Discussion on Indian Special Forces

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Austin
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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Austin » 18 Nov 2011 00:59

Toothless Black Cats

National Security Guards

The National Security Guards' (NSG) portly and bespectacled Director General RK Medhekar is the antithesis of the image of his commando force, the Black Cats. So you have to take his vision statements with a pinch of salt. At its 26th raising day last month, the affable Mr Medekar declared two new ultra-modern NSG commando force of 1600 commandos each would be ready in five years. The government would spend nearly Rs 1 crore on equipping each commando. (Mr Medhekar, of course, would be in blissful retirement by then).

Medhekar's statements are a tacit admission that the NSG - the home ministry's primary counter-terrorism and anti-hijack response force - is yet to receive any of the sophisticated equipment it had listed after the November 26, 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai. The lack of modern walkie talkies, lightweight bulletproof jackets and holographic sights on rifles was painfully evident during the prolonged 26/11 seige in Mumbai. The NSG's long shopping list continues to be stuck in red tape. What has happened since 26/11 is that the NSG has bloated into what could easily be the world's largest anti-terrorist force. Over 12,000 strong with a mish-mash of police, paramilitary and army personnel strung out in little isolated outposts in Hyderabad, Kolkata, Chennai and Mumbai. A black-dungaree clad paramilitary force that will only add to the chaos of, God forbid, yet another 26/11-style terror attack.

Money is clearly not a problem. The NSG spent Rs 25 lakh for their raising day including a gala dinner and Rs 12 lakh for a mock Delhi metro train for the firing display. Of course, equipment alone does not make a force. But the training which is supposed mould these armymen into specialist urban-intervention commandos also remains frozen in 1980s. Terrorists have grown nimbler and smarter but the NSG's curriculum hasn't changed in a quarter-century.

The NSG had an epiphany recently while training at their Manesar complex with German GSG-9 commandos (on whom they were modeled on in 1984). In just one crucial area - tactical radios - they noted how far their beefy German counterparts had moved on. The GSG-9 commandos had button-sized radio implants in their ears and sported band-aid sized mouth-pieces taped on their chins. The radios had a range of 1 km. The difference between the two forces is far more intrinsic than that. The GSG-9 remains a cutting-edge commando force that demands and gets nothing but the best mission-critical equipment. The NSG has been reduced to a paramilitary force whose chiefs make boastful claims at public events.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby rajeshks » 13 Dec 2011 16:41

There was a counter terrorism drill in office today involving NSG and IAF. An IAF heli(MI-8?) did few dry runs(touch and go) on top of one of the buildings and then finally dropped some NSG personal. NSG gear was not that great.. the same old heavy BPJ and one guy was carrying a sterling gun also. others had MP5, MP5 SD.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Singha » 13 Dec 2011 17:02

the lack of eqpt due to purchasing delays is something I do not understand - surely enough money can be found to equip atleast the SAG elements upto the best std. it is afterall our Netas and mantris in lutyens delhi and elsewhere who would be the first beneficiaries of a better equipped force. perhaps the feeling is "let them take 10 extra casualties, in the end they will get job done, its not my son in the line of fire, he is safely studying in harvard!"

the SPG which guards the dynasty and the PM is however smartly equipped with the latest kit per photos one sees.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby atreya » 13 Dec 2011 23:05

http://www.mid-day.com/news/2011/dec/13 ... inagar.htm

Let us pray for his well being and safety!
A question: Which is the 'Marol' unit? And do NSG commandos join regular Army regiments when posted in COIN ops?

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Marut » 13 Dec 2011 23:47

NSG hub in Mumbai is based at Marol.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby sum » 30 Dec 2011 14:51

Image

One pooch on this new US style camo of our MARCOS. How does this "sand coloured" camo help in a marine environment? Isnt this colour more suited for desert type scenario with black/dark blue being better for marine units?

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Gaur » 30 Dec 2011 15:02

^^
This reminded me of another pic I came across today.
Image

Source:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... es/page378

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby chackojoseph » 30 Dec 2011 15:07

sum wrote:Image

One pooch on this new US style camo of our MARCOS. How does this "sand coloured" camo help in a marine environment? Isnt this colour more suited for desert type scenario with black/dark blue being better for marine units?


Pic may be misleading. This is not exactly brown colored. There is a king of green/brown white/grey etc tint and looks quite convincing.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby sum » 02 Jan 2012 15:21

Gaur wrote:^^
This reminded me of another pic I came across today.
Source:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... es/page378


PS quote on this:
To Unknown: They're not MARCOS, but naval infantry personnel who had previously applied for inclusion into MARCOS but could not qualify. It is these personnel that now form the nucleas of the Sagar Prahari Bal and are also deployed at all naval dockyards as quick-reaction teams.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby sum » 02 Jan 2012 15:23

On the camo for the MARCOS, a comment by a reader:
They are Marcos in desert camouflage, imported from USA on trail basis as told to me by one these guys.
I met they on their way back from a place in Rajasthan to Mumbai. One of them told me that they were practicing deep penetration and sabotage in enemy area. I do not want reveal more as that guy told me many things in good faith.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby sum » 15 Jan 2012 14:29

The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war

Image


Dapon Ratuk Ngawang was one of the senior leaders of the Voluntary Freedom Fighter Force in Tibet, a Tibetan guerrilla outfit which fought Chinese rule and played a key role in the Dalai Lama's escape to India in March 1959.

After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Ratuk Ngawang commanded the Tibetan secret regiment, known as the Special Frontier Forces, SSF, or Establishment 22, based near Dehra Dun in Uttar Pradesh.

Now 84, Ratuk Ngawag lives in the Tibetan colony of Majnu Ka Tilla in Delhi. He recently published his memoirs (in Tibetan) in which he recounts his early life in Kham province of Eastern Tibet and the escape to India as well as the Tibetan participation in the 1971 operations.

In an exclusive interview, he tells Claude Arpi about the SSF's role during the Bangladesh Liberation War.

In 1971, Ratuk Ngawang was a 'Dapon', often translated as 'Brigadier'; they were also known as 'Political Leaders.'

One of the aspects of the 1971 War which has never been publicised is the participation of Tibetan troops in the operations.

The official history of the war mentions all the victorious battles, but the Tibetan regiment is not mentioned. Today we have no document proving the Tibetan soldiers' participation.

We would be interested to hear from you more about the Tibetan Forces' role in the Bangladesh operations. We are also curious to find out about the directives (if any) from the Central Tibetan Administration (the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile) towards the Tibetan soldiers?

I have covered all these issues in my memoirs (published in Tibetan by the Amnye Machen Institute, Dharamsala). The Tibetan Regiment known as Special Frontier Forces or Establishment 22 has never officially been under the Indian Army.

It was established in 1962, after the Indo-China War. The main objective of the regiment was to fight the Chinese army with the help of the Indian Army.

At the time of the creation of the Force, we thought that the operations could be based at Lhuntse Dzong in Tibet (near the Indian border).

The plan was to engage the Chinese army in a military conflict within 5, 6 months of the Force's creation. But the Indo-China war came to an abrupt end (on November 22), and due to severe international pressure to maintain peace, no further military engagements occurred with China.

Therefore, the services of Establishment 22 regiment were not used as planned.


Tell us more about Establishment 22.

The Chinese took over Tibet in 1959. In 1960, the Government of India established a Force known as the Indo-Tibetan Border Force. Tibetan Establishment 22 was established in November 1962.

Who ordered the SFF to take part in the war?

A senior Indian Army officer, Major General Sujan Singh Uban (The SSF became known as 'Establishment 22' or simply 'Two-twos' because General Uban earlier served as commander of the 22 Mountain Brigade). At that time, he was the commander of the Tibetan Force.

A special army meeting was held in New Delhi; later we heard that General Uban had volunteered to lead the Establishment 22 regiment in the Bangladesh war.

It was S S Uban and my colleague Dapon Jampa Kalden who voluntarily decided to take part in the war.

Later they told me about their plans. First, I refused to join them, because to voluntarily go to war was for me 'illegal.' I told them that only if we got an order from the Government of India or from the Central Tibetan Administration, could we join the operation.

Moreover, I told them that Establishment 22 had not been created to fight 'for India'; rather it was established with the sole aim to fight the Chinese.
In fact, it is the reason why we get less salary as compared to Indian soldiers. We are not part of the regular Indian Army.

When the regiment was established, there was a mutual agreement that we would fight the Chinese. This did not happen.


However, I told General Uban and Dapon Jampa Kalden that if we were to get a formal order from the Indian government then we could join the operations.


How many Mukti Bahini were trained at Uttar Pradesh by General Uban?

After Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was imprisoned in West Pakistan, more than 1,000 of his supporters escaped to India. Many of them were stationed near by the SSF camp.

We trained them in military combat. They were known as the Mukti Bahini.

Some of them were related to Mujibur Rahman. They later acted as our guides and contact persons during the war though they did not actually fight with us.

Though it was us who fought the real war and suffered the casualties, all the credit has later been given to the Mukti Bahini (because the Tibetan Force was involved under the guise of the Mukti Bahini).

Were the Mukti Bahini also under the command of General Uban?

Yes. General Uban provided the training to the Mukti Bahini.

When did you and the other two Dapons reach Bangladesh?

It was in November 1971. I was 39 years old at that time.

Did you go to Bangladesh before the beginning of the war or during the war?

We went before the Bangladesh war started. Though we were meant to fight the Chinese in a guerrilla warfare, during the Bangladesh war, our main enemy was the Mizo insurgents.

Just as the Tibetans were trained by the Indian Army, the Mizo soldiers were trained by Pakistan.

When and how did you go?

We went from the base of Establishment 22 in Uttar Pradesh to Dum Dum airport (Kolkata) by plane. From Dum Dum we went to Demagiri in Mizoram by motor vehicles. It took us three days.

After reaching the Bangladesh border (the Chittagong Hill Tracks), we had a meeting and went straight into the battle.

We left for the war on November 12 and fought for 28 days after which we came out victorious.

Many soldiers from the Pakistani side were killed and many surrendered.

What was General Uban's military objective in the war?

We were thoroughly trained in commando warfare to fight the Chinese; we were requested to use these skills to fight in the Bangladesh war.

The Indian authorities had assured us that the Indian Army would fight with the Tibetans for the cause of Tibet. Their reasoning was that the Tibetan soldiers alone could not defeat the Chinese army.

That's why we decided to join the Bangladesh war. It was in the hope that the Indian Army will help us militarily one day to fight the Chinese.


Before going to the war, did General Uban gave you any instructions to capture specific places or specific Pakistani military bases?

We had a map of the area (Chittagong Hills). Each of the three units (battalions) with a little more than 1,000 soldiers each included the Tibetan soldiers and some Mukti Bahini partisans.

Since General Uban was the commander of the Tibetan Special Frontier Forces, he gave us instructions in Hindi (we had Tibetan translators). He told us where to go and later through walkie-talkie we could inform him where we had reached and he would then tell us what we had to do.

The three Tibetan battalions had three Tibetan Dapons and three Indian colonels. The three Dapons and the three colonels always discussed the strategies, but the decisions were taken by General Uban after we had informed him.

Other than Demagiri, in which other places did the Tibetan soldiers fight?

Demagiri was the main military base. About 100 Tibetan soldiers and 100 Mukti Bahini were posted to guard the base.

Apart from senior military officials stationed at Demagiri, the base also had a hospital, where those who got injured in the battle could be treated. Most of the doctors were majors and captains of the Indian Armed Medical Corps.

The preparation for this had been done much before the beginning of the war.

The severely injured soldiers were taken by helicopters to other hospitals, but since the war was going on in the jungle of the Chittagong Hills, it was difficult for the helicopters to land. That is why many of the injured had to be sent by boats through the river.

When the Indian Army came to Demagiri at the beginning of the actual war, were the Indian soldiers able to help the Tibetan soldiers?

No. The Indian soldiers were not able to help us. Similarly, the Tibetan soldiers were also not able to help the Indian soldiers since both have been trained in different types of military warfare.

The Tibetan commandos were trained in guerrilla warfare whereas the Indian soldiers were trained in urban warfare.

Were your military objectives fulfilled?

Within ten days, we captured almost all the enemy bases except for two.

Most of the enemy bases had only 50 soldiers or so and when we attacked them, they were hugely outnumbered and surrendered within an hour of fighting.

On December 16, when news of the Indian Army's conquest of Dhaka became known, most of the remaining smaller units surrendered.

After the victory in the Bangladesh war, did you go to Chittagong for the official victory parade?

General Uban did organise a trip for us to go to Chittagong for the official victory ceremony. But we couldn't go as the Tibetan soldiers had been scattered in many different places.

Therefore, General Uban and R N Kao went to Chittagong to attend the official ceremony and discuss the perks and rewards for the Tibetan soldiers's contribution in the war.

We stayed back and celebrated the victory at our bases.





Did Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother, give the directives to the Tibetan soldiers to join the Bangladesh war or was it someone else?

The directive came from the department of security of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.

The department had called us for a meeting. They told us that there was no alternative but to go to war 'for India.'

Moreover, they told us that the Indian government was in a very critical situation at that time and our participation in the war could help save a lot of Indian lives.

Did you have any contact with R N Kao who was responsible for external intelligence in the Cabinet secretariat?

Yes. R N Kao was a high level officer of the Indian government and Indira Gandhi's close associate. But our commander was General S S Uban. He had visited New Delhi and also informed the Central Tibetan Administration about his plans to lead the SFF in the Bangladesh war.

After he came back to our base (in Uttar Pradesh), he sent Jampa Kalden and me to meet officials of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.

We told the administration about our initial reluctance to join the war. But since the Central Tibetan Administration had already decided about sending Establishment 22 to the war, we would go for it.

Was R N Kao involved in the decision?

R N Kao was a high level official and not a military man. So he was not directly involved in the operations. But he instructed us and advised us to prepare ourselves and fight well.

Was Mr Kao giving orders to General Uban?

General Uban was a military officer. R N Kao was a high ranking official, therefore he had greater authority.

When we captured Chittagong, R N Kao came to visit Establishment 22 and gave awards and speeches in praise of the Tibetan unit's heroic battles. R N Kao was a very patriotic person.

After the decision to participate in the operations was taken, Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang (who lost his life during the 1971 operations), Dapon Pekar Thinley and myself divided the regiment into three units.

We decided that each one of us would lead one unit in the war.

Due to his age and despite his military experience, Dapon Jampa Kalden couldn't take part in the war. He remained the administrative link between the Indian government and Establishment 22.

Gyalo Thondup was the chief strategist of Dehra Dun's SFF, but he was not involved in the decision to send Tibetan soldiers to the Bangladesh war.

When the Tibetan refugees first came to India, the Indian government had categorically urged the Tibetans not to participate in any political activities.

Much before the Bangladesh war, Gyalo Thondup and Andrug Gonpo Tashi (the founder of the Tibetan Volunteer Force in Tibet) had already resigned from their military posts.


Claude Arpi notes: It is said General S S Uban's plan was to use the Tibetan Force to capture Chittagong, but the SFF did not have the artillery and the airlift support to conduct such a type of mission.

However, they conducted smaller missions in the Chittagong Hill Tracks including the operation at the Kalurghat radio station, attacks on bridges and on the Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli River, 65 km upstream from Chittagong in Rangamati district.

They managed to stop the Pakistani 97 Independent Brigade and the 2nd Commando Battalion from retreating into Burma by cutting off their rear defences.

Establishment 22 lost 56 men and 190 were wounded in the 1971 operations.

The Indian government gave cash awards to 580 soldiers for their valourous conduct, but no bravery awards as the Tibetan soldiers were only 'The Phantoms of Chittagong', fighting a war which was not theirs under the guise of the Mukti Bahini.

I am indebted to Jamphel Shunu and Tenzin Lekshay for the translation of the interview.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby rohitvats » 15 Jan 2012 17:34

^^^A slight correction: Major General Uban had commanded 22 Mountain Regiment and hence, Establishment 22.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby rkhanna » 20 Jan 2012 19:50

Dont know if this has been posted before

Indian Polish SF ex (most likely mizoram)

http://www.network54.com/Forum/211833/t ... s+training

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Dmurphy » 24 Jan 2012 20:30

Got this pic of NSG kammandu at Raj Path from Indian Army Fans page on FB

Image

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby nachiket » 24 Jan 2012 23:52

^^I was under the impression only MARCOS were allowed to keep beards.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Austin » 25 Jan 2012 00:04

Nice picture , what is that rifle with a nice big scope MP-5 ?

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby atreya » 25 Jan 2012 00:16

Yes, what rifle is that? Doesn't look like an MP-5 to me. Is it a Sig SG 551?

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Mayuresh » 25 Jan 2012 00:21

nachiket wrote:^^I was under the impression only MARCOS were allowed to keep beards.


Everyone in the Navy can sport a beard with the Commanding Officer's permission. But I don't think any Navy personnel are deputed to the NSG, I always thought it was Army & Para Military units. Could this guy be an ex-Marcos personnel currently made to serve in NSG before going back to becoming a normal Navy sailor?

Read: http://indiannavy.nic.in/beard.htm for more information and a funny anecdote :)

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby nachiket » 25 Jan 2012 00:29

Austin wrote:Nice picture , what is that rifle with a nice big scope MP-5 ?

SIG SG-551. Another pic
Image

We saw a few pics of NSG using it during 26/11 as well.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby K_Rohit » 25 Jan 2012 10:27

Dmurphy wrote:Got this pic of NSG kammandu at Raj Path from Indian Army Fans page on FB

Image


Arent these Marcos? See the (in)famous scooter helmet in the hands of the guy following?

Would explain the beard?

Unless, of course, he is a sardar

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Rahul M » 25 Jan 2012 12:22

even non-sikh IN personnel can keep beards, with permission from superiors.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Indrajit » 25 Jan 2012 12:37

Those are'nt scooter helmets but 1st gen ballistic helmets,GSG-9 used them in the '80s.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Gaur » 25 Jan 2012 12:39

What about CAPFs (or Paramilitary forces)? Can they keep beards? If so, he may be from SRG.
BTW, two other pics from last year showing another bearded NSG commando.
Image
Image

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Singha » 25 Jan 2012 15:11

how is he able to tape together two extra mags outside the rifle without any visible tape?

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby rohitvats » 25 Jan 2012 16:20

The magazines come with complimentary sets of connectors to stack them together. The fact that the magazines are made of polymer helps.

See here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Caroline-chargeur-plein-p1000499b.jpg

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Manish_P » 26 Jan 2012 12:35

The flag flies high

An account of the Chachro Raid with some very good photos

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Gaur » 26 Jan 2012 13:33

^^
Thanks a lot mate. The pics are really nothing short of a treasure.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Gaur » 28 Jan 2012 18:02

Just remembered something. Last Dec, I came across a TA soldier from Parachute Regiment in full uniform. I was intrigued to see that he was wearing parawings on his right chest plate. So, I had a little chat with him and came to know that even TA go through static line jumps! This was news to me!

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Asit P » 29 Jan 2012 00:15

Gaur wrote:Just remembered something. Last Dec, I came across a TA soldier from Parachute Regiment in full uniform. I was intrigued to see that he was wearing parawings on his right chest plate. So, I had a little chat with him and came to know that even TA go through static line jumps! This was news to me!


Yups. Infact MS Dhoni was recently commissioned in the para regiment of the TA.

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Raja Bose » 29 Jan 2012 02:37

Gaur wrote:So, I had a little chat with him and came to know that even TA go through static line jumps! This was news to me!


ummm.....he can't be in para (TA) if he is not at least static line qualified, no? :)

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Raja Bose » 29 Jan 2012 02:47

The officer named MP Chaudhry in the Chachro raid photos - is he the same guy (name sounds familiar) who was later associated with NSG?

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby SagarAg » 29 Jan 2012 02:53

SPG with FN- P 90 8)
Image

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Surya » 29 Jan 2012 07:26

RB

Yes

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby saje » 30 Jan 2012 19:03

Love the way the P-90 snugly matches up into the body of the carrier. You would hardly notice it's there. So does it mean that the 'briefcase guns' are no longer carried? The SPG or somebody else used to carry it sometime back in the 80s & 90s.

Image

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby rohitvats » 30 Jan 2012 20:31

From here: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/26-11-it-took-5-hrs-to-decide-on-sending-nsg-find-aircraft/472337/0

Col. MP Chaudhary(retd.)

Sir, What ever Mr Dutta told the nation during WALK THE TALK with Indian Express was lies and lies. When I commanded the SPECIAL GROUP in 1982 out of which the NSG was born, we had one AN12 fully tanked up capable of taking 120 men (20tons) ready at Palam every time with pilots sleeping at the airport. The plane had all the bomb squad and other equipment like ladders etc. along with ammunition and explo and implosives, heavier sniper rifles of the duty group loaded. My duty group was ready within 20 minutes at Palam to take off any where. We had along with R@AW and IB worked on intelligence regarding all possible targets during Nam, CHOG(M) and Asian Games and practiced live on the same. To day I can ask as to why this top heavy NSG was sleeping till 26/11. All these years as a responsible Counter Terrorist Force, NSG should have collected detailed maps and other intelligence of all the targets in the country. Like us NSG should have practiced live on these targets.


Sir, NSG was raised in 1985 out of the SPECIAL GROUP, the Counter Terrorist Force I raised duing 1982/83, by transfering two of my companies lock stock and barrel and naming then 51 and 52 SAG which are the teeth arm of the NSG. The rot started from the day this transfer was done. There was no proper traibning, no further import of weapons and equipment which we had like the audio and vidio bugs, tapped explosives and implosives and special plastic ladders n equipment to break open the doors silently. We practiced firing with pistols at 20, MP-5 at 50 and sniper rifles at 1000 meters on targets head shots with officers and men standing next to the targets. The anti hostage drill were practiced with live hostages and terrorist in the room while we entered through glass doors (bollywood style) and front door blasting off by implosives to fully surprise the terrorists. How ever the NSG dealt with the operatrions like untrained infantry in built up area operations without seeking them.


Enough material to raise the BP of Surya-ullah for next couple of days!!!! :mrgreen:

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Surya » 30 Jan 2012 20:44

as my friend who served under MP says

the man is honest - what he says may hurt but it is the truth and its all directed at the idiots at the top.

If I say more I will sound like ASP :)

Only minor thing I might add - what MP says is true but credit for those days goes to him and another chap who was with him -

we will let his name slide for now :mrgreen:

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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby rohitvats » 30 Jan 2012 20:49

I guess his legacy in SG aka 22 SF carries on....

Aditya G
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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Aditya G » 17 Feb 2012 23:35

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Normally chatty, the pilots of the squadron are reticent about talking about their recent operations for reasons of security, But over a period of three days, your correspondent managed to piece together a typical scenario with the help of the squadron to try and understand what it actually does.

The 202 Squadron is based in a location that renders all the areas of the valley approximately equidistant in terms of flying time for their Dhruv helicopters.

A UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) is carrying out a surveillance sortie above the north western mountains bordering the valley. The fresh snowfall at the higher reaches tends to give away the movement of terrorists, since the only other presence in these inhospitable heights would be security forces.

The UAV pilot detects several sets of footprints in the snow with the high definition camera onboard and passes the data up the channel.

The record low number of infiltration attempts in the past year had made militants desperate.

The fact that the foot prints would have to be relatively fresh to remain visible even with the intermittent snowfall prevalent in these parts, increases their confidence of a possible interception. Meanwhile, the UAV circles over the location, following the tracking the footprints until they trail into the vegetation of a forest.

And so an operation is launched. A wide net is cast with patrols converging on the locations to surround it and set up a perimeter, without alerting the targets to their presence.

The pilots at 202 have already been informed of the possibility of being called up and begin preparing for the operation. While the engineering officers configure the aircraft for slithering, placing weapons and other special heliborne operations, the pilots assemble at the briefing room with maps and charts of the area to figure out their flight path and insertion points, and wait.

The detailed final tasking leaves no room for ambiguity and clearly lays out the role of the squadron. The terrorists remain in the forest, believing themselves safe in the shelter from the marginal weather.

The Special Forces unit has been on the job as well, familiarizing themselves with the terrain where they could establish contact on the basis of satellite imagery.

The call comes at five in the evening.

Four Dhruv helicopters are to deliver the troops and a Cheetah helicopter, fitted with a High Resolution Camera and Infra Red Surveillance System, will detect any thermal signatures in the cold environment. Three of the Dhruvs will insert commandos while the fourth will maintain standby position with a squad of commandos ready to deploy in case of an attempted escape. A UAV will provide overwatch.

The commandos board the aircraft, their gear double checked, and the pilots wave off the ground marshals and bring their aircraft to a hover.

The UAV sends in final confirmation of the layout: A slope which ends in a gradual gradient at the top, on the base of which is the forest, extending nearly two kilometers downhill. The forest is snowbound on all sides so any movement outside is likely to be picked up.

Flying close formation and nap-of-the-earth in coarse terrain, the Gideons use the folds of the ground to hide their fast moving task force from the terrorists. The autopilot and advanced onboard navigation system take the helicopters to the predetermined location. All this, while maintaining constant communication with the surveillance detachments monitoring the forest, and headquarters, beyond line-of-sight over the onboard VHF and HF radio.

Just before the last turn towards the valley where the intended Landing Zone (LZ) lay, the pilots switch to manual to hand-guide the aircraft, masking their flight to check out the LZ before deplaning the commandos. While the first helicopters overflies the forest and comes to a low hover over the gradual slope, the second tier moves closer towards the southern edge of the forest closer to the pine forest and slithers the troops down.

The fourth Dhruv circles at a distance, keeping the other three in sight and waits to deploy additional troops on the ground. The Cheetah and the drone keep the operation under watch.

The commandos cut off the militant group from the south and the gradual slope above. As soon as the first squad reaches the edge of the forest, they make contact and the fire-fight begins. This is when the fourth helicopter moves into position to drop the squad that to cut off the escape route of the terrorists.

For twenty minutes the commandos pound the location of the terrorists with automatics and grenades. The commandos carefully entered the forest, and closed in. The militants fire a rocket at the fourth helicopter, missing it but giving it a good shaking. But this also gives away the position of the launcher and the commandos silence it quickly.

Half an hour and the terrorists are neutralized. Time elapsed from first sighting by the UAV: One hour.

But the commandos find they’ve also taken casualties and pull out two hit by splinters and one critical, with a femoral artery rupture. While they mop up, a CASEVAC call has been sent out and an air ambulance configured Dhruv is on its way.

As it closes in on their location, the extraction of the commandos has already begun, while the Cheetah helicopter scans the area one last time for signs of life. The infantry moves in to clear the area and take custody of the dead terrorists.

After sunset, the pilots now fly with their Night Vision Goggles (NVG), operating under minimum light conditions which are further exacerbated by the shadows thrown by the mountains.

The commandos at the LZ mark it with Infra-Red markers and lights to guide the pilots to a safe landing point. The doctor arrives and loads the casualties on the aircraft, which can carry four stretchers and other life saving equipment.

He stabilizes the casualties giving in-flight first aid and treatment for trauma to deliver them safely into the care of waiting surgeons and doctors on ground.

Twelve terrorists are killed and a large cache of arms and ammunition recovered.

The Dhruvs eliminated the need for a long, grueling mountain walk by the security forces and reduced the reaction time from possibly a few days to a couple of hours, making intelligence inputs truly actionable. Meanwhile, the Special Forces and 202 Squadron continue to devise newer tactics for Special Heliborne Operations.


More at:

http://www.stratpost.com/army-day-speci ... ng-gideons

Surya
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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Surya » 18 Feb 2012 00:06

thanks Aditya

Singha
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Re: Discussion on Indian Special Forces

Postby Singha » 18 Feb 2012 07:50

I guess problems can be fixed if the VIP protection SRG part of NSG (presumably huge) is split out and retains the maneswar campus, while only 300 persons are kept in SAG and they mostly attach and train with the para cdo units and some shadowy new facility out of the media limelight. they should be centralized and be given a C130J to reach anywhere in india from palam or hindon.

we need a GSG9 for the tough calls, not a 10,000 person kala-billi army to guard the umpteen people who call themselves VIP here.

its a lot easier if control and funding for SAG-Nuova rests with Army rather than the home ministry fatkats.


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