Discussion on Indian Special Forces

[Anshul]

good article by tarmak007 on belgaum center ops

there is a pic of a dead fish being injected with something in a steel dish. perhaps its to simulate injecting a human.

Singha its a module on stitching a field wound with basic medical equipment after administering morphine.In a recent ambush in Daltonganj , Reds used a similar tactic to booby trap a Jaguar Jawan's dead body with a timer delayed bomb.The jawan's body survived the helicopter ride back to base and timer was discovered at the hospital during autopsy.Imagine if it had blown up with the chopper.

[Sanku]

Do you know what the right reaction to 26/11 type of attacks is? It is to further dis-empower NSG and make hurt their efficiency. God forbid what if they kill more terrorists?

India's elite anti-terror force-NSG pays for Centre's laxity, compromises in manpower and training

Since May 2012, the NSG has barely had any helicopter training due to unavailability of chopper. The sudden expansion of the NSG, with new hubs in Mumbai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Chennai has only amplified the problem.


India's famed Black Cats seem to have lost their bite in the four-and-a-half years since the Mumbai terror attacks. The National Security Guard (NSG), the nation's much vaunted counter-terror arm that so heroically brought the curtain down on the 26/11 outrage, stands compromised in the critical areas of manpower and training, a Mail Today investigation has found out.

Governmental neglect and apathy have so hobbled this sword arm of the security apparatus that the top hierarchy of the NSG has been moved to say as much to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), its controller and administrator. The NSG wants officers, and it wants helicopters to train its men. Both are in short supply.

Says one source, "The norm is that a helicopter be made available to us once in two months, if not more. But the frequency has dropped sharply." It is to the NSG's credit that it has improvised by erecting platforms atop tall structures at its hubs and bases to simulate helicopter operations. "But nothing can beat the original. Should a force like the NSG be forced in this way to seek alternatives and compromises?" asks an officer.

Highly disturbing'
Lt. Gen (Retd) P.C. Katoch, who served with the Army's elite Parachute Regiment has no kind words for the government. "The force is being compromised. Helicopters are a must for the NSG, especially when you talk of the operations they are to do," he says. "It is highly disturbing that the government has agreed to replace men from the Army with those from the paramilitary and state forces."

Former NSG chief Rajan K Medhekar says, "A force like the NSG should have it own fleet of helicopters or a dedicated squadron. Historically, the Special Action Group (SAG) which has always been an all-Army group, and Special Rangers Group (SRG) which is largely staffed by men from BSF and CRPF and is used for protection duties, have till date never been mixed the way this proposal plans to. It won't be good.

[Austin]

Disturbing indeed I hoped after 26/11 they would have learnt their lessons atleast partly ...I just hope citizens dont have to pay the price once again.

Link for the above article
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nati ... 66509.html

Just wondering why NSG cant have it own fleet of Choppers like ALH , instead of depending on BSF to loan it for training ..a force like NSG should have a dedicated fleet of 8-10 ALH chopper equipped with Thermal Camera/IR and other sensors plus 2-3 Aircraft for C-130J class or even An-32 should be fine both for training and operations.

[Singha]

>>The norm is that a helicopter be made available to us once in two months

even the local ops all over the world have civilian model helis with lights and FLIR, as it stands the SWAT we saw on TV this week are better equipped and supported than our national level CT force NSG. NSG has none of the heavy armour trucks seen on TV used to get in and out of fights.

what a shame. only hope is the next big attack takes out some of the ga***s in charge than hit the common people but that never seems to be on the cards...our enemies actually want the rulers to endure!

each hub needs atleast 3-4 helicopters with full kit. and if BSF are to be depended on to move around people (something which the hub idea was supposed to solve), then they need some C130 , not the luxurious boeing BBJ which our netas flit around in

[hnair]

There seem to be an ongoing (and rather public) clash between the men with red stripes on their collar vs the men wearing deep blue striped ones inside NSG. The men wearing deep blue stripes inside NSG, to put it mildly, sucks big time at this point and seem to need patsies to explain delays in levels of funding and preparedness. It was not always the case!

Remember the recent allegations by the blue-stripe wallahs of how an SAG trooper "divulged" info to a paki caller, when
- the info from the SAG trooper was way too low grade to merit anything more than a private rap on the knuckles, not certainly a press conference
- the paki caller could have been used to feed misinformation, if they were still tracking outgoing, but rather decided to be used against IA's personnel.

Sort of gave an idea about the cheap-ass stuff happening. the glorious media as usual, went chasing taxis and barking around as usual, instead of asking hard questions for all sides

These dedicated helos are not going to solve issues in a densely populated and spread-out country like India and the NSG cannot be expected to be omnipresent, even if up scaled. NSG intervenes in intel-intensive operations that need accurate local sit-rep, to reduce variables. Ambiguities of the type dealt with other SF should be at the minimum, due to collateral damage issues and that means local component must be super strong. So local armed police + IB will have to work the streets to secure any areas of action, much, much before the helos bring in intervention specialists that we jingos so like to drool over. In the local scene, there does not seem to be much action even in Tier 1 cities since 26/11, except in Mumbai. There we saw atleast a few Darth Vader helmets on parade

We got volvo buses for even Tier2 cities under JNNURM, but not all local forces are ready and the CCTN etc are still not fully linked up. Why not a JNNURM equivalent for urban police forces?

[dinesha]

X-post
Three Tri-service commands for Space, Cyber Warfare and Special Forces
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 115462.cms

The armed forces are now finalizing the plan for creation of three new tri-Service commands to handle space, cyber and special forces, which will be "critical" in deploying capabilities for conventional as well asymmetric warfare in a unified manner.

Contours of the Cyber, Aerospace and Special Operations Commands (SOC), after "a lot of spadework" over the past several months, are now being fine-tuned to ensure the "formal joint plan" can be presented to the government by end-July, say sources.

"The Aerospace Command, for instance, can be based at Hyderabad because of the presence of ISRO, DRDO there. Similarly, the SOC can come up at Delhi since the C-130J `Super Hercules' aircraft, which are customized for special operations, are based at Hindon airbase," said a source.

The chiefs of staff committee — headed by Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne and including General Bikram Singh and Admiral D K Joshi — as well as other forums of the top military brass have been mulling over the plan since last year, as was first reported by TOI.

Though the "urgent need" for Army, Navy and IAF to "synergise" their efforts in tackling challenges in the domains of space, cyber and special forces is well-acknowledged, especially with China furiously developing counter-space and cyber weapons, there has been no final decision on who will "mother" which command.

The experience of India's only theatre command at Andaman and Nicobar islands (ANC), with its commander-in-chief (a three-star officer like Lt-General, Vice-Admiral or Air Marshal) being rotated among the three Services, has not been successful. "Turf wars ensure the Services are not very keen to part with their assets for ANC," said the source.

At present, each Service gets to head the three unified commands — ANC, Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) — by rotation. "But it is felt one particular service should have stake in a specific command that can draw assets and manpower from all three but is steered by that Service," he said.

So, a view that has emerged is that while SFC, IDS and Cyber Command can continue to be "rotated", ANC should be headed by Navy, Aerospace Command by IAF, and SOC by Army. "This fits in with the domain expertise of each Service. The government will of course have to take the final call on the new commands," he said.

India has floundered for long in setting up effective and unified structures to deal with threats in space and cyberspace as well as in strengthening its clandestine and "unconventional" warfare capabilities.

The Aerospace Command, for instance, has been demanded by the armed forces in the past also but the government has kept it in cold storage despite China having an expansive military space programme that extends to advanced ASAT (anti-satellite) capabilities with "direct-ascent" missiles, hit-to-kill "kinetic" and directed-energy laser weapons.

Cyber-warfare, too, is a frontline military priority for China. Cyber-weapons can cripple an adversary's strategic networks and energy grids, banking and communication, and even sabotage a country's nuclear programme like Iran learnt after the Stuxnet software "worm" destroyed a thousand of its centrifuges a couple of years ago.

[srai]

Disturbing indeed I hoped after 26/11 they would have learnt their lessons atleast partly ...I just hope citizens dont have to pay the price once again.

Link for the above article
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nati ... 66509.html

Just wondering why NSG cant have it own fleet of Choppers like ALH , instead of depending on BSF to loan it for training ..a force like NSG should have a dedicated fleet of 8-10 ALH chopper equipped with Thermal Camera/IR and other sensors plus 2-3 Aircraft for C-130J class or even An-32 should be fine both for training and operations.

Good points!

IMO, NSG should have done the following by now (or by the next 5 years):

2 x Regional Hubs - Delhi and Hyderabad
Each Regional hub:

• 1 x Light-Medium Transport - An-32/C-295 to send troops and reinforcements to cities (plus IAF providing additional transport as required)
• 2,500 x NSG troops
• Training Facilities
• Major Operations and Command Facilities
• Reserve Equipments & Vehicles

6 x Metropolitan Hubs - Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Chennai and Bangalore
Each hub:

• 3 x ALH w/ sensors
• 250 NSG troops
• 10 x Armoured Transport (each able to carry 16 troops)
• 3 x Command Vehicles
• 2 x Bomb Disposable Vehicles
• Practice Facilities
• Command & Information Centre - w/ up-to-date 3D maps of potential terrorist targets
• Various other Equipments and Vehicles

[Singha]

imo the NSG needs to be disbanded from its current format and a clean sheet approach taken. it has become a bloated russian home ministry style militia that will soon be large enough to challenge the BSF!

use their training methods and facilities to train up the regional metro police forces to khanish SWAT levels..ie able to take on all but the highest level of threat matrix....not just weapons but mobility and small unit SF style running gunbattles in crowded streets of india need new thought and training...perhaps lower power guns and pistols are best for that etc etc. back that up with a huge data gathering effort to keep updating every bylane and every important building in a national security database.

keep only 300 NSG in delhi, but equipped with own dedicated C130 and helicopters for when the stuff gets really bad. they should ALL be from army SF units on deputation and apart from their speciaized CT/HRT training be fully kept qualified to used as a conventional army SF unit if war breaks out. ie a combo of GSG9, GIGN and the KSK pay them the best allowances and make their entry criteria tougher than cracking JEE AIR#1 kamandu uber-badge...only the most talented and mature "warriors" would get in after a few yrs of army or marcos unit exp.

[Raja Bose]

^^^Singha saar, lagta hai aap India mein naye aaye ho!

Its really sad how NSG has basically disintegrated from the top notch force it was in the 80s to a barely equipped force today. Even their equipment is not consistent unlike IA/MARCOS SF and a lot of it is vintage from their original procurement in the 80s mixed with some knee jerk purchased made after Akshardham and 26/11.

[Singha]

^ well the home ministry has been run by a succession of luminaries like patil sir, shinde sir, loh purush and many more...they have no idea what it takes to keep such a unit....they probably view just as a adjunct to the BSF which they also own.

defence ministry atleast has a better hold on the whole idea and generally our defmins have been better std than home mins though thats not saying a whole lot, given the low bar height here.

[member_23455]

As pointed out a few posts back in this thread, if you have Empire Builders running the show, it won't matter who heads Spec Ops Command, NSG etc. The faujis are not blameless - Para SF "expansion", the ridiculous MARCOS press conference midway through 26/11.

There was a good article by Saikat Datta about career SF guys quite a while back, and the way the system took care of them.

[Nikhil T]

We got volvo buses for even Tier2 cities under JNNURM, but not all local forces are ready and the CCTN etc are still not fully linked up. Why not a JNNURM equivalent for urban police forces?

There seems to be a Modernization of Police Scheme that got approved for 12th five year plan.

Rs 432 crore of this fund will, incidentally, go to seven cities to procure modern equipments like GPS/GIS for dial 100 system and patrol cars, CCTV systems, vehicle scanner, vehicle number plate identification system, cyber patrol and communication monitoring system and integrated GIS based automated vehicle tracking and management system.

States will, accordingly, be given Rs 12,378 crore till the year 2016-17 to modernize their police forces. Though the fund approved by the Cabinet does not appear to be substantial considering the enormity of task before the states to create better police infrastructure, the sanctioned amount is nearly 20 per cent more than what the states had got during 2007-12 plan period.

Sounds like 10,000 crore were spent in last 5 year plan. How much of that went to Police Housing societies vs equipment capex isn't clear.

Added later: There is a dedicated division in MHA for this scheme. As suspected, the Scheme attempts to do too much and not targeted towards Special Forces and CT ops.

Major items provided under the Scheme
i. construction of secure police stations,
ii. outposts,
iii. police lines,
iv. ensuring mobility,
v. security,
vi. provision of modern weaponry,
vii. surveillance,
viii. communication,
ix. forensic equipments,
x. upgradation of training infrastructure,
xi. police housing,
xii. computerisation, etc

[ramana]

Love that etc,

[Juggi G]

Dressed for Action : The striking variety of uniforms Special Forces don to protect India by Land, Sea and Air
Daily Mail

[prahaar]

In the Dailymail story: Never heard of SPY, probably it should be SPG. Is that a typo about the force that protects PMs, ex-PMs and their family?

[jayaaren]

Definitely the clean sheet approach. A complete overhaul is needed. Case in point, The 26/11 Mumbai ops. NSG functioned like any ordinary infantry unit. Their CQB skills seemed to have disappeared. You may fault the lack of NVGs, TIs, building plans and the whole lot of what was not there or available but i have not seen a single comment on why it took so many NSG personnel to take out a handul of terrorists. Skill sets clearly atrophied which may be due to either no training at all or inadequate training. Can't blame the guy on the ground. He is only as good as he is trained or equipped.

[rohitvats]

Definitely the clean sheet approach. A complete overhaul is needed. Case in point, The 26/11 Mumbai ops. NSG functioned like any ordinary infantry unit. Their CQB skills seemed to have disappeared. You may fault the lack of NVGs, TIs, building plans and the whole lot of what was not there or available but i have not seen a single comment on why it took so many NSG personnel to take out a handul of terrorists. Skill sets clearly atrophied which may be due to either no training at all or inadequate training. Can't blame the guy on the ground. He is only as good as he is trained or equipped.

....

[Surya]

Definitely the clean sheet approach. A complete overhaul is needed. Case in point, The 26/11 Mumbai ops. NSG functioned like any ordinary infantry unit. Their CQB skills seemed to have disappeared. You may fault the lack of NVGs, TIs, building plans and the whole lot of what was not there or available but i have not seen a single comment on why it took so many NSG personnel to take out a handul of terrorists. Skill sets clearly atrophied which may be due to either no training at all or inadequate training. Can't blame the guy on the ground. He is only as good as he is trained or equipped.

hmmm and this comment is based on your vast experience in dealing with 26\11 scenarios??

Could you point out a similar scenario elsewhere where super duper TFTA SF managed to do a similar job with lets say just a squad or two??

[sbangera]

jayaaren, I am guessing the comparison is based on the long list of factual documentaries like "Die Hard", "Last Action Hero", "Mission Impossible", "Commando", "Under Siege", etc

[member_23455]

jayaaren, I am guessing the comparison is based on the long list of factual documentaries like "Die Hard", "Last Action Hero", "Mission Impossible", "Commando", "Under Siege", etc

Since you brought up the references, this is the famous NSG trooper from Nariman House, whose egregious stupidity is really brought out in the YouTube videos that capture the same act.



Since dispassionate criticism on BR is usually followed by questions about one's breeding, nationality, mental balance I will now stand by for the usual incoming...from the usual suspects.

[member_23455]

>>Since dispassionate criticism on BR is usually followed by questions about one's breeding, nationality, mental balance I will now stand by for the usual incoming...from the usual suspects.

That's trolling - no need for it! Why invite comments of that type by calling out in this manner?

QED.

[member_20453]

jayaaren, I am guessing the comparison is based on the long list of factual documentaries like "Die Hard", "Last Action Hero", "Mission Impossible", "Commando", "Under Siege", etc

Since you brought up the references, this is the famous NSG trooper from Nariman House, whose egregious stupidity is really brought out in the YouTube videos that capture the same act.



Since dispassionate criticism on BR is usually followed by questions about one's breeding, nationality, mental balance I will now stand by for the usual incoming...from the usual suspects.

I don't see why this is a stupid move, clearly supressive fire, well intended to keep heads down, not an intention to kill. Moreover, the video shows the guy taking clean single shots and few multiple bursts, you should really see how the ISAF units in Afghan waste ammo, box after box of LMG ammo without ever hitting a damn thing.

Also, no one except the Nsg guy knows how the visbility was from his point of view, he was clearly firing into the building while trying to spot his target over what could have been obstruction. Its clear from the angle of his head that he trying to view over something.

Risky move but he kept firing while trying to view over, so to me a valid move.

[Singha]

the question imo is actually a bigger one.
was there any other way than to lay siege to the chabad house for a day+ after that dramatic insertion onto the roof?
would any form of missing equipment or training have helped achieve this?
why did they not storm in immediately..was it fear of explosives or fear that the hostages would be killed?
did they plan to move in asap but changed their mind on the roof due to some new input?

I am yet to read a proper analysis by ex-soldiers of the chahad house, trident and taj battles...if it exists , does not seem to be in public domain.

also does anyone know why the marcos operate in 3s when most HRT units like NSG use teams of 2s? I know IN has a fetish for building ships in 3s, but there must be a reason for this no?

[Viv S]

hmmm and this comment is based on your vast experience in dealing with 26\11 scenarios??

While I am not in complete agreement with RajitO, I do see his point. Clearing out the Taj and Oberoi was bound to take time but plan adopted at Nariman House i.e. the overnight siege of Nariman House, resembled an RR operation in J&K, more than it did a top flight CT unit.

Frankly, one can't even blame them - with a standing strength of 14,500 (if Wikipedia is to be believed), the NSG is bound to resemble an average SWAT team rather than the 90 man FBI-HRT or even the 200 strong GSG-9 that it 'models' itself after.

The solution is pretty straightforward as well - disperse the NSG into local units operating under individual state's home ministry, available on-call to the local police in rural, urban as well as metropolitan areas. Retain a truly elite core of 500 or so operators based in the NCR, half of whom are remain 'on alert', with a fueled C-130J available 24x7.

With the local CT unit in support, 250 men are more than enough to handle any contingency and for once they can realistically be trained and equipped to world-class standards.

[Surya]

Viv S

you maybe right but you are also talking in hindsight

No one before has encountered this on this scale - there was utter chaos.

Look at Boston - conducted with knowledge and preparation for 26\11



now I am not saying things had to improve

yes there are but I was disagreeing with the sweeping statement being made the earlier poster that the guys were all untrained buffoons (paraphrasing)


many of them were deputed from SF (original SF )

[Raja Bose]

jayaaren, I am guessing the comparison is based on the long list of factual documentaries like "Die Hard", "Last Action Hero", "Mission Impossible", "Commando", "Under Siege", etc

Since you brought up the references, this is the famous NSG trooper from Nariman House, whose egregious stupidity is really brought out in the YouTube videos that capture the same act.



Since dispassionate criticism on BR is usually followed by questions about one's breeding, nationality, mental balance I will now stand by for the usual incoming...from the usual suspects.

On top of that incompetence the guy is wearing a borrowed scooter helmet and totally lacks basic fitness - look at his chubby cheeks! I think NSG should invite trainers from local US police SWAT teams such as LAPD and Boston. In Boston they called off the search and cleverly lulled the hiding terrorist into a false sense of security before taking him down. NSG has much to learn from them.

[member_23455]

hmmm and this comment is based on your vast experience in dealing with 26\11 scenarios??

While I am not in complete agreement with RajitO, I do see his point. Clearing out the Taj and Oberoi was bound to take time but plan adopted at Nariman House i.e. the overnight siege of Nariman House, resembled an RR operation in J&K, more than it did a top flight CT unit.

Frankly, one can't even blame them - with a standing strength of 14,500 (if Wikipedia is to be believed), the NSG is bound to resemble an average SWAT team rather than the 90 man FBI-HRT or even the 200 strong GSG-9 that it 'models' itself after.

The solution is pretty straightforward as well - disperse the NSG into local units operating under individual state's home ministry, available on-call to the local police in rural, urban as well as metropolitan areas. Retain a truly elite core of 500 or so operators based in the NCR, half of whom are remain 'on alert', with a fueled C-130J available 24x7.

With the local CT unit in support, 250 men are more than enough to handle any contingency and for once they can realistically be trained and equipped to world-class standards.

Well this works if we have decided to throw in the towel with the NSG - its become a glorified SWAT unit so why not hasten its demise? And how is that too different from the mish-mash that persists currently with the NSG?

The RR point is well made, when a force is expanded to 5x time its planned strength, it will resemble and act like more conventional units - elites tend to be in the few hundreds, something in evidence from the times of the Thermopylae and the "300".

All the other distortions - short deputations, poor training, equipment etc. flow from this original sin.

All the rest of the stuff about 26/11 etc. being uniquely challenging etc. is all true but let's not use that to perpetuate an aura about the NSG that is simply not backed up by facts. People have a short memory, Akshardham was a cakewalk comparatively and the brilliant Brig. Raj Seethapathy botched it up and few lessons were learnt.

[Lalmohan]

bosebabau - it is clear that the nsg man's rear axle has failed in the heat, and his gun is not made of maraging steel. he is probably a UPA voter and bets on the IPL

[Austin]

The first thing they should stop doing at NSG is to stop dumping outside IPS people to become its chief , they should let people who have grown up in the NSG and let them lead it rather then an outsider who has no clue about NSG ethos much less its functioning and working take over and be its boss as GOI Nominee

I read the Chief of NSG during 26/11 J.K. Dutt was accused of watering down Purlia arms investigation during 90's and was doing govt bid on it.

Look at Dutta comical view on NSG chief appointment
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nsg-b ... ef/433705/

"The NSG chief should be from the police service. After the NSG finishes an operation, the message that goes to the world is that the elite commandos of India executed the job. But if it is an Army officer heading the NSG, it would look like the Army had to be called in for a Mumbai-like operation," said former NSG Director J K Dutt in New Delhi.

[jayaaren]

Surya,

As i said in the post, we are not against the guy on the ground trying to do a difficult job. But hey if we need him to do a good job, then we need to prepare him for it. I might not be a tactical ops specialist but the writing is there on the wall for all to see. Tactics, training and equipment were exposed and we need to accept this understand why and correct it to move ahead. If nomex suits, balaclavas and heckler & koch are all that are required then every country in the world would have a CT capability. Point is we need to train hard with qualitative mission oriented tactics and equipment if we are to prevail over the loonies from across the border. You might also want to refer to the various reviews of the tactics of the police and NSG widely available.

[jayaaren]

Sbangera,

I would think you had better choice. And if you are basing your views on what's on TV, try Seal Team 6, The Raid that Killed Bin Laden or Act of Valor or Tears of the Sun

[member_23455]

Surya,

I might not be a tactical ops specialist but the writing is there on the wall for all to see.

Neither are any of the other posters, especially the one equating tactical employment of a squad fire support weapon in open terrain with a personal CQB weapon being used in MOUT (because Nariman House certainly didn't feel like Hostage Rescue)

As i said in the post, we are not against the guy on the ground trying to do a difficult job. But hey if we need him to do a good job, then we need to prepare him for it.

The day this forum introduces a signature functionality I am going to put that quote there - much needed on BR.

The irony is that even at Nariman House there were a few using their tactical savvy on that day like this NSG trooper who has discarded his 5.56mm Sig 550/551 and has switched to the penetrating and killing power of the good old 7.62 mm SLR (borrowed from one of the Mumbai police guys in all probability).



Anyone with a passing acquaintance with Quality Management principles can see that between the MP-5 wielding Rajnikanth and this chap there is a wide inconsistency in the "product." When you have 10,000+ "operators", best of luck training them to the same elite standard, regardless of budgets.

[Surya]

Surya,

As i said in the post, we are not against the guy on the ground trying to do a difficult job. But hey if we need him to do a good job, then we need to prepare him for it. I might not be a tactical ops specialist but the writing is there on the wall for all to see. Tactics, training and equipment were exposed and we need to accept this understand why and correct it to move ahead. If nomex suits, balaclavas and heckler & koch are all that are required then every country in the world would have a CT capability. Point is we need to train hard with qualitative mission oriented tactics and equipment if we are to prevail over the loonies from across the border. You might also want to refer to the various reviews of the tactics of the police and NSG widely available.

again I do not dispute that we have not kept it to the level we should (hell MP Chowdhury says it so who am I to question it)

but you made a wholesale blanket statement and linked to the time taken to clear it.

RajitO at least narrowed his criticism to the nariman house ops.

what benchmark do we have for this type of ops??

Sayaret matkal faced a few men in one 4 storey building and did worse?


Thousands of SWAT teams, FBI HRT, state troopers, ATF struggled (failed) to locate one wounded (probably) miserable teen for a day in one suburb

Considering the chaos of the Indian environment, the enormity of the task (hundreds of rooms , 10s of floors), number of hostages - I doubt we could do much better at that time (when this was all new).

[member_23455]

RajitO at least narrowed his criticism to the nariman house ops.

what benchmark do we have for this type of ops??

Sayaret matkal faced a few men in one 4 storey building and did worse?

Thousands of SWAT teams, FBI HRT, state troopers, ATF struggled (failed) to locate one wounded (probably) miserable teen for a day in one suburb

Considering the chaos of the Indian environment, the enormity of the task (hundreds of rooms , 10s of floors), number of hostages - I doubt we could do much better at that time (when this was all new).

Thanks for offering me an easy way out but I'm not taking it.

I was constrained to put up the Nariman House example to bring out starkly the depths to which the NSG has deteriorated, a downward slide already evident from Akshardham. Since detailed footage of Trident and Taj will not be publicly available (nor should it be), one cannot analyze how those ops went.

Now, thanks to political tokenism and empire builders at the NSG, we have an even more compromised force with its ridiculous hub and spoke structure, post 26-11. If that is a blanket statement, well so be it.

It is also apples vs. oranges to talk about Boston etc. And 26-11 by no means has the monopoly on high degree of difficulty. Some Alfa Group groupie will bring up Beslan or Dubrovka Theatre (Moscow) - the latter in particular illustrating the small margins between spectacular success and disaster in SF ops.

So why cut the NSG any slack?

[Surya]

I am not cutting NSG the org any slack but I also do not see the NSG as a monolith unit as you seem to see.

The main sword arm fo the NSG is manned by Army and many are SF deputed to it. Those SF guys many from the original SF units (not the new high speed transformed ones) - no way I would agree that they lacked anything other than access to the sort of gizmos and facilties the TFTA groups have.

It is also apples vs. oranges to talk about Boston etc. And 26-11 by no means has the monopoly on high degree of difficulty. Some Alfa Group groupie will bring up Beslan or Dubrovka Theatre (Moscow) - the latter in particular illustrating the small margins between spectacular success and disaster in SF ops.

now you are taking the easy way out if everything is apples and orange then point me an efficient one in a crowded city, multi building , multi terrorist, multi hostage, with all movements being monitored scenario.

Likewise lots of people criticize the alpha assautls too and in the Beslan one , one can make similar comments to the one you made. But I don't - they all tried to do their best in the circumstances and all are professionals who try to learn from it and prepare for the next unforeseen problem

the latter in particular illustrating the small margins between spectacular success and disaster in SF ops.

precisely - so why does this not apply to the Mumbai ops?? or does this only apply to TFTA operators?

[vaibhav.n]

@RajitO

While I am not in the least a fan of the NSG, the Mumbai attacks were one of a kind and have not been seen anywhere bar Pak/Afghanistan for their sheer scale and ingenuity.

You clearly lack the appreciation for what the unit went through, given the difficult circumstances yet fan the ignorance. The core group of the NSG is formed by the 51 and 52 SAG which number at about 950 Troopers into 4 Squadrons. They form the primary units to undertake final assaults onto their respective objectives. Of those while one looks after specifically at Counter-Hijack, the other only looks to develop Counter-Terror skillsets.

The objective to create and an increase in number for the Regional Centers was completely different, I believe those were well documented and be know to you very well. These are without fiddling around with the existing set-up.

BTW, The NSG ended up clearing close to 1400 rooms* through the entire duration. This in itself is a mind numbing number, none of those TFTA CT Units would have been able to do in the given time frame given their numbers. To give you an example: The SAS maintains a Squadron on CT alert for crisis response which numbers 80 Man strong headed by the Squadron Major. How do you think they would have fared plus given that only 350 cops across the Scotland Yard are firearms authorized.

The number of active shooters in FBI HRT, GIGN or GSG9 does not go beyond 100 in either case. Try clearing and doing Render Safe Procedures (RSP) with 100 men for 1400 rooms+ !!



*
Taj Mahal Palace-225
Taj Towers – 340
Oberoi-290
Trident-555
Total-1410

[member_23455]

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

A discussion on the NSG brings instant comebacks of "How would the TFTA fared?" - the standard BR strawman gambit.

I am not cutting NSG the org any slack but I also do not see the NSG as a monolith unit as you seem to see.

Neither do I, which is why the 2 pictures of the operators exhibiting very different competencies. But if you read that last post of mine the fact that it is not a monolith (of the good kind) is the problem.

While I am not in the least a fan of the NSG, the Mumbai attacks were one of a kind and have not been seen anywhere bar Pak/Afghanistan for their sheer scale and ingenuity.

Gee...I wonder what my TFTA teachers taught me the meaning of that word in English was

All the rest of the stuff about 26/11 etc. being uniquely challenging etc. is all true

...and since I am fanning ignorance no point going any further.

We can keep living in our bubbles till the next one blows up. I do hope for all your sakes it's another 26-11 so you can trot out all the mitigating factors again, and not an Akshardham, which like in this thread itself, you will have a tough time speaking a word on.

[vaibhav.n]

^^^
I agree, given the fact that you seem to have drawn inferences and conclusions based on liberties of cinematic vanity. You do justice to your 'Thermopylae Theory'.

[member_23455]

^^^
I agree, given the fact that you seem to have drawn inferences and conclusions based on liberties of cinematic vanity. You do justice to your 'Thermopylae Theory'.

Hah! a drive by one line snark. Genius, did you see who brought up the cinematic references, to what that was a response.

Basic reading comprehension...get some!

[jayaaren]

Surya,

again I do not dispute that we have not kept it to the level we should (hell MP Chowdhury says it so who am I to question it)

but you made a wholesale blanket statement and linked to the time taken to clear it.

RajitO at least narrowed his criticism to the nariman house ops.

what benchmark do we have for this type of ops??

Sayaret matkal faced a few men in one 4 storey building and did worse?


Thousands of SWAT teams, FBI HRT, state troopers, ATF struggled (failed) to locate one wounded (probably) miserable teen for a day in one suburb

Considering the chaos of the Indian environment, the enormity of the task (hundreds of rooms , 10s of floors), number of hostages - I doubt we could do much better at that time (when this was all new).[/quote]


If we go by benchmarking, then lets benchmark everything, right from rectruitment, selection, training, tactics, equipment, weapons etc. Granted that 26/11 was a first timer, but what we lacked clearly impacted what we should have done. All tactics employed atleast those visible were based on a siege op and not a clearance op.
As for Sayeret Matkal, they have been known for their spectacular up as well as downs. Now for the Boston Marathon bombings. I concurr that Boston was in sea of nomex black & blue and they could not find the guy. But there is a world of difference in location someone across a vast geographical area and locating people in a given building. Also you cannot compare SWAT with HRT or for that matter State Troopers and ATF with SWAT. SWAT is tactical resolution based on set piece situations while HRT is for tactical resolution across a whole range of situations. Plus there is a difference in SWAT and HRT tactics and training.
We have had to fight terrorism since 1987 and we are continually being found wanting. No country has suffered and bled and lost men, women and children as we have and yet we say - we did with what we had. I'm sorry but i cannot bear to see any more of my countrymen being cannon fodder for those cross border loonies. I have lost friends to them and it is time we faced the music. Shape up or ship out.
National Security is no joke and certainly cannot be carried out on peanuts. The requirement for dedicated lift assets on the same alert string as the CT assets was indentified ages ago by the mistakes the Americans made. I cannot believe we have not learnt a thing since. Same goes for tactics, each new incident teaches us new things and if we cannot learn it is time we got out of this business. Elite is elite not only in bearing but also in manpower, equipment, training, equipment etc. CT is not SWAT and 26/11 went bad for us because we failed to learn and our people died. If we continue to be in the denial mode we are going to lose a lot more of us