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Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Y. Kanan
Posts: 645
Joined: 27 Mar 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 21 Jun 2004 10:24

It's heartening to see that my thread, which was initially condemned as traitorous, has actually spawned some very interesting analysis.

Still though, the tendency to take the easy way out and dismiss all negative info as treasonous "psy-ops" is still rearing its head here, and those of you who are guilty of this mental laziness and moral cowardice, well you know who you are.

So please let's not let all this "shoot the messenger" stuff derail what's turned into an illuminating discussion.

Posts: 1562
Joined: 09 Oct 2000 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby JCage » 21 Jun 2004 23:22

Originally posted by Sanjay:
The argument that the "boys in the field" don't know anything has been used by Sawhney since he was a mediocre Asian Age correspondent.

It is also the greatest myth around. The IAF previously knew of the free-fall bomb deterrent - they would have needed to know numbers, yield and fuzing ( the latter two even for the trials ).

Furthermore, if you read anything Sawhney writes, remember that there isn't any new information anywhere - it's all recycled stuff from his Asian Age days.

The same rubbish arguements repeated over and over again. That's perhaps why M.J. Akbar cancelled his column in 1996.
Typical- check out his latest piece on the Arjun.
Same recycled BS. He has become so entrenched in self deceit that he is unwilling to face reality.

BRF Oldie
Posts: 34620
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 22 Jun 2004 15:37

Lessons of Op Parakram - OCRed from Vayu III/2004

More than a year after its ignominious termination, the true story of Operation Parakram can now be told. The Indian threat of war was an empty boast, the Indian armed forces had neither effective plans, nor the wherewithal to "punish" Pakistan. The armed forces blame their political and bureaucratic masters for not having provided them adequate resources, but the armed
forces in fact are to blame for not having a workable strategy.

After the terrorist attack on Parliament, the Cabinet asked the forces to act against Pakistan. There was just one condition - action must be immediate and should not go beyond two weeks. That nothing happened is now history. There have been claims that they were ready to act in early January and again in June 2002. The reality is that they were unready when the only window available was open - from December 13, the day of the terrorist attack, to January 2, 2002 when Tony Blair announced his visit to the subcontinent.

According to reports, the first Army plan was for several thrusts across the Line of Control (LoC), to be launched in early January. The second, after the Kaluchak massacre, was for a deep strike into Pakistan through the Rajasthan border. Both plans were infirm. India did not have the numbers and fire power to punch across the LoC, or sufficient special forces to undertake the task in an effective manner. The second plans' strategy of thrusting deep into Pakistan would have meant an all-out war with its attendant risk of the use of nuclear weapons.

Confronted by the Cabinet mandate, the armed forces wanted a month's time frame, a window that was simply not available. Indeed, it has not been for a long time. The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted 22 days, and the 1971 conflict for 14. As the record now shows, on both occasions India came under enormous pressure from the UN and the great powers to cease fighting.

The armed forces response was based on neither cowardice nor incompetence, but an old-fashioned mindset and organisation that is unable to address the security challenges of the age. The Army, for example, has not been able to reorganise and equip itself to fight short, sharp wars like Kargil or mount deep cross-border strikes. More important, India's combat power is divided between three services, the Army, Navy and Air Force which work separately on their respective war plans and acquisitions.

The country has spent roughly Rs 60,000 crore per year on defence in the previous five years, and this was about the maximum it could without compromising the country's economic well-being. Instead of cutting their suit to fit the cloth, the armed forces constant refrain is that they are not given adequate resources.

All expert advice, including a path breaking Group of Minister's (GoM) report approved by the Cabinet, have suggested that the way to go is to integrate the three services, thereby rationalising costs and maximising fire power. A notable feature of the American campaign against Iraq was how US aircraft, taking off from Navy ships, functioned as airborne artillery for the Army's armoured columns.

The American example reveals that the most important compulsion to integrate is not simply on the need to economise, but to be able to fight wars in a paradigm shaped by what is called the revolution in military affairs. It means the ability of a commander to have total awareness of the location of his enemy's forces at all times, through a fused network of surveillance satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles. Then, using IT -based command and control systems, he can make devastating precision strikes at the enemy's vitals.

Such war fighting requires smaller and more mobile forces, because large and stationary ones will be sitting ducks. Relying on massed artillery, armoured columns and fixed defences, the Indian Army can only hope to fight the last war better. Despite their technological orientation, the Indian Air Force and Navy, too are working along the sanne track. The three services make battle plans and acquisitions with little reference to the needs of the other service. The lesson of all wars is that the final decision has to be on land.

The GoM which went into the issues related to the Kargi! war recommended integration of the three wings of the armed forces as a means of enhancing their combat power and effectiveness. The experience of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the US has shown that breaking service bureaucracies can only be done by the political leadership. The Vajpayee Govenunent skillfull y used the GoM format to execute deep reaching refonns in a host of areas from telecom to labour and textiles.

Unfortunately, the experience of the past two years shows that the old Government had been successfully stymied in critical atea of defence. The new government needs to give another push towards a joint armed force. The Government should immediately announce a Chief of Defence Staff to kickstart the process.

In the next five year plan, the Government could well spend Rs 400,000 crore on defence. This is a huge amount of money for a developing country, and so much more the reason whyil should be spent in a way that ensures that it creates a world class military.

Dr. Manoj loshi

Posts: 123
Joined: 05 Sep 2002 11:31
Location: India

Postby Denis » 31 Jul 2004 12:47

Operation Parakram was a war

"It is not that they died bina ladai. Though there was no war declared, there were attacks and counter attacks," said Defence Minister Pranab Mukherji.

Bloodless operation?

The many full-fledged operations during Operation Parakram were also never made public. These were going on in Kargil, Drass and Turtuk sectors.

In fact 14 corps captured Point 5070 during one such operation, forcing Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to sack the GOC, the Brigade Commander, and the Divisional commander of the Northern areas,

For India's defence establishment, Operation Parakram was seen to have shown off India's resolve to have an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with Pakistan. It also helped achieve some political and military objectives.

But while the government projects this as a bloodless operation, the figures of casualties suggest that this was a war, which had its human costs.

The story in the video, is available at ndtv site for subscribers. I have missed it on their news. Has some one seen the thing?

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