Rahul M wrote:
the political parties, especially the current one in power does not take strong actions against terrorism/pakistan because they find NO electoral benefits from it.
neither are they 'punished' if they fail to do so. delhi is a prime example.
even the bjp might question the linking of electoral dividends with the security plank.
Perfect. The trajectory of the political path in the nation is set towards grabbing the piece of "pie" by hook or crook. There is no concious effort to even safe-guard the pie, let alone enhance it. ("pie" as in building viable nation-state and its interests - not just economy).
Coupled with the above, a sore lack of vision by non-leadership across the spectrum in political class, the recipe is rigged towards either non-performance or defeat.
In such an atmosphere, IMVHO it is extremely inadvisable to take action by the armed forces, the finest institution thriving in the nation. Because there is no sense in expending the blood of the finest men/women in uniform to the non-existent vision by the political leadership. When victory is achieved, as surely by the defence forces, the mumbling politicos with blatant lack of vision for the nation shall snatch defeats from the jaws of victory. The politicos will surrender the gains on a platter to the enemy, in a heart-beat for expediency purposes. So no tangible gain will be preserved or protected, but will be squandered. Recall, the legacy of mumbling political landscape in the history and the recent screw ups even today in approaching UN.
All efforts are done to keep this trajectory in the same direction. The reversal of trajectory to get out of this rut requires development of vision and leadership, which only time can tell.
At a minimum, right now, the economic loss that occurred due to the terrorists in mumbai has to be punitively billed to Porkistan and extracted in post haste. This will atleast ensure lesser money to buy fancy weapons by the contract killers in paki uniforms.
Acharya wrote:Fascinating Article which shows how they have been doing social studies and understanding India.
Kaplan said on the Rheem show that he had spent a lot of time in Gujrat. Talked of BJP, RSS, Hindu fundamentalists etc. on the show. He said that when he interiewed people in Gujrat, Hindus spoke of a pure India uncontaminated by ROP. Kaplan said that India is India because of the mouslim innvasions, all that syncretic stuff, you know. It seems to me that a lot of goras talk to hindoos and they open up and express their views in non-PC manner. (Not many goras in rural or southern US will open up in this manner to, say, a desi researcher.) The gora researchers then report back how repulsed they were of these views. Seems like a trend. Nussbaum says the same. Strobe Talbott says the same of Jaswant Singh.
can we respond by administratively banning pakistan as state sponsor of terrorism... i hope, mumble singh don't humble paki anti-terror stories, and goes with real ways to get them kneel down.
Acharya wrote:Fascinating Article which shows how they have been doing social studies and understanding India.
Kaplan said on the Rheem show that he had spent a lot of time in Gujrat. Talked of BJP, RSS, Hindu fundamentalists etc. on the show. He said that when he interiewed people in Gujrat, Hindus spoke of a pure India uncontaminated by ROP. Kaplan said that India is India because of the mouslim innvasions, all that syncretic stuff, you know. It seems to me that a lot of goras talk to hindoos and they open up and express their views in non-PC manner. (Not many goras in rural or southern US will open up in this manner to, say, a desi researcher.) The gora researchers then report back how repulsed they were of these views. Seems like a trend. Nussbaum says the same. Strobe Talbott says the same of Jaswant Singh.
It is musch deeper. They have been doing sociology studies for 40+ years and employed Romila Thaper and create inferences regarding Indian society. They have put one community against the other in a generalized manner across the country ignoring the history of India.
They do not want to give any voice to the Hindu history
I dont agree with other views here. Its no more an electoral issue. Its a dent on Indian psyche. Think 1 sec, what a terrorist will consider abt India, if say it didnt 'act' in this dastardly attack. It will be considered a mere soft state and embolden other terrorist orgs to carry out more strikes, something like Taliban resurgence. There is going to be ridicule, whenever we conduct symposium on security or send a ship for patrol or in any UN deployment. On the other hand, think how Russian image changed when they hit back in Georgia.
Whether Cong or BJP there is going to be reaction and there is not going to be much difference btw them. Its all about posturing and symbolism. I see the stage is set. It is game India.
Yes, there is genuine doubts whether the gov sleeping on afzal matter can act. But, this is something different. Lets wait.
Acharya wrote:
Hindus and Muslims have begun separate searches for roots to anchor them inside a bland global civilization. Mass communications have produced a uniform and severe Hinduism from a host of local variants, even as the country’s economically disenfranchised Muslims are increasingly part of an Islamic world community.
[/quote]
This is the most critical point. There is a method in this. Any accusation against Islamic atrocity is torpedoed by comments like this. This is not merely doing an equal equal. It says that anything Hindu is detrimental and a balkanized India (as has always been portrayed by Western "scholars" - India was never one entity, "pluralism" is destroyed if India is one) should be the goal. In a way, Hindu society as a way of life NEEDS to be erased. The Abrahamic hostility between Islam and Christianity may be taken up at a later date. So the Islamic atrocity upon non-believers is shrewdly and surreptitiously supported in the web of words! The guy is a mercenary.
Acharya wrote:Fascinating Article which shows how they have been doing social studies and understanding India.
Kaplan said on the Rheem show that he had spent a lot of time in Gujrat. Talked of BJP, RSS, Hindu fundamentalists etc. on the show. He said that when he interiewed people in Gujrat, Hindus spoke of a pure India uncontaminated by ROP. Kaplan said that India is India because of the mouslim innvasions, all that syncretic stuff, you know. It seems to me that a lot of goras talk to hindoos and they open up and express their views in non-PC manner. (Not many goras in rural or southern US will open up in this manner to, say, a desi researcher.) The gora researchers then report back how repulsed they were of these views. Seems like a trend. Nussbaum says the same. Strobe Talbott says the same of Jaswant Singh.
This is true. But we are a young country, also slightly naive .. we learn about ourselves and improve upon it.
On the other side what is said by Acharya is also true because there are Harvard, Illinois etc doing unnecessary sociology studies on India and surprisingly they have been given permission to do so and gain info on population. All this nonsense should be countered at Govt level and not allowed to filter into body conscious as universal truths.
surinder wrote:
Kaplan said on the Rheem show that he had spent a lot of time in Gujrat. Talked of BJP, RSS, Hindu fundamentalists etc. on the show. He said that when he interiewed people in Gujrat, Hindus spoke of a pure India uncontaminated by ROP. Kaplan said that India is India because of the mouslim innvasions, all that syncretic stuff, you know. It seems to me that a lot of goras talk to hindoos and they open up and express their views in non-PC manner. (Not many goras in rural or southern US will open up in this manner to, say, a desi researcher.) The gora researchers then report back how repulsed they were of these views. Seems like a trend. Nussbaum says the same. Strobe Talbott says the same of Jaswant Singh.
It is musch deeper. They have been doing sociology studies for 40+ years and employed Romila Thaper and create inferences regarding Indian society. They have put one community against the other in a generalized manner across the country ignoring the history of India.
They do not want to give any voice to the Hindu history
But one more thing is, that I have been communicating with western esp Brits on other forums and they give exactly similar vibes. Usually completely unclued on goings on in subcontinent they too come up with terrific equal-equal as if it is a behavioural thing in the west.
It seems a deep pscyhological issue over there. Completely unprepared to accept even relative Hindu innocence in past actions of one-way terrorism by Pakistan. The only exceptions to this are right-wing types who have a soft corner for Hinduism/Vedas etc. Looks like they are the only mentally unshackled folks in the west these days.
This GOI is so stupid and so incompetent lead by Mumble No Marbles singh.
This picture tells you how the British leveraged Indian (Lions) to tame the world and put Lions in the HM symbols.
Shame that our rules only know how to fleece the citizens but not protect them
Kanson wrote:I dont agree with other views here. Its no more an electoral issue. Its a dent on Indian psyche. Think 1 sec, what a terrorist will consider abt India, if say it didnt 'act' in this dastardly attack. It will be considered a mere soft state and embolden other terrorist orgs to carry out more strikes, something like Taliban resurgence. There is going to be ridicule, whenever we conduct symposium on security or send a ship for patrol or in any UN deployment. On the other hand, think how Russian image changed when they hit back in Georgia.
Whether Cong or BJP there is going to be reaction and there is not going to be much difference btw them. Its all about posturing and symbolism. I see the stage is set. It is game India.
Yes, there is genuine doubts whether the gov sleeping on afzal matter can act. But, this is something different. Lets wait.
Correct that is one good articulation of national interest and self-preservation. The need of the hour is closing of ranks and have one unified response as a nation. This is again what is expected. Political systems should necessarily be sub-servient to nation-state. This is golden opportunity for the political system to correct its course and demonstrate their vision and purpose.
Agreed. We need to wait for the response. But there are things that are to be done like posturing and symbolisms that are easy to do by the nation, such as: demanding punitive compensation which is prohibitive from the porkis, declaring them as terrorist-state, reducing/recalling the embassy staff, announcing general travel warnings to Pak.
These symbolisms cannot be substitute for real response. The real response should be served for sure, at a time of India's choosing. Pak as one knows now is history, the question is when and by who?
Even lack of symbolism is a cause for concern at this juncture.
However, literacy will - hopefully - lead to less political hoodwinking, and, IMHO a more stable economic situation (not looking for 9% growth, but a steady, stable eco situation).
An educated mass will not be hoodwinked, but the country will have a huge portion of the educated wither underemployed or unemployed, neither of which are worth it.
I would like to see an India that is politically wise (oh yeah, what is that?) and economically stable - 95% (mixed) employment. With 5% or so rich, 5% or so poor and 90% middle class (with NO upper/lower middle class).
Going to the UN is absolute waste of time and effort -- NOTHING will come out of it, except Chini-paki lies, not to mention that "the evidence is insufficient" would be a huge setback to India's independent efforts to tackle Pakistan.
B. Rubin's article addresses the likely outcomes:
India goes to the international community and asks for help. This should be the solution. The Indian government presents evidence, the international community is appalled, and Pakistan is not only denounced but faces sanctions and pressures.
The problem here is that the international community is not exactly courageous. There are those who sympathize with the terrorists, those who apologize for the terrorists, and those who are afraid of the terrorists.
It can present evidence to the UN and demand an international tribunal into Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism, not only regarding this attack but earlier attacks, to take place in some neutral country, for example the Hague in the Netherlands.
The problem here is that a similar tribunal, against Syria's assassination of former Lebanon's prime minister Rafiq Hariri, is bogged down due to Syrian political maneuvers. Still the idea may be worth trying.
In the case of Indo-Pakistan even IF both nations come to the table with sane people they cannot really solve the Kashmir problem. At best they can kick the can. Even what Pres Z did (no first use) is just kick the can, it cannot solve Kashmir. Pakistan cannot get J&K, India cannot give J&K. What part of that anyone cannot understand is beyond me.
On conflicts, or more precisely border conflicts, the US itself is facing it on her own soil: it manifests as security checks at the airports and closer scrutiny at source airports. While the US has been able to enforce such changes, India has either not been allowed or India is not prepared to do so (for whatever reason).
This problem does not start at an Israeli border and end at an Indian border. It is all over the world. With different actors acting at various parts of the world.
These actors have the same goal and most originate, either physically or metaphysically, from Pakistan.
Within Pakistan such actors have the blessing of the Pakistani non-civilian agencies. Non-civilian, non-elected and Islamic agencies. Funded by the US in some cases and Saudis in some other. Funded none the less.
NRao wrote:The ROBERT D. KAPLAN article is a ramble at best.
In the case of Indo-Pakistan even IF both nations come to the table with sane people they cannot really solve the Kashmir problem.
Absolutely correct. There is NO Kashmir problem, only a Pakistan problem. And no amount of talking to Pakistan will solve it so long as the country is still controlled directly or indirectly by the Mullah-Military combine.
NRao wrote:The ROBERT D. KAPLAN article is a ramble at best.
In the case of Indo-Pakistan even IF both nations come to the table with sane people they cannot really solve the Kashmir problem. At best they can kick the can. Even what Pres Z did (no first use) is just kick the can, it cannot solve Kashmir. Pakistan cannot get J&K, India cannot give J&K. What part of that anyone cannot understand is beyond me.
On conflicts, or more precisely border conflicts, the US itself is facing it on her own soil: it manifests as security checks at the airports and closer scrutiny at source airports. While the US has been able to enforce such changes, India has either not been allowed or India is not prepared to do so (for whatever reason).
This problem does not start at an Israeli border and end at an Indian border. It is all over the world. With different actors acting at various parts of the world.
These actors have the same goal and most originate, either physically or metaphysically, from Pakistan.
Within Pakistan such actors have the blessing of the Pakistani non-civilian agencies. Non-civilian, non-elected and Islamic agencies. Funded by the US in some cases and Saudis in some other. Funded none the less.
The interesting thing is there is zilch tp minimal op-eds by Indians while the Western experts are spinning profusely in all the mainsteam Western press.
IOW there is hardly any debate on what India can, will or should do in this case.
In another time and event that was considered more significant.
I would read what Karen Armstrong says about debate in Hindu India.
NRao wrote:
From an Indian political PoV, the Mumbai attacks were of really no consequence - just part of the territory. IF India could live with Kashmir since 1990, what is Mumbai? Even IF nukes were not a part of the equation I have to wonder how many think that India would act decisively against Pakistan even in today's environment.
Sadly I had come to same conclusion on Sunday night when I had my talk with a neighbor.
The UPA seems to think it can go to the UN as an aggreived party a la Draupadi to force them to take action or else India will act. However these charlatans ahve blunted and defanged Indian military capability. So the appeal to UN will be ignored and worse made to look like an out of turn compliant. In the end John Snow's laments will come true.
India is still going to the UN as a supplicant rather than one who demands action because they blunted the capability in many ways.
I otherwords a toothless tiger will get no respect.
Rye wrote:Going to the UN will only complicate matters for India....you would think the GoI would have learnt that over 60 years of getting shafted by the UN mofos. But then, these are the same people have not let 100s of terrorist attacks affect their sleep or diet. Never mind, let me get back to watching some paint dry on the wall nearby...definitely more useful that watching the Indian response to terrorism.
John Snow wrote:Going to UN is big time trouble. It will bring back all the dirty linen into public with lot of garbage dumped at India's door.
Bad Bad Bad move IMHO.
Probably one more excuse for GOI under MMS not to act. Its Holiday season, I dont know what the UNSC will do till new year...
o The most important aspect of the UN Resolution, that I proposed, is
that it should NOT have anything to do with the current Mumbai Attacks, except as an example.
o It should not be packaged as either the powers pass the UN Resolution, or India would act.
o It should have nothing to do with UN forcing Pakistan to hand over the 'suspects' to India.
o India should not be presenting any evidence in the UNSC at all. India can however share this information with any interested country.
o USA should take the initiative of getting the Resolution passed.
Otherwise India would be playing the wrong game, and I would hate the whole thing just as much as all of you.
Having said that, there exists the possibility of getting a UN Resolution on Pakistan right now, and India should use that window of opportunity. The UN Resolution has to be a lot more general.
I am just pasting my few posts on the issue.
RajeshA wrote:I have some hopes from the UPA Government. Hoping for a forceful reaction from this team, would be expecting too much. So I have more modest hopes from this government. Something more doable (harbans ji, thanks for the word).
This Govt. can perhaps get the UNSC to pass a Resolution saying ...
1. Pakistan does not have control over the land within its borders (loss of sovereignty).
2. Pakistan has a lot of terrorist infrastructure blossoming in the country.
3. Other countries in the neighborhood are victims of terrorism emanating from Pakistan.
4. A UN Terrorism Monitoring Commission for Pakistan (UNTMCP) is being set up to monitor terrorist activity from within and from outside the country.
5. Other countries are requested to provide the Commission with intelligence on terrorists and terrorist infrastructure.
6. Other countries are requested to support the eradication of terrorism emanating from Pakistan and help the government regain its sovereignty, lost to terrorists.
7. The UNTMCP will have an armed complement.
I believe this Government is uniquely in a position to get the international cooperation to bring about this Resolution.
After that the Government can go ride into the sunset. And BJP can go and kick some ass!
RajeshA wrote:
vera_k wrote:
No UN please. We should not legitimize the UN until we are part of the security council. It will be 1948 and Kashmir all over again.
o Give Americans a legal cover to undertake their operations in FATA.
o Give Indians to go after the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan.
Your skepticism of UN is shared by many, but the situation is different between 1948 and 2008, and it comes down to today's reality and not some abstract principles.
You want to keep the sentiments of Indian Muslims in check, which could again turn pro-Pakistani, even though they may at the moment be against the attack.
You want to keep the Arab majority satisfied.
You want to have the moral high ground.
You want to be militarily involved in Pakistan, and still avoid the re-hyphenation.
For all that a Resolution under Chapter 7 would be extremely helpful. Obama would not want to commit the same mistakes as George W. Bush. He will be willing to play ball, especially if there is a UN Resolution on Pakistan.
RajeshA wrote:The UN Resolution is needed for sanctioning a long-term terrorist busting program in Pakistan by regional countries or anybody else who wants to have some fun.
I think that Indian politicians have become very comfortable with the situation. How does this Mumbai attack impact them for sure or even the Indian people? Mumbai has been traumatised to some extent, it will revive.
The rest of the country will go back to Bollywood and cricket. They ALL have got used to getting water from a water truck, total lack of hygiene, no secure worthwhile jobs, making ends meet everyday, having to travel most of their lives, etc. Once in a while a piece of news lights up the nation - +ve and -ve. But there is never a determined, prolonged, even effort to clean up anything.
Before we set out for Singapore for the sixth round of the India-Pakistan Peace Process last week, held under the aegis of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, we had a significant number of dropouts. Some Indian participants opted out -- they felt this was not the right time to talk to Pakistan as it would send a wrong message that it was business as usual and that Pakistan should not be allowed to think it could keep "hitting us and expect that it would be business as usual". At least one suggested very severe measures like suspending the Indus Water Treaty, and "overt and covert measures to cut Pakistan down to size". Mumbai after all, was not just another terrorist attack. It had changed the paradigm of hitting at India's vitals.
The Pakistanis who made it to the conference were simply outnumbered because it was so difficult for them to get visas for Singapore and the Bangkok airport had been commandeered by anti-Government protesters.
The significant thing about our India-Pakistan track II conference was that it started after the attack on Parliament in 2001 and has endured, no matter how bad the ambience surrounding the relationship between the two countries. In Kathmandu in 2003, even as diplomatic relations between the nations were being resumed, at our meeting participants began with raised voices but managed to talk their way through the tension. From talking at each other, they were talking to each other by the end of the conference.
This was my fervent hope at the start of this conference as well. Taxi driver Paul Lee received us at Changi Airport. Singapore, Lee reassured us, had never witnessed a terrorist attack though as an island it was vulnerable from the sea. The only setback to its immaculate security record was the escape from custody earlier this year of a Singaporean Muslim national Mas Salamat, who had been implicated in terrorist attacks in Indonesia.
Granted Indonesia was bad. But Mumbai was also not just another terrorist attack. It has been hit periodically since 1993 to rupture the commercial heart of India and cripple its economy. The current decapitating strike had created a crisis in India-Pakistan relations even more serious than the attack on Parliament in 2001. Because the Mumbai attack was a systematic violation of Pakistan's pledges at least five times since 2002 not to allow the use of its soil for jihadis to target India, in Singapore it was made clear to Pakistanis that this time public anger and political and electoral compulsions would not permit the ruling regime in India to let this pass as just another terrorist attack. It was a crisis for India. Therefore Pakistan needed to take quick, visible and convincing action to the satisfaction of India against anti-India terrorist groups based in Pakistan which according to information and intelligence provided and to be provided, had committed the crime.
Pakistanis were quick to recall the legacy of the lack of hard evidence shrouding past allegations. Give Pakistan "compelling evidence and it will act under due process of law" it was said. The Pakistanis said there should be recognition of the fact that a weak, yet to be embedded civilian Government with tenuous relations with the military was in place and that terrorist groups enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy under a dispensation in which the ISI was still a wild card.
A retired Pakistani General tried to correct this perception saying that the new Army Chief, Gen Parvez Kayani, was in full control of the ISI under its new Chief, Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha. Cancelling the despatch of Gen Pasha to Delhi to help in the investigation was put down to the lack of consultation between the political leadership and the Army Chief. If Gen Pervez Musharraf could not act against LeT chief Hafiz Sayeed, how could President Asif Ali Zardari who has warned that non-state actors could provoke a war?
For the first time perhaps, the Pakistanis openly admitted their country's complicity in creating the Taliban and supporting the jihadis who, they said, have turned inwards. When the military was in power, relations with India improved substantially and even the Kashmir dispute appeared resolvable. However, this trend reversed when a civilian Government came to power. This observation by a Pakistani was as striking as the admission of fuelling jihad.
Pakistanis expressed their own anger about the country having become hostage to the jihadis who comprise just 0.2 per cent of the population. While the new minority, Pakistan People's Party Government had assumed full ownership of the war against terror, they noted that the US had played a very negative role in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The threat to Pakistan, they said, came from terrorism and not India. For instance, a signature campaign, "Yeh Ham Main Se Nahin", to disown jihadis and terrorists was signed by as many people as those who voted in the elections.
However, while saying they were sorry about Mumbai, the Pakistanis were not apologetic even as one of them revealed that his Indian friend sent him a mail asking Pakistan to apologise. Why, he wondered, as his fellow countrymen added that Pakistan was itself a victim of terrorism. An Indian added: "Also the source of it".
Remarkably, the deliberations were devoid of any tension. Instead participants displayed striking balance and composure. Voices were not raised and discussion conducted with candour but civilised expression.
The bottomline was on how to save the peace process, not call off the composite dialogue and the ceasefire. The conference revealed how the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism was meant to be an institutional mechanism for both countries to address terrorism-related issues together and cooperatively but instead had become a crutch to salvage the peace process whenever it got derailed.
The JATM has been an utter failure at getting to the root of terrorist attacks for which it was intended. Pakistanis acknowledged that they needed to empathise with India. They suggested visits by parliamentary and business delegations to each other's countries, a signature campaign in Pakistan condemning terrorism and management of public perception.
The Indians reciprocated by offering to scale down its list of 20 wanted offenders to just jihadi leaders linked to the Mumbai attacks. The challenge lay in getting Pakistan to act without any loss of face and a jihadi riposte.
I'm still in Singapore. BBC is reporting that Lashkar-e-Tayyeba camps near Muzaffarabad have been raided and that LeT leaders linked to the Mumbai massacre have been taken into custody. If this meets India's demands it is remarkable that it has happened at all.
The Indians reciprocated by offering to scale down its list of 20 wanted offenders to just jihadi leaders linked to the Mumbai attacks. The challenge lay in getting Pakistan to act without any loss of face and a jihadi riposte.
harbans ji,
Somebody seems to be reading your posts about doability.
The Indians reciprocated by offering to scale down its list of 20 wanted offenders to just jihadi leaders linked to the Mumbai attacks. The challenge lay in getting Pakistan to act without any loss of face and a jihadi riposte.
I'm still in Singapore. BBC is reporting that Lashkar-e-Tayyeba camps near Muzaffarabad have been raided and that LeT leaders linked to the Mumbai massacre have been taken into custody. If this meets India's demands it is remarkable that it has happened at all.
Wow. Never ceases to amaze. This Indian penchant for indulging in abusive relationship with porkis is unbelievable. What the abused is concerned about: the loss of face for porkis? Balancing act carried out by abused is not even stockholm syndrome, it purely reflects the party manning Indian side does not represent Indian Interests.
Quarantining this disease (porki) and not acknowledging the scums should be the need of the hour. Instead the chai-biskoot sessions seem to be more important than saving one's own face. Willingly entering into abusive relationship is unfathomable. The end agenda and confidence seems to reek of non-starters in this chai biskoot musings.
I dont understand what is this garbage about proof, when ordinance is from TSP, the phone contacts were in TSP. The guy caught says we were trained TSP citizens.
Are India tier two diplomats soo Stoooopid to even argue and negotiate.
Now they will we will cherry pick out of 20.
Even in sabzi mandi (for vegitables) they say 'Lena hai tho layo , magar haath math lagana' wanna buy buy but dont touch.
As long as the "great game" is going on in Afghanisthan, Pakistan will retain value for the west in whatever shape/form. Even if Pakistan becomes an ungovernable terrorist state, it retains utility by creating chaos in the region and keeping everyone, including competitors like Russia, out of the region. Chances are there is going to be an Indian response, even if it is not overt -- if the intent is to cause Pakistan immense pain in return for their terror, there is no reason why India has to pay any price in the process of punishing pakistan. In fact, the peace process should continue, while relations between the Pakiban and the Paki army deteriorate to the point where there are 3 excuses a day for one party to blow up the other, and we all know that PA and Pakiban love blowing up stuff.
Prof. Chi Hua Hua of the Chinese instutute for Scholarly Studies on Important Stuff writes "Ever since the Mumbai terrorist attacks in Dec. 2008, Pakistan's internal problems and cohesion are on a downward spiral with massive RDX explosions on an almost daily basis. As Pakistan's close ally and friend, China has tried to roll back this spiral but to no avail. 5,000,000 Tons of New Unsoiled Army Uniforms and dumping Pakistan with cheap chinese goods has not helped pakistan retrieve itself from the edge of the cliff".
Last edited by Rye on 10 Dec 2008 03:40, edited 1 time in total.
I would say, among the first things that Mr. Chidambaram needs to do centrally and the new CM needs to do in Maharashtra is to de-couple the Politician - Police nexus.
The police departments need to be autonomous and accountable only to the Constitution of India.
Only then can something like what happened in Chicago happen in India - the arrest of the Illinois Governer by the FBI.
In the sort of “high alert” last seen during Operation Parakram, launched after the December 13, 2001, attack on Parliament, the armed forces, especially the air force and the navy, have been kept in a state of war readiness. There has been no massive mobilisation of troops on the border, though.
While Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters have been mounted with bombs and kept in a state of readiness to take off within minutes, almost the entire western naval fleet is aggressively patrolling the Arabian Sea.
The military was moved into this state of heightened alert within 24 hours of the terror attack on Mumbai, which began on November 26. When it became clear that the terrorists were Pakistanis, the government ordered the mobilisation.
According to a source, the IAF has recalled senior officers from leave, moved some of its missile formations forward, and armed its fighters with missiles. Pilots have been put on standby in operational rooms.
To justify the state of war readiness, the government spoke of the possibility of a 911-style attack on India. At a meeting with the three service chiefs, defence minister AK Antony cautioned them to take measures to thwart such an attack. But a source said the alert was a cover to justify India’s exceptional military mobilisation.
The forces have been put on high alert to back up India’s diplomatic efforts to get Pakistan to crack down on terrorists on its soil.
The IAF says it is in state of “passive air defence (PAD)”, which means it is geared to take any measure to defend the country’s assets. Under PAD, all platforms, including fighters, are kept operationally ready, armed with missiles, and pilots are prepared to fly at a moment’s notice.
During Operation Parakram, the air force was kept on “active air defence”, which means it was in a state of readiness to destroy enemy assets.
The source said the IAF has reduced the number of personnel on leave to just 10% from the average 30% of its total strength and recalled several key officers from leave. In the western and southwestern air commands, which cover the Pakistani border, all leave has been cancelled. The state of high alert extends to air stations in the South.
According to the source, besides fully arming fighters and placing pilots in operational rooms, the IAF has moved some missile units close to the Pakistan border. These are primarily surface-to-air missiles and other air-defence assets that can shoot down any incoming threat.
Meanwhile, the navy’s western command based in Mumbai has also been put on a state of high alert, with nearly two dozen warships patrolling the Arabian Sea.
A source said that drawing from the experience of Operation Parakram, it was decided not to carry out massive troop movements on the border. The mobilisation of ground forces, started after the 2001 attack, achieved little and was called off on October 16, 2002. This time the government has put in place a more “opaque” military mobilisation.
From the 16th to the 18th centuries, the Mughal dynasty, created by Muslims from Central Asia, governed a sprawling empire encompassing northern and central India, almost all of Pakistan and much of Afghanistan — even as Hindu Maratha warriors in India’s south held out against Mughal armies.
This is factually incorrect - there were pockets of areas even within this so-called sprawling empire where the Mughal writ did not run. The Chandelas of Khajuraho, Mewar, regions to the west of the Indus were mostly indpendent. Even Kabul was lost from time to time.
India’s whole history — what has created its rich syncretic civilization of Turko-Persian gems like the Taj Mahal and the elaborate Hindu temples of Orissa — is a story of waves of Muslim invaders in turn killing, interacting with and ultimately being influenced by indigenous Hindus.
There is no proof of Muslim invaders being influenced by indigenous Hindus. What appears to be syncretic tendencies is simply the retention of pre-Islamic cultural and philosophical elements in deeply embedded layers of social psyche in those Hindus who were converted. Kaplan seems to be unaware of the claims of the Ashrafis - the so-called "pure" Muslims who can claim to be descended from the invaders, and deem themselves to be distinct and "better" than the native converts. Kaplan should study, Maulan Zia-uddin Barani, Amir Khusrau, Ibn Batuta, Syed Amir Ali to get the wind blowing within the psyche of Islamic elite in India.
There is even a name for the kind of enchanting architecture that punctuates India and blends Islamic and Hindu styles: Indo-Saracenic, a reference to the Saracens, the term by which Arabs were known to Europeans of the Middle Ages.
Saracenic is a common very negative connotation in Graeco-Roman and medieval European literature. It did not specifically mean Arabs, as for most of history, Saracen was explicitly distinguished from "Arabes". Moreover, it was not Arabic influence in architecture but more of Persian, and copies of Byzantine (there is not much of Arabic architecture in any case - it was always adaptation of Graeco-Roman, Levantine, Persian styles) in India.
Democracy has so far kept the lid on an ethnic and religious divide that, while its roots run centuries back, has in recent years essentially become a reinvented modern hostility.
Wrong - what kept the lid on was the trauma of a society decimated by the Partition and a population forced to be on the move. Uprooted Hindus, and Sikhs were more absorbed in simply surviving. These would have been the most radical of social and political groups that could have taken it out on the Muslims. Added to this was intense pressure from the establishment with the help of upper echelons in the civilian and military admin who had been nurtured under the British to preserve Islam within India. No need here to go into factors that made this necessary for both the British and the Congress leadership.
The culprit has been globalization. The secular Indian nationalism of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Congress Party, built around a rejection of Western colonialism, is more and more a thing of the past.
Nehru's CP was not built around a rejection of Western colonialism - but around the replacement of the colonial personnel in the colonial state apparatus with some of the Indian elite, without any change whatsoever in the colonial state machinery established by the British. Exploitatibe capital extraction process, such as the India debt were continued surrpetitiously.
As the dynamic Indian economy merges with that of the wider world, Hindus and Muslims have begun separate searches for roots to anchor them inside a bland global civilization. Mass communications have produced a uniform and severe Hinduism from a host of local variants, even as the country’s economically disenfranchised Muslims are increasingly part of an Islamic world community.
Who disenfranchised the Muslims? Were they already economically disenfranchised before the birth of Republican India? Then it would become the responsibility of the British. Suppose not - then it has to have happened under Nehru and the Congress! If none of these two did it - then did they allow the Hindus to do it? Were they so ineffective as rulers? If none of these are plausible - then was it the Muslims themselves? Kaplan makes a mockery of serious sociological studies on the deliberate disjunction of Muslim society from modern education by its feudal and theological leadership - because of obvious reasons - loss of military power would have meant the loss of coercive power to extract surplus from non-Muslims, and loss of non-productive parasitic Muslim classes to reconversion and European influence through education.
The Muslim reaction to this Hindu nationalism has been less anger and violence than simple psychological withdrawal: into beards, skull caps and burkas in some cases; self-segregating into Muslim ghettos in others.
What reaction to which Hindu nationalism started the Kashmiri Jihad in the 80's? BJP was a fledgling - the scene was dominated by "secular" giants. What about the Kashmiri Jihad and the realization through the experiences of the BD war, that Islam on the subcontinent has not changed a single bit in its Jihadi agenda of 1947 - that apparently "peaceful" non-rioting cohabitant Muslim communities can turn suddenly violently Jihadi - looting, raping, abducting non-Muslims living around them when the opportunities arise or an Islamic regime decides to support such Jihad - that ultimately started "Hindu nationalism"?
The rest of Kaplan's article is not worth even trashing. We have discussed all his subsequent arguments threadbare in our various threads.
This Govt. can perhaps get the UNSC to pass a Resolution saying ...
...
...
...
I believe this Government is uniquely in a position to get the international cooperation to bring about this Resolution.
After that the Government can go ride into the sunset. And BJP can go and kick some ass!
RajeshA, I agree that a UN resolution that acknowledges Pakistan is not in control of its own territory is a very good idea. OTOH, won't the UNTMCP get in India's way? What is the utility of getting the UN involved in "monitoring pakistan"? Also, don't think the BJP will to any better than the current bunch since it is not the politicians fighting the enemy directly -- still the same professionals will be doing their job.
Last edited by Rye on 10 Dec 2008 06:37, edited 1 time in total.
December 8, 2008
Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis
By George Friedman
In an interview published this Sunday in The New York Times, we laid out a potential scenario for the current Indo-Pakistani crisis. We began with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike.
Our argument that India is likely to strike focused, among other points, on the weakness of the current Indian government and how it is likely to fall under pressure from the opposition and the public if it does not act decisively. An unnamed Turkish diplomat involved in trying to mediate the dispute has argued that saving a government is not a good reason to go to war. That is a good argument, except that in this case, not saving the government is unlikely to prevent a war, either.
If India's Congress party government were to fall, its replacement would be even more likely to strike at Pakistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress' Hindu nationalist rival, has long charged that Congress is insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism. The BJP will argue that the Mumbai attack in part resulted from this failing. Therefore, if the Congress government does not strike, and is subsequently forced out or loses India's upcoming elections, the new government is even more likely to strike.
It is therefore difficult to see a path that avoids Indian retaliation, and thus the emergence of at least a variation on the scenario we laid out. But the problem is not simply political: India must also do something to prevent more Mumbais. This is an issue of Indian national security, and the pressure on India's government to do something comes from several directions.
Three Indian Views of Pakistan
The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India.
The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan's main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable.
The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission.
The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is.
The first two analyses are essentially the same. They posit that Pakistan could stop attacks on India, but chooses not to. The third is the tricky one. It rests on the premise that the Pakistani government (and in this we include the Pakistani army) is placing some restraint on the attackers. Thus, the government's collapse would make enough difference that India should restrain itself, especially as any Indian attack would so destabilize Pakistan that it would unleash our scenario and worse. In this view, Pakistan's civilian government has only as much power in these matters as the army is willing to allow.
The argument against attacking Pakistan therefore rests on a very thin layer of analysis. It requires the belief that Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, that it is nonetheless restraining radical Islamists to some degree, and that an Indian attack would cause even these modest restraints to disappear. Further, it assumes that these restraints, while modest, are substantial enough to make a difference.
There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn't merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.) Turning those individuals over would be enormously difficult politically for Pakistan. It would create a direct confrontation between Pakistan's government and the Pakistani Islamist movement, likely sparking violence in Pakistan. Indeed, turning any Pakistani over to India, regardless of ideology, would create a massive crisis in Pakistan.
The Indian government chose to make this demand precisely because complying with it is enormously difficult for Pakistan. New Delhi is not so much demanding the 20 individuals, but rather that Pakistan take steps that will create conflict in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government is in control of the country, it should be able to weather the storm. If it can't weather the storm, then the government is not in control of Pakistan. And if it could weather the storm but chooses not to incur the costs, then India can reasonably claim that Pakistan is prepared to export terrorism rather than endure it at home. In either event, the demand reveals things about the Pakistani reality.
The View from Islamabad
Pakistan's evaluation, of course, is different. Islamabad does not regard itself as failed because it cannot control all radical Islamists or the Taliban. The official explanation is that the Pakistanis are doing the best they can. From the Pakistani point of view, while the Islamists ultimately might represent a threat, the threat to Pakistan and its government that would arise from a direct assault on the Islamists is a great danger not only to Pakistan, but also to the region. It is thus better for all to let the matter rest. The Islamist issue aside, Pakistan sees itself as continuing to govern the country effectively, albeit with substantial social and economic problems (as one might expect). The costs of confronting the Islamists, relative to the benefits, are therefore high.
The Pakistanis see themselves as having several effective counters against an Indian attack. The most important of these is the United States. The very first thing Islamabad said after the Mumbai attack was that a buildup of Indian forces along the Pakistani border would force Pakistan to withdraw 100,000 troops from its Afghan border. Events over the weekend, such as the attack on a NATO convoy, showed the vulnerability of NATO's supply line across Pakistan to Afghanistan.
The Americans are fighting a difficult holding action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States needs the militant base camps in Pakistan and the militants' lines of supply cut off, but the Americans lack the force to do this themselves. A withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Afghan border would pose a direct threat to American forces. Therefore, the Pakistanis expect Washington to intervene on their behalf to prevent an Indian attack. They do not believe a major Indian troop buildup will take place, and if it does, the Pakistanis do not think it will lead to substantial conflict.
There has been some talk of an Indian naval blockade against Pakistan, blocking the approaches to Pakistan's main port of Karachi. This is an attractive strategy for India, as it plays to New Delhi's relative naval strength. Again, the Pakistanis do not believe the Indians will do this, given that it would cut off the flow of supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. (Karachi is the main port serving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.) The line of supply in Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and the Americans, the Pakistanis calculate, do not want anything to threaten that.
From the Pakistani point of view, the only potential military action India could take that would not meet U.S. opposition would be airstrikes. There has been talk that the Indians might launch airstrikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan's view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting airstrikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don't have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective.
Moreover, if the Indians did kill large numbers of radical Islamists, this would hardly pose a problem to the Pakistani government. It might even solve some of Islamabad's problems, depending on which analysis you accept. Airstrikes would generate massive support among Pakistanis for their government so long as Islamabad remained defiant of India. Pakistan thus might even welcome Indian airstrikes against Islamist training camps.
Islamabad also views the crisis with India with an eye to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Any attack by India that might destabilize the Pakistani government opens at least the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear strike or, in the event of state disintegration, of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of factional elements. If India presses too hard, New Delhi faces the unknown of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal — unless, of course, the Indians are preparing a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Pakistan, something the Pakistanis find unlikely.
All of this, of course, depends upon two unknowns. First, what is the current status of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? Is it sufficiently reliable for Pakistan to count on? Second, to what extent do the Americans monitor Pakistan's nuclear capabilities? Ever since the crisis of 2002, when American fears that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into al Qaeda's hands were high, we have assumed that American calm about Pakistan's nuclear facilities was based on Washington's having achieved a level of transparency on their status. This might limit Pakistan's freedom of action with regard to — and hence ability to rely on — its nuclear arsenal.
Notably, much of Pakistan's analysis of the situation rests on a core assumption — namely, that the United States will choose to limit Indian options, and just as important, that the Indians would listen to Washington. India does not have the same relationship or dependence on the United States as, for example, Israel does. India historically was allied with the Soviet Union; New Delhi moved into a strategic relationship with the United States only in recent years. There is a commonality of interest between India and the United States, but not a dependency. India would not necessarily be blocked from action simply because the Americans didn't want it to act.
As for the Americans, Pakistan's assumption that the United States would want to limit India is unclear. Islamabad's threat to shift 100,000 troops from the Afghan border will not easily be carried out. Pakistan's logistical capabilities are limited. Moreover, the American objection to Pakistan's position is that the vast majority of these troops are not engaged in controlling the border anyway, but are actually carefully staying out of the battle. Given that the Americans feel that the Pakistanis are ineffective in controlling the Afghan-Pakistani border, the shift from virtually to utterly ineffective might not constitute a serious deterioration from the United States' point of view. Indeed, it might open the door for more aggressive operations on — and over — the Afghan-Pakistani border by American forces, perhaps by troops rapidly transferred from Iraq.
The situation of the port of Karachi is more serious, both in the ground and naval scenarios. The United States needs Karachi; it is not in a position to seize the port and the road system out of Karachi. That is a new war the United States can't fight. At the same time, the United States has been shifting some of its logistical dependency from Pakistan to Central Asia. But this requires a degree of Russian support, which would cost Washington dearly and take time to activate. In short, India's closing the port of Karachi by blockade, or Pakistan's doing so as retaliation for Indian action, would hurt the United States badly.
Supply lines aside, Islamabad should not assume that the United States is eager to ensure that the Pakistani state survives. Pakistan also should not assume that the United States is impressed by the absence or presence of Pakistani troops on the Afghan border. Washington has developed severe doubts about Pakistan's commitment and effectiveness in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and therefore about Pakistan's value as an ally.
Pakistan's strongest card with the United States is the threat to block the port of Karachi. But here, too, there is a counter to Pakistan: If Pakistan closes Karachi to American shipping, either the Indian or American navy also could close it to Pakistani shipping. Karachi is Pakistan's main export facility, and Pakistan is heavily dependent on it. If Karachi were blocked, particularly while Pakistan is undergoing a massive financial crisis, Pakistan would face disaster. Karachi is thus a double-edged sword. As long as Pakistan keeps it open to the Americans, India probably won't block it. But should Pakistan ever close the port in response to U.S. action in the Afghan-Pakistani borderland, then Pakistan should not assume that the port will be available for its own use.
India's Military Challenge
India faces difficulties in all of its military options. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications.
India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic.
We have no idea what India is thinking, but one obvious option is airstrikes directed not against training camps, but against key government installations in Islamabad. The Indian air force increasingly has been regarded as professional and capable by American pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. India has modern Russian fighter jets and probably has the capability, with some losses, to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory.
India also has acquired radar and electronic warfare equipment from Israel and might have obtained some early precision-guided munitions from Russia and/or Israel. While this capability is nascent, untested and very limited, it is nonetheless likely to exist in some form.
The Indians might opt for a drawn-out diplomatic process under the theory that all military action is either ineffective or excessively risky. If it chooses the military route, New Delhi could opt for a buildup of ground troops and some limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground attacks. It also could choose airstrikes against training facilities. Each of these military options would achieve the goal of some substantial action, but none would threaten fundamental Pakistani interests. The naval blockade has complexities that could not be managed. That leaves, as a possible scenario, a significant escalation by India against targets in Pakistan's capital.
The Indians have made it clear that the ISI is their enemy. The ISI has a building, and buildings can be destroyed, along with files and personnel. Such an aerial attack also would serve to shock the Pakistanis by representing a serious escalation. And Pakistan might find retaliation difficult, given the relative strength of its air force. India has few good choices for retaliation, and while this option is not a likely one, it is undoubtedly one that has to be considered.
It seems to us that India can avoid attacks on Pakistan only if Islamabad makes political concessions that it would find difficult to make. The cost to Pakistan of these concessions might well be greater than the benefit of avoiding conflict with India. All of India's options are either ineffective or dangerous, but inactivity is politically and strategically the least satisfactory route for New Delhi. This circumstance is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. In our opinion, the relative quiet at present should not be confused with the final outcome, unless Pakistan makes surprising concessions.
Pakistani sponsors of terror have gradually figured out how much pain can be inflicted on an India that has diverse groups of people who do not agree with each other on what constitutes pain.
They have found out that over wars with the regular armed forces, or even with Paki armymen disguised as civilians usually ends in failure and pain to Pakistan. But terrorism is a different ball game. It paid some dividends in Kashmir, until the pain caused in Kashmir started a blowback in Pakistan.
Even as that occurred Pakistani jihadi groups openly admitted that they had sleeper cells "all over India including South India" to cause mayhem. 2008 probably marked th beginning of the activation of those sleeper cells.
But when you kill train passengers in India or when you kill people in bicycle parking lots, a whole class of people who do no use trains or do not approach bicycle parking lots are unaffected. The attacked the Indian parliament and after the initial shock wore off (and predictably a policeman with a .303 helped kill one of the terrorists) - a whole lot of people in India - particularly thee anglophone chatterati
lamented that not a single politician had so much as a scratch. And when war was considered as an option the "captains of industry" of India - the same people whose employees and peers for the chatterati balked at the idea. In a perverse way the captains of our industry have shown how Hindu they are in their fatalism. When the economy was likely to be affected by a war that was needed (in 2001), they protested. And now that the same economy - of those very captains of industry has been shattered by scamsters in US banks - they sit back and absorb it fatalistically and philosophically.
But it is probably wrong to say that Mumbai 26/11/2008 was the first time the lipstick wearing English speakers of India were targeted. The previous occasion was the IC 814 hijack.
I recall at that time the NSG again was delayed. There was paralysis of the decision making apparatus and panic. Again it is wrong to say that Mumbai 2008 was the first terrorist attack to be seen on TV for days on end. IC 814 took that honor in 1999. Our memories are so short that we have forgotten - (or alternatively most people on here were so young, they can't remember)
As the drama lasted longer the terrorists promised to openly massacre the lipstick wearing chatterati. And the people of India bit the bait. There were protests on the streets. And the patriotic, bold and nationalistic BJP government in 1999 (so rudely rejected by an ignorant public in 2008) did the really bold thing. They released Maulala Masood Azhar and Right Honorable Shri Jaswant Singh, Member of Parliament, Bharatiya Janata Party, Foreign Minister of the Republic of India, most populous democracy, 4 th largest armed forces, budding superpower accompanied the father of terror Masood Azhar to Kandahar where the terrorist leaders was released in exchange for the passengers. And Azhar went back home to Pakistan.
How naive we must be to think that a political party will make a difference between effective national security and continued terrorism. It is pure political rhetoric to ignore history, ignore facts and imagine that one bunch of politicians in India can somehow be very effective but out of power while another bunch are in power and ineffective. The truth that does not seem to enter educated heads in India is that for Indian politicians, to be in power is to be ineffective in handling crises of this sort in a manner that makes everyone happy.
After IC 814 the relatives of the people were happy. People cursed the government. The same bunch. now out of power are touted as the great saffron hope of Indian resurgence.
After the parliament attack war might have occurred. The same same BJP was right in mobilizing based on ideals (attack on the parliament, the temple of democracy)
But what did Indians say? Industrialists cried in horror, and war did not occur. After 9 years we are lamenting the fact that politicians were not hurt. But when war did not occur, a whole lot of Indian industrialists (and their employees and the IT boomers and H1 visa holders) were happy. And it was the patriotic BJP that caved in to the demands of its own people. Patriotism for politicians is agreeing to the demands of people. Nothing wrong in that - except that not everyone is going to be happy.
Nearly a decade later we have Congress in power.
What was different?
Actually some things WERE different. Yes there were delays. Yes it was the same Pakistan.
But the government did not negotiate with terrorists this time as they did after Kandahar. But in that they were merely following the law that was laid down AFTER Kandahar.
They have not mobilized for war.
We need to see if they will now take the BJP route and negotiate with Pakistan "for peace" which is the same as negotiating with terrorists.
I suggest that we leave out party politics from our discussions. All parties are the same. At a time of crisis They respond to
1) Written laws.
2) People's demands
Anyone who steps far beyond that will be lynched. The people do rule in India. But they certainly could be led by more visionary leaders who do not hesitate to tell the truth about Pakistan to Indians.
It is not the government that is stupid is presenting or not presenting proof to Pakista,. Wd he peopel and the media are equally culpable in stupidity. Masood Azhar was arrested under POTA. POTA means that detention can occur without proof or trial. POTA was meant for Masood Azhar types. When you invoke POTA you do not have firm proof. Where is the question of "proof"?
If you start looking for proof of Pakistani terror - you will never find proof to convince a Pakistani jury. Pakistan is a nation that denies the massacre of 3 million people in Bangladesh? How can we forget that? Why is anyone even discussing "proof" with Pakistan.
But if we must hit Pakistan without proof. we the people must agree that this is the thing to do. But we are not agreed about war and firm action. We talk war when we are safe and we cry in panic about our personal wealth and assets when they are threatened by war. Why blame the government for not being "nationalistic"?
The government responds to the people. They are elected leaders, but not inspiring leaders. they are insipid and ignorant leaders of an ignorant peaceful people. India will fight when we get an inspiring leaders who know what it takes to make every Indian believe in the sacrifice he needs to make to fight war. If that means your city will go up in a mushroom cloud, you should be able to say "so be it".
In an interview published this Sunday in The New York Times, we laid out a potential scenario for the current Indo-Pakistani crisis. We began with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike.
Why on earth would India "strike Pakistan"? India would at most strike a terrorist camp in Pakistan, WITHOUT moving any forces to her border. IF such an event occurs, Pakistan cannot make a case to move 100,000 troops away from A'stan border.
Next, what good is the Pakistani Army doing on the A'stan border, to threaten that they will move a 100,000 troops away from the A'stan border? The sole purpose of such troops is to eradicate terrorists - the VERY terrorists that are a problem for THEM. Why would they move so many to a border that is not even active?
"deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan"? No, any more aggressive movement into A'stan, by the Taliban or AQ, should see a more aggressive U.S. operations than we get to know of today. I think the U.S. should move across the border to defend their soldiers - national interest.
"emboldened Iran"? To do what? Obama is expected to sit with them and Taliban.
So, what exactly are we scared of? IF someone says TSP nukes, I can understand. Anything else is just pure waste of print material.
What you are saying is that India does not have a collective national pain.
That is not only true, but even local pain is given a pain killer by the very people who are supposed to prevent such pain: politicians.
You may be interested to know that in the US, since the country is so large and is unable to watch all corners of the country, those areas that are not patrol-able, such as some waterways, the government has given local populations certain amount of authority to act - and a web site, with tele numbers to report suspicious activities.
Anyone born in TSP is pretty much under scrutiny - even if the person has Canadian citizenship. Pretty lenient use of Wire taps, etc, etc, etc.
The US has build and is continuing to build a vast network to collect intel and disseminate it in real-time.
It is my understanding that the IM is the stumbling block WRT India. A lot of these things that NEED to be done cannot be done in India. ::::: IM.
Moi liked George Friedman's stratfor article. Logical, clear, well argued. Of course, onbe can have disagreements with specific assumptions and details but overall, good effort.
IMO, his biggest assumption is that should TSP not turn in the arrested terrorists, not acting will not be a choice for New Delhi. Looks like he doesn't our netas one bit onlee.
It is amazing how shamelessly evil the Pakistani muslims are.
First, their "brother" muslim terrorists shot and murdered 200+ innocent civilians in the name of Islam.
Then, while the USA was pro-actively dissuading India from retaliating, these muslim ******** are now verbally antagonizing India into open war?
Has it struck anyone that a U.S "strike" could be (freely) interpreted as an Indian strike - say even from A'stan?
It is a distinct possibility.
Interesting that Gul was added by the U.S!!!!
There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn't merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.)
sometimes back, it was the understanding religion is the only thing that glues many yindoos. but surprisingly when akshardam was hit, we did find no response to terrorism. we 2 billion cheeks to show! what is akshardam and mumbai!! is what the feel is all about.
mumbai, is the financial capital. it was hit when our economic guru was the PM.. still no response.
we disgracefully conceded at khandahar, whilst the most security giving political party, who could do a n-test, but have no idea how to tackle terror.. went about pota, only to be reverted by their opposing clouts.
may be next time the targets would be multiple.. a combination of religious centers, like bahai, a large hindu temple, a big mosque and a giant church, of course a cochin synagogue would not be ruled out., and clubbed with this, they might also explode a few bombs near parliament, and near all major industrial state govt assemblies. i would not rule out a direct on mil establishments as well. all these targets will be picked, google maped, black berried, executed with local fishermen and dhobies.
hopefully, we would still remain un-responsive.. cause, we don't understand what is a response, cause our tolerance is way too high. we are like, if babooze can do this and that, any one can.. chalta hai.
all these attack at our hearts and veins, and people have taken position that there would no war.. and pakis have audacity to chest beat and saber rattle about counter-wars, and high alerts since pranab spoke a little harsh.. which nation would not speak harsh? did bush kept a smooth face, and mumbled mumbled!?!?!
this insanity in reporting, understanding of our nationhood, all looks f-ed up!~ we are so diverse, and that diversity is the future target, to further take this to next level. kudos! aaam junta- their literacy rate and education level, and understanding about democracy and way of live, understanding what is religion, etc.. everything speaks louder by the tolerance philosophy.
i am thinking of international outsourcing of security needs, israel and unkil could benefit a huge billion $$$ industry.. hey, it could help some politicians to pocket some 30% cut as well.. and we all can be happy being secured with some chai-bisquooth.
should we think about changing the definition of response to our context?
Pakistan can avoid this by handing over the terrorists. Failing to do so elevates the terrorism to an act of war by Pakistan against India
Does anyone know/remember what exactly our demands were re: The Twenty and why we called our wet pataka a "48 hour ultimatum"? It hurts just to know how hard the pakis are laughing at us and how pathetic we seem to the rest of the world.
Victor wrote:
Does anyone know/remember what exactly our demands were re: The Twenty and why we called our wet pataka a "48 hour ultimatum"? It hurts just to know how hard the pakis are laughing at us and how pathetic we seem to the rest of the world.
Perhaps we need to go back to the Mahabharat and wonder why the Pandavas - despite being disinherited, attempted to be killed, wife being humiliated were willing to avoid a war in return for 5 villages.
For a historical analogy, part of Austria-Hungary’s (unmet) demands to Serbia after the Franz Ferdinand assasination was that the Serbs turn over members of the Black Hand.
The Serbs refused and the rest, as they say, is history.
