Civil Aviation Flight Safety

[putnanja]

I was reading on one other forum about the Air France crash, and they were mentioning that some switches can be operated only on the ground, and it is not able to be turned on once in air. Given that SU-30MKI is unstable in one axis and requires the computer to be on all times during flight, I wonder how difficult it would be to lock those switches once they are in air.

[chetak]

A question from a complete novice in aviation or related technical stuff:We have two explanations been given for the MKI crash:

1. Inadvertent switching off of the FCS Controls leading to loss of control and hence the crash

As for this explanation, its understandable that since the a/c is unstable, it will crash due to the FCS being switched off. But then, if the location of FCS switches is so bad ( as to getting switched off by mistake), something like this could have happened much earlier also when the a/c was being inducted and Sqns were being raised with all the flying and conversion taking place. I do not think it was freak accident where the FCS was switched off by mistake. If a seasoned Wing Co can make such a mistake, what to speak of a new Flg Officer transitoning on to the MKI

2. The explanation posted in the link above by Chetak from the forum which is haraam on BRF.

Sirs, is it actually possible to push the FCS to a limit where the a/c becomes unstable and the FCS cannot ecover the a/c? Is the flight envelope of an a/c similar to flight envelope of a FCS? Isn't FCS a limiting factor to the envelope of an a/c? IIRC, the Cobra maneuvre can be attempted only after killing the FCS switch? So, a MKI can achieve more but the FCS limits it to safe/acceptable levels of flight envelope. So how can the pilots push the FCS to limit whereby it gives way? And is there something like "non-prescribed" usage of FCS envelope? If there is, why is such thing in the FCS envelope in the first place? The whole explanation seems like pushing the usual "holier than thou" attitude of the Russians when it comes to their stuff. Its us SDREs whoe do not know how to use their "superior" stuff.

Thanks for the patience

Sorry for the haram link (now deleted). Was not aware. My bad.

For the cobra maneuver only the angle of attack ( alpha ) limiter is temporarily disabled, the FCS is never completely switched off under any circumstances.

There are two schools of thought for the authority of the FCS.

The French, as exemplified by the Airbus (and Mirage?) system do not permit the pilot any leeway at all to operate outside the FCS envelope.

The FCS is the final authority and arbiter in flight.

Boeing on the other hand, permits the pilot to operate outside the FCS envelope and leaves it to his better professional judgment to over ride the FCS if the situation so warrants.

The PILOT is the final authority and arbiter in flight.

Some Airbus accident investigations have severely faulted the Airbus approach to the FCS but Airbus in its wisdom has pressed on regardless with their design philosophy.

A case in point would be the Airbus that pranged at Bangalore many years ago.

At that low level, during the final stages of this mishap, when the pilot finally firewalled the throttles demanding max power from the engines, the engines took five to six seconds odd to spool up to max power ( as all such large jet engines normally do ), simultaneously the pilot also tried to pitch up the nose to gain height.

At this stage, the envelope protection of the Airbus FCS kicked in and decided that the tail would have touched the ground if the nose were to be pitched up ( due to the length of the fuselage and the low height of the aircraft ) and thereby took away all authority from the pilot and suppressed the pitch up command. Therefore the aircraft continued to descend in spite of the fact that the pilot desperately wanted to climb.

The resulting situation was one where no increased power was immediately available from the engines as they were still spooling up coupled with the pilot unable to command a nose up as the FCS envelope protection had over ruled him.

The Airbus simply mushed into the ground. The famous last words " oh s**t " was later heard on the CVR.

The Boeing system would have permitted the pilot a tail strike and maybe still land a damaged aircraft.

This is the difference between a pilots call and the FCS call.

IMHO, its a toss up. Six of one and half a dozen of the other.

The Airbus that pranged at the Paris Airshow was also some such envelope protection cock up. Details suppressed by Airbus as per popular lore.

Without offense to anyone, which system would you have given to the Airfrance pilot who transited through known bad weather over the atlantic? Forget FCS limits, this guy was well outside his airframe limits too.
Would either system have made any difference in such a case?

The trick is to stay within the FCS envelope and this is what an expensively trained and highly paid pilot is meant to do.

The Sukhoi FCS has overrides and can apparently be flown outside the envelope but never without the FCS itself.

Very true.

Its us SDREs whoe do not know how to use their "superior" stuff.

[Prem Kumar]

Thanks to Chetak for highlighting the design philosophy differences between Airbus & Boeing. Very enlightening.

Cross-posting from SU-30 thread:

This FDR discussion got me thinking along the lines of "why cant the FDR transmit the data as a real time feed to a satellite and there-upon to a control center?". Would solve a lot of problems - black-box damage, problems in its recovery, possible real-time alerting of emergency situations (even alerting the pilot before its too late) etc. Something like the telemetry checks on space vehicles.

Upon Googling, found the following links of interest:

A discussion of some of the challenges of this approach (key ones seems to be data volume & cost):

Air France crash sparks black box debate
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090618/wl_ ... blackboxes

Many military aircraft already use data streaming, sending flight information real-time via satellite to ground stations.

But the massive bandwidth and sophisticated infrastructure needed to manage and process data from tens of thousands of commercial flights per day could make it prohibitively expensive.

Bruce Coffey, President of the Aviation Recorders division of L-3 Communications -- the world's largest supplier of crash-survivable recording units -- told Reuters the use of data streaming in conjunction with traditional recording units could provide a "belt and suspenders" approach.

Another company that is trying to do this:

Beyond the Black Box - Live Flight Data Analysis
http://finance.alphatrade.com/story/200 ... C8011.html

[pgbhat]

For some Comorians, the Yemenia Airways crash is no surprise

'Trashy' planes for non-European flights?
Comorians, including Ali Mohammed of the Federation of Comorians in Marseilles, have long accused airlines of using new, well-maintained planes for flights between the Middle East and France, but then switching to older planes not maintained to European standards – aircraft that would not be allowed to land here.

"We saw this might happen. We are put in trashy planes that do not meet the norms," said Farid Soilihi, president of SOS-Voyages for Comorians, a Marseilles lobby for safer travel conditions. "We aren't listened to, even in Comoros. The airlines we fly on don't meet regulations. People are heaped on board like animals, schedules aren't kept, there are always technical problems."

[enqyoob]

The Airbus that pranged at the Paris Airshow was also some such envelope protection cock up. Details suppressed by Airbus as per popular lore.

Wasn't that a case of the landing gear automatically coming out because the FCS decided that the aircraft was about to land and Le Pilot had forgotten to lower the gear, when he was only making a fancy low-altitude pass at treetop level?

The landing gear then took out some treetops, but also created enough drag to pull L'Airbus down into Les Trees.

[enqyoob]

Trashy' planes for non-European flights?

Sorry but this is Oiropean racist propaganda. Not that Yemen Air is the best in the world, but there is no evidence that this crash was a result of poor maintenance. If the engines quit, well, they would have at least made some sort of crash-landing on the ocean, and many more people would have survived - no reason for this sort of complete destruction with the plane totally in pieces. If there was total electrical or hydraulic failure (does a modern Airbus have hydraulics or is it all electric servos?), I have to wonder about the design of the airplane.

Airbus has a serious problem - two crashes in "bad weather" within a month. So they will put out all their racist rumors to wash their hands of this second crash.

I don't believe that the first one was because of a pilot flying through a storm that overstressed the airframe, or because he didn't know what speed he was flying at, nor do I believe that the second was due to poor maintenance.

Both are either sabotage, or some very very bad software/ electrical system flaw.

[Rahul M]

you mean the cause is likely to be "weather related electrical disturbances" aka lightning ?

[shiv]

Wasn't that a case of the landing gear automatically coming out because the FCS decided that the aircraft was about to land and Le Pilot had forgotten to lower the gear, when he was only making a fancy low-altitude pass at treetop level?

The landing gear then took out some treetops, but also created enough drag to pull L'Airbus down into Les Trees.

[Shameek]

So the landing gear came down involuntarily without the pilot knowing about it? Or was it too late to compensate and pull up?

[chetak]

The Airbus that pranged at the Paris Airshow was also some such envelope protection cock up. Details suppressed by Airbus as per popular lore.

Wasn't that a case of the landing gear automatically coming out because the FCS decided that the aircraft was about to land and Le Pilot had forgotten to lower the gear, when he was only making a fancy low-altitude pass at treetop level?

The landing gear then took out some treetops, but also created enough drag to pull L'Airbus down into Les Trees.

The landing gear of the Airbus 320 cannot extend automatically under any circumstances, "" because the FCS decided that the aircraft was about to land and Le Pilot had forgotten to lower the gear, when he was only making a fancy low-altitude pass at treetop level?""

There is an audio as well as visual warning in the cockpit ( coupled with very specific conditions and settings for the flaps and engines, among other things) that is triggered at 700 ft as indicated on the RADALT.

This is a warning to the pilot that he should select his undercarriage down if he has been too preoccupied to do so before. If the flaps and engines etc are not in a setting that has been predetermined for landing, this warning will not be triggered. However other audio and visual warnings may well be triggered like "flaps", "too low" or "Pull up" etc.

The before landing checks are verbally called out by the pilot and each concerned switch or concerned lever position is thereafter visually checked by the co pilot and its position confirmed back to the pilot that it is in a position or condition as required in the checklist.

The checklist is never done by rote but always and obligatorily it is deliberately read out and done from a manual / book that is permanently carried in the cockpit. This is mandated by regulatory authority requirements.

If the pilot / copilot does not respond to a particular check, the procedure stops right there and a quick investigation is done by both the pilots to as to why a set and given condition has not been achieved like a light or indication coming on or going off etc.

The before landing checks are done comfortably well in advance before the actual landing and once completed, the pilots settle down to the serious business of landing the aeroplane. This is one of the most dangerous jobs that the pilot does.

The flight envelope protection of the aeroplane thus does not involve the landing gear operations. The FCS cannot operate the landing gear on its own.

[chetak]

Trashy' planes for non-European flights?

Sorry but this is Oiropean racist propaganda. Not that Yemen Air is the best in the world, but there is no evidence that this crash was a result of poor maintenance. If the engines quit, well, they would have at least made some sort of crash-landing on the ocean, and many more people would have survived - no reason for this sort of complete destruction with the plane totally in pieces. If there was total electrical or hydraulic failure (does a modern Airbus have hydraulics or is it all electric servos?), I have to wonder about the design of the airplane.

Airbus has a serious problem - two crashes in "bad weather" within a month. So they will put out all their racist rumors to wash their hands of this second crash.

I don't believe that the first one was because of a pilot flying through a storm that overstressed the airframe, or because he didn't know what speed he was flying at, nor do I believe that the second was due to poor maintenance.

Both are either sabotage, or some very very bad software/ electrical system flaw.

The Airbus 310 has multiple independent hydraulic systems.

Confirmed bad weather and (unconfirmed!) bad luck seems to be involved in both cases.

The 310 has a cross wind limitation of 30 Kts. The pilot was attempting a night landing in very marginal conditions at about 0130 hrs local time. An approach, a missed approach and a second attempt were reported by eye witnesses.

The recorded winds at the airport reportedly 61 kms/hr is marginally higher than the aircraft limit limit at 32.9 kts. Making for a very tough ask for landing

Reportedly, "The weather conditions were rough; strong wind and high seas. The wind speed recorded on land at the airport was 61 km/h. There could be other factors,"

There is the strong possibility of his getting caught in a microburst or windshear.

Yemeni airliner may have been attempting go-around

BRUSSELS — The Yemenia Airbus 310 that crashed into the Indian Ocean near Comoros may have been attempting a go-around in rough weather for another approach when it hit the sea, a pilots association says.

International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association, a group of over 100,000 pilots, made the claim in its daily newsletter late Tuesday. It did not give a source for this information, but it is a well-respected industry group whose members are very familiar with airports around the world.

The plane, which crashed in poor weather and high winds, was carrying 153 people from France to Comoros via Yemen. One teenage girl has survived, but there is no word yet on other survivors.

The 2,900-meter (9,558-feet) long runway at Prince Said Ibrahim International Airport on Moroni island is adequate for modern airliners. But the airport is considered a difficult one for pilots due to prevailing weather conditions and hills to the east of the runway. Some airlines provide special training to pilots who need to fly in there.

“The field in question is thought of as being challenging, and certain operators consider it a daytime-only airport,” said Gideon Ewers of the London-based pilots’ association.

The Yemenia plane was trying to land in the dark, about 1:30 in the morning, amid bad weather.

For planes coming in from the south, the Moroni runway is equipped with an all-weather instrument landing system, but landings from the north are performed visually.

The all-weather Instrument Landing System (ILS) provides precision guidance for pilots on their final approach by projecting an electronic beam known as the “glide path” which guides airliners in to just above the runway threshold. This is projected on the control panel, which shows whether the plane is on the correct heading and altitude for touchdown.

“Obviously, we prefer precision ILS approaches, but there’s nothing wrong with VFR (visual flight rules) landings,” Ewers said. “People do them every day.”

Tuesday’s accident occurred several kilometers (miles) north of Moroni airport, indicating that the crew — which would likely have opted for an ILS approach from the south in poor weather conditions — was probably following the path prescribed by the airport’s chart for a go-around following a missed approach.

[enqyoob]

Hi Chetak (Of course my sources may be a wee bit anti-Airbus..)

There is another story in the folklore about Airbus (absolutely true that there was such a crash, and for generally the reasons I have indicated, though on-board activities may be slightly dramatized for TV). There was an Oiropean airliner, that encountered engine trouble somewhere over southern Oirope. So they had 2 choices:
1. Land in Italy. Unfortunately, this would require flying a new engine out there, putting it on and flying back to Germany.
2. Make it back to Germany.

The airline / pilots chose (2). Le Computeur calculated down to 5 digit accuracy that if they flew at, say, 700 m AGL, they had enough fuel to make it back on 1 engine. So they slowed down, went down to 700M, and took several hours cruising along.

Unfortunately, they ran out of le fuel and ended up landing in Belgium - in a field. Totalled the aircraft. Because the L/G had come down, and Le Computeur failed to include the huge added drag from that in La Computacion.

My question: How could the L/G have come down and Les Pilots not be aware of it, given what you say above re: Failsafe / FoolProof L/G Deployment Algorithm? Or is the algorithm only EITHER Failsafe OR FoolProof? Or did they break out too many bottles of Chateau L'Atif during the long flight?

My totally unbiased expert opinion as one who has traveled quite a bit on Air France is that it is the sheer rudeness of their ground staff that pulls these poor planes down.

[chetak]

Hi Chetak (Of course my sources may be a wee bit anti-Airbus..)

There is another story in the folklore about Airbus (absolutely true that there was such a crash, and for generally the reasons I have indicated, though on-board activities may be slightly dramatized for TV). There was an Oiropean airliner, that encountered engine trouble somewhere over southern Oirope. So they had 2 choices:
1. Land in Italy. Unfortunately, this would require flying a new engine out there, putting it on and flying back to Germany.
2. Make it back to Germany.

The airline / pilots chose (2). Le Computeur calculated down to 5 digit accuracy that if they flew at, say, 700 m AGL, they had enough fuel to make it back on 1 engine. So they slowed down, went down to 700M, and took several hours cruising along.

Unfortunately, they ran out of le fuel and ended up landing in Belgium - in a field. Totalled the aircraft. Because the L/G had come down, and Le Computeur failed to include the huge added drag from that in La Computacion.

My question: How could the L/G have come down and Les Pilots not be aware of it, given what you say above re: Failsafe / FoolProof L/G Deployment Algorithm? Or is the algorithm only EITHER Failsafe OR FoolProof? Or did they break out too many bottles of Chateau L'Atif during the long flight?

My totally unbiased expert opinion as one who has traveled quite a bit on Air France is that it is the sheer rudeness of their ground staff that pulls these poor planes down.

Narayanan,

Please give further details or a link to the incident you are referring to.

However, the A-320 should be able to fly comfortably at FL230 with one engine out. and the other on MCT. I do not understand why they descended to 700 Mts AGL unless they had some other major problem.

The crew is always aware of the position of the undercarriage.
When the undercarriage is down and locked, three green lights go on and remain on continuously. Failure, if any, of any of the multiple hydraulic systems is also indicated in the cockpit.

When the undercarriage is in transit, meaning that its actually moving as when either extending or retracting, three red lights come on and remain on until the gear is locked up or down as selected. At which point the red lights go off (locked up) or turn green (locked down).

This is the familiar three greens call.

The drag at 700Mts AGL is very high and very high on fuel consumption.
Normally a large aeroplane will not choose to fly at this altitude with one engine out UNLESS constrained by peculiar circumstances.

If actually constrained by some critical factor, the crew would not have debated germany / italy.

After such a crash, the pilots would NEVER fly again because their licenses would have been permanently revoked. This is ALWAYS uppermost in the mind of any commercial pilot 24 X 7. Indian, french or eskimo.

There is no possibility for the crew to be unaware that their gear is down.
There are too many diverse indications that cannot and will not be be missed like increased fuel flow, lower air speeds due to drag, increased engine temperatures, increased engine rpm etc etc.

Over europe, radar is bound to query their slower speed and ask for reasons. The traffic there is very dense and a laggard will immediately be noticed and carefully watched.

On any aeroplane, the selection of the undercarriage position is is a purely deliberate and manual operation by the pilot. There are mechanical and hydraulic locks that lock the gear in either the up or down position. These locks have to be broken by hydraulic pressure for the gear to move up or down.

Finally, the undercarriage electrical microswitches that have to be mechanically operated by the physical movement of the landing gear will not fail to indicate in the cockpit because even in case of total electrical failure they are fed off the emergency bus bar or in the case of the Airbus, the Ram Air Turbine that automatically deploys if speed drops below a certain value, 100 kts for Airbus I think.

There seems to be some garbling in your inputs.

[HariC]

This Airbus flying with wheels down and running out of fuel and landing in a field - is more like the incident that happened in Andhra Pradesh - when an IA airbus landed in a paddy field. The pilot got his u/c stuck down, could not land in hyd due to bad weather and decided to fly to chennai. ran out of fuel over tirupati. lot of lucky folks in that incident

http://aviation-safety.net/database/rec ... 19931115-1
The aircraft could not land at Hyderabad due to low visibility and carried out a missed approach. After the missed approach, the crew reported a flap retraction problem and decided to enter a holding pattern overhead at Hyderabad, during which the flight crew enquired visibility at nearby Air Force airfields. Because visibility was low there as well, the aircraft then diverted to Madras. Due to flaps problem, the crew had to maintain low speed and low altitude as a result of which it experienced fuel shortage. The crew then tried to divert to nearby Tirupati. However, the aircraft could not reach even Tirupati airport and executed forced landing in an open paddy field about 14 nautical miles from Tirupati airport. The aircraft dragged on the soft paddy field before coming to final stop.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "(a) The ill-conceived decision of the aircraft's Commander to divert to Madras, without ensuring that adequate fuel was available for reaching there, when he was faced with a flap-jam and poor visibility at Hyderabad. (b) The failure of the aircraft's Commander and his Flight Crew to monitor fuel consumption correctly, and the failure of the Commander to revise his decision accordingly, until it became impossible to reach any airfield. (c) A forced landing due to the eventual shortage of fuel".

[enqyoob]

Still looking for that precise incident, but here are a few more found in the search:

The accident rates for Boeing and Airbus are similar: however, there have been some unusual Airbus accidents apparently caused by computer malfunctions.

One of the first occurred in 1988 shortly after the Airbus was placed in service. During a flyover at a French air show, the computer assumed that the plane was supposed to land since it was close to the ground and the landing gear was down.

Although the pilot attempted to accelerate and climb, the computer ignored his input and landed the plane in an adjacent forest killing three passengers. Airbus attempted to blame the accident on pilot error.

Another incongruous accident more recently occurred during the testing of a brand new 472-passenger Airbus A-340-600 being delivered to Etihad Airlines in 2007 at the Toulouse airport.

As the flight crew ramped up the four engines to takeoff power with the brakes on, a takeoff warning horn sounded because the computer sensed that the plane was not properly configured for takeoff. When the crew silenced the alarm, the computer apparently decided the plane was flying and trying to land with its brakes on. The computer released the brakes and the plane accelerated into a crash barrier at full power.

The spectacular televised landing of a JetBlue Airbus at the Los Angeles airport in 2005 with its nosewheel locked in place crosswise to the fuselage brought to light at least 67 earlier “nosewheel failures” on a variety of Airbus aircraft that were usually repaired by the replacement or “reprogramming” of the Brake Steering Control Unit computer.

Rudder Design

A rudder design implemented by Airbus in 1988 increased the sensitivity of actual rudder movement to the pilot’s movement of the pedals by slightly more than one inch and allowed for a wider degree of rudder travel per pound of force on the pedal. Rudder movement is necessarily restricted at cruising speeds; however, the Airbus computer did not impose a limit at lower speeds, such as during takeoff.

These rudder changes contributed to the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 on Nov. 12, 2001 shortly after takeoff from Kennedy Airport in New York City when the aircraft encountered wake vortices from the preceding aircraft.

As the copilot attempted to maintain the Airbus’ steady-state left turn, he sought to correct an unexpected, vortex-caused “overbank” by using the rudder attached to the back of the tail fin. The copilot commanded rapid left-right rudder movements that exceeded the design loads of the vertical stabilizer, and the computer was not programmed to limit the command at low speeds.

The all-composite stabilizer was ripped from the fuselage and the aircraft became uncontrollable. Its crash killed nine crew members, 251 passengers and five people on the ground. The relatively intact tail fin was found floating in the waters of Jamaica Bay.

Although several catastrophic Airbus crashes into the ocean with major loss of life have been blamed on pilot error, including the 2000 losses of Kenya Airways Flight 431 and Gulf Air Flight 072, the crash of an Airbus belonging to Air New Zealand on Nov. 27, 2008, into the Mediterranean Sea has raised new questions about Airbus safety.

Seven crew members engaged in a test maintenance flight died in the crash, and the tail section was found floating where the plane went down. No official cause for the accident has been reported.

One month previously, an accident aboard Qantas Flight 72 on Oct. 7, 2008 that injured 106 of the 313 passengers was apparently caused by a malfunction of the FBW system. While traveling at 37,000 feet, the computer reported an autopilot irregularity and trouble with the inertial reference system.

After the Airbus A330-300's autopilot was disengaged, the computer caused the aircraft to suddenly pitch down and rapidly descend 650 feet in 20 seconds before the pilots could regain control. Three minutes later, the computer again caused the plane to pitch down and descend 400 feet in 16 seconds. The crew declared a Mayday and made an emergency landing at the Learmonth airport.

Preliminarily, the “likely origin of the event” has been blamed on the failure of an Air Data Inertial Reference Unit that supplied incorrect data to other aircraft systems.

The Unit may have falsely reported that the airplane “angle of attack” was very high resulting in the flight control computers commanding the nose-down movements, or the computer may have believed that the plane was going too slow and put it into a dive to increase its speed.

[enqyoob]

Here is the (obviously doctored ) version of the fuel calculation event:

# Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 on 12 July 2000 had a landing gear problem when it failed to fully retract after takeoff. The pilots decided to continue to Munich but did not realise that their lower speed for much the same hourly fuel consumption (required because the landing gear was not up) meant that they had insufficient fuel to do so. Once the aircraft lost all fuel, the crew attempted an emergency landing at Vienna International Airport but the aircraft landed short of the runway. There were no fatalities.[15]

This is not how it was initially reported - the part that reads "pilots decided to" is the doctored part. As I recall it was an engine problem initially, and the choice was "suggested" by the maintenance HQ of the company.

[enqyoob]

Joy for those contemplating a trip

27 November 2008; XL Airways Germany A320-200; near Perpignan, France : The aircraft had been leased to XL Airways Germany and a flight test crew, along with an New Zealand civil aviation inspector, were conducting a test flight prior to the aircraft being returned to its owner, Air New Zealand. On approach into Perpignan, the aircraft was seen to enter a rapid dive before it crashed in the Mediterranean Sea just off the coast. All seven occupants were killed.
... 7 October 2008; Qantas A330-300; Flight 72; near Learmonth, Australia: The aircraft was on a scheduled international flight from Singapore to Perth. While in cruise, the aircraft reportedly experienced some type of sudden and unexpected altitude change. The crew issued a mayday call before diverting the aircraft to the airport at Learmonth, near the town of Exmouth, about 1100 kilometers or 680 miles north of its intended destination of Perth.

About 36 passengers and crew members were injured, with over a dozen severe injuries. Reportedly, several occupants were slammed into the ceiling during the event. Most of the injuries were to passengers and crew in the rear of the aircraft,

23 August 2000; Gulf Air A320; Near Manama, Bahrain: The aircraft was making a third attempt to land at the Bahrain International Airport after a flight from Cairo when the aircraft crashed into the sea about three miles (4.8 km) from the airport. All eight crew members and 135 passengers were killed.

[neerajb]

The Airbus that pranged at the Paris Airshow was also some such envelope protection cock up. Details suppressed by Airbus as per popular lore.

If I am not wrong the plane was being flown manually. Also the main reasons cited for the crash were failure of the engines to pick up at low altitude and incorrect reading of 100 feet by barometric altimeters whereas the aircraft was flying even lower.

Captain Asseline flew the aircraft manually. He had been instructed by Air France to overfly the airfield at 100 ft above ground. When he increased throttle to level off at 100 ft, the engines did not respond. So after some seconds he got worried and thought there was something like a short-circuit in the completely computerized throttle control. So he pulled the throttle back all the way and forth again. By that time the aircraft had touched the trees.

After the accident, Captain Asseline was very astonished when he saw on an amateur video tape that the gear was only 30 ft above ground when the aircraft was passing over the runway. He affirms the altimeter of the Airbus A320 indicated 100 ft.

1. OEB 19/1 (May 1988): Engine Acceleration Deficiency at Low Altitude. This means that it was already known before the accident that the engines sometimes did not respond normally to the pilot's commands on the Airbus A320. However Air France did not inform their pilots about this anomaly. After the Habsheim accident, the engines have been modified (OEB 19/2, August 1988).

2. OEB 06/2 (May 1988): Baro-Setting Cross Check. It stated that the current design for barometric altitude indication on the Airbus A320 did not comply with airworthiness. This could be a hint why the aircraft was as low as 30 ft (9 m) above the runway whereas Asseline affirms that the altimeter indicated 100 ft (30 m).

http://www.airdisaster.com/investigatio ... f296.shtml

Cheers....

[chetak]

The Airbus that pranged at the Paris Airshow was also some such envelope protection cock up. Details suppressed by Airbus as per popular lore.

If I am not wrong the plane was being flown manually. Also the main reasons cited for the crash were failure of the engines to pick up at low altitude and incorrect reading of 100 feet by barometric altimeters whereas the aircraft was flying even lower.

Captain Asseline flew the aircraft manually. He had been instructed by Air France to overfly the airfield at 100 ft above ground. When he increased throttle to level off at 100 ft, the engines did not respond. So after some seconds he got worried and thought there was something like a short-circuit in the completely computerized throttle control. So he pulled the throttle back all the way and forth again. By that time the aircraft had touched the trees.

After the accident, Captain Asseline was very astonished when he saw on an amateur video tape that the gear was only 30 ft above ground when the aircraft was passing over the runway. He affirms the altimeter of the Airbus A320 indicated 100 ft.

1. OEB 19/1 (May 1988): Engine Acceleration Deficiency at Low Altitude. This means that it was already known before the accident that the engines sometimes did not respond normally to the pilot's commands on the Airbus A320. However Air France did not inform their pilots about this anomaly. After the Habsheim accident, the engines have been modified (OEB 19/2, August 1988).

2. OEB 06/2 (May 1988): Baro-Setting Cross Check. It stated that the current design for barometric altitude indication on the Airbus A320 did not comply with airworthiness. This could be a hint why the aircraft was as low as 30 ft (9 m) above the runway whereas Asseline affirms that the altimeter indicated 100 ft (30 m).

http://www.airdisaster.com/investigatio ... f296.shtml

Cheers....

At the heights involved, nobody in his sane mind would go by BARALT readings, its always the RADALT reading and good situational awareness. Someone in the cockpit should have been looking out and correctly appreciated the lower altitude of the aeroplane.

The reports indicate that the pilot had the ALPHA floor protection disabled. There was no reason for Asseline to pitch up the nose so much. He basically stalled the aeroplane. At his declared aeroplane weight and engines at flight idle he would have continued at continuous rate of decent. Was he intending to hold height on sheer faith?

His engines were at flight idle but he should have flown on much higher power settings and held his height to 100ft AGL as planned and briefed.

IMHO, this height selection was dangerously low by itself. Showboating has gotten many a pilot into a fine pickle.

Had he not mistakenly disabled certain protections in the FBW, the system itself would have applied power much earlier.

This was a very experienced Airbus pilot who goofed badly up by flying too low and too slow and trusting blindly in the FBW without fully understanding it. His high nose up attitude also indicates that he was sure that the FBW would kick in ( envelope protection but not correctly appreciated by Asseline ) and the aeroplane would safely climb away to the awe and admiring applause of the crowd.

[chetak]

Here is the (obviously doctored ) version of the fuel calculation event:

# Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 on 12 July 2000 had a landing gear problem when it failed to fully retract after takeoff. The pilots decided to continue to Munich but did not realise that their lower speed for much the same hourly fuel consumption (required because the landing gear was not up) meant that they had insufficient fuel to do so. Once the aircraft lost all fuel, the crew attempted an emergency landing at Vienna International Airport but the aircraft landed short of the runway. There were no fatalities.[15]

This is not how it was initially reported - the part that reads "pilots decided to" is the doctored part. As I recall it was an engine problem initially, and the choice was "suggested" by the maintenance HQ of the company.

It does not really matter who "suggested" what.

The Captain finally concurred with the "suggestion" and it thereafter became legally his and only his responsibility.

The ultimate responsibility for the safety of the passengers, crew and aeroplane is that of the Captain of the aeroplane alone, legally, morally and professionally.

On the face of it, it looks to be a complicated issue ( without access to additional information )

The Airbus can fly at roughly 12-15000 ft with undercarriage not retracted.

The gentleman appears to have had a problem on takeoff itself. Wisely, he should have legitimately declared an emergency and returned back to the airport from where he took off immediately after the undercarriage problem was confirmed.

Had he climbed higher, he may have had a marginally better fuel burn at higher altitude and maybe the additional height would have helped him bridge the final gap of 500 mts that he ultimately fell short of.

Seen dispassionately, it seems like bad judgement, bad airmanship, bad situational awareness and bad luck on the part of the Captain.

Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 (HF-3378), registered as D-AHLB, was a commercial Hapag-Lloyd Airlines Airbus A310-304 flight, on 12 July 2000. It was carrying 142 passengers and 8 crew members from Chania, Greece to Hanover, Germany.

The flight departed at 10:59, after which it was noticed that it was not possible to fully retract the landing gear. As a result the pilot decided to shorten the flight to land in Munich, after the crew had estimated the fuel consumption using the Flight Management System (FMS). However, the FMS was not designed to take into account a half-raised landing gear, and in fact there was not enough fuel to reach this destination. After an alarm at 12:49 informed the crew that there was only 1.3 tons of jet fuel left in the tanks, the pilot quickly redirected the flight to Vienna. However, the aircraft ran out of fuel with twenty kilometers to go, and the crew were left to glide the jet towards the runway. It touched down 500 meters short, striking airport equipment, spinning 120 degrees, and coming to a rest off the runway. Some of the passengers were injured, none seriously. The aircraft was a writeoff because of severe underbelly damage.

[enqyoob]

Hi Chetak:

The reports indicate that the pilot had the ALPHA floor protection disabled. There was no reason for Asseline to pitch up the nose so much. He basically stalled the aeroplane. At his declared aeroplane weight and engines at flight idle he would have continued at continuous rate of decent. Was he intending to hold height on sheer faith?

His engines were at flight idle but he should have flown on much higher power settings and held his height to 100ft AGL as planned and briefed.

This raises some similar questions about the claim that an iced Pitot tube led to the AF447 crash. Doesn't the Artificial Horizon tell the pilot the attitude? (no reason for that to depend on the Pitot tube) And the thrust setting give a fair idea of the speed expected? And doesn't the Rate of Climb/Descent come from the gyroscopes, not from the barometer? If they have an autopilot, don't they have a gyroscope? How can the Air France Clouseau say that the AutoPilot could not have had enough information to do anything, just because the Pitot tube iced over - and did they not have heaters to de-ice the Pitot tube?

The report about vertical descent of AF447 indicates loss of the tail, which comes back to what happened to the crash over Long Island, NY in Nov. 2001. Not much that any pilot can do if the tail falls off. There it was attributed (per the site I linked above) to the airplane encountering a tip vortex, and the pilot (again blame the pilot, he's dead) commanding a very large recovery rate that somehow overstressed the tails.

The other possibility may be that the plane hit the Mother of All Downdrafts in the storm. Somewhere I read mention of a 100mph downdraft - which means there was a big updraft around it, approaching it. So if the plane was going too slow, it would have stalled first due to updraft, and the stupid FCS would have put the nose down fast - and then the downdraft would have hit, stalling it the other way and sending the nose back up, and the FCS would have pulled the nose further up - just in time to get out into the updraft on the other side, and maybe roll the plane over with no lift.

BUT.. even then, if there was one pilot strapped in, and they were, say, at 25000 feet when all this happened, they should have been able to pull out, sending engines to max thrust. Unless, of course the VNE was way exceeded and the wings/ tails broke off.

The AF investigator now says that the plane hit the water belly first, which means that they had recovered attitude (or was it sheer chance as it came down like a spinning brick?) But the rate of descent was enormous.

Somewhere I read also that Airbus craft are designed for max load factor of 2.5, vs. 4 for Boeings. This makes no sense - it means that if the plane does a 65-degree bank at high speed, the wings break off. If this is true (I can't see how it can be), it is a case of extreme and frauludent corner-cutting (the weight saving and hence the operational cost saving is very very large, and makes all the difference in airline buy decisions) and the ICAO should ground the whole fleet. I have never heard of any plane being designed for lower than 3, usually 3.5 (OK, maybe ultralight Fedayeen craft, but not airliners). It does appear that components are breaking off, at least after a good number of fatigue cycles, and the craft are not designed to take sudden atmospheric phenomena. Combine that with airlines too cheap to put mandatory GPS/differential GPS as backup, software that has not been adequately idiot-proofed or tested for extreme events, and pilots not trained or enabled to think for themselves and use their common sense - and we seem to be seeing a very dangerously mis-managed aircraft program, coupled with a massive Oiropean Cover-Up Program (CUP).

The explanations being advanced for both crashes in the past month are totally unacceptable. One flew into a regular Atlantic hurricane at 35000 feet and the Pitot tubes iced over (have they not heard of heaters for these devices?) - and the other encountered cross-winds trying to land in a rainstorm. Hello!!!! This sounds worse than the cases described in

Fate Is The Hunter

about the 1930s-1950s.

I guess I am perfectly safe flying Airbus in clear sunny daytime weather in summer .. IF the landing gear is working and the fuel reserve is being calculated with the right drag coefficient....

[vina]

The report about vertical descent of AF447 indicates loss of the tail, which comes back to what happened to the crash over Long Island, NY in Nov. 2001. Not much that any pilot can do if the tail falls off. There it was attributed (per the site I linked above) to the airplane encountering a tip vortex, and the pilot (again blame the pilot, he's dead) commanding a very large recovery rate that somehow overstressed the tails

Long Island , I remember very well, coz I was living in Noo Yawk at that time. If I recall correctly, it was poor training /mistake by the AA commander. That plane encountered a wake turbulence from a 747 that took off a little earlier. To steady the plane the pilot used excessive and crazy rudder inputs , jiggling it back and forth and the tail just snapped!. He was supposed to use ailerons rather than rudders. AA trained it's pilot training after that.

[HariC]

The report about vertical descent of AF447 indicates loss of the tail, which comes back to what happened to the crash over Long Island, NY in Nov. 2001. Not much that any pilot can do if the tail falls off. There it was attributed (per the site I linked above) to the airplane encountering a tip vortex, and the pilot (again blame the pilot, he's dead) commanding a very large recovery rate that somehow overstressed the tails

Long Island , I remember very well, coz I was living in Noo Yawk at that time. If I recall correctly, it was poor training /mistake by the AA commander. That plane encountered a wake turbulence from a 747 that took off a little earlier. To steady the plane the pilot used excessive and crazy rudder inputs , jiggling it back and forth and the tail just snapped!. He was supposed to use ailerons rather than rudders. AA trained it's pilot training after that.

it was the Co-Pilot's fault. he was handling the take off and he gave some pretty aggressive inputs on the rudder and the fin snapped off.

[enqyoob]

he gave some pretty aggressive inputs on the rudder and the fin snapped off.

Or one could call this criminally negligent design. The guy was trying to save his life and that of his passengers - not showing off. The plane was not flying at transonic conditions, but at low altitude. HOW can an airplane be designed and certified, where the rudder can break off due to control inputs at such conditions, I wonder? What was the design criterion for the rudder - and why would the control system be able to put such loads on it that it breaks off? Doesn't this suggest some serious issues with how this aircraft is designed and certified?

As I heard it on that particular accident, the tail had suffered damage before and had been patched up. Goes back to the integrity of composite structures and how they are attached, and once again, to low-margin, low-quality design, fabrication and assembly.

Also, just the rudder breaking off will not cause a plane crash - the craft has two engines, and can be controlled by differential engine input to point the nose, and banking to turn. But if the rudder break-off also "takes out" other things, like the horizontal tail and the hydraulics / electric system and all back-up power, then the pilots can do nothing to save their lives. Again comes back to a design philosophy. Apparently, Boeing planes have the redundant hydraulics/ control lines distributed between the top and the bottom of the fuselage, so that a disaster on one side does not take out everything. Costly, inefficient, I am sure. Airbus is much neater and tres elegant and cheap, running redundant lines through the same place.


It's ALWAYS the pilot's fault: s(he) got on the plane.

[vina]

Or one could call this criminally negligent design. The guy was trying to save his life and that of his passengers - not showing off.

No one's life was in danger. He was just flying through some wake turbulence. It seems AA had some agressive "Advanced Maneuvering Training" program where pilots were taught to do such things and that contributed to it. If he had done nothing, they would have been fine.

The plane was not flying at transonic conditions, but at low altitude. HOW can an airplane be designed and certified, where the rudder can break off due to control inputs at such conditions, I wonder?

A 300 is definitely not a fighter or even a remotely "military" plane. So it is not designed for that kind of rudder inputs.

What was the design criterion for the rudder - and why would the control system be able to put such loads on it that it breaks off? Doesn't this suggest some serious issues with how this aircraft is designed and certified?

Wiki says that the rudder is designed for max sustained turning loads in ONE direction under max manuevering speeds. Not waving it back and forth.
Yes, I agree with you that it is a design defect. For a FBW aircraft, the FBW should protect against such overloading beyond structural limits. That is a very easy thing to program in to the plane.

Also, just the rudder breaking off will not cause a plane crash - the craft has two engines, and can be controlled by differential engine input to point the nose, and banking to turn

That I submit is close to impossible, even in combat planes. Once tail fin snaps, the aircraft is not stabilized in yaw at all and there is no way an A300 FBW will have such scenarios programmed in. It is not a manually operated plan right? Even if everything is working fine I doubt if a pilot , even in a manual plan will be able to fly with the tail fin snapped off with sufficient control to do anything really . I think the plane is mortally damaged if the fin is snapped

[enqyoob]

Ah, vinaji, with that fine explanation of aircraft design philosophy, I hope you are not the one designing any plane where I have to seat my musharraf - or that flies over my head.

So if I understand this correctly, the Airbus FCS does not allow pilots to override its stupid decisions, but it does not prevent them from shaking pieces off the airplane in a non-life-threatening, routine low-speed situation.

OK, this *&^( plane is turning to the &*^& left! I want to go RIGHT, damnit! Step on the pedal - Oops! There goes the rudder!

I think the plane is mortally damaged if the fin is snapped

Ah! Even better design of a twin-engined airliner. Please check into the story about how a plane was landed (I think it was in St. Louis) with ONLY engines - no hydraulics control, no vertical tail, no rudder, no brakes, and probably no flaps. I think the horizontal stabilizer was still there.

[HariC]

The guy was trying to save his life and that of his passengers - not showing off.

the guy showed his inexperience - all he had to do was give one rudder input - not four. and the entire vertical stabilizer snapped off, not just the rudder. all this talk aobut controlling the aircraft with left and right differential thrust should go in the newbie thread.

aircraft fail, due to age, due to extreme conditions - I dont understand why you are nitpicking airbus . you can nitpick all the features you dont like and call it criminally negligent design. but there is no such thing as a pilot proof aeroplane.

what next? zero-zero ejection seats for all passengers in the name of safety? issue of parachutes at the door?

[HariC]

So if I understand this correctly, the Airbus FCS does not allow pilots to override its stupid decisions, but it does not prevent them from shaking pieces off the airplane in a non-life-threatening, routine low-speed situation.

Airbus FCS equips only aircraft after A320. The A300 that crashed does not have fly-by-wire. no point in blaming the non-existent FCS in this case.

[enqyoob]

entire vertical stabilizer snapped off, not just the rudder.

Oh! that's so much BETTER as an endorsement of Airbus design! Pilot kicks rudder pedal 4 times - ENTIRE vertical tail breaks off!
Hello... before takeoff, every "newbie" and "oldbie" pilot kicks the rudder pedal hard SEVERAL times to make sure the thing is responding and nothing is stuck, say a notepad or a broom left there by the pakis cleaning the plane, or, in the case of Air France, the sponge with L'eau de Cologne and "Yves St. Laurence". I guess the AA pilots forgot to do this - maybe the Manual said:

DO NOT kick le pedal de Rudder dans any circonstance however desperat - Ce ne Pas BIEN ETIQUETTE! Le fin verticale est tres delicate et elegant, pls see le Symbol d'Air France painted on it. It may get tres upset et decide to separate

Must have forgotten this etiquette when he felt the plane yawing/rolling crazily at 200 feet AGL.

all this talk aobut controlling the aircraft with left and right differential thrust should go in the newbie thread.

It's the all-knowingness that I love about BRF MILForum discussions. Pls see St. Louis event referred to above. Thx.

[KiranM]

entire vertical stabilizer snapped off, not just the rudder.

Oh! that's so much BETTER as an endorsement of Airbus design! Pilot kicks rudder pedal 4 times - ENTIRE vertical tail breaks off!
Hello... before takeoff, every "newbie" and "oldbie" pilot kicks the rudder pedal hard SEVERAL times to make sure the thing is responding and nothing is stuck, say a notepad or a broom left there by the pakis cleaning the plane, or, in the case of Air France, the sponge with L'eau de Cologne and "Yves St. Laurence". I guess the AA pilots forgot to do this - maybe the Manual said:

DO NOT kick le pedal de Rudder dans any circonstance however desperat - Ce ne Pas BIEN ETIQUETTE! Le fin verticale est tres delicate et elegant, pls see le Symbol d'Air France painted on it. It may get tres upset et decide to separate

Must have forgotten this etiquette when he felt the plane yawing/rolling crazily at 200 feet AGL.

all this talk aobut controlling the aircraft with left and right differential thrust should go in the newbie thread.

It's the all-knowingness that I love about BRF MILForum discussions. Pls see St. Louis event referred to above. Thx.

Sorry for OT. But I remember Rahul giving a carte blanche to pester you to write a piece on LCA.

[HariC]

yep, I love all this "al-knowingness" exhibited by non-pilots on this thread as well. (FCS on A300 - anyone?)

[vina]

yep, I love all this "al-knowingness" exhibited by non-pilots on this thread as well. (FCS on A300 - anyone?)

Yup. Sorry. You are right, the A300 is not FBW. It starts with A320 . But N^3 point still holds. The structure that gave way in the A300 over LI was the composite mounting brackets. That is what he pointed out. It obviously wasnt designed for the kind of loads the plane experienced.

Yes, in an FBW aircraft, you can limit the amount of control deflection via software to prevent overstressing of that part. However in a conventional plane, you dont have that luxury and you actually have to design that part for that kind of loads. A design failure surely

[HariC]

yep, I love all this "al-knowingness" exhibited by non-pilots on this thread as well. (FCS on A300 - anyone?)

Yup. Sorry. You are right,

that wasnt directed at you

[HariC]

That is what he pointed out. It obviously wasnt designed for the kind of loads the plane experienced.

every aircraft has its limitations - any aircraft can be made to fail. (Put the airraft in a steep dive, and pull out hard and I will bet the wings will come off. then we can moan all about the aircraft wings not being designed well. ) . The aircraft was not designed for the kind of pilot inputs or the airline didnt recognise the limitations of the aircraft and gave wrong training to the pilot. It should be noted


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_A ... Flight_587

American charges that the crash was mostly Airbus's fault, because the A300 was designed with unusually sensitive rudder controls

Airbus charges that the crash was mostly American's fault, because the airline did not train its pilots properly about the characteristics of the rudder. Aircraft tail fins are designed to withstand full rudder deflection in one direction at maneuvering speed. They are not usually designed to withstand an abrupt shift in rudder from one direction to the other

The NTSB indicated that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program tended to exaggerate the effects of wake turbulence on large aircraft. Therefore, pilots were being trained to react more aggressively than was necessary

I will stick with the NTSB and blame the airline/pilot and not the aircraft. Unless ofcourse the NTSB itself is now incompetent

[enqyoob]

Airbus' excuse for why their vertical tail fell off at low speed, is . Loads scale as dynamic pressure, which is 0.5*density*v^2. When that flight was over Long Island, it was moving at maybe 200 mph, rather than the 600mph cruise speed. So the velocity was lower than cruise by a factor of 3, v^2 was lower by a factor of 9. Maybe the density was lower by a factor of 3, than cruise altitude. Still, the load was lower by a factor of 3 than it would have been at cruise conditions.

To say that "Le fin verticale est designed only for moving only once, not four times" is scary in the utmost, but it is typical of the "rules" that the French are accustomed to telling fare-paying customers all the time, as they lie about their abysmal laziness and incompetence. So now, when I am not a fare-paying customer stuck with having to put up with their lies, I say it like it is: the Airbus explanation suggests that their planes are designed and managed by Les Ourang-Outans. After drinking too much of Le Champagne. Apologies to those gentle, smart creatures.

As for moving rudders suddenly and with maximum pedal force, my poor Flight Instructor's terrified yells still resonate in my ear (the poor guy seemed to become 20 years older inside the year it took him to get me to solo), as the trees on the left side of the runway filled his vision:

RIGHT RUDDER! RIGHT RUDDER!

Most of the time, we lived because, at the very last instant, he would stomp as hard as he could on his rudder pedals. Same thing happened so many times when he was teaching me how to do power-on-stalls.

Fortunately the plane was not built by Airbus.

But getting back to the AF447 mystery:

Analysis: Air France crash mystery deepens
By Kieran Daly
Editor, Air Transport Intelligence

Kieran Daly is Editor of Air Transport Intelligence and blogs on aviation at Unusual Attitude (CNN) -- If there was ever any question over the importance of finding the black boxes from Air France flight 447 then there is certainly none now.... Lead investigator Alain Bouillard sums matters up when he says: "As of today we are far from having any real idea of the causes of this accident.""

Consider what we now know. The aircraft was cruising in an area in which other aircraft were successfully managing to avoid the worst of the storms. It did however suffer "inconsistent" speed indications to the pilots and its computers and this is an aircraft type with a known history of such problems. But even if the aircraft penetrated deep into the storm, it didn't break up in the air. Instead, at some point it seems the crew lost control of this state-of-the-art, highly-automated aircraft in unknown circumstances. And it then followed what must have been a horrific trajectory down to the ocean nearly seven miles below which it finally struck belly-first, crushing internal structures. The current evidence sheds little light on those terrible minutes. We still don't know why the aircraft was as close to the storm as it was, or what caused the malfunctioning speed indications. We don't know if it was damaged by lightning or turbulence or even if it was damaged at all. Perhaps the crew was simply unable to fly the aircraft in the darkness, severe turbulence and possibly cloud without the vital airspeed data. {er... the first thing they do in teaching pilots to fly in cloud, is to put a mask over your head so that you can't see anything except the gages... and then, in night flying, they teach you to fly with the lights out and the gauges invisible..}

We don't in fact know who was flying the aircraft -- it is a curiosity that the captain's body is among the relatively few found so far. (sounds like only the bodies from the tail section were even identifiable - unless the captain's rest station is in First Class) Perhaps he was taking his authorized rest as the aircraft headed over the ocean in line with normal procedure and so was not in the cockpit at all as the remaining two pilots flew the aircraft.

Some facts that we learned are not so surprising and caution is needed in drawing conclusions from them. It's confirmed that there was no emergency call, but not only is it a common feature of accidents that pilots don't make a call, but we now hear that radio communications on the night had been hopelessly difficult throughout, perhaps making it seem even less worthwhile for them to bother with it.

The investigators tell us that no inflated lifejackets have been recovered, but imagine the situation in the cabin. Not only did the passengers have no reason to expect to ditch, but with the aircraft out of control it may have been impossible for them to reach them due to high G-forces. ..... But if the flight data recorder in particular is not found then the air transport industry is staring at the deeply worrying prospect of permanently living with the unexplained loss of one of the world's most modern aircraft.

Find this article at:
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/ ... index.html

(But he omits 2 facts:
1. The vertical tail was found, amazingly intact. Not even the paint scratched, though there were a couple of dents from hitting the water.
2. The aircraft sent signals saying that (a) there was depressurization and (b) all electrical systems had failed. And then it continued sending signals for 4 minutes on its way down.

So why are they now declaring that the aircraft was intact when it hit the water, and there was no trace of explosives or fire? And they are way too keen to cite the ridiculous notion that an iced Pitot Tube (something that happens every day) caused a modern jetliner to go out of control. Something is far, far wrong.

Anyone else read the words "missile test" between the lines? Or maybe it was a piece of Space debris falling down? Were they shooting off Ariane Launchers from French Guyana that evening, by any chance?

[vina]

every aircraft has its limitations - any aircraft can be made to fail. (Put the airraft in a steep dive, and pull out hard and I will bet the wings will come off. then we can moan all about the aircraft wings not being designed well. ) . The aircraft was not designed for the kind of pilot inputs or the airline didnt recognise the limitations of the aircraft and gave wrong training to the pilot. It should be noted

Yes. I know. Nothing is idiot proof. But I guess that the promise of FBW and all that gee whiz stuff and guaranteed safe envelope etc is to make it as idiot proof as possible. I would guess that is the difference isn't it? In a FBW aircraft, you can put in g limits so that if you put the aircraft into a steep dive and then pull up the stick, the nose wont lift at a speed fast enough for the wings to come off, or if the A300 was FBW controlled, the rudder wouldnt have had the kind of motions that made it come off like it did over LI.

But the flip side is if the aircraft is in such a steep dive and the g limits cannot be exceeded because of the FCS , you will crash not because the wings come off but because you fly into the ground! You are dead all the same. And N^3' s instructors frantic criers of right rudder RIGHT RUDDER , would still see them fly into the trees , because the aircraft would not be allowed to overstress the tail fin beyond design and goes through a far less tighter turn than N^3 wanted to pull.
And then of course N^3 would whine, Les Computers Francais dont allow the pilot to kill himself in the way he wanted (by breaking upt he plane), but decides to fly into obstacles instead!

[enqyoob]

Ah! The Airbus A300 (and in fact all airplanes since 1898 until the A-320) had no system to control its flight!! My bad!

More on Le Design Delicat d'Ourang-Outans:

On June 9, many newspapers carried a photograph of a red, white and blue object floating, like some sort of gaily colored raft, in a blue-black ocean. To pilots, it brought a chilling sense of deja vu. In November 2001, a similarly shaped and colored object floated in Jamaica Bay, just off Long Island in New York. It was the vertical stabilizer - colloquially, the "tail fin" - of an American Airlines Airbus, Flight 587, that had broken up shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport. That fin was practically undamaged; it had parted at the root, each of the massive fittings that attach it to the fuselage torn neatly in half. Here was another such fin: seemingly intact, snapped cleanly from the vanished Air France Flight 447.

The National Transportation Safety Board took almost three years to untangle the mystery of the American Airlines crash. It eventually concluded that the first officer had caused the breakup by stepping too vigorously on the airplane's rudder pedals, and that the rudder pedals of Airbus airplanes were more susceptible to over-control than those of rival Boeing's jets. {Translation: biss-boor, shortcut / criminally fraudulent design of an absolutely critical part.}

The rudder is the movable portion of the vertical fin. Unlike the rudder of a boat, it is not used to turn. In fact, the rudders of jets are seldom used at all, except when landing in a strong crosswind or to hold the airplane straight after an engine failure. In this case, the NTSB thought, the pilot had tried to use the rudder to steady the plane in the wake of a 747 several miles ahead and had managed to break the vertical tail off instead.

Pilots were incredulous. The airplane had just taken off and was climbing; it was flying well under its "maneuvering speed," the speed below which a pilot should be able to use the flight controls in any way without risk of damaging the airplane. How, then, could this pilot possibly have broken the airplane with its own controls?

The New York crash uncovered a gaping misunderstanding among pilots, manufacturers and the Federal Aviation Association, which sets standards for structural safety and certifies compliance. Even though pilots believed in the absolute protection of maneuvering speed, and informational publications from the FAA and from manufacturers supported that belief, it turned out that if you read the certification regulations carefully, you would discover an exception: The vertical fin did not have to be strong enough to allow the rudder to deflect fully when the airplane was in a "yawed" position - that is, when the back end of the plane had swung to one side, most likely because of a gust of wind.

The common-sense response of any air traveler is, "Why don't they just make it stronger?"

The answer, which will provide little comfort, is that airplanes are not designed to be as strong as possible. They are designed to be as light as possible. The manufacturer that adds extra "beef" to its structure ends up with a heavier airplane that carries fewer passengers or uses more fuel, and loses sales to the lighter and more efficient, although "weaker," {and criminally fraudulent} competitor.

In the aftermath of the American Airlines accident, the FAA and the manufacturers revised their publications to incorporate the bad news about maneuvering speed and rudders. The NTSB recommended changes to the hypersensitive rudder pedals of some Airbus models, but most, including the Air France A330, have control systems in which the pilot's commands are normally channeled through computers programmed to avoid over-stressing any component. (The American Airlines airplane lacked this protection, and on Flight 447, the computers appear to have been off-line at the time of the accident.)

It is far, far too early to analyze the Air France catastrophe. The series of automated messages that emanated from the doomed airplane paint a murky picture of cascading electronic failures. The triggering event - icing, turbulence, lightning, bomb or cargo fire have been suggested - is unknown.

But the picture painted by the fin floating almost undamaged in the Atlantic is much clearer. It broke off in one piece, and maps of debris distribution suggest that it could have been the first thing to go. The pilots may have been controlling the airplane manually, having bypassed the computers because of the electronic problems. If, as seems likely, they were in turbulent weather, they would have had their hands full, and they may possibly have over-controlled in just the way that the American Airlines pilot did in 2001.

This is pure - and premature - speculation. But it is not speculative to observe that some vertical fins are weaker than they should be, and that this is because of the regulations that govern how airplanes are built. The FAA, together with its international counterparts, should amend certification requirements for future aircraft to restore to the maneuvering speed the safety status that pilots always believed it had. The rules that govern the structural integrity of airliners should not include asterisks.

Peter Garrison, a pilot and contributing editor to Flying magazine, wrote this column for The Los Angeles Times.

This Airbus is appropriately named - like one of those KSRTC buses where pieces come off routinely. At least there you can just stop and grab some banana tree bark to tie the gear shift knob, axles etc. This French design seems amazing. The computer doesn't work if the weather is bad, (or will drive you into the trees if the weather isn't bad) and if you try to fly the plane yourself, the tail breaks off if the wind is strong and you press on the controls. Great! But do those planes look ELEGANT or what! Especially that Air France logo!

Then again, maybe the speed sensor wasn't working, the gyroscope wasn't working, the Differential GPS wasn't working, the radio wasn't working, the radar altimeter wasn't working, the Artificial Horizon wasn't working, the compass wasn't working, the windshield wiper wasn't working, so how could they have any idea whether they were below the Maneuvering Speed or not?

I do hope that at least Le Champagne was at the right temperature - or maybe Les Chimpanzees in the natty uniforms in the cabin had given away the last Veg. Meal to impress the nearest chick they wanted to impress, like they did instead of giving me my meal.

What was that about supplying parachutes to passengers? I hope they are not Made By Airbus.

[shiv]

^^

[SaiK]

I 'd not be surprised if Airbus engine failure was caused by Microsoft loophole and some virus attack on its control logic.

[p_saggu]

Maulanar Al-Harvardi! Le Brand Ambassedeur' d'Air Franc au Airbus.