PRC Economy and Industry: News and Discussions

[anishns]

China Puts Brakes on High-Speed Trains

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... TopStories

Quoting in full

BEIJING—China will begin forcing its growing fleet of high-speed trains to operate at slower speeds, the country's railways chief said in an interview with state-run media, in the latest sign of trouble for the country's most vaunted transportation project.

Sheng Guangzu, head of China's Ministry of Railways, said in an interview with the Communist Party's People's Daily newspaper published Wednesday that the decision will make tickets more affordable and improve energy efficiency on the country's high-speed railways.

Mr. Sheng, who took over the Ministry of Railways in February after his predecessor resigned amid a corruption investigation, said trains in China ...

[suryag]

Didnt we have c-bots over here saying that it is very profitable and arguing with vina-ul-ekanomixi ? Possible reason for decrease in speed could also be some unmentionable wearing out of copied parts because of inferior/improper metallurgy or alloy mix

[vina]

Didnt we have c-bots over here saying that it is very profitable and arguing with vina-ul-ekanomixi ? Possible reason for decrease in speed could also be some unmentionable wearing out of copied parts because of inferior/improper metallurgy or alloy mix

That is indeed true. In fact there are reports that because of poor construction, the expected life of the rails and basically the entire "permanent way" was projected to be a fraction of the normal 40 year life of such things.

No wonder the need to reduce speed to triage their investment to last longer and also to cut energy costs and basically try to fill in the seats and make some decent money.

But all this looks like a futile rear guard to me. When service life is Pakied, it is Pakied! . So yeah, you can make it last a bit longer, but your revenues person kilometer takes a big hit if you run slower! Damned if you do, damned if you don't. Also , the prices need to come to a quarter of their current levels to make it attractive to the Mango Chinese Abdul.

[somnath]

A few years ago, on my first trip to Shanghai, I boarded the Maglev from the airport, more out of curiosity than convenience (as the fare was a steep 21 dollars)..It was a nice ride, but I got a mini shock when the train dumped me precisely in the middle of nowhere, obliging me to take a cab to my hotel from there...

High Speed Railways are not necessarily a good idea, and certainly not over all ditances...There are too many variables that make HSRs viable/unviable..It cannot be a silver bullet the way the Chinese are doing it..

A good study on the eonomics of HSR..
http://www.internationaltransportforum. ... 200816.pdf

[JE Menon]

Good to know Somnath. It would be good if BRFites who've spent time in China can type out a few paras on their experiences and observations. There should be a few of them, given the overall spread of BRFites judging by the posts. I've not spent any time east of Thailand (although have spent quite some quality time there, though not in last couple of years). It would be both informative and a pleasure to have some first hand accounts. Guessing from your post, I take it you've been more than once to Shanghai...

[astal]

Nice article in Slate By Nouriel Roubini

Beijing's Empty Bullet Trains.

Roubini, quite boldly, makes concrete predictions.

Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible—most likely after 2013—China is poised for a sharp slowdown. Instead of focusing on securing a soft landing today, Chinese policymakers should be worrying about the brick wall that economic growth may hit in the second half of the quinquennium.

and

Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. All historical episodes of excessive investment—including East Asia in the 1990s—have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth. To avoid this fate, China needs to save less, reduce fixed investment, cut net exports as a share of GDP, and boost the share of consumption.

The trouble is that the reasons the Chinese save so much and consume so little are structural. It will take two decades of reforms to change the incentive to over-invest.

Read it all for some interesting details.

[devesh]

^^^
several others were saying that, and now Roubini is saying it too. very likely imvho.

[AnimeshP]

Apologies if posted earlier ...

Video of China's property bubble ..

http://youtu.be/pbDeS_mXMnM

Couple of things for our cheeni dlones who keep waxing lyrical about the wonder that is China
- A few days back someone was mentioning how Chinese slums have a way better quality of life as compared to say Dharavi ... this video puts that argument to rest. Check out the "Old Neighborhoods" in this video.
- The worker who works in the property sector says "he knows too much and cannot say anything as he will get into trouble" ... so much for worker's paradise !!

After seeing these videos, I feel sympathy for the Chinese people who are being taken for a ride by the Communist Party of China ...

[sanjaykumar]

After seeing these videos, I feel sympathy for the Chinese people who are being taken for a ride by the Communist Party of China ...



You should see Chinese veneration of Buddha. The iconography of the statues and paintings is still Indic although there are (and should be elements that are sinicised). I must say I feel a greater kinship with Chinese at times than Pakistanis!

[svinayak]

See the map of India at 0.36 min with Kashmir as a seperate country, arunachal pradesh as a seperate etc.

[Christopher Sidor]

Cross posting from the People's Republic of China Nov 22, 2009 thread



China and the End of the Deng Dynasty | STRATFOR

STRATFOR has written an article today regarding the current chinese state of affairs. Worth Reading, I am reproducing it in full over here. But before we go and read it some caveats are in order.

There are some glaring inconsistency in what the authors are saying in this article. Firstly they say that "plans of boosting household consumption have failed". Later they say " it (boosting household consumption) cannot (happen) within the decade period that China’s leaders envision — then growth will slow sharply and unemployment will rise". And finally they say "the attempt at economic transition has hardly begun."
So it is not clear what do the authors mean. Do they mean
1) Re balancing has failed ?
OR
2) Re balancing is not being attempted whole-heartedly ?
OR
3) Re balancing is being attempted but might fail ?

Basically this one of the dooms day pitch. We should not believe outright but nor should we discard it entirely. There are some gems and very important insights on offer in this article. These insights are definitely worth of a second look.


Happy reading...

China and the End of the Deng Dynasty
April 19, 2011 | 0855 GMT
By Matthew Gertken and Jennifer Richmond

Beijing has become noticeably more anxious than usual in recent months, launching one of the more high-profile security campaigns to suppress political dissent since the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Journalists, bloggers, artists, Christians and others have been arrested or have disappeared in a crackdown prompted by fears that foreign forces and domestic dissidents have hatched any number of “Jasmine” gatherings inspired by recent events in the Middle East. More remarkable than the small, foreign-coordinated protests, however, has been the state’s aggressive and erratic reaction to them.


Meanwhile, the Chinese economy has maintained a furious pace of credit-fueled growth despite authorities’ repeated claims of working to slow growth down to prevent excessive inflation and systemic financial risks. The government’s cautious approach to fighting inflation has emboldened local governments and state companies, which benefit from rapid growth. Yet the risk to socio-political stability posed by inflation, expected to peak in springtime, has provoked a gradually tougher stance. The government thus faces twin perils of economic overheating on one side and overcorrection on the other, either of which could trigger an outburst of social unrest — and both of which have led to increasingly erratic policymaking.

These security and economic challenges are taking place at a time when the transition from the so-called fourth generation of leaders to the fifth generation in 2012 is under way. The transition has heightened disagreements over economic policy and insecurities over social stability, further complicating attempts to coordinate effective policy. Yet something deeper is driving the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) anxiety and heavy-handed security measures: the need to transform the country’s entire economic model, which carries hazards that the Party fears will jeopardize its very legitimacy.

Deng’s Model

Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping is well known for launching China’s emergence from Mao’s Cultural Revolution and inaugurating the rise of a modern, internationally oriented economic giant. Deng’s model rested on three pillars.

The first was economic pragmatism, allowing for capitalist-style incentives domestically and channels for international trade. Deng paved the way for a growth boom that would provide employment and put an end to the preceding decade of civil strife. The CPC’s legitimacy thus famously became linked to the country’s economic success rather than to ideological zeal and class warfare.

The second pillar was a foreign policy of cooperation. The lack of emphasis on political ideology opened space for international maneuver, with economic cooperation the basis for new relationships. This gave enormous impetus to the Sino-American detente Nixon and Mao initiated. In Deng’s words, China would maintain a low profile and avoid taking the lead. China would remain unobtrusive to befriend and do business with almost any country — as long as it recognized Beijing as the one and only China.

The third pillar was the primacy of the CPC’s system. Reform of the political system along the lines of Western countries could be envisioned, but in practice would be deferred. That the reform process in no way would be allowed to undermine Party supremacy was sealed after the mass protests at Tiananmen, which the military crushed after a dangerous intra-Party struggle. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police would serve as Deng’s “Great Wall of steel” protecting the Party from insurrection.

For three decades, Deng’s model remained mostly intact. Though important modifications and shifts occurred, the general framework stands because Chinese-style capitalism and partnership with the United States have served the country well. Deng also secured his policy by establishing a succession plan: He was instrumental in setting up his immediate successor, Jiang Zemin, and Jiang’s successor, current President Hu Jintao.

Hu’s policies have not differed widely in practice from Deng’s. China’s response to the global economic crisis in 2008 revealed that Hu sought recourse to the same export- and investment-driven growth as his predecessors. Hu’s plans of boosting household consumption have failed, the economy is more off-balance than ever, and the interior remains badly in need of development. But along the general lines of Deng’s policy, the country has continued to grow and stay out of major conflict with the United States and others, and the Party has maintained indisputable control.

Emergent Challenges

Unprecedented challenges to Deng’s model have emerged in recent years. These are not challenges involving individuals; rather, they come from changes in the Chinese and international systems.

First, more clearly than ever, China’s economic model is in need of restructuring. Economic crisis and its aftermath in the developed world have caused a shortfall in foreign demand, and rising costs of labor and raw materials are eroding China’s comparative advantage even as its export sector and industries have built up extraordinary overcapacity.

Theoretically, the answer has been to boost household consumption and rebalance growth — the Hu administration’s policy — but this plan carries extreme hazards if aggressively pursued. If consumption cannot be generated quickly enough to pick up the slack — and it cannot within the decade period that China’s leaders envision — then growth will slow sharply and unemployment will rise. These would be serious threats to the CPC, the legitimacy of which rests on providing growth. Hence, the attempt at economic transition has hardly begun.

Not coincidentally, movements have arisen that seek to restore the Party’s legitimacy to a basis not of economics but of political power. Hu’s faction, rooted in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), has a doctrine of wealth redistribution and Party orientation. It is set to expand its control when the sixth generation of leaders arrives. This trend also exists on the other side of the factional divide. Bo Xilai, the popular Party chief in Chongqing, is a “princeling.” Princelings are the children of Communist revolutionaries, who often receive prized positions in state leadership, large state-owned enterprises and the military. This group is expected to gain the advantage in the core leadership after the 2012 transition. Bo made himself popular by striking down organized-crime leaders who had grown rich and powerful from new money and by bribing officials. Bo’s campaign of nostalgia for the Mao era, including singing revolutionary songs and launching a “Red microblog” on the Internet, has proved hugely popular. It also has added an unusual degree of public support to his bid for a spot on the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. Both sides appeal to the inherent value of the Party, rather than its role as economic steward, for justification.

The second challenge to Deng’s legacy has arisen from the military’s growing self-confidence and confrontational attitude toward foreign rivals, a stance popular with an increasingly nationalist domestic audience. The foreign policy of inoffensiveness for the sake of commerce thus has been challenged from within. Vastly more dependent on foreign natural resources, and yet insecure over prices and vulnerability of supply lines, China has turned to the PLA to take a greater role in protecting its global interests, especially in the maritime realm. As a result, the PLA has become more forceful in driving its policies.

In recent years, China has pushed harder on territorial claims and more staunchly defended partners like North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. This trend, especially observable throughout 2010, has alarmed China’s neighbors and the United States. The PLA is not the only institution that seems increasingly bold. Chinese government officials and state companies have also caused worry among foreigners. But the military acting this way sends a particularly strong signal abroad.

And third, Deng’s avoidance of political reform may be becoming harder to maintain. The stark disparities in wealth and public services between social classes and regions have fueled dissatisfaction. Arbitrary power, selective enforcement of the law, official and corporate corruption, and other ills have gnawed at public content, giving rise to more and more frequent incidents and outbursts. The social fabric has been torn, and leaders fear that it could ignite with widespread unrest. Simultaneously, rising education, incomes and new forms of social organization like non-governmental organizations and the Internet have given rise to greater demands and new means of coordination among dissidents or opposition movements.

In this atmosphere, Premier Wen Jiabao has become outspoken, calling for the Party to pursue political reforms in keeping with economic reforms. Wen’s comments contain just enough ambiguity to suggest that he is promoting substantial change and diverging from the Party, though in fact he may intend them only to pacify people by preserving hope for changes in the unspecified future. Regardless, it is becoming harder for the Party to maintain economic development without addressing political grievances. Political changes seem necessary not only for the sake of pursuing oft-declared plans to unleash household consumption and domestic innovation and services, but also to ease social discontent. The Party realizes that reform is inevitable, but questions how to do it while retaining control. The possibility that the Party could split on the question of political reform, as happened in the 1980s, thus has re-emerged.

These new challenges to the Deng approach reveal a rising uncertainty in China about whether his solutions are adequate to secure the country’s future. Essentially, the rise of Maoist nostalgia, the princelings’ glorification of their Communist bloodline and the CCYL’s promotion of ideology and wealth redistribution imply a growing fear that the economic transition may fail, and that the Party therefore may need a more deeply layered security presence to control society at all levels and a more ideological basis for the legitimacy of its rule. Meanwhile, a more assertive military implies growing fears that a foreign policy of meekness and amiability is insufficient to protect China’s access to foreign trade from those who feel threatened by China’s rising power, such as Japan, India or the United States. Finally, a more strident premier in favor of political reform suggests fear that growing demands for political change will lead to upheaval unless they are addressed and alleviated.

Containing the Risks

These emerging trends have not become predominant yet. At this moment, Beijing is struggling to contain these challenges to the status quo within the same cycle of tightening and loosening control that has characterized the past three decades. Though the cycle is still recognizable, the fluctuations are widening — and the policy reactions are becoming more sudden and extreme.

The country is continuing to pursue the same path of economic development, even sacrificing more ambitious rebalancing to re-emphasize, in the 2011-15 Five-Year Plan, what are basically the traditional methods of growth. These include massive credit expansion fueling large-scale infrastructure expansion and technology upgrades for the export-oriented manufacturing sector, all provided for by transferring wealth from depositors to state-owned corporations and local governments. Modifications to the status quo have been slight, and radical transformation of the overall growth model has not yet borne fruit.

In 2011, China’s leaders also have signaled a swing away from last year’s foreign policy assertiveness. Hu and Obama met in Washington in January and declared a thaw in relations. Recently, Hu announced a “new security concept” for the region. He said that cooperation and peaceful negotiation remain official Chinese policy, and that China respects the “presence and interests” of outsiders in the region, a new and significant comment in light of the U.S. re-engagement with the region. The United States has approved China’s backpedaling, saying the Chinese navy has been less assertive this year than the last, and Washington has since toned down its own threats. China’s retreat is not permanent, and none of its neighbors have forgotten its more threatening side. But China has signaled an attempt to diminish tensions, as it has done in the past, to avoid provoking real trouble abroad (while focusing on troubles at home) for the time being.

Finally, the security crackdown under way since February — part of a longer trend of security tightening since at least 2008, but with remarkable new elements — shows that the state remains committed to Deng’s general deferral of political reform, choosing strict social control instead.

The Deng model thus has not yet been dismantled. But the new currents of military assertiveness, ideological zeal and demand for political reform have revealed not only differences in vision among the elite, but a rising concern among them for their positions ahead of the leadership transition. Sackings and promotions already are accelerating. Unorthodox trends suggest that leaders and institutions are hedging political bets to protect themselves, their interests and their cliques in case the economic transition goes wrong or foreigners take advantage of China’s vulnerabilities, or ideological division and social revolt threaten the Party. And this betrays deep uncertainties.

The Gravity of 2012

As the jockeying for power ahead of the 2012 transition has already begun in earnest, signs of vacillating and conflicting policy directives suggest that the regime is in a constant state of policy adjustment to try to avoid an extreme shift in one direction or another. Tensions are rising between leaders as they try to secure their positions without upsetting the balance and jeopardizing a smooth transfer of power. The government’s arrests of dissidents underline its fear of these growing tensions, as well as its sharp reactions to threats that could disrupt the transition or cause broader instability. Everything is in flux, and the cracks in the system are widening.

One major question is how long the Party will be able to maintain the current high level of vigilance without triggering a backlash. The government effectively has silenced critics deemed possible of fomenting a larger movement. The masses have yet to rally in significant numbers in a coordinated way that could threaten the state. But the regime has responded disproportionately to the organizational capabilities that the small Jasmine protests demonstrated, and has extended this magnified response to a number of otherwise-familiar spontaneous protests and incidents of unrest.

As security becomes more oppressive in the lead up to the transition — with any easing of control unlikely before then or even in the following year as the new government seeks to consolidate power — the heavy hand of the state runs the risk of provoking exactly the type of incident it hopes to prevent. Excessive brutality, or a high-profile mistake or incident that acts as a catalyst, could spark spontaneous domestic protests with the potential to spread.

Contrasting Deng’s situation with Hu’s is illuminating. When Deng sought to step down, his primary challenges were how to loosen economic control, how to create a foreign policy conducive to trade, and how to forestall democratic challenges to the regime. He also had to leverage his prestige in the military and Party to establish a reliable succession plan from Jiang to Hu that would set the country on a prosperous path.

As Hu seeks to step down, his challenges are to prevent economic overheating, counter any humiliating turn in foreign affairs such as greater U.S. pressure, and forestall unrest from economic left-behinds, migrants or other aggrieved groups. Hu cannot allow the Party (or his legacy) to be damaged by mass protests or economic collapse on his watch. Yet, like Jiang, he has to control the process without having Deng’s prestige among the military ranks and without a succession plan clad in Deng’s armor.

More challenging still, he has to do so without a solid succession plan. Hu is the last Chinese leader Deng directly appointed. It is not clear whether China’s next generation of leaders will augment Deng’s theory, or discard it. But it is clear that China is taking on a challenge much greater than a change in president or administration. It is an existential crisis, and the regime has few choices: continue delaying change even if it means a bigger catastrophe in the future; undertake wrenching economic and political reforms that might risk regime survival; or retrench and sacrifice the economy to maintain CPC rule and domestic security. China has already waded deep into a total economic transformation unlike anything since 1978, and at the greatest risk to the Party’s legitimacy since 1989. The emerging trends suggest a likely break from Deng’s position toward heavier state intervention in the economy, more contentious relationships with neighbors, and a Party that rules primarily through ideology and social control.

[zlin]

Zhengzhou Ghost City Alive!

Zhengzhou, Henan, China (March 28, 2011): In December, London’s Daily Mail reported that the Zhengzhou New Area was China’s largest “Ghost City.” A visit to the Zhengzhou New Area indicates exactly the opposite. Chinese “Ghost Cities” are large areas of new development that are virtually unoccupied. The most famous example is Ordos, a new and reportedly empty city, built to replace an older city in Inner Mongolia.

Zhenghou is an urban area of approximately 2.5 million population and is the capital of Henan province. The Zhengzhou New Area is located in the northeastern quadrant of Zhengzhou. It is circular in design, with two parallel roads, high-rise condominium buildings on the inner ring and commercial buildings on the outer ring. The interior of the circle includes the Henan Arts Center and a skyscraper that is under construction. A new high speed rail station is under construction to serve the new Guangzhou to Beijing line. The station is to be one of the largest in Asia.



Our visit revealed anything but a Ghost City. Granted, no-one would mistake the traffic for Beijing Third Ring Road volumes, but virtually all of the parking spaces were taken and there was traffic on the streets (Figure 1). That ultimate indicator of Chinese urbanization, the availability of frequent taxicab service was well in evidence. Two of the city’s bus rapid transit lines serve the interior circle road, again indicating a substantial threshold of non-ghost urbanization.



There were people on the sidewalks, though not the numbers typical of an older, more dense section of a Chinese urban area (Figure 2). It was clear from the laundry hanging in glass enclosed patios that many of the condominiums were occupied, though it is to be expected that many would not be, given the Chinese propensity to invest in multiple residential properties (a tendency the central government seeks to curb). Many of the commercial skyscrapers were occupied, and some were still under construction. There are also shopping centers, small stores and fast food restaurants.

Zhengzhou New Area is intended by the developers to become the new central business district for Zhengzhou. There is much more planned than this first phase. Eventually, the Zhengzhou New Area is intended to cover 105 square kilometers (41 square miles), generally further to the northeast. City maps already show the planned street pattern, not unlike 19th century maps of some US cities.

In short, the Zhengzhou New Area is alive and not a Ghost City. It may well be that it took longer than expected for the place to come alive. But it is clear that the life of the Zhengzhou New Area began more than four months ago.

[devesh]

See the map of India at 0.36 min with Kashmir as a seperate country, arunachal pradesh as a seperate etc.

Western propaganda is always alive. Google is but an extension of the imperial system considering that it has close ties to US ICE.

[Christopher Sidor]

Zhengzhou Ghost City Alive!

Zhengzhou, Henan, China (March 28, 2011): In December, London’s Daily Mail reported that the Zhengzhou New Area was China’s largest “Ghost City.” A visit to the Zhengzhou New Area indicates exactly the opposite. Chinese “Ghost Cities” are large areas of new development that are virtually unoccupied. The most famous example is Ordos, a new and reportedly empty city, built to replace an older city in Inner Mongolia.

Zhenghou is an urban area of approximately 2.5 million population and is the capital of Henan province. The Zhengzhou New Area is located in the northeastern quadrant of Zhengzhou. It is circular in design, with two parallel roads, high-rise condominium buildings on the inner ring and commercial buildings on the outer ring. The interior of the circle includes the Henan Arts Center and a skyscraper that is under construction. A new high speed rail station is under construction to serve the new Guangzhou to Beijing line. The station is to be one of the largest in Asia.



Our visit revealed anything but a Ghost City. Granted, no-one would mistake the traffic for Beijing Third Ring Road volumes, but virtually all of the parking spaces were taken and there was traffic on the streets (Figure 1). That ultimate indicator of Chinese urbanization, the availability of frequent taxicab service was well in evidence. Two of the city’s bus rapid transit lines serve the interior circle road, again indicating a substantial threshold of non-ghost urbanization.



There were people on the sidewalks, though not the numbers typical of an older, more dense section of a Chinese urban area (Figure 2). It was clear from the laundry hanging in glass enclosed patios that many of the condominiums were occupied, though it is to be expected that many would not be, given the Chinese propensity to invest in multiple residential properties (a tendency the central government seeks to curb). Many of the commercial skyscrapers were occupied, and some were still under construction. There are also shopping centers, small stores and fast food restaurants.

Zhengzhou New Area is intended by the developers to become the new central business district for Zhengzhou. There is much more planned than this first phase. Eventually, the Zhengzhou New Area is intended to cover 105 square kilometers (41 square miles), generally further to the northeast. City maps already show the planned street pattern, not unlike 19th century maps of some US cities.

In short, the Zhengzhou New Area is alive and not a Ghost City. It may well be that it took longer than expected for the place to come alive. But it is clear that the life of the Zhengzhou New Area began more than four months ago.

This is what is called barking up the wrong tree. Westerners have their biases and their view points. That is why they see everything through the prism of their experiences and/or beliefs. In a country growing at 8-10%, 65 million unoccupied homes will have takers, if not today then tomorrow and if not tomorrow then next week or next year. That is not the problem. Even in India in greater noida, pockets of gurgaon and other places ghost localities exist. That does not mean India is going to have a crash.
Also the recent real-estate crash in America has a different genesis. There people have taken mortgages out on their homes. These mortgages were taken and the money was spent on consumption or on buying new homes. There was another case also of constructing some 400 billion USD dollars of housing supply which nobody was going to occupy. Then there was the case of giving loans to people who could not pay or asking for very less down payment, the so called sub-prime mess.
If sub-prime was a fraction of the prime mortgages in America, then things would have been fine. If housing was built only on basis of demand and not for re-financing, then things would have been fine.

Rather the problem is somewhat different in China. Money spent on houses means money not available for buying clothes/apparels, toys, etc. Even with 50-60% down payment expected from house buyers, that still leaves some 40-50% to be financed. That money will go out from the pockets of consumers. Money which will not be available for consumption. Right now the need for China is to rebalance its economy and move away from export led growth. Further like India, builders have moved from low-cost housing to luxury or premium or big houses. Houses which the average Chinese are unable to afford. What china needs is housing, but housing for what we in India call as "Economic Weaker Section".

So if we are laboring under the illusion that China is headed for a sub-prime type crash or a housing bust, then the sorry to say that is not going to happen. Rather this housing might impact china is an adverse way indirectly. That is what is worrying.

[Ameet]

Third day of Shanghai strike threatens China exports

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/ ... 9J20110422

Striking truck drivers protested for a third day on Friday in Shanghai's main harbour district amid heavy police presence and signs the action has already started to curb exports from the world's busiest container port.

The strike is a very public demonstration of anger over rising consumer prices and fuel price increases in China.

It comes as the government struggles to contain higher inflation, which hit 5.4 percent in March, fearful that rising prices could fuel protests like those that have rocked the Middle East.

[Cosmo_R]

The WSJ also picked up the trucker strike story. Apparently, the inflation rate is roughly double the official 5.9%.

http://www.google.com/search?q=Chinese+ ... s+Continue

Premium article but always a way in through uncal googal.

[Theo_Fidel]

Good read. $271 Billion debt. Holy cow...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ ... print.html

China’s train wreck

For the past eight years, Liu Zhijun was one of the most influential people in China. As minister of railways, Liu ran China’s $300 billion high-speed rail project. U.S., European and Japanese contractors jostled for a piece of the business while foreign journalists gushed over China’s latest high-tech marvel.

Today, Liu Zhijun is ruined, and his high-speed rail project is in trouble. On Feb. 25, he was fired for “severe violations of discipline” — code for embezzling tens of millions of dollars. Seems his ministry has run up $271 billion in debt — roughly five times the level that bankrupted General Motors. But ticket sales can’t cover debt service that will total $27.7 billion in 2011 alone. Safety concerns also are cropping up.

Faced with a financial and public relations disaster, China put the brakes on Liu’s program. On April 13, the government cut bullet-train speeds 30 mph to improve safety, energy efficiency and affordability. The Railway Ministry’s tangled finances are being audited. Construction plans, too, are being reviewed.

Liu’s legacy, in short, is a system that could drain China’s economic resources for years. So much for the grand project that Thomas Friedman of the New York Times likened to a “moon shot” and that President Obama held up as a model for the United States.

Rather than demonstrating the advantages of centrally planned long-term investment, as its foreign admirers sometimes suggested, China’s bullet-train experience shows what can go wrong when an unelected elite, influenced by corrupt opportunists, gives orders that all must follow — without the robust public discussion we would have in the states.

The fact is that China’s train wreck was eminently foreseeable. High-speed rail is a capital-intensive undertaking that requires huge borrowing upfront to finance tracks, locomotives and cars, followed by years in which ticket revenue covers debt service — if all goes well. “Any . . . shortfall in ridership or yield, can quickly create financial stress,” warns a 2010 World Bank staff report.

Such “shortfalls” are all too common. Japan’s bullet trains needed a bailout in 1987. Taiwan’s line opened in 2007 and needed a government rescue in 2009. In France, only the Paris-Lyon high-speed line is in the black.

This history counseled caution about introducing bullet trains in China, where the typical passenger was still a migrant worker, not a businessman rushing to a meeting. To be sure, there was an economic case to be made for upgrading China’s lumbering rail system: It would free up limited rail capacity for freight trains, thus reducing truck traffic on congested roads. Beijing’s initial feasibility studies envisioned the gradual introduction of trains that would move at a maximum 125 mph, according to Caixin, the Chinese economic magazine.

But Liu Zhijun — part Cornelius Vanderbilt, part Sammy Glick — took over the rail ministry in March 2003 and urged officials to aim for speeds above 200 mph. “Seize the opportunity, build more railways, and build them fast,” he wrote.

Liu exploited the communist leadership’s fascination with bigness and national prestige. Among the benefits he promised was a chance to squeeze foreign companies for bullet-train technology so that China could build and export its own. What happened next suggests that he — and others — also saw the potential for graft in such a vast undertaking.

In 2004, the State Council signed off on Liu’s plan to build the world’s largest high-speed-rail network by 2020. The first leg, a 72-mile stretch between Beijing and Tianjin, would open in time for the 2008 Olympics.

Word went forth that state-owned banks and local governments were to give Liu all the money, land and labor he required. When Chinese journalists found that Liu’s ministry was using cheap, low-quality concrete, creating a safety hazard, the Communist Party’s propaganda department quashed the reports, according to a January piece in the South China Morning Post.

Students and other humble citizens greeted the first fast trains with complaints about high ticket prices. They crowded aboard buses instead. According to a recent report in China Daily, the government was forced to deploy 70,000 extra buses during the Chinese New Year celebrations in February.

This month, I rode the bullet train from Beijing to Tianjin in half an hour — then returned by bus, which took two hours. Next to me on the decrepit, but packed, vehicle was a 17-year-old girl migrating to Beijing to search for work. She had never heard of the high-speed train, but when informed it cost $9, as opposed to $5.40 for the bus, expressed no regret at missing it. The bus driver assured me the girl was typical of his working-class clientele; to them, even a little money is more valuable than a lot of time. Small wonder that the Beijing-Tianjin line, built at a cost of $46 million per mile, is losing more than $100 million per year.

[vina]

Good read. $271 Billion debt. Holy cow...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ ... print.html

China’s train wreck

This bit was quite easy to foresee. If the sparring we had we the posters from Panda land were anythign to go by we were assured that the lines were running at a Mushrrafesque 400% capacity and were raking in the money. Sure. Problem is that the ticket sales cant even cover the debt, forget about paying back investment and actually earning a profit!

The other wreck coming is the real estate wreck. That will dwarf this train wreck in size and scale. The problem is as Warren Buffet side, you know who is swimming naked only when the tide goes out. Sure as hell, the tide is going to go out one day for China. It is inevitable, the question is when the tide goes out, can the Chinese ride it out like a normal capitalist society would with some pain or is it going to go bust like the Soviet Union thanks to all the excesses during the boom and the Japanese like overinvestment coupled with a soviet style command economy?

[chola]

Apologies if posted earlier ...

After seeing these videos, I feel sympathy for the Chinese people who are being taken for a ride by the Communist Party of China ...

I don't. If China ever throws off the communist yoke, the US will pour in money and resource in an unprecedented scale to create a democratic China. It will turn it into another Taiwan or Japan that will drain investment, market access and resource from every other country in the world and that includes India. There is a romance in the US about the Far East. It will try to remake China in its image and it will succeed while the rest of the world is ignored.

Communism keeps China within striking distance economically. If China stays communist, India will eventually catch up and pass it. If it is a democratic China fully supported by the US and its allies then we won't ever be able to catch it.

In the long term Chankian view where our culture is in competition with others , a democratic China run like Japan, Taiwan or South Korea and backed by a mesmerized US does Indians no good. At best, it would mean even more competition at worse it could mean American support for Chinese positions in South and Central Asia.

[chola]

Interesting point of view ... but I have a few questions for you !!!

1.) A democratic china can afford to pay the same peanuts to its workers it is paying now?

Does Japan? Does Taiwan? Does South Korea? The danger is a China with the same per capita income as the rest of the Far East. Unless you truly believe that communism is a better system then it is inevitable that China will be wealthier if it ever democraticizes. That had been the universal experience in the Far East.

2.) Once a country becomes democratic and sheds its communist past, will the outburst kept compressed in people's mind for so many years, just disappear?

I am assuming that the outburst will be exercised in open violence and revolution in a China turning towards democracy. The chicoms won't give up power otherwise.

In open rebellion, the Americans will enter the fray. The Americans will brook no power vacuum, especially across the largest landmass in the Western Pacific which for all intents and purposes is an American lake.

3.) If a society gets freed from a complete suppression, will they immediately return to disciplined life at the very next day?

No, communism depends on discipline and slavery to be "successful" (as if being 10 times poorer than Japan is successful.) A free nation doesn't.

Think about this -- will it take longer than for the US to turn around Japan or South Korea after complete devastation? There is little chance of the destruction that we saw in those wars during a modern color or velvet revolution.

4.) People who were bullied by their own pseudo-elites will accept any form of interference from the West?

People bullied by their elite are exactly the ones who will ask for American intervention. Look at Libya. Those people beg for American intervention. The Far East worship the gora far more.

There is also the little thing called the internet where people know exactly the freedom and, even more importantly in the Far East, the wealth represented by the Americans and its allies.

If a revolution kicks off, there will be many asking for US support. There will be Chinese Americans pushing for intervention from the US end.

5.) In present days and in immediate future, does Ameerkhan has that kind of money to take care of the most populated country in the world, especially post-recession?

Americans will try and even if they do not succeed they will end up focusing the West and the Far East, the richest regions of the world, on a democratic China. That means China gets preferential access to markets, aid and everything else. Again, look at American support of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

In fact, if what things are pointing to, if China does become a democracy, there will be a huge journey to market and social corrections. It will be a big uncontrolled giant, with nobody to guide and very few to listen to. In such a bad shape, the priority would be to get a society super structure in place and its going to be a very rough ride. Forget about any threat or competition to India.

You are assuming that market (and social) corrections will harm a nation in the long or even medium term. Market corrections are what makes economies rational. They are what made democracies the wealthiest nations on earth. By a wide margin.

Irrational economies created under communism -- whether it is the Soviet Union in the past or North Korea and the PRC today -- are much poorer than than virtually every democratic neighbors.

And I doubt that whatever condition China would be in after a revolution would be any worse than Japan after WWII or South Korea after the Korean War. Those nations were remade after total devastation.

In the modern world, nations suffer much less in Color Revolutions. With China, a good chunk of its wealth is in American treasury bonds which won't be affected by revolution and will in fact be the money for the US to use in rebuilding a democratic China.

The US will be in effect using Chinese money to remake China under American influence and control.

Even the world economy put together cannot sustain an economically stirred and democratic china and rest assured nobody will like to feed this new democratic infant which has such a huge appetite.

The real problem is the world put together cannot sustain both a democratic China and a wealthy democratic India. With Americans stamping their mark on China, it might well mean that all resources flow towards China to the detriment of everyone else.

The reason China is the second largest economy in the world despite the massive corruption, inefficiency and irrationalities of its communist government is because Americans began opening its market and resources to China after Nixon's visit in 1970.

If China becomes a democracy, that effort becomes ten-fold.

The only thing that comes to my mind is the main land getting disintegrated into smaller land blocks as it was pre-Ming dynasty.

One, it doesn't matter if it remains one Chinese state or 10 of them. If they are democratic, they will be more economically rational, competitive and wealthy. Having 10 Japans will be massive competition.

Two, there is no way that the US will leave such a huge and critical landmass in a power vacuum and it will not let anyone else have influence there. Therefore it will attempt to rebuild China in its image.

Americans is connected to the Far East strategically. They fought three bloody wars there. Pulling China into its orbit would be the crowning achievement of all those previous wars. It will cement American power for centuries.

Americans did not become a superpower by acting passive or stupid. China in revolution would be a game changer that Americans will go all in and in all likelihood win. An American win will make the US even more powerful but Chinese much wealthier.

Now, as Indians we shouldn't want the game to change. China remaining communist not only retards its growth so it can be overtaken but also makes American spend its resources containing China instead of building it up.

A democratic China or many democratic Chinas under the US umbrella would make India redundant in the strategic space. It would also cause the US to support Chinese position. Remember Taiwan is free and democratic but its claims to the former Chinese empire is greater than even the PRC. On Taiwanese maps, Mongolia and chunks of Russia and India are still shown as Chinese.

[svinayak]

Americans will try and even if they do not succeed they will end up focusing the West and the Far East, the richest regions of the world, on a democratic China. That means China gets preferential access to markets, aid and everything else. Again, look at American support of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.


The US will be in effect using Chinese money to remake China under American influence and control.

The real problem is the world put together cannot sustain both a democratic China and a wealthy democratic India. With Americans stamping their mark on China, it might well mean that all resources flow towards China to the detriment of everyone else.

The reason China is the second largest economy in the world despite the massive corruption, inefficiency and irrationalities of its communist government is because Americans began opening its market and resources to China after Nixon's visit in 1970.

If China becomes a democracy, that effort becomes ten-fold.


Americans is connected to the Far East strategically. They fought three bloody wars there. Pulling China into its orbit would be the crowning achievement of all those previous wars. It will cement American power for centuries.


Now, as Indians we shouldn't want the game to change. China remaining communist not only retards its growth so it can be overtaken but also makes American spend its resources containing China instead of building it up.

A democratic China or many democratic Chinas under the US umbrella would make India redundant in the strategic space. It would also cause the US to support Chinese position. Remember Taiwan is free and democratic but its claims to the former Chinese empire is greater than even the PRC. On Taiwanese maps, Mongolia and chunks of Russia and India are still shown as Chinese.

What happens if US America promises a $2T - $3T trade and commerce with India to pacify India so that it does not wage a war against PRC. Is this scenario acceptable.

[Hari Seldon]

Acharya san, kindly elaborate on the need to pacify a status-quoist pacifist country like India in the first place. Besides, when democratic china, ready to be remade in the US image is all available, why bother with misfiring engines at all, eh? Remember, PRC democracy is likely to be a disciplined story, much like Russian democracy - where single party huge majorities may well be the norm. Russia too became democratic in the 90s after centuries of authoritarian/monarchist rule after all, no?

[chola]

What happens if US America promises a $2T - $3T trade and commerce with India to pacify India so that it does not wage a war against PRC. Is this scenario acceptable.

Possibly a good idea. I mean, it works for North Korea. But India needs to turn itself into an insane communist dictatorship and starve 10 percent of our population to make that gambit viable.

[svinayak]

What happens if US America promises a $2T - $3T trade and commerce with India to pacify India so that it does not wage a war against PRC. Is this scenario acceptable.

Possibly a good idea. I mean, it works for North Korea. But India needs to turn itself into an insane communist dictatorship and starve 10 percent of our population to make that gambit viable.

Why is the need to look at NK
PRC has gobbled Tibet and is now going for Indian territory Arunachal Pradesh.

[Paul]

Gobbled but not digested……To recall an incident. I remember reading the Fredrick Forsyth novel on Ukrainian freedom fighters, The devil’s alternative in the late 80s. Ukraine had been part of USSR and imperial Russia for close to 180 years, At that time, the Berlin wall had not yet collapsed, USSR was still a superpower, hence independence for this state seemed a remote possibility. Now Ukraine is an independent state with key Russian treasures, Black sea fleet, Kiev (Mother of Russian cities) in it. At best Tibet will gain independence(not in Indian interests, do not want another landlocked state in our proximity), or be administered from China with free access from India . In turn China gets access to IOR ports from Indian territory. (preferred option)….

[Christopher Sidor]

At best Tibet will gain independence(not in Indian interests, do not want another landlocked state in our proximity), or be administered from China with free access from India . In turn China gets access to IOR ports from Indian territory. (preferred option)….

China does not require IOR ports from India. China's greatest threat from India is based on the premise of an alternative power center, which it will not be able to subdue or overawe it with its might. And as long as there are alternatives, others will not blindly toe the Chinese line.

Tibet HAS to be independent of China/PRC and India. We did a Himalayan blunder but letting go of it. It is true that we were in no position, to prevent it physically without seriously compromising our independence. But still we should have at least made some effort.

[svinayak]

China does not require IOR ports from India. China's greatest threat from India is based on the premise of an alternative power center, which it will not be able to subdue or overawe it with its might. And as long as there are alternatives, others will not blindly toe the Chinese line.

Tibet HAS to be independent of China/PRC and India. We did a Himalayan blunder but letting go of it. It is true that we were in no position, to prevent it physically without seriously compromising our independence. But still we should have at least made some effort.

China is worried about India s population. Another is that India as one large country. So figure out which countries talk about India to be broken up and weakened. We have China official groups talking about it and obviously Pakistan. But there is another country which has been guiding them and giving them information about the social changes and plans on the Indian society.

Tibet was planned out for PRC right from the early days even before independence. Somewhere in the 1930 s and 1940 s they wanted to make sure that India is not one country. After India s second election in 1957 Mao and En Lai made their move on Tibet sensing that India is going to grow bigger and powerful.
Before India arms itself they defeated India in 1962 to keep an entire generation under weakness.

[UBanerjee]

Interesting point of view ... but I have a few questions for you !!!

1.) A democratic china can afford to pay the same peanuts to its workers it is paying now?

Does Japan? Does Taiwan? Does South Korea? The danger is a China with the same per capita income as the rest of the Far East. Unless you truly believe that communism is a better system then it is inevitable that China will be wealthier if it ever democraticizes. That had been the universal experience in the Far East.

2.) Once a country becomes democratic and sheds its communist past, will the outburst kept compressed in people's mind for so many years, just disappear?

I am assuming that the outburst will be exercised in open violence and revolution in a China turning towards democracy. The chicoms won't give up power otherwise.

In open rebellion, the Americans will enter the fray. The Americans will brook no power vacuum, especially across the largest landmass in the Western Pacific which for all intents and purposes is an American lake.

3.) If a society gets freed from a complete suppression, will they immediately return to disciplined life at the very next day?

No, communism depends on discipline and slavery to be "successful" (as if being 10 times poorer than Japan is successful.) A free nation doesn't.

Think about this -- will it take longer than for the US to turn around Japan or South Korea after complete devastation? There is little chance of the destruction that we saw in those wars during a modern color or velvet revolution.

4.) People who were bullied by their own pseudo-elites will accept any form of interference from the West?

People bullied by their elite are exactly the ones who will ask for American intervention. Look at Libya. Those people beg for American intervention. The Far East worship the gora far more.

There is also the little thing called the internet where people know exactly the freedom and, even more importantly in the Far East, the wealth represented by the Americans and its allies.

If a revolution kicks off, there will be many asking for US support. There will be Chinese Americans pushing for intervention from the US end.

5.) In present days and in immediate future, does Ameerkhan has that kind of money to take care of the most populated country in the world, especially post-recession?

Americans will try and even if they do not succeed they will end up focusing the West and the Far East, the richest regions of the world, on a democratic China. That means China gets preferential access to markets, aid and everything else. Again, look at American support of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

In fact, if what things are pointing to, if China does become a democracy, there will be a huge journey to market and social corrections. It will be a big uncontrolled giant, with nobody to guide and very few to listen to. In such a bad shape, the priority would be to get a society super structure in place and its going to be a very rough ride. Forget about any threat or competition to India.

You are assuming that market (and social) corrections will harm a nation in the long or even medium term. Market corrections are what makes economies rational. They are what made democracies the wealthiest nations on earth. By a wide margin.

Irrational economies created under communism -- whether it is the Soviet Union in the past or North Korea and the PRC today -- are much poorer than than virtually every democratic neighbors.

And I doubt that whatever condition China would be in after a revolution would be any worse than Japan after WWII or South Korea after the Korean War. Those nations were remade after total devastation.

In the modern world, nations suffer much less in Color Revolutions. With China, a good chunk of its wealth is in American treasury bonds which won't be affected by revolution and will in fact be the money for the US to use in rebuilding a democratic China.

The US will be in effect using Chinese money to remake China under American influence and control.

Even the world economy put together cannot sustain an economically stirred and democratic china and rest assured nobody will like to feed this new democratic infant which has such a huge appetite.

The real problem is the world put together cannot sustain both a democratic China and a wealthy democratic India. With Americans stamping their mark on China, it might well mean that all resources flow towards China to the detriment of everyone else.

The reason China is the second largest economy in the world despite the massive corruption, inefficiency and irrationalities of its communist government is because Americans began opening its market and resources to China after Nixon's visit in 1970.

If China becomes a democracy, that effort becomes ten-fold.

The only thing that comes to my mind is the main land getting disintegrated into smaller land blocks as it was pre-Ming dynasty.

One, it doesn't matter if it remains one Chinese state or 10 of them. If they are democratic, they will be more economically rational, competitive and wealthy. Having 10 Japans will be massive competition.

Two, there is no way that the US will leave such a huge and critical landmass in a power vacuum and it will not let anyone else have influence there. Therefore it will attempt to rebuild China in its image.

Americans is connected to the Far East strategically. They fought three bloody wars there. Pulling China into its orbit would be the crowning achievement of all those previous wars. It will cement American power for centuries.

Americans did not become a superpower by acting passive or stupid. China in revolution would be a game changer that Americans will go all in and in all likelihood win. An American win will make the US even more powerful but Chinese much wealthier.

Now, as Indians we shouldn't want the game to change. China remaining communist not only retards its growth so it can be overtaken but also makes American spend its resources containing China instead of building it up.

A democratic China or many democratic Chinas under the US umbrella would make India redundant in the strategic space. It would also cause the US to support Chinese position. Remember Taiwan is free and democratic but its claims to the former Chinese empire is greater than even the PRC. On Taiwanese maps, Mongolia and chunks of Russia and India are still shown as Chinese.

Fascinating hypothesis! But the problem is, why would China come under US orbit in the long term, even if it democratizes and certain American ideologies are imported? China would be big enough to have its own significant orbit and make the western Pacific its own lake, not the Americans!

Why would China assent to a unipolar world when it can become a pole of its own? In the long run, there will always be significant rivalry between the US and the Chinese so long as resources are scarce, that is, it is going to happen. Each will seek to draw out the satellites into their orbits (Korea, Japan, Indochina, Australasia). What will be India's role in this?

Remember the only way Japan was subdued and it's alpha-male ambitions broken, was with a massive bloody war ending in two atomic explosions. Since then Japan has had to accept it's beta-male status.

[svinayak]

Fascinating hypothesis! But the problem is, why would China come under US orbit in the long term, even if it democratizes and certain American ideologies are imported? China would be big enough to have its own significant orbit and make the western Pacific its own lake, not the Americans!

Chinese political nature and the China of the current generation have accepted the modernization of the western kind.

Why would China assent to a unipolar world when it can become a pole of its own? In the long run, there will always be significant rivalry between the US and the Chinese so long as resources are scarce, that is, it is going to happen. Each will seek to draw out the satellites into their orbits (Korea, Japan, Indochina, Australasia). What will be India's role in this?

Remember the only way Japan was subdued and it's alpha-male ambitions broken, was with a massive bloody war ending in two atomic explosions. Since then Japan has had to accept it's beta-male status.

Global demographics and economic trends lead to a surprising conclusion

[svinayak]

Is PRC independent to take care of its trade and monetary policy

BBC News
Geithner Will Urge China To Allow Higher Interest Rates, Stronger Currency
Bloomberg - Rebecca Christie, Ian Katz - ‎58 minutes ago‎
Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner will urge China to allow higher interest rates when he meets with Chinese leaders this week, as the US extends its push for a stronger yuan.

[Gaurav_S]

Meet the workers dying to meet your iPad 2 demand

If you're frustrated at being unable to buy an iPad 2, spare a thought for the Chinese workers who may never be able to afford one of the shiny new gadgets but are literally dying to get them out fast enough to meet Western demand.

A new report into conditions at Apple's manufacturing partner, Foxconn, has found slave labour conditions remain with staff complaining of being worked to tears, exposure to harmful disease, pay rates below that necessary to survive and military-style management that routinely humiliates workers.

...

[Vasu]

Something seems seriously amiss at Foxconn. The reports of worker conditions keep coming out regularly, despite assurances by the company of changed policies. Now the report says that Apple is yet to respond to all these reports! SACOM is a watchdog based in Hong Kong.

meanwhile, this comment in The Guardian by a European teacher working in Guangzhou. He's basically saying its all relative!

Chinese workers not exploited

am an English teacher, working and living in Guangzhou, China. Your article about Apple products supplier Foxconn gave the impression that foreign companies are exploiting Chinese workers ("Chinese iPad factories are accused of treating their workforce 'inhumanely, like machines'", News). This is far from reality, though it might seem so from abroad. The situation for workers at Foxconn is not considered bad at all, even including overtime. If they couldn't work overtime, they probably wouldn't be interested in working there. I can't remember ever hearing of factory workers or other people in the private sector working fewer than 10-12 hours a day, for at least six, sometimes seven days a week.

You said 1,350 yuan (£125) a month was an average salary for a Foxconn worker. In China, you don't need to spend more than £1 a day to have three meals. In Europe, 10 times that amount would hardly be sufficient. Also, housing and work clothing is supplied by the employer. Usually, they don't have much of a social life in these factories, so they try to work as much as possible and save as much as possible.

Yes, dormitories would seem awful to live in for a western worker. The Chinese don't mind it; in fact, my students have told me that they preferred to live in a dorm to living on their own. Of their 1,350 yuan a month, a worker can save about 1,000, on which his or her family in the countryside can live maybe 100 days. With low taxes for workers and exporters, and a low living standard, Chinese products are very competitive.

[chola]

Fascinating hypothesis! But the problem is, why would China come under US orbit in the long term, even if it democratizes and certain American ideologies are imported?

If China democratizes under its own influence and timeline, possibly not. But that would mean the communists allow it to happen. Highly unlikely.

My assumption is that China if it ever democratizes, it will be through revolution and in that case, the US will be involved. It will be a game-changer and it will rationalize all of America's previous wars in the Far East.

But even if the communists allowed the transition to democracy peacefully, the US will try to influence China's direction. This will mean aid and resources going to China to the detriment of others. China would be the biggest game for in town for the Americans and all its allies. China in the US orbit would cement US power for decades if not centuries.

Why would China assent to a unipolar world when it can become a pole of its own?

Because like Japan, it would be wealthier and it would mean acceptance into the world of whites. We underestimate the attraction that US pose to the East Asians. Whether it be the Chinese, Japanese or Korean, these people absolutely worship the Gora.

You take away communism and membership into the world of Europe, Japan, Singapore, etc. and the US would be far more appealing than a multipolar world to the Chinese masses voting in their politicians.

In the long run, there will always be significant rivalry between the US and the Chinese so long as resources are scarce, that is, it is going to happen. Each will seek to draw out the satellites into their orbits (Korea, Japan, Indochina, Australasia). What will be India's role in this?

Resources was scarce for the rest of the world too when the US and Japan were the largest and second largest economies in the world. Throw in the Europeans and the Far Eastern Tigers and the vast majority of resources went to the American alliance. China in the US orbit would just mean an expansion of this cartel.

India would have no role if there were a democratic China. There would be no need for India as a hedge against China. What role we have today depends on our role in the containment of communist China.

Remember the only way Japan was subdued and it's alpha-male ambitions broken, was with a massive bloody war ending in two atomic explosions. Since then Japan has had to accept it's beta-male status.

The war is not the only reason for a Japan that readily accepts American dominance. Wealthy states like Korea and Taiwan happily accept US dominance as well. The reason is cultural. I truly doubt that the Chinese when given freedom to act as they please would react any differently than the other East Asian states. There is a reason why people can't tell them apart. Not only do they look alike, they think alike. You take away communism and there is no reason why China will not act like Taiwan or Hong Kong except on a bigger scale.

At any rate, I don't think a democratic China whether or not it is under US control would be good for India at all. The clash over the long term is between civilizations not between ideologies (which can come and go.) A democratic China will be wealthier and harder to catch and will suck up more resources while at the same time get far less push back from powerful democracies in the US, Japan and Europe.

[Hari Seldon]

^^^Interesting discussion. I seriously doubt PRC will turn democratic anytime soon. I certainly hope it doesn't. Not before we catchup with it in GDP terms at least.

[sanjaykumar]

These East Asian states have had US linkages originally based on post war security needs, mutual needs. At the time the US was far wealthier than any east Asian state. There may be more inertia than any fundamental affinity here.

Worship of the goron is phenomenology. An examination of the cultural need for goron admiration may be illuminating. In Japanese media, blondes often find a place without context or reason. But the same blondes may be refused service in traditional Japanese inns and restaurants.

Chinese are flattered by Americans-you can rent yourself out to Chinese business if you have a white face, but the Chinese aim to be number one.

[Rupesh]

Exploding melons hit China after chemical overdose

BEIJING: Watermelons have been bursting by the score in eastern China after farmers gave them overdoses of growth chemicals during wet weather , creating fields of "land mines' ' instead of the bounty of fruit they wanted.

About 20 farmers around Danyang city in Jiangsu province were affected, losing up to 115 acres (45 hectares) of melon, China Central Television said in an investigative report . Prices over the past year prompted many farmers to jump into the watermelon market. All of those with exploding melons apparently were first-time users of the growth accelerator forchlorfenuron , though it has been widely available for some time, CCTV said.

The farmers used it during an overly rainy period and put it on too late in the season, causing the melons to burst open, CCTV said, citing agricultural experts. Chinese regulations don't forbid the drug, and it is allowed. But the report underscores how farmers in China are abusing both legal and illegal chemicals, with many farms misusing pesticides and fertilizers.

Intact watermelons were being sold at a wholesale market in Shanghai, but even those showed telltale signs of forchlorfenuron use: fibrous, misshapen fruit with white instead of black seeds

[Theo_Fidel]

....but the Chinese aim to be number one.

The Chinese definition of #1 varies quite a bit from what the West or even SDRE would consider #1.

Their definition of #1 is most-est and biggest not the best. Also want to be #1 in power and #1 in status over say #1 in knowledge and #1 in a just/fair society.

The best example of this thought process is their proliferation of nuclear technology. By spreading it to psychotic countries they thought that the west would then get bogged down in containing it. It has worked. Panda has dragged down the West a bit while it continues to grow. But now China is surrounded by nuclear capable countries, the only country in the world to be so surrounded. There will be blow back from this.

The other one is the on going real estate bubble. Where building huge new cities is more important than investing in existing cities where people actually live.

Another one is the HSR debacle, where Panda wanted the world largest, fastest network right now....

[Pranav]

Because like Japan, it would be wealthier and it would mean acceptance into the world of whites. We underestimate the attraction that US pose to the East Asians. Whether it be the Chinese, Japanese or Korean, these people absolutely worship the Gora.

Not any more. Often Chinese have a disdain for the Gora. It may true to some extent in S.Korea because of the extensive Missionary activities.

India would have no role if there were a democratic China. There would be no need for India as a hedge against China. What role we have today depends on our role in the containment of communist China.

The west is interested in dominance, not democracy per se. They are very happy with dictators when it is convenient. Anyway, India needs to pursue its own path.

[abhischekcc]

Acharya wrote: But there is another country which has been guiding them and giving them information about the social changes and plans on the Indian society.


That would be Britain.

[svinayak]

Guess again. Last try