Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Raj Singh
BRFite
Posts: 101
Joined: 23 Jan 2002 12:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Raj Singh » 26 Dec 2003 22:53

Chanakya

The US administration would not have had the will to engage us, particularly in '71 after Vietnam.
This statement too is questionable given that now records have been found (I think, it was some Pakistani who picked some papers from an American/some American institution)which clearly state (it is probably official/real transcript of a meeting), Dr Kissinger openly egged on Chinese Ambassador to US, to attack India, before and during the 1971 war. He also told the Chinese Ambassador that US is now moving some ships to the region. Russia (SU) wil not be able to do much as technically we are more superior.

In addition, just before going to China, Dr Kissinger talked to Mr Haksar (he was probably one of the advisors or secretary or something like that to Mrs Gandhi)in person and told him in Delhi itself that he/US will not say or accept anything negative about India from China. However, when he returned from his trip to China and went back to US, his statement had been changed. Now it was, that assurance does not stand in the event of hostilities break out between India/Pakistan.

Shankar
BRFite
Posts: 1905
Joined: 28 Aug 2002 11:31
Location: wai -maharastra

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Shankar » 28 Dec 2003 11:00

The entry of USS Enterprise carrier group into bay of bengal in 71 was not exactly a move for war -it was more a show of force particularly because Vikrant was operating in the region .USN new time was not in their favour .If you look closely at the timeline of 71 war by the time Enterprise could have reached close enough to stop Vikrant the war was almost over.The USN was in no position to affect the final outcome of the war ,ofcourse it could hav sunk Vikrant but Bangladesh would have been formed in any case.Unlike US Vikrant was not the spearhead in Bangladesh operatins -it was an assist in land-air operations. Even if Vikrant ceased to exist the carrier based F-4 s of Enterprise couldnot have taken on IAF on the coasts of Khulna and Chitagong .US policy makers understood this simple fact and wiseli did not make an already bad state -state relation worse.
Russians did not really do much except shadowing the US carrier group as was their usal practice during cold war days.I am sure they would not have triggered a global conflict just so that the tiny nation of Bangladesh can be born.
China as already said was not really much bothered and as such made lot of diplomatic noise but no single operatinal advance deployment was made on ground.
Indian army anticipated the realpolitik of war very well for once and seized the chance to remove a threat once and for all .They knew time is of essence and that is why pulled out all stops from para dropping to use of carrier group to blocade and demoralising strike missions -from straffing governors house to para dropping in Tangail to crush the Pakistan armys will to fight .It paid off

Raghz
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 59
Joined: 12 Aug 2002 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Raghz » 30 Dec 2003 10:37

Two Op Eds on BRM
Op Ed 1
Op Ed 2

mody
BRFite
Posts: 385
Joined: 18 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: Mumbai, India

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby mody » 31 Dec 2003 01:26

I remember there was an incidence of a Searcher UAV flying into paki airspace and being shot down by the PAF deep inside paki territory. Does anybody have any more info on this incident.
It certainly appears that there isn't much info on the actual facts about what the army, IAF and teh navy do during the entire deployment, what scenarios they practiced for and what exactly did they learn about paki tactics and movements. As someone rightly said, after a while this was a game of chess and we had the white pieces. Once it was understood that no war is actually going to take place, you go on making different moves just to see how the enemy reacts to each one of them.

I think the UAV incident was part of one such move. To perhaps find holes in paki airdefense, see how long does it take the paf from engaging the target, where exactly do they scramble the planes, when a target comes along a particular axis etc.

Another key incidence was the sacking of the commandnig officer of the II strike corp. What exactly led to that move? Theer were various speculations like unkil detected the corps movements to be too close to the border etc etc. But no one really seems to know the right answers.

Also how well did the navy participate in the exercise? They had deployed almost the entire fleet. Did the paki navy venture out atall? if so did we ever manage to shadow any of thier subs? Didi the navy manage in blockading karachi? Along what routes did the pakis move their assets to pasni and gwadar and did we manage to observer such movements etc.

These are some of the questions/issues I would like to be discussed. Obviously I know most of such info would be hard to come by and some of it even if known, should not be discussed. But am just interested in knowing what the indian military learn from the experience, espcially about the enemy.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5038
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Surya » 31 Dec 2003 02:38

The SEarcher was not lost to the PAF

It hada technicalproblem and went down after going deep into Puki territory :D

mody
BRFite
Posts: 385
Joined: 18 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: Mumbai, India

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby mody » 31 Dec 2003 03:48

Hey Surya, according to this report it was indeed shot down by a PAF F-16 somwheer near Kasur. I remember reading similar reports of a PAF F-16 shooting down the searcher after had ingressed deep inside paki territory.

http://www.dawn.com/2002/06/11/top9.htm

chanakya
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 14
Joined: 17 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 31 Dec 2003 15:08

Raj,

1. Thanks for joining the issue and questioning the statements and steering the discussion for the '71 war instead of Op.Parakram.

2. Thanks for the references citing the swift move on the ground on the Eastern theatre.

3. Going to my assertions, it was primarily that military objectives where achieved and the leverage obtained in the operations was lost during the negotiations in Shimla. In other words, the "higher" objectives that could have been extracted were not done. The proof for it is the still existing PoK.

4. Nixon came to power with a promise to bring the boy's back home from Vietnam. If US commits in India overtly, it will have to deploy its forces in a country many times the size of Vietnam and where there were many more trained men (in the form of army, police, etc). It would be a nightmarish scenario for the economy, pundits or pentagon to support. To add to it, there was no communism spreading out of India's liberation of Bangladesh, in the name of which India could have been attacked. (There still was some public accountability in those days in the US).

5. Covertly US was arming the PAF marrying US missiles on Chinese Aircrafts and helping in terms of tactics (Ref: BG Chuck Yeager’s Autobiography).

6. US coaxing China is openly admitted, I think even in Yeager’s book. But the question is will the dragon move out of its liar in December '71 against a fully deployed and ready India? I don't think there was (and probably IS) reasonable understanding of the working of PRC to assert (or predict) which way the wind would blow. But needless to say, in terms of logistical management and armament we were a lot different from the previous decade and that was known to all. In the worst case scenario, we would stand up to them and not only slow their progression but would make them pay many times over than what we did in the past. I'm sure PRC would have asked a thousand questions to itself on bleeding for others cause! Either way whatever we say in '04 is like a video game where you can go to combat and win, loose or die without a scratch.

7. For its part, USSR was posturing in terms of providing us the required weapons system (literally speaking both India and Pak gave our money to buy systems and making the US and Europe reach only to kill ourselves, which seems to continue even now and which I don't want to make an issue of discussion in this topic). For all practical purposes they had made sure UN was not going to come into the picture stopping us from the military objective (Your reference of MG Jacob in bold asserts that there was a support until then). As with PRC, there was no reason for USSR to commit beyond a threshold.

8. These leave only two players to stand in the ground and settle their issues either militarily or by negotiations. As all post war negotiations go, the victor could have asked for just a few miles in to POK to have a better hold on J&K. The military requirement of maintaining the border had not been justifiably addressed. And hence the "idiots in Delhi" will have to be held responsible for that.

amarnath
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 29
Joined: 02 Apr 2001 11:31
Location: CBE,TN,IN

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 31 Dec 2003 15:28

And to say that during 1971 it was only India and Pakistan doing our jobs would be foolish.Never forget that there is another form of aggression called sanctions and diplomacy.Just doing what we wanted would have yeilded us a Rogue state badge. This pressure was indeed felt during the 1971 war Though it is difficult to fancy that Uncle would be tough on India for hitting Pakistan during Op.P period,i am pretty much convinced that relations would be badly damaged,which works best for TSP.

Very well Chanakya
Again with all humility may i suggest that [bold]we[\bold] stick to the topic and not discuss about 1971 here !.Ok.It was i who started this 1971.I regret. For if we start to dicuss them,then the thread and its content would have no meaning at all.

chanakya
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 14
Joined: 17 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby chanakya » 31 Dec 2003 18:42

Amarnath,

Good that you regret to have started the '71 issue. We shall keep it off the spectrum in this thread. Again read to the depth of any content before dismissing it. I didn't say it was an Indo Pak stand off in isolation, but in then exisiting situation there was an equilibrium minus the participation of India and Pakistan.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5038
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Surya » 31 Dec 2003 19:06

Sachin

Of course the Pukes would claim to shoot it.

There were enough red faces after the UAV loitered deep into their territory

Raj Singh
BRFite
Posts: 101
Joined: 23 Jan 2002 12:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Raj Singh » 31 Dec 2003 21:27

Chanakya

Thanks for joining the issue and questioning the statements and steering the discussion for the '71 war instead of Op.Parakram.

That is an allegation which will not stand under scrutiny.

Intention was not, is not to steer the dicussion in any direction but to correct the false impressions being given in a particular post. Especially when the factual history does not support those assertions, and I have tried to refute those assertions.

It is said, lot of people read this forum and many do form impressions. So it is important that at least INDIANS know their own history. Even if the version is questionable but at least there are more that one version to form an opinion/impression of. So my intention was to let the people make their own minds and not only I quoted from what I had read in the past but also questioned the statements made in your post. By questioning those statements, I left the room open for any new information which may come from your side. And this, even when I had quoted the top participants in that war and NOT expressed my opinion.

You (not you personally)see, it is difficult to comprehend that when one view is being presented, that is/would be okay but when another view, which challenges or questions the first view should be taken as steering the thread in another direction. So either the first view should not be there for others to challenge/question or if it has to be there then the first view should be prepared for the question/challenge. Especially the one which deals with Indian history. And that too of war.

Can/will respond to the rest of the post if/when there is some other thread on the subject.

Added few hours later

For now, suffice to say, opinion expressed in that post is quite questionable.

mody
BRFite
Posts: 385
Joined: 18 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: Mumbai, India

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby mody » 31 Dec 2003 22:30

Surya infact I would be happy if the pukes had to shoot it down. From the report if they had to scrabmle a F-16 to shoot down a slow UAV which their forward radars did not even detect till it was deep inside their territory would be hilarious. That too at a time when everything as at the highest alert. But anyways the point is what were we trying to see by sending in the UAV? Obviously we didn't really expect it to come back safe and sound.

But thats exactly what i want someone to shed some light on....what did the indian military learn in the 10 months period. What different things were tried and how did the pakis react to them. Almost all the analysis that seems to have been done in diferent articles simply talks about indias positions and what strategies did india think about as to how to attack the pakis and where we moved our forces and the politiks of it all etc. There is no talk about what the pakis did. For example when we moved certain units to certian positions what the pakis do? Were they sending up regular sorties close to the border. How did the paki navy react and what tactics did it try out in that period. Did the pakis conduct any exercises during that period, did they have problems in mining and demining, how smooth was their mobilisation, what problems did they encounter. I remember seeing photographs of paki jaanbaaz force being moved to the border in trains.

Surya
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5038
Joined: 05 Mar 2001 12:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Surya » 01 Jan 2004 00:27

DearSachin

U really think the lessons can be mentioned here.

They are deep in the combat colleges of the 3 services.

All we can do is take a few sentences from some reports and speculate

but if that gives a few people their kicks so be it :D

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35041
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 01 Jan 2004 20:26

Well - here's one guy's take on Parakram - albeit in a sentence

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/398448.cms
The Kashmir elections were a resounding success. But in many ways, this was the intended consequence of the 10-month-long Operation Parakram, which changed the terms of reference for the Kashmir debate.

Rudra
BRFite
Posts: 599
Joined: 28 May 2001 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Rudra » 01 Jan 2004 21:52

from snippets in intelonline and elsewhere I believe some of the things learnt was
-- Pak has a critical lack of POL supplies. unsuitable for full intensity ops beyond 1 week
-- It is possible to achieve tactical surprise
in RYK region by night manouvers due to Paks lack of realtime satint and UAV (witness them absolute freaked out when Gen Vijs armd divs appeared 10km from border one fine dawn)
-- PA has kind of given up its riposte bravura
and strategy seems to be hold on for dear life
east of indus.

-- Pak leadership tends to panic and squeal for
D.C. intervention at the first sign of real trouble. They lack the discipline and institutional capacity for a sustain toe-to-toe fight. too much terrorism has softened these aspects. their generals dont have to work for a living.
-- combined arms is woefully lacking in their approach.
-- their AAA is quite pitiful going by antique weapons seen in karachi (prime target) and sukkur via media pix. some are still in corbis.

-- they dont even have enough mines to lay much
protective screens. I heard no report of them mining the border like india did extensively.
--they tend to concentrate 75% of PAF to defend
the punjabi heartland and karachi leaving a gaping huge playground in the center for IAF to prowl unmolested.

Kuttan
BRFite
Posts: 439
Joined: 12 Jul 1999 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Kuttan » 01 Jan 2004 22:53

blah-blah-blah.

Simple truth: India decided to go to war. mush/mushlets made one too many panicked threats to use nookulear weapons "even if there was economic blockade against Karachi".

US/PRC got together and decided that the risk of nuclear war was too high, and that there was only one way to stop it - take mush's "assets" away.

They did.

I explained the compelling logic which must have driven their actions. There was no other way to go.

Mush got deflated like the gasbag he is. George Fernandes could barely conceal his laughter as he said: "We are sure that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are in responsbile hands".

India withdrew, since Pakistan is a Dong-less wonder, and its perfectly obvious that Musharraf is now like a chess player who has lost his "Queen" and two Rooks. It will take a few more moves, but its all downhill from here. Checkmate inevitable as the snows falling in the Kargil mountains.

No sense in having more young men die in war-preparation exercises, so India withdrew most of the forces. End of story.

No one here has any facts to disprove this, for the simple reason that this is the truth. OTOH, the key evidence I cited for an about-turn remains valid:

Since mid-June 2002, there has not been a single threat from senior Paki govt. entities to use nuclear weapons.

Also, Christina Rocca, US Asst-SoS, when asked bluntly in a Congressional Subcommittee hearing: "What are you doing/ have you done to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons?" answered: " I will have to answer that in a Classified Forum".

Mush visit to PRC, both in July 2002, and recently in late 2003, were obvious flops with Mush seeming like a whipped dog. This time the PRC flatly insulted him by telling him to quit sending terrorists to Uighurstan.

Also a public refusal to supply nuke materials. Obvious code for a refusal to return the confiscated "nuclear arsenal".

Doesn't this also explain why there is suddenly such an increased level of trust and bhai-bhai and give-and-take between India and PRC? The noises being heard are positively lovey-dovey.

Recently, there has been another confirmation of Pakistan's nook-noodity from an unmistakeable source. Not at liberty to divulge here, but the other pointers are quite enough.

Typically, the dorks of the desi angrezi media are incapable of seeing the simplest and the only logical explanation of what we saw in the buildup, pause and stand-down of Operation Parakram.

dhaval.shah
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 4
Joined: 07 May 2003 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby dhaval.shah » 01 Jan 2004 23:11

Originally posted by sachin mody:
Hey Surya, according to this report it was indeed shot down by a PAF F-16 somwheer near Kasur. I remember reading similar reports of a PAF F-16 shooting down the searcher after had ingressed deep inside paki territory.

http://www.dawn.com/2002/06/11/top9.htm
I thought or read it somewhere that the UAV was actually probing the defences of Pak and since there was no defence it ended up deep into enemy territory!! Anyway it was fun to read one to one combat of F-16 and UAV - even if it was imaginary.

amarnath
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 29
Joined: 02 Apr 2001 11:31
Location: CBE,TN,IN

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 02 Jan 2004 07:42

n^3 :
Now that is a naRAWayanan report!
But still seems quite ambitious for me that US/PRC would simbly "take away" mushys assets.Had that been the situation think this way ,"No Pak Nuke , So lets do what we can to soften this Up" ,or atleast a "salami slice" to facilitate Infiltration Blocking Jobs would have been done.

But then you are the naRAWayanan, you could be correct ;) if you insist

Kuttan
BRFite
Posts: 439
Joined: 12 Jul 1999 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Kuttan » 02 Jan 2004 08:19

Amarnath: The reality is that there HAS to be a tough condition imposed on India, accompanying the TSP nook-noodity. Read the latest from Dubya and you'll see it clearly:
From ABC News:

http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1019418.htm

Bush says Pakistan nukes are secure
US President George W Bush says Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is "secure" following two failed assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf in the last three weeks.

Mr Bush also said he emerged from a recent telephone conversation with General Musharraf convinced that the "friend of the United States" and ally in the global war on terrorism had the situation under control.

"Obviously terrorists are after him and he sounded very confident that his security forces would be able to deal with the threat," Mr Bush said.

"He sounded confident and therefore I feel confident about his security situation."

In response to a reporter's question, the US leader said that Pakistan's nuclear weapons "are secure and that's important".

"It's also important that India as well have a secure nuclear weapons program," he said.
Remember: PRC and US took away the weapons out of their own self-interest (explained in the TSP-nook-nood article on BRM in 2002). NOT out of any love for India. So the accompanying message to India was two-fold:

1. Don't publicize this (or mush's tush is slush).
2. Don't try to exploit this. Just use this knowledge to de-escalate in confidence that TSP now has no option.

You have to think through these to understand why there was no "salami-slicing" or "punitive strike". Either of those would have blown the whistle and destabilized the whole place, and brought a combined US-PRC-TSP response against India. Now as much as I admire India's Armed Forces, I don't think they can withstand such a combination. Neither does GOI.

All the Faithful here are disappointed that there was no "Akram" in "Parakram". But you have to realize that there are many possible manifestations of a policy to destroy TSP.

Let me use the chess analogy, since I am coming off a victorious series against my little nephew, the only person I can remember defeating in a very long time.

Once the Strategic Assets like Queen, Rook etc. are gone, the game is as good as lost. BUT, that's assuming the "winning" side doesn't do anything really stupid.

And it still takes many moves before the King is well and truly checkmated, with no escape moves left. In fact, the winner may take his time, pushing several pawns forward to get at least one to become an Additional Queen (Minister, in the Indian version of chess pieces). The fact is that once the opposing Strategic Assets have been neutered, there is no hurry at all.

Think back to July 2002, and you'll realize that everything since then has really been downhill for Mush & Co - completely consistent with their no longer having the nuclear option to brandish. And India has been coolly making the right moves, step by logical step.

Note that most of our troops are down from Siachen, for the first time since - 1990? Major saving in lives and limbs, and other costs. The Army is steadily handing over operations in J&K to paramilitary or police forces. Steps to ease lives for our people there have taken priority. Tourism is up. Trade is up.

Meanwhile, Mush is faced with steadily having to squeeze his terrorists - and now he even claims that they are turning on him. Funding to the L-e-T and J-e-M are cut off.

No hurry at all to destroy the L-e-T camps. Who knows? They may go blow up IslamaGood with no help needed from us... Or they may decide to launch themselves against the Americans - inviting Ambassador Daisy Cutter to visit.

You have to see the WHOLE picture - not just the military one.

Cheers. (IOW, its the RAW Truth: Pakistan Has Lost Its Nuclear Weapons!) Musharraf sold/ handed them over to China and the US.

Manne
BRFite
Posts: 172
Joined: 26 Jul 2002 11:31
Location: Mumbai

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Manne » 02 Jan 2004 09:45

N^3,

Nice to see you back. Missed meeting you at Mumbai meet as I was OOT. Anyway, a few Qs:

1. Would you then say that the very recent reports in Washington Post (or some such newspaper) - about security experts advising Dubya to secure the nukes and subsequent reports saying that it was a tough job as US did not know where and how many they were - were careful plants ?

2. Would you also say that the one compelling reason why Mushy is still wearing his brown pants and still in the chair is because he sold the crown jewels ? I have always wondered that there had to be a better reason for US to support Mushy.

3. Could this nuke handover be the real reason why a top section of PA is now turning against Mushy ?

Kuttan
BRFite
Posts: 439
Joined: 12 Jul 1999 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Kuttan » 02 Jan 2004 16:07

Manne:

Everything that I see from CL (cuckoo-land) is consistent with the above.

"1. Would you then say that the very recent reports in Washington Post (or some such newspaper) - about security experts advising Dubya to secure the nukes and subsequent reports saying that it was a tough job as US did not know where and how many they were - were careful plants ?"

Or these "experts" don't know diddly. Another point proven early in said Paper, where they discuss detailed scenarios re: South Asia nooks, with not a mention of PRC's role, power and threat. "idiots" would be too kind a description.

"2. Would you also say that the one compelling reason why Mushy is still wearing his brown pants and still in the chair is because he sold the crown jewels ? I have always wondered that there had to be a better reason for US to support Mushy."

Of course. This is the reason why in Tubelightabad, Mush can do no wrong, and he's constantly patted on the tush for "cooperation" (i.e., GUBO). His "credit" account is as large as it can be - he sold out not only the entire Pak Army in A'stan (minus the odd escapee from Kunduz) and thereby ran away from his Strategic Depth, but also his Strategic Assets.

They have him by his Tactical Assets. Any time at all, GOTUS can even HINT at leaking this simple fact (they just showed how close they can come, with Dubya's cool statement) - and Mush rushes to "London" for the next hour.

"3. Could this nuke handover be the real reason why a top section of PA is now turning against Mushy ? "

I think Jamali knows, but I don't believe that anyone else really is sure. As for top section of PA "turning" - they would do that anyway at the slightest opportunity.

I also think many of the nook "scientists" (i.e., Xerox operators) suspect, hence their hurry to leave sinking ship. And Mush's eagerness to put them away behind bars, or by more permanent means.

The reality, as far as I can gather:

1. Warheads gone.

2. Guidance systems may have been returned to missiles AFTER warheads were safely confirmed as being out.

3. Production of new fissile material at Kahuta stopped (also reported). They gave a conducted tour to the Finance Minister, who is a US Citizen, of Kahuta, so that he could personally report to his Commander-in-chief that there was little going on there. Remember the flap in the Pak-li-ament about this?

But I think Jamali knows - hence his greater eagerness to mend fences with India while there is still time (i.e., before the Strike Corps start rolling in).

Mullah Diesel MAY know - he certainly suspects - because he said so in July-Aug.2002 right after our thread here. This may also account for his surprising welcome in India.

Kuttan
BRFite
Posts: 439
Joined: 12 Jul 1999 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Kuttan » 02 Jan 2004 17:54

I have to reject that theory, because there is no way that even the mighty US of A can ensure that such things can be kept "safe" in a place where EVERYONE is against the US. It would be suicidal of the Americans to try that option - and anyway the cost of such "security" would be immense - Ft. Knox doesn't even begin to come close. They would have to run everything from the postal service and toilet-cleaning to the actual inspections themselves. Just makes no sense at all.

Tim
BRFite
Posts: 136
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: USA

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Tim » 02 Jan 2004 20:26

Y. Kanan,

Sorry about that. It was an interesting thread. In an effort to try to get back to it, it might be interesting to track what the Pakistanis claim to have learned from it. I haven't done a thorough study of it (yet - it may be a future project), but it seems to me there are a couple of major differences in the perspectives of India and Pakistan. These are a couple of ideas I've seen or heard from Pakistani analysts - I'm not saying I agree with them.

1. Some significant portion of the Pakistani decision making elites appear to believe that Pakistan's conventional forces played an important role in deterring Indian attack. They still see conventional deterrence as reasonably robust, although they also express significant concern (to the US) about the deteriorating situation due to India's greater spending and larger resources. They're still looking at a short, constrained war (ended by international intervention), and think their forces are adequate to prevent a decisive Indian victory in a short conflict. The Indian reports on the 1.22:1 ratio last spring helps support that perspective.

2. I don't think the riposte scenario is gone. It depends on the conflict. If it's a limited Indian incursion (constrained in both size and geography), there will probably be a limited Pakistani conventional response. In a massive, LoC/IB full-blown war, there may still be a limited thrust into Indian territory based on the assumption that having some territory to bargain with at the end of the war (which, again in theory, will be terminated by international intervention) will be useful. So I'm not sure the riposte concept is done yet. Offensive defense is a military concept with a long history. I think Pakistan found it politically useful, in 2002, to appear much less aggressive, but I'm not sure that's an indication of fundamental changes in doctrine or war planning.

3. Nuclear deterrence is also seen as robust, although red lines and other doctrinal issues will still be tinkered with. Nuclear weapons play two roles (again, this is just my interpretation) - first, to impose psychological constraints on India regarding the use of conventional force (traditional deterrence, in the Waltzian sense of raising the potential costs of war) and second, to ensure US intervention at an early stage, even if it's only diplomatic intervention. From that perspective, Parakram confirmed both aspects of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence strategy.

4. The renewed alliance with the US remains a temporary, rather than long-term, phenomenon. Having US troops in country may have helped constrain India in January. But the US clearly did not leap to Pakistan's defense in either January or May-June. Instead, it ordered the evacuation of US citizens from both countries - an indication that the US policy was simply damage control and disaster relief after the conflict.

5. In a perverse way, Parakram confirms the most dangerous assumptions of the Pakistani elites, especially the army. In January 2002, India had an inarguable causus belli for attacking Pakistan, and instead of doing so sat on the border for ten months. Some will see that as evidence of Indian vacillation and weakness.

6. Diplomatic maneuvers, especially skillful tactical ones, buy sufficient time and negotiating space to de-fuze a possible crisis.

Since crises often arise from mutual miscalculation or misunderstanding, comparing Pakistani "lessons" with Indian "lessons" may provide some useful perspectives on the future. If I'm right about any or all of these (especially the last one), it suggests that Pakistani elites may see Parakram as a success, rather than a failure. It may even embolden them in the future, particularly if they believe that diplomatic dexterity is an "easy" solution to crisis, miscalculation, or flawed policy.

Just some thoughts.

Tim

Hari Sud
BRFite
Posts: 182
Joined: 12 Dec 2002 12:31
Location: Toronto, Canada

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Hari Sud » 02 Jan 2004 23:42

In the above discussion we lost to gather information on the removal of the Commander of the II Corps and circumstances which lead to it. Can we get back on this subject.

Thank you

mody
BRFite
Posts: 385
Joined: 18 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: Mumbai, India

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby mody » 02 Jan 2004 23:52

Are there any reports of about how smooth the paki mobilization was and just how many divisions did they mobilize?
Also did they have any major accidents(like our ammo blaze of 80 odd trucks etc) and what was their casualty count for the 10 month period.
Those who are saying the riposte option was no,longer considered/ or considered, are their any reports that bear such things out. I suspect the paki mobilization was purely defensive in nature and the aim was to just try and save their skins and try and inflict maximum losses on india in case we invaded. There were no concrete moves to suggest that TSP planned a counter move in lew of an indian attack. Offourse though I do not have any concrete evidence to back this up.
Also what was level of PAF and PN activity?

Did the PAF undertake a large number of sorties and what areas were they patrolling. IAF sorty rates had really gone up during the period.

Did PN simply try and hide its ships or did the PN venture out into the sea atall. This would show whether the pakis were ready to fight or simply hide under a table and wish we didn't attack or somehow someone like uncle saved them.

Also what was the US response during the period at the bases it occupies in pakiland, like Jacobabad etc. Did they have evacuation plans or not, I'm sure they had them, but were running such drills on a regular bases? This would show what ws going on behind the scenes.

N^3 the recent peace moves by india also kind of lend credence to your theory. It might have been one of the conditions asked for by unkil. Solve the "K" question. Lets see. Would love to believe that your theory is correct, but still have doubts.

NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 16052
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby NRao » 03 Jan 2004 01:18

Interesting.

If nukes were still there I have to wonder if Mush would still be on the seat. With rabid wahabis in PA, he would/should have gone long back. What Tim states is applicable to 2000 or +/- a year or so.

However, narayanan, is there anyway you can confirm that the paint that TSP used is also gone? That would be a clincher. Then and only then could we all sleep :cool:ly.

Mush in Salvar-Kamiz. AT least he has that on.

adrian
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 10
Joined: 20 Dec 2002 12:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby adrian » 04 Jan 2004 10:53

Arun,

I did not see the article on India-Pakistan standoff you reference. I see 4 articles on various other issues. Can you please tell me what I'm doing wrong.

Thanks,

Ravi

Ravi,
Please copy and paste the link below into your web browser to access the document it might take a while to open but ultimately it will .......

irs.org.pk/spotlightEditions/Sp%20June-July%202003.pdf

if that does not work then do this copy and paste "India-Pakistan Standoff" the phrase within the quotes into google and the last response on page 1 should be the document you seek ...its a huge pdf file so I think its better you right click and save it to your hard disk so you can access it faster ......

regds,

Adrian

PS. I still wonder who the generals' good source was who gave out the final locations of Indian corps divs and brigades during Op parakram...

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35041
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 05 Jan 2004 07:46

Originally posted by Tim:

5. In a perverse way, Parakram confirms the most dangerous assumptions of the Pakistani elites, especially the army. In January 2002, India had an inarguable causus belli for attacking Pakistan, and instead of doing so sat on the border for ten months. Some will see that as evidence of Indian vacillation and weakness.
Undoubtedly assumptions of Indian weakness will have been strengthened by this. And I have seen Pakistani refs that speak of both the conventional strength and nuclear strength of Pakistan as having been instrumental in scaring India. IMO There is nothing that needs to be done (or can be done) to counter such Pakistani perceptions. Pakistani perceptions of military superiority and Indian weakness go back along way - starting from the time the Brits declared them "martial races"

The other subect related to this has also been discused on BR on and off - even before Parakram. I will state my view - and I realise others may have other views on this.

India cannot win an all out conventional war with Pakistan, nor can it win a nuclear war. India is, and will continue to be militarily superior to Pakistan but "winning" and "losing" have little to do with military victories on the ground unless tangible long term benefits can be predicted, planned and gained.

In that sense 1971 was "easy" - there was a well formed opposition and a well demarcated nascent nation of Bangladesh.

If Pakistani territory is occupied, there is no point occupying small areas. Huge chunks will have to be occupied and when the Paki army is defeated there will be no government other than the multiple governments of multiple madrasssas of Pakistan. And IMO India occupying forces willhave to ocupy huge chunks of Pakistan for a long long time. I am personally not convinced that the Indian political establishment is ready to do this while they are busy watching their own political backsides - those backsides are dependent on Indian economic resurgence and not on military adventurism. Unlike the US withits deep pockets - these two are mutually exclusive in india. (The are mutually exclusive for Pakistan too - but the martial minds have to figure that out)

Oh yes - I believe that the armed forces were ready to do what was asked of them - including occupation of areas, but I think that if Pakistan continus as it is and India does what it is doing now - it will still be at least 2 decades of developomentand military spending before India can do an Iraq on Pakistan. (my guesstimate)

I have jjst obtained a book on Parakarm and I don;t intend to read it for at least a couple of weeks - and until then I wil believe what I have seen - that Parakram was an exercise for the armed forces and assisted in the Kashmir elections and caused a bit of a flutter. That is about all.

Y. Kanan
BRFite
Posts: 687
Joined: 27 Mar 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 05 Jan 2004 08:57

Originally posted by shiv:
Undoubtedly assumptions of Indian weakness will have been strengthened by this. And I have seen Pakistani refs that speak of both the conventional strength and nuclear strength of Pakistan as having been instrumental in scaring India. IMO There is nothing that needs to be done (or can be done) to counter such Pakistani perceptions. Pakistani perceptions of military superiority and Indian weakness go back along way - starting from the time the Brits declared them "martial races"

The other subect related to this has also been discused on BR on and off - even before Parakram. I will state my view - and I realise others may have other views on this.

India cannot win an all out conventional war with Pakistan, nor can it win a nuclear war. India is, and will continue to be militarily superior to Pakistan but "winning" and "losing" have little to do with military victories on the ground unless tangible long term benefits can be predicted, planned and gained.

In that sense 1971 was "easy" - there was a well formed opposition and a well demarcated nascent nation of Bangladesh.

If Pakistani territory is occupied, there is no point occupying small areas. Huge chunks will have to be occupied and when the Paki army is defeated there will be no government other than the multiple governments of multiple madrasssas of Pakistan. And IMO India occupying forces willhave to ocupy huge chunks of Pakistan for a long long time. I am personally not convinced that the Indian political establishment is ready to do this while they are busy watching their own political backsides - those backsides are dependent on Indian economic resurgence and not on military adventurism. Unlike the US withits deep pockets - these two are mutually exclusive in india. (The are mutually exclusive for Pakistan too - but the martial minds have to figure that out)

Oh yes - I believe that the armed forces were ready to do what was asked of them - including occupation of areas, but I think that if Pakistan continus as it is and India does what it is doing now - it will still be at least 2 decades of developomentand military spending before India can do an Iraq on Pakistan. (my guesstimate)

I have jjst obtained a book on Parakarm and I don;t intend to read it for at least a couple of weeks - and until then I wil believe what I have seen - that Parakram was an exercise for the armed forces and assisted in the Kashmir elections and caused a bit of a flutter. That is about all.
Yes, I agree 100% with the supposition that an Indian invasion/occuption of Pakistan in part or entirety was not feasable and indeed I'll go further and venture that it probably never will be possible for India to do an "Iraq" on Pakistan. This is something I thought about a lot during Op. Parakram. During that time, about the GOI/military leadership I kept wondering "what the **** are they thinking?" --- in the sense that I couldn't fathom what sort of logical war game plan there might be, given the various reasons you outlined above (and also considering the nuclear factor).

This led me to thinking, if India can't do an Iraq on Pakistan, can India do a Serbia instead? :) Seriously, is it possible to draw any conclusions from Op. Parakram about the possibility of Indian air & naval power playing the dominant warfighting role?

Since invading them is impossible, impractical, infeasible, or just plain stupid ... does it make any sense to just bomb the **** of Pakistan and starve them with a blockade instead? Or would that be pointless? I have this vision of an isolated, bombed-out, half-starved Pakistan, cordoned off from India by minefields, barbed wire, anti-personell radars, and trigger happy Indian troopers. I picture a strategy that combines Yugoslavia 1999 and the Iraq containment of 1991-2003. Does this make any sense or am I just rambling?

Did Op. Parakram tell us anything about our ability to carry out that kind of war? Are our air and naval capabilities sufficient for this or are we still an old-fashioned army-centric force that can only inflict serious damage by flinging hordes of infantry, tanks, and artillery at the other side? Do air and naval forces comprise a large proportion of our combat power, or are they still minor players compared to the army?

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35041
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 05 Jan 2004 20:13

Originally posted by Y. Kanan:

Since invading them is impossible, impractical, infeasible, or just plain stupid ... does it make any sense to just bomb the **** of Pakistan and starve them with a blockade instead? Or would that be pointless? I have this vision of an isolated, bombed-out, half-starved Pakistan, cordoned off from India by minefields, barbed wire, anti-personell radars, and trigger happy Indian troopers. I picture a strategy that combines Yugoslavia 1999 and the Iraq containment of 1991-2003. Does this make any sense or am I just rambling?
:rotfl: The idea is good - but you really must get onto the Lancer books site and order Jasjit Singh's "Air Power". Lots of answers there. I personally think your idea is being implemented - but not the way you state it.

Every analysis of "strategic bombing" in ANY era has shown that it has not worked. Yugoslavia was a small, landlocked exception. Iraq had 10 years of sanctions.

Pakistan is self sufficient in food and a lot of other stuff. An oil blockade would give me great joy, but I think that is politically (and physically) not feasible.

IMO The way to starve Pakistan is to ensure that it consistently gets less than it needs of as much of the strategically important stuff that will help it to survive as an economy. Chip away etc. But that is deviating from the Parakram discussion.

More to the point - I think India is actually doing some serious things to Pakistan at a strategic level - but I may have to sound like a philosopher to say what and also end up with a lo-oong post.

What is our problem with Pakistan?

Have we attacked Pakistan? Is it our intention to captuer Pakistan? It is our intention to subjugate all Muslims and make them low-caste servants?

NO. Not at all.

1947 - Pakistan attacked Kashmir, took 1/3rd. Issue went to UN. UN resolution is now dead and I will say more about this below.

1965 - Pakistan launches Operation "Gibralter" (sic) followed by Operation Grand slam. Objective - Srinagar (I have cites) That fails. Pak plan fails

1971 - No need to say what happened - Pakis really angry.

1999: Salami slicing of Kashmir attempted. Pakistan backs out. Status quo restorted. Pakistan plan fails

1989 till date: Pakistan infiltrates terrorists into India for acts of sabotage and to "bleed India by a thousand cuts" But India has not bled dry. Pakistan has not stopped either.

Every Indian effort and statement nowadays is aimed at stopping this. Parakram was probably part of this. Parakram. like very other effort to stop infiltration and terrorism has failed to do that. If the lesson that Pakistan learned from Parakram was that India will not make war or not win war, or that deterrence is good. those conclusions may be right. or they may not be right.

But over a longterm Pakistani leaders are going to have to learn that India has no intention of solving its problems with Pakistan soon or in a quick war that leaves India bloodied but not victorious. India will play to its strengths. Pakistan is going to find that there will be NO progress with Kashmir, and no progress with UN resolutions, no progress even with US "mediation", OIC mediation or even Martian mediation. No progess from Pakistan's viewpoint that is. India loses no more than it has lost for 56 years by just hanging in there and allowing Pakistan to savor its 2001-2002 "victory" like the victories of 1949, 1965, and 1999.

Operation Parkram was one little act in a saga that India has been working on for 56 years. To be sure, Pakistan has been working on the same sags for 56 years.

A short read though history - or even my post above will show who wanted to do what, and whose aims have been achievced in 56 years.

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35041
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 06 Jan 2004 13:55

Another take from me - resumed 6 hour after spilling entire cup of coffee on my keyboad this morning shortly after typing half the post below :) Seriously, is it possible to draw any conclusions from Op. Parakram about the possibility of Indian air & naval power playing the dominant warfighting role?

Did Op. Parakram tell us anything about our ability to carry out that kind of war? Are our air and naval capabilities sufficient for this or are we still an old-fashioned army-centric force that can only inflict serious damage by flinging hordes of infantry, tanks, and artillery at the other side? Do air and naval forces comprise a large proportion of our combat power, or are they still minor players compared to the army?[/b][/quote]The more I read about history and warfare, the more I begin to see that expressions like " an old-fashioned army-centric force " can variably carry a lot of meaning, some meaning, or no meaning at all depending on the situation and the adversaries in question.

Most wars in history have been won by land forces even after revolutions in naval and air power, and land forces are essential to war winning.

Air Superiority is essential to winning wars, but the existence of air superiority per se does not guarantee victory.

Naval power is more about force projection, and is arguably as important or even more important than air power in winning wars.

Air and naval superiority alone have no (or a negligible) precedent of winning wars in the total absence of land action. Land forces have won wars in the absence of air and naval superiority.

Warfighting and winning/losing are done on a grand strategic scale by leaders of nations, on a smaller theater scale by Generals, and on a tactical scale by smaller armed forces units and on a battlefield scale by those on the ground.

Vietnam and Somalia meant total naval and air superiority for the US, but the US pulled out because Vietnamese strategy (and for the matter the disorganised Somali "strategy") of allowing thousands odf their own to die while continuing to fight and inflict a few unacceptable casualties caused the US to pull out.

It was British Naval force projection ability vs Argentinian inability to deny the sea to the Brits that allowed the Brits to put men on the ground in the Falklands. Once on the ground, the air forces and navies of both nations were unable to play a major role. The Birtish land forces won.

It has been said that Pakistan can fight all out war for two weeks with India and that India can fight for one month (or maybe 6 weeks)

Anything that happens in an India Pakistan war must happen within this timescale in an "all out war".

I am sure the Indian Navy can blockade Pakistan for a month, but that is not long enough.

I think the IAF would NOT be able to inflict a "Gulf war 1990" degree of damage on Pakistan in one month, although I think it could do some serious damage. Ultimately, air power has historically been most effective in battles of mobility - such as when India forces are rapidlly pushing deep into Pakistan, or if Pakistani forces push into India. In "static battles" - air power does not have much of a decisive role - as was seen in the 8 year Iran-Iraq war, (or WW1)

All that I have written above is known to militaries - and certaily to the Indian military - because some of the stuff has been sourced from Indian authors - mainly Jasjit Singh.

Ultimately Operation Parakram involved sea, air AND land force mobilization that suggested a strategy to occupy areas of Pakistan within the known constraints that I have mentioned above. Obviously that threat has not gone away. As long as a force disparity exists between India and Pakistan, that disparity can be utilized by India to continuously place Pakistan under threat of unspecified action. For that reason Pakistan has to continuously maintain a deterrent. Some Pakistanis may feel that their nuclear deterrent (provided they are not nook nood - as Pervez Hoodbhoy is said to have told someone) is enough, some have said that the conventional "near parity" worked in Op Parakram.

As long as Pakistan seeks to oppose India by military force, it will have to spend enough on its defence forces to deter India. The "nuclear deterrent" of Pakistan assumes that the "wicked Hindoo" is a rational being. I would not expect many Pakistani generals to attribute "rationality" to the likes of Bal Thackeray, or Togadia or even Advani. So there will always be a worry that nukes or no nukes - some Indian madman will attack Pakistan .

If Pakistan spends less on defence, it then puts itself at a disadvantageous position the next time some Indian leader starts a Parakram like move or even a Brass Tacks like exercise.

Pakistan HAS to keep up with India in defence expenditure. Or it must sue for peace. And India - as the bigger nation with greater resources, and now a better economy has the advantage of being able to ratchet up belligererence to a level that puts Pakistan under threat so that they have to decide exactly what they are going to do - H&D or no H&D.

Let us see what that mad jehadis do.

amarnath
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 29
Joined: 02 Apr 2001 11:31
Location: CBE,TN,IN

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby amarnath » 06 Jan 2004 15:58

Shiv may be you are forgetting N^3 "theory" of nuke-nude pureland?

Y. Kanan
BRFite
Posts: 687
Joined: 27 Mar 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y. Kanan » 08 Jan 2004 22:58

Originally posted by shiv:
It has been said that Pakistan can fight all out war for two weeks with India and that India can fight for one month (or maybe 6 weeks)

Anything that happens in an India Pakistan war must happen within this timescale in an "all out war".

I am sure the Indian Navy can blockade Pakistan for a month, but that is not long enough.

I think the IAF would NOT be able to inflict a "Gulf war 1990" degree of damage on Pakistan in one month, although I think it could do some serious damage. Ultimately, air power has historically been most effective in battles of mobility - such as when India forces are rapidlly pushing deep into Pakistan, or if Pakistani forces push into India. In "static battles" - air power does not have much of a decisive role - as was seen in the 8 year Iran-Iraq war, (or WW1)

All that I have written above is known to militaries - and certaily to the Indian military - because some of the stuff has been sourced from Indian authors - mainly Jasjit Singh.

Ultimately Operation Parakram involved sea, air AND land force mobilization that suggested a strategy to occupy areas of Pakistan within the known constraints that I have mentioned above.
This all makes good sense, and indeed you're right that India's posture during Parakram did seem to indicate a lack of confidence in the ability of our air power to inflict real damage on the enemy. In other words our air-to-ground fighters are basically just airborne artillery, relying on dumb bombs, rocket pods, and guns to do 99% of the work. This sounds about right, considering that nighttime, high-altitude, precision strike capability is absent from all but a handful of our attack planes.

I have to insist this is a very old-fashioned and unneccesarily expensive (in $$ and lives) way of doing business. I know, I know, air power doesn't win wars. We've all heard it umpteen times. Just ask tough old war relics like Colonel David Hackworth and Amarinder Singh. But I think that old wisdom is outdated and obsolete. Times change. Witness every conventional war fought by the US, UK, and France since 1991 and tell me that air power doesn't win wars. Like hell it doesn't. Air power inflicted most of the casualties & damage in all these conflicts. Yes the US/UK ground forces move in and fight the remaining opposition, then occupy enemy territory, after the air power has done its work but that doesn't mean they deserve credit for "winning the war".

We're seeing a trend towards standoff, all-weather, precision strike capabilities in the IAF but I wish the planners gave it more emphasis. It seems there is still a decidedly old-fashioned mindset governing our military aquisitions. Geriatric politicans and geriatric generals. :)

Rudra
BRFite
Posts: 599
Joined: 28 May 2001 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Rudra » 08 Jan 2004 23:13

P has a strong set of well planned defence lines
in vital areas, and the roads/rail parallel to front all along the Indus give them quick mobility
from cantonments and depots located say 100-200km
behind the lines.

which is why it is necessary build up resources to
severely attack this 'communication zone' to prevent re-inforcement and relief of selected areas chosen for breakthrough moves.

IAFs strike ability upg is well underway with Jag
and -27 upgrades.

the missing link is a full airborne division styled along the 101st airborne and equipped with considerable number of Mi17, Dhruvs and LCH to carry out one or two very strong , deep multi brigade attacks into this 'communication zone' - in enough strength to hold for 3-4 days until armour spearheads reach them.

we already have 5-6 para cdo batallions and a
para brigade (which I assume is separate from the SF units). Need 3-4 more brigades and a economy of scale in transport helicopter production (Mi17 sized).

PA will absolutely panic if faced with a 2xstrike corps in front + 2 airborne brigades to bite them in the rear. A rapid collapse and envelopment, ending in the Indus will be easy to threaten once we have a credible formation.

can also be deployed for colonial wars in CHT and
expeditions further afield.

Y I Patel
BRFite
Posts: 506
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Y I Patel » 09 Jan 2004 01:59

I am sorry at not having participated in this thread, but I did download the article on Op Parakram by the Paki LtGen. The appendices have a goldmine of information on operational deployments; one thing that jumped out is that the Pakis did not seem to know where one entire division (21 inf Div) was located

The deployments indicate that there were two strike corps milling around in Bikaner area, with 2 strike corps more forward deployed, and elements of 1 strike corps held farther back in reserve. 1 strike corps was later augmented in the same area, and 21 strike corps also moved into the same area around June 01. So there was this awesome fist of 3 strike corps in the same area, though not as forward deployed as many newspaper reports conveyed. Two of them were actually fairly far behind the forward concentration areas. The real forward deployment on IB was by the holding corps plus, to some extent, elements of 2 strike corps. The distances covered by some formations are mind boggling, especially considering the speed at which the deployment occurred. The Paki Gen alludes to how much they must have been caught by surprise by the speed of deployment, although he couches it in spin. In operational terms, this must have been one heck of a learning experience, and we are undoubtedly seeing the psy impact of that deployment in the current peace moves by the bandicoot.

And all this without considering the impact of IAF deployment which happened in days.

War of a thousand threats was backed by an extremely credible brandished fist.

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35041
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 09 Jan 2004 05:45

Originally posted by Y. Kanan:

Witness every conventional war fought by the US, UK, and France since 1991 and tell me that air power doesn't win wars. Like hell it doesn't. Air power inflicted most of the casualties & damage in all these conflicts. Yes the US/UK ground forces move in and fight the remaining opposition, then occupy enemy territory, after the air power has done its work but that doesn't mean they deserve credit for "winning the war".
Geriatric politicans and geriatric generals. :)
Strong words but not necessarlily based on real information. I really think you must read some serious references regarding air warfare before making judgements based on what the media say. Air power wins wars under some very specific circumstances - that is when air power is applied at the right place and the right time. The statement is easy to make but does not speak of the specific inputs required.

In all wars, pre- or post 1991, aircraft losses have been very high and effectiveness very low for the losing side.

The main reason has been the application of both stealth and EW (ECM, ECCM) in an initial role of air defence suppression. Ground-Air defences have taken the highest toll of attacking aircraft. Once the air defences are suppressed attacking aircraft have a free run. Typically attacking aircraft have had the totally unacceptable attrition rate of about 4% which tapers off provided defences are suppressed. No air force can withstand 4% losses for more than a few days. Defence suppression requires AWACS/UAVs in addition to PGMs. IOW money AND Technology. All air wars have been won because of initial air defence suppression followed by free access to attacking aircraft to do what they want.

ECM/ECCM/EW capabilities are far from state of the art in India (and the IAF) not becuse of geriatric generals but incompetent civilians like you and me who are unable to deliver the required degree of sophistication in hardware and software, but we are good at pointing fingers. Sorry if I sound harsh - but that is as much of the truth as anything else.

The highest tech is not made in India and is basically sanctioned so we have to beg and grovel to acquire ONE AWACS. Not that China is much better off - but if we are going to be self flagellating and critical we might as well deal in facts rather than mythology.

Anoop
BRFite
Posts: 310
Joined: 16 May 2002 11:31

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Anoop » 09 Jan 2004 06:58

YIP,
Good to see you back. Why did you mention 21 Inf Div? Was there any report that it was mobilized for Op. Parakram? As far I've read, it's an AHQ reserve, but was deployed for CI in Assam as of Dec. 2002. Is it possible that it was deinducted so quickly from Op. Parakram (Oct. 2002) and resumed CI duties on the Eastern border? Isn't it possible that it was never mobilized for Op. Parakram?

On going over the Appendix in the Paki report, there is no mention of newly raised 41 (?) Arty Division. Wasn't it raised well before Op. Parakram to be more than a paper formation by then?

ehsmang
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 54
Joined: 12 Nov 1999 12:31
Location: ndelhi
Contact:

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby ehsmang » 09 Jan 2004 07:39

There is an interview with Gen Roychowdhry in the latest issue of FORCE wherein he says that 'Op Parakram compromised the IA capability ......'

shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 35041
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby shiv » 09 Jan 2004 07:52

Originally posted by ehsmang:
There is an interview with Gen Roychowdhry in the latest issue of FORCE wherein he says that 'Op Parakram compromised the IA capability ......'
Any idea why he says that? That would be enlightening for this thread.

Mohan Raju
BRFite
Posts: 217
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Operation Parakram: An Analysis

Postby Mohan Raju » 09 Jan 2004 09:54

YIP,

Good to see you back.

Originally posted by Y I Patel:

...the Pakis did not seem to know where one entire division (21 inf Div) was located.

It was actually more serious than that, wasn't it? IIRC, the Packees lost track of a whole Strike Corps (the one commanded by LtGen Kapil Vij), not just a Division. Under cover of darkness one night in June or so, KV maneuvered his formation in such a way that the Packs didn't have a clue where it was (and neither, it seems, did the Americans). Everyone was in a panic thinking that the cunning Yindoo bania devils had sent the strike corps across the border at night. The next morning, everyone discovered that it was still 'this side' of the border, but just barely :D . Much laundering of soiled underwear took place in I'bad that day. :rotfl:

Wasn't that the cause of the diplomatic flap and the reason Kapil Vij was transferred out of theatre? The incident was extensively discussed here on BR.


Return to “Military Exercises Archive”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest