Cold Start: An analysis

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Raman » 21 Jul 2004 23:50

It is impossible to have radio silence since the computers must talk to each other constantly. With that kind of traffic, the enemy doesn't need to find you, you've just told them where you are.
I see no reason why NCW implies the impossibility of radio-silence. It is always possible to trade-off between volume of communication and information freshness --- if this is important (and I sense from your words that you think it so), it simply must be designed into the system.

Also keep in mind that in the time it takes a bellycrawler to say "Uhhh ... I'm in grid position ... where's the f*** map? ... err.. 1400 ...", a computer can send a compressed and encrypted packet burst containing the readings from every sensor held by a company (such as known enemy positions), where the elements of the company are, what they had for breakfast, their mothers' maiden names and if PFC Doofus *really* needs to take a pee.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Johann » 22 Jul 2004 00:16

Originally posted by wyu:
I suspect div would follow the way of corps (when was the last time we had a corps lvl exercise?) and that future div lvl actions would be individual bde actions as was the case with V Corps as a collection of individual div lvl actions in the Iraq War.
Very true - if the US Army is going to train at brigade level, it is going to fight engagements at the brigade level.

Re. CLF reorganisation, what is the role envisaged for these medium forces?

For example I am assuming CF would not be willing to send this emerging medium force across the Karbala Gap to engage the Medina RG div with TUAs. Or would they have say acted as a screening force for heavier formations from Coalition partners?

Rajesh,

Not letting the enemy know exactly where you are, how you are deployed and where you are heading gives you tactical freedom and allows you to get in to the other fellows decision cycle.

Lt. Col. Yu's concern is that traffic analysis
of a networked army where every sensor, platform and perhaps soldier is emitting will offer tremendous opportunity to quite passively locate own units and their disposition, including command post locations.

However in my opinion the sheer volume of traffic would demand extremely sophisticated analysis, so not every foe will be able to exploit such a weakness.

I am more concerned about the security implications of embedding IFF type devices on vehicles as is being considered.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 22 Jul 2004 02:09

Rajesh,

The demands on the NC system is continous. You don't know when and where you need to receive/send info from/to someone else and vice versa.

The cmdr doesn't ask for the bellycrawler's position. He directly reads it off the bellycrawler's GPS (or rather, he have his 2IC do it).

Johann,

CF/LF assumes that it would always be part of a Coalition (read American) Force. The doctrinal development is not happenning in isolation but as part of the ABCA Armies Standardization Program. Thus, there is a tendency to assume either British or American supplying required assets and we in turn supply assets that they don't have (such as the COYOTE ARV for the US 187BCT, 101st Airborne Div (Air Assualt) in Afghanistan).

CF/LF is certainly not envisioning not taking part in any future Iraq type war and that our participation may be mandatory, whether this be a Battle Group (ala 3 PPCLI BG in Afghanistan) or the proposed 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (comprising of the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the 3 Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Groups) to the Iraq War before Jean Chretien pulled the plug on that one. I can't remember where I learned this but the Brits were offerring a 3rd BG to flush 2CMBG out as part of the Commonwealth Division.

It is more than likely that this is the vision held by the Chief of Land Staff, to ask our allies to flush us out at either bn/bde lvl while we flush them out at the bde/div lvl.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Johann » 22 Jul 2004 02:45

Col. Yu,

I am aware of the ABCA trend. UK MoD in the most recent white paper assumed that all actions would be in a Coalition setting, however unlike Canada or the Anzacs heavy forces are being retained. Medium forces are proposed to form 1/3rd of British forces under the current 'rebalancing' exercise, and there are a number of raging battles underway as we speak.

Let me rephrase and focus my question sir; given that Canada is as you said often on the 'bleeding edge' of doctrinal evolution, and the knowledge enabled/supported medium force concept under development, given the expected capabilities what kind of force would CLF be willing to send up a Canadian led task force against?

I ask because of course differences persist; For example British brigades and battle groups have in fact grown more powerful (although the number likely to be deployed has reduced), while the American brigades are shrinking. Another example, the British Army is unreceptive to the idea of wheeled armour which has proved so popular in North America.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Raman » 22 Jul 2004 02:52

Johann,

Lt. Col. Yu's concern is that traffic analysis of a networked army where every sensor, platform and perhaps soldier is emitting will offer tremendous opportunity to quite passively locate own units and their disposition, including command post locations.
I fully understand the above vulnerability. However, given the sophistication of current defense hardware and the definite possibility of smart EM management in an NCW system, I question the following assumption:

The demands on the NC system is continous.
This may well be the demands of a particular implementation of a NCW system. I do not believe it to be a necessity of all NCW systems --- a sophisticated implementation can allow the end-user to trade-off correctness/freshness of displayed information against volume of traffic.

Under the assumption that an "approximate" position (that is indicated to the commander to be uncertain) is better than having no positional updates at all, it will be possible to send out updates less frequently. E.g., "stale" information may slowly fade out of commanders' displays, with the ability of being able to call-up last known positions and whether the units in question were put into "low-update-volume" (or even fully disconnected) mode when last heard from. This is no worse than a radio-silent operation, except that, when the situation demands it, units can come out of "disconnected/low-update-volume mode" and bring both themselves and their commanders to full situational awareness in a matter of seconds/minutes.

My disagreement is that an "always on" NCW system (which, I agreee, is a pretty dumb idea) is being compared to a completely radio-silent operation.
- First, as I have stated, there is no rule that says that NCW must be always on.
- Second, assuming that belly-crawlers must talk *sometime*, can't traffic analysis be performed on radio transmissions?
- Third, assuming that the units are not completely radio silent, an NCW system can transmit a *lot* more data than a belly-crawler's voice in the same amount of time

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby NRao » 22 Jul 2004 03:08

Rajesh,

All that assumes present day techs I assume. (I am only trying to understand where you are coming from, not a knock.)

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Raman » 22 Jul 2004 07:03

Niranjan,

I am no defense expert and have no access to specifications of NCW systems. I am, however, a software engineer --- I'm merely speculating with what is technologically possible *today* in an ad hoc networking environment. Even a system that assumes "always on" NCW *must* be able to represent/process the possibility of late or missing updates from various network elements (obscured by terrain/malfunctioning equipment/battle damage/etc); the "limited update mode" and "disconnected mode" that I speculate on above are merely means of *purposely* exercising these possibilities.

Note that I am only making a technological argument. There may be some deep military science reason why the NCW *doctrine* forbids this. But the NCW *technology* (as I see it) need not necessarily imply giving away your position, tactical intent, etc. to the enemy any more than non-radio-silent military operations.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby NRao » 22 Jul 2004 07:40

Thanks.

As a FYI. NCW does not depend on todays techs. To put it into some perspective: during the last Iraq war, "they" were down to a few hours between +ve id and bombing. They want to get down to 4 minutes. And, computers used by the USN are dunked in salt water and expected to function.

And, they have been at it for some time now.

India sits pretty nice in such matters. IMVHO.

All open source.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 22 Jul 2004 07:46

Johann,

You won't see much difference at the Battle Group level than what you're currently seeing today. Just that the engr recee, AT pltn, and mortar pltn would not be organic to the inf bns. If something heavy like Iraq or Afghanistan, CF/LF would like to re-enforce with another coy from one of the other regts. The preferred would be a COYOTE ARV reee troop or coy-sized squadron though a LAV-105 troop or squadron would not be out of the question.

That's the most likely deployable TOE.

Currently, we be extremely hard pressed to deploy a bde group but not out of the question. We deployed two BGs to Kosovo and an entire bde group (including reserves) was raised for the G7 in Alberta.

Again, most likely, we'll supply two bns and ask our allies to flush out a third.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 22 Jul 2004 07:55

Rajesh,

The age old arguement, the more you give them, the more they want. The demand for real time info is as great as the Brigadier states it to be. For the purposes outlined, everyone would want a realtime and continous feed to all recee intel (either ARV or UAV).

For alot of the PGM TOT to work, target selection and feed would have to be on constantly just so that the munitions have something to home in on, especially if they were launched BVR.

Alot of technological hurdles remains in that no one has yet to solve the problem of "real" real-time info. USANG Maj Schmit was 20 seconds too early bombing us Canadians or that the info that he had targetted friendlies was 20 seconds too late.

There is now a very strong desire to have a continous system to avoid future blue-on-blue problems. Something us bellycrawlers are not exactly comfortable with.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Raman » 22 Jul 2004 09:18

wyu,

Thanks --- I think I understand the problem and source of your discomfort. It is not technical as I thought you originally insinutated). Operational tempo and degree of cross-service synchronization expected from a NCW setup would force units into an "always on" disposition even though they might at times prefer to disconnect due to local "on-the-ground" realities.

Please correct me if I'm wrong --- everything from here on is your area of expertise --- what you describe seems to me like an inflexible interpretation of NCW. Wouldn't it be possible to posit an NCW doctrine that allows units to disconnect/go dark if the situation so demands it?

As far as solving the technical problem of "real" in real-time, I think it is fairly safe to state that it cannot be completely licked. A survey of distributed systems in computer science will show that systems that have been successful are ones that accept that distribution implies uncertainty, entailing designs that embrace uncertainty rather than "engineering it out" of the system.

If this expectation is communicated effectively to (and absorbed by!) planners, it may yet be possible to have an NCW system that everyone is comfortable with.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Rajiv Lather » 22 Jul 2004 10:05

Rajiv Lather's rules:

#1 The ability of a given force to expand its range and capability using higher technology is inversely proportional to the 'Habitational Index'.

#2 After a certain point, all other thing being equal; the faster and greater the information being received by a commander, the lesser will be his capability to plan and execute any given operation.

Note: Habitational Index is calculated using the population density, construction and terrain of the area of operation.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby Anoop » 22 Jul 2004 16:15

YIP and Johann, I was away for a few days and so read your replies only now. Thanks.

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Re: Cold Start: An analysis

Postby wyu » 23 Jul 2004 09:50

Rajesh,

That's the propaganda, err I mean the sales pitch, err I mean the Request for Proposal. It is not the military who is demanding this but the industry who is promising this.

Those of us who raises the white flag got no vote in Congress nor Parliment in how to spend taxpayer's dollers in politican's local ridings.

Rajiv,

You forgot to add in the time factor which makes your axiom null and void.

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Postby RayC » 30 Jul 2004 20:50

Colonel and Johann,

What are your comments on the YIP article on Cold Start when compared to whats happening in the West?

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Postby Guru » 30 Jul 2004 21:05

I had earlier read the Cold Start article, but it didn't sound anything innovative, except that it was a summary of whats up in the media. And that didn't say anything startling or novel, though it seem very impressive.

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Postby Johann » 31 Jul 2004 04:44

Ray, will reply in a few days when I have time

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Postby Guru » 31 Jul 2004 11:08

I will ask Ray also. But I wanted to know as to what is the western concepts sine you and Wyu were in discussion and there seem to be a bit of difference.

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Postby wyu » 01 Aug 2004 08:50

RayC wrote:Colonel and Johann,

What are your comments on the YIP article on Cold Start when compared to whats happening in the West?


Sir,

YIP already stated that his article was geared towards those familiar with the InA. That pre-qualifications disqualifies me from making comments. I am still as confused as before.

I can say that what he wrote does not reflect what we're doing in the West. It is certainly not any interruptation of FM-3 that I am aware of. The air force fighting the war seperately but co-ordinating with the army is something that is totally alien to me. No military in NATO/ANZAC nor the former Warsaw Pact would tolerate this diversion. All services answer to one cmdr.

I am also unaware of anyone trying to do a "100 gun" formation. I have questions whether this is viable. I am unaware of any battle area that would accomondate such formations (I also cannot see how the enemy would allow time for such a formation to assemble).

Forgive me, Sir, but the British (and everyone else I am aware of) always consider guns as combat arms. What did the InA consider guns as before? Combat support? The only disagreement between the various armies that I am aware of are the engineers. Some armies consider them combat arms. Others combat support.

There are certain other aspects which I am uncomfortable with. We know the Cold Start did not have much development time. Thus, I would be very hesitant to say that Cold Start would include some fancy manouvering and new implementations of new and old toys. Platoons, companies, and battalions would still have to fight as platoons, companies, and battalions. If there is too much change, then, they would be platoon groups, company groups, and battle groups which is what is not happenning.

I am inclined to wait things out so that the actual Cold Start formations would answer my questions.

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Postby RayC » 01 Aug 2004 11:51

Colonel,

That is a fair answer.

The 100 gun concept is a Russian concept. In Kargil, they used it. Ofcourse, it was not classical in implementation, but in totality it meant devastating fire during a time continuum controlled thorough a Master FDC.

Regarding each service operating in their own wars in a single war, it is not totally correct. At higher levels, there is cooordination of all effort. However, since strategic targets cannot be addressed by the land forces, it is for the airforce to organise the same. Also deep interdictions to support the land plans. Air effort is also dedicated for ground operations and it beceomes more as the days of the war goes on since the airforce related tasks get largely accomplished.

As I see, the Cold Start is more of giving teeth to the Brigade. India, to the best of my knowledge, has no imperialist designs of capturing land or even do regime changes by swamping another country. All that is required, should India be required to go to war, is to ensure that a messsge is sent that it cannot be trifled with, without cause or historical animosity from that side. All the grandoise stuff about bifurcating Pakistan, to my mind, were merely mind games and playing soldiers without having the wherewithals to do so, excepting excellent command over English. Maybe the new concept is closer to reality and achievement. But, as you correctly say, we have to wait and see.

A look at the historical aspect of all wars fought after Independence, prima facie, have been Brigade battles at best. Now, if they are Brigade battles and not classical battles at the Divisonal level, since we have no territorial gains ambition (except to liberate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), then why not give the wherewithals to the Brigade so that the accomplishment becomes faster, rather than them looking over the shoulder.

Of course, these are my off the cuff comments without the luxury of deep thought.

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Postby Guru » 01 Aug 2004 22:59

Hey!

I still remain confused.

What's the real thing?

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Postby Johann » 02 Aug 2004 09:00

Ray,

As for Lt. Col. Yu, Yogi's article is a reminder of the difference in requirements, and the consequent diversion in approaches and concepts.

- The growing emphasis on artillery fires, in particular the massing of tubes is a completely different trend, as is the use of artillery for punitive action.

Jointness with the air component, and the air components ability to relatively quickly establish air superiority has obviously played a part in that trend in the West.

We also do not face situations where penetrations are likely to be so shallow.

The closest situation I can think of (and this is a very imperfect analogy) is the Korean peninsula today, where the N.Korean concentration of artillery (both tubes and rockets) is meant to both provide massive prep fires on S.Korean forces for invasion forces, but increasingly offers a kind of stand-off capability to inflict damage to a wide range of targets in the South, particularly in and around Seoul.

- As far as jointness goes in the West the historical trend was that joint command, (including CDS) preceded the development of joint doctrine and procedures. The Indian forces appear to be doing things in the opposite order, perhaps because the factors that brought about joint command (shortening decision cycles, budgetary pressures, multinational commands, expeditionary war, etc) have not been felt as early or as strongly in India.

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Postby wyu » 02 Aug 2004 17:47

Sir,

Your post makes sense to me and contradicts my understanding of YIP's article.

Johann and the Brigadier,

Gentlemen, I am still uneased at how 100 guns can fit into Cold Start. That's a corps lvl asset and quite frankly, too much overkill which translated into wasted LOG and time usage.

The Russians last use such formations during WWII. Since then, while they do deploy large number of guns, they were always part of a DAG or RAG.

I would expect a 4x4 or 4x6 deployment for a bde and an artillery bde for a DAG for a div lvl deployment.

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Postby RayC » 02 Aug 2004 20:27

Colonel,

My comments were not toally on the YIP article.

YIP's was generic and so obviously the nitty gritties would not be there as it is still not known in the public domain.

The 100 guns concept cannot be at bde level. That is obvious. It would mean 50 guns in support of each battalion attack in a two up attack. As you are aware, the actual fighting is not numbers, it requires deployment area that has a tactical logic, movement, support echelons, camouflage, dispersion, contingency postitions, alternate positions and so many other things. In fact, with a small number but with a rapid rate when required, the same effect can be achieved. With Bofors, it is even better having the shoot and scoot capability.

Oh well....

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Postby Johann » 03 Aug 2004 06:32

Lt. Col. Yu,

I was under the impression that investments were being made at the Corps and above level in raising artillery divisions, as well as modernisation and standardisation at lower levels.

Some of the C3 investments described should eventually improve their ability to concentrate fires, and not just tubes.

Ray,

Can you give us an outline of artillery employment in support of the brigade battle in Kargil?

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Postby wyu » 04 Aug 2004 08:21

Johann wrote:Lt. Col. Yu,

I was under the impression that investments were being made at the Corps and above level in raising artillery divisions, as well as modernisation and standardisation at lower levels.

Some of the C3 investments described should eventually improve their ability to concentrate fires, and not just tubes.


My comments were in reference to Cold Start itself. I just cannot see any 100 guns formation as part of any Cold Start Battle Groups.

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Postby khan » 05 Aug 2004 19:15

wyu wrote:
Johann wrote:Lt. Col. Yu,

I was under the impression that investments were being made at the Corps and above level in raising artillery divisions, as well as modernisation and standardisation at lower levels.

Some of the C3 investments described should eventually improve their ability to concentrate fires, and not just tubes.


My comments were in reference to Cold Start itself. I just cannot see any 100 guns formation as part of any Cold Start Battle Groups.
IA is expected to buy around 500+ self propelled guns. That should equip 5 divs. Is that enough for the 100 guns thing to work? How many will it take?

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Postby wyu » 05 Aug 2004 19:53

I believe you've misunderstood. 100 guns are too many guns. For a bde size "Integrated Battle Group", you need no more than a battalion (4 batteries of 4 to 6 guns each). Anymore than that, then you will have idle guns because the front line inf would already be too busy directing the guns in action and would not be able to find new targets for the idle guns.

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Postby Rudra » 05 Aug 2004 20:00

would MLRS elements like Pinaka and Smerch make sense to attach into the IGBs or better to hold them at more strategic levels ?

How are the two Arty divisions expected to be used ... piecemeal or
concentrated with particular IBGs ?

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Postby Guru » 05 Aug 2004 20:49

Wyu,

How much area would a IBG attack? I don't understand much of these battle techniques, but if 100 guns are there to help them through, then would the fire base not be more than the area being attacked?

What would be the distance between guns as obviously it would not mean that they are positioned side by side like a tin of sardines.

If 100 guns fire how much will be the area that they cover? One of my army friends told me that it covers 150 by 150 (the standard guns) and more when big guns like Bofor fires.

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Postby wyu » 05 Aug 2004 22:30

Rudra Singha wrote:would MLRS elements like Pinaka and Smerch make sense to attach into the IGBs or better to hold them at more strategic levels ?


As a former Bde OpsO, if you want to give them to me, I will take them. I like to keep them further back and also use them to form my tactical reserve.

Rudra Singha wrote:How are the two Arty divisions expected to be used ... piecemeal or concentrated with particular IBGs ?


I do not have the InA background to comment on how the InA would use guns. However, I would feel more comfortable if a single guns bn (which may or may not include a rocket battery) is organic to the IBGs (meaning that the IBG owns the guns battalion and not detached from an upper echelon).

Guru wrote:How much area would a IBG attack? I don't understand much of these battle techniques, but if 100 guns are there to help them through, then would the fire base not be more than the area being attacked?


http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol4/ ... re-2_e.gif

I'm not sure I'm understand your right. By fire base, do you mean the artillery staging area or the target area?

I will try to answer both.

If you mean by staging area, then Cold Start lacks the flexibility to choose the place of engagement since the battle area must be within range of the artillery.

If you mean the target area, then 100 guns would saturate more than what the IBG could see.

Guru wrote:What would be the distance between guns as obviously it would not mean that they are positioned side by side like a tin of sardines.


B-GL-371-1 - FA Doctrine

Guru wrote:If 100 guns fire how much will be the area that they cover? One of my army friends told me that it covers 150 by 150 (the standard guns) and more when big guns like Bofor fires.


Beyond my understanding of guns. The last time the Canadian army employed guns in such numbers is WWI.

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Postby Guru » 06 Aug 2004 00:29

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol4/ ... re-2_e.gif

Could you explain this a little more for a layman like me?

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Postby daulat » 06 Aug 2004 13:19

the 100 guns concept is not straightforward. if you have pre-located guns with enough stores to keep going thats one scenario, but you're losing many tactical advantages. if you dynamically cluster the guns as per need, then the logistics chain is complex. i dread to think how much transport and 'feed' such a formation will require.

also, with ~100 bofors clustered, their kill power must be beyond scary. :eek:

Perhaps in the punjab/jammu sector, you can quickly coalesce a 100 gun formation and beat the mother of all crap out of any enemy formation forming on the other side and then disperse again behind defenses/armour. to me this seems to preclude any real battle of manouevre - which lets be honest is sort of ruled out in this sector due to the dense defenses.

MLRS seems to be much more of a super-tactical asset to me. I thought that they were originally conceived as 'assault breakers', i.e. destroy any massed formation coming your way. used offensively - as they were in GWII - I am not sure what you'd do with them that you couldn't do with regular artillery? I guess its a nice big sledgehammer with many uses...

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Postby putnanja » 07 Aug 2004 01:40

[url=http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040807/edit.htm#4]Defence structure needs overhaul — Also a doctrine on national security
[/url]

Established in 2001, India’s IDS is intended to fashion a joint approach to warfare and allow the nation’s most senior military officers to advise the Prime Minister directly without passing through layers of bureaucracy.

In the past two years, IDS members have:

1 Written a draft joint doctrine and joint perspective plan through 2017.

2 Established a unified command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, a Strategic Force Command to oversee India’s nuclear arsenal.

3 Set up a national command post, using the Defence Communication Network and dedicated satellites.

The IDS already has played a key role in shaping the five-year defence plan for 2002-2007, though the plan still must be approved by the Defence Ministry, said an official at the Indian Planning Commission, which builds long-term plans for the entire federal government. Under IDS’ direction, India’s vast inventory of Soviet- and Russian-made weapons is likely to be upgraded to Western systems, Defence Ministry sources say.

IDS intends to reshape military planning and modernisation efforts from a budget-driven exercise to a need-driven one, said retired Army Lt. Gen. Brij Mohan Kapur, who until recently served on the IDS as Deputy Chief for policy planning and force developing. Eventually, IDS would like to create an effects-based military planning system that judges new weapons on their relative combat effectiveness, Kapur said. For example, if a missile-armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can destroy a target better than a tank, the tank may have to go.

Most importantly, IDS has promoted joint thinking about warfare, Kapur said. The unified command set up at Andaman and Nicobar will serve as the experimental lab for joint warfare training. “Future wars are not going to be Air Force dominated or Army-dominated,” he said. “It is going to be country-dominated,” with a national objective rather than service objectives driving combat strategy, he said.

But inter-service rivalry and bureaucratic delays are slowing reform. “Like most militaries, the Indian military has the usual inter-service rivalries, including turf wars,” said Oberoi. But without integration “you cannot win wars, including low-intensity conflict.”

...

Ministry officials will decide within three months whether to approve the new doctrine, which was developed under the direction of Gen. Joginder Jaswant Singh, former Army Training Command Chief, who now heads the Army’s Western Command.

Other ministry sources said the restructuring would:

1 Prompt a rethinking of acquisition priorities.

2 Integrate elements from the Navy, Air Force and the Army.

3 Aim to create Special Forces that could strike behind enemy lines.

4 Require better satellite communications and imagery, aerial and ground sensors, and night-vision devices.

The restructuring also would reduce the fighting role of the three Strike Corps stationed in northern India, and turn them largely into training units, said a senior Army planning official. The doctrine calls for developing a deterrent ability to inflict greater punitive retaliation with nuclear and conventional arms. “Wars would be short, swift and limited against a nuclear background,” the ministry-planning official said.

...

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Postby NRao » 07 Aug 2004 05:01

Ravi,

post the entire article, it may not be there latter on.

RayC
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Postby RayC » 09 Aug 2004 12:06

This thread has turned 'Cold'. Someone can kick'start' it.

wyu
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Postby wyu » 10 Aug 2004 09:09

RayC wrote:This thread has turned 'Cold'. Someone can kick'start' it.


Sir,

My apologies. I've been too busy with home after being a week away. Dogs were hyper. Horses forgot who I was and wouldn't come in to be groomed (ever tried to get a Belgian into a barn). Number One Daughter decided to celebrate with daddy by drowning me in apple juice. Mistress of the House had a thousand things for Man who Brags too much to fix (never exhault your engineer status, gentlemen, she'll never let you forget it).

Sir, also, please check your email.

Guru wrote:If 100 guns fire how much will be the area that they cover? One of my army friends told me that it covers 150 by 150 (the standard guns) and more when big guns like Bofor fires.


I would like to add more information to your question if you do not mine. It's not so much an area but the targets they could hit. 150x150 covers alot of empty ground and really, a waste of ammo even if you are doing recee by fire.

What 100 guns would give you is simultaneous on multiple targets. If you could all the CPs and HQs at once, it would more than disorient the enemy. It would have destroyed his ability to react, even with his reserves.

What is most certainly a given is the increased need for recee and battle management assets. I'm not sure how the InA would approach this but there is most certainly a need to pass between back and forth between bde and bn recee and CP.

Guru wrote:Could you explain this a little more for a layman like me?


Actually, the graph is too simplistic and does not give the whole picture. What the graph was trying to portray is the history of how much area a bde can control during operations. At the earliest point, a bde is limited by lethality and communication range. A bde cmdr must be able to issue orders and expect them to be carried out by bn and coy cmdrs within a timely manner. This usually means foot/horse messengers.

As time progresses and technology is further introduced into the battlefield, lethality and communications range also increases. However, so is the size of a bde. A bde in the early days is about a 1000 men. Today, it's 3-8 thousand. However, this must be taken into consideration that alot of these increases were in the cbt spt and cbt svc units and not just the cbt arms.

These increases further increase the area a bde can control during operations.

We should be extremely careful not to take these things as written in stone. British, American, and Canadian military histories had had coy size outposts controlling thousands of kms (mostly in the Wild West or in Africa). This is because the population density and the size of force the local hostile force could muster would be hard pressed to reach over 300 warriors (Little Big Horn being a big exception).

Thus, there may be cases where a coy could do what a div could not or would not.

Anoop
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Postby Anoop » 04 Sep 2004 02:56

Hi,

Some thoughts w.r.t the Cold Start doctrine:

The likely PA response to Cold Start. From the discussion on this thread, it seems that Cold Start is predicated on accelerated deployment of force at the brigade level.

In that sense, what happens if the PA doctrine shifts to keeping one bde battle ready at all times to match the IA deployment geographically – their version of Cold Defence? In essence, they will not be caught entirely at “peace-time” locations when Cold Start commences. Since our Cold Start doctrine does not aim to make a deep thrust, the level of force needed to put up an effective defence for a short period of time (12-24 hrs) will not be large because they have the advantage of defending and the terrain.

Another possible PA response is massive shelling of our population centers and immediate use of short-range (50 to 100 km) Hatf-II missiles on our troop formations (if they can be located). Given that the objective of Cold Start is disproportionate destruction on the Pak side, PA’s efforts will be to deny that to the IA – by wanton destruction on our side even if its only for publicity purposes. This will sway public opinion in India and prevent a second Cold Start operation in the future because the Indian public perception -aided no doubt by their sympathizers in the Indian press – will be that of a rash GoI move for uncertain results.

In the event that we do succeed (please see below), the likely Pak response will be to increase Jihadi attacks on India many-fold. Again the Pak aim will be to show the futility of conventional operations as a deterrent to terrorists.

So, I think the true success of Cold Start will be measured by

(a) preventing the Pakistanis from escalating, so that we have control of when it stops. In other words, Cold Start, followed by Cold Stop. It is unlikely that Pak will accept an Indian presence in Pak or PoK without a corresponding Pak presence in India, so that territory can be bartered. This means they will seek to continue the battle elsewhere until they achieve their aim and we will have to ensure that they simply cannot.

(b) repeatability of a punitive operation on the same lines at some point in future. This means that IA, GoI and the Indian populace will have to be convinced that this is a worthwhile strategy. As far as the GoI and India at large is concerned, the IA can do nothing about that. So as far as the IA is concerned, it will have to have a sufficient number of back-up plans (i.e. a sufficient variety of plans) to undertake similar ventures later with the PA now on guard.

Given these criteria, I am leaning towards Siachen as the stage for the curtain-raiser. The world knows it's a battleground, so what's a few fire-fights between friends? The IAF can target PA base camps each time a red-line is crossed. We have local air-superiority, so PAF interference should be manageable - besides their A-G operational ability at that height is a big question mark. Our A-D defences should be on alert round the clock to prevent PAF from returning the favor.

Logistics strain is minimal since no infantry attacks are planned. IA continues artillery shelling of their forward posts and IAF targets their base camps. This locks the Paks into a scenario where quick ripostes are impossible due to terrain limitation and there is lower international interest in their whining. If they open up other fronts, escalate the battle according to YIP's classical CS scenario. The big advantage as I see it is that we are not committed to a precipitate action and there's a lot of room (and time) for diplomatic manouever.

And it's repeatable, provocation after provocation. No need to raise such noise in the media, but Pak must know the price of a major terrorist attack will be paid by their soldiers in Siachen.

Comments, please.


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