Cold Start: An Analysis
Posted: 14 Jun 2004 03:49
Gentlemen: I'm sure we have discussed this previously, but given its apparent centrality in our efforts it appears that we may wish to analyze this further. If this is an ongoing discussion elsewhere in the forum, please direct me to it.
http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper991.html
Introductory Observations: India unveiled officially its new war doctrine on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commander’s Conference that took place last week. Obviously, the need for a new war doctrine was decades-long overdue, but it seems that the lessons of the Kargil War reinforced by the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army in the run-up to and during Operation PRAKARAM in 2001-2002 hastened the Indian military hierarchy towards this end.
General Padmanabhan the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation PRAKARAM had initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine and the fruitation now seems to have taken place after a series of major joint exercises between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force including massive live fire power demonstrations.
It seems that the new Cold War Strategy would now be discussed at various levels of three Services and fine tuned. Needless to say that in any future conflict scenario where a “blitzkrieg” type strategy is going to be followed; joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy would be an imperative.
Security requirements did not permit the spelling out of adequate details of the “Cold Start Strategy” by the Chief of Army Staff. However, it is not difficult to visualize what this new war doctrine conceptually incorporates as it is said to revolve around the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.
Such strategy did exist in NATO and was being taught at the Royal British Army Staff College. Camberley, UK which the author attended in 1971. In NATO terminology, “integrated” groups for offensive operations existed at three levels. The highest was “ combat group” and “combat command” based on a divisional or brigade Headquarters (armoured/infantry mechanised) under which were a flexible number of “battle groups” (based on an armoured regiment/mechanized infantry battalion Headquarters) and the lowest was the “combat team” (based on an armoured squadron/mechanized infantry company Headquarters). The groupings at the each level were task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force besides close support of ground attack Air Force squadrons. Also, was integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters. Command and control helicopters were available too.
Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”. For the purposes of this strategic review the eight “integrated battle groups” being talked about will be taken to mean eight integrated armoured division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. This would be a fair assumption to be made for our discussion in case the intended aim of this new war doctrine is to be achieved.
The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play, the responses of the enemy to such a new war doctrine and a host of other associated considerations.
“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Strategic Conceptual Underpinnings: In the absence of more details, and rightfully not spelt out due to security reasons, the strategic conceptual underpinnings of India’s new war doctrine can be envisaged as under:
* Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed. The distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished.
* The offensive military power available with defensive corps in the form of independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, by virtue of their forward locations would no longer remain idle waiting to launch counterattacks. They would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours.
* Strike Corps may be re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets.
* Obviously, then, India’s strike corps elements will have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. It also means that Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last three wars. The Strike Corps remained unutilised.
On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:
* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.
* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.
* The above also gives time to Pakistan’s external patrons like USA and China to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.
* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.
* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ‘ab-initio’ and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.
Cold Start Strategy” is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.
India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India’s political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The “ Cold Start Strategy” can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.
“Cold Start Strategy”- The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come into Play: Such an offensive strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has:
* Political will to use offensive military power.
* Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies.
* Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity.
* Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures.
* Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.
If the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to 2004, Indian Army’s new war doctrine would not add up to anything. For more detailed views on this subject, see the authors recent book: “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis” (reviewed on SAAG website as “Igniting Strategic Mindsets in Indians:; SAAG paper no. 657 dated 09-04-2003)
India’s National Military Directives Need Change: Indian Governments, irrespective of political hues have shied away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. However, what can be called as a sort of national military directive, which the Indian Army under political compulsions stands fixated is “No Loss of Territory, Not Even an Inch”. Heads have rolled in the Army on this account in past wars.
“Cold Start Strategy” with its inherent character of mobile warfare using mechanized military formations, and especially where defensive formations may be called upon to undertake such operations, may at times involve some loss of territory in plains warfare.
If the above is not acceptable then strategically and militarily the status quo needs to be maintained with Indian Army fixated on linear defences. This author had argued against this as early as 1985 in an article “India’s Linear Fixations” in the Combat Journal of what is now called the Army War College.
India’s Strategic Military Objectives Needs to be Made Clear: India’s strategic military objectives need to:
* Shift from capturing bits of Pakistan territory in small scale multiple offensives to be used as bargaining chips after the cease fire.
* Focus on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine without much collateral damage to Pakistani civilians.
All the three armed forces have to synergise operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army as it is that which enslaves Pakistan, impedes democracy in Pakistan and indulges in military adventurism against India, including proxy wars and terrorism.
It is for nothing that the Pakistani military rulers and the Pakistani Army have hid from the Pakistani nation the causes of their military failure against India in 1971, 1999 (Kargil) and a catastrophic defeat in January 2002 if India’s political leadership had not restrained the Indian Army during Operation Prakaram. “Cold Start Strategy” should therefore be aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s military machine. India’s Army Commanders can infer what this implies.
“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Imperatives of Dedicated Air Force Close Air Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons: The Indian Air Force (IAF) would have a very crucial and critical role to play in the successful implementation of this new war doctrine. The “Cold Start” eight or so “battle groups” cannot undertake “blitzkrieg” type military operations without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air support.
The IAF would therefore have to proportionately assign its combat assets to cater for the following:
* Achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyse the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”.
* Dedicate a fair portion of its combat assets for the air defence of the Indian homeland.
* Earmark dedicated close air support and ground attack squadrons in direct support of the “battle groups”.
The IAF would be hard pressed to execute the tasks from within its existing combat assets. Earlier, the IAF could initially allocate all its combat assets to achieve air superiority as any operations by “strike corps” would hope to subsequently follow.
In the new war doctrine scenario all these tasks would have to be concurrent. It was such a visualization that made this author in his strategic papers (“ India’s Strategic and Security 2004 Imperatives”: SAAG Paper no 884 dated 06.01.2004) reiterate that the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons. India has the financial resources to afford them. In any case even disconnecting from the new war doctrine requirements the IAF needs 70 combat squadrons in the context of India’s revised strategic frontiers discussed in an earlier paper of this author.
Indian Navy Aviation Support for “Battle Groups”: Besides its traditional tasks of sea control, naval blockades etc. the naval aviation support for the “battle groups” operations is a welcome step in filling some of the voids of IAF combat assets besides dividing the enemy’s aerial combat strength.
The Indian Navy, more importantly should concurrently be focusing in the new war doctrine scenario on amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.
India Will Have to Use Conventional Short Range Battle Field Missiles (SRBM) and Cruise Missiles: The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.
Use of SRBMs and cruise missiles will not only help in softening enemy’s ‘Vulnerable Areas’ and ‘Vulnerable Points’ but also thicken fire support assisting “battle groups” operations. These assets would more increasingly be required in support of “battle groups” operations in case of bad weather when IAF combat power cannot be applied.
Associated with this would be India’s imperatives to accelerate her ICBM development and production which is India’s sovereign right. “Cold Start” war doctrine without ICBM back up would be susceptible to external pressures.
Inventories of these weapons have to be significantly expanded and the time is now to jump-start India’s defence production apparatus to this end.
Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Expansion and Employment in New War Doctrine: The successful implementation of the new war doctrine for force multiplication effect, for reinforcing the offensive punch and for exploitation of fleeting apparatus in fast paced military operations would call for sizeable employment of :
* Special Forces
* Air Assault Divisions.
* Air Cavalry brigades.
* Light infantry divisions with air-transportable combat power.
In the ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine scenario widespread use of the above forces including the capture and holding of airheads behind enemy lines would confuse the enemy, divide his reaction and counterattacks and spread panic. The Indian Army’s capabilities in this direction are limited and need to be comprehensive enhanced.
Logistic Support For Cold War Doctrine: Such operations which can be expected to be swift, fluid and rapidly changing directions of attack cannot rest for logistic requirements on Indian Army’s conventional logistic support which is ground based and wheel-based and incapable of swift cross country mobility.
Indian Army’s own aviation assets and heavier utility helicopters of the IAF would need significant mustering for logistic support of “Cold Start” battle group.
India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and military hardware spares along with “War Wastage Reserves” will have to be maintained at full levels at all times to enable “Cold Start” war doctrines to take off. Without these at full levels ‘Cold Start’ operations may end up as cold start.
Pakistan’s Responses to India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine Enunciation: India’s ‘ Cold Start’ war doctrine stands discussed in a recent Corps Commanders Conference of the Pakistan Army, and even amongst their strategic experts. Curiously, the discussions of the latter seem diverted to Pakistan’s special relationship with USA post 9/11 and there appears to be an implied assurance that the “special Pakistan-USA military relationship” would take care of the challenges posed to Pakistan by India’s new war doctrine. Pakistani strategic analysts view the enunciation of India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine as :
* Putting pressure on Pakistan prior to peace talks.
* The growing Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus is also curiously drawn in as an Indian concern requiring new war doctrines.
Surprisingly, no major military analysis has emerged so far Probably, it would take time to digest and come up with responses.
Pakistan’s Military Challenges Arising From India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine: Strategically and militarily, it can be visualized that Pakistan would be faced with a number of military challenges arising from India’s new war doctrine, namely:
* India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle group would be launched.
* Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in numbers and quality of numerical strength.
* Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence.
* Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.
* When and how does Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play.
* How to offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support.
* How to counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear.
Pakistan cannot combat the Indian challenges by the oft-repeated bravado statement that “One Pakistan Soldier is equal to ten Indian Soldiers” leading to strategic wags countering “what happens when the Eleventh Indian Soldier emerges”.
If the “Cold Start” doctrine is applied in its purist form, then in terms of military operations it does not become a game of military numbers but a game in terms of military technological superiority in terms of weapon systems, firepower and aerial combat assets besides the force multiplication effects of the Indian Navy.
Pakistan would have to divert sizeable financial resources for its weapon systems build-up to counter this doctrine. Of course, it can look to its external strategic patrons like USA and China for assistance and military largesse, but there is a limit here.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent and the Myth of Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold: The Indian political leadership and its national security establishment fed on US academia planted stories (probably officially inspired) of Pakistan nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold have been inordinately awed by its fearful consequences.
Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:
* Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.
* India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.
* The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.
* Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.
* Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.
* Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.
When the obvious intention of India’s new war doctrine is not to cross the nuclear threshold, and it seems declaratory in content, then a higher responsibility rests on Pakistan’s external strategic patrons that their wayward protégé does not charge foolishly and blindly into the realms where even fools or the devil do not dare.
Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold has crucial implications for USA and China too. In fact a USA-China conflict can be generated which may have its own nuclear overtones. Therefore it is incumbent on both USA and China to strategically declare that they would not countenance any Pakistani first nuclear strike against India i.e. crossing the nuclear threshold.
Pakistan proclivities to threaten nuclearisation of an Indo-Pakistan conventional conflict is more of a blackmail to force USA and China’s intervention. And if sincerely both USA and China are interested in South Asian peace and global security then Pakistan’s nuclear proclivities have to be pre-empted now with a strategic declaration against Pakistan as above.
India, in any case, has to be prepared militarily, eitherway, notwithstanding any such caution that may be imposed on Pakistan.
Concluding Observations: From the Indian perspective, enunciation of a new war doctrine was long overdue and it is significant for the following reasons:
* India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilization of India and proxy war and terrorism
* India moves away from its defensive mindset of last 50 year plus.
* India will now prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the out set.
* India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold
The Indian Army, despite any limitations in its hierarchy of not being forceful to make the political leadership in the last 50 years plus to adopt strategies which are strategically desirable but may be politically distasteful, has done well this time to bring India’s war doctrine in public debate. The vast majority of the Indian public will be in support of any war doctrine that puts Pakistan into place and forces it to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India.
From the Pakistani perspective the following needs to be recognized with the enunciation of India’s new war doctrine:
* India will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan without giving Pakistan time to bring diplomatic leverages into play against India.
* India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.
The United States and China have not come out with any response so far. Nor should they since national security interests of India need to be respected, as those of a responsible, politically stable and a mature regional power which has exercised restraint even to the extent of being ridiculed for its restraint.
Since a nuclear conflict initiated by Pakistan has global overtones and has the potential to bring them to conflict with each other, both the United States and China need to strategically declare that they will not countenance Pakistan, initiating a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Alternatively both USA and China, as Permanent Members of the UN Securing Council initiate steps jointly, to bring Pakistan’s (failed state WMD proliferator) nuclear assets under international control to be released only in the event of a nuclear threat.
Lastly, it needs to be reiterated that India may never have to put into effect its new “Cold Start” war doctrine if the United States and China restrain their wayward military protégé i.e. Pakistan from military adventurism and military brinkmanship. Also if United States and China wish to add value to their relationships with India, they need to desist from equating India with Pakistan when it comes to the prospects of the nuclear conflict in South Asia. India’s strategic maturity is not in doubt; it is Pakistan’s strategic maturity, which is in doubt. A nuclear conflict will take place in South Asia, only if the United States wants it and lets Pakistan permissively cross the nuclear threshold.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)
http://www.saag.org/papers11/paper1013.html
Indian Army’s above named war doctrine stood reviewed in the earlier paper of this author( SAAG Paper No991. dated 04,05,2004 entitled: India’s New "Cold Start" War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed)
Some additional imperatives, which have a significant bearing on the operationalisation of the new war doctrine, are listed below.
It has already been noted in the earlier Paper that this new ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine is Pakistan specific. Hence the imperatives discussed below need to be viewed in that context.
Re-location of Armoured Divisions, Armoured Brigades and Strike Formations Headquarters:
Since the most significant aim of the new war doctrine is to strike offensively without giving away battle indicators of mobilization, it is imperative that all strike formations headquarters, Armoured Divisions and Armoured Brigades are re-located from their existing locations in Central India and in depth in Punjab to forward locations.
All such formations should be moved forward to the general line of Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-Suratgarh from their present locations in the interior.
It can be envisaged that armoured formations would be loathe to move forward from their cushy cantonments on the plea that an adequate infrastructure should first come up. If infantry formations have existed in field area conditions for decades, there is no reason why armoured formations cannot similarly exist.
In this connection, the author would like to observe based on his exposures to NATO armies and United States forward deployments in Okinawa and Korea that no Army wastes so much money on building huge garages etc for their tanks. Field coverings of tanks etc should suffice.
Since conflicts in South Asia can erupt without long drawn out battle indicators, it is necessary that armoured formations are moved to the general line suggested above, and infrastructure creation can follow.
Higher Commanders Mental Robustness and Military Audacity:
Military operations of the type envisaged in Indian Army’s new war doctrine incorporates swift, fluid and relentless offensive operations, without the luxury of pauses and time duration spans of defensive operations to which Indian Army’s higher echelons are so conditioned to today.
Such swift and mobile fast-paced operations present the challenges of rapidly changing tactical situations and fleeting opportunities. The exploitation of these demands a high order of mental resilience and an eagle eye for reading such rapidly changing battle situations.
Military audacity does not come overnight. It has to be cultivated over a long period of time. If the German Panzer generals like Rommel and Guderian had been brought up in defensive mindsets of the Indian Army and the Indian political leadership, the blitzkreig’ lightening operations with which they covered themselves with glory would not have come their way.
Military orthodoxy in the Indian Army must give way to military audacity and offensive spirit, and the Indian Army higher commanders should ensure that it becomes the hallmark of junior leaders too..
C4I-(Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Networks) Need Upgradation and Fine Tuning:
Mechanized offensive operations by joint Army and Air Force cooperation require a highly upgraded and fine tuned C4I network. Since line communications become redundant in such a war doctrine, so envisaged, the command and control of such mechanized operations where fresh orders have to be passed every other minute, there will be a generation of high density traffic on C4I networks.
The Indian Army would have to create an extensive C4I network which can handle high density traffic on the move, which is secure, having scrambling and unscrambling features including digital voice fax and telex encryption capabilities.
Alternative and duplicate means will also have to be provided due to disruptions and destruction by enemy action.
Indian Air Force (IAF) Planning and Concept of Operations:
The Indian Air Force may have a marked superiority over the Pakistan Air Force in terms of sophisticated combat aircraft and advanced training,but this is not enough by itself.
The entire Indian Air Force planning will have to undergo a significant re-orientation in terms of concept of operations.
The following points need to be noted:
* New war doctrine of the Indian Army would call for more massed air operations as against compartmentalized sorties and small scale air operations in vogue so far.
* IAF should be able to generate very high sortie rates round the clock with effective maintenance support.
* Advanced C4I systems and use of AWACS system is a must. Indian Defence Ministry needs to speed up AWACS acquisition. In the interim explore for a lease; it may not be a problem.
* PGMs (Precision guided munitions) would be used extensively in such operations. Extensive stocks should be built up from now.
* Systems to paralyse and jam enemy radar and air defence networks would be a high priority.
The aim of the IAF in support of the Indian Army’s new war doctrine should be to combine mass with technology and PGMs and advanced munitions to paralyse the enemy’s reaction and destroy his war waging materiel and potential.
Air Defence Networks and Systems:
A sizeable expansion of India’s air-defence network would be required with multi-layered air defence in terms of surveillance, range capabilities and engagement ranges. This would need to be backed by an effective C4I system integral to the air defence system.
Mobile air defence weapon systems for the strike formations, combat area air defence networks, rear areas air defence networks for VAs and VPs and of all air bases calls for significant investments.
It must be remembered that an effective air defence system for IAF bases would enable release of that many combat aircraft on air defence duties to support combat operations. India’s air defence planning should now also incorporate ballistic missile defense systems as the enemy has a vast array of ballistic missiles. Here one is not talking of the NMD or TMD level of ballistic missile defences but of the US PATRIOT or the Russian S-300 systems.
The fourth generation of S-300 that is S-300PMU-1 system entered in service in 1995. In the Russian arsenal, a battery of this system includes 48 48N6 missiles mounted on 12-transport-erector-launchers. The missiles have a range of 5-150km and a maximum altitude of 27km.All of this supported by a highly sophisticated C4I battle management system including engagement radars. It is named as ALMUZ 83 M6
India was considering acquisition of these mobile systems but the “considering” has now to be translated into 'fast track' acquisition.
Integration with Nuclear Warfare Plans Both Defensive and Offensive:
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is very low and its nuclear doctrine does not believe in “No First Use.” Secondly, Pakistan’s nuclear triggers are in the hands of Pakistan Army known for its jingoism and military adventurism. India’s new war doctrine has to take into account that in the execution of its “Cold Start” War Doctrine and if lightening success comes their way, Pakistan could use its nuclear weapons or even the tactical nuclear weapons it claims to have. Reports suggest a few in original have been passed by China to Pakistan and these could come into play.
India’s execution of its new war doctrine must be integrated with nuclear warfare plans both defensive and offensive. And by defensive it is meant that Pakistani goes in for in first strike and by offensive it is meant the scenario in which India resorts to “second strike” in response. In both cases strike formations of Indian Army will have to operate on a nuclear battlefield.
NBC Proofing of Tanks/APCs, Provision of NBC Combat Suits for Personnel and Systems Within Strike Formations:
As a corollary of the above it follows that on first priority , Indian Army’s strike formations to be used in the new war doctrine are well equipped for battlefield combat under NBC conditions. It means that all tanks and APCs, command and control tanks, and allied vehicles, all have NBC sealing kits and that strike formations are equipped with de-contamination vehicles and kits and that all personnel are equipped with NBC suits to under take battle operations in NBC scenario. .
Sadly, it has to be noted that even today every Indian Army soldier combating Pakistan’s proxy war has not been equipped with bulletproof vests. What a poor contrast to the politicians sporting bullet proof vests and moving in bullet proof cars in New Delhi, while soldiers facing enemy bullets have not been so equipped due to bureaucratic lethargy.
Hopefully the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy and the Defense Minister would recognize the imperatives of equipping India’s strike formation with NBC combat suits.
Imperatives of Digitalised Real Time Information and Satellite Coverage:
India’s intelligence penetration of the Pakistan Army even in terms of human intelligence is not satisfactory. This limitation has to be off-set by technical means encompassing high attitude surveillance aircraft and satellite imagery with high resolution.
More importantly, such technical means should be geared to provide real time digitalized information to strike force commanders, with special reference to movements of enemy’s reserve formations. The Indian Army has to devise and acquire systems for such capabilities.
Indian Army’s Electronic Welfare (EW) Capabilities Enhancement:
Fortunately, the Indian Army has been focusing on this aspect from the 1980s, but the demands of the new war doctrine call for an effective enhancement of existing EW capabilities.
India’s EW capabilities must cater for jamming and neutralizing of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control systems, air-defense and surveillance system jamming and a complete paralysis of Pakistani C4I system in the battlefield area of India’s strike formations.
India’s technological capability in electronics and allied systems and Information Technology should enable it to use cyber-warfare as a force multiplier.
India’s ICBM and SLBM Development: India’s new doctrine would be unable to to generate its full potential without an ICBM and SLBM back-up. Both in the Congress regimes and in the BJP regime, external pressures have impeded their development. A national will is now required for a “Fast track ’’materialisation of these missiles in India’s missile arsenal.
Concluding Observations:
The Indian Army needs to make an exhaustive study of United States military operations in Gulf War I and Gulf War II. The Chinese have painstakingly gone through every detail of US military operations to draw the relevant lessons.
It would be wrong to surmise that the US military has been ineffective in Iraq because of the present problems that have now surfaced. These problems are post-war and are political in nature and do not detract from the US military’s use of high-technology war-fighting to subdue the enemy by demoralization of the Iraqi military machine in the war fighting phase.
India’s new war doctrine in terms of operationalising the concepts militarily, should aim at the destruction of the Pakistani military machine and the demoralization of the Pak Army. That would be the acid test for any political leadership of the day and the Indian military hierarchy.
This is not pontificating but an accurate appraisal of the achievable in relation to strategic means available. The only caveat being this that it calls for national political will to use military power ruthlessly and the military hierarchy of India to be militarily audacious and relentless in offensive operations.
http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper991.html
Introductory Observations: India unveiled officially its new war doctrine on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commander’s Conference that took place last week. Obviously, the need for a new war doctrine was decades-long overdue, but it seems that the lessons of the Kargil War reinforced by the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army in the run-up to and during Operation PRAKARAM in 2001-2002 hastened the Indian military hierarchy towards this end.
General Padmanabhan the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation PRAKARAM had initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine and the fruitation now seems to have taken place after a series of major joint exercises between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force including massive live fire power demonstrations.
It seems that the new Cold War Strategy would now be discussed at various levels of three Services and fine tuned. Needless to say that in any future conflict scenario where a “blitzkrieg” type strategy is going to be followed; joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy would be an imperative.
Security requirements did not permit the spelling out of adequate details of the “Cold Start Strategy” by the Chief of Army Staff. However, it is not difficult to visualize what this new war doctrine conceptually incorporates as it is said to revolve around the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.
Such strategy did exist in NATO and was being taught at the Royal British Army Staff College. Camberley, UK which the author attended in 1971. In NATO terminology, “integrated” groups for offensive operations existed at three levels. The highest was “ combat group” and “combat command” based on a divisional or brigade Headquarters (armoured/infantry mechanised) under which were a flexible number of “battle groups” (based on an armoured regiment/mechanized infantry battalion Headquarters) and the lowest was the “combat team” (based on an armoured squadron/mechanized infantry company Headquarters). The groupings at the each level were task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force besides close support of ground attack Air Force squadrons. Also, was integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters. Command and control helicopters were available too.
Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”. For the purposes of this strategic review the eight “integrated battle groups” being talked about will be taken to mean eight integrated armoured division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. This would be a fair assumption to be made for our discussion in case the intended aim of this new war doctrine is to be achieved.
The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play, the responses of the enemy to such a new war doctrine and a host of other associated considerations.
“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Strategic Conceptual Underpinnings: In the absence of more details, and rightfully not spelt out due to security reasons, the strategic conceptual underpinnings of India’s new war doctrine can be envisaged as under:
* Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed. The distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished.
* The offensive military power available with defensive corps in the form of independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, by virtue of their forward locations would no longer remain idle waiting to launch counterattacks. They would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours.
* Strike Corps may be re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets.
* Obviously, then, India’s strike corps elements will have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. It also means that Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last three wars. The Strike Corps remained unutilised.
On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:
* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.
* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.
* The above also gives time to Pakistan’s external patrons like USA and China to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.
* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.
* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ‘ab-initio’ and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.
Cold Start Strategy” is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.
India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India’s political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The “ Cold Start Strategy” can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.
“Cold Start Strategy”- The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come into Play: Such an offensive strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has:
* Political will to use offensive military power.
* Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies.
* Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity.
* Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures.
* Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.
If the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to 2004, Indian Army’s new war doctrine would not add up to anything. For more detailed views on this subject, see the authors recent book: “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis” (reviewed on SAAG website as “Igniting Strategic Mindsets in Indians:; SAAG paper no. 657 dated 09-04-2003)
India’s National Military Directives Need Change: Indian Governments, irrespective of political hues have shied away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. However, what can be called as a sort of national military directive, which the Indian Army under political compulsions stands fixated is “No Loss of Territory, Not Even an Inch”. Heads have rolled in the Army on this account in past wars.
“Cold Start Strategy” with its inherent character of mobile warfare using mechanized military formations, and especially where defensive formations may be called upon to undertake such operations, may at times involve some loss of territory in plains warfare.
If the above is not acceptable then strategically and militarily the status quo needs to be maintained with Indian Army fixated on linear defences. This author had argued against this as early as 1985 in an article “India’s Linear Fixations” in the Combat Journal of what is now called the Army War College.
India’s Strategic Military Objectives Needs to be Made Clear: India’s strategic military objectives need to:
* Shift from capturing bits of Pakistan territory in small scale multiple offensives to be used as bargaining chips after the cease fire.
* Focus on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine without much collateral damage to Pakistani civilians.
All the three armed forces have to synergise operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army as it is that which enslaves Pakistan, impedes democracy in Pakistan and indulges in military adventurism against India, including proxy wars and terrorism.
It is for nothing that the Pakistani military rulers and the Pakistani Army have hid from the Pakistani nation the causes of their military failure against India in 1971, 1999 (Kargil) and a catastrophic defeat in January 2002 if India’s political leadership had not restrained the Indian Army during Operation Prakaram. “Cold Start Strategy” should therefore be aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s military machine. India’s Army Commanders can infer what this implies.
“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Imperatives of Dedicated Air Force Close Air Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons: The Indian Air Force (IAF) would have a very crucial and critical role to play in the successful implementation of this new war doctrine. The “Cold Start” eight or so “battle groups” cannot undertake “blitzkrieg” type military operations without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air support.
The IAF would therefore have to proportionately assign its combat assets to cater for the following:
* Achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyse the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”.
* Dedicate a fair portion of its combat assets for the air defence of the Indian homeland.
* Earmark dedicated close air support and ground attack squadrons in direct support of the “battle groups”.
The IAF would be hard pressed to execute the tasks from within its existing combat assets. Earlier, the IAF could initially allocate all its combat assets to achieve air superiority as any operations by “strike corps” would hope to subsequently follow.
In the new war doctrine scenario all these tasks would have to be concurrent. It was such a visualization that made this author in his strategic papers (“ India’s Strategic and Security 2004 Imperatives”: SAAG Paper no 884 dated 06.01.2004) reiterate that the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons. India has the financial resources to afford them. In any case even disconnecting from the new war doctrine requirements the IAF needs 70 combat squadrons in the context of India’s revised strategic frontiers discussed in an earlier paper of this author.
Indian Navy Aviation Support for “Battle Groups”: Besides its traditional tasks of sea control, naval blockades etc. the naval aviation support for the “battle groups” operations is a welcome step in filling some of the voids of IAF combat assets besides dividing the enemy’s aerial combat strength.
The Indian Navy, more importantly should concurrently be focusing in the new war doctrine scenario on amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.
India Will Have to Use Conventional Short Range Battle Field Missiles (SRBM) and Cruise Missiles: The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.
Use of SRBMs and cruise missiles will not only help in softening enemy’s ‘Vulnerable Areas’ and ‘Vulnerable Points’ but also thicken fire support assisting “battle groups” operations. These assets would more increasingly be required in support of “battle groups” operations in case of bad weather when IAF combat power cannot be applied.
Associated with this would be India’s imperatives to accelerate her ICBM development and production which is India’s sovereign right. “Cold Start” war doctrine without ICBM back up would be susceptible to external pressures.
Inventories of these weapons have to be significantly expanded and the time is now to jump-start India’s defence production apparatus to this end.
Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Expansion and Employment in New War Doctrine: The successful implementation of the new war doctrine for force multiplication effect, for reinforcing the offensive punch and for exploitation of fleeting apparatus in fast paced military operations would call for sizeable employment of :
* Special Forces
* Air Assault Divisions.
* Air Cavalry brigades.
* Light infantry divisions with air-transportable combat power.
In the ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine scenario widespread use of the above forces including the capture and holding of airheads behind enemy lines would confuse the enemy, divide his reaction and counterattacks and spread panic. The Indian Army’s capabilities in this direction are limited and need to be comprehensive enhanced.
Logistic Support For Cold War Doctrine: Such operations which can be expected to be swift, fluid and rapidly changing directions of attack cannot rest for logistic requirements on Indian Army’s conventional logistic support which is ground based and wheel-based and incapable of swift cross country mobility.
Indian Army’s own aviation assets and heavier utility helicopters of the IAF would need significant mustering for logistic support of “Cold Start” battle group.
India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and military hardware spares along with “War Wastage Reserves” will have to be maintained at full levels at all times to enable “Cold Start” war doctrines to take off. Without these at full levels ‘Cold Start’ operations may end up as cold start.
Pakistan’s Responses to India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine Enunciation: India’s ‘ Cold Start’ war doctrine stands discussed in a recent Corps Commanders Conference of the Pakistan Army, and even amongst their strategic experts. Curiously, the discussions of the latter seem diverted to Pakistan’s special relationship with USA post 9/11 and there appears to be an implied assurance that the “special Pakistan-USA military relationship” would take care of the challenges posed to Pakistan by India’s new war doctrine. Pakistani strategic analysts view the enunciation of India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine as :
* Putting pressure on Pakistan prior to peace talks.
* The growing Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus is also curiously drawn in as an Indian concern requiring new war doctrines.
Surprisingly, no major military analysis has emerged so far Probably, it would take time to digest and come up with responses.
Pakistan’s Military Challenges Arising From India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine: Strategically and militarily, it can be visualized that Pakistan would be faced with a number of military challenges arising from India’s new war doctrine, namely:
* India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle group would be launched.
* Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in numbers and quality of numerical strength.
* Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence.
* Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.
* When and how does Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play.
* How to offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support.
* How to counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear.
Pakistan cannot combat the Indian challenges by the oft-repeated bravado statement that “One Pakistan Soldier is equal to ten Indian Soldiers” leading to strategic wags countering “what happens when the Eleventh Indian Soldier emerges”.
If the “Cold Start” doctrine is applied in its purist form, then in terms of military operations it does not become a game of military numbers but a game in terms of military technological superiority in terms of weapon systems, firepower and aerial combat assets besides the force multiplication effects of the Indian Navy.
Pakistan would have to divert sizeable financial resources for its weapon systems build-up to counter this doctrine. Of course, it can look to its external strategic patrons like USA and China for assistance and military largesse, but there is a limit here.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent and the Myth of Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold: The Indian political leadership and its national security establishment fed on US academia planted stories (probably officially inspired) of Pakistan nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold have been inordinately awed by its fearful consequences.
Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:
* Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.
* India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.
* The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.
* Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.
* Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.
* Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.
When the obvious intention of India’s new war doctrine is not to cross the nuclear threshold, and it seems declaratory in content, then a higher responsibility rests on Pakistan’s external strategic patrons that their wayward protégé does not charge foolishly and blindly into the realms where even fools or the devil do not dare.
Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold has crucial implications for USA and China too. In fact a USA-China conflict can be generated which may have its own nuclear overtones. Therefore it is incumbent on both USA and China to strategically declare that they would not countenance any Pakistani first nuclear strike against India i.e. crossing the nuclear threshold.
Pakistan proclivities to threaten nuclearisation of an Indo-Pakistan conventional conflict is more of a blackmail to force USA and China’s intervention. And if sincerely both USA and China are interested in South Asian peace and global security then Pakistan’s nuclear proclivities have to be pre-empted now with a strategic declaration against Pakistan as above.
India, in any case, has to be prepared militarily, eitherway, notwithstanding any such caution that may be imposed on Pakistan.
Concluding Observations: From the Indian perspective, enunciation of a new war doctrine was long overdue and it is significant for the following reasons:
* India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilization of India and proxy war and terrorism
* India moves away from its defensive mindset of last 50 year plus.
* India will now prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the out set.
* India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold
The Indian Army, despite any limitations in its hierarchy of not being forceful to make the political leadership in the last 50 years plus to adopt strategies which are strategically desirable but may be politically distasteful, has done well this time to bring India’s war doctrine in public debate. The vast majority of the Indian public will be in support of any war doctrine that puts Pakistan into place and forces it to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India.
From the Pakistani perspective the following needs to be recognized with the enunciation of India’s new war doctrine:
* India will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan without giving Pakistan time to bring diplomatic leverages into play against India.
* India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.
The United States and China have not come out with any response so far. Nor should they since national security interests of India need to be respected, as those of a responsible, politically stable and a mature regional power which has exercised restraint even to the extent of being ridiculed for its restraint.
Since a nuclear conflict initiated by Pakistan has global overtones and has the potential to bring them to conflict with each other, both the United States and China need to strategically declare that they will not countenance Pakistan, initiating a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Alternatively both USA and China, as Permanent Members of the UN Securing Council initiate steps jointly, to bring Pakistan’s (failed state WMD proliferator) nuclear assets under international control to be released only in the event of a nuclear threat.
Lastly, it needs to be reiterated that India may never have to put into effect its new “Cold Start” war doctrine if the United States and China restrain their wayward military protégé i.e. Pakistan from military adventurism and military brinkmanship. Also if United States and China wish to add value to their relationships with India, they need to desist from equating India with Pakistan when it comes to the prospects of the nuclear conflict in South Asia. India’s strategic maturity is not in doubt; it is Pakistan’s strategic maturity, which is in doubt. A nuclear conflict will take place in South Asia, only if the United States wants it and lets Pakistan permissively cross the nuclear threshold.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com)
http://www.saag.org/papers11/paper1013.html
Indian Army’s above named war doctrine stood reviewed in the earlier paper of this author( SAAG Paper No991. dated 04,05,2004 entitled: India’s New "Cold Start" War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed)
Some additional imperatives, which have a significant bearing on the operationalisation of the new war doctrine, are listed below.
It has already been noted in the earlier Paper that this new ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine is Pakistan specific. Hence the imperatives discussed below need to be viewed in that context.
Re-location of Armoured Divisions, Armoured Brigades and Strike Formations Headquarters:
Since the most significant aim of the new war doctrine is to strike offensively without giving away battle indicators of mobilization, it is imperative that all strike formations headquarters, Armoured Divisions and Armoured Brigades are re-located from their existing locations in Central India and in depth in Punjab to forward locations.
All such formations should be moved forward to the general line of Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-Suratgarh from their present locations in the interior.
It can be envisaged that armoured formations would be loathe to move forward from their cushy cantonments on the plea that an adequate infrastructure should first come up. If infantry formations have existed in field area conditions for decades, there is no reason why armoured formations cannot similarly exist.
In this connection, the author would like to observe based on his exposures to NATO armies and United States forward deployments in Okinawa and Korea that no Army wastes so much money on building huge garages etc for their tanks. Field coverings of tanks etc should suffice.
Since conflicts in South Asia can erupt without long drawn out battle indicators, it is necessary that armoured formations are moved to the general line suggested above, and infrastructure creation can follow.
Higher Commanders Mental Robustness and Military Audacity:
Military operations of the type envisaged in Indian Army’s new war doctrine incorporates swift, fluid and relentless offensive operations, without the luxury of pauses and time duration spans of defensive operations to which Indian Army’s higher echelons are so conditioned to today.
Such swift and mobile fast-paced operations present the challenges of rapidly changing tactical situations and fleeting opportunities. The exploitation of these demands a high order of mental resilience and an eagle eye for reading such rapidly changing battle situations.
Military audacity does not come overnight. It has to be cultivated over a long period of time. If the German Panzer generals like Rommel and Guderian had been brought up in defensive mindsets of the Indian Army and the Indian political leadership, the blitzkreig’ lightening operations with which they covered themselves with glory would not have come their way.
Military orthodoxy in the Indian Army must give way to military audacity and offensive spirit, and the Indian Army higher commanders should ensure that it becomes the hallmark of junior leaders too..
C4I-(Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Networks) Need Upgradation and Fine Tuning:
Mechanized offensive operations by joint Army and Air Force cooperation require a highly upgraded and fine tuned C4I network. Since line communications become redundant in such a war doctrine, so envisaged, the command and control of such mechanized operations where fresh orders have to be passed every other minute, there will be a generation of high density traffic on C4I networks.
The Indian Army would have to create an extensive C4I network which can handle high density traffic on the move, which is secure, having scrambling and unscrambling features including digital voice fax and telex encryption capabilities.
Alternative and duplicate means will also have to be provided due to disruptions and destruction by enemy action.
Indian Air Force (IAF) Planning and Concept of Operations:
The Indian Air Force may have a marked superiority over the Pakistan Air Force in terms of sophisticated combat aircraft and advanced training,but this is not enough by itself.
The entire Indian Air Force planning will have to undergo a significant re-orientation in terms of concept of operations.
The following points need to be noted:
* New war doctrine of the Indian Army would call for more massed air operations as against compartmentalized sorties and small scale air operations in vogue so far.
* IAF should be able to generate very high sortie rates round the clock with effective maintenance support.
* Advanced C4I systems and use of AWACS system is a must. Indian Defence Ministry needs to speed up AWACS acquisition. In the interim explore for a lease; it may not be a problem.
* PGMs (Precision guided munitions) would be used extensively in such operations. Extensive stocks should be built up from now.
* Systems to paralyse and jam enemy radar and air defence networks would be a high priority.
The aim of the IAF in support of the Indian Army’s new war doctrine should be to combine mass with technology and PGMs and advanced munitions to paralyse the enemy’s reaction and destroy his war waging materiel and potential.
Air Defence Networks and Systems:
A sizeable expansion of India’s air-defence network would be required with multi-layered air defence in terms of surveillance, range capabilities and engagement ranges. This would need to be backed by an effective C4I system integral to the air defence system.
Mobile air defence weapon systems for the strike formations, combat area air defence networks, rear areas air defence networks for VAs and VPs and of all air bases calls for significant investments.
It must be remembered that an effective air defence system for IAF bases would enable release of that many combat aircraft on air defence duties to support combat operations. India’s air defence planning should now also incorporate ballistic missile defense systems as the enemy has a vast array of ballistic missiles. Here one is not talking of the NMD or TMD level of ballistic missile defences but of the US PATRIOT or the Russian S-300 systems.
The fourth generation of S-300 that is S-300PMU-1 system entered in service in 1995. In the Russian arsenal, a battery of this system includes 48 48N6 missiles mounted on 12-transport-erector-launchers. The missiles have a range of 5-150km and a maximum altitude of 27km.All of this supported by a highly sophisticated C4I battle management system including engagement radars. It is named as ALMUZ 83 M6
India was considering acquisition of these mobile systems but the “considering” has now to be translated into 'fast track' acquisition.
Integration with Nuclear Warfare Plans Both Defensive and Offensive:
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is very low and its nuclear doctrine does not believe in “No First Use.” Secondly, Pakistan’s nuclear triggers are in the hands of Pakistan Army known for its jingoism and military adventurism. India’s new war doctrine has to take into account that in the execution of its “Cold Start” War Doctrine and if lightening success comes their way, Pakistan could use its nuclear weapons or even the tactical nuclear weapons it claims to have. Reports suggest a few in original have been passed by China to Pakistan and these could come into play.
India’s execution of its new war doctrine must be integrated with nuclear warfare plans both defensive and offensive. And by defensive it is meant that Pakistani goes in for in first strike and by offensive it is meant the scenario in which India resorts to “second strike” in response. In both cases strike formations of Indian Army will have to operate on a nuclear battlefield.
NBC Proofing of Tanks/APCs, Provision of NBC Combat Suits for Personnel and Systems Within Strike Formations:
As a corollary of the above it follows that on first priority , Indian Army’s strike formations to be used in the new war doctrine are well equipped for battlefield combat under NBC conditions. It means that all tanks and APCs, command and control tanks, and allied vehicles, all have NBC sealing kits and that strike formations are equipped with de-contamination vehicles and kits and that all personnel are equipped with NBC suits to under take battle operations in NBC scenario. .
Sadly, it has to be noted that even today every Indian Army soldier combating Pakistan’s proxy war has not been equipped with bulletproof vests. What a poor contrast to the politicians sporting bullet proof vests and moving in bullet proof cars in New Delhi, while soldiers facing enemy bullets have not been so equipped due to bureaucratic lethargy.
Hopefully the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy and the Defense Minister would recognize the imperatives of equipping India’s strike formation with NBC combat suits.
Imperatives of Digitalised Real Time Information and Satellite Coverage:
India’s intelligence penetration of the Pakistan Army even in terms of human intelligence is not satisfactory. This limitation has to be off-set by technical means encompassing high attitude surveillance aircraft and satellite imagery with high resolution.
More importantly, such technical means should be geared to provide real time digitalized information to strike force commanders, with special reference to movements of enemy’s reserve formations. The Indian Army has to devise and acquire systems for such capabilities.
Indian Army’s Electronic Welfare (EW) Capabilities Enhancement:
Fortunately, the Indian Army has been focusing on this aspect from the 1980s, but the demands of the new war doctrine call for an effective enhancement of existing EW capabilities.
India’s EW capabilities must cater for jamming and neutralizing of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control systems, air-defense and surveillance system jamming and a complete paralysis of Pakistani C4I system in the battlefield area of India’s strike formations.
India’s technological capability in electronics and allied systems and Information Technology should enable it to use cyber-warfare as a force multiplier.
India’s ICBM and SLBM Development: India’s new doctrine would be unable to to generate its full potential without an ICBM and SLBM back-up. Both in the Congress regimes and in the BJP regime, external pressures have impeded their development. A national will is now required for a “Fast track ’’materialisation of these missiles in India’s missile arsenal.
Concluding Observations:
The Indian Army needs to make an exhaustive study of United States military operations in Gulf War I and Gulf War II. The Chinese have painstakingly gone through every detail of US military operations to draw the relevant lessons.
It would be wrong to surmise that the US military has been ineffective in Iraq because of the present problems that have now surfaced. These problems are post-war and are political in nature and do not detract from the US military’s use of high-technology war-fighting to subdue the enemy by demoralization of the Iraqi military machine in the war fighting phase.
India’s new war doctrine in terms of operationalising the concepts militarily, should aim at the destruction of the Pakistani military machine and the demoralization of the Pak Army. That would be the acid test for any political leadership of the day and the Indian military hierarchy.
This is not pontificating but an accurate appraisal of the achievable in relation to strategic means available. The only caveat being this that it calls for national political will to use military power ruthlessly and the military hierarchy of India to be militarily audacious and relentless in offensive operations.