Cold Start: An analysis

Calvin
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Cold Start: An Analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 03:49

Gentlemen: I'm sure we have discussed this previously, but given its apparent centrality in our efforts it appears that we may wish to analyze this further. If this is an ongoing discussion elsewhere in the forum, please direct me to it.

http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper991.html

Introductory Observations: India unveiled officially its new war doctrine on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commander’s Conference that took place last week. Obviously, the need for a new war doctrine was decades-long overdue, but it seems that the lessons of the Kargil War reinforced by the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army in the run-up to and during Operation PRAKARAM in 2001-2002 hastened the Indian military hierarchy towards this end.

General Padmanabhan the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation PRAKARAM had initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine and the fruitation now seems to have taken place after a series of major joint exercises between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force including massive live fire power demonstrations.

It seems that the new Cold War Strategy would now be discussed at various levels of three Services and fine tuned. Needless to say that in any future conflict scenario where a “blitzkrieg” type strategy is going to be followed; joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy would be an imperative.

Security requirements did not permit the spelling out of adequate details of the “Cold Start Strategy” by the Chief of Army Staff. However, it is not difficult to visualize what this new war doctrine conceptually incorporates as it is said to revolve around the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.

Such strategy did exist in NATO and was being taught at the Royal British Army Staff College. Camberley, UK which the author attended in 1971. In NATO terminology, “integrated” groups for offensive operations existed at three levels. The highest was “ combat group” and “combat command” based on a divisional or brigade Headquarters (armoured/infantry mechanised) under which were a flexible number of “battle groups” (based on an armoured regiment/mechanized infantry battalion Headquarters) and the lowest was the “combat team” (based on an armoured squadron/mechanized infantry company Headquarters). The groupings at the each level were task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force besides close support of ground attack Air Force squadrons. Also, was integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters. Command and control helicopters were available too.

Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”. For the purposes of this strategic review the eight “integrated battle groups” being talked about will be taken to mean eight integrated armoured division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. This would be a fair assumption to be made for our discussion in case the intended aim of this new war doctrine is to be achieved.

The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play, the responses of the enemy to such a new war doctrine and a host of other associated considerations.

“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Strategic Conceptual Underpinnings: In the absence of more details, and rightfully not spelt out due to security reasons, the strategic conceptual underpinnings of India’s new war doctrine can be envisaged as under:

* Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed. The distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished.

* The offensive military power available with defensive corps in the form of independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, by virtue of their forward locations would no longer remain idle waiting to launch counterattacks. They would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours.

* Strike Corps may be re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets.

* Obviously, then, India’s strike corps elements will have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. It also means that Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last three wars. The Strike Corps remained unutilised.

On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:

* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.

* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.

* The above also gives time to Pakistan’s external patrons like USA and China to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.

* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.

* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ‘ab-initio’ and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.

Cold Start Strategy” is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.

India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India’s political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The “ Cold Start Strategy” can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.

“Cold Start Strategy”- The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come into Play: Such an offensive strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has:

* Political will to use offensive military power.

* Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies.

* Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity.

* Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures.

* Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.

If the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to 2004, Indian Army’s new war doctrine would not add up to anything. For more detailed views on this subject, see the authors recent book: “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis” (reviewed on SAAG website as “Igniting Strategic Mindsets in Indians:; SAAG paper no. 657 dated 09-04-2003)

India’s National Military Directives Need Change: Indian Governments, irrespective of political hues have shied away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. However, what can be called as a sort of national military directive, which the Indian Army under political compulsions stands fixated is “No Loss of Territory, Not Even an Inch”. Heads have rolled in the Army on this account in past wars.

“Cold Start Strategy” with its inherent character of mobile warfare using mechanized military formations, and especially where defensive formations may be called upon to undertake such operations, may at times involve some loss of territory in plains warfare.

If the above is not acceptable then strategically and militarily the status quo needs to be maintained with Indian Army fixated on linear defences. This author had argued against this as early as 1985 in an article “India’s Linear Fixations” in the Combat Journal of what is now called the Army War College.

India’s Strategic Military Objectives Needs to be Made Clear: India’s strategic military objectives need to:

* Shift from capturing bits of Pakistan territory in small scale multiple offensives to be used as bargaining chips after the cease fire.

* Focus on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine without much collateral damage to Pakistani civilians.

All the three armed forces have to synergise operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army as it is that which enslaves Pakistan, impedes democracy in Pakistan and indulges in military adventurism against India, including proxy wars and terrorism.

It is for nothing that the Pakistani military rulers and the Pakistani Army have hid from the Pakistani nation the causes of their military failure against India in 1971, 1999 (Kargil) and a catastrophic defeat in January 2002 if India’s political leadership had not restrained the Indian Army during Operation Prakaram. “Cold Start Strategy” should therefore be aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s military machine. India’s Army Commanders can infer what this implies.

“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Imperatives of Dedicated Air Force Close Air Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons: The Indian Air Force (IAF) would have a very crucial and critical role to play in the successful implementation of this new war doctrine. The “Cold Start” eight or so “battle groups” cannot undertake “blitzkrieg” type military operations without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air support.

The IAF would therefore have to proportionately assign its combat assets to cater for the following:

* Achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyse the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”.

* Dedicate a fair portion of its combat assets for the air defence of the Indian homeland.

* Earmark dedicated close air support and ground attack squadrons in direct support of the “battle groups”.

The IAF would be hard pressed to execute the tasks from within its existing combat assets. Earlier, the IAF could initially allocate all its combat assets to achieve air superiority as any operations by “strike corps” would hope to subsequently follow.

In the new war doctrine scenario all these tasks would have to be concurrent. It was such a visualization that made this author in his strategic papers (“ India’s Strategic and Security 2004 Imperatives”: SAAG Paper no 884 dated 06.01.2004) reiterate that the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons. India has the financial resources to afford them. In any case even disconnecting from the new war doctrine requirements the IAF needs 70 combat squadrons in the context of India’s revised strategic frontiers discussed in an earlier paper of this author.

Indian Navy Aviation Support for “Battle Groups”: Besides its traditional tasks of sea control, naval blockades etc. the naval aviation support for the “battle groups” operations is a welcome step in filling some of the voids of IAF combat assets besides dividing the enemy’s aerial combat strength.

The Indian Navy, more importantly should concurrently be focusing in the new war doctrine scenario on amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.

India Will Have to Use Conventional Short Range Battle Field Missiles (SRBM) and Cruise Missiles: The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.

Use of SRBMs and cruise missiles will not only help in softening enemy’s ‘Vulnerable Areas’ and ‘Vulnerable Points’ but also thicken fire support assisting “battle groups” operations. These assets would more increasingly be required in support of “battle groups” operations in case of bad weather when IAF combat power cannot be applied.

Associated with this would be India’s imperatives to accelerate her ICBM development and production which is India’s sovereign right. “Cold Start” war doctrine without ICBM back up would be susceptible to external pressures.

Inventories of these weapons have to be significantly expanded and the time is now to jump-start India’s defence production apparatus to this end.

Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Expansion and Employment in New War Doctrine: The successful implementation of the new war doctrine for force multiplication effect, for reinforcing the offensive punch and for exploitation of fleeting apparatus in fast paced military operations would call for sizeable employment of :

* Special Forces

* Air Assault Divisions.

* Air Cavalry brigades.

* Light infantry divisions with air-transportable combat power.

In the ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine scenario widespread use of the above forces including the capture and holding of airheads behind enemy lines would confuse the enemy, divide his reaction and counterattacks and spread panic. The Indian Army’s capabilities in this direction are limited and need to be comprehensive enhanced.

Logistic Support For Cold War Doctrine: Such operations which can be expected to be swift, fluid and rapidly changing directions of attack cannot rest for logistic requirements on Indian Army’s conventional logistic support which is ground based and wheel-based and incapable of swift cross country mobility.

Indian Army’s own aviation assets and heavier utility helicopters of the IAF would need significant mustering for logistic support of “Cold Start” battle group.

India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and military hardware spares along with “War Wastage Reserves” will have to be maintained at full levels at all times to enable “Cold Start” war doctrines to take off. Without these at full levels ‘Cold Start’ operations may end up as cold start.

Pakistan’s Responses to India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine Enunciation: India’s ‘ Cold Start’ war doctrine stands discussed in a recent Corps Commanders Conference of the Pakistan Army, and even amongst their strategic experts. Curiously, the discussions of the latter seem diverted to Pakistan’s special relationship with USA post 9/11 and there appears to be an implied assurance that the “special Pakistan-USA military relationship” would take care of the challenges posed to Pakistan by India’s new war doctrine. Pakistani strategic analysts view the enunciation of India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine as :

* Putting pressure on Pakistan prior to peace talks.

* The growing Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus is also curiously drawn in as an Indian concern requiring new war doctrines.

Surprisingly, no major military analysis has emerged so far Probably, it would take time to digest and come up with responses.

Pakistan’s Military Challenges Arising From India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine: Strategically and militarily, it can be visualized that Pakistan would be faced with a number of military challenges arising from India’s new war doctrine, namely:

* India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle group would be launched.

* Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in numbers and quality of numerical strength.

* Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence.

* Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.

* When and how does Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play.

* How to offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support.

* How to counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear.

Pakistan cannot combat the Indian challenges by the oft-repeated bravado statement that “One Pakistan Soldier is equal to ten Indian Soldiers” leading to strategic wags countering “what happens when the Eleventh Indian Soldier emerges”.

If the “Cold Start” doctrine is applied in its purist form, then in terms of military operations it does not become a game of military numbers but a game in terms of military technological superiority in terms of weapon systems, firepower and aerial combat assets besides the force multiplication effects of the Indian Navy.

Pakistan would have to divert sizeable financial resources for its weapon systems build-up to counter this doctrine. Of course, it can look to its external strategic patrons like USA and China for assistance and military largesse, but there is a limit here.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent and the Myth of Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold: The Indian political leadership and its national security establishment fed on US academia planted stories (probably officially inspired) of Pakistan nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold have been inordinately awed by its fearful consequences.

Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:

* Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.

* India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.

* The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.

* Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.

* Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.

* Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.

When the obvious intention of India’s new war doctrine is not to cross the nuclear threshold, and it seems declaratory in content, then a higher responsibility rests on Pakistan’s external strategic patrons that their wayward protégé does not charge foolishly and blindly into the realms where even fools or the devil do not dare.

Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold has crucial implications for USA and China too. In fact a USA-China conflict can be generated which may have its own nuclear overtones. Therefore it is incumbent on both USA and China to strategically declare that they would not countenance any Pakistani first nuclear strike against India i.e. crossing the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan proclivities to threaten nuclearisation of an Indo-Pakistan conventional conflict is more of a blackmail to force USA and China’s intervention. And if sincerely both USA and China are interested in South Asian peace and global security then Pakistan’s nuclear proclivities have to be pre-empted now with a strategic declaration against Pakistan as above.

India, in any case, has to be prepared militarily, eitherway, notwithstanding any such caution that may be imposed on Pakistan.

Concluding Observations: From the Indian perspective, enunciation of a new war doctrine was long overdue and it is significant for the following reasons:

* India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilization of India and proxy war and terrorism

* India moves away from its defensive mindset of last 50 year plus.

* India will now prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the out set.

* India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold

The Indian Army, despite any limitations in its hierarchy of not being forceful to make the political leadership in the last 50 years plus to adopt strategies which are strategically desirable but may be politically distasteful, has done well this time to bring India’s war doctrine in public debate. The vast majority of the Indian public will be in support of any war doctrine that puts Pakistan into place and forces it to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India.

From the Pakistani perspective the following needs to be recognized with the enunciation of India’s new war doctrine:

* India will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan without giving Pakistan time to bring diplomatic leverages into play against India.

* India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.

The United States and China have not come out with any response so far. Nor should they since national security interests of India need to be respected, as those of a responsible, politically stable and a mature regional power which has exercised restraint even to the extent of being ridiculed for its restraint.

Since a nuclear conflict initiated by Pakistan has global overtones and has the potential to bring them to conflict with each other, both the United States and China need to strategically declare that they will not countenance Pakistan, initiating a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Alternatively both USA and China, as Permanent Members of the UN Securing Council initiate steps jointly, to bring Pakistan’s (failed state WMD proliferator) nuclear assets under international control to be released only in the event of a nuclear threat.

Lastly, it needs to be reiterated that India may never have to put into effect its new “Cold Start” war doctrine if the United States and China restrain their wayward military protégé i.e. Pakistan from military adventurism and military brinkmanship. Also if United States and China wish to add value to their relationships with India, they need to desist from equating India with Pakistan when it comes to the prospects of the nuclear conflict in South Asia. India’s strategic maturity is not in doubt; it is Pakistan’s strategic maturity, which is in doubt. A nuclear conflict will take place in South Asia, only if the United States wants it and lets Pakistan permissively cross the nuclear threshold.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)

http://www.saag.org/papers11/paper1013.html
Indian Army’s above named war doctrine stood reviewed in the earlier paper of this author( SAAG Paper No991. dated 04,05,2004 entitled: India’s New "Cold Start" War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed)

Some additional imperatives, which have a significant bearing on the operationalisation of the new war doctrine, are listed below.

It has already been noted in the earlier Paper that this new ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine is Pakistan specific. Hence the imperatives discussed below need to be viewed in that context.

Re-location of Armoured Divisions, Armoured Brigades and Strike Formations Headquarters:

Since the most significant aim of the new war doctrine is to strike offensively without giving away battle indicators of mobilization, it is imperative that all strike formations headquarters, Armoured Divisions and Armoured Brigades are re-located from their existing locations in Central India and in depth in Punjab to forward locations.

All such formations should be moved forward to the general line of Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-Suratgarh from their present locations in the interior.

It can be envisaged that armoured formations would be loathe to move forward from their cushy cantonments on the plea that an adequate infrastructure should first come up. If infantry formations have existed in field area conditions for decades, there is no reason why armoured formations cannot similarly exist.

In this connection, the author would like to observe based on his exposures to NATO armies and United States forward deployments in Okinawa and Korea that no Army wastes so much money on building huge garages etc for their tanks. Field coverings of tanks etc should suffice.

Since conflicts in South Asia can erupt without long drawn out battle indicators, it is necessary that armoured formations are moved to the general line suggested above, and infrastructure creation can follow.

Higher Commanders Mental Robustness and Military Audacity:

Military operations of the type envisaged in Indian Army’s new war doctrine incorporates swift, fluid and relentless offensive operations, without the luxury of pauses and time duration spans of defensive operations to which Indian Army’s higher echelons are so conditioned to today.

Such swift and mobile fast-paced operations present the challenges of rapidly changing tactical situations and fleeting opportunities. The exploitation of these demands a high order of mental resilience and an eagle eye for reading such rapidly changing battle situations.

Military audacity does not come overnight. It has to be cultivated over a long period of time. If the German Panzer generals like Rommel and Guderian had been brought up in defensive mindsets of the Indian Army and the Indian political leadership, the blitzkreig’ lightening operations with which they covered themselves with glory would not have come their way.

Military orthodoxy in the Indian Army must give way to military audacity and offensive spirit, and the Indian Army higher commanders should ensure that it becomes the hallmark of junior leaders too..

C4I-(Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Networks) Need Upgradation and Fine Tuning:

Mechanized offensive operations by joint Army and Air Force cooperation require a highly upgraded and fine tuned C4I network. Since line communications become redundant in such a war doctrine, so envisaged, the command and control of such mechanized operations where fresh orders have to be passed every other minute, there will be a generation of high density traffic on C4I networks.

The Indian Army would have to create an extensive C4I network which can handle high density traffic on the move, which is secure, having scrambling and unscrambling features including digital voice fax and telex encryption capabilities.

Alternative and duplicate means will also have to be provided due to disruptions and destruction by enemy action.

Indian Air Force (IAF) Planning and Concept of Operations:

The Indian Air Force may have a marked superiority over the Pakistan Air Force in terms of sophisticated combat aircraft and advanced training,but this is not enough by itself.

The entire Indian Air Force planning will have to undergo a significant re-orientation in terms of concept of operations.

The following points need to be noted:

* New war doctrine of the Indian Army would call for more massed air operations as against compartmentalized sorties and small scale air operations in vogue so far.

* IAF should be able to generate very high sortie rates round the clock with effective maintenance support.

* Advanced C4I systems and use of AWACS system is a must. Indian Defence Ministry needs to speed up AWACS acquisition. In the interim explore for a lease; it may not be a problem.

* PGMs (Precision guided munitions) would be used extensively in such operations. Extensive stocks should be built up from now.

* Systems to paralyse and jam enemy radar and air defence networks would be a high priority.

The aim of the IAF in support of the Indian Army’s new war doctrine should be to combine mass with technology and PGMs and advanced munitions to paralyse the enemy’s reaction and destroy his war waging materiel and potential.

Air Defence Networks and Systems:

A sizeable expansion of India’s air-defence network would be required with multi-layered air defence in terms of surveillance, range capabilities and engagement ranges. This would need to be backed by an effective C4I system integral to the air defence system.

Mobile air defence weapon systems for the strike formations, combat area air defence networks, rear areas air defence networks for VAs and VPs and of all air bases calls for significant investments.

It must be remembered that an effective air defence system for IAF bases would enable release of that many combat aircraft on air defence duties to support combat operations. India’s air defence planning should now also incorporate ballistic missile defense systems as the enemy has a vast array of ballistic missiles. Here one is not talking of the NMD or TMD level of ballistic missile defences but of the US PATRIOT or the Russian S-300 systems.

The fourth generation of S-300 that is S-300PMU-1 system entered in service in 1995. In the Russian arsenal, a battery of this system includes 48 48N6 missiles mounted on 12-transport-erector-launchers. The missiles have a range of 5-150km and a maximum altitude of 27km.All of this supported by a highly sophisticated C4I battle management system including engagement radars. It is named as ALMUZ 83 M6

India was considering acquisition of these mobile systems but the “considering” has now to be translated into 'fast track' acquisition.

Integration with Nuclear Warfare Plans Both Defensive and Offensive:

Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is very low and its nuclear doctrine does not believe in “No First Use.” Secondly, Pakistan’s nuclear triggers are in the hands of Pakistan Army known for its jingoism and military adventurism. India’s new war doctrine has to take into account that in the execution of its “Cold Start” War Doctrine and if lightening success comes their way, Pakistan could use its nuclear weapons or even the tactical nuclear weapons it claims to have. Reports suggest a few in original have been passed by China to Pakistan and these could come into play.

India’s execution of its new war doctrine must be integrated with nuclear warfare plans both defensive and offensive. And by defensive it is meant that Pakistani goes in for in first strike and by offensive it is meant the scenario in which India resorts to “second strike” in response. In both cases strike formations of Indian Army will have to operate on a nuclear battlefield.

NBC Proofing of Tanks/APCs, Provision of NBC Combat Suits for Personnel and Systems Within Strike Formations:

As a corollary of the above it follows that on first priority , Indian Army’s strike formations to be used in the new war doctrine are well equipped for battlefield combat under NBC conditions. It means that all tanks and APCs, command and control tanks, and allied vehicles, all have NBC sealing kits and that strike formations are equipped with de-contamination vehicles and kits and that all personnel are equipped with NBC suits to under take battle operations in NBC scenario. .

Sadly, it has to be noted that even today every Indian Army soldier combating Pakistan’s proxy war has not been equipped with bulletproof vests. What a poor contrast to the politicians sporting bullet proof vests and moving in bullet proof cars in New Delhi, while soldiers facing enemy bullets have not been so equipped due to bureaucratic lethargy.

Hopefully the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy and the Defense Minister would recognize the imperatives of equipping India’s strike formation with NBC combat suits.

Imperatives of Digitalised Real Time Information and Satellite Coverage:

India’s intelligence penetration of the Pakistan Army even in terms of human intelligence is not satisfactory. This limitation has to be off-set by technical means encompassing high attitude surveillance aircraft and satellite imagery with high resolution.

More importantly, such technical means should be geared to provide real time digitalized information to strike force commanders, with special reference to movements of enemy’s reserve formations. The Indian Army has to devise and acquire systems for such capabilities.

Indian Army’s Electronic Welfare (EW) Capabilities Enhancement:

Fortunately, the Indian Army has been focusing on this aspect from the 1980s, but the demands of the new war doctrine call for an effective enhancement of existing EW capabilities.

India’s EW capabilities must cater for jamming and neutralizing of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control systems, air-defense and surveillance system jamming and a complete paralysis of Pakistani C4I system in the battlefield area of India’s strike formations.

India’s technological capability in electronics and allied systems and Information Technology should enable it to use cyber-warfare as a force multiplier.

India’s ICBM and SLBM Development: India’s new doctrine would be unable to to generate its full potential without an ICBM and SLBM back-up. Both in the Congress regimes and in the BJP regime, external pressures have impeded their development. A national will is now required for a “Fast track ’’materialisation of these missiles in India’s missile arsenal.

Concluding Observations:

The Indian Army needs to make an exhaustive study of United States military operations in Gulf War I and Gulf War II. The Chinese have painstakingly gone through every detail of US military operations to draw the relevant lessons.

It would be wrong to surmise that the US military has been ineffective in Iraq because of the present problems that have now surfaced. These problems are post-war and are political in nature and do not detract from the US military’s use of high-technology war-fighting to subdue the enemy by demoralization of the Iraqi military machine in the war fighting phase.

India’s new war doctrine in terms of operationalising the concepts militarily, should aim at the destruction of the Pakistani military machine and the demoralization of the Pak Army. That would be the acid test for any political leadership of the day and the Indian military hierarchy.

This is not pontificating but an accurate appraisal of the achievable in relation to strategic means available. The only caveat being this that it calls for national political will to use military power ruthlessly and the military hierarchy of India to be militarily audacious and relentless in offensive operations.

Calvin
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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 03:49

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_8-5-2004_pg3_3

OP-ED: India’s ‘Cold Start’ strategy —Shaukat Qadir

Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it

In March this year the Indian army leaked news about the salient features of its new war doctrine. The doctrine hopes to exploit more fully India’s conventional superiority without giving Pakistan cause to escalate to the nuclear level.

The Indian army has named it ‘cold-start’ strategy since it purports to avoid the noise of a military build-up and achieve surprise. The strategy rests on operations through ‘eight integrated battle groups with elements of IAF and Navy as thrust formations’ and ‘calls for hard strikes’ limited ‘to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation’. What does this mean?

Given the current relationship of forces, despite India’s qualitative and quantitative edge, Pakistan could successfully defend itself against an Indian aggression. War termination strategy, which we have discussed in this space, is an important part of conflict. India is better placed than Pakistan to think up concepts and then equip its forces to operationalise them.

In the 1980s India borrowed from the Soviet concepts. One of the concepts, which we could term the “Multi-tiered Offensive Concept,” intended to simultaneously engage our front-line defensive forces while airlifting forces to engage our reserves. This was meant to upset the state of balance (‘balance’ is a product of time relationship between any force and the reserves. If a defensive force can survive the offensive for the period it takes for the reserves to reinforce it, the entire force is said to be in a state of balance).

It was a highly ambitious concept given India’s rather humble capability to airlift less than a division at a time with no artillery. But it could have been done at a critical moment in time imposing a delay on the reserves at which time it could have been most telling. Pakistan’s response was fairly easy. We ‘layered’ our reserves — i.e., infantry elements were moved closer to the front, so that if interdicted by enemy forces, some would engage them and the rest, with the armour and artillery, reroute themselves to retain the balance.

The current Indian concept has two aspects to it: one part of it retains the concept explained above, but the other seeks to offset another advantage Pakistan enjoys: the shorter mobilisation time. Because of its size, Indian forces deployed against China or located in depth, take considerable time to assemble at our borders. This time used to be about twenty days which they have perhaps managed to reduce to around two weeks. On the other hand, Pakistani forces assemble in a week’s time (at places even less) given our lack of depth. The moment news of the movement of Indian forces reaches us, we can be ready and waiting for them before their arrival.

However, for any operation, not all forces are required simultaneously. If, for instance, there are five Indian offensive divisions located within a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles of our borders, which can get there say within three days, they could open the offensive at perhaps Sialkot and opposite Bahawalnagar. If, of the remaining nine Indian offensive divisions, another three could reach the border within eight days and the five that had opened the offensive could last five days, these forces would still be in a state of balance. The remaining Indian offensive forces could initiate a delayed offensive somewhere in the south on arrival. This would be a cold start; all preliminary preparations having been completed in their cantonments, they arrive at the border to immediately go into action.

While it is definitely workable and, if well executed, very threatening, there are a number of problems with the concept.

Firstly, the timing has to be immaculate. There is no room for error. Secondly, in the north the Pakistani defensive forces are located at or very close to the border and, even the reserves are fairly close. There is little doubt that if such a concept is adopted it will rely heavily on the far-superior Indian air force, IAF, to interdict and prevent Pakistani reserves from intervening early. But if the IAF were to fail, Pakistani reserves could enter the fray early and destroy the Indian forces piecemeal.

Thirdly, the PAF, though considerably inferior to the IAF, when coupled with our fairly strong air defence system could extract a terrific toll of the IAF in a defensive battle within our own borders. That could reduce the IAF’s superiority to very acceptable proportions for the PAF for the remainder of the war.

There is little doubt that the Indian concept is a most challenging one. It demands a highly superior command over operational strategy (which is the art of bringing troops into battle such that they enjoy a greater chance of success). However, it is fraught with risk. No bureaucracy, particularly the military, produces ‘risk-takers’; in fact, they invariably die young. There is always the odd exception, but one exception is not enough. For such a concept to succeed all senior commanders down to the division level will need to have faith in it.

Risk-taking, like any other art, is honed through practice. It cannot be acquired suddenly. In military history, peacetime commanders have usually failed during wars and war itself has thrown up the required leadership, the German general staff system being the sole exception.

To take the American example; Eisenhower was a Colonel on the faculty of the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, while Mark Clark, Omar Bradley, and Patton were Lt Cols when Pearl Harbour was attacked in 1941. Within the span of less than three years Eisenhower became the supreme commandeer of the allied forces, without having commanded anything other than a regiment.

Omar and Clark rose to command army groups, while Patton rose to command an army. The sole exception was McArthur who was a general before the war began and remained successful. He resigned due to his disagreement with Roosevelt on which theatre of war should be of greater significance to the American war policy.

Neither Indian nor many Pakistani commanders are comfortable taking risks. There is far too much at stake! It is for this reason most of all that I consider it unlikely that such a concept might actually be tried. If it ever is, I would like to witness it.

The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 03:49

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-5-2004_pg3_4

OP-ED: Cold Start: the nuclear side —Shaukat Qadir

Wars, unfortunately, cannot be fought in ‘halves’ or ‘quarters’. That is the basis of the opposition to these concepts of punitive strikes and limited wars, terms carefully avoided in the concept but in fact attempting to actualise them

Last week I attempted a theoretical explanation of the ‘cold start’ concept as it relates to an all-out conventional war. Now we move to where the concept seeks to address India’s response to sub-conventional warfare. That is the more worrying aspect.

Part of the strategy rests on operations through ‘eight integrated battle groups with elements of IAF, ground forces and Navy as thrust formations’, while ground forces mixing a combination of armour elements and mobile infantry will operate on land. The strategy also ‘calls for hard strikes’ limited ‘to the point which should not invite any nuclear retaliation’: destroy fully the objective while sparing the adversary’s strategic potential to keep its response below the nuclear threshold. How does one ensure that the opponent’s response remains below the nuclear threshold and how does anyone define the nuclear threshold?

It merits understanding here that apart from the theoretical aspect of cold start, intended to redress the Indian disadvantage in assembling the army, this is a continuation of the ongoing study in India of two aspects: ‘punitive strikes’ and ‘limited wars’, without the use of these terms, since they have generated considerable controversy among Indian analysts.

The integrated battle groups that will carry out hard strikes to destroy the objective while sparing the strategic potential are obviously not intended to capture territory or target reserves. In fact, ‘sparing the strategic potential’ clearly implies that reserves will remain untouched. This is based obviously on the assumption that so long as Pakistan retains its reserves and the potential of a strategic retaliation with conventional forces, it will refrain from nuclear war and thus remain below the nuclear threshold.

What does this mean?

First, punitive strikes are intended not just to punish, but to teach the perpetrator a lesson such that he/she will desist from repeating the act. What is the means of judging that a certain punishment will suffice? Since the commencement is nebulous, the whole concept remains so.

Second, it implies the ability to reach into the enemy’s territory to inflict punishment. While terms like ‘integrated battle groups’ and ‘thrust formations’ sound impressive, the ability of the Indian military to execute such a venture, despite the unquestionable superiority of the IAF, against well-defended territories is very questionable.

It has to be assumed that the ‘objectives’ the concept refers to are so-called training camps in AK or some other target which could hurt Pakistan enough to force it to fall in line with Indian demands. Even if we assume that it could achieve surprise the first time and succeed, it might not be able to do so again. The paradox of punitive strikes in a situation where the disparity of forces is not extreme — as is the case between the US and all other countries of the world and between Israel and Palestine — whether the strike succeeds or not the result is the same: a cyclical escalation, unless the country subjected to the strike just buckles under.

If the strike succeeds, the other country’s response will necessitate an escalation to ensure that the aggressor does not repeat a strike. If the strike does not succeed, the country initiating the strike will deem necessary to escalate to redeem itself and ensure that the lesson is learnt, since that is the entire purpose of such a venture.

Although the PAF is greatly outnumbered by the IAF, when supported by our air defence forces, fighting within our own air space, the PAF could extract an unacceptable price from the IAF. The same goes for helicopter-borne forces or attack helicopters. In fact, it is very likely that the price extracted could by itself result in escalation.

Third, if Pakistan’s forces retain the capability of a strategic response, it might have little option left, in the face of domestic pressure but to employ these forces to retaliate. If it does so, we will have escalated to war.

This is the other paradox in the philosophy behind this concept: if India destroys Pakistan’s strategic forces, it might cross our nuclear threshold forcing a nuclear war; if it does not, it leaves us the option to retaliate with these forces, thus initiating a conventional war, which in turn might lead to a nuclear one.

Wars, unfortunately, cannot be fought in ‘halves’ or ‘quarters’. That is the basis of the opposition to these concepts of punitive strikes and limited wars, terms carefully avoided in the concept but in fact attempting to actualise them.

Finally, I explained in an earlier article that nuclear deterrence in the cold war era was a product of mutually assured destruction; which does not exist here. If one could coin a term; in South Asia there is unilaterally assured destruction. Consequently, Pakistan relies on a very nebulous concept of ‘unacceptable damage’ for deterring India. Since this term is indefinable and inexact, we have a state of nuclear instability that concerns the world. Now this Indian concept, dissatisfied with the current level of instability wants to increase it by introducing its reliance on an even more nebulous term, ‘threshold of nuclear tolerance’; equally, if not more difficult to define.

Whereas the cold start appears an interesting but perhaps unlikely concept in relation to an all out conventional war; it is extremely worrying in its application to the sub-conventional war. Knowing some of the Indian analysts, I am certain that a healthy debate has commenced already in India on the subject.

The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 03:51

JUNE 13TH; http://www.dawn.com/2004/text/top12.htm

'Cold start doctrine' being closely studied: ISPR

By Our Staff Reporter

RAWALPINDI, June 12: Pakistan is closely studying India's 'Cold start doctrine', though the country feels that it is not directly threatened by the doctrine, director general Inter-Services Public Relations Major General Shaukat Sultan said on Saturday.

'Cold start doctrine' is defined as one in which a quick in-and-out action is undertaken by a hostile army without giving any formal and informal warning to the country being invaded.

Speaking at a press briefing, Gen Sultan said, "We cannot outrightly ignore the cold start doctrine, but we strongly believe that it is not a viable proposition in the case of Pakistan.

"This could perhaps work for a banana republic or for that matter a small state, where operating under this doctrine foreign forces could land one fine morning without any

warning and fulfil the objective by capturing strategic positions," he said, adding that Pakistan's case was altogether different.

In the case of Pakistan, India would have to mobilize a large number of troops and military hardware and such a massive movement could not remain hidden no matter how much it was disguised.

Moreover, the ISPR chief said, Pakistan was better placed strategically as its troops were always located very close to the border and could assemble much more rapidly and respond quickly and effectively.

This doctrine, he said, should not cause undue fears and apprehensions in the minds of the general public.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby appuseth » 14 Jun 2004 04:09

The "Cold Start" doctrine does not work unless the air force, army and navy know how to work well together. At present, this is not the case as shown by the poor communication between the air force and the army in Kargil.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 04:14

Appuseth: Kargil happened 5 years ago. Things change.

Remember, SDI destroyed the Soviets, even though it didn't work.

The key here is the paradigmatic shift from defensive to offensive posture. What are the implications?

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby appuseth » 14 Jun 2004 04:20

I know Calvin. But we still need better integration.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 04:27

http://www.indiatogether.org/2004/may/fah-coldstart.htm

May 2004 - The spring and autumn peace initiatives of 2003 led to the subcontinent being treated to an Indo-Pak cricketing spectacle early this year. But with a fresh military menu being served up in the form of the new army doctrine countenancing ‘Cold Start’, the hawks may be back. 'Cold start' is a euphemism for mobilizing military forces faster than international diplomacy can defuse an Indo-Pak crisis. The details are expected to follow in another six months when the new doctrine has the imprimatur of the Navy and Air Force at the Combined Commander’s Conference scheduled yearly in autumn.

‘Integrated Battle Groups’ (Cold Start) is the Indian Army’s cryptic answer to the nuclear standoff witnessed between India and Pakistan during the ten month long Operation Parakram in 2002. Presently only the Army Commanders appear to have endorsed it at their early summer meet, the first of their biannual meetings. That the Army would take the initiative is understandable in that it was the Army that had been found wanting off the blocks during both Operation Parakram and the Kargil-induced Operation Vijay earlier.

During Operation Vijay it had taken the Army up to one and half months to get its act together in giving what eventuated in a fitting reply to Pakistan’s adventurism. In Operation Parakram, launched in the wake of India’s very own 9/11, the dastardly terrorist attack on parliament in Dec 2001, the Army is reported to have taken three weeks to mobilize its armoured might. Even though the then Army Chief, the articulate and media savvy Gen ‘Paddy’ Padhmanabhan, did get the message across at his Jan 11, 2002 press conference that India meant business, his wily counterpart Gen Musharraf managed to take the wind out of India’s sails by his now famous ‘about turn’ speech against terrorism of the very next day, Jan 12, 2002.

It has been conjectured that the interim between India's slow mobilizing in 2002 and being ready on the blocks was exploited skillfully by Pakistani diplomacy, seized as it already was then with its role of ‘frontline’ state for the second time round, this time against its own former surrogate, the Taliban. As a result the pressure mounted by the US was such that India prevaricated, with the mobilization being termed by its spin doctors as ‘coercive diplomacy’ worthy of India’s Chanakyan tradition. However, the ‘sacking’ of the Indian General in command of the leading Indian strike corps in late January 2002 for jumping the gun suggests otherwise. General Paddy’s telegenic performance was perhaps somewhat premature and a likely resultant of the need to preempt General Musharraf rather than as a true reflection of the preparedness of India’s mobilized armed might, two weeks into the crisis.

The Army's strike corps have been designed to strike deep at politically important objectives so as to bring about favourable war termination, a favourite scenario being to cut Pakistan into two at its midriff. Since Pakistan has made it fairly self evident that its ‘nuclear redline’ is not so high as to countenance an Indian penetration that deep, India has had to rethink its reliance on having three strike corps to Pakistan’s two. The problem posed by Chagai, Pakistan's tit for tat answer to India's nuclear blasts at Pokhran II, is only now being grappled with.

The Indian Army therefore has had to come up with some answers. The doctrine currently doing the rounds of South Block is purported to be based on brigade sized ‘integrated battle groups’ that will offset two disadvantages of the ‘strike corps’ concept of Sundarji vintage. The first is that these groups being smaller would be quicker off the blocks in what is being termed as ‘Cold Start’, thereby positioning India better at the political level in the diplomatic game.

Second, and more pertinently, these would be able to undercut Pakistan’s yet unstated nuclear doctrine of ‘first use’ by striking at shallow objectives that do not necessarily compel Pakistan to cross its nuclear threshold. These groups would lack the punch to go for Pakistan’s innards, the erstwhile role of the ‘strike corps’. Therefore ‘military necessity’ would not be of the order to permit Pakistan morally and legally to ‘go nuclear’.

Smaller battle groups would also be more survivable, presenting smaller fast moving targets even if Pakistan were to contemplate the nuclear option against them. Several of these moving into Pakistan would also pose Pakistan the problem as to which one to tackle and with what. The idea is to paralyse Pakistani leadership with this decision dilemma while making quick territorial gains to be bartered post conflict on the negotiation table in return for Pakistan’s promise of good behaviour with regard to Kashmir. It is expected that the next round will be swiftly over since the US led international community would not want to grapple with the nuclearised aftermath of any future subcontinental conflict.

At present there is no indication that the Air and Naval counterparts of Army Commanders are mulling over the same doctrine at their coincident early summer meetings elsewhere. It would appear that the ‘integrated’ in the ‘integrated battle groups’ is a reference only to the Army’s own complement of tools – artillery, armour, mechanized infantry, the additional special forces being raised and possibly helicopters. Integrating the Air Force into this would be decidedly more difficult because the Air Force is yet in the Douhet era wherein the aim of air power was to pulverize the centre of gravity of the enemy. If it were to be now told to be merely an extension of the Army’s artillery, there is likely to be an inter service bureaucratic war in the offing.

For its part, the Navy too sees its role as strategic in nature. During Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram, it had sailed forth into the Arabian Sea so as to seal off Karachi and blockade the Pakistani coast. It would not like to have the Army undercut its expansive role, on which its sustenance, expansion and aircraft carrier in the pipeline are predicated. Indeed the Army may already have its answer in the simultaneous release of the India’s first naval doctrine at the Naval commander’s conference.

But turf wars are the least of the dangers that loom ahead.

First, in keeping with its mandate of furnishing the political leadership military options, the Army has tried to work around the problem posed by Chagai and revealed during Operation Parakram. The danger is that in doing so it is attempting to bring war back as an option into political calculus. If it takes as little as a bunch of fanatics with automatic weapons to spark of a subcontinental crisis with nuclear overtones, then to make ‘war’, howsoever restrained, appear as a viable option to address similar crisis in the future is itself a danger.

It took as little as a bunch of fanatics with automatic weapons to spark of a subcontinental crisis with nuclear overtones. And now, 'Cold start' attempts to bring war back as an option into political calculus; this in itself a danger.

Second, the Air Force and Navy have not betrayed any indication that they are aware of the nuclearisation of the subcontinent and its implications. Blockade of Karachi and destruction of vital installations within Pakistan could well prove as provocative as pincers launched by India’s strike corps. The Army alone appears to be aware of the need to factor in the possibility that Pakistan’s nuclear redline could well be low.

But the concept is not being adopted tomorrow, either. There is no indication that the idea of integrated battle groups has originated in the Integrated Defence Staff, the joint body serving as a proto unified services head quarter. It may not be any time soon before the services adopt the doctrine to serve as blueprint for the next war situation. This interim requires to be exploited to revisit the primary lesson of the nuclear standoff known to history as Operation Parakram – that the military tool is obsolescent in the nuclear age.

Operation Parakram may have had the unintended consequence of revealing to the politicians the limited utility of military force. In fact, this lesson could have led up to the spring and autumn initiatives of 2003 towards peace that resulted in the grand Indo-Pak cricketing spectacle of this year. But with a fresh military menu being served up in the form of the new army doctrine countenancing ‘Cold Start’, the impetus to reconciliation underway could also lose ground and the hawks will surely be back to sup. ⊕

Firdaus Ahmed
May 2004

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 04:32

http://dailymailnews.com/200403/09/column.html

India’s war doctrine: “Cold Start”
—implications for its neighbours?
S. M. Hali

“Dreams float on an impatient wind,
A wind that wants to create a new order,
An order of strength and thundering of fire.”

The above is a quote from a poem ascribed to Dr. Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam, father of India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Program and is available on the website ‘Indian Missiles’ which is dedicated to him with the caption: “It was the brilliant Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam who breathed life into ballistic missiles like the Agni and Prithvi, which put China and Pakistan well under India’s missile range.”
It appears that India wants to take the dream of Dr. Abdul Kalam, now India’s President to new dimensions. Its new war doctrine, appropriately named Cold Start was “unveiled” to the public by India’s Army Chief Gen N.C. Vij on 04 March 2004 while inaugurating a two-day seminar on ‘Army 2020: shape and size and structure and general doctrine for emerging challenges’. As reported by The Indian Express of 05 March 2004, he said, “With warfare scenario undergoing dramatic changes, the Indian Army has drafted a new war doctrine which would be finalized soon after it is circulated within the service as well as incorporating suggestions from the defence think tanks.
For reasons of security, the Indian Army Chief General N C Vij did not go public with the details of the new doctrine but the central idea revolves around replacing the age-old concept of mobilization of forces and Strike Corps spearheading the attack. The salient features of the new war doctrine, which calls for rewriting the war-book are:

• Changed world doesn’t allow massing of troops, invites diplomatic intervention
• Out go Strike Corps spearheading attack. Eight integrated battle groups to lead thrust into enemy territory
• Aim for ‘total destruction of objective’ but spare enemy’s strategic potential to avoid nuclear response
• Focus on precision capability and hard impact since massive air, land campaigns not possible

According to The Indian Express of 06 March 2004’s report titled: ‘No eyeball to eyeball any more in new war doctrine’, by Shishir Gupta, more details are provided: “While many in the forces may take credit for this doctrine, the then Western Army Commander Lt General Vijay Oberoi was one of the first to root for this strategy. Present Army Vice Chief Lt General Shantano Choudhary has refined the concept keeping in mind the existing nuclear environment. Gen Oberoi, who retired as Army Vice Chief in 2002, presently heads an Army think tank called CLAWS. This doctrine, debated at the last tri-Services military commanders conference, will be on the agenda again during the commanders’ conference next month. The new doctrine does not believe in dividing the forces into defensive or attack formations. India’s three Strike Corps — Mathura-based I Corps, Ambala-based II Corps and Bhopal-based XXI Corps — will be there only for training purposes. The war will be fought through eight battle groups with integrated elements from the IAF and Navy. Backed by tank regiments, heavy artillery, missile regiments and the air force, the battle groups will go for limited but lethal destruction on enemy territory. The Navy with its carrier-based fighters will have the key role of supporting the battle groups. Ships will also launch missiles like the Russian Klub. The idea is to destroy, not to hold or capture territory.
“This concept was first war-gamed during Exercise Vijay Chakra in the Thar desert by Gen Oberoi in 2001 and synergized between the three forces during Exercise Brahmastra later that year. Still being war-gamed, a part of it was on view at Exercise Divya Astra in Pokharan this week. This strategy was fine-tuned once the threat of nuclear war dawned on the security establishment. It was done by Gen Choudhary, then commander of the Jalandhar-based XI Corps, and his counterparts in IAF and Navy. Measuring the force application during war time, they took into account the nuclear threshold of the adversary.”
‘Divya Astra’ was organized at the Mahajan Firing Ranges (Rajasthan), on March 1, 2004 by the Indian Army and Air Force as a massive firepower demonstration of the new long-distance multiple weapon firing ranges from a variety of weapon systems, comprising: tank columns, infantry combat vehicles, MI-35 attack helicopters, MiG-21 and MiG-23 jet fighters. Some of the systems demonstrated included the Krasnopol precision-guided ammunition fired from the 155-mm Bofors guns. Krasnopol is guided onto the target by a laser designator operated by an observer close to the target. The GRAD BM 21 multi-barrel rocket launchers consisting of 40 tubes with 122-mm rockets displayed their lethality. Among the weapons and equipment on display were the infantry weapons including automatic grenade launchers (AGLs), under barrel grenade launchers (UBLs), the Dragunov sniper rifle and the Carl Gustav 84-mm rocket launcher. The Army also unveiled its long range reconnaissance and observation system, integrated observation equipment and radars. The Israeli-made Searcher UAV also demonstrated its capabilities by taking high-resolution pictures of ‘‘enemy activity’’ from very high altitude.
The timing of this “disclosure” of India’s new war doctrine is of interest. Why have India’s top military commanders returned to their drawing board to work on this new war doctrine: the ‘Cold Start’ strategy while a highly hyped peace process is underway? What is the implication of announcing that hard strikes can be launched without massing of troops? Is it only to conceal their aggressive designs from an unsuspecting enemy and deny him the flexibility of response or to stealthily achieve the odious aim of belligerence before the watchful international opinion plays its role in thwarting the iniquitous plan?
The fact is that the main aim of this exercise appears to put pressure on Pakistan prior to the peace talks. Read another story in the Indian Press on the same date (06 March). This time in Asia Times titled: ‘India frets over Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus’, the correspondent Sultan Shahin “reveals” that : “According to Indian intelligence assessments, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is actively trying to realize its plan for a sovereign Islamic state in India’s northeast, with full support from fundamentalist elements within Bangladesh government, army, bureaucracy and intelligence. Sources in India’s Ministry of Home Affairs have told Asia Times Online that it has regularly been receiving reports of increased ISI activity in Bangladesh, and of tacit support extended to the ISI by the authorities there. With the ceasefire on the Kashmir border, militant outfits are increasingly using Bangladesh as a training ground rather then Pakistan-administered Kashmir, according to the sources. There are also reports that Pakistan nationals owing allegiance to different terrorist outfits have been using Dhaka as a transit point for entering India and Nepal, as well as an escape route. Delhi has on several occasions raised the issue with Bangladeshi authorities. But Dhaka has repeatedly denied all similar reports and statements made by Indian government officials, including Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani.”
After this (startling) revelation, herein lies the rub: “Though ruling Indian politicians will not make an issue out of the alleged ISI activity for the next couple of months until general elections are over - the achievement of peace on the borders is a major poll plank for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) - Asia Times Online has learnt that central as well as state intelligence officials are deeply concerned at the growing influence of the ISI at various levels in Bangladesh, and of the activities of a variety of secessionist militants and Islamic fundamentalists, many of whom have found refuge in Bangladesh.”
The columnist attempts to drag in Khaleda Zia’s regime too, in direct contravention to the SAARC spirit of brotherly relations revived during the Islamabad summit of January 2004. “…This has been particularly the case since the Bangladesh visit of Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf in July 2002, when additional ISI personnel were posted at the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka. The situation became even more favorable for the ISI after the assumption of power in October 2001 by the present four-party coalition led by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), with the help of pro-Pakistan fundamentalist elements.”
The answer to this multi-pronged attack of brow beating and maliciously maligning, lies in India’s ambitions of becoming a super power and a full fledged member of the UN Security Council so that it can continue its hegemonic designs undeterred. It would be prudent for the defence planners of Pakistan to take India’s peace overtures with a pinch of salt and not let their guard down. After all the Indian President himself provides the clue in his poem quoted in the beginning of this article; India’s burning desire of creating a “new order,
An order of strength and thundering of fire.”

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 14 Jun 2004 04:37

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-4-2004_pg1_3

Indian Army commanders discuss ‘cold start’

Daily Times Monitor

NEW DELHI: The new war doctrine, which revolves around the “cold start” strategy by “integrated battle groups,” was officially presented in the ongoing Indian Army commanders’ conference on Wednesday.

“It’s a classified matter. Army commanders will now discuss details of the doctrine and tune it,’’ a senior officer told the Times News Network. He refused to divulge anything more.

Sources, however, say that the doctrine talks about eight rapidly-deployable “integrated battle groups,” drawn from the Navy and the Indian Air Force.

These groups will be trained to make swift and hard inroads into enemy territory. The strikes should be ‘‘limited’’ and ‘‘calibrated’’ to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play in any war scenario.

The Army feels the strategy has to change from the existing one of slowly amassing India’s three strike formations — headquartered in Mathura (I Corps), Ambala (II Corps) and Bhopal (XXI Corps) — in preparation for war to these integrated battle groups.

During Operation Parakram, the massive forward mobilisation after the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament, had taken the Army almost a month to deploy its three strike corps in ‘‘launch pads’’ along the India-Pakistan border.

‘‘The idea is that the international community should not get the opportunity to intervene. Hence, the need for swift action starting from a ‘cold start’ instead of slow mobilisation,” said a source. Chaired by Chief of Army Staff General NC Vij, the conference is being attended by the chiefs of the five regional commands and the training command, the Army headquarters principal staff officers and heads of various arms.

Naval chief Admiral Madhvendra Singh and Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy have also addressed this important commanders conference, stressing the need for ‘‘total operational synergy’’ among the three services.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-4-2004_pg1_3

Indian Army commanders discuss ‘cold start’

Daily Times Monitor

NEW DELHI: The new war doctrine, which revolves around the “cold start” strategy by “integrated battle groups,” was officially presented in the ongoing Indian Army commanders’ conference on Wednesday.

“It’s a classified matter. Army commanders will now discuss details of the doctrine and tune it,’’ a senior officer told the Times News Network. He refused to divulge anything more.

Sources, however, say that the doctrine talks about eight rapidly-deployable “integrated battle groups,” drawn from the Navy and the Indian Air Force.

These groups will be trained to make swift and hard inroads into enemy territory. The strikes should be ‘‘limited’’ and ‘‘calibrated’’ to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play in any war scenario.

The Army feels the strategy has to change from the existing one of slowly amassing India’s three strike formations — headquartered in Mathura (I Corps), Ambala (II Corps) and Bhopal (XXI Corps) — in preparation for war to these integrated battle groups.

During Operation Parakram, the massive forward mobilisation after the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament, had taken the Army almost a month to deploy its three strike corps in ‘‘launch pads’’ along the India-Pakistan border.

‘‘The idea is that the international community should not get the opportunity to intervene. Hence, the need for swift action starting from a ‘cold start’ instead of slow mobilisation,” said a source. Chaired by Chief of Army Staff General NC Vij, the conference is being attended by the chiefs of the five regional commands and the training command, the Army headquarters principal staff officers and heads of various arms.

Naval chief Admiral Madhvendra Singh and Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy have also addressed this important commanders conference, stressing the need for ‘‘total operational synergy’’ among the three services.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Luxtor » 14 Jun 2004 06:25

I think we worry too much about Pakistan's nuke threshold. Pakistan should be well aware that if they ever use nukes on us, then India will make sure that Pakistan ceases to exist. That in itself should serve as a deterant to the Pakis. Maybe then again the Pakis are irrational creatures. (Kargil, 1971, etc) They always think that they can put one over us without thinking about the consequences. So we just might have to end up destroying Pakistan in a massive nuke retaliation.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby RayC » 14 Jun 2004 16:30

Originally posted by Calvin:
RayC: Any professional opinion regarding this?
At best I can guesstimate.

The problems with the Strike Corps concept (which theoretically was good) was that:

1. It did not match the concept with the equipment desired and available.
2. The obstacle ridden terrain or the sparse desert 'roads' (heavy eqpt which are not tracked cannot bash on through desert tracks)did not match the pace desired to beat the enemy reaction and in the long term, the timeframe that would be available before the powers that be intervened and called it to a halt.
3. The nuclear threshold. Pakistan is an irresponsible country (the deceit at Lahore with the ongoing Kargil preparation as also selling of nuke secrets)and they cannot be trusted to not use nukes even at an early stage. It is true that if we retaliate they would be in serious problems, but then we are a democracy and we cannot afford a nuclear conflagration.

Therefore, the answer is to selcted not shallow but limited objectives that are medium value targets. It should be deep enough to hurt but not too deep enough to create panic in Pakistan. This would also ensure that we beat the international timeframe calling the cessation of hostilties. It would also ensure that task based forces are poised to take on the objectives desired like a panther and not have a juggernaut rumbling through at an elephant's pace.

What should the force structure be? If one is curious and one wants to guesstimate, one should
read the US Field Manual 3 as also the 'Objective Force' including the Stryker Brigade. That would give some idea of what a force should look like. Obviously, it should be tailored to meet the Indian security objectives, the budget and so on.

This is but an off the cuff guesstimate.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby jrjrao » 14 Jun 2004 17:31

'Cold start' doctrine comes under a lens

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-736405,curpg-1.cms
ISLAMABAD : Pakistan said that it is closely studying the implication of the ‘cold start doctrine’, which, according to media reports here, the Indian army sought to implement during the ’02 border tensions with Pakistan .

Pakistan ’s defence spokesman major general Shoukat Sultan said that even though the country did not feel threatened by the doctrine, it was studying its implications. The ‘cold start doctrine’ involves launching lightning ground and air strikes and taking over the enemy country without giving the rival army time to hit back.

According to reports, the Indian army had considered the implementation of the ‘cold start’ after amassing troops along the Pakistan borders during the tensions that followed the attack on the Indian Parliament in December ’01.

“We cannot ignore outright the cold start doctrine, but we strongly believe that it is not a viable proposition in the case of Pakistan ,” Mr Sultan told reporters.

“This could perhaps work for a banana republic or, for that matter, a small state, where operating under this doctrine, foreign forces could land one fine morning without any warning and fulfil the objective by capturing strategic positions,” he said, adding that Pakistan’s case was completely different.

He said that in the case of Pakistan , India would have to mobilise a large number of troops and military hardware, and such a massive movement could not remain hidden no matter how much it was disguised.

Moreover, Pakistan was better placed strategically, as its troops were always located very close to the border and could assemble much more rapidly and respond quickly and effectively, he said.
“This doctrine should not cause undue fears and apprehensions in the minds of the general public,” he said.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby daulat » 14 Jun 2004 18:20

having reread the above analyses, i remain convinced taht cold start is a variant on WZC, but with more integrated air and naval force usage, and the all important red line issue

the aim is to gain a poltically favourable ground situation before the great powers intervene

the role of the navy and airforce it would seem would be to act as two oversized alsatians to threaten the naked prisoner (a la abu ghraib) whilst the army does the chaddi utaroing. the whole point being to induce sufficient fear

sorry if i have stretched the analogy

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 14 Jun 2004 18:33

Originally posted by RayC:
What should the force structure be? If one is curious and one wants to guesstimate, one should read the US Field Manual 3 as also the 'Objective Force' including the Stryker Brigade. That would give some idea of what a force should look like. Obviously, it should be tailored to meet the Indian security objectives, the budget and so on.
Sir,

FM 3 is a total war scenario. OBJFORCE is a total war TRADOC. And what these articles have written so far doesn't fit. I don't see a disengagement phase in Cold Start.

I don't know if I can agree with the nuclear threshold part. I didn't believe it when I was stationed in Germany. It was either us nuking to stop a Soviet tank army or the Soviets nuking us to blast open a path for a tank army.

And just how many bombs do you need before India ceases to be a country with working infrastructure? In Canada, that's 10 bombs, and we stop having a federal and some provincial governments that works. Most people are going to live but law and order is out the window.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 14 Jun 2004 18:37

Originally posted by Daulat:
having reread the above analyses, i remain convinced taht cold start is a variant on WZC, but with more integrated air and naval force usage, and the all important red line issue
We know the Chinese have read FM-105, the presuccessor to FM-3. I strongly suspect that the InA Staff have at least read FM-105, if not FM-3. Thus, it would not be surprising to see similarities.

However, as I stated before, I don't see a disengagement phase. For the Chinese, they would run away after Phase III, after having claimed their political victory. I'm not sure that this would fit within the Indian pschye - killing the enemy, winning the battle, own the battlefield, and then run away.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby RayC » 14 Jun 2004 18:41

Colonel,

I did not mean that it will replicate the US doctrines or scenarios. I only suggested a study of the same so that one can in his own wisdom and understanding do a cut and paste.

We are concerned about the nuke threshold. Unlike the US and USSR who couldn't care less about the effects of the nukes in case the situation cam to that, we here, I reckon will still have to bear the aftermath of world opinion and wrath and hence our sensitivity to the nucler question.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby RayC » 14 Jun 2004 18:52

Colonel,

We may not 'run away' after winning, but I think the Chinese policy of quitting while the going is good and in a 'have won' position and gaining a moral victory in addition, is a great policy.

Imagine the psychological effect on the population of the Nation that has lost! Pakistan is still seething over the disgrace of 1971 and we have still not been able to shrug off the 1962 debacle! 'Losing face' in the East is a big deal!

Now imagine India going hell for leather and captures some medium value but politically high value objectives and then digs her feet in. Thereafter making pious political noises leaves with some concessions, what could be better?

Haven't you seen Aryan and other Pakistanis on WAB stating the India is an artificial nation with so many religions, communities etc and that it will break up soon. It is but the consequence of their bile that India is doing well in ALL field compared to them. Secretly, they want to be as successful as India, but inwardly lament that they are not.

Therefore, if we can make them 'lose face' it will be a greater victory than square kilometres of their impoverished land.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Rudra » 14 Jun 2004 18:59

> we have still not been able to shrug off the 1962 debacle

if you mean the people of india, I can assure you
even the people of NE those who had to evacuate
down to lower assam remember it vaguely and harbour no grudge against anyone.

unlike 1971@Pak, 1962 hasnt been made into a convenient hook by the Govt of india to flay the chinese with.

problem with some of the "teach a lesson" campaigns is you need visible and humiliating end goals to rub it in. if the chinese had marched into guwahati and broadcast TV footage that would be a great propaganda win, in reality they came to "somewhere near tezpur" in a part of the country few if any of the time could even name the states properly, so the psyops impact on the indian people lost a lot of bite. the effect on
the political & army leadership may have been more - you'd know better about that.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby daulat » 14 Jun 2004 19:00

wyu - Indian disengagement occurs when POTUS calls on the hotline and orders IA to stop or face B52 strikes on logistics nodes - a la 'BBC Situation Room' analysis. This is preceded by Generalissimo in Pindi calling POTUS and screaming like hell that his finger's on the nuke button and is starting to itch uncontrollably

IA then stops where they are, plus minus few tactical enclaves here and there. PA by now has been mauled sufficiently but withdraws back across teh canals and rivers to regroup. PAF if having taken to the air, is now molten aluminium and PN regardless of leaving port is also molten aluminium.

if IA now persists, PA withdraws all remaining units and throws all jehadis to the front to act as a human minefield, buying time for Generalissimo to talk to POTUS and scream some more - at this stage an honourable exit is still possible for Generalissimo. If PA core is now threatened, then red line is crossed and nukes fly

note - by now, PA is left with missiles and jehadi delivered nukes (JDAM) only, air launched capability is severly degraded - atleast to penetrate Indian airspace.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby ramana » 14 Jun 2004 19:16

There is a six page discussion on Divya Astra in BRF.

Link: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=3;t=000761;p=1
Also for completeness one should find the Ashley Tellis speech in New Delhi at the India Today seminar/conf about IA not having Cold Start type of doctrine.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby NRao » 14 Jun 2004 19:49

Originally posted by appuseth:
The "Cold Start" doctrine does not work unless the air force, army and navy know how to work well together. At present, this is not the case as shown by the poor communication between the air force and the army in Kargil.
Check out Divya Astra. CS is not a new thought. But is evolving. FINSAS, etc are all a part of it. It will not be easy. But will make many on the opp side very uneasy.

'Cold start' is a euphemism for mobilizing military forces faster than international diplomacy can defuse an Indo-Pak crisis.
Or to force the political process in favor of India too.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Anurag » 14 Jun 2004 20:09

Originally posted by Daulat:
wyu - Indian disengagement occurs when POTUS calls on the hotline and orders IA to stop or face B52 strikes on logistics nodes - a la 'BBC Situation Room' analysis.....
It's only TV! B52's, hmmm..do the math now!

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby daulat » 14 Jun 2004 20:13

Originally posted by Anurag:
Originally posted by Daulat:
[b]wyu - Indian disengagement occurs when POTUS calls on the hotline and orders IA to stop or face B52 strikes on logistics nodes - a la 'BBC Situation Room' analysis.....
It's only TV! B52's, hmmm..do the math now![/b]
never woz no gud at maths...

think politics, only takes one b52 strike to have the required POLITICAL impact

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Anurag » 14 Jun 2004 20:17

Originally posted by Daulat:
Originally posted by Anurag:
[b]
Originally posted by Daulat:
[b]wyu - Indian disengagement occurs when POTUS calls on the hotline and orders IA to stop or face B52 strikes on logistics nodes - a la 'BBC Situation Room' analysis.....
It's only TV! B52's, hmmm..do the math now![/b]
never woz no gud at maths...

think politics, only takes one b52 strike to have the required POLITICAL impact[/b]
You didn't understand. I don't see that happening!

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby daulat » 14 Jun 2004 20:22

anurag - given the way unkil has behaved some form of extreme pressure will be applied to save MuNNA's tushy - as long as MuNNA is valuable to Unkil. the threat of b52 strikes is no different to 7th fleet sailing up the bay of bengal - which has happened. Now if war on terror were to finish, Unkil would drop MuNNA pretty soon... and that would open up a whole new ball game...

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Anurag » 14 Jun 2004 20:23

Originally posted by Daulat:
anurag - given the way unkil has behaved some form of extreme pressure will be applied to save MuNNA's tushy - as long as MuNNA is valuable to Unkil. the threat of b52 strikes is no different to 7th fleet sailing up the bay of bengal - which has happened. Now if war on terror were to finish, Unkil would drop MuNNA pretty soon... and that would open up a whole new ball game...
That was '71, things have changed!

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Rudra » 14 Jun 2004 20:43

before B-52s get anywhere logistical nodes 1000km from the coast, US would need to fight and defeat the whole of IAF first.

So in effect you are declaring that US will declare war on india for the sake of saving Munna.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby daulat » 14 Jun 2004 21:23

Originally posted by Rudra Singha:

So in effect you are declaring that US will declare war on india for the sake of saving Munna.
one of many scenarios. we were discussing what intervention there could be for desi-WZC to end. as discussed previously on the situation room thread, unkil agreed to threaten military intervention in order to prevent paks using the new klear detergent

other scenarios could be

1. general is toppled in massive popular liberal revolution spearheaded by the lead singer of Junoon or Imran Khan (velvet revolution)

2. mullahs take over with LeT as the new gov't (green revolution)

3. France/Russia/Germany offer incentives for end to hostilities

etc.etc

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby appuseth » 15 Jun 2004 01:21

Niranjan Rao, what I am worried about is if a lack of communication between the command and control of the three/two branches leaves a smaller number of soldiers without close-air-support at the critical time: Since Cold Start requires decreasing the number of soldiers in each group to increase mobility.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby NRao » 15 Jun 2004 02:34

Originally posted by appuseth:
Niranjan Rao, what I am worried about is if a lack of communication between the command and control of the three/two branches leaves a smaller number of soldiers without close-air-support at the critical time: Since Cold Start requires decreasing the number of soldiers in each group to increase mobility.
For this specific concern, there is the network centric philosophy. (IMHO, just the right medicine for Indians.)

CS, IMHO, is way beyond some of the things we think about in general. It will have to go down to each soldier and the equipment he/she carries.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Victor » 15 Jun 2004 06:08

Calvin's first couple of posts pointed to the pakis attributing the growing paki-bangladesh chumminess as a cause for Indian worry. Yes, we are worried about this but I can bet that those b@stards are worried a whole lot more about us doing a "bangladesh" on bangladesh itself in the not too distant future just because of this chumminess based on Islamic fundamentalism. A lot of the paki smugness flows from a conviction that they have us tied down and that they will eventually win in the Northeast, fracturing the rest of country along religious and linguistic lines soon after. But I'm sure they are worried that a really ballsy Indian government will quickly rearrange the map in the eastern sector using Cold Start thinking under the international radar screens by manufacturing a "humanitarian event" in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and using the unacceptable flow of millions of illegal settlers into India. They know that it would enable India to turn the full focus of its energy on the western sector.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 15 Jun 2004 06:08

Before we get carried away in the details, could we look at the bigger picture?

For one, as a non-military person (unlike wyu, RayC and others) my comments are specifically not related to operational issues, but to strategic ones. In the case of Pakistan, the nuclear issue has been a massive deterrent. Secondly, Pakistan, its Army and its citizenry believe that they can "defeat" India in conventional or unconventional war. Relieving them of this fantasy, requires a direct attack on their H&D. The option of dismemberment, territorial occupation etc, carry with it the risks of nuclear-war.

There are a few questions that we may want to address with some broad strokes in this context:

1. Is a declaratory policy of punishment, ipso facto, sub-nuclear in nature?

2. Does a successful "punishment" attack serve the purpose of denting the H&D of the Pakistani Army?

3. Does the Degradation Objective (Artillery based-destruction) constitute a successful punishment?

Your comments are welcomed.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby pran » 15 Jun 2004 06:44

I was wondering ,how does cold-start planners contain and stop a retaliation ,both conventional and non-conventional at different place and time after raising the ante.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 15 Jun 2004 06:46

Originally Posted by RayC
I did not mean that it will replicate the US doctrines or scenarios. I only suggested a study of the same so that one can in his own wisdom and understanding do a cut and paste.
Sir,

My apologies for not being clear. If Cold Start is not based upon FM-3, then it sure looks like it. However, it is clear from all these articles that not one of these authors bothered to read FM-3. Some of the underlying assumptions are just plain wrong and others might as well be on Mars. Why bring ICBMs into Cold Start, I have no idea.

Indeed, Sir, FM-3 should required reading for those trying to understand modern warfare (and I will readily admit the key word here is TRYING. All FMs are hard reads).

Nonetheless, the authors of the articles, failing to read FM-3, is repeating alot of the mistakes that we've made and are now making erroneous assumptions.

Sir, I will email you with the particulars since I may intrude on some sensitive issues that should be discussed elsewhere.

Originally Posted by RayC
We are concerned about the nuke threshold. Unlike the US and USSR who couldn't care less about the effects of the nukes in case the situation cam to that, we here, I reckon will still have to bear the aftermath of world opinion and wrath and hence our sensitivity to the nucler question.
I think the last thing India and Pakistan would worry about after a nuclear exchange is world opinion. Both countries would have their hands full in an unprecedented humanitarian disaster. Indeed, I think the world would also be too busy trying to contain the situation after the nuke exchange.

Originally Posted by RayC
We may not 'run away' after winning, but I think the Chinese policy of quitting while the going is good and in a 'have won' position and gaining a moral victory in addition, is a great policy.

Imagine the psychological effect on the population of the Nation that has lost! Pakistan is still seething over the disgrace of 1971 and we have still not been able to shrug off the 1962 debacle! 'Losing face' in the East is a big deal!
Sir,

The other famous war the PLA entered in, the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War, the PLA militarily did similar things to VN's nothern defences and they even managed to capture 3 Provincial Capitals, something they didn't do in India. And this was done by second rate troops.

Yet, there is no doubt that VN won the political war, even indicating that they chased the PLA all the way back home. Didn't happenned, when the PAVN was ready to offer battle to evict the Chinese, the PLA already left. However, VN sure give the impression of chasing the Chinese.

The military situation is almost identicle to that of the 62 Sino-Indo War when the PLA left, they were in no position to challenge the InA relief force.

The point here is that for a political victory to work, the victim must be willing to play the part of the victim.

If not, then the best you can hope for is a tie and for that, you need an extremely good propaganda machine, to which the InA is sorely lacking.

Originally Posted by Daulat
wyu - Indian disengagement occurs when POTUS calls on the hotline and orders IA to stop or face B52 strikes on logistics nodes - a la 'BBC Situation Room' analysis. This is preceded by Generalissimo in Pindi calling POTUS and screaming like hell that his finger's on the nuke button and is starting to itch uncontrollably
Doesn't sound very professional at all. At least not like the developments I've seen and experienced.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 15 Jun 2004 07:15

Originally posted by Calvin:
Before we get carried away in the details, could we look at the bigger picture?

For one, as a non-military person (unlike wyu, RayC and others) my comments are specifically not related to operational issues, but to strategic ones. In the case of Pakistan, the nuclear issue has been a massive deterrent. Secondly, Pakistan, its Army and its citizenry believe that they can "defeat" India in conventional or unconventional war. Relieving them of this fantasy, requires a direct attack on their H&D. The option of dismemberment, territorial occupation etc, carry with it the risks of nuclear-war.
I can only give you a historic response. The Chinese were in the exact same position vis-a-vi the Soviets.

The Soveits in response prepared a massive nuclear strike invasion of the PRC and was ready to go in the early 70s. Brezhnev even asked Nixon to help. A shocked Nixon replied that he would do all he can to humanitarian aid the Chinese after any nuclear strike.

However, the Soviets let it be known how close the Chinese were to glow in the dark. After that, border incidents decreased dramatically.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 15 Jun 2004 07:58

GOOD GOD!

PAKISTANI BRIGADIERS, IN A PROFESSIONAL THINK TANK NO LESS, HAVE NOT READ FM-3?!?!?!?!

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Calvin » 15 Jun 2004 08:05

wyu: What is the comment on Pak brigadiers based upon?

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 15 Jun 2004 08:25

Calvin,

Your postings of articles by Brigadier (Ret'd) Shaukat Qadir does not reflect the very nature suggested by Cold Start, which is accelerated deployment, not faster mobilization (two very different concepts - the difference between imposing decisive force as opposed to bringing to bear overwhelming force).

By the very nature of what we know of Cold Start, eight smaller "Battle Groups," they do not have the mass of the 3 Strike Corps and thus, these battle groups are not meant to do battle as done by the corps.

This is not new and is in fact being practised as suggested by FM-3, as was done in the Kuwait and Iraq Wars. The purpose is not to engage the whole of the hostile army but to make most of their formations meaningless and thus can be bypassed.

In NATO soldier speak, this is Isolation and Reduction, our counter to the Soviets' Deep Battle (which is what the Multi-Tier Offensive Concept is based upon).

Had the Pak Brigadier known this, he would not bring up irrevelent issues as the reserve mobilization times. Unless they were at their posts before Cold Start begins, then it is irrevelent how fast they can mobilize. The battle would be over before they can get into place.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Kuttan » 15 Jun 2004 08:26

This is just another fancy term, with a lot of hot air being generated about the general inability in the past to do a swift deep-strike-and pull-out with any convincing level of efficiency and effectiveness.

From past reports, it appears that every such effort was noted by western satellites way in advance, enabling GOTUS to let the dilli billis know that the cover was blown, with enough time left to abort the start of the operation. That means, plans were blown about 24 to 48 hours in advance.

So the moustache-twirling what-whats come up with ever- fancier Operation names and Formation names.

Obviously all this has to be "sub-nuclear" or else there is no possibility of a clean withdrawal.

Ideally, a Cold Start operation must hit PA / ISI HQ with enough force to cause complete chaos - then deter Paki retaliation with enough conviction to cow down the enraged Paki generals. That can only be done through combined military-political operations: a public TV/radio announcement by the Indian PM that the operation was undertaken as punishment for terrorism/ other crimes, and any attempt at retaliation would be seen as total war.

If this works, the Paki regime crumbles, and TSP shatters into six - and that HAS to be the end result of Cold Start - anything less is not a worthwhile aim, and won't work - the Pakis would retaliate and things would swiftly spiral down to the situation mentioned above - threats of fingers on buttons and B-52s etc. etc.

Cheers


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