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Arun_S wrote:No fleet can enforce 300km under surface protective bublbe that in the first place requires under water sensor reach of 300km. The Brahmos terminal sersors do a neat job, if only they can be roughly cued. and a subsurface vessal can do that quite well.
Not necessarily. Assuming the target is a carrier, the CBG will provide a 100-300km bubble of AAW protection for the group. Under that bubble of AAW protection will reside multiple ASW helos, SSN(s) and land based MPAs. The only countries that employ carriers but not have SSNs are Brazil, Spain, Indonesia and India. The ASWs helos, land based MPAs, SSNs and escort ship based VDS and HMS will do continous sweeps to sanitize the subsurface battlespace.
You can already see that Indian carrier(s) are the most vulnerable as they are the only ones that will face an enemy with OTH SS-ASM capability yet not have AWD worth the name nor will the IN's carriers have a SSN escort, Akula notwithstanding.
Of course, in 10 yrs or so, with Barak-8 equipped fleet of beefy AWD and a couple of SSNs, the IN's CBGs can hold their own.
Thats good in commitment I guess, but in almost all real life exercises, the US CBG subsurface bubble has been penetrated, and the carrier shot.
There are umpteen reports of Canadian, Dutch, Australian, Swedish and even a Pak sub doing the honors. And thats getting close enough to take a torpedo shot.
A Brahmos/ Club equipped sub would have a better chance of doing the same from much further away.
Vick wrote:JCage,
SOC at AFM had pretty good pic of the Syrian radars' overlapping coverages based on Google Earth pics and open source knowledge about the types and locations of the Syrian radars.
The Syrians have a networked AD radar network, had it for a few years, IIRC. The only question is the level of integration of the subsystems. Loose integration has advantages and disadvantages and same with tight integration.
I believe that SOC had also pointed out that the Israelis made ingress from the weakest part of that AD network (the north, from Turkey I think), and their route was specifically chosen to avoid the most intensely defended areas. So, the whole thing about Israelis incursion into Syrian airspace seems a little overblown. WHether they actually jammed/spoofed anything can hardly be confirmed considering this route. They might have faced more trouble had they approached the heavily guarded cities where they may have to face Tors or Buks. If and when the S-300 turns up, it'll be a lot more difficult for them. RIght now, the Iranians and Syrians have Tors I believe, which are relatively short ranged and could be engaged by fighters with SLAM/Popeye types.
JMT.
One big advantage of supersonic missiles is the impact that they have on the target. A couple of harpoons hits, a large destroyed may take; one brahmos though could ensure a clean break! IOW, to cripple a large ship, you'd want to get more than just one subsonic missile through its defences. Not so with the Brahmos, we all remember what it did to that IN ship during the test, IIRC - "the ship broke in 2 and sank within 4 minutes"
As far as penetrating a CBG bubble of 300 odd kms, a salvo of Brahmos types fired (even at high altitude) from max ranges by MKI types (to avoid a/c detection), with different ingress routes would have a far better chance than subsonic missiles fired. Ideally one would want a combo of sizzlers and brahmos or subsonic + supersonic all launched outside the bubble. That'd be tough to beat.
Kiran.Rao wrote:Don't mind Arun , but aren't the Brahmos too heavy to be carried on the Jags of No.6.They will more likely be carried by one of the MKIs...JMT.
IIRC I saw a report few months ago that when air launched brahmos on MKI is operationalized, the Sea-Dragon No: 6 Sqn. will have MKI.
There is only some confirmation on the exit route with the discarded fuel tanks. If we believe the syrian stand, then entry route should be different as there is no alarm raised till they exit the syrian border.
Only plausible scenario of successful attack on US CBG by Ashm in real war situation can be from 1. from sub-surface platform and 2. from land. Rest, before the platform releases the weapon, it will be destroyed.
Brahmos S curve is really like Hadlee's swingers The "doosra" maneuvers of Brahmos are sure to baffle enimy defence in two fold. Spatial and Time...Jus like a good spinner's ball.
BTB how abt countering this ones? If our future enemy(s) fire something like this on us, will our Barak NGs take care of that ??
friends, the DRDO was supposed to have tested the AAD in june 07.
why is there no news about it. or have they given up on it for barak SAMs currently in development. please explain.
thanks in advance.
what caught my eye was the ability of something like a greenpine to detect 0.01 RCS targets as far as 229km!
Regards,
CM
Indian's figured out early the advantage of AESA for ABM role. Digital signal processing offers much superior Signal to Noise ration compared to PESA or old style radars, that directly translates into much superior RCS x Range product.
Why am I not surprised by "0.01 RCS targets as far as 229km!"?
Oh BTW that article by the Buddhi-chuyte Zia Mian and MV Ramana is largely trash. The idiot does not know physics, while (copy pasting) all the high sounding physics equations.
So as always he sells "snake oil" claiming the largest RCS of the hypothetical missile could be a phenomenal 100 sq meters. The SOB does not know that all missiles are cylindrical in shape (and not flat wall surface), thus the reflectivity of a curved cylinder is a function of radar wavelength, and much smaller than the optical area seen by naked eyes.
As expected he misses big time on the quantum S/N sensitivity difference between the other 2 radars and AESA based radar. His results are obviously fuc*ked up.
------------------ Added later:
Bottomline Greenpine range for 0.01m^2 RCS is much better than what his Madrasa-Math in the so called NPA cannon fodder paper try to fathom.
Seriously though, while GP type units may well be effective against VLO (after all thats what BM RVs can be), problem is scan angles and 360 degree surveillance. I wonder if they can put a GP on a turntable and get true 360 coverage, but the problem of a fixed elevation look angle will remain. So probably elevate that system up high ...which again makes it static and vulnerable to ARMs...no easy answers.
Emm yes you have a point , Wonder how the Phalcon will perform against VLO targets , Do you know how many T/R module do those static dome of IAF phalcon's have ?
I have read that IAF has asked for better T/R stuff
They have never released that info, whats public is Grade A watered down stuff. Eg the # of Tx/Rx modules hasnt been revealed either or average power per module. Nor is there any consistent public info available on # of targets tracked, fighters that can be managed/ vectored. The figures that are available are weird, eg 400-450 Km range for a fighter sized target and 100 Target TWS...which is something that nobody believes or should believe, rather since its obviously fishy given the size of the array and the ability of the Il-78 airframe to carry a proper liquid cooling system and cooled RF cabinets, even with space for crew.
You are quite correct that IAF asked for better T/R stuff. The Gen1 Tx/Rx module on Phalcon, as probably used on the Chile one/s was a hybrid one using MIC. But our Phalcon will be using pretty much standard MMIC based units.
One of the most important figures for an AWACS is endurance, those figures havent been released either. Extrapolating IL-78 figures is dodgy since that radome is bound to add significant drag. Plus the Phalcon may have IFR.
EL SEGUNDO, Calif. --- A solid-state illuminator laser developed by Raytheon Company for the Missile Defense Agency has been fired successfully more than 50 times for periods of up to 90 seconds since in-flight tests began in January.
The kilowatt-class illuminator, built for the agency's Airborne Laser (ABL) program and fired from a heavily modified Boeing 747, is used to track a boosting ballistic missile. The projectile is then destroyed by the ABL's high-energy laser.
Raytheon created the illuminator as a major supplier to Lockheed Martin, which provides the ABL Beam Control/Fire Control segment. Boeing is the prime contractor for the program and integrates the segment into the ABL system.
"We're very pleased with the performance of our laser and proud of its role in the nation's missile defense," said Nick Uros, vice president for the Advanced Concepts and Technology group of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems. "We'll be watching with keen interest as the test program continues."
The illuminator has been fired more than 900 times since installation on the aircraft for ground tests that began in 2006. It has conducted more than 140 million pulsed laser shots, "a remarkable achievement for high-power solid-state lasers," according to Uros.
and this thing is supposed to have 1600 tx/rx elements. assuming israeli
modules to be trailing raytheons lets assume 1000 elements in that
same real estate.
Phalcon rotodome would be smaller than E3 and the length will be less
due it being triangular but still I would think around 15 feet length in each
side of triangle. so 5000 elements each side for a total of 15K.
how would the range of the radar be with a 15 ft length, 2 feet height
rectangle packed with elements? .... can we consider it double that of
the APG77 ?
NEW DELHI — India this month will test the endo-atmospheric capability of its indigenous Prithvi Air Defence (PAD-1) anti-ballistic missile system, part of a two-step effort to develop a missile defense network by about 2015.
Designed and developed by the state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the system is being developed with Israeli help, sources in the DRDO said.
An exo-atmospheric test was conducted in November, when the system killed an incoming missile above the Earth’s atmosphere.
The endo-atmospheric test will attempt to hit an incoming missile within the Earth’s atmosphere, at a range of about 25 kilometers.
Missile tests are planned at India’s missile testing range at Balasore in the eastern state of Orissa, but no details are available, the sources said.
“The endo-atmospheric interceptor will engage targets at 25 kilometers,â€
India's nuclear program was conceived in the pre-independence era by a small group of influential scientists who grasped the significance of nuclear energy and persuaded political leaders from the Indian National Congress to invest resources in the nuclear sector. In the aftermath of independence in August 1947, the Congress government led by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru launched an ambitious dual-use, three-stage nuclear program to exploit India's abundant natural thorium reserves. The primary focus of the program was the production of inexpensive electricity. However, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle--from ore mining, processing and fuel fabrication facilities, research and power reactors, spent-fuel reprocessing plants, heavy water production plants, and waste treatment and disposal facilities--also led to India's acquiring the technical capability to build nuclear weapons.
India's defeat in the 1962 war with China and the latter's nuclear test in 1964 triggered an internal debate within and outside the Indian government on whether India should follow suit. Ultimately, in November 1964, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP).
The SNEPP project culminated in the test of a fission device on 18 May 1974 during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's tenure. India described the test as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). However, India did not follow the 1974 test with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately weaponize the device that was tested. During the brief tenure of the Janata Party government (1977-79), the nuclear weapons program was put on hold. However, the weapons program was resumed after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized preparations for additional nuclear tests in 1982, but the tests were canceled for reasons that have never been explained publicly. However, in the late 1980s advances in Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the oblique nuclear threats issued by Islamabad in the wake of the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, appears to have persuaded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to authorize weaponization of India's nuclear capability. By May 1994, India acquired the capability to deliver nuclear weapons using combat aircraft; by 1996, Indian scientists also succeeded in developing a nuclear warhead that could be mated on to the Army's Prithvi-1 ballistic missile. In the winter of 1995, in an apparent reaction to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and advances in negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Narasimha Rao government considered a crash program of nuclear tests. However, India's test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence agencies; subsequently, Rao's government postponed the tests under U.S. pressure.
Plans for testing were renewed when the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to power for a brief period in 1996. However, Vajpayee's government was unable to win a parliamentary majority and decided not to go through with the tests as they would create a political crisis for the incoming successor government. However, when returned to power in 1998, the BJP finally authorized two rounds of nuclear tests in May 1998, after which it formally declared India's nuclear status. Subsequent to the tests, the Vajpayee government declared that India would build a "credible minimum deterrent." Since then, the Indian government also formally articulated a nuclear doctrine of "no-first-use" and more recently spelled out the broad outlines of India's nuclear command, control, and communications framework.
Capabilities
There is considerable controversy over the yield and reliability of India's nuclear devices. When India tested its first fission device in May 1974, Indian scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12kt. However, that figure has been disputed by independent analysts who estimate that the yield was far lower, probably between 2-6kt. Later, a senior Indian scientist who was part of the design and testing effort privately admitted that the yield was more likely in the range of 8kt. Similar controversy dogs India's May 1998 tests. After the first of round of tests on May 11, India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announced that it had tested three nuclear devices: a fission device with a yield of 12kt; a thermonuclear device with a yield of 43kt; and a sub-kiloton device with a yield of 0.2kt; The figures were later revised to 45kt for the thermonuclear device and 15kt for the fission device. However, these figures have been disputed by independent analysts, who--citing evidence from seismic data--claim that the cumulative yield of the Indian tests was more likely between 20-30kt, the implications being the thermonuclear test was likely to have been a failure. Senior Indian scientists such as P.K. Iyengar have also publicly suggested that it is likely that the fusion device only burned partially. However, the former head of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr. R. Chidambaram has claimed that a "post-shot" analysis of the Pokhran II tests confirmed that the May 1998 tests yielded about 60kt. Chidambaram subsequently asserted that the tests provided India with "the capability to design and fabricate nuclear weapons [in the range] of low-yields up to 200 kilotons."
Following the May 11 tests, India carried out two tests of sub-kiloton devices on May 13 "to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of designs and for attaining the capability to carry out sub-critical experiments, if considered necessary." However, observers doubt whether such a small number of tests are sufficient for Indian scientists to have collected all the necessary data to conduct "sub-critical" experiments successfully.
Fissile Material Stocks
The plutonium for India's nuclear stockpile is most likely obtained from two research reactors: the 40MW CIRUS and 100MW Dhruva, which went critical in 1960 and 1985, respectively. The CIRUS reactor is capable of producing 9-10kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually; the corresponding figure for the Dhruva reactor is 20-25 kg. The CIRUS reactor was shut down in 1997 for refurbishment and is expected to resume operations in 2003. Although the Dhruva went critical in 1985, vibration problems delayed normal operations until 1988. The irradiated fuel from the reactors is probably reprocessed at either the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay (50 tons per year) or the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant at Kalpakkam (100-125 tons per year). According to published sources, India produces 20-40 kg of plutonium annually and has probably accumulated 280-600kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to build 40-120 weapons. There is some evidence to suggest one of the nuclear devices tested in 1998 used reactor grade plutonium (Pu-240). If Pu-240 is available for warhead production, it would fundamentally change estimates of India's fissile material stock. India also has a small stock of highly enriched uranium, but it is unclear if the latter has been used to build nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Force Architecture
India's nuclear deterrent is centered on a dyad consisting of a small number of land-based bombers and land-based short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. However, in the long term, the Indian government envisions a "minimum deterrent" based on a triad of land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear forces.
The bomber leg of India's dyad consists of a small number of Mirage 2000s and possibly Jaguar and MiG 27 aircraft. There is evidence to suggest that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is seeking to augment its bomber fleet through the purchase of additional Mirage 2000 multi-role combat aircraft; reports also suggest that the IAF is interested in arming its proposed Su-30 fleet with nuclear capable air-launched cruise missiles. Other reports indicate that India may be interested in acquiring long-range nuclear-capable bombers such as the Tu-22 Backfire bombers from Russia.
At present, the Prithvi-1 (150km-range/1,000kg-payload) and Prithvi-2 (250km-range/500kg-payload) are the only ballistic missiles in service with the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. An undisclosed number of Prithvi-1 missiles have been modified to deliver nuclear warheads. However, the Prithvi suffers from several limitations such as its short-range, liquid-fueled engines, which add to the logistics burden, and fuel toxicity, which increases the difficulties of handling the weapon system in the field. Hence, the Prithvi missiles will most likely be replaced by the new solid-fueled, short-range Agni ballistic missile (700-800km-range/1,000kg-payload) for nuclear missions. The missiles already in the inventory of the Army and Air Force are likely to be reassigned to perform conventional battlefield support functions. The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has also developed a 350km-range naval-variant of the Prithvi: the Dhanush. The missile has completed flight-trials at sea. However, the Indian Navy (IN) has not made a decision to deploy the Dhanush on board surface warships; but the IN might acquire a small number of these missiles and deploy them on board surface warships as part of the inter-services organizational battle to acquire a stake in the proposed "minimum deterrent."
The short-(700-800km-range/1000kg-payload), medium- (2,000-2,500km-range /1,000kg-payload), and the planned intermediate-range (3,500-4,000km-range/1,000kg-payload) variants of the Agni ballistic missile are likely to be the mainstay of India's land-based missile force in the future. In comparison to the Prithvi, each of these variants of the Agni combines the advantages of longer-range, higher-payload, and solid-fueled engines. Although it is developing an intermediate-range ballistic missile, India appears to have stopped short of building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. New Delhi's restraint in this regard is probably the result of a conscious political choice to avoid threatening or challenging the legally recognized members of the nuclear club, with the exception of China, which India regards as a potential long-term threat to its security. Furthermore, as India moves in the direction of an operational nuclear force, Indian elites perhaps feel reduced pressure to rely on technological symbols to demonstrate political resolve.
As part of a program to develop a secure, sea-based, second-strike capability, India is developing a nuclear powered submarine, also referred to as the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). However, the DAE's inability to design and integrate a compact reactor power plant for the vessel has led to program delays. It has been reported that India has sought technical advice and assistance for the ATV from Russia. India is also negotiating the lease of two Shchuka B-class (NATO designation Akula-II) nuclear submarines from Russia. India's nuclear submarines will probably be armed with the Sagarika missile. Details about the Sagarika missile's class, payload, and range are classified. In addition, the DRDO is also developing a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, the BrahMos/PJ-10, in close collaboration with the Russian entity NPO Mashinostroyeniye. Two versions of the missile are under development: a naval version for surface and sub-surface vessels, and an aircraft-based version. Indian defense planners ultimately hope to develop nuclear-capable cruise missiles with land attack capability.
Custody/Command and Control
India does not maintain a constituted nuclear force on a heightened state of alert. The nuclear-capable missiles, bombers, non-nuclear warhead assemblies, and fissile cores are maintained in a de-alerted state by their respective custodians--the individual armed services, the DRDO, and the DAE--with plans to reconstitute them rapidly during an emergency or national crisis.
After much debate, deliberations, and delay, the Indian government has entrusted operational control of India's nuclear missile force to the Indian Army. Although the Air Force deploys an undisclosed number of nuclear-capable bombers and the short-range Prithvi-2 ballistic missiles, it has lost the inter-services battle with the Army for custody of India's nuclear missile force. The Indian government is also considering a proposal to place all nuclear-capable land missiles under the consolidated control of a Strategic Rocket Command within the Army.
Although the nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft are under the control of individual armed services, India's consolidated nuclear force is administered by a tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Due to the delay in the appointment of the proposed Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), who will ultimately head a joint tri-service command, the commander-in-chief of the SFC currently reports to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Ultimately, however, the SFC will report to the CDS, who will act as the "single-point" military advisor to the Indian government and act as the interface between the civilian executive and the armed services.
At the level of the civilian executive, India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for the management of its nuclear forces and for making all decisions pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons. The NCA is a two-layered structure. It comprises a Political Council (PC) and an Executive Council (EC). The PC is chaired by the prime minister and is the "sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons." The decisions of the PC are conveyed to the EC, headed by the prime minister's National Security Advisor, who then interfaces with the SFC to execute the political directives of the PC.
The Indian government claims it has "reviewed and approved arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities," an obvious reference to the transfer of power in the event of a successful decapitation strike on India's top political and military leadership. However, for reasons of national security, details and composition of the NCA and the alternate chains of command remain a closely guarded secret.
Nuclear-Use Doctrine
India's primary goal is to achieve "economic, political, social, scientific, and technological development" and autonomy in domestic and strategic decision making in an environment free of coercion from either the threat or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. With these objectives in view, the Indian government has adopted a nuclear "no-first-use" or doctrine of "retaliation only." The doctrine's central goal is to deter the threat of nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons use by any state or entity against India or its armed forces. In the event of deterrence failure, the doctrine states that India will resort to punitive strikes to inflict unacceptable losses on the adversary state or entity. However, India will not resort to the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons, or are not aligned with states that possess such capabilities.
India and the Nonproliferation Regime
India remains steadfastly opposed to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since the late 1960s, a consensus has emerged in India that the NPT is an inequitable instrument that divides the world into "nuclear haves" and "have nots," and the solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation is comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. The Indian government, even while remaining steadfastly opposed to the NPT, has reiterated its resolve to undertake nuclear disarmament as part of a time bound and comprehensive worldwide effort in that direction.
Although India was initially one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when that treaty was first proposed in the 1950s and among the first to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the Indian government's position has changed radically since then. By the early 1990s, when negotiations on the CTBT rapidly moved towards a resolution, Indian elites came to regard the CTBT not as an instrument of controlling the nuclear arms race, its original goal when it was first proposed, but rather as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to freeze countries along the nuclear learning curve. The Indian government also objected to the treaty's entry-into-force provision, as well as clauses that allowed nuclear weapon states to conduct hydronuclear and hydrodynamic experiments to ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear arsenals.
After conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian government announced that it would abide by a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear testing and declared that India would not be the first state to resume nuclear tests. In the aftermath of the tests, the Indian government also considered the idea of signing though not ratifying the CTBT. However, the absence of a domestic consensus, the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify the treaty, as well as questions about the success of India's past nuclear tests, led the Indian government to defer signature in favor of the current policy of an informal moratorium. There is some evidence to suggest that India's AEC has requested the government's permission to conduct further nuclear tests. Thus far, such a request has not been approved.
India has rejected U.S. suggestions to abide by an informal moratorium on fissile material production. However, India has agreed to participate in the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) talks at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. However, India proposes to continue accumulating fissile material stocks until the FMCT comes into effect.
As a non-signatory to the NPT, India remains the target of nuclear supplier export controls. Although India is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it formally abides by strict domestic export control laws and regulations to control the export of nuclear and related dual-use technologies.
Future Trends
In its determination to build a "credible" and "survivable" minimum deterrent, the Indian government is transforming India's once symbolic nuclear capability into an operational nuclear force. Since conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian government has divided the custody of India's nuclear delivery systems and nuclear warheads among the armed forces and civil defense and atomic energy departments. It has also formally articulated a nuclear use doctrine, and spelled out command and control arrangements for initiating nuclear use as well as succession arrangements within the government to manage in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. Reluctantly, Indian strategic elites have begun to grapple with the reality that nuclear weapons are not just political instruments, but that such weapons may indeed have to be used, and India needs to start planning for such contingencies.
India's nuclear policy planning, which for the last four decades was almost the exclusive preserve of a handful of politicians and civilian nuclear and defense scientists, is in the process of being opened up to a larger coalition of stakeholders. New entrants in this coalition now include the military and, to a lesser extent, civilian strategic thinkers. Accommodation of new stakeholders in the nuclear coalition is changing the cognitive lens through which nuclear weapons have been perceived. Whereas Indian politicians and scientists have traditionally treated nuclear weapons as political icons, the military and professional strategic analysts' goals converge around the task of transforming that symbolism into an operational and hence, usable nuclear capability.
New Delhi has so far not defined what it means by a "minimum" deterrent. However, statements by Indian government leaders suggest that the program is evolutionary in its scope: the nature and scale of the nuclear arsenal will be determined by a host of variables ranging from the regional and global security environment, to the performance of the Indian economy, and the availability of specific technologies. A review of India's defense strategic programs also suggests that in the medium-term, the dyad, which currently comprises short-range bombers and land-based short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, will most likely be expanded to include long-range nuclear-capable bombers and medium-range ballistic missiles. But in the long-term, India is likely to acquire a sea-based capability based on nuclear submarines armed with cruise or ballistic missiles. However, at this point, it is unclear whether India is seeking to acquire a global nuclear strike capability in the long-term, or whether its nuclear deterrent will be technically restricted to deterring nuclear threats from China and Pakistan.
But in the short- and medium-term, the shift toward an operational nuclear capability is unlikely to be accompanied by corresponding changes in India's posture. All indicators suggest that the Indian government favors a recessed posture of deployment. Barring a national crisis or emergency, the arsenal will not be deployed in the field. Furthermore, current custodial arrangements under which control over nuclear delivery systems, non-nuclear warhead assemblies, and fissile cores is divided among different civilian and defense agencies, is likely to be retained in the interests of safety, security, and the reduced risk of nuclear accidents. However, the acquisition of a sea-based strike capability in the long-term will most likely induce changes in the current deployment posture.
There is a strong possibility that future Indian governments might authorize additional nuclear tests to clear the controversy surrounding India's thermonuclear weapons capability, to gather additional data for subcritical experiments, as well as to design and validate a new class of nuclear weapons. The Indian military is also likely to favor additional tests in the interests of safety and reliability. However, the Indian government is unlikely to break the current moratorium in the face of the prevailing global moratorium on tests. However, tests by another country will provide the Indian government an adequate political cover to break its self-imposed restraint on further nuclear testing.
Finally, India's nuclear doctrine has begun to show evolutionary changes. In 1999, the draft nuclear doctrine suggested that India's nuclear deterrent would only be invoked against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, new security guidelines released in early 2003 suggest that the threat of nuclear use would be invoked to deter or retaliate against the use of chemical or biological weapons as well. But despite revisionist suggestions from some members of the strategic establishment, the Indian government remains steadfast in its commitment to abide by a "no-first-use" doctrine.
TUCSON, Ariz., Dec. 4, 2007 /PRNewswire/ -- Raytheon Company has successfully flight tested a key component of the Network Centric Airborne Defense Element missile defense system with the intercept of a test ballistic missile. The Dec. 3 test at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., demonstrated the NCADE infrared seeker's ability to acquire and track a ballistic missile target in the boost phase.
NCADE is an air-launched weapon system designed to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the boost and ascent phase of flight. NCADE provides an interim or near-term solution to boost or ascent phase threats.
"This test provides clear evidence that the NCADE seeker is a viable solution against a boosting ballistic missile threat," said Mike Booen, Raytheon Missile Systems vice president of Advanced Missile Defense. "NCADE fills a critical niche in the Ballistic Missile Defense system and provides a revolutionary, low-cost approach to interceptor development and acquisition."
An Air National Guard F-16 test aircraft from the Air National Guard-Air Force Reserve Command Test Center, Tucson, Ariz., launched the AIM-9X airframe that carried the NCADE seeker.
The NCADE interceptor leverages many proven components and technologies, including the aerodynamic design, aircraft interface and flight control system of Raytheon's Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile. The commonality with AMRAAM enables NCADE to launch from a wide variety of aircraft. NCADE's small size enables it to be carried by and launched from smaller unmanned aerial vehicles, providing a potential operational advantage.
NCADE also leverages proven imaging infrared seeker components from existing Raytheon production programs. This enables a potentially rapid development and fielding path.
Last year, Raytheon teammate Aerojet successfully tested the NCADE second stage axial propulsion system, demonstrating the maturity of this new propulsion system. Future testing will involve the missile's divert and attitude control system.
The system -- named the Net-Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCDE) -- breaks new ground in that it would arm fighter aircraft or drones with missiles fast enough to intercept a ballistic missile as it lifts into space.
The aircraft would have to get to within a 100 miles of the launch site to catch the ascending missile in the first two to three minutes after launch.
But it could be very useful in a short range combat situation against short and medium range missiles, said Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the US Missile Defense Agency.
The proposed sale includes nine Patriot fire units with 10 phased-array radars, 37 launching stations and 288 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles plus 216 Guidance Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T). PAC-3 missiles are manufactured by Lockheed Martin and GEM/T by Raytheon.
PAC-3 is designed specifically for use against theatre ballistic missiles, while the GEM/T is a PAC-2 missile with improved capability against TBMs as well as low-altitude cruise missiles.
BALASORE: As part of efforts to develop a multi-layer interceptor missile system, India on Thursday successfully test fired an indigenously-built Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile capable of destroying hostile missiles at low altitude from the integrated test range off Orissa coast.
The trial was conducted from two different launch sites of the ITR in the Bay Of Bengal in the presence of top defence scientists, defence sources said.
The target missile, a modified indigenously-built Prithvi, was first test fired from a mobile launcher at 1100 hours from ITR's launch complex-3 at Chandipur-on-sea while two minutes 40 seconds later the interceptor was fired from Wheeler's Island 70 nautical miles from here to destroy it at an altitude of 15 km in mid air.
The entire trial starting from launch to interception and destruction of the target was successful meeting all the required data, an official associated with the test said.
Now detailed results, specifically the kill effects of the interceptor of the co-ordinate exercise, would be assessed by analysing data from multiple source, he said.
Yet to get a formal name, this hypersonic new interceptor missile is termed as AAD-02 meant to be engaged in Endo-Atmospheric conditions, the official said.
An Exo-atmospheric interceptor missile PAD-01 had been successfully tested on November 27, 2006 to destroy an incoming Prithvi missile at an altitude of 50 km while a solo and mock trial of the present variant was conducted on December two, 2007 with a simulated electronic target from the wheelers island, they said.
The proposed sale includes nine Patriot fire units with 10 phased-array radars, 37 launching stations and 288 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles plus 216 Guidance Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T). PAC-3 missiles are manufactured by Lockheed Martin and GEM/T by Raytheon.
PAC-3 is designed specifically for use against theatre ballistic missiles, while the GEM/T is a PAC-2 missile with improved capability against TBMs as well as low-altitude cruise missiles.
That would be just an average of US$ 20million per missile with all attached systems like radars etc
Japan successfully intercepted a ballistic missile in its first test launch of the US-developed SM-3 missile interceptor system from a warship in waters off Hawaii, reports said on Tuesday.
The Japanese destroyer Kongou launched a missile -- from waters off Kauai Island -- and successfully intercepted the mock target, another missile, fired from onshore on Monday, Kyodo News agency and public broadcaster NHK said.
JCage wrote:Thats good in commitment I guess, but in almost all real life exercises, the US CBG subsurface bubble has been penetrated, and the carrier shot.
There are umpteen reports of Canadian, Dutch, Australian, Swedish and even a Pak sub doing the honors. And thats getting close enough to take a torpedo shot.
A Brahmos/ Club equipped sub would have a better chance of doing the same from much further away.
JC,
Diesel boats can sneak in, but they're most likely to be succesful in a littoral environment. That's where detection is harder, *and* where they will have an easier time locating and closely tracking a CVBG through whatever means.
Essentially what this means is that the carrier based air campaign will not be able to start without a more comprehensive naval campaign and/or the air campaign will start further out to sea.
New Delhi (AFP) Dec 14, 2007
Nuclear-armed India said on Friday it was ready to jump-start production of long-range nuclear missiles which can hit targets deep in China or Pakistan.
V. K. Sarswat, the chief of India's missile development project, said the assembly lines were in place to speed up the production of the precision rockets.
Military insiders told AFP the announcement was a response to reports of growing cross-border military intrusions into India by China, which has an unresolved border dispute with its smaller Asian neighbour.
The statement came amid reports Friday that India had moved a brigade-sized (6,000-man) army unit to the Bhutan-China border on India's uneasy eastern flank.
"India is now capable of delivering missiles much earlier than the earlier period of three to seven years as basic building blocks for production and deployment of long-range missile are now in place," scientist Saraswat said.
The comments also coincided with the second test in so many days of the locally made 700-kilogramme (1,540-pound) surface-to-air Akash missile on Friday.
Saraswat, speaking to reporters in southern Hyderabad city, one of India's largest hubs for strategic research, said nuclear-capable missiles would be built much faster with private sector particpation.
"We will develop the next levels of missiles in a much shorter time.
"The private industry has emerged as a co-developer of the sub-systems of the missiles, which is helping us in cutting down development time," Saraswat added.
India's defence industry opened up to the private sector three years ago after state-owned ordnance units failed to deliver.
Saraswat's comments came after India's chief military scientist M. Natarajan Wednesday said New Delhi will test a ballistic missile with a top range of 6,000 kilometres (3,800 miles) in 2008.
"The defence industry, having gone through a reality check, is now kicking up with results, and I'll describe it as a positive sign," a senior defence ministry official, who did not want to be named, told AFP.
India has built a range of ballistic and cruise missiles as part of a 1983 project.
There are ,as the famous saying goes,"umpteen numbers of ways to skinning a cat".Similarly,there are a number of ways in which ABM systems can be defeated.WMDs also don't always come in the shape of nuclear weapons remember.However,in the development of expensive ABM systems,the spin-offs that improve SAM systems for use against aircraft and cruise missiles is a bonus.Coupled with cyber-warfare and space and other aero-based surveillance assets,a complex anti-air/missile defence can be developed.The increasing number of stealth aircraft and UCAVs ,apart from stealthy missiles,is going to make the task harder in the future.Inevitably costs will skyrocket and the "Russian solution",posted poses a svere headache.
Russia threatens to target US missile shield
By Harry de Quetteville and Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 2:19am GMT 18/12/2007
Russia has threatened to target two proposed American bases in Europe with its nuclear missiles if the Pentagon pressed ahead with its plans for a missile defence shield.
In an escalation of the Cold War-style threats favoured by President Vladimir Putin, the general in charge of Russia's ballistic arsenal said that he could target the bases in Poland and the Czech Republic that will host the missile-interceptor shield if America insists on building them.
Vladmir Putin favours cold-war rhetoric
"I do not exclude the missile-defence shield sites in Poland and the Czech Republic being chosen as targets for some of our intercontinental ballistic missiles," said Gen Nikolai Solovtsov.
America insists that its new shield will carry only a few missiles, designed to intercept warheads fired from rogue states, such as Iran.
But Gen Solovtsov dismissed that concept as a lie, claiming that America was determined to surround Russia with its military might.
"If the Americans signed a treaty with us that they would only deploy 10 anti-missile rockets in Poland and one radar in the Czech Republic and will never put anything else there, then we could deal with this," he said. "However they won't sign, they just tell us verbally, 'We won't threaten you'."
advertisementHe said that believing such verbal assurances in the past had seen Russia encircled by the Western military alliance, Nato.
"Verbally they already told us that when we re-unite Germany there won't be one Nato soldier there. Now where are they?," he said. "They already cheated Russia once."
Gen Solovtsov's remarks follow a year of increasingly bombastic comments about the proposed missile shield.
Moscow separately said that a shipment of Russian nuclear fuel had arrived in Iran, which the Bush administration suspects is seeking to develop an atomic weapons programme under the cover of civilian energy production.
The delivery of enriched uranium was made to Bushehr power station, which is being built by a Russian company and is expected to start producing electricity within six months.
President George W Bush said that "if the Iranians accept uranium for a civilian nuclear power plant, then there's no need for them to learn how to enrich".
Any suggestion that Iran is attempting to further enrich the uranium it has received in order to make it weapons-grade could trigger a military response from the US or Israel.
America and Britain are already pushing for a new round of sanctions against Teheran at the United Nations Security Council, despite a recent US intelligence report that suggested that Iran's nuclear weapons research might have been mothballed.
The heightened tensions between Washington and Moscow looked unlikely to subside soon as Mr Putin said that he was ready to become prime minister when he steps down as president ahead of elections in March.
The job will allow him to continue exerting enormous public influence under the rule of his near-certain successor, Dmitry Medvedev. It would also give him the platform to run as president again in 2012.
"If the citizens of Russia trust Dmitry Medvedev and elect him the country's president I will be ready to chair the government," Mr Putin said at a conference of the ruling United Russia party.
In two terms as president Mr Putin has led a resource-rich Russia from post-communist weakness back to the heart of global affairs through a sometimes confrontational approach.
thats news to me.
The "doosra" maneuvers of Brahmos are sure to baffle enimy defence in two fold. Spatial and Time...Jus like a good spinner's ball. 
