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ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Karan M » 19 Oct 2017 02:14

Sawhenys sheikh chilli tirade against DRDO continues. Dude was telling everyone that Akash, Pinaka were failures. Now what. And the GOI has earmarked two locations for the DRDO BMD for giggles. The S400 is a multipurpose system not a dedicated BMD unit and will be used as such.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 07 Nov 2017 15:41

Raytheon Boosting Performance Of TPY-2 Radar ; Aerospace Daily & Defense Report Nov 06, 2017


The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Raytheon will greatly improve detection range and sensitivity of the X-band TPY-2 missile defense radar through the introduction of gallium nitride semiconductor components, and Saudi Arabia could be among the first beneficiaries.
Raytheon says going forward all new and upgraded TPY-2 active electronically scanned array radars for domestic and international customers will be delivered with GaN-based transmit/receive modules rather than legacy gallium arsenide elements.

The manufacturer also will boost the TPY-2’s computing power and image resolution by introducing X86 microprocessors and digital receiver/exciter units.

As the eyes of Lockheed Martin’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) antiballistic missile system, the radar can detect and track short- to intercontinental-range ballistic missiles from ascent to decent, depending on its proximity to the threat.

GaN components can operate at higher power levels, or more efficiently at the same power levels, compared to gallium arsenide components. By improving the TYP-2’s range through the introduction of GaN components, military operators will have more time to act against ballistic missile threats. By adding processing power and higher resolution, the radar also can take advantage of more complex target tracking and discrimination algorithms.

Judy Lewis, vice president of business development at Raytheon’s mission systems and sensors business, says the transitioning to GaN components as well as the X86 processor and digital receiver/exciter will multiply the TPY-2’s performance.

“If you can see it farther out and see the details, that’s incredible for missile defense,” Lewis says. “It overall increases the battlespace.”

The TPY-2 has an unclassified detection range of 621 mi. (1,000 km), but can probably see much farther. Raytheon won’t say how far.

Raytheon produces GaN radio frequency amplifiers for military radars at its foundry in Andover, Massachusetts. GaN components already feature in the company’s new SPY-6 Air and Missile Defense Radar and Next Generation Jammer, designed for the U.S. Navy’s DDG 51 Flight III destroyer and Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, respectively.

Under a “production planning” contract awarded to Raytheon last year, the company has been preparing for the introduction of GaN-based components into the TPY-2 production line. Once the first GaN-based TPY-2 unit is assembled and tested, all radars thereafter will be built to the same specifications, domestic or foreign.

The U.S. government currently operates 12 TPY-2 units: seven providing terminal-phase fire control for U.S. Army Thaad batteries and another five in a forward-base mode for early warning of missile threats.
Two more radars were ordered as part of an unspecified foreign military sales case, likely Qatar, which the State Department cleared in 2012 to receive up to 12 Thaad fire units and two TPY-2 radars.

The Pentagon could consider buying more Thaad batteries and radars to counter the growing missile threat abroad, or it might convert existing TPY-2s to the improved configuration through a depot-level upgrade that Raytheon has proposed.

Saudi Arabia could become the first foreign military operator of the GaN-based TPY-2 if it proceeds with a massive Thaad deal worth up to $15 billion. On Oct. 6, the State Department approved Riyadh’s request for up to 44 Thaad launchers, 360 interceptors, 16 fire control units and seven TPY-2 radars.

“After the production planning period, all new TPY-2s that are developed will incorporate GaN,” Lewis says. “And, as old antennas are upgraded and replaced, those new components will receive GaN.”




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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Austin » 05 Dec 2017 13:51

Remind me of GW 1 where Saddam Scud simply disintegrated upon re-entry due to poor workman ship or were very inaccurate and fell out in desert and none got intercepted. This was found out years later after careful data analysis done.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 05 Dec 2017 15:45

Yes, this was the same thing I said in the other thread. PAC-2 has this problem in which it will not guarantee a successful warhead destruction each and every time it intercepts a missile in case the missile breaks up and the proximity sensor goes off and damages the wrong target or leads to a partial intercept. Having said that, NYT did a shoddy job in analysis since they spent absolutely no time in covering the warhead, its capability, what damage it caused and whether there was any damage commensurate with the nature and capability of the warhead and ballistic missile. For all we know this could have involved a successful intercept with the warhead and other components falling elsewhere from the intended target and not causing any significant damage.

Obviously the interceptors hit something hence the missile parts landed at totally different locations from the actually intended target or where the NYT analysis claims the impact took place. As I had mentioned earlier, the US Army's own analysis during and post Gulf War led them away from the PAC-2 path and towards a decade plus of development of Hit to Kill and improved discrimination of their sensor and active missile seekers (hence Ka band was chosen for their first active missile seeker). While the PAC-2s were considered adequate for getting an intercept and deflecting a majority of the impact away from the intended targets, there was no guarantee that the adversary won't simply switch payloads to include chemical or biological weapons that don't require complete warhead impact right on the intended target. Hence the pursual of the highest possible kinetic impact between the interceptor and the warhead which occurs when they both physically collide during a H2K intercept.

The Saudi's Air Defenses and their Patriot batteries were in a pretty bad shape when they started the war in Yemen back in 2015. They had focused modernization on their air-force, choosing to invest in the Typhoon and the F-15 modernization/procurement while neglecting to modernize their air-defense radars, software or buy new interceptors. Realizing this they rushed and placed a very significant PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE order in late 2015 or early 2016 which is still being fulfilled. They are yet to, from what I know, committed to introduce the latest radar processor and software modernization to bring their TBM defense capability at par with that of the UAE or the US. They need to get rid of the PAC-2s and keep them for AAW as the US Army does and fully shift to the PAC-3/MSE for ABM work as others in the user community have done already (US has almost replaced 3 in every 4 launchers in its inventory to shoot just the PAC-3). You really do not need PAC-2s in any configuration if the primary threats to you are ballistic and cruise missiles as they are for most Patriot and MEADS users.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Aditya_V » 05 Dec 2017 15:53



The export versions of US weapons are not same as the US armed forces, especially given Israeli concerns, they will not work perfectly.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 05 Dec 2017 16:01

Aditya_V wrote: The export versions of US weapons are not same as the US armed forces, especially given Israeli concerns, they will not work perfectly.


This is not important or relevant here. Patriot Configuration 3+ is the latest Patriot standard, and Saudi's aren't upgraded to it, nor had they fully invested in the ERINT/PAC-3 upgrades until very late in the game. Others in the region or elsewhere, such as the UAE, Japan and the US have. As I had mentioned, their orders for the PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE were sort of rushed in and only came through towards late 2015 or early 2016 instead of the early 2010s when rest of the Patriot community decided to move away from the 4 PAC-2s per launcher and towards the 16 PAC-3s per launcher configuration given the demonstrably better performance of active RF seekers and H2K on account of better acceleration, higher agility, more accuracy and better discrimination through both the upgraded radar and the Ka band active seeker upfront. Saudi PAC-3 order won't even be completed till 2020 (it was only definitized this year) and this would involve making the radars capable of launching the new missiles and modifying launchers and crew training.

Israel is in the same boat as the Saudi's. They haven't upgraded to PAC-3 either and it is unlikely they will since under their layered system the Stunner is going to be intercepting all of the lower tier threats that the Arrow system needn't go after. Raytheon even has the Stunner incorporated now on the Patriot but the problem is that the Stunner max's out at roughly a 300-400 km TBM envelope while the MSE extends to around 1150 km. Israel has decided to just use the Arrow in between that envelope gap and avoid buying a new missile into its inventory since they'll be operating largely form fixed sites.

Israeli concerns likely do not apply to Saudi Patriot modernization, since Patriot is largely now an anti ABM and Cruise missile defense optimized systems and Israel's offensive capability isn't as much reliant on these things. Saudi's have committed to modernizing Patriot after first addressing other areas of their armed forces..in sharp contrast to the UAE that purchased latest configuration (at the time) of Patriot with all the software and interceptors that came with it. It will be the early 2020s by the time Saudi's have a Configuration 3 comparable system on the Patriot with MSE rounds available to all batteries. By that time the US Army is likely to field the AESA radar which Saudi's could also procure but likely won't till later that decade.

This is obviously poor modernization strategy since they, probably more than the US need some of these features or even MEADS since a potential conflict with Iran for them can see ballistic missiles launched from either the North East, or the South, something which the sectored Patriot (or any sectored system) is not as good at covering as say the MEADS is until the Patriot gets its new radar.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Austin » 05 Dec 2017 17:02

The NY Times article mentions contrary to what Raytheon and Saudis have been claiming so far and they even mentioned PAC-3 is being used

As with all Missile Defence Stories in past we would need data from multiple sources including independent ones with corroborated evidence to prove what percentage of hits were success and what percentage were failures , this would take many months or even years to come by.


Raytheon: Arab-operated Patriots intercepted over 100 tactical ballistic missiles since 2015

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-sho ... ince-2015/
But in a Nov. 15 interview, Riki Ellison, chairman and founder of the Alexandria, VA-based Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, not only confirmed Raytheon’s 100-plus figure, but insisted it was a conservative count. “Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, there have been over 150 intercepts of Yemen-launched missiles,” said Ellison.

When asked to define the ratio between successful intercepts and TBM threats that leaked through the active defense, Ellison said he did not have that data. “I don’t know about leakage, but over 150 intercepts in combat is impressive,” he said.

A U.S. source clarified that all of the intercepts took place in the skies of Saudi Arabia or in Yemen, where UAE air defenders forward-deployed Patriot PAC-3 batteries. Arab coalition forces have publicly acknowledged just a few successful intercepts over Yemen, the last one of record in June 2016 when rebels in the country’s south launched east of the capital city of Sanaa.


And while the coalition never identified which partner nation conducted that intercept, sources from the U.S. and another country in the region attributed that successful engagement to Emerati air defenders operating the Patriot PAC-3. The UAE’s forward-deployed Patriots in Yemen, those sources said, was a direct lesson from the September 2015 SS-21 attack launched from southern Yemen that killed dozens of Emerati and Yemeni soldiers in the center of the same war-torn country.

Aside from Russian and North Korean Scud-class missiles and the Russian SS-21 Toshka, the Houthi TBM arsenal includes the Iranian-supplied Burkan 1 and Burkan 2 and what some analysts have called the Qahr, which is a surface-to-surface version of the SA-2. According to Western sources, the Burkan 1 is similar to a regular short-range Scud while Burkan 2 carries a smaller, but separating warhead with extended range that can reach beyond the Saudi capital to the Kingdom’s oil production facilities and sensitive desalination plants.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Austin » 05 Dec 2017 17:08


While the Houthis missed their target, Mr. Lewis said, they got close enough to show that their missiles can reach it and can evade Saudi defenses. “A kilometer is a pretty normal miss rate for a Scud,” he said.

Even the Houthis may not have realized their success, Mr. Lewis said. Unless they had intelligence sources at the airport, they would have little reason to doubt official reports.

“The Houthis got very close to creaming that airport,” he said.

Laura Grego, a missile expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists, expressed alarm that Saudi defense batteries had fired five times at the incoming missile.

"You shoot five times at this missile and they all miss? That's shocking,” she said. “That's shocking because this system is supposed to work.”

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 05 Dec 2017 17:19

Again, where is the impact "analysis" of the warhead? That there are missile parts littered and present in areas that were not the intended target point to the fact that the interceptors struck a target. The article then focuses on the missing warhead based on photos posted by users on twitter and the social media. So in the absence of that, what have they done to study the performance of the warhead? How long was the airport shut down for? How many flights delayed and operations suspended for how long? All these things could have been looked at to gauge the actual impact of the warhead and whether it created a level of damage or destruction that would be commensurate with a missile of such type. If so, then you could positively say that the warhead escaped clean and caused damage as intended. They also failed to get the battery wrong, pointing to a unit that is not active. The unit that led the intercept was located at King Abdullaziz farther from the target than claimed.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 05 Dec 2017 17:22

Austin wrote:The NY Times article mentions contrary to what Raytheon and Saudis have been claiming so far and they even mentioned PAC-3 is being used


Yes, those were UAE batteries that had deployed during the conflict, but not Saudi ones. If one did an analysis of the overall conflict that started in 2015 then yes there were PAC-3s used by the UAEs that operates them to destroy incoming missiles. In this particular instance, the Patriot battery used was a Saudi one operating out of King Abdullaziz airport, hence the distinction in my last post.

Raytheon and Saudi claims aside there is open source collection of intercept record in the 2+ year conflict based on what folks have been able to corroborate to the best possible abilities using open source reporting. CSIS has a series they have which is different from what Raytheon and Saudi claims since they could not independently verify using open source data some of the claims made by OEM and end-user. There is a lead time that they take so expect November,2017 missiles to show up early next year.

Austin wrote:"You shoot five times at this missile and they all miss? That's shocking,” she said. “That's shocking because this system is supposed to work.”


Using legacy missiles at the very end or beyond their intended envelope when the TBM is directed at a major infrastructure or population center will get you to do that. The TBM used was approaching the 950-1000 km (which NYT even corraborates) range which will put it very close to the edge of, if not outside the legacy GEM envelope. You need the PAC-3 MSE to effectively do a ripple fire intercept since a 1000 km is likely to be at the very end of the envelope even for the standard PAC-3 which is largely considered as ineffective at anything beyond 1100 km target (MSE max's out at around 1300 km).

These are subtle nuances the NYT fails to capture which is remarkable since they reached out to the who's who of arms-control and anti-missile defense advocates. A nearly 1000 km launched ballistic missile is going to be very very hard for a legacy Patriot battery to intercept given missile performance, speed etc. It was a patchwork of legacy interceptors upgraded to do TBM which was never a perfect solution for this threat type hence the long road to modernization, focusing specifically on this threat. Longer range TBM developments was one of the reason that led to progressive TBM envelope expansion via the PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE to extend all the way to 1300 km ranged weapons (THAAD covers anything beyond). Even though the PAC-2 can loft higher it isn't optimized for higher altitude, longer ranged intercepts of incoming warheads as opposed to air-breathing threats so this means that the most challenging targets will be intercepted at lower altitudes where these missiles are most vulnerable to breaking apart and posing a very big discrimination problem to TVM dependent legacy interceptors.

As I said earlier, this was known even in the 1990s hence the decades of work to improve discrimination and interceptor performance by focusing on acceleration, agility (both out of plane and endgame using thrusters) and active Ka band seekers for better ed game discrimination. The Saudi's just failed to realize these upgrades at an appropriate time as other users of the system have been able to do. They focused on offensive capability and as a result have systems that are significantly inferior to even those operated by the UAE. They will begin to field upgraded systems in the 2018-2019 timeframe but won't likely reach the US current standard till early next decade. UAE and even Qatar have outpaced them in the region as far as a layered TBM defense capability is concerned and of course Israel leads the regional forces in that respect with a layered system already deployed.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Austin » 05 Dec 2017 18:09

Reading upon the Yemen BM versus Saudi/UAE debate , This goes back to GW 1 where the missile only failed to hit the target because their CEP was more than 1 km and not because the ABM could intercept them , Considering Saudi will be very opaque about it and even the news of hit would mostly from approved sources or state media there is no way either the Yemenis or Saudi claimed will be proved either ways.


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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Philip » 05 Dec 2017 18:15

Is there a land version developed of the naval SM-3/etc. series,or is Patriot the only land based LR SAM?

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 05 Dec 2017 18:21

Reading upon the Yemen BM versus Saudi/UAE debate


This particular instance was against a Saudi launched interceptor launched from a battery located at Abdulaziz airport. This is the only active Patriot battery located in the region corresponding with the missile attack as confirmed by imagery analysis.

Austin wrote:This goes back to GW 1 where the missile only failed to hit the target because their CEP was more than 1 km and not because the ABM could intercept them


Again, the problem is technical and I have tried to explain why it occurs. This problem, as I mentioned, was studied extensively and various solutions analyzed post gulf-war (which occurred more than 25 years ago). The path eventually chosen was to build interceptors that had the performance (acceleration and agility) to intercept TBM warheads at higher altitudes (to mitigate them breaking apart) hence faster and more agile interceptors were developed. Second solution focused on taking the ambiguity out by demanding H2K performance on top of the lethality enhancer warheads. The aim was to hit it high and hit it directly before it could spend a lot of time inside the atmosphere where it has a higher chance of breaking up.

Finally they addressed the guidance by moving away from legacy TVM concepts to end game active seekers and by requiring those seekers to be able to do end-game discrimination by requiring higher frequency sensors (Ka band on PAC-3 since X-band upgrade on PAC-2 was considered inadequate for discrimination and range). The radars themselves were improved for discrimination and the configuration 3+ Patriot radar nearly completely overhauls signals processing, computing and back end computations while leaving the Antenna in tact. Antenna upgrades if chosen (Lockheed has a dual S/C band alternative) will essentially result in a completely new radar.

The Patriot and PAC-2 were never designed with heavy TBM focus as the dominant USSR threat at the time was air-breathing targets with ECM and jamming. Offensive capability at the time was expected to mitigate the tactical ballistic missile threat since technically, high end ABM at the tactical level was not possible beyond Hawk / PAC level. Pre-Gulf War the system did focus on adding this capability but the PAC-2, the radar and the network was not really optimized for this role. Post GW the focus was almost exclusively on the TBM threat and various upgrades were performed. The US didn't have to worry about any of Saddam's TBM's launched at its protected infrastructure during OIF. Whatever (BMs) he did launch towards CENTCOM HQs were intercepted by US Patriot systems.

Since then the MSE has been made operational (IOC last year) and configuration 3+ is now slowly being rolled into the US Patriot batteries and even export systems. IBCS will further enhance the C2 by 2023 and a new AESA radar will provide 360 degree capability begining that time as well. The Saudi's will likely lag other operators in choosing these upgrades just as they have done for some time. Perhaps with their re-focus on ABM things will change (starting late 2015 they have progressively placed large orders of PAC-3s, THAAD negotiations, and S400 negotiations) but they don't really follow a rational or balanced path towards modernization so one can't rule insane decisions and delays on account of excessive customization in order to field superior systems than their counterparts in the region.

Philip wrote:Is there a land version developed of the naval SM-3/etc. series,or is Patriot the only land based LR SAM?


Patriot is not an LR-SAM (against this threat type). It is a point defense ABM system that focuses in on the SRBM to low end MRBM threat (ballistic missiles with ranges at or below 1300 km provided you use the most current interceptor - MSE) but that is limited by radar performance since a Patriot radar is not looking up exclusively for ballistic missiles (as the TPY-2 is for example) but is looking simultaneously for ballistic missiles flying in space, and aircraft and helicopters at much lower altitudes. As a result, the envelope against incoming ballistic missiles is radar-performance limited. You won't be able to knock down ballistic missiles at anything beyond 40 - 60 km using a sensor that has to cover these many missions. For longer ranged ballistic missile targets the US uses THAAD that covers a 200 km ballistic-missile envelope.

SM3 will be ineffective against a 1000 km ranged ballistic missile. It really requires a 1500+ km ranged weapon since its minimum altitude is likely higher than the highest altitude of most short-ranged or low end medium ranged ballistic missiles.

Most simply won't get high enough to bring the SM3 into play. Not to mention that it is a large, bulky missile not suitable for an expeditionary force that has to deploy thousands of kms from home and then move its systems inside a theater. Even the legacy PAC-2, a sub 1000 kg missile is considered too heavy and bulky for the saturated high end threat.

Mid-Course intercepts are more suited to protect very large swaths of land against missiles that have a long mid-course phase. So think longer ranged MRBMs to IRBMs and even ICBMs. SRBMs have a very short mid-course and don't loft as high. For them you need terminal defense systems such as the Patriot/S300/400 or THAAD.
\
There were earlier plans to field a more mobile upper tier, longer ranged capability to the Patriot by introducing a purely ballistic missile radar akin to a mini TPY-2 that was mobile as opposed to transportable (a distinction in US Army nomenclature for IAMD systems). This would have allowed an upper tier 100 km or so ranged interceptor against a larger MRBM target set and would allow faster emplacement and displacement compared to the THAAD even though it would be less capable. These plans were shelved as the demand seemed to be on lighter footprint, increased mobility and the ability to do integrated AMD enabled by any-sensor any shooter concepts rather than silver bullet, single use sensors and shooters. IN my opinion there is still some room in the terminal mission in between the 200 km ranged THAAD and the 40 km ranged PAC-3 MSE but the US Army has other priorities for the system that it values more.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Austin » 10 Dec 2017 16:53

Upgraded 53T6/Gazelle Interceptor Tested


The renewed anti-missile system began to develop even faster. 53T6 and in former times flew several times faster than the bullet and gained in a matter of seconds the speed of more than 3 km / sec, being the fastest rocket in the world. In the modernized version, its speed approached already to 4 km / sec. The available overloading of the product has significantly increased. If earlier they exceeded 200 g, now they are close to 300 g

The new product almost a half times increased the zone of damage in height and range. Now, the interception of combat blocks of the enemy's intercontinental ballistic missiles is confidently carried out at a height well over 50 km.


https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2017/11/24/11002088.shtml

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby viveks » 10 Dec 2017 19:24

Yeah...thanks for the post. This is most impressive...this is the one I was observing about in its acceleration. Looks like they are maturing a new booster technology.

A thought comes to me. Maybe they are testing ways to counter the US navy upcoming railgun projectiles. Haha.

I suppose the arms race is still very much on between the two research giants..if it is..then old traditions continue to prevail...only coupled with greater, closer, common, warmer influences. Haha

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby PratikDas » 29 Dec 2017 05:22

From Odisha:
AAD successfully tested with a direct hit

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Philip » 29 Dec 2017 10:46

Great news! 3rd positive test.Augurs well for swift serial production.

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby arun » 29 Dec 2017 11:30

X Posted from the “Indian Missiles News and Discussions - May 2017” thread.

The “Official” Ministry of Defence press release on yesterday’s ballistic missile defence system interceptor missile test via Press Information Bureau (PIB):

Ministry of Defence
Successful Direct Hit by Interceptor Missile

Posted On: 28 DEC 2017 9:17PM by PIB Delhi

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully scored a direct hit on incoming missile today at around 09:45 am from Dr Abdul Kalam Island off the coast of Odisha. The interceptor directly hit the target at an altitude of about 15 kilometre and destroyed it into fragments. The spectacular success puts India in the league of a very few select nations world over in the arena of critical defence technology.

Today’s direct interception is fourth in a row, where the missiles have scored a perfect hit on the incoming missile.

In text book style launch, the incoming ballistic missile was launched from LC-III complex of ITR, which followed the exact path of intended ballistic missile. Radars located at different stations far-off, acquired the target, tracked them and passed on to the Master Control Centre (MCC), which generated the expected trajectory of the target and alerted the interceptor missile. The interceptor was launched from Dr A P J Abdul Kalam Island at appropriate time for interception, which was initially guided by the Inertial Navigational System and the radars. Later, the seeker took over after a proper lock on to the target and guided the missile towards the target. All the radars, Electro Optical and Telemetry Stations tracked both the missiles and recorded the final interception.

The event was witnessed by Vice Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Sirish Deo and other senior officials of Armed Forces. Directors of DRDO laboratories namely RCI, ASL, LRDE and ITR reviewed the entire launch operations.

Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri & Director General (Missiles & Strategic Systems) Dr G Sateesh Reddy was present during the launch operation said that the repeat performance of the interception demonstrates the country’s professional capability in high technology oriented Ballistic Missile Defence.

Chairman DRDO & Secretary Department of Defence Research & Development Dr S Christopher, congratulated the scientists behind the magnificent feat and said that the test paved the way for self-reliance.

Raksha Mantri Smt Nirmala Sitharaman congratulated DRDO for elevating the country to few select nations having such BMD capability.

NA/DK
(Release ID: 1514567)


From here:

PIB

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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby Zynda » 29 Dec 2017 12:19

I dunno if these tweets are posted here:

Link

Image

The thread also contains some videos of HTK hitting the P2 missile warhead.


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Re: ABM/Missile Defense Discussion

Postby brar_w » 13 Jan 2018 19:16

A good description of the features of the upgraded TPY-2 starting at 2:05 mark. Basic elements of the modernized radar include a switch to Gallium Nitride T/R Modules, a new processor among other enhancements. The first radar built to this standard was in production last year targeting a Q1 2018 delivery date for the US Army/MDA. A more powerful radar and then an upgraded to the Prime Power Unit had been identified as precursors to a longer ranged interceptor so with most of those elements now in place we should be hearing about the Extended Range round in the next year or two.

Below is a quote from an article by Geoff Fein from Jane's IDR quoting Raytheon on performance improvements enabled by the new radar and power supply upgrades:

"With GaN you can increase your search capability by 5x the search volume, Bedingfield said on 29 September. "It allows the power to be much more effectively used."GaN enables the search volume to be greatly enhanced and the range increased by upward of 50%, Bedingfield said. "And you can increase the discrimination capability."




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