Cold Start: An analysis

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 18 Jun 2004 00:32

anything below a (1 armour + 1 mech div) is not powerful enough to inflict grave casualties on PA holding formations which is the stated goal of CS - to draw PA into battle in certain areas and destroy their assets/manpower. PA could well choose to ignore attacks by smaller formations like a indep brigade.

since IA has officially onlee 3 armr divs, CS might have the desired effect of *finally* reorganizing all the indep armd brigades floating around into atleast 3 more armr divs.

we'also need to find and invest in the means to
quickly penetrate to a depth of 20-30km across the DCB lines at desired spots. More engr regiments and more heliborne SF units look certain. SP guns, WLRs, gunship helos, PGM support from IAF...

Leonard · Post by **Leonard** » 18 Jun 2004 01:29

Wyu:

U stated WZC campaign has 3 phases ....

Probably Phase 3 may be the most intense part of the campaign ....

What will stop the defending force from say accepting Phase 1 & Phase 2 with limited losses and reserving the massive/overwhelming response for the 3rd phase ???

Kind of like Draw them in like the tentacles of a sea anemone, and then ...

wyu · Post by **wyu** » 18 Jun 2004 01:36

Phase I is recee by force
Phase II is defining the War Zone (shaping the battlefield).
Phase III is the battle of annhilation

You let Phase I and II go by, you gave the advantage to Phase III.

Stopping Phase I and Phase II will not stop Phase III but at least, it would deny the advantage of ground to Phase III.

Gentlemen,

There is one major disadvantage to WZC. It is NOT sustainable. Phase III Force MUST go home after its engagement. It would have exhausted itself in men and material.

The MILITARY answer to WZC is NOT to offer the Phase III Battle of Annhilation but to force losses and expenditures (material and men) onto WZC forces. In other words, a whole bunch of little skirmishes, nothing big. Both the InA and the PLA will win some, lose some but nothing significantly decisive. Except one thing, the PLA would reach its exhaustion point alot sooner than the InA (shorter and more secured LOCs).

The POLITICAL counter however is that such a tactic can allow the PLA to call the InA just a bunch of chickens which may be negated if the InA gives chase - just don't do anything stupid and run into an ambush.

Raman · Post by **Raman** » 18 Jun 2004 02:08

There is one major disadvantage to WZC. It is NOT sustainable. Phase III Force MUST go home after its engagement. It would have exhausted itself in men and material.

Is there a way to prevent the force from going back? By definition they are low in men and material, and so must be "rescued" by a relief force (an escalating battle) or be annihilated. Neither outcome appears to be what the PLA wants ...

wyu · Post by **wyu** » 18 Jun 2004 02:45

And a miracle happens here.

Even before the military actions begin, the PLA would have identified the unit that they want to destroy which may or may not include an InA relief force.

Phase II is supposed to shape the battlefield to fix and isolate the target unit(s).

Raman · Post by **Raman** » 18 Jun 2004 04:15

Except one thing, the PLA would reach its exhaustion point alot sooner than the InA (shorter and more secured LOCs).
...
Even before the military actions begin, the PLA would have identified the unit that they want to destroy which may or may not include an InA relief force.

wyu,

I find it difficult to reconcile the above two statements. If the PLA exhausts before the Indian Army, how does it manage to disengage? Given the "shorter and more secured LOCs", couldn't another relief force be sent to outflank/"pin" the PLA and prevent an easy disengagement? I.e., how can Phase II isolate the battle area from *future* relief forces?

Sorry for the dumb questions ... my understanding of military science is poor.

Hitesh · Post by **Hitesh** » 18 Jun 2004 06:20

The PLA will know when it is exhausted and go home before it gives the InA a chance to give an ass kicking. That's what happened in the 1962 War. The PLA became exhausted and hightailed out of there therefore denying InA much needed morale, military and political victory.

As for the pinning force, well, that's a whole another ballgame because you have to sychronize the two forces at play which is very hard to do. You don't want to let the PLA know that you have a second force that is ready to pin them.

Also, it is very hard to know when the PLA has exhausted themselves. The PLA will never let anybody else know that the PLA has exhausted themselves.

The way I think about it, if it is not possible to stop Phase III, maybe it can be possible to speed up Phase III to our favor. One way would be letting the PLA Phase III force into the battlefield that they wanted to fight and use a decoy force to ensure that they stay there. Then use two forces, one main force and one pinning force. The pinning force will attempt to pin and man the transit routes that the PLA use for retreats. Use the decoy force to force the PLA phase III to exhaust themselves rapidly. Whether the decoy force survives or not, it is a moot point since we got what we wanted. We got the PLA phase III force exhausted. Now they will go home. That's where the main force should be. The Phase III force will meet the pinning force while the main force makes a surprising bold attack and finish them off.

Guys, what do you think?

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 18 Jun 2004 06:58

Col. Wyu,

You have more than once talked about the difference between doctrine and war-fighting plans. Is it fair to say that the difference between the two lie only in the fact that it may not be possible to actually fight according to the doctrine because real life is different from theory? Or is there a deeper difference? Thanks in advance.

wyu · Post by **wyu** » 18 Jun 2004 07:36

Rajesh,

The difference in the two statements is that the InA would NOT offer a battle of annhilation and thus preserve its force, and by extention, its combat effectiveness. The PLA Phase III Force would have exhausted itself in these little skirmishes without actually engaging in a battle of annhilation. Thus, at this point of exhaustion, even if the InA force does offer battle at this point, the PLA 3rd Phase III force would have no choice but to go home ... and in shame.

Hitesh,

BRAVO, BRAVO, BRAVO!!!!!!!!!

I have not thought of this. And from my readings, neither did the PLA. Essentially, what you're suggesting is a WZC counter to the PLA WZC.

Bravo!

Anoop,

Theory is just theory. Real life is a whole different ball game. However, we have to have a basis to start planning military operations. If we had the Starship USS Enterprise with a 1000 Klingon stormtroopers with laser guns, then we would plan things very differently. What doctrine serves is how we think an (generalized) enemy can be defeated. What doctrine provides is an understanding of what we must do/destroy in order to render the enemy defeated. Real life operations would be based upon that understanding.

I will give you an example. Derstroying a divisional headquarters will render that division ineffective. However, the three sub-echelon brigades would still remain effective. Do you need still to reduce those or can you move on because those brigades can no longer do a division's job?

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 18 Jun 2004 08:33

"Cold Start" = "Cold Feet"? We saw it during Op.Parakram!

Hitesh · Post by **Hitesh** » 18 Jun 2004 09:03

WYU, thanks for the compliment.

However, what I proposed is easier said than done. For instance, the first obstacle is knowing where the PLA intend the battlefield to be and insert/designate a decoy force into that area. The second obstacle is knowing the transit routes that PLA uses and how to insert the pinning force without the PLA knowing the pinning force. The pinning force cannot start their attack operations until the PLA force goes home and who knows how long. The third obstacle is the manuevering the main force without giving the ball game away. The fourth obstacle which I view as inevitable is that the PLA commander will realise what's going on and the game will be up. The question is how do we gain that momentum and sustain it in our favor?

That's four obstacles I see and each one is formidable in its own right.

How would you propose to overcome these obstacles?

If anyone can see other obstacles, let's hear and maybe we can put together a reply to the WZC doctrine. Keep in mind that the reply has to be realistic with the resources we currently have.

Ashutosh · Post by **Ashutosh** » 18 Jun 2004 09:45

So what if the words decoy force or main force are substituted with "holding corps", and the word pinning force is replaced with "8 integrated battle groups"?

Since the deployment time for the 8 battle groups is much lesser than the holding corps; being in the right place at the right time shouldn't be an extremely painful issue for them.

The holding corps can draw in the invading forces for all three phases - however the Phase III gets concluded by the 8 battle groups.

Note that in this scenario - the battle groups are the ones that finish off the battle and the holding corps are the ones that head into battle first - exactly opposite of what we've been thinking so far.

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 18 Jun 2004 15:04

phase III can also be pinned and then subjected to arty/air/missile assault to break it up

wyu - i believe you stated that phase I and II make way for III. would that leave a large number of exhausted, spent PLA units 'milling around' the combat zone waiting to go home, or do they still continue to offer cohesive combat?

also does phase III come in a single formation or does it come in multiple formations and offer multiple battles of annihilation?

Raj Malhotra · Post by **Raj Malhotra** » 18 Jun 2004 16:36

An interesting discussion on Chinese military thinking.

What I am wondering is- how do Chinese plan on getting Phase III to battlefield and then out again. Also how much equipment it will carry, i.e. to say how will (& how much) it get re-supplied.

In Indian context lot of it may need to take place over long and difficult Tibetan & Central area terrain with lot of bridges, culverts and narrow passes which will be receptive to PGMs and sabotage.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 18 Jun 2004 17:47

Hi Nikhil,

I think "Cold Start" cuts both ways.

The political leadership earlier had to think about the massive cost of deployment. They had to factor in things like,

1) Not getting the deployment to clash with harvesting season,

2) Keeping POL stocks for both a 20 day deployment and a 45 day war, (I never thought of it this way, but until now, the Indian Army would cover more distance travelling to the border than it would in any actual thrust into Pakistan.)

3) Deflecting international pressure throughout the deployment phase. ( All that effort for what? - nothing?)

Now the only thing they have to keep track of is the readiness of the units at the border. If that is withing specs, then war can be initiated on India's terms within hours. Literally at the push of a button.

Will it be difficult for a decision maker in India to order the Army to go to war?

Yes I think so. It is diffiult for anyone to suggest a course of action that will most certainly bring death and suffering to so many people. So that will always be an unknown. However once the decision to go to war is made, I feel now the `machine' will simply take over.

How long can the Pakistanis keep believing that Indian civilian leadership will not be interested in going to war?

Perhaps they can delude themselves into thinking that a `weak coalition government' is not going to take the decision - entirely foolish line of thinking. Maybe it does not occur to them, but a Prime Minister of India who has no hope in being re-elected, or does not really care about his party, could now (after cold start) very easily start something on the border and claim his/her place in the history books. It is not like that has not happened in India's political history. Anyway once the war starts, barring total mavericks, the bulk of the polity will support the war.

People on this forum are critical of the Vajpayee govt. for not going through with Parakram. Very few ask the question - was there ever a need to go to war after Parakram? I am increasingly come around to the view that in the next five years Pakistani government will collapse under its own contradictions, and ultimately they will ask for an Indian Peace Keeping Force to be deployed there. Okay maybe it will be a UN led peace keeping force maintaining order a la Kosovo or East Timor, but the bulk of the contribution will come from Indian troops. Hey maybe we will even get Bangladesh to contribute to the UN Peace Keeping Mission in Pakistan (UNPKM-PAK)!

In Parakram we brought a dagger to Pakistan's neck. Cold Start simply ensures that the dagger stay sharp and stays at Pakistan's throat. Let the Pakistani Army come up with the gallows humor that matches this scene.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 18 Jun 2004 19:42

Originally posted by Anoop:

You have more than once talked about the difference between doctrine and war-fighting plans. Is it fair to say that the difference between the two lie only in the fact that it may not be possible to actually fight according to the doctrine because real life is different from theory? Or is there a deeper difference? Thanks in advance.

This is probably an inappropriate analogy for these forums, but think of religion. Doctrine can be compared to the various prescriptions in the sacred texts, while Battle planning and battle management would be what the priests and people actually do in real life.

In some armies doctrine represents the menu of options available to a commander in a given situation.

At the very least doctrine shapes one's view of the battlefield in a particular way. That helps keep commanders together on the same page.

The relationship between doctrine and war-fighting depends on the culture of a particular army at a time.

The Soviets took doctrine very seriously, and applied it in a highly consistant manner.

The Americans taking a cue from the Germans also take doctrinal development very seriously, but thanks to a number of factors apply doctrine in a very different and much more flexible manner. However, the Americans have difficulty fighting military operations they have not written doctrine for -usually the kind they dislike being involved in. Despite Vietnam and various bush conflicts since, they have not gotten around to writing a counter insurgency / 'low intensity conflict' doctrine. Peacekeeping was another subject they were reluctant to produce doctrine for.

Until the last 10-15 years British Army was highly resistant (one might even say allergic) to the idea of a written doctrine, with the tight definitions of terms and above all concepts that such an effort demands. Instead commanders were expected to gain a sound knowledge of military history, capabilities of their own and other forces, and most importantly their fellow officers. The rest was essentially dismissed as unknowable until one was actually in the field. This approach produced enormous flexibility, but it has of course led to something of a slow start in most military operations. If anything has brought change it was the quickening pace of the media cycle and greater media penetration, which increased political pressures and denied commanders the time they were accustomed to in getting the job done. It demanded in short, a well defined doctrine. The other great pressure has been the political decision to conduct operations as far as possible in a Coalition, rather than unilateral environment. Doctrinal development makes it easier to work with other forces, making the commander's intent more transparent all around.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 18 Jun 2004 20:17

Originally posted by Daulat:
i believe you stated that phase I and II make way for III. would that leave a large number of exhausted, spent PLA units 'milling around' the combat zone waiting to go home, or do they still continue to offer cohesive combat?

I am sure the Colonel will be able to answer in greater detail, but traditionally PLA units fight until they are incapable of mounting further combat operations. Survivors that make it back to their lines are either sent to medical facilities, or are assembled in rear areas to form new units.

As long as the recce force and Phase II forces remain combat effective they can be expected to continue to participate in the battle.

Given PLA's traditional emphasis on the attack and the meeting engagement, it seems unlikely they would run out of supplies before they ran out of warm bodies.

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 18 Jun 2004 20:24

Johann - i see what you mean, however it seems to me that Phase I troops are most likely to run out of supplies (assuming they are still warm) and will need to get out. ofcourse, the front should have passed them by that time, so they might automatically find themselves in the rear! Phase II units would take the first round of heavy counter attacks and are likely to be severely depleted - this implies that a fast and heavy enough counter could break the attack's cohesiveness?

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 18 Jun 2004 20:38

Daulat,

Phase I will have a high proportion of special forces. They are likely to remain out in front of the advancing forces performing a number of roles.

PLA Special Forces from available sources seem to put far more emphasis than other modern SF on living off the land, and doing so for extended periods not just as part of Escape & Evasion, but as part of combat operations.

Nevertheless they will probably suffer even higher rates of attrition than the regulars, although it is possible that a few may receive limited helicopter resupply.

As for Phase II, I think Hitesh has encapsulated things very nicely - a lot will depend on how quickly the IA grasps the *intentions* of the PLA commander and moves to defeat them. Remember that Phase II is meant to fix a given IA (Phase I found it) force while Phase III destroys it. So destroying Phase II while allowing Phase III to manoeuvre in to place would only be half a victory, leaving the initiative with the PLA.

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 18 Jun 2004 20:52

Originally posted by Johann:

As for Phase II, I think Hitesh has encapsulated things nicely - a lot will depend on how quickly the IA grasps the intentions of Phase II forces and moves to defeat it. Remember that Phase II is meant to fix a given IA (Phase I found it) force while Phase III destroys it. So destroying Phase II while allowing Phase III to maneouver in to place would only be half a victory.

agreed, phase II almost has to be counter-held or dissipated and then a pre-weakened Phase III has to be hit hard in the counter attack and routed back across the border

Phase II ofcourse will try to distract the pre-weakening of Phase III as best as it can. Seems to me that the only way to deal with it is to go full on instead of ratcheting up. One must assume that the PLA will avoid a tactical nuke scenario or indeed a strategic one

Leonard · Post by **Leonard** » 18 Jun 2004 20:59

Wyu stated
<<<<
You let Phase I and II go by, you gave the advantage to Phase III.

Stopping Phase I and Phase II will not stop Phase III but at least, it would deny the advantage of ground to Phase III.
>>>>

This is What I meant ....

Phase 1 would like be a probe, recce kind of op...

Phase 2 would be more of same but with more intense skirmishes.

Phase 3 would where WZC would try to lower the hammer !!!

We should not let Phase 2 become "the ALL or NOTHING stopping point".

I feel our approach should be like the Letter W with the Point in the W being Far ahead of the Wings ...

Let the point be Pinning Force or holding force, Engage & Force Phase 1 & Force Phase 2 at point ...

Keep the battle on Conservatively, with Minimum Losses, while we have 2 IBG (integrated battle groups ready & primed) as the Wings in W ...

When Phase 3 begins, Let the Point Slowly Fall Back---> Draw Them In, Draw them in, Kind of Like a Slow Table Dance ... First a leg, then a XXX, leaving the rest to your imagination...

Then ----> Wham-Bam thank-you XXXX

This is what I meant ....

A Sea-Anemone THRIVES living at the Ocean Floor, Traps with bright colors, moving tentacle or arms and Kills Prey ....

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 18 Jun 2004 21:14

leonard you are describing zulu tactics! also very effective in their time - albeit at a different scale!

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 18 Jun 2004 22:04

Mongols and tatars used such things too. as did alexandar. fast movin cavalry on the wings move in once the main force is heavily engaged and 'fixed' in the center.

Hitesh · Post by **Hitesh** » 19 Jun 2004 02:57

WYU and Johann, how strong does the decoy force have to be in order withstand the Phase II and meet the Phase III oncoming attack?

Phase II- Battalion/Brigade size
Phase III-Brigade/Division/Corps size

How strong does the pinning and the main force have to be?

How would you sychronize the three forces-decoy, pinning, and main?

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 19 Jun 2004 05:10

Col. Wyu and Johann, thank you both for the replies. It's much clearer now.

Taking off from Johann's earlier post about existing resources, there are 8 independent brigades currently split among XVI Corps, X, XII Corps, XI Corps and II Corps and 2 independent mechanized brigades split among XI and XII Corps. The first post on this thread mentions that the 8 integrated battle groups will be spearheaded by an armored division each. Assuming this, and if the 2 mechanized brigades are converted into armored brigades, we will have 10 armored brigades, which can make 3 new armored divisions. This coupled with the 3 armored divisions from the current Strike Corps still gives only 6 armored divisions for the 8 battle groups. Perhaps the groups involved in J&K will not need armored divisons - at most an armored brigade.

However, this raises several questions - if the armored briagdes from the current 'defensive' Corps (namely X, XI, XII and XVI) are scavenged for battle groups, the limited offensive potential of these Corps is removed - maybe even their defensive potential is affected. Is this a satisfactory state of affairs? Secondly, who will control the 8 battle group - i.e Corps sized HQ or Command size HQ? I have read that Pakistan suffered from lack of Corps level HQ during the 65 war, particularly in handling their 1st Armored Division directly from GHQ. Even now, they do not have a Command level HQ. Will the proposed reorganization of the IA add another layer or remove one? Given that these battle groups will have elements of the IAF at least, won't it call for reorganization of HQ probably right at the brigade level or lower (in army terms)?

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 19 Jun 2004 06:03

what if you assign 2 armour brigades to each group ? large scale modernization of the T72 fleet to block1-upg/Karna std is a must plus ofcourse T90 and Arjun progs ... most of our armour would be committed to these 16 brigades.

wyu · Post by **wyu** » 19 Jun 2004 06:14

There are so many issuses here that it's hard to know where to begin.

First, let me just identify the WZC forces.

Phase I - anywhere from 6 to 15 air inserts of SOF type forces ranging brick size to coy size. Most likely these would be from the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Corps. Though corps size, they have been practising brick to coy size ops for the past 5 years. In three exercises that they noted with fanfare, it was lead by a LCol. This is extremely significant since LCol is the first decision making rank in the PLA.

Phase II - This is kind of murky at the moment and it seems that this is still a work-in-progress. Originally, this was a motor rifle bde (ie, a motor rifle regt re-enforced with a div's cbt spt and cbt svc). The PLA must have found this formation lacking because currently, it would seemed that it is being re-enforced with an arty bde and an engr regt. The bdes were formed by reducing a div to its single HERO regiment and half the cbt spt and cbt svc.

What we've seen thus far is that the bdes are still performing regt lvl roles and not gone up to the reduced div lvl roles. They are not getting new toys which would be the indicator of increased combat capabilities. Instead, they're getting the best of the what the div currently had to offer. This would indicate that they can perform a regt's roles to the best of their abilities.

By contrast, the divisions in the showcase 38th and 39th Group Armies are getting new toys which does increase their combat capabilities.

Thus, it would not be surprising to see a div performing a Phase II role.

Phase III - div to corps size force. The PLA would love to use the showcase 38GA and 39GA. This does not mean that they will. The Mountain Divisions in the three surrounding Military Regions around Tibet could act long before the 38GA and the 39GA could hop onto their trains.

Ok,

The Phase III Force, even if its corps size, would act as divisions on the march. That essentially means that the division's recee coy would be 15 to 25 kms ahead of the main column. I would suggest that this would be the key to any InA response.

wyu · Post by **wyu** » 19 Jun 2004 08:07

Daulat,

Phase I forces are those of the 15ABC. The exercises that I have seen lately includes air dropped jeeps armed with FIVE-OHs. I should mention that when these jeeps first appeared, they included a 25mm canon which since appearred to have been dropped. This gives the airborned troops a battle taxi and an armoury

Johann is right that they have further jobs to do.

Phase II Forces are to man and maintain the Lines of Departure for the Phase III force.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 19 Jun 2004 17:26

My previous listing of existing independent armored brigades did not include 4, one with each RAPID. That makes it a total of 14 that brings us to 5 armored divisions (less a brigade) - added to that are the 3 divisions from the current Strike Corps, making a total of 8. Is this where the number 8 for the integrated battle groups comes from?

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 19 Jun 2004 18:28

Anoop,

That makes it EIGHT Armoured Divisions. That would not be Integrated Battle Groups. What would and whats your guess?

Hitesh · Post by **Hitesh** » 19 Jun 2004 18:30

WYU, please put the WZC in the context of Tibet.

Will Phase II be a division and Phase III be a corps size in the number challenged area of Tibet? There's very little room for manuever to accommadate the size of a division and the size of a corps.

They will have serious problems manning their formations and keeping them intact without tangling them all up. How will they coordinate the retreat of Phase II when elements of Phase III are using the same routes? How will they keep the routes clear for the Phase III guns, ammo supplies, water, food, etc, and at the same time, manage to bring Phase II back to the rear?

Or is Phase III using a different route?

What is the delay between Phase II and Phase III? How much of a delay will cost the PLA and in what terms? When I say delay, I mean the time between when Phase II goes home and Phase III begins their attack. If it was to be lengthened, what does that do to the operations of the WZC force? Or let's look at it the other way around What happens if we force Phase III to start their operations much earlier than they would like to? What does it mean in terms of operations?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 19 Jun 2004 19:07

Did any one see the commentary about Stryker and the Indo-US joint exercise at Variengte

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/605612.cms

Adds the American leader for the ongoing joint exercise Yudh Abhyas, Lt-Col David Wisecarver, “We don’t have a school like this in the US. We will take the lessons from here to other units in our Army.”

Lt. Col Wisecarver and his soldiers are part of the Alaska-based 172 Stryker Infantry Brigade. The Stryker Brigades, capable of rapid deployment all over the world and already present in Iraq, are a new concept in the US Army to bridge the gap between light and heavy armoured forces.

“Our vehicle, the Stryker, is lighter and more transportable than existing tanks and armoured vehicles in C-130 aircraft...the brigades are trained to be highly mobile, digital and network centric for rapid anti-terrorist or other strikes,” says Lt-Col Wisecarver. The visiting US team has briefed the Indian forces on the Stryker Brigades and “stability operations.” The Indian Army, too, is now planning to go in for “integrated battle groups,” which can be deployed swiftly, rather than rely on the slow amassing of strike corps in preparation for war. As

Could RayC, YIP, wyu and others comment about Vijay Chakra in the context of CS?

http://users.senet.com.au/~wingman/vijay.html

Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi, pointed out that the core objective was to fine-tune tactics of an integrated battle so that depth areas could be engaged and captured. The army was working towards acquiring a capability to quickly neutralise intermediary resistance so that decisive tank battles in the last 40 km, which is the heart of the combat zone, can begin. The exercise was apparently testing the concept of a limited short-duration war. ... Exercise Vijay Chakra is seeking to validate tactical doctrines to ensure a decisive victory in quick time. He said this exercise was different than "Shiv-Shakti" conducted last year, as "Vijay Chakra" was basically to test rapid deployment of forces.
...
Essentially, this wargame is aimed at over-running the enemy territory by the strike armour and mechanised infantry. The fighter aircraft are used to provide air support to the rapidly moving tanks and infantry combat vehicles(BMP), while troops are para-dropped behind enemy line to secure vital points and installations. The integrated task force finally links up with the paratroopers to secure a victory in the battle.
...
The IAF transport planes played a key role in the rapid deployment of airborne troops. The decision on the airborne deployment was coordinated with the ongoing assault of tanks on the ground. On February 15 night, IAF Jaguar fighters carried out a photo reconnaissance mission. Then five AN-32 and a IL-76 aircraft, airdropped about 20 'pathfinders', a BMP(weighing 14 tonnes), two Jeeps fitted with anti-tank weapons and 160 troops, some 60km inside the "enemy" territory. At that point, the strike armour had crossed the make-believe international border and managed to penetrate 40km inside the area of the "opposing" forces.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 19 Jun 2004 21:02

Folks: Have there been any reports in the last 3-4 weeks that suggest that the change in government is affecting the proposed CS doctrine?

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 19 Jun 2004 22:12

Calvin,

Right from the start I have asked all to read about the Stryker Brigade.

I also said read FM 3 and the Objective Force.

Do read it and we will have a more constructive debate.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 19 Jun 2004 22:42

RayC: Are there any references where the uninitiated may be directed to? The below referenced page has a number of links, would you be so kind as to review it and recommend which we need to focus on?

http://www.fortliberty.org/military-library/army-field-manuals.shtml

Stryker Brigade Reference:
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/MR1606.ch1.pdf

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 19 Jun 2004 22:46

Originally posted by RayC:
That makes it EIGHT Armoured Divisions. That would not be Integrated Battle Groups. What would and whats your guess?

Ray sahab, I obviously do not know the answer to your question, but it set me thinking in another direction and exposed the folly of my earlier posts. First, as a clarification, I went along with the size of the battle groups (at least the army's component of it) based on the article by Dr. Kapila in SAAG ( the link is in the first post in this thread).

Following this line of thought, we come to the conclusion that the Defensive Corps would be seriously compromised by taking away their armored components - clearly not acceptable. For, what if Pakistan decides to ignore the multiple, shallow (as compared to that achievable by the current 3 Strike Corps) thrusts by the 8 battle groups and uses the mass of its ARN and ARC to take territory in India? So the defensive component must be strong enough to withstand that assault.

Then I realized that the Cold Start doctrine does not call for the 8 battle groups to be headed by an armored division each. In fact, the purpose would be best served under the rotating model that Col. Wyu talked about. Only about 1/3rd (just a number I picked) of the battle groups' resources would be maintained in a state of readiness, ready to make the first thrust. The rest 2/3rd would be held back as reserve to draw Pakistan into combat with the forward elements and use them to exploit the situation as it unfolds. So it is immaterial whether each of the eight battlegroups are headed by a division each -only 1/3rd (i.e. only a brigade) will still be used to kick off the Cold Start.

Viewed in this light, the requirements of CS change:

1. The primary change will be in the manner in which the HQs at various levels (say from battalion upwards) are reorganized. For instance, if currently a brigade has it's own artillery arm, now a battalion commander will need to be able to call on arty support. More important will be the integration of CAS - IAF liasion officers -posted to lower levels.

2. The requirements of various echelons of the battlegroups will be different - the forward elements being heavy in special forces, helicopter assets, mechanized infantry and signals (all for quick insertion and communication with follow up forces) and the follow up elements heavy in engineers, armor, artillery and air defence (all for exploitation).

3. The geographical proximity of the follow up force to relieve the initial force. Once the forward elements of the battlegroups have entered enemy territory with the element of surprise, the rear groups cannot lag behind for long - otherwise the forward force would be isolated and destroyed. So it seems that the peacetime location of the individual units of the battle groups must be in a graded fashion, bringing to light a point Johann raised - about land availability.

Am I on the right track?

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 19 Jun 2004 22:53

Anoop,

Are you on the right track? You surely jest, sir.

A very interesting view, espeically for someone who has not been in uniform.

I will have to read the post in detail in my leisure time and then maybe I would dare a comment.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 19 Jun 2004 23:02

Calvin,

FM 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operation.
FM 3-21.38 Pathfinder Operations.
FM 3.0 Operations.

There is also a document called 'Objective Force'. Interesting.

Of course, you have to 'cut and paste' so to say since everything is not applicable.

You know my e mail.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 19 Jun 2004 23:19

FM3.0 - Operations
http://jkl.adsl.dk/library/field%20manuals/fm%203-0.pdf

3.06-11. Combined Ops - ZIP FILE
http://jkl.adsl.dk/library/field%20manuals/fm%203-06_11.zip

3.21-31 - Stryker
http://jkl.adsl.dk/library/field%20manuals/fm%203-21_31.pdf

wyu · Post by **wyu** » 20 Jun 2004 02:22

Hitesh,

MARRIED! ...WITH CHILDREN! Whenever you get into these brainstorms, I get into trouble for not spending my 5 minutes free time thinking about them. Next time when you have these brainstorms, have a heart and ask something I can do from memory instead of going through my books. Number One Daughter gets mighty ****ed off if I grab anything but Dr Seus off the shelves.

Give me a few days to look up the proper TOEs.

Also, you might noticed that CDF is noticing how the new light mech div may fit into WZC's Phase II. While it's too early to say that PLA's Brigadization is a failure, it does suggest the PLA is tilting towards division.

To the Brigadier,

Sir,

The original concept of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team is dead. The USArmy has given up trying to solve a USAF's lack of strategic lift problem and has gone back to their traditional pre-positioning of weapons and stocks near potential theatres of operations to be mated up with troops whenever a crisis would occur.

As such, you will see the incorporation of an arm'd calvary squadron (ie a tank battalion) into its TOE within a couple of years.

Also,

YOU'VE FINISHED FM-3 ALREADY?!?!?!?! That is an 8 month course material.