others had to change their handles.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 23 Dec 2003 07:32

>When you know "your balls" are in someone else's hand why try to run a 100m dash?

When i say that i mean that it is the diplomatic pressure applied and the results yeilded from it.Had all the pressures on TSP yielded zero results i am sure there would have been action.Oh Yheah we know they have us .,,,so why have an army/airforce or a navy.Shall we disband them all ?.The point is you will have to move on regardless of who is going to tell you,plead with you or apply pressure on you to stop doing it.But then if those acts of the international community are indeed helping us then why not use it ?

>It's understandable that at your age, you wouldn't know the difference from being separated from family and sitting on the fence waiting to be killed from leading a peacetime military life

Ok.Peacetime.Nobody dies in Kasmir or NE ?. Do you advice that because there will be peacetime deaths in the army we should never mobilize at all ?. Worse in war time many will die so no war.Come lets all surrender.And what peace time deaths?That 1000+ no ?.

4> I had not used the word "leaders" anywhere for "idiots of Delhi". I suggest you spend some time reading what I have written before you post.

Then what did it mean ?

5> IF “Peaceful” elections are a by-product or a fleeting opportunity it may be worth a mention

Correct

7>Ok.93000 thousand prisoners taken,Bangladesh was created.A nation is split into two.Understand that the aim of the then campaign was "Bangladesh".That sole purpose was obtained.We may not know all that went into the Simla agreement.Which ally was checked from intervention ? So easy of you to forget that aircraft carrier sailing into bay of bengal.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 23 Dec 2003 12:07

Shiv,

Your geocities email addy doesn't work anymore? I got a bounced mail from the server. Is there a different addy you use?

Amarnath,

Blah blah blah. It's getting to be more a panting gibberish than discussion.

1. Op Parakram was mobilization for war and not CI ops, which happens in Kashmir and elsewhere. There is a substantial difference in the force mobilization for either of them.

2. Bangladesh was ONE of the objectives. It was not the only objective, lest there would not be any mention of the on going issue of Kashmir. The negotiators didn't leverage the hand they had in Shimla and that is what I had mentioned.

3. I still suggest that you do some reading before posting "easily". 7th fleet (not just one aircraft carrier) was sailing into the Bay. The US administration would not have had the will to engage us, particularly in '71 after Vietnam. Either way USSR was posturing favourably to India checking the mobilization of US forces. In other words, the dimensions were more complicated and an US President who came to power on the promise of "bringing the boys back home" would not dare to engage India, particularly during ceasefire negotiations.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 23 Dec 2003 13:06

>Blah blah blah. It's getting to be more a panting gibberish than discussion.

How true ? :D

Anyway what is your point here ?

1.Who denies Op.P was a mobilisation of war.Indeed it was you who said the our babus in Delhi mobilised without any clear intention

Our Beloved thieves (or politicians, which ever one would choose to call them) decided that the parliament was attacked and that's it, we have to mow our enemy. ....
You must also understand that the 1000+ estimate of casualities are not entirely because of Op.P. Most of those casualities would have occured even without Op.P

2.As you said , if it was a failure it was because of negotiators.Not netas.Or "idiots of delhi".If "idiots of delhi" are bureacrats in your vocab then i am sorry then they do not take decisions about the mobilisations.

3.So there was no pressure on IA/IAF/IN to finish the objectives quickly because USA was not going to intervene ?.Infact even the soviets were asking us to clean it up fast.

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 23 Dec 2003 14:13

You must also understand that the 1000+ estimate of casualities are not entirely because of Op.P. Most of those casualities would have occured even without Op.P
Read my previous posts carefully. Casualty in terms of death alone hasn't been discussed.

If "idiots of delhi" are bureacrats in your vocab then i am sorry then they do not take decisions about the mobilisations.
It is your comment on your assumption.

Infact even the soviets were asking us to clean it up fast.
I wonder what "cleaning up" you are referring to!

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 23 Dec 2003 14:19

[q]Read my previous posts carefully. Casualty in terms of death alone hasn't been discussed.[/q]

Yes i understand that !

It is your comment on your assumption
Very well i thought it was you who talked about "idiots in Delhi".

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby JCage » 23 Dec 2003 23:58

"chanakya" you have valid points but is there any need to take personal potshots at amarnath g on the lines of "teens watching tv" etc?
There are many who do not support your assumption/ presumption/ conviction/ beliefs/ that Parakram was a failure/ debacle . Are we to believe that all of them are "ill informed" countrymen etc for not following your perception? Your beliefs may be valid, they may not be valid- at any rate- your points would be lent greater credence if you fleshed out what you think without dissing amarnaths age as a "reason" for his beliefs. It is a fact that Parakram had benefits (elections in J&K , vital experience re" logistics et al) albeit at high cost (loss of men and materiel). The point whether the above were "unintended" adavantages vis a vis planned ones, is an interesting thesis and surely merits discussion. However, if we bicker about the age etc of those discussing the same, the basis of BR - to serve as a means of disseminating information to those interested, is put to test and serves to introduce venom into the discussion where there should be none.

Best Regards,
Nitin

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 24 Dec 2003 05:48

Let us put an end to this chanakya debate. I have requested one to change his handle on pvt email.

I have also deleted non-relevant posts

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 24 Dec 2003 11:42

Nitin,

Fair enough, there is no requirement for one and all to agree with me. We can positively discuss on the merits of ones argument and that should be mutual. Disregarding the "venom" you would like to engage me, I would be happy about it.

Amarnath,

Its your assumption that "idiots in Delhi are bureacrats." You had commented on that assumption that, "they do not take decisions about the mobilisations." I didn't particularly find it worth a topic to discuss and left it at that.

To all,
Wish you a merry Xmas and a Happy New year. Shall see you all here in 2004.

Chanakya

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby JCage » 24 Dec 2003 11:56

Chanakya,

Thanks. To summarise, I gather that your points are (re: your discussion with amarnath) that Parakram may have been an op wherein the GOI didnt take the Army into confidence wrt what its intentions were and hence caused a lot of needless heartburn and led to a no-show. Would that be a fair approximation?
Could you elaborate more at length re: the above?\

Cheers,
Nitin

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Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Raj Singh » 26 Dec 2003 17:58

Chanakya

Either way USSR was posturing favourably to India checking the mobilization of US forces.
And what is the basis of this statement? Is there anything whatsoever which supports the above statement/assertion?

Here, I have two statements from two different Indian Generals who were not only part of 1971 war but have been the hero of many Indians, too.

In a chat session, a question was put to Lt Gen J S Aurora and this is how it went (Q&A)..

Quote:

Sir, I have been reading Walter Isaacson's excellent biography of Henry Kissinger where he says the then US national security adviser felt that China may come to Pakistan's assistance if the Russian came to ours. As someone who drafted the army's strategy in that war, did you take the likelihood of Chinese intervention into your calculations?

Answer by Lt Gen J S Aurora

Thank you Jaswant for a very good question. We had sufficient troops deployed on the northern boarder to take care of any disturbance that the Chinese might have created. On the other hand we also realised that in a situation of this nature Chinese coming to the assistance of Pakistan was not so likely as in no way we had taken any physical help from Russia. The real help was in the Security Council by stopping the other nations from passing a resolution against India. If a situation like this arose as it happens the Chinese did not come to Pakistan's help in any effective manner. Primarilly because in no way it helped their own domestic policies.

Following has been said by Maj Gen Jacob




The Eastern Command went ahead with its own plans, although Army Headquarters felt it was too ambitious and could not be achieved. Jacob's commander, Lt. Gen. Aurora, provided full support for his Army's own plans and allowed Jacob to pull down troops kept in reserve for a possible attack by the Chinese. Some of these troops had to be brought into battle so hurriedly that the only way was to paradrop them. This was accomplished with the help of the IAF and soon soldiers geared to fight the Chinese in the high mountains found themselves in the tropical riverine areas of Tangail in East Pakistan.

We realised that any campaign to be successful had to be swift. The United Nations was putting great pressure on us and also the Russians had indicated that they did not want to exercise their veto any more, " Jacob explained. "Therefore any campaign had to be quick. We realised that Niazi (the Pakistani Army commander in East Pakistan) was going to fortify the towns and defend them in strength. We therefore decided not attack any towns but bypass them using subsidiary tracks to get to our objective: Dhaka."


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